

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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Reference Designator: N/A
 Part Name (Qty): Gas Container (1)
 Drawing Reference: SED33105590

Project: Government Furnished Equipment
 LRU Name (Qty): ACES Coverall (1)
 LRU Part No.: SED33105590

Subsystem: CES
 Effectivity: All Orbiters

Failure Mode Number 7.1.2	Criticality 1B/2	Failure Effect	Retention Rationale
FUNCTION Retain the pressure in the entire body area below the neck for low atmospheric pressure physiological protection.		END ITEM ACES counter pressure garment unable to maintain pressure and provide physiological protection against low atmospheric pressure	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. DESIGN FEATURES TO MINIMIZE FAILURE MODE <ol style="list-style-type: none"> A. The gas container material (tri-laminate Goretex) is ultrasonically sealed B. The restraint layer and coverall are exterior to the gas container and act as protective covers C. Designed with a burst pressure at least 2.5 times operational pressure of 3.5 psig (9.0 psi) 2. TEST OR ANALYSIS TO DETECT FAILURE MODE <ol style="list-style-type: none"> A. Acceptance Test (P528/CEE-1054) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Coverall structural test, 7.0 psig (2 times operational) for 15 minutes (no damage) 2. Coverall leakage test, 3.5 psig (400 sccm max) B. Certification (JSC 38024) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Overpressure test at 9.0 psig for 60 seconds with subsequent leakage test 2. Full pressure ensemble cycle tested, 500 cycles 3. Pressure sealing closure cycle tested, 4000 cycles 4. Manned hypobaric chamber testing at 75,000 ft, rapid decompression from 29,000 to 65,000 ft. C. Turnaround Testing (P326/CEE-M1011) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Coverall structural test at 36 months, 7.0 psig for 5 minutes (no damage) 2. Coverall leakage test, 3.5 psig for 5 minutes (1600 sccm max)
Failure Mode and Cause Mode: Gas container leakage/rupture Cause: 1. Defective material 2. Defective/leaking vent (flapper valve) 3. Defective/leaking bio-medical pass-thru port/plug 4. Defective/leaking pressure sealing closure		Mission N/A Crew/Vehicle Loss of crewmember	
Redundancy Screens A-Pass B-N/A C-Pass	Remaining Paths - 1 Requires previous critical Orbiter failure (decompression) for suit pressurization	Interface N/A	
Mission Phase	Time to Effect	Time to Correct	
Abort	Seconds	N/A	

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Subsystem: CES
 Effectivity: All Orbiters

Failure Mode Number 7.1.2	Criticality 1R/2	Failure Effect	Retention Rationale
FUNCTION Retain the pressure in the entire body area below the neck for low atmospheric pressure physiological protection.		END ITEM ACES counter pressure garment unable to maintain pressure and provide physiological protection against low atmospheric pressure	1. INSPECTION A. Acceptance Inspection (P528/CEE-1145) 1. Government source inspection for seam assembly, cementing, sewing procedures during assembly 2. Visual inspection of restraint, link net for defects during assembly B. Turnaround Inspection (P528/CEE-1061) 1. Inspection of seams, restraint layer, pressure sealing closure for physical damage/structural integrity (PIA) 4. FAILURE HISTORY None. The ACES gas container construction techniques are virtually identical to other full pressure suits currently in use by DOD for over 30 years. 5. OPERATIONAL USE A. Operational effect of failure - possible loss of crewmember B. Crew action - None C. Crew training - Crew trained in proper use of ACES D. Mission constraint - None - Mission terminated prior to use of this equipment E. Inflight checkout - None - Crew could inspect coverall for damage but probably not repairable
Failure Mode and Cause Mode: Gas container leakage/rupture Cause: 1. Defective material 2. Defective/leaking vent flopper valve 3. Defective/leaking bio-medical pass-thru port/plug 4. Defective/leaking pressure sealing closure		Mission N/A	
Redundancy Screens A - Pass B - N/A C - Pass		Crew/Vehicle Loss of crewmember	
Remaining Paths - 1 Requires previous critical Orbiter failure (decompression) for suit pressurization		Interface None	
Mission Phase	Time to Effect	Time to Correct	
Abort	Seconds	N/A	

Prepared BY: P.E. Hooper

Superseding Date: N/A

Approved By: B.W. Sauser

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