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EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST			5/30/200 12/31/20	2 SUPERSEDES 01	Page 1 Date: 6/5/2002
NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
JUMPER HARNESS, ITEM 392 	2/2	Cable chafing against connector shell or shield. Improper connector	open in status Loss of Open lines. continuity in inte status line. Tefl insu Cable chafing against GFE INTERFACE: than connector Loss of inte shell or ability to prov shield. display EMU extr Improper transducer conn	A. Design - Open circuits are minimized by the following: Each interface is locked in place to prevent rotation by Teflon insulated wires and connector provide electrinsulation properties to prevent wire breakage and Connector pins are operating at 56.7% of derated te than 1% of derated current. The woven Halar sheath internal cables to provide protection from abrasion provided by the combination of convolute tubing, mextra cable length. The braided items are secured be connector/cable interface. The convolute tubing is wire crimping is performed per SVHS4909 (based on Mexico Connection (Content of Content of	a mechanical lock. #24 ical conduction and to help prevent shorting mperature and wire at le is assembled over the and impact. Strain reli etal EMI braid, and 0.! y a band strap at each threaded into the connec
		Faulty connection between the connector and the lead wires, conductor severed, contact resistance.	perform suit leak check. Inability to monitor the operational integrity of the EMU. MISSION: Loss of use of one EMU. Suit leak check cannot be	B. Test - Component Acceptance Test - The 392 harness is subjected to acceptance are AT-E-392 prior to final acceptance to ensure there are no workman problems that could cause an open or short circuit. Each connector/hainterface is subjected to a 9-lb. pull test. The insulation resistance ach conductor and the ground circuit is measured during this test to there are no intermittent shorts and to verify the integrity of the strain relief. A continuity test is performed to measure the resistancircuit to ensure there are no open circuits or high resistance paths. The insulation resistance and dielectric strength between each conductor and the ships measured to ensure there are no shorts.	ere are no workmanship Each connector/harness nsulation resistance bet uring this test to ensui integrity of the harness asure the resistance of e paths. The insulation
			performed. CREW/VEHICLE: None. TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Minutes. TIME AVAILABLE: Minutes.	PDA Test - The status lines are checked during DCM PDA testing (Electrical Testing). Certification Test - Certified for a useful life of 15 years (ref. EMUI- C. Inspection - To ensure that there are no workmanship problems wh circuit in the harness conductors, the following in crimp samples are made prior to start of crimping a crimping and pull tested to ensure the crimp toolin crimp terminations are inspected for defects. Harne visually inspected prior to assembly to ensure there	Remanship problems which could cause an open rs, the following inspections are made: Cont start of crimping and at the conclusion of are the crimp tooling is operating properly of for defects. Harness cables and conductors embly to ensure there are no defects which consider the consure there are no defects which consider the consure there are no defects which consumers the consumer that the consumer the consumer that the consumer that the consumer can be consumer can

TIME REQUIRED: Minutes.

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A

D. Failure History - None.

circuits.

E. Ground Turnaround Tested per FEMU-R-001, Pre-Flight V1103 Performance Data and Item 113 Regul
Check. FEMU-R-001, para. 8.2, EMU Pre-flight KSC Checkout for EET processir

cause an open due to workmanship. Electrical bond test is performed to ver ground path through various points on the harness. In-process and final

electrical checkout of the harness (conductor continuity, dielectric streng

and insulation resistance tests) are performed to ensure there are no open,

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NAME FAILURE
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392FM12

F. Operational Use -

Crew Response -PreEVA: When detected during periodic status check, trouble problem using RTDS, consider third EMU if available. Otherwise, EMU is no/g EVA. EVA: When detected during periodic status check, troubleshoot using RT Terminate EVA.

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Training - Standard training covers this failure mode.

Operational Considerations -

Flight rule Al5.1.2-2 of "Space Shuttle Operational Flight Rules", NSTS-126 defines go/no go criteria related to EMU CWS. Generic EVA Checklist, JSC-4 procedures Section 3 (EMU Checkout) and 4 (EVA prep) verify hardware integrand systems operational status prior to EVA. Real Time Data System allows ground monitoring of EMU systems.

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-392 JUMPER SIGNAL HARNESS

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: AS - Project Engineering

Approved by: MRSA - SSA/SSM NASA - SSA/SSM