

NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
JUMPER HARNESS, ITEM 391 ----- SV821755-1 (1)	2/1RB	391FM02 Electrical open, warning tone or status tone line.  Cable chafing against connector shell or shield. Improper connector strain relief. Faulty connection between the connector and the lead wires, conductor severed, contact resistance.	END ITEM: Loss of signal in warning tone or status tone line.  GFE INTERFACE: No audible tones when activated by CWS.  MISSION: Crewman would not be alerted to subsequent failures and could not properly respond with corrective action.  CREW/VEHICLE: None for single failure. Possible loss of crewman with loss of CCC, oxygen, or low vent flow.	A. Design - Open circuits are minimized by the following: Each connector/adaptor ring interface is locked in place by a mechanical lock to prevent rotation. #24 AWG Teflon insulated wires and connector provide electrical conduction and insulation properties. Connector pins are operated at 56.7% of derated temperature and wire at less than 1% of derated current The woven Halar sheath is assembled over the internal cables to provide protection from abrasion and impact. The P3 connector backshell housing has internal edges blended smooth to prevent cable chafing. Strain relief is provided by the combination of convolute tubing, metal EMI braid, and 0.5" cable length. The braided items are secured by a band strap at each connector/cable interface. The convolute tubing is threaded into the connectors. Wire crimping is performed per SVHS4909 (based on MSFC Spec-Q-  B. Test - Component Acceptance Test - The 391 harness is subjected to acceptance testing per AT-E-391 prior to final acceptance to ensure there are no workmanship problems that could cause an open or short circuit. Each connector/harness interface is subjected to a 9-lb. test. The insulation resistance between each conductor and the ground circuit is measured during this test to ensure there are not intermittent shorts and to verify the integrity of the harness strain relief. AC continuity test is performed to measure the resistance of each circuit to ensure there are no open circuits or high resistance paths. The insulation resistance and dielectric strength between each conductor and the shield ground is measured to ensure there are no shorts.  PDA Test- The warning tone and status tone lines are checked during DCM PDA testing per SEMU-60-015 para. 4.0 (Electrical Testing).  Certification Test- Certified for a useful life of 15 years (ref. EMU1-13-046).  C. Inspection - To ensure that there are no workmanship problems which could cause an open circuit in the harness conductors, the following inspections are made: Contact crimp samples are made prior to the start of crimping and at the conclusion of crimping and pull tested to ensure the crimp tooling is operating properly. All crimp terminations are inspected for defects. Harness cable conductors are visually inspected prior to assembly to ensure there are no defects which could cause an open due to workmanship. Electrical bond test performed to verify ground path through various points on the harness. In- process and final electrical checkout of the harness (conductor, continuity, dielectric strength, and insulation resistance tests) are performed to ensure there are not open/short circuits.  D. Failure History - None.  E. Ground Turnaround - Tested per FEMU-R-001. Tones test.
			TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Minutes.	
			TIME AVAILABLE: Minutes.	
			TIME REQUIRED: Seconds.	
			REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS	

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F. Operational Use -

Crew Response- Pre-EVA: Troubleshoot. If no success, consider third EMU available. Otherwise, EMU go for EVA. Rely on visual monitoring of displayed messages. EVA: If detected during airlock depress, continue EVA. Rely on visual monitoring of displayed messages.

Training- Standard EMU training covers this failure mode.

Operational Considerations -

Flight rule A15.1.2-2 of "Space Shuttle Operational Flight Rules", NSTS-128 defines go/no go criteria related to EMU CWS. Define EMU as lost if crew on ground determine insufficient CWS data is available. Generic EVA Checklist 48023, procedures Section 3 (EMU Checkout) and 4 (EVA prep) verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EVA. EMU CWS provides real time status. Real Time Data System allows ground monitoring of EMU systems.

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT  
SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW  
FOR THE  
I-391 JUMPER POWER HARNESS  
CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)  
EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

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