CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: PANEL ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391 SHEET:

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: N/A
800	4	MANUAL CONTROL RIGIDIZE/ DERIGIDIZE QTY-1 P/N ME 452-0102-7305 ED 92020 SHEET 3	MODE: CONSTANT MANUAL DERIGIDIZE CAUSE(S): (1) S/C CONTACT (2) 12V/6V POLE PERMANENTLY IN 6V POS. (3) SWITCH FAILS COMPLETELY IN DERIGIDIZE POSITION.	CAUSE (1) IF IN PRE-CAPTURE POSITION WHEN AUTO/MANUAL/ OFF SWITCH SET TO MANUAL DERIGIDIZE COMMAND WILL OCCUR AND MOTOR WILL STALL WITH NO INDICATIONS. IF P/L CAPTURED EE WILL DERIGIDIZE WITH UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE WARNING. LOSS OF RIGIDIZE COMMAND. CAUSE (2) SAME AS ABOVE. CAUSE (3) AS ABOVE EXCEPT NO UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE WARNING. WORST CASE --- UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE, UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQ. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING --- N/A	DESIGN FEATURES --- TOGGLE SWITCHES USED ON THE D&C PANEL ARE HERMETICALLY SEALED, AND OF A MATURE AND PROVEN DESIGN. THESE SWITCHES ARE IN COMMON USE ON THE ORBITER VEHICLE. THE SWITCHES ARE CONTROLLED BY ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL SPECIFICATION MC 452-0102 AND HAVE BEEN QUALIFIED TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS SPECIFICATION. ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS TO THE SWITCH ARE ACHIEVED BY MEANS OF SOLDERABLE TERMINALS. WIRING TO SWITCH TERMINALS UTILIZES NICKEL PLATED CONDUCTORS WITH A POLYAMID INSULATION. SOLDERING OF THE NICKEL PLATED WIRE TO THE SWITCH TERMINALS IS CONTROLLED BY CAE PROCESS SPECIFICATION PD 91059. THE WIRING HARNESS IS DESIGNED TO BE CAPABLE OF SEPARATE TESTING (FOR INSULATION RESISTANCE, DIELECTRIC STRENGTH, AND CONTINUITY). MOUNTING OF THE SWITCH TO THE D&C PANEL IS BY MEANS OF A 15/32 NUT WHICH ENGAGES A THREADED BUSHING ON THE SWITCH. A KEYED WASHER PROVIDES ROTATION RESTRAINT. AFTER INSTALLATION AND TORQUING, THE NUT IS STAKED TO THE PANEL BY A BLOB OF EPOXY ADHESIVE. A STAINLESS STEEL GUARD PROTECTS THE SWITCH LEVER AGAINST DAMAGE OR INADVERTENT OPERATION. ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC PANEL STRUCTURE HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE ARE NO RESONANCES IN THE RELEVANT VIBRATION FREQUENCY SPECTRUM. THIS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN VERIFIED BY VIBRATION TESTING OF THE D&C PANEL ASSEMBLY. APPLICATION ANALYSIS HAS CONFIRMED THAT ADEQUATE ELECTRICAL STRESS MARGINS ARE ACHIEVED. AT THE PART LEVEL, QUALIFICATION/CERTIFICATION TESTING IS DEFINED BY ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL SPECIFICATION MC452-0102. THIS TEST REQUIREMENT INCLUDES: INSULATION RESISTANCE, DIELECTRIC STRENGTH, CONTACT RESISTANCE, RANDOM VIBRATION (48 MINUTES PER AXIS), LEAKAGE AT ONE ATMOSPHERE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE, TOGGLE STRENGTH. FOR SWITCH OPERATIONAL CYCLES REFER TO TABLE 13. ALL UNITS ARE SUBJECTED TO ACCEPTANCE TESTS WHICH INCLUDE PRE-ACCEPTANCE RUN-IN, DIELECTRIC STRENGTH, INSTALLATION RESISTANCE, CONTACT RESISTANCE, ACCEPTANCE VIBRATION, SEAL TEST, VISUAL EXAMINATION, AND RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION.

PREPARED BY: MFWG SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87 APPROVED BY: DATE: 24 JUL 91 CIL REV: 2

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL
SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y P/N: 5114DE391

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY — RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: N/A
600	4	MANUAL CONTROL RIGIDIZE/ DERIGIDIZE QTY-1 P/N ME 452-0102-7305 ED 92020 SHEET 3	MODE: CONSTANT MANUAL DERIGIDIZE CAUSE(S): (1) S/C CONTACT (2) 12V/6V POLE PERMANENTLY IN 6V POS. (3) SWITCH FAILS COMPLETELY IN DERIGIDIZE POSITION.	CAUSE (1) IF IN PRE-CAPTURE POSITION WHEN AUTO/MANUAL/ OFF SWITCH SET TO MANUAL DERIGIDIZE COMMAND WILL OCCUR AND MOTOR WILL STALL WITH NO INDICATIONS. IF P/L CAPTURED EE WILL DERIGIDIZE WITH UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE WARNING. LOSS OF RIGIDIZE COMMAND. CAUSE (2) SAME AS ABOVE. CAUSE (3) AS ABOVE EXCEPT NO UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE WARNING. WORST CASE --- UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQ. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING --- N/A	ACCEPTANCE TESTS --- THE HARDWARE ITEM IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE ENVIRONMENTAL TESTS AS PART OF THE D&C PANEL ASSEMBLY. O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1 O THERMAL: +110 DEGREES F TO PLUS 10 DEGREES F (2 CYCLES - 9.5 HRS/CYCLE.) THE D&C PANEL ASSEMBLY IS FURTHER TESTED AS PART OF THE RMS SYSTEM TESTS (TP510 RMS STRONGBACK TEST AND TP552 FLAT FLOOR TEST) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE. QUALIFICATION TESTS --- THE SWITCH ITEM HAS BEEN QUALIFIED FOR ORBITER USE. THE D&C PANEL ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATION TEST ENVIRONMENTS. O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1 O SHOCK: 20G/11 MS - 3 AXES (6 DIRECTIONS) O THERMAL: 130 DEGREES F TO -23 DEGREES F (12 HRS PER CYCLE) (6 CYCLES) O HUMIDITY: 95% (120 DEGREES F TO 82 DEGREES F CYCLE IN 16 HRS) 10 CYCLES TOTAL. O EMC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TEST CE01, CE02, CE03, CS01 (DC/AC), CE03, CS01 (DC/AC), CS02, CS06, RE02 (B/W), RS02, RS03, RS04) FLIGHT CHECKOUT --- PDRS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987

PREPARED BY: MEHG
SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87
DATE: 24 JUL 91

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL
SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y P/N: ST140E391
SHEET: 3

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: N/A
800	4	MANUAL CONTROL RIGIDIZE/ DERIGIDIZE QTY-1 P/N ME 452-0102-7305 ED 92020 SHEET 3	MODE: CONSTANT MANUAL DERIGIDIZE CAUSE(S): (1) S/C CONTACT (2) 12V/6V POLE PERMANENTLY IN 6V POS. (3) SWITCH FAILS COMPLETELY IN DERIGIDIZE POSITION.	CAUSE (1) IF IN PRE-CAPTURE POSITION WHEN AUTO/MANUAL/ OFF SWITCH SET TO MANUAL DERIGIDIZE COMMAND WILL OCCUR AND MOTOR WILL STALL WITH NO INDICATIONS. IF P/L CAPTURED EE WILL DERIGIDIZE WITH UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE WARNING. LOSS OF RIGIDIZE COMMAND. CAUSE (2) SAME AS ABOVE. CAUSE (3) AS ABOVE EXCEPT NO UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE WARNING. WORST CASE --- UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE, UNANNUNCIATED, CREW ACTION REQ. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING --- N/A	QA/INSPECTIONS --- HERMETICALLY SEALED TOGGLE SWITCHES ARE PROCURED TO ROCKWELL SPECIFICATION MC452-0102, ROCKWELL PART NO. ME452-0102----. QUALIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE TESTING OF SWITCHES IS PERFORMED TO R.I. SPEC. MC452-0102. RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT SWITCHES RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO SWITCHES DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND ACCEPTANCE TEST DATA IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS. PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE, COMPONENT MOUNTING TO FRONT PANEL INSPECTION, SOLDERING OF WIRES TO SWITCH CONTACTS, WIRE ROUTING, STRESS RELIEF OF WIRES ETC., OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA NHB 5300.4(3A) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED BY JSC08800A. PRE-TEST INSPECTION OF D&C PANEL ASSY INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILD CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT) A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL, TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIABILITY, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVENMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION). ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT PERFORMANCE, THERMAL AND VIBRATION TESTING, (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT). INTEGRATION OF D&C PANEL, RHC, THC AND MCIU, INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH STAGE OF INTEGRATION, WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, INTER CONNECT CABLE VERIFICATION, CONNECTOR INSPECTION FOR BENT OR PUSHBACK CONTACTS ETC. SUB-SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TESTING (ATP), INCLUDES AN AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT). SRMS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, THE INTEGRATION OF MECHANICAL ARM SUBASSEMBLIES AND THE FLIGHT CABIN EQUIPMENT TO FORM THE SRMS. INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH PHASE OF INTEGRATION WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, THRU WIRING CHECKS, WIRING ROUTING, INTERFACE CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSH BACK CONTACTS ETC. SRMS SYSTEMS TESTING - STRONGBACK AND FLAT FLOOR AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)

PREPARED BY: MFWG
SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87
APPROVED BY: _____
DATE: 24 JUL 91
CIL REV: 2

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL
SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y P/N: 5114DE391
SHEET: 4

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: N/A
800	4	MANUAL CONTROL RIGIDIZE/ DERIGIDIZE QTY-1 P/N ME 452-0102-7305 ED 92020 SHEET 3	MODE: CONSTANT MANUAL DERIGIDIZE CAUSE(S): (1) S/C CONTACT (2) 12V/6V POLE PERMANENTLY IN 6V POS. (3) SWITCH FAILS COMPLETELY IN DERIGIDIZE POSITION.	CAUSE (1) IF IN PRE-CAPTURE POSITION WHEN AUTO/MANUAL/ OFF SWITCH SET TO MANUAL DERIGIDIZE COMMAND WILL OCCUR AND MOTOR WILL STALL WITH NO INDICATIONS. IF P/L CAPTURED EE WILL DERIGIDIZE WITH UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE WARNING. LOSS OF RIGIDIZE COMMAND. CAUSE (2) SAME AS ABOVE. CAUSE (3) AS ABOVE EXCEPT NO UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE WARNING. WORST CASE --- UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQ. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING --- N/A	FAILURE HISTORY --- THERE HAVE BEEN NO FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE SRMS PROGRAM.

PREPARED BY: MFWG
SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87
DATE: 24 JUL 91
CIL REV: 2

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C 1 ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391 SHEET: 5

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 1/1 CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: N/A
800	4	MANUAL CONTROL RIGIDIZE/ DERIGIDIZE QTY-1 P/N ME 452-0102-7305 ED 92020 SHEET 3	MODE: CONSTANT MANUAL DERIGIDIZE CAUSE(S): (1) S/C CONTACT (2) 12V/6V POLE PERMANENTLY IN 6V POS. (3) SWITCH FAILS COMPLETELY IN DERIGIDIZE POSITION.	CAUSE (1) IF IN PRE-CAPTURE POSITION WHEN AUTO/MANUAL/ OFF SWITCH SET TO MANUAL DERIGIDIZE COMMAND WILL OCCUR AND MOTOR WILL STALL WITH NO INDICATIONS. IF P/L CAPTURED EE WILL DERIGIDIZE WITH UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE WARNING. LOSS OF RIGIDIZE COMMAND. CAUSE (2) SAME AS ABOVE. CAUSE (3) AS ABOVE EXCEPT NO UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE WARNING. WORST CASE --- UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZE. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQ. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING --- N/A	OPERATIONAL EFFECTS --- WHEN EE MODE SWITCH IN MANUAL THE CARRIAGE WILL DERIGIDIZE WITH NO OPERATOR COMMAND. THE CARRIAGE COULD BE COMPLETELY EXTENDED. IF THIS OCCURS WHILE THE ARM IS BEING DRIVEN, THE PAYLOAD MIGHT TAKE AN UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY. CREW ACTION --- ACTION REQUIRED TO PREVENT ORBITER/PAYLOAD CONTACT. STOP ARM OPERATIONS, RE-RIGIDIZE THE CARRIAGE IF POSSIBLE. IF CARRIAGE DOESN'T RE-RIGIDIZE AND THE PAYLOAD IS ROTATING IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT COULD CONTACT STRUCTURE, THEN RELEASE THE PAYLOAD AND MANEUVER THE ARM AWAY. MANEUVER ORBITER AWAY FROM PAYLOAD. CREW TRAINING --- MUST PREPARE CREW TO BE ABLE TO MANEUVER THE ORBITER AWAY FROM A FREE PAYLOAD AT ANY TIME DURING ARM OPERATIONS. MISSION CONSTRAINT --- THE EE MODE SWITCH SHOULD ONLY BE OUT OF THE OFF POSITION WHEN THE EE IS IN THE CAPTURE ENVELOPE OF A BERTHED PAYLOAD OR IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO A FREE FLYING CAPTURE OR WHEN IN RELEASE POSITION. THE SWITCH SHOULD BE PLACED BACK IN THE OFF POSITION IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SPEC CAPTURE AND RIGIDIZE (REL/DERIG) TIMES HAVE ELAPSED. OPERATE UNDER VERNIER RATES WITHIN 10 FT OF STRUCTURE. THE OPERATOR MUST BE ABLE TO DETECT THAT THE ARM/PAYLOAD IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS VIA WINDOW AND/OR CCTV VIEWS DURING ALL ARM OPERATIONS. OMRSD OFFLINE --- EE MODE SWITCH IN MANUAL EXERCISE RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE SWITCH VERIFY COMMAND VOLTAGES AT D&C PANEL OUTPUT. OMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION --- EE MODE SWITCH IN MANUAL EXERCISE RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE SWITCH VERIFY COMMAND VOLTAGES AT LONGERON INTERFACE. OMRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND --- WITH EE MODE SWITCH SET TO MANUAL VERIFY RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE FUNCTION

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