## Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List

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Title: Risk Assessment Executive Summary Report (RAESR) for the USA SAFER

Item Name: Battery Assembly Qty: 1 FMEA Number: US-SFR-460

Item Part Number: SED33105907 ORU Name: SAFER

Subsystem Name: Battery ORU Part Number: SED33105900-311

Function: Battery pack supplies electrical power to SAFER.

Item Type Designator: C PG/IP Identifier: N/A

Reference Designator/Find No.: N/A Drawing Number: SED33105907

Logistics Control Number: N/A

End Item Name: SAFER

End Item Capability: Six degrees of freedom through 24 thrusters, each rated at 0.8 ± 0.08 lbs. force in vacuum.

**End Item Function:** Provides emergency EVA self-rescue for separated crewmember.

ISS Zone: EVA Shuttle Zone: EVA

Criticality

Critical Item: Yes: No: X Criticality Category: 1R 1R/3

Critical Item: Yes: \_\_\_\_ No: X Criticality Category:
Success Success Paths Remaining:

Paths:

Failure (Mode, Cause, Detection, Corrective Action)

Failure Mode: Battery assembly fails to provide power.

Failure Mode Code:

Failure Cause: Cell failure, open/short circuit, blown fuse, piece-part failure, depleted battery.

**Failure Detection:** 

Flight: IVA – IVA checkout.

EVA - No thrust response. No display.

**Ground:** Functional Test.

Time To Detect Quantity: 10 Time To Detect Units: Seconds

**Correcting Action:** IVA – If a failure or apparent bad battery indication is detected during the IVA checkout, the battery

pack will be changed with a spare battery and re-tested. IF changing the battery has no effect on the

failure, the back-up SAFER (if available) will be used.

EVA – Cycle power. If not successful, no other corrective action.

Remarks: For battery leakage to cause the battery pack to fail to provide power, 6 cells (2 per string) would have to be

leaking. A short to ground anywhere within SAFER would cause a blown fuse in the battery pack.

Failure Effect Phase: EVA Operations Affected Stage(S): EVA Operations

Failure Effect

On ORU/Assembly:

<u>First/Second Failure:</u> Inadvertent EVA crewmember separation.

<u>Third (this) Failure:</u> Unable to arrest previous motion.

On Subsystem/Next Assembly: None.

On End Item/Segment: Prevents self rescue. Possible loss of mission objectives if SAFER required for EVA.

On Crew/ISS: Possible loss of EVA crewmember/damage to EMU/Orbiter/ISS.

Time To Effect Quantity: 1

Time To Effect Units: Minutes

Redundancy Screen

ISS (Shuttle)

Checkout Pre-Launch (A): Pass Checkout On-Orbit (B): N/A

Detection Flight Crew: Pass Or Detection Ground Crew: Fail

Loss Of Redundancy

From A Single Cause (C): N/A