

FMEA NO. <u>4.4.4.2</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/1R</u>		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>PTU</u> DWG NO. <u>2294822-502.503.504</u> SHEET <u>1</u> OF <u>7</u>
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
Pan or tilt limit switch fails in a shorted mode. (1) Mercury relay fails shorted.	Pan or tilt movement will be inhibited in CW or CWN direction of stepper motor. Worst Case: Loss of elbow PTU control prevents stowing the RMS.	<p><u>DESIGN FEATURES</u></p> <p>The heritage for the PTU mechanisms is the designs used successfully on the Lunar Rover equipment on the Apollo 15, 16, and 17 missions.</p> <p>All support bearings in the azimuth and elevation axes are conservatively designed when compared to the launch load environment.</p> <p>The design was prepared by a detailed finite element analysis of the structure, taking into account the derating for the fatigue cycles represented by 100 missions. A series of developmental tests were conducted to verify the analytical models for the structure and drive train analyses. Reviews were held at preliminary design and critical design review levels to evaluate the designs and test data.</p> <p>The PTU has been used on 24 missions at four bulkhead locations and at the RMS elbow location without a failure in the drive train, axis support mechanisms, or structure.</p> <p>The mounting provision from the PTU base to the orbiter structure and RMS arm was analyzed for worst-case landing loads and showed adequate margins.</p>	

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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE Pan or tilt limit switch fails in a shorted mode. (1) Mercury relay fails shorted.	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM Pan or tilt movement will be inhibited in CH or CW direction of stepper motor. Worst Case: Loss of elbow PTU control prevents stowing the RHS.	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE QUALIFICATION TESTS For Qualification Test Flow, see Table 2 located at the front of this book.	

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CRITICALITY <u>2/1R</u>		DWG NO. <u>2299822-502.503.504</u>
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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
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Pan or tilt limit switch fails in a shorted mode.

(1) Mercury relay fails shorted.

Pan or tilt movement will be inhibited in CW or CCW direction of stepper motor.

Worst Case:
loss of elbow PTU control prevents stowing the RMS.

ACCEPTANCE TESTS

The CCTV systems* PTU is subjected directly, without vibration isolators which might be used in their normal installation, to the following testing:

- **Vibration:**

20-80Hz:	3 dB/Oct-rise from 0.01 G ² /Hz
80-350 Hz:	0.04 G ² /Hz
350-750 Hz:	-3 dB/10 Oct-slope
Test Duration:	1 Minute per Axis
Test Level:	6.6 Grms
- **Thermal Vacuum:** In a pressure of 1X10⁻⁵ Torr, the temperature shall be as follows:

125° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour
25° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour
125° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour

The PTU may not have been subjected to the vacuum condition.

For Acceptance Test flow, see Table 1 located at the front of this book.

OPERATIONAL TESTS
In order to verify that CCTV components are operational, a test must verify the health of all the command related components from the PHS (A7A) panel switch, through the RCU, through the sync lines to the Camera/PTU, to the Camera/PTU command decoder. The test must also verify the camera's ability to produce video, the VSU's ability to route video, and the monitor's ability to display video. A similar test would be performed to verify the MDM command path.

Pre-Launch on Orbiter Test/In-Flight Test

(NOTE: In-Flight testing of the elbow camera/PTU must not be conducted as long as the crit 1/1 interference is present.)

1. Power CCTV System.
2. Via the PHS panel, select a monitor as destination and the camera under test as source.
3. Send "Camera Power On" command from PHS panel.
4. Select "External Sync" on monitor.
5. Observe video displayed on monitor. Note that, if video on monitor is synchronized (i.e., stable raster), then this indicates that the camera is receiving composite sync from the RCU and that the camera is producing synchronized video.
6. Send Pan, Tilt, Focus, Zoom, ALC, and GAMMA commands and visually (either via the monitor or direct observation) verify operation.
7. Select downlink as destination and camera under test as source.
8. Observe video routed to downlink.
9. Send "Camera Power Off" command via PHS panel.
10. Repeat Steps 3 through 9, except issue commands via the MDM command path.

4-294 This proves that the CCTV equipment is operational.

CCTV - Eyal

FNLA NO. <u>4.4.4.2</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/1R</u>		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>PTU</u> DWG NO. <u>2294022-502,503,504</u> SHEET <u>4</u> OF <u>7</u>
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE Pan or tilt limit switch fails in a shorted mode. (1) Mercury relay fails shorted.	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM Pan or tilt movement will be inhibited in CW or CCW direction of stepper motor. Worst Case: Loss of elbow PTU control prevents stowing the RMS.	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE <u>QA/INSPECTION</u> <p><u>Procurement Control</u> - The PTU EEE Parts and hardware items are procured from approved vendors and suppliers, which meet the requirements set forth in the CCTV contract and Quality Plan Work Statement (MS-2593176). Resident DCAS personnel review all procurement documents to establish the need for GSI on selected parts (PAI 517).</p> <p><u>Incoming Inspection and Storage</u> - Incoming Quality inspections are made on all received materials and parts. Results are recorded by lot and retained in file by drawing and control numbers for future reference and traceability. All EEE parts are subjected to incoming acceptance tests as called for in PAI 315 - Incoming Inspection Test Instructions. Incoming flight parts are further processed in accordance with RCA 1045604 - Preconditioning and Acceptance Requirements for Electronic Parts, with the exception that DPA and PFND testing is not performed. Mechanical items are inspected per PAI 316 - Incoming Inspection Instructions for mechanical items, PAI 305 - Incoming Quality Control Inspection Instruction, and PAI 612 - Procedure for Processing Incoming or Purchased Parts Designated for Flight Use. Accepted items are delivered to Material Controlled Stores and retained under specified conditions until fabrication is required. Non-conforming materials are held for Material Review Board (MRB) disposition. (PAI 307, PAI IQC-531).</p> <p><u>Board Assembly & Test</u> - Prior to the start of PTU board assembly, all items are verified to be correct by stock room personnel, as the items are accumulated to form a kit. The items are verified again by the operator who assembles the kit by checking against the as-built-parts-list (ABPL). DCAS Mandatory Inspection Points are designated for all printed circuit, wire wrap and welded wire boards, plus harness connectors for soldering wiring, crimping, solder splices and quality workmanship prior to coating of the component side of boards and sleeving of harnesses.</p> <p>Specific PTU board assembly and test instructions are provided in drawing notes, and applicable documents are called out in the fabrication Procedure and Record (FPR-2294022) and parts list PL 2294022. These include wire connection List 2295901, Process Standard RTV-566 228081, Process Standard - Bonding over Tape 228089, Specification Soldering 2280749, Specification Name Plate Application 1960167, Specification - Crimping 2280800, Specification - Bonding and Staking 2280878, Specification - Urethane coating 2280877, Specification - Lacking compound 2026116, Specification Epoxy Adhesive 2010985, Specification - Marking 2280876, Specification-Workmanship 8030035, Specification Bonding and Staking 2280875.</p>	

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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
Pan or tilt limit switch fails in a shorted mode. 1) Mercury relay fails shorted.	Pan or tilt movement will be inhibited in CW or CCW direction of stepper motor. Worst Case: loss of elbow PTU control prevents stowing the RMS.	<p><u>QA/INSPECTION</u></p> <p><u>PTU Assembly and Test</u> - An open box test is performed per TP-IT-2294022, and an Acceptance Test per TP-AI-2294022, including vibration and thermal vacuum. Torques are specified and witnessed, traceability numbers are recorded and calibrated tools are checked prior to use. RCA Quality and DCAS inspections are performed at the completion of specified FPR operations in accordance with PAI-204, PAI-205, PAI 206 and PAI 217. DCAS personnel witness PTU button-up and critical torquing. RCA and DCAS personnel monitor acceptance tests and review the test data/results. These personnel also inspect for conformance after all repair, rework and retest.</p> <p><u>Preparation for Shipment</u> - The PTU is packaged according to CCTV Letter 8011 and 2280746, Process standard for Packaging and Handling guidelines. All related documentation including assembly drawings, Parts list, ABPL, Test Data, etc. is gathered and held in a documentation folder assigned specifically to each assembly. This folder is retained for reference. An EIDP is prepared for each PTU in accordance with the requirements of WS-2593176. RCA QC and DCAS personnel witness crating, packaging, packing and marking, and review the EIDP for completeness and accuracy.</p>	

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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
<p>Pan or tilt limit switch fails in a shorted mode.</p> <p>(1) Mercury relay fails shorted.</p>	<p>Pan or tilt movement will be inhibited in CW or CCW direction of stepper motor.</p> <p><u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of elbow PTU control prevents stowing the RMS.</p>	<p><u>FAILURE HISTORY</u></p> <p>TDR A3275 Log #0930 PTU S/N035-503</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Acceptance Test Failure, Box Level Vibration Environment. After unit panned in one direction (pan-right) successfully, it would not move off mechanical stop when commanded.</p> <p><u>Cause:</u> Azimuth magnets polarized incorrectly, and insufficient shimming between magnet and turn-off switch for Z-axis.</p> <p><u>Corrective Action:</u> Azimuth magnets repolarized and the magnetic assembly was reshimmed.</p> <p>TDR A2277 Log #0858 PTU S/N031-503</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Acceptance Test Failure, Box Level, Vibration Environment Unit failed to reverse rotation on pan function during Z-axis vibration.</p> <p><u>Cause:</u> Switches S1 and S2 out of adjustment.</p> <p><u>Corrective Action:</u> Shims added to switches. Test procedure EEN (CCT 1122) written to clarify switch adjustment.</p> <p>TDR W6908 Log #0701 PTU S/N024-503</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Acceptance Test Failure, Box Level, Ambient Environment. PTU will not pan in CW/CCW position.</p> <p><u>Cause:</u> S1 switch will not open or close.</p> <p><u>Corrective Action:</u> Replace defective S1 switch.</p> <p>TDR C470B Log #2087 PTU S/N021-503</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Flight failure. Spacecraft Level. SFS-51J (30) Camera C was panned right near stop and would not pan left.</p> <p><u>Cause:</u> Anomaly could not be duplicated during extensive environmental testing.</p> <p><u>Corrective Action:</u> This TDR was closed on the basis that the pan condition could not be duplicated during extensive testing.</p>

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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
Pan or tilt limit switch fails in a shorted mode. (1) Mercury relay fails shorted.	Pan or tilt movement will be inhibited in CW or CCW direction of stapper motor. Worst Case: Loss of elbow PTU control prevents stowing the RMS.	<p><u>OPERATIONAL EFFECTS</u></p> <p>Loss of ability to position the elbow camera. Possible inability to stow the RMS if the elbow camera physically interferes with a payload. If RMS cannot be stowed the port payload bay door cannot be closed. Loss of crew and vehicle.</p> <p><u>CREW ACTIONS</u></p> <p>Perform EVA to reposition the elbow camera, use RMS motion to reposition the camera, or jettison the RMS.</p> <p><u>CREW TRAINING</u></p> <p>Crew should be trained in contingency EVA and RMS operations procedures.</p> <p><u>MISSION CONSTRAINT</u></p> <p>Do not manifest elbow camera for any flight where the payload and the elbow camera can interfere with each other (for any pan or tilt angle). If the camera must be flown do not change the camera position until the interfering payload is deployed.</p>	