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CIL EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/31/2001

Date: 3/27/2002 NAME FAILURE P/N MODE & OTY CRIT CAUSES FAILURE EFFECT RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE 330FM06A COMMON MULTIPLE 2/2 END ITEM: External A. Design -The potable water coupling has three potential external leakage paths. One path CONNECTOR, ITEM leakage, Water leakage is blocked by a static face type O-seal. A second path is blocked by a static 330 coupled, water to ambient. radial O-seal. The third path is blocked by two sliding radial O-seals. The Osupply. SV778872-26 seal design configuration and rigidness of assembly provide squeeze under all loading conditions of the elastomeric seals. The sliding O-seals slide on (1) GFE INTERFACE: Depletion of Nituff coated surfaces, minimizing the potential for seal damage. Failure, EMU water coupling 0seal bypass reservoir. The airlock fill B. Test leakage. Component Acceptance: valve would be closed, Air-Lock, Inc. ATP 9619-08 requires that with the potable water at 22.5 + .5preventing the psig, external leakage shall not exceed .15 cc/hr. leakage of vehicle water. An external leakage test is performed per SEMU-60-015 with the potable water line mated. The water line is pressurized with water to 30-35 psiq and observed for 5 minutes minimum. No visible leakage from the water line or mated MISSION: Terminate EVA. connector is allowed. Loss of use of one EMU. Certification: Certified for a useful life of 15 years. CREW/VEHICLE: None. C. Inspection -The O-seals and the metallic sealing components are 100% inspected by Air-Lock, Inc. for dimensional and surface finish requirements. TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Minutes. D. Failure History -None. TIME AVAILABLE: E. Ground Turnaround -N/A Tested for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001, Water Servicing, Leakage and Gas TIME REQUIRED: Removal. FEMU-R-001 Para 8.2 EMU Preflight KSC Checkout for EET processing. N/A F. Operational Use -REDUNDANCY Crew Response -SCREENS: Pre/PostEVA: Troubleshoot problem, if no success terminate EVA operations. Special Training - Standard training covers this failure mode. A-N/A B-N/A Operational Considerations - EVA checklist procedures verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EVA. Flight rules define go/no go

criteria related to EMU thermal control.

C-N/A

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-330 COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

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