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EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST 5/30/2002 SUPERSEDES 12/31/2001

Date: 6/5/2002 NAME FAILURE P/N MODE & CRIT CAUSES OTY FAILURE EFFECT RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE 391FM17 JUMPER HARNESS, 2/1R Electrical END ITEM: A. Design open in fan Loss of Open circuits in the item 391 harness are minimized by the following: Each switch line. continuity to connector/adapter ring interface is locked in place to prevent rotation by SV821755-1 Fan (123) mechanical lock. #22 AWG Teflon insulated wires and connector provide elect conduction and insulation properties. Connector pins are operating at 56. electronics. (1) derated temperature and wire at 4.4% of derated current. The woven Halar sh Cable chafing against is assembled over the internal cables to provide protection from abrasion & connector GFE INTERFACE: impact. The P3 connector backshell housing has internal edges blended smoot shell or Loss of power prevent cable chafing. Strain relief is provided by the combination of shield. to fan. Loss convolute tubing, metal EMI braid, and 0.5" extra cable length. The braided of vent flow. items are secured by a band strap at each connector/cable interface. The Improper convolute tubing is threaded into the connectors. Wire crimping is performe connector strain relief. MISSION: SVHS4909 (based on MSFC Spec-0-1A). Terminate EVA. Faultv connection B. Test hetween Component Acceptance Test connector and CREW/VEHICLE: The 391 harness is subjected to acceptance testing per AT-E-391 prior to fi lead wires, None for acceptance to ensure there are no workmanship problems that could cause an conductor single or short circuit. Each connector/harness interface is subjected to a 9-lb. failure. severed, test. The insulation resistance between each conductor and the ground circ contact Possible crew is measured during this test to ensure there are no intermittent shorts and resistance. loss with loss verify the integrity of the harness strain relief. A continuity test is of SOP. performed to measure the resistance of each circuit to ensure there are no circuits or high resistance paths. The insulation resistance and dielectric TIME TO EFFECT strength between each conductor and the shield ground is measured to ensure /ACTIONS: there are no shorts. Seconds. If EVA, open PDA Test purge valve to The fan switch line is checked during DCM PDA testing per SEMU-60-015 para. activate the (Electrical Testing). SOP and return to vehicle. Certification Test -Certified for a useful life of 15 years (ref. EMU1-13-046). TTMF AVAILABLE: C. Inspection -Minutes. To ensure that there are no workmanship problems which could cause an open circuit in the harness conductors, the following inspections are made: Cont crimp samples are made prior to start of crimping and at the conclusion of TIME REOUIRED: crimping and pull tested to ensure the crimp tooling is operating properly. Seconds. crimp terminations are inspected for defects. Harness cables and conductor visually inspected prior to assembly to ensure there are no defects which (cause an open due to workmanship. Electrical bond test is performed to ver REDUNDANCY ground path through various points on the harness. In-process and final SCREENS: electrical checkout of the harness (conductor continuity, dielectric streng A-PASS and insulation resistance tests) are performed to ensure there are no open, B-PASS circuits.

> D. Failure History -None.

C-PASS

E. Ground Turnaround -Tested per FEMU-R-001, Water Servicing, Leakage and Gas Removal. FEMU-R-0(Para. 8.2, EMU Pre-flight KSC Checkout for EET processing.

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		391FM17		

F. Operational Use -

Crew Response -

PreEVA/PostEVA: Trouble shoot problem. Consider third EMU if available. If success, EMU go for prep without fan and SCU standby. EVA: When loss of far occurs, open helmet purge valve and deactivate EMU power. Terminate EVA.

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Training - Standard training covers this failure mode.

Operational Considerations -

Flight rule A15.1.2-2 of "Space Shuttle Operational Flight Rules", NSTS-128 defines go/no go criteria related to EMU ventilation flow. Generic EVA Checklist, JSC-48023, procedures Section 3 (EMU Checkout) and 4 (EVA prep) verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EVA. Reatime Data System allows ground monitoring of EMU systems.

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-391 JUMPER POWER HARNESS

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: Approved by: Approved by: NASA - SSM SSM

Jacum 6/04/02
NASA - Crew

John 6/3/02
NASA - Program Manager