Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List

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Risk Assessment Executive Summary Report (RAESR) for the USA SAFER Title:

Item Name: Relief Valve Qty: 1 **FMEA Number: US-SFR-120**

Item Part Number: 5159T-6T-L-300 **ORU Name: SAFER**

Propulsion **ORU Part Number:** SED33105900-311 **Subsystem Name:**

Function: Protects low-pressure system against failed open/leaking regulator.

N/A **Item Type Designator:** PG/IP Identifier:

Reference Designator/Find No.: N/A **Drawing Number:** SED33105904

Logistics Control Number: N/A

End Item Name:

End Item Capability: Six degrees of freedom through 24 thrusters, each rated at 0.8 ± 0.08 lbs. force in vacuum.

End Item Function: Provides emergency EVA self-rescue for separated crewmember.

ISS Zone: **EVA Shuttle Zone:**

Criticality

ISS Shuttle

1R

1R/3

Criticality Category: No: Success Success Paths Remaining:

Paths:

Critical Item:

Failure (Mode, Cause, Detection, Corrective Action)

Failure Mode: Relief valve fails closed.

Failure Mode Code:

Failure Cause: Contamination, binding of relief poppet, piece-part failure.

Failure Detection:

Flight: IVA - None.

EVA - None, unless over-pressurization structural failure occurs. Leak warning will be displayed if pressure

system structural failure occurs.

Functional Test.

Time To Detect Quantity: Time To Detect Units: Seconds

Correcting Action: IVA - None. EVA - None.

Remarks: None

Failure Effect Phase: **EVA Operations** Affected Stage(S): **EVA Operations**

Failure Effect

On ORU/Assembly:

First/Second Failure: Inadvertent EVA crewmember separation.

Third Failure: Regulator failure.

Fourth (this) Failure: Relief Valve fails to release high pressure. Downstream pressure exceeds design pressure limit, structural failure of low-pressure system. This structural failure would take place at the weakest point in the low-pressure system, the Nomex braided Teflon flex hoses. These flex hoses would split open, releasing the GN2. The Nomex/Teflon debris, which is generated, would be of low mass and, therefore, have low energy.

On Subsystem/Next Assembly: Rupture of flex hoses. On End Item/Segment: Prevents self rescue.

On Crew/ISS: Possible loss of EVA crewmember.

Time To Effect Quantity: Time To Effect Units: Minutes

Redundancy Screen

ISS (Shuttle)

Checkout Pre-Launch (A): **Pass Checkout On-Orbit** (B): N/A

Detection Flight Crew: Pass Or **Detection Ground Crew:** Fail

Loss Of Redundancy

From A Single Cause (C): N/A