NAME FAILURE P/N MODE & MODE	Page 1 Date: 6/5/2002
MODE & TYTY MODE & CAUSES FAILURE EFFECT RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE AIOFMOIA AIOFMOIA A. Design - The coupled oxygen supply fitting has three potential external leak coupled, whicle/ ourgen. A. Design - The coupled oxygen supply fitting has three potential external leak and coupled, whicle/ coupled, whicle/ ourgen. A. Design - The coupled oxygen supply fitting has three potential external leak a radial O-seal which slides axially along a sealing surfar supply to supply to s	
YTY CRIT CAUSES FAILURE EFFECT RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE Anomeno Multiple 2/2 External leakage, coupled, vehicle/ 0 END ITEM: coupled, vehicle/ 0 A. Design - The coupled oxygen supply fitting has three potential external leak One path is blocked by a single static radial 0-seal. The second lu coupled, vehicle/ 0 V778872-24 Failure, coupling 0- seal bypass defective The O-ring seal design configurations, dimensions and rigidness of a provide squeeze under all loading conditions. 1) Failure, coupling 0- seal bypass defective O2 bottles if the leakage is dynatube hose cr hose The third leakage path is by a dynatube fitting joint at the flex h interfacing Mynatube hose cr hose fitting GFE INTERFACE: leakage. B. Test - consention oxygen istation oxygen. MISSION: Unable to use one EWD during IV activity if leakage is croneet Mission: The Mission: Unable to use one EWD during IV activity if leakage is croneet No visible leakage is allowed. Terminate BVA MISSION: CREW/VEHICLE: None. The Mission congenetic inclust leakage tests are performed per EMU1-21-022 after the Oxygen Compatibility Cycle Test, the multiple connector (v attached) is mated and pressurized with oxygen to 850-950 psia. Lei not exceed 30 soc/initute.	
tommon Multiple 2/2 External END ITEM: A. Design - tomneotor, Item leakage, Leakage of The coupled oxygen supply fitting has three potential external leak	
onnector, Item leakage, coupled, vyrgen. Leakage of coupled, vyrgen. The coupled oxygen supply fitting has three potential external leak. One path is blocked by a single static radial 0-seal. The second h ontains a radial 0-seal which slides axially along a sealing surfac by the umbilical common connector plunger coupling and uncoupling. 1) Failure, coupling 0- seal bypas defective Onable to seal bypas defective The 0-ring seal design configurations, dimensions and rigidness of provide squeeze under all loading conditions. 1 Failure, coupling 0- seal bypas The leakage is conserve The third leakage path is by a dynatube fitting joint at the flex h interfacing dynatube hose or hose fitting GFE INTERFACE: leakage. B. Test - consumption of vehicle/ station oxygen. B. Test - consumption of vehicle/ station oxygen. IPT: An external leakage test is performed at HSWL (after 02 Compatibility Test) with the oxygen line coupled. No visible leakage is allowed. IPT: An external leakage test is performed at HSWL (after 02 Compatibility Test) with the oxygen line coupled. No visible leakage is allowed. IPX: Leakage is fitting IPX: Leakage is station oxygen. IPX: Leakage is one EWU during IV activity if Leakage is statched) is mated and pressurized with oxygen to 850-950 psia. Lea not exceed 30 soc/minute.	
After the Oxygen Compatibility Cycle Test, the multiple connector (attached) is mated and pressurized with oxygen to 850-950 psia. Les not exceed 30 scc/minute.ACTIONS: ACTIONS: Seconds.not exceed 30 scc/minute.TIME AVAILABLE: N/ACertification: Certified for a useful life of 15 years.TIME AVAILABLE: N/AC. Inspection - Air-Lock, Inc. visually inspects the umbilical half at final inspect source inspection visually inspects the umbilical half at final inspect source inspection visually inspects the umbilical half at final inspect source inspection visually inspects the umbilical half at final inspect SCREENS: SCU: A-N/AANA B-N/A C-N/AD. Failure History - HEMU-410-D001 99/12/90 - Excessive leakage of SCU-side MWC 02 port cracks in the Teflon impregnated hardcoat at the 0-ring sealing sur; C-N/AC-N/Awas initially masked by Braycote lubrication which effectively provide seal at the 02 port 0-rings until the Braycote deteriorated over thi Task LSS-139, the 02 housing material was changed to Nitronic 60 to the hardcoat in new builds. Ref EC 163402-454-001.	d leakage path rface provided g. of assembly x hose to IEU 2 micro-inch N2), the maxim ility Cycle ed. 022. Before a r (with 02 lin Leakage must 015. Before a r (with 02 lin Leakage must 015. Before a r (with 02 lin Leakage must ort due to surface. Leaka rovided a flui time. Per Cal

CIL EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST			5/30/200 12/31/20	2 SUPERSEDES Page 2 01 Date: 6/5/2002	_
NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	-
		410FM01A			-
				System Functional check.	
				F. Operational Use - Crew Response - Pre/Post-EVA: Use airlock panel 02 valve to isolate leak betwee 02 recharge operations.	n
				Special Training - Standard EMU training covers this failure mode.	

Operational Considerations -Generic EVA Checklist, JSC-48023, procedures Section 3 (EMU Checkout) and 4 (EVA prep) verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EVA. Real Time Data System allows ground monitoring of EMU systems. EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW

FOR THE

I-410 SCU COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR

CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: HS - Project Engineering

Approved by: <u>RMR In staloz</u> NASA - SSA/SSM

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6/04/02 NASA - Crew

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