CIL
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

ASSEMBLY NAME/PART NUMBER: LATCH PIN CADDY/[illegible]-20292-01
Reference: (PEADET)
Prepared By: C. Hartman
Approved By: R. Withey
Supercoding Date: 8/88
Date 8/89 Revs A

NAME P/N QUANTITY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
Latch Pin Caddy [illegible]-30048-02 Item 5.1 One	3/1	5.1/MA5 Loss of Tether Ring. CAUSE: Defective material. Repair. Loss of interface adapter bracket screws.	END ITEM: Caddy separates from tether. Loss of Caddy. SFE INTERFACE: Loss of Latch Pin Assemblies. MISSION: Unable to secure latches. Terminate EVA. CREW/VEHICLE: Vehicle damaged by loose latches during reentry. Loss of crew and vehicle.	A. DESIGN: The Latch Pin Caddy Tether ring is fabricated from 6061-T651 aluminum and is anodized according to MIL-A-8625, Type III, Class I (QQ-A-250 1d). The interface adapter bracket and tether ring are installed with a set of three screws fabricated from stainless steel and procured to MS specification. Loss of screws is precluded in design by adherence to standard engineering torque requirements for screw installation. The screws are installed and torqued to 20 in/lbs to ensure that they remain in place. The Latch Pin Caddy is stowed in a foam cushion in a Payload Bay PSA to protect it from the possibility of protect it from the possibility of damage from impact. B. TEST: Component Acceptance Test None PBR Test - The following tests are conducted at the Latch Pin Caddy assembly level in accordance with ILC Document [illegible]-70670:

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ASSEMBLY NAME/PART NUMBER: LATCH PIN CADDY/14159-20292-01
Reference: LTCADDIL
Prepared By: C. Harlan
Approved By: M. Withey
Superceding Date: 8/88
Date: 1/89 Rev: A

NAME P/N QUANTITY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
Latch Pin Caddy 14101-10088-02 Item 5.1 One	1/1	5.1FM05 Loss of Tether Ring.		1. Interface with wrist tether hook. Certification Test - None C. INSPECTION: Components and material manufactured to ILC requirements at an approved supplier are documented from procurement through shipping by the supplier. ILC incoming receiving inspection verifies that the materials received are as identified on the procurement documents, that no damage has occurred during shipment and that supplier certification has been received which provides traceability information. The following MIP's are performed during the Tether Ring manufacturing process to assure the failure causes are precluded from the fabricated item: 1. Visual inspection for damage or material degradation. 2. Verify presence of screws. 3. Witness screw torque.

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ASSEMBLY NAME/PART NUMBER: LATCH PIN CADDY/10159-20292-01
References: LPCADCIL
Prepared By: E. Harlean
Superceding Date: 8/89

Approved By: M. Withey
Date: 1/89 Rev. A

NAME P/N QUANTITY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
Latch Pin Caddy 10101-20044-02 Item 5.1 One	1/1	5.1CRM5 Loss of Tether Ring.		During PDA, the following inspection points are performed at the Latch Pin Caddy Assembly Level in accordance with ILC Document 10107-70690: 1. Visual inspection for damage. 2. Verification of conformance to drawing. D. FAILURE HISTORY: None E. GROUND TURNAROUND: During ground turnaround, in accordance with ILC Document 10107-70701, the Tether Ring is interfaced with Tether Hook and visually inspected for damage. F. OPERATIONAL USE: 1. Crew Response PRE/POST EVA - N/A EVA - If possible, attach Caddy to MWS to prevent loss. If Caddy is lost, attempt to remove both unpinned Latches from Payload Bay rails and transport to crew compartment for reentry stowage.

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CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

ASSEMBLY NAME/PART NUMBER: LATCH PIN CADDY/10159-20292-01
Reference: LPCADCIL
Prepared By: C. Hartman
Superseding Date: 8/88

Approved By: M. Withey
Date: 1/89 Rev:A

NAME P/N QUANTITY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
Latch Pin (Caddy 10159-20292-01) Item 5.1 One	1/1	5.1 MDS Loss of Tether Ring.		2. Training Crew trained in general EVA Ops. 1. Operational Considerations Mission impact. Tool usefulness unaffected. Task may require additional time.