SQL> select ref_rpt_no, text_item_no, seq_no, disposition 2 from pra_disp_text 3 where ref_rpt_no in 4 (select t1.ref_rpt_no 5 from pra_pr_report t1, pra_initiation t2 6 where t1.ref_rpt_no=t2.ref_rpt_no 7 and substr(eicn1,1,3) in ('FCP', 'STR', 'MEQ', 'OEL') and 8 rpt_type = 'PR' and 9 praca_eff_cd = '103' and hi_seq_flag='Y'); REF_RPT_NO TEXT_ SEQ_NO DISPOSITION ---------- ----- ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 305 1 1 WHILE TORQUING CLAMP TO V070-787624-001 BRACKET, BRACKET DEBONDED FROM 305 1 2 AFT SIDE OF NOSE CAP ACCESS DOOR. THE BRACKET WAS PREPED AND RE-BONDE 305 1 3 D PER V9045. LAP SHEARS PASSED. THE BRACKET HAS BE RETURNED TO PRINT C 305 1 4 ONFIGURATION. 389 1 1 THIS PR IS "EO-TO-FOLLOW" TO DWG V070-346112 VERIF 389 1 2 Y REPLEASED EO REFLECTS AS ACCOMPLISHED ENGINEERIN 389 1 3 G 389 2 1 EO TO FOLLOW MODIFY SUPPORT BRKT. NO FURTHER RC RE 389 2 2 Q'D. JAIMIE POSEY 1-28-86 423 01 1 CANCELLED - DUPLICATE PR - STR-3-01-0074 PG 1A 611 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATE REPLACED PER PRINT. 691 1 1 THE IMPACT DAMAGE IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS EVALUATED BY RI STR 691 1 2 ESS AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR APPRO 691 1 3 VAL. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE IMPACT DAMAGE IS DUE TO METEOR (FLIGTH) 691 1 4 DAMAGE. CONCLUDE THAT NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 755 01 1 VOID,WRITTEN IN ERROR,S/B DV-6-001692 827 1 1 THIS PR REPLACED THE (V070-198371-001, AND V070-198373-002) SEALS LOCA 827 1 2 TED AT THE LEFT INBOARD ELEVON ACTUATOR HINGE POINT. IT WAS FIRST DISC 827 1 3 OVERED THAT THE FORWARD SEAL(V070-198371-001) HAD HEAT DAMAGE. DISPO W 827 1 4 AS WRITTEN TO REMOVE AND REPLACE THE SEAL. IT WAS ALSO DISCOVERED THAT 827 1 5 THE SIDE SEALS (V070-198373-001 AND-002)ALSO HAD HEAT DAMAGE, AND PAGE 827 1 6 1A WAS WRITTEN. STEPS, ADDRESSING PAGE 1, WERE WRITTEN TO REMOVE AND R 827 1 7 EPLACE THE SIDE SEALS. THE -002 SIDE SEAL WAS TOO THICK TO FIT IN ITS 827 1 8 RESPECTIVE LOCATION, AND PAGE 1B WAS GENERATED. MRB APPROVAL WAS GIVEN 827 1 9 TO TRIM THE -002 SEAL SO THAT IT WOULD FIT. THE DIMENSIONS GIVEN WERE 827 1 10 WRONG AND THE SEAL DID NOT FIT AFTER TRIMMING, SO PAGE 1D WAS WRITTEN 827 1 11 MRB APPROVAL WAS GIVEN FOR FURTHER TRIMMING, THE SEAL FIT AFTER THE SE 827 1 12 COND TRIMMING. AT THE TIME IT WAS FOUND THAT THE -002 SIDE SEAL WAS T 827 1 13 OO THICK,THE -001 SIDE SEAL WAS BONDED IN PLACE. AT A LATER DATE IT WA 827 1 14 S DISCOVERED THAT THE -001 SIDE SEAL WAS MISSING DATA ON THE ADHESIVE 827 1 15 AND THAT IT WAS NOT BONDED PER PRINT. PAGE 1C, DOCUMENTED THIS. THE CO 827 1 16 RRECTIVE DISPO REMOVED AND REBONDED THE SEAL. A NEW FORWARD SEAL AND N 827 1 17 EW SIDE SEALS WERE SUCCESSFULLY BONDED IN PLACE. THE LAP SHEAR AND THE 827 1 18 SHORE A HARDNESS TESTS PASSED, AND THE THERMAL INTEDRITY OF THE SEALS 827 1 19 IS RESTORED. 880 1 1 THE DOUBLER WAS REWORKED PER MR AS SPECIFIED IN 880 1 2 STEPS 1, 2, & 3 AND WAS INSTALLED PER TPS 3-07-183 943 1 1 THE JO-BOLT WAS REMOVED IN ITS ENTIRETY. THE CAUSE 943 1 2 OF THIS PROBLEM WAS MATERIAL DEFICIENCY. ANOTHER 943 1 3 JO-BOLT WILL BE INSTALLED PER TPS STR-3-07-183. CL 943 1 4 OSE PR. 1021 1 1 THE CORROSION WAS REMOVED FROM THE WING TIP USING A DREMEL TOOL WITH A C 1021 1 2 ARBIDE IMPREGNATED RUBBER TIP (ITEM 1). THE "POSSIBLE" CORROSION (ITEM 2 1021 1 3 ) WAS DETERMINED TO BE DEBRIS: TILE, SCREED AND DUST. THE CORROSION AROU 1021 1 4 ND THE RIVET HEADS WHICH WAS NOT ACCESSIBLE USING THE DREMEL TOOL (ITEM 1021 1 5 3) WAS REMOVED USING A DENTAL PICK AND A STAINLESS STEEL BRUSH. THE SPAR 1021 1 6 FITTING INSULATOR AT RIB SPLICE #23 WAS SPLIT IN HALF PER MR ACTION TO 1021 1 7 ALLEVIATE THE INSTALLATION PROBLEM (ITEM 4). THE INSULATOR REWORK WAS DE 1021 1 8 EMED A PROCEDURAL ENHANCEMENT NOT A REQUIRED DESIGN CHANGE, THEREFORE IT 1021 1 9 WAS PERFORMED ON A MR INSTEAD OF E.O.T.F. TWO RIVET HEADS WERE DAMGED 1021 1 10 ABY DREMEL WORK (ITEM 5). THE DAMAGE WAS INSIGNIFICANT AND WAS MR ACCEPT 1021 1 11 OK AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE CORROSION PITTED/REWORK WING TIP WAS 1021 1 12 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE WING TIP WAS COATED WITH RTV TO 1021 1 13 RETARD FURTURE CORROSION. THE PROBABLE CASUE DISSSIMILAR MATERIALS, 1021 1 14 DESIGN DEFICIENCY, WEATHER AND UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 1075 1 1 V070-198478-006 LAMINATED SHIM IS SLIGHTLY DELAMINATED. THIS CONDITION 1075 1 2 IS OKAY PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CLOSE THI 1075 1 3 S PR 1153 1 1 REMOVED & REPLACED. 1162 1 1 THE SILICON RUBBER SEALS AND THE DAMAGED V070-354241-002 SPACERS ON TH 1162 1 2 E 50-02 DOOR WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER THIS DISPOSITION. THE SEALS 1162 1 3 AND WASHERS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE PROBABLE C 1162 1 4 AUSE OF DAMAGE IS THE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF THE DOOR ON A REGULA 1162 1 5 R BASIS (OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION). 1213 1 1 PART IS ON ORDER 1253 1 1 LO2 T-O BEARING WHICH WOULD NOT COMPLETELY ACCEPT THE G070-510082 HOLE 1253 1 2 INSPECTION TOOL (GO/NO GO GAUGE) WAS FOUND TO HAVE NICKS/RAISED METAL 1253 1 3 ON THE BEARINGS. THE RAISED EDGES WERE REMOVED TO ALLOW COMPLETE INST 1253 1 4 ALLATION OF THE INSPECTION TOOL. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND 1253 1 5 NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: IMPROPER USE OF T-O LIGHTWEIGHT FRAM 1253 1 6 E LOCKING PIN. 1319 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1. THE BOLTS WERE REMOVED, THE HOLES WERE INSPECTED WITH E 1319 1 2 DDY CURRENT FOR CRACKS AND THE BOLTS WERE REPLACECD WITH PRINT CALLED 1319 1 3 OUT LENGTHS. ITEM 2 PG. 1A: THIS DISCREPANCY WAS DISCOVERED WHEN A BUI 1319 1 4 LDING 45 TORQUE CHECK WAS REQUIRED. THE NEW BOOT INSTALLATION REQUIRED 1319 1 5 A TORQUE OF 900-1020" LBS. ITEM 3 PG. 1B: THE INSTALLATION WAS RETURN 1319 1 6 ED TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS, BY THE INSTALLATION OF THE BOLTS PER ITEM 1 1319 1 7 PG. 1. BY ADDING WASHERS PER MAO101-301 PROPER GRIP LENGTH WAS MAINTAI 1319 1 8 NED. ITEM 4 PG. 1C: REMOVED THE FITTING, TO ALLOW CLEARANCE SO BOLT CO 1319 1 9 ULD BE REMOVED. ITEM 5 PG. 1D: REMOVED THE FITTING, TO ALLOW CLEARENCE 1319 1 10 SO THE BOLT COULD BE REMOVED. ITEM 6 PG. 1E: THE HOLD WAS REAMED AND 1319 1 11 A BUSHING INSTALLED. WITH MR APPROVAL, SO PRINT DIAMETER BOLT COULD BE 1319 1 12 INSTALLED. ITEM 7 PG. 1F: THE BOLT WAS INSTALLED FROM THE MIDBODY SID 1319 1 13 E, WITH MR APPROVAL, SO THE FITTING REMOVED FOR ITEM 4 PG. 1C COULD BE 1319 1 14 RE-INSTALLED. ITEM 8 PG. 1G: THE BOLT WAS INSTALLED FROM THE MIDBODY 1319 1 15 SIDE, WITH MR APPROVAL SO THE FITTING REMOVED FR ITEM 5 PG. 1D COULD B 1319 1 16 E RE-INSTALLED. ITEM 9 & 10 PG. 1H: THE BUSHING WAS REMOVED AND DISCAR 1319 1 17 DED. ITEM 11 & 12 PG. 1I: THIS THE SAME HOLE AS IN ITEM 6 PG. 1E. THE 1319 1 18 HOLE WAS REAMED LARGER AND ANOTHER ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO INSTALL A BUSHI 1319 1 19 NG. ITEM 13 PG. 1J: A NEW BUSHING WAS FABRICATED. ITEM 14 PG. 1K: THE 1319 1 20 HOLE WAS REAMED TO CLEAN UP THE HOLE. ITEM 15 PG. 1L: THIS IS THE SAM 1319 1 21 BUSHING INSTALLATION AS IN ITEM 6 PG. 1E. THE BUSHING WAS REMOVED, WIT 1319 1 22 H NO DAMAGE TO THE HOLE, AND A BUSHING WITH A SMALLER OD WAS INSTALLED 1319 1 23 . ITEM 16 PG. 1M: THE HOLE WAS MEASURED AND DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABL 1319 1 24 E AS IS. ITEM 17 PG. 1M: IT WAS DETERMINED THAT NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS 1319 1 25 FOR THIS ITEM. THE BOLT INSTALLATION WAS RETURNED TO CONFIGURATION. ON 1319 1 26 E DISCREPANT HOLE WAS REPAIRED. THE OTHER DISCREPANT HOLE WAS MR OK AS 1319 1 27 IS. THE INSTALLATION AND REPAIR ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. THE VEHICL 1319 1 28 E WAS DELIVERED FROM PALMDALE WITH THE WRONG DASH NUMBER BOLTS, INSTAL 1319 1 29 LED IN THE WING CARRY THRU. CLOSE THIS PR. 1359 1 1 PART WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS WITH SURFACE CRACKS. CAUS 1359 1 2 E: BACKING PLATE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN USED DURING DRILLING OF PANEL HOLES 1359 1 3 . 1461 1 1 DRIVE SHAFTS ARE DESIGNED TO BE FLEXABLE IN TWO DI 1461 1 2 RECTIONS (Z & Y). FAIRLEADS ARE INSTALLED IN PLBD 1461 1 3 RIBS TO PREVENT SHAFTS FROM CONTACTING/DAMAGING P 1461 1 4 LBD RIB. THEREFORE POTENTIAL CONTACT OF DRIVE SHAF 1461 1 5 T AND FAIRLEAD IS NOMINAL. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDI 1461 1 6 TION. 1469 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A PREVISOULY MR REPAIRED ANOMOL 1469 1 2 Y WORKED PER MEQ-3-03-0116/A0012 WHICH OK'D THIS C 1469 1 3 ONDITION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. REPAIR CONSISTED 1469 1 4 OF FILLING THE HOLE WITH VOID FILLER, GRADE "B" 1709 1 1 AS STATED IN THE SUMMARY ON PAGE 8 FUEL CELL #2 CO 1709 1 2 OLANT FILTER WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED AFTER SIX FL 1709 1 3 IGHTS. A SECTION OF THE COOLANT LINES ON THE UPST 1709 1 4 REAM SIDE OF THE FILTER WAS FLUSHED AND SUCCESSFUL 1709 1 5 LY SAMPLED. THE SYSTEM CLEANLINESS HAS BEEN RESTO 1709 1 6 RED. INITIALLY THE PLAN WAS TO KEEP THE PR OPEN P 1709 1 7 ENDING THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYZED FILTER. THE FI 1709 1 8 LTER ANALYSIS RESULTS DO NOT CONSTRAIN THE CLOSURE 1709 1 9 OF THIS PR. AS STATED THE SYSTEM HAS BEEN RESTOR 1709 1 10 ED TO FLIGHT STATUS. THE REMOVED FILTER WILL BE I 1709 1 11 NSPECTED BY LSS TO EVALUATE FILTER PERFORMANCE AFT 1709 1 12 ER EXPERIENCING SIX FLIGHTS. FUEL CELL #2 COOLANT 1709 1 13 LINES ARE RESTORED AND ARE FLIGHT WORTHY. 1779 1 1 THE CHIP IN THE EDGE OF THE #22 RCC TEE IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, 1779 1 2 WAS RESOLVED, WITH MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, BY REPAIRING THE 1779 1 3 CHIPPED TYPE "A" COATING PER STANDARD REPAIR MLO601-9026. THE PROBABLE 1779 1 4 CAUSE OF THE TEE BEING CHIPPED IS DUE TO MISHANDLING DURING RCC TEE RE 1779 1 5 MOVAL. CONCLUDE THAT THE RCC TEE IS ACCEPTABLE AS REPAIRED AND NO FURT 1779 1 6 HER WORK IS REQUIRED. 1935 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP BECAUSE THE L/H ADP FOWARD 1935 1 2 FAIRING WAS INSTALLED WITH A R/H FAIRING P/N. BOTH 1935 1 3 ADP'S WERE DEPLOYED AND PART NUMBERS WERE IDENTI- 1935 1 4 FIED. BOTH LEFT AND RIGHT FAIRING CONTAINED THE 1935 1 5 SAME P/N. BOTH FAIRINGS WERE THEN MEASURED AND COM 1935 1 6 PARED TO THE DRAWING TO REASSURE PROPER INSTALLA- 1935 1 7 TION. IT WAS THEN CONCLUDED THAT THE LEFT HAND 1935 1 8 FAIRING WAS MIS ID'D. THE LEFT HAND FAIRING THUS 1935 1 9 ID'D PROPERLY. 2161 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO ADDRESSED THE THEORETICAL OVER-PRESSURIZTION 2161 1 2 OF THE RIGHT WING ELEVON COVE SEAL DURING TROUBLESHOOTING PER IPR 31RV 2161 1 3 -0094. ELEVON COVE SEAL LEAK RATE TESTS PERFORMED PER OMI V1164 WERE F 2161 1 4 OUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE AND RTV REPAIRS DID NOT CORRECT THE DISCRE 2161 1 5 PANCY. TROUBLE SHOOTING PER IPR 31RV-0094 REVEALED THE PROBLEM TO BE T 2161 1 6 HE GSE C70-1183 LEAK MONITOR UNIT (C70-1183) BACKPRESSURE PROBE P/N G0 2161 1 7 70-622277-001. A PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE DISCREPANT SENSOR, WERE 2161 1 8 THEORETICALLY CALCULATED TO BE .03 PSIG GREATER THAN THE 1 PSIG ALLOWA 2161 1 9 BLE. A WAIVER WAS INITIATED AND ACCEPTED FOR THIS THEORETICAL OVER PRE 2161 1 10 SSURIZATION. WAIVER NO. WK1684 (COPY IN IPR 31RV-0094 ADDED) SUBSEQUEN 2161 1 11 T LEAK CHECKS WITH A REPLACEMENT UNIT S/N -002 PROVIDED EVIDENCE THAT 2161 1 12 THE THEORETICAL OVERPRESSURIZATION DID NOT COMPROMISE THE FIT, FORM, O 2161 1 13 R FUNCTION OF THE ELEVON SEAL. NO CORECTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED PER THI 2161 1 14 S PR. 2197 1 1 BLOW BY IDENTIFIED ON PAGE 1 WAS FOUND TO BE A WHITE POWDER WHICH WAS 2197 1 2 SOLVENT-WIPED OFF STR. MINOR DISCOLORATION ALSO REMAINED, WHICH DID NO 2197 1 3 T PENETRATE KORPON, AND WAS TOUCHED UP. NO SIGNS OF BLOW BY OR OVER TE 2197 1 4 MP ARE PRESENT IN AREA. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO BAD TILE GAPS. 2352 1 1 BRACKET MOVED BY AN EO-TO-FOLLOW. CLOSE THIS PR. 2390 1 1 A SLIGHT INTERFERENCE, OF LESS THAN .250 INCH, WAS NOTED BETWEEN THE V 2390 1 2 070-337844-001 FAIRING PANEL AND THE V070-337885-001 CLOSEOUT PANEL. T 2390 1 3 HE V070-337844-001 FAIRING PANEL WAS TRIMMED, PER FLAG NOTE 3 OF DWG. 2390 1 4 V070-337844, WHICH ALLOWS FOR .250 INCH TRIMMING OF THE FAIRING PANEL 2390 1 5 TO REMOVE INSTALLATION INTERFERENCE. 2729 1 1 TEAR AND HOLE IN RH #10 SPAR, DOCUMENTED BY ITEMS 1 & 2, PAGE 1, HAVE 2729 1 2 BEEN REPAIRED BY ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. REWORK HAS RETURNED THE INSU 2729 1 3 LATOR WILL BE INSTALLED PER JOB CARD V80-96918. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERAT 2729 1 4 RIONAL DEGRADATION. 2919 1 1 BRACKET WAS INSTALLED WITH HI-LOC'S INSTEAD OF RIV 2919 1 2 ETS BECAUSE OF LIMITED SPACE IN ELEVON COVER WITH 2919 1 3 MR DISPO. CLOSE THIS PR. 2921 1 1 THE INCORRECT CARRIER PANELS HAVE BEEN R/R WITH TH 2921 1 2 E ONES FOR 103 3012 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 3012 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 3012 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE CARRI 3012 1 4 ER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE P 3012 1 5 OSSIBLE CHANBE OF ATTACHING H/W TO PREVENT FURTHER 3012 1 6 DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. CLOSE PR. 3017 1 1 THE TWO PART SPACER, SMG4DC1A FARSIDE AND SM4D29A 3017 1 2 NEARSIDE, INSTALLER PER MAO101-307 (INSTALLED POTT 3017 1 3 ED AND MECHANCAL HONEYCOMB INSERTS) AS SHOWN ON DW 3017 1 4 G V070-199720 PNL INSTL - LOWER ACCESS STA 1131 TO 3017 1 5 STA 1148 WING LEADING EDGE, SECTION D-D. THE UPP 3017 1 6 ER PORTION, NEARSIDE, OF THE SPACER HAS DE-POTTED 3017 1 7 ALLOWING SLIGHT MOVEMENT (TURNING) IN EITHER CLOCK 3017 1 8 WISE OR COUNTER CLOCKWISE DIRECTION. STRUCTURAL M 3017 1 9 OD, VSTR-2-08-213, IS IN PROGRESS AT THIS TIME TO 3017 1 10 BOND SHIMS TO THE WING LEADING EDGE CARRIER PNL AT 3017 1 11 TACH POINTS. A SHIM WILL BE BONDED OVER THIS SPAC 3017 1 12 ER AS A PART OF THE AFOREMENTIONED MOD. THERE IS 3017 1 13 NO DANGER OF THE SPACER FALLING OUT. STRUCTURAL I 3017 1 14 NTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. SPACER WILL CONTINUE TO F 3017 1 15 UNCTION PER DESIGN. MR ID, OUTSIDE OF THE SHIM BO 3017 1 16 ND LINE, MR-STR-3-07-1240 PER MAO104-301, CODE BL- 3017 1 17 00-NG-13. CLOSE THIS PR. 3298 1 1 DURING VEHICLE TESTING IN OMI V1022 THE O2 TANK #2 VENT POPPET LEAK RA 3298 1 2 TE WAS MEASURED AT 1385 SCCMS WITH AN O2 TANK #2 PRESSURE OF 235 PSIA. 3298 1 3 THE TEST WAS REPERFORMED ON THIS PR AT TANK PRESSURES OF 355 PSIA AND 3298 1 4 825 PSIA WITH RESULTS OF 867 SCCMS AND LESS THAN 55 SCCMS (READING WA 3298 1 5 S OFF SCALE LOW) RESPECTIVELY. THE CURRENT REQUIREMENT FOR THIS TEST I 3298 1 6 S A MAXIMUM LEAKAGE OF 900 SCCMS AT A TANK PRESSURE OF 115-350 PSIA. R 3298 1 7 CN OV8672 HAS BEEN GENERATED TO THE OMRSD CHANGE THE POPPET LEAK REQUI 3298 1 8 REMENT TO 900 SCCMS AT A TANK PRESSURE OF 115-975 PSIA POPPET LEAK CHE 3298 1 9 CK WILL BE PERFORMED BELOW TANK THRESHOLD PRESSURE AND THEN AT HIGH PR 3298 1 10 ESSURE ONLY IF FAILURE AT LOW PRESSURE. 3534 STAT 1 1AIR INDEX IS CLOSED. THIS PR IS BEING DUPLICATED FOR DATABASE CLOSURE 3 3534 STAT 2 ITEM 1 WAS WORKED ON ORIGINAL PR AND PR WAS CLOSED (REF ATTACHED TAIR IN 3534 STAT 3 DEX). ORIGINAL LOST IN CLOSURE LOOP. 3555 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE 3555 1 2 PEELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD 3555 1 3 BEARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION 3555 1 4 . THE SHIM(S) WERE CENTERED OVER THE BOLT HOLES 3555 1 5 PER MR ACTION TO RESOLVE THE MISALIGNMENT PROBLEM. 3555 1 6 RC ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTA 3555 1 7 CHING HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR # 3555 1 8 5121-87-103-C1) 3582 1 1 DISCREPANCY 1 WAS A RESULT OF DESIGN DEFICIENCY AN 3582 1 2 D WAS RESOLVED BY MR DISPO TO REAM THE HOLES TO A 3582 1 3 LARGER DIA. DISCREPANCY 2 WAS A RESULT OF WORKMANS 3582 1 4 HIP DURING THE REAMING PROCESS AND WAS RESOLVED BY 3582 1 5 MR DISPO ACCEPTING THE HOLES. EDDY CURRENT INSPECT 3582 1 6 ION CONFIRMED NO CRACKS WERE PRESENT IN HOLES 4 & 3582 1 7 10. 4006 1 1 ON THE RIGHT HAND WIRE TRAY AT XO919,HOLES 1,2,3,4 4006 1 2 ,5,6,7,9,11 AND 12 SHOWED SIGNS OF DAMAGE DUE TO T 4006 1 3 HREADS IN BEARING. HOLES 2,7, AND 12 WERE REAMED T 4006 1 4 O 0.2132 INCHES. HOLES 1 AND 6 WERE REAMED TO 0.21 4006 1 5 33 INCHES. HOLES 9 AND 11 WERE REAMED TO 0.2134 IN 4006 1 6 CHES HOLE 3 WAS REAMED TO 0.2135 INCHES AND HOLE 5 4006 1 7 WAS REAMED TO 0.2137 INCHES. ND WAS THEN PERFORME 4006 1 8 D (REPORT 30,396) AND NO ADDITIONAL DAMAGE WAS DIS 4006 1 9 COVERED. THIS REPAIR CLEARS THE HOLES FOR UNRESTRI 4006 1 10 CTED USE. HOLES 8 AND 10 WERE REAMED TO 0.196 IN. 4006 1 11 AND NDE APPLIES. USE IS UNRESTRICTED. 4059 1 1 PART HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT ONFIGURATION., 4245 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSTION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-10 4245 1 2 07 NUT AT LOCATION RH XO835.75 XO396.50 IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORIGINAL R 4245 1 3 D114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 12.0 INCH POUNDS. NU 4245 1 4 T WS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE TO 4245 1 5 THE APPROPRIATE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO PRIN 4245 1 6 T CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THI 4245 1 7 S IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 4431 1 1 LATCH WAS FUNCTIONALLY RETESTED PER V1097. 4498 1 1 FASTENERS HEAD WAS DRILLED OFF TO ALLOW REMOVAL OF 59-02 DOOR, DOOR 59 4498 1 2 -28 WAS REMOVED BY JOB CARD TO INCREASE ACCESS FOR R & R OF NUTPLATE. 4498 1 3 A DEBRIS TRAP WAS USED TO CATCH THE NUTPLATE AND RIVETS WHEN REMOVED. 4498 1 4 A NEW NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED USING BLIND RIVETS BY UNRESTRICTED MR ACT 4498 1 5 ION DUE TO LACK OF ACCESS TO BUCK THE PER PRINT RIVETS. ADJACENT STRUC 4498 1 6 TURE WAS MR ID'D THE 59-28 DOOR REMOVED FOR ACCESS, WAS RE-INSTALLED P 4498 1 7 ER JOB CARD. CLSOE THIS PR. 4518 1 1 THE OVERSIZED HOLES HAVE BEEN MR'D OK AS-IS FOR UN 4518 1 2 RESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. 4684 1 1 DURING ET DOOR FUNCTIONAL (V1097), THE RH ET DOOR RAN OVERTIME WHEN 4684 1 2 DRIVEN OPEN AND CLOSED. IN SUBSEQUENT TROUBLESHOOTING, THE PDU (POWER 4684 1 3 DRIVE UNIT) STALLED, (SLIPPED EITHER A TORQUE LIMITER OR BRAKE). AND THE 4684 1 4 DOOR FAILED TO CONTINUE OPENING PAST APPROXIMATELY 150 DEG FROM CLOSED. 4684 1 5 THE DOOR DRIVE CONTINUED TO WORK INTERMITTENTLY WITH REPEATED CYCLES. 4684 1 6 THE PDU WAS REMOVED AND AN LRU PR INITIATED TO RETURN TO VENDOR (HOOVER) 4684 1 7 FOR REPAIR. THE SPARE PDU WAS INSTALLED AFTER A "BENCH CHECK" USING 4684 1 8 VEHICLE POWER. DOOR DRIVE RIGGING WAS VERIFIED TO BE PER SPEC AND THE 4684 1 9 SYSTEM WAS RETESTED BY A SUCCESSFUL RUN OF V1097. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY 4684 1 10 EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. RECURRENCE CONTROL: 4684 1 11 INCORPORTATE NEW PDU DESIGN PER MCR 12154. 4684 1 12 4907 1 1 SEVERAL SCRATCHES WERE FOUND ON THE STRUT. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN 4907 1 2 OF THE SCRATCHES. PR STR-3-07-1670 APPLIED KORPON OVER SCRATCHES PREV 4907 1 3 ENTING A VISUAL INSPECTION BY ENGINEERING. STRUT WAS SENT TO DOWNEY AN 4907 1 4 D PROOF LOADED TO VERIFY INTEGRITY. THE STRUT PASSED PROOF LOAD TEST A 4907 1 5 ND WAS REINSTALLED AS MR OK AS IS, UNRESTRICTED USE. SCRATCHES WERE A 4907 1 6 RESULT OF AN OBJECT RUBBING AGAINST STRUT. NO FURTHER DISPOSITION IS R 4907 1 7 EQUIRED. 4915 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION IS TO MR ID AN ELECTRICAL BONDING SPRI 4915 1 2 NG ON THE LEFT HAND AFT FUSELAGE EXTERNAL TANK ATTACH POINT SHELL ASSE 4915 1 3 MBLY. THIS DISCREPANCY IS THE SECOND TIME THIS DISCREPANCY HAS BEEN WR 4915 1 4 ITTEN UP SINCE IT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED FLIGHT. THE PART HA 4915 1 5 S BEEN MR IDENTIFIED TO PREVENT FUTURE PR'S ON THIS DISCREPANCY. THE C 4915 1 6 AUSE OF THIS PR WAS A PROCEDURAL ERROR. 5013 1 1 THE PROBLEM WAS THAT FIVE FIRE PORT DECALS WERE EITHER DAMAGED OR MISS 5013 1 2 ING. THE DAMAGED DECALS WERE REMOVED AS WELL AS THE ADHESIVE RESIDUE. 5013 1 3 NEW DECALS WERE PUT IN THEIR PLACES. 5059 1 1 ONE CLIP WAS PREVIOUSLY MR'D O.K.-AS-IS. THE OTHE 5059 1 2 R WILL BE MR'D O.K.-AS-IS BY THIS PR. CAUSED BY D 5059 1 3 OOR FLEXURE. 5490 1 1 DISCREPANT INSERTS WERE REMOVED & REPLACED WITH NEW INSERTS RETURNING 5490 1 2 INSTL'N TO PRINT OR PREVIOUS CONFIG'N. DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXISTS. 5694 1 1 ROCKWELL-TULSA ENG MANUFACTURES OF THE DOORS, NO P 5694 1 2 ROBLEM EXISTS. THE LINES OBSERVED ARE OVERLAPPING 5694 1 3 PLY LAYERS IN THE GRAPHITE-EPOXY. THIS IS A MANUFA 5694 1 4 CTURING CONDITION. CLOSE PR. 5837 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 5837 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 5837 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 5837 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 5837 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 5837 1 6 7-103-C1). THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 5871 1 1 REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF THE DISCREPANT BOLT RET 5871 1 2 URNS ASSEMBLY TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE IMPROPE 5871 1 3 R LENGTH BOLT WAS INSTALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER. 5879 1 1 REF ITEMS 1.0 AND 2.0, PG 1. V070-298112-017 THERMAL BARRIER ASSY (2 L 5879 1 2 OCATIONS) MISSING TAB AND TORN AT TAB ATTACH POINT ON LH LOWER RUDDER 5879 1 3 SPEED BRAKE. TWO DAMAGED THERMAL BARRIERS WERE R&R'D. V070-298112-017 5879 1 4 THERMAL BARRIER ASSY WAS RETURNED TO PRINT CONDITION (2 LOCATIONS). PR 5879 1 5 OBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 5887 1 1 RUB PANELS V070-198801-050, -056, -058 & -060 WERE FOUND TO HAVE DENTS 5887 1 2 . DENTS WERE MR'D FOR RESTRICTED USE FOR FLIGHT 7. POST FLIGHT EVALUAT 5887 1 3 ION BY ENGINEERING REVEALED NO FURTHER DAMAGE. PANELS ARE NOW MR'D FOR 5887 1 4 UNRESTRICTED USE BASED ON NO FURTHER DEGRADATION BEING FOUND. PROBABL 5887 1 5 E CAUSE WORKMANSHIP. 5913 1 1 THE SCRATCHED WINDOW IS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CAUSE 5913 1 2 OF SCRATCHES UNKNOWN (FLIGHT OR GROUND PROCESSING). 5918 1 1 THE STUD FASTENING THE LOWER/AFT LOCATION OF THE FRCS LH LOWER AFT PER 5918 1 2 IMETER CARRIER PANEL BECAME DEBONDED. THE STUD WAS REMOVED FROM THE CA 5918 1 3 RRIER PANEL AFTER THE CARRIER PANEL REMOVAL. A NEW STUD WAS INSTALLED. 5918 1 4 THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING 5918 1 5 IS REQUIRED AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 5978 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THE CHIPS IN THE COATING ON THE R/H RIB SPLIC 5978 1 2 E #11 TEE WERE EVALUATED BY LSOC/STR AND RI/STR ENGINEERING AND ARE AC 5978 1 3 CEPTABLE PER MLO601-0002 PARAGRAPH 4.12.4. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 6111 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITON WAS TO REPLACE A MISSING HI-LOK NUT ON 6111 1 2 A FASTENER PROTRUDING THROUGH THE RIGHT HAND PAYLOAD BAY 11 WALL. THIS 6111 1 3 IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY IS MANUFACTURING 6111 1 4 ERROR. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE HI-LOK COLLAR WAS EVER INSTAL 6111 1 5 LED. 6135 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY NOTED ON PAGE 1 HAS BEEN ANNOTATED ON STR-3-07-2502 WI 6135 1 2 TH SIMILAR DISCREPANCIES ON OTHER RUB PANELS. THE DISCREPANCY WILL NOT 6135 1 3 BE WORKED ON THIS PR. NO OTHER DISCREPANCY EXIST IN THIS PR. CLOSE TH 6135 1 4 IS PR. 6255 1 1 THE STRUT WAS CLEANED AND A 24-HOUR AND 1 WEEK LEA 6255 1 2 K CHECK WERE PERFORMED WITH NO EVIDENCE OF FURTHER 6255 1 3 LEAKAGE. THE LEAK CHECKS SATISFIED THE REQUIREME 6255 1 4 NTS OF OMRS V51ACO.020. STEPS 4 AND 5 WEREDELETE 6255 1 5 D SINCE NO OMRS EXISTS WHICH REQUIRES PERFORMING A 6255 1 6 LEAK CHECK WITH WEIGHT ON WHEELS. NO FURTHER WOR 6255 1 7 K IS REQUIRED. THIS WAD IS NOT A CONSTRAINT TO VE 6255 1 8 HICLE POWER UP. 6280 1 1 THE VOID IN THE BODY/FLAP COVE PANEL WAS FILLED WITH ADHESIVE PER MR A 6280 1 2 CTION. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST AND THE PR CAN CLOSE. CLOSE TH 6280 1 3 IS PR. 6331 1 1 LINE V070-454705-020 FEMALE DYNATUBE FITTING HAD O 6331 1 2 BSTRUCTED THREADS. A LUBED PLUG WAS REPEATEDLY RU 6331 1 3 N INTO AND OUT OF FITTING, CLEANING IT EVERY CYCLE 6331 1 4 , TO CHASE THE B-NUT THREADS CLEAR. THERE WAS A N 6331 1 5 OTICEABLE IMPROVEMENT IN EASE OF THREADING ONCE OB 6331 1 6 STRUCTION WAS CLEARED. UPON O2 MANIFOLD PANEL #2 6331 1 7 RE-INSTALLATION, LINE FITTING WAS FIT CHECKED CARE 6331 1 8 FULLY, USING FINGER PRESSURE ONLY. FITTING THREAD 6331 1 9 ED ON COMPLETELY AND EASILY. PR CONDITION NO LONG 6331 1 10 ER EXISTS. FINAL INSTALLATION LUBED, TORQUED AND 6331 1 11 SAFETY WIRED LINE V070-454705-020 IN PLACE TO O2 P 6331 1 12 ANEL PORT, RETURNING TO DWG CONFIGURATION. 6349 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER AND I 6349 1 2 S INSTALLED. THE INSULATOR AND PANEL ARE OK FOR FLIGHT. 6394 1 1 HEATSINK STRIPS WERE DAMAGED OR DID NOT MEET DESIG 6394 1 2 N INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS. THE HEATSINK WAS EITH 6394 1 3 ER REWORKED OR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. REWO 6394 1 4 RK OR ACCEPTED HEATSINK MEETS THE INSTALLATION DES 6394 1 5 IGN INTENT. 6647 1 1 THE THREE MOUNTING BOLTS THAT WERE LOOSE (REF. PAGE 1) WERE REMOVED FO 6647 1 2 R INSPECTION. EVALUATION REVEALED THAT THE INCORRECT HARDWARE WAS INST 6647 1 3 ALLED (REF PAGE 1A). CORRECT HARDWARE WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED PER P 6647 1 4 RINT REQUIREMENTS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORK 6647 1 5 MANSHIP. 6679 1 1 THE DISCREPANT V070-851117-001 GROUND STRAP SUPPORT BRACKET HAS BEEN R 6679 1 2 EPLACED WITH A NEW GROUND STRAP OBTAINED IN STEP 2.0 OF THIS PR. THE B 6679 1 3 RACKET HAS BEEN RETURNED TO A PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE 6679 1 4 OF DAMAGE IS INCIDENTAL DAMAGE DURING ORBITER PROCESSING. 6829 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 6829 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 6829 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 6829 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 6829 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 6829 1 6 7-103-C1). 6996 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE TWO DAMAGED NUT PLATES 6996 1 2 ON THE LO2 UMBILICAL STRUCTURE CLOSEOUT. THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE 6996 1 3 . THE ORIGINAL DISCREPANT NUT PLATES WERE ACCEPTABLE DURING FERRY FLIG 6996 1 4 HT OPERATIONS ONLY USING (14) SCREWS INSTEAD OF (15). THE CAUSE OF THE 6996 1 5 DAMAGE TO THE NUT PLATES WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. DURING INSTALLATIO 6996 1 6 N OF NAS1199-3 RIVET, RIVET SQUEEZER MARD THE BEAM. DYE-PENETRATION TE 6996 1 7 ST WAS PERFORMED WHICH REVEALED EVIDENCE OF NO CRACK. DISCREPANCY DOCU 6996 1 8 MENTED BY ITEM 2, PAGE 1A HAS BEEN RESOLVED. THE NUT PLATES WERE REPLA 6996 1 9 CED RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. 7006 1 1 INTERFERENCE CONDITION WAS RESOLVED BY TRIMMING .2 7006 1 2 5" OFF THE LOWER END OF STIFFENER VIA MR. INTERFE 7006 1 3 RENCE HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE CAUSED THRU TOLERA 7006 1 4 NCE BUILD-UP. 7012 1 1 REWORK OF RUB PLATE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED. MR 7012 1 2 WORKED AS APPROVED 7288 1 1 WHILE REMOVING C/P V070-194123-001 THE ROSAN AND SHIM BACKED OUT OF O/ 7288 1 2 B ATTACH POINT. THE ROSAN WAS REPLACED ON A DR AND STEP 5.0 OF THIS PR 7288 1 3 VERIFIED THAT THE ROSAN WOULD HOLD A THREADED FASTENER IN PLACE AT FL 7288 1 4 IGHT TORQUE. THE SHIM WAS REBONDED IN PLACE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SH 7288 1 5 IM DEBONDING IS DUE TO BAD SURFACE PREP OF THE STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAU 7288 1 6 SE FOR THE ROSAN BACKING OUT IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 7511 1 1 THE ABOVE STEP AND NOTE ESTABLISHES THAT THE 7511 1 2 BOLT IS PER DWG.CONFIGURATION WITH PROPER WEAR 7511 1 3 MARKINGS.NO MR CONDITION EXISTS.NORMAL OPERATIONAL 7554 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW SEAL THE DISCR 7554 1 2 EPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS AND THE PR CAN CLOSE. 7654 1 1 (ITEM 1) NOT ENOUGH DISTANCE BTWN THE STIFFENER & SUPPORTS TO INSTALL 7654 1 2 A TEE & NEW SUPT. INSTL'D MD121-0002-06 C'SNK RIVETS AT Xo 1306, Zo 4 7654 1 3 10.875, 386.375, 371.375 FLUSH OUTBD SIDE OF Yo 82.0 STIFFENER PER MR 7654 1 4 ON PG. 6 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBLEM CAUSED DUE TO A BUILD UP OF TO 7654 1 5 LERANCES. (ITEM 2) HI-LOK INTERFERES W/ INSTL'N OF TEE SUPT. CONTERS 7654 1 6 UNK RIVET SUBSTITUTED PER MR ON PG. 8 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. DESIGN PR 7654 1 7 OBLEM. (ITEM 3) PROPER EDGE DISTANCE IN THE V070-856212-003 FITTING I 7654 1 8 S NOT MAINTAINED WHILE INSTL'G THE V070-858038-001 TEE. HOLE IN FITTI 7654 1 9 NG COUNTERBORED UP TO .4" TO ALLOW HI-LOK TO SEAT AGAINST THE STIFFENE 7654 1 10 R. STIFFENER LOC'D BENEATH THE FITTING. MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE ON P 7654 1 11 G. 12 DESIGN PROBLEM. (ITEM 4) COUNTERSUNK HOLE TO A DEPTH > SPEC ALL 7654 1 12 OWS IN THE Yo 82 STIFFENER. OKAY AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR ON 7654 1 13 PG. 13. ACCESS PROBLEM. 7698 1 1 THE SEAL AROUND THE CM SIDE HATCH WAS SUSPECTED TO BE A V070-332902-00 7698 1 2 1. PRINT CALLS OUT A V070-332902-002. AFTER INSPECTION IT WAS FOUND TH 7698 1 3 AT A -002 SEAL WAS INSTALLED, BUT WAS DISCREPANT BECAUSE IT DID NOT ME 7698 1 4 ET THE -002 DESIGN CRITERIA. THE SEAL WAS R&R'D WITH A PER PRINT -002 7698 1 5 SEAL. CAUSE: OVERSIGHT DURING ORIGINAL MANUFACTURING INSTALLATION. DIS 7698 1 6 CREPANT SEAL WAS FLOWN FLT #7 AND WAS REPLACED POST FLIGHT. 7886 1 1 BRACKET V070-1910092-002 WAS REPLACED AND EVALUATE 7886 1 2 D BY ENGINEERING WHICH REVEALED IT IS INSTALLED PE 7886 1 3 R PRINT. O/T STEP FROM C/P TO BRACKET STEP IS ADDR 7886 1 4 ESSED ON PR STR-3-07-1922 WHERE STEP IS REQUIRED. 8094 1 1 DISCREPANT STRUT HAS BEEN SENT TO VENDOR FOR 8094 1 2 REWORK AND REPLACED FOR FLIGHT 6 OF OV-103. 8190 1 1 THE V070-395217-003 CARRIER PANEL COULD NOT BE TRIMMED PER VSTR-3-07-3 8190 1 2 33 BECAUSE IT WAS NOT IN PRINT CONFIGURATION. ALL THE DIMENTIONS BUT O 8190 1 3 NE WERE SHORT. THEREFORE THIS PR TRIMMED THE V070-395217-003 CARRIER P 8190 1 4 ANEL PER THE DIMENTIONS GIVEN IN ATTACHMENT A. THE TRIMMED CARRIER PAN 8190 1 5 EL WAS MRB APPROVED AND IDENTIFIED. 8202 1 1 THE TIME EXPIRED ON SURFACE PREP FOR PART VR70-332129-004. THE SURFACE 8202 1 2 PREP WAS REPERFORMED BY ISSUING A NEW SEQUENCE 300. PROBABLE CAUSE IS 8202 1 3 WORKMANSHIP. 8386 1 1 THE DAMAGED STRUT WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW ONE. REF 8386 1 2 PMR 311952 THE INSTALLATION IS RETURNED TO PRINT 8386 1 3 CONFIGURATION. 8399 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE 8399 1 2 PEELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD 8399 1 3 BEARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION 8399 1 4 . THE DEBONDED SHIM(S) WERE REBONDED IN PLACE. 8399 1 5 RC ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACH 8399 1 6 ING HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #51 8399 1 7 21-87-103-C1) 8444 1 1 AS INSTALLED CONFIGURATION WILL BE ADDED TO CORREC 8444 1 2 T DWG. 8444 2 1 DWG INCORRECT EO B08 TO CORRECT-SYS INTEGRITY MAIN 8444 2 2 TAINED. NO FURTHER RC. JAIMIE POSEY 12-20-85 8640 1 1 ITEM 1- DISCREPANT HOLE WAS FILLED WITH MB0130-119 TYPE 111 ADHESIVE P 8640 1 2 ER MRB DISPOSITION. 8673 1 1 USE BLIND FASTENER JO BOLT CODED XDB-02-05,WHICH 8673 1 2 IS AN MD128-0002-0205 IN PLACE OF FASTENER CALLED 8673 1 3 OUT ON THE FACE OF THE DRAWING. EO TO FOLLOW 8673 1 4 VERIFY EO/PR CONFORM V070-100008 EO B05 8736 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 8736 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 8736 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACTI 8736 1 4 ON TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W 8736 1 5 TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 8736 1 6 THE CARRIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. CLOSE PR. 8925 1 1 THE FIRST DISCREPANCY WAS THAT THE "B" HATCH SEAL WAS GOUGED. THE SEAL 8925 1 2 WAS MR APPROVED FOR RESTRICTED USE (FLIGHT 07 ONE FLIGHT). THE SEAL W 8925 1 3 AS FLOWN, REMOVED, AND REPLACED. THE REPLACEMENT SEAL TURNED UP WITH A 8925 1 4 PIN HOLE WHICH IS DOCUMENTED AS THE SECOND DISCREPANCY. THE PINHOLE W 8925 1 5 AS FILLED WITH RTV PRIOR TO SEAL INSTALLATION. THE SEAL WAS MR'D FOR R 8925 1 6 ESTRICTED USE AND WAS INSPECTED PER PR MEQ-3-08-0381 AND INSTALLED SUC 8925 1 7 H THAT THE REPAIRED PROTION IS FACING INTO THE SEAL GROOVE SO THAT THE 8925 1 8 REPAIRED SIDE GOES AGAINST THE ADHESIVE IN THE GROOVE. THE SEAL PASSE 8925 1 9 D A LEAK CHECK PER V1047 (3-011089-6) STEP 21 OF THIS WAD. THE SEAL WA 8925 1 10 S THEN MR'D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE 1: AIRLOCK TRAFFIC, P 8925 1 11 ROBABLE CAUSE 2: MISMANUFACTURED. COORDINATE/EVALUATE PROBABLE CAUSE W 8925 1 12 ITH DESIGN AGENCY. 9190 1 1 DISCREPANCY TO BE WORKED ON DR STR-3-09-0049. PR NO LONGER REQUIRED. N 9190 1 2 O PARTS TO BE ORDERED ON DR. 9217 1 1 THE TOP 4 EA. RIVETS OF THE BODY FLAP ACTUATOR FITTINGS ARE NOT INSTAL 9217 1 2 LED PER SPEC. THE RIVETS WERE INSPECTED FOR DEFECTS AND MR ACCEPTED AS 9217 1 3 IS. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO DESIGN. THE 1 EA. LOCATION THAT HAD SHEARED 9217 1 4 RIVET HEAD HAD WAS FILLED WITH ADHESIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF SHEARED RI 9217 1 5 VET IMPROPER RIVET INSTALLATION. CLOSE THIS PR WITH PMRB CONCURRENCE R 9217 1 6 EF. STEP 27. 9218 1 1 ITEM 1 THRU 4, PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS SPLITS AND HOLES IN R/H TEE #12 9218 1 2 (R/S 13) INSULATOR WAS RESOLVED BY ROUTING THE INSULATOR TO RI SERVICE 9218 1 3 CENTER FOR REPAIR. INSULATOR WAS RETURNED AND REINSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. 9218 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 9502 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY WAS DISCOVERED DURING STEP 08-001 OF V9002.07. THE PLA 9502 1 2 TING ON PIN 1170854-1 IS MISSNG IN TWO LOCATIONS. BOTH LOCATIONS ARE O 9502 1 3 N THE PIN'S OUTER SURFACE ALONG ONE EDGE (SEE FIGURE 1). THE DE-PLATIN 9502 1 4 G IS CLEAR OF THE AREA OF INTERFACE BETWEEN THE PIN AND THE NLG HYDRAU 9502 1 5 LIC ACTUATOR. IT WILL NOT AFFECT THE FORM, FIT, FUNCTION OR STRUCTURAL 9502 1 6 INTEGRITY. THIS CONDITION WAS MOST LIKELY DUE TO REPEATED REMOVAL/INS 9502 1 7 TALLATION OF THE HARDWARE CONNECTING THE STRUT TO THE ACTUATOR. THE PA 9502 1 8 RT WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, "USE AS IS" PER MRB CONCURRANCE. 9502 1 9 AN MR ID WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER THIS WAD. 9535 1 1 THE ELONGATED AND SUSPECTED CRACKED GSE ATTACH POINT IDENTIFIED IN ITE 9535 1 2 M 1, PAGE 1 WAS REWORKED BY REMOVING RAISED METAL WITH MR APPROVAL RES 9535 1 3 TRICTEDTO ONE FLIGHT. AFTER REWORK, THE HOLE WAS DYE PENETRANT INSPEC 9535 1 4 TED AND NO CRACKS WERE FOUND. AFTER FLIGHT 11, A .080" THICK DOUBLER W 9535 1 5 AS INSTALLED. THE DOUBLER WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE SU 9535 1 6 SPECTED CAUSE OF THE ELONGATED HOLE IS WORKMANSHIP. CONCLUDE THAT THE 9535 1 7 V070-399253-002 BULKHEAD HAS BEEN RETURNED TO DESIGN INTENT AND NO FUR 9535 1 8 THER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. CLOSE THIS PR. 9883 1 1 THE SHIM WAS SUCCESFULLY TRIMMED . NO FURTHER ACTI 9883 1 2 ON REQUIRED. 9984 1 1 DISCREPANCY #1 - BOTH THE SURFACE ANOMALIES ARE SU 9984 1 2 PERFICIAL IN NATURE, AND HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UN 9984 1 3 RESTRICTED USE. THE SCRATCHES PROBABLY OCCURRED D 9984 1 4 URING INSTALLATION OF ADJACENT HARDWARE (BLACK BOX 9984 1 5 ES OR COLD PLATE). VERY LITTLE WORK SPACE EXISTS 9984 1 6 IN AVIONICS BAY 5. DISCREPANCY ITEM #2 WAS BROKEN 9984 1 7 DOWN INTO ITEMS 3-7. ITEM #2 WAS DELETED. DISCR 9984 1 8 EPANCIES 3 - 7 - ALL (5) TAPE RESIDUE AREAS WERE C 9984 1 9 LEANED WITH M.E.K. AND CORROSION PROTECTED. 10026 1 1 OMRS REQUIREMENT S00E00.690 SPECIFIES FUEL CELL SHUT-DOWN IS REQUIRED 10026 1 2 IF ESTIMATED HOLD PERIOD IS GREATER THAN 48 HOURS. FUEL CELLS WERE NOT 10026 1 3 SHUT-DOWN FOR WCDDT 72 HOUR SCRUB TURN-AROUND. PURPOSE OF REQUIREMENT 10026 1 4 IS TO MINIMIZE FUEL CELL RUN TIME (LIMIT LIFE ITEM). DUE TO ET LH2 T- 10026 1 5 O REPAIR WORK (DURING 72 HOUR SCRUB TURN-AROUND), FUEL CELL SHUT-DOWN 10026 1 6 WOULD HAVE COMPLICATED GH2 T-O SAFING REQUIRED TO SUPPORT LH2 REPAIRS 10026 1 7 RESULTING IN ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL IMPACTS/IMPLICATIONS. AVOIDANCE OF 10026 1 8 THESE OPERATIONAL IMPACTS WAS DEEMED BY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT TO BE MORE 10026 1 9 IMPORTANT THAN MINIMIZING FUEL CELL RUN TIME (REFERENCE WAIVER WK0686 10026 1 10 ). FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT SCRUB TURN-AROUND MIN 10026 1 11 AL. CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT/APPROVAL OF WAIVER WK0686. 10139 1 1 INSERT WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED FROM LOWER FORWARD CORNER OF 28-13 DOO 10139 1 2 R. THE INSERT WAS INSTALLED AS PART OF MRTT4896-000M REPAIR AND WAS RE 10139 1 3 BONDED WITH M80120-008 ADHESIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP ON ORIG 10139 1 4 INAL BOND. CLOSE THIS PR. 10178 1 1 DURING AXLE INSP IT WAS NOTICED THAT AN UNKNOWN RESIDUE WAS ON THE AXL 10178 1 2 E BUSHINGS. SAMPLES OF THE RESIDUE WERE TAKEN FROM THE AXLE. WHILE T 10178 1 3 HE RESULTS WERE BEIN ANALYZED CONVERSATION W/ THE VENDOR REVEALED THAT 10178 1 4 THE RESIDUE WAS A DRY LUBE USED TO PREVENT SEIZURE OF THE WHEEL ASSY 10178 1 5 ON THE BUSHING. RESULTS OF THE SAMPLE (ATTACHED) INDICATED ENVIRONMEN 10178 1 6 TAL DEBRIS CONSISTENT TO THE OPF WORK AREA. THE SAMPLE TAKEN WAS OF A 10178 1 7 N INSUFFICIENT AMT TO IND A DRY LUBE SUBSTANCE. THE RESIDUE (DRY LUBE 10178 1 8 ) WAS MR'D FOR UNRESTRICTED USED FOR THIS PR. THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEBRI 10178 1 9 S WAS CLEANED FROM THE AXLE BUSHINGS PER THIS PR. 10203 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 THE V070-198702-024 TRAILING EDGE SEAL DOES HAVE BOTH RE 10203 1 2 TAINING RINGS AS REQUIRED PER DRAWING. THE MINOR TEARS IN THE V070-198 10203 1 3 702-036 SCREEN AT ONE END OF THE V070-198702-024 SEAL WERE MR ACCEPTED 10203 1 4 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 10203 1 5 N. 10292 1 1 A TAP WAS USED TO CLEAN THE THREADS OF THE FWD OUT 10292 1 2 BRD CORNER NUT PLATE OF THE FC BRACKET. A NEW BOLT 10292 1 3 WAS THEN INSTLD & TORQUED PER V5R01 AND NO GALLIN 10292 1 4 G NOTED. CLOSE PR. 10397 1 1 DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED BY MR TO TRIM 10397 1 2 BRACKETS SO THAT PROPER EDGE DISTANCE CAN BE 10397 1 3 ACHIEVED. 10419 1 1 DISCREPANCY 1, PAGE 1, AND DISCREPANCY 3, PAGE 1B, 10419 1 2 WERE CORRECTED BY FABRICATION OF A MRB APPROVED 10419 1 3 STUD PLATE AND USING IT TO REPLACE THE DEFECTIVE 10419 1 4 STUD PLATE. BOLTS IN ITEM 2, PAGE 1A, WERE NOT RE 10419 1 5 MOVED PER A MRB APPROVED DISPO WHICH LEFT THE BOLT 10419 1 6 S INSTALLED - O.K.-AS-IS. CAUSE OF THIS PR WAS OV 10419 1 7 ERTORQUING OF NUTS ON STUD PLATES PER FCS-3-07-239 10427 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REMOVE RESIDUE FROM THE LEFT HA 10427 1 2 ND LOWER BODY FLAP (FORWARD CORNER LEADING EDGE) CLOSEOUT RIB UNDER CA 10427 1 3 RRIER PANEL V070-399125-002. THE APPEARANE OF THE RESIDUE WAS DUE TO O 10427 1 4 UTGASSING FROM RTV AND FILLER BAR INSTALLATION. THERE WAS NO PERMANENT 10427 1 5 DAMAGE TO ADHESIVE, AND THE RESIDUE WAS REMOVED WITH A QUICK BRUSH OF 10427 1 6 SANDPAPER. THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OUTGASSING. 10429 1 1 V070-336554-009 & V070-336554-010 LIOH CONTAINER SUPPORTS COULD NOT BE 10429 1 2 INSTALLED DUE TO NEW VR70-332129-004 DOUBLER BEING BONDED. SUPPORTS W 10429 1 3 ERE TRIMMED BY E-O-T-F TO ACCOMODATE DOUBLER. PROBABLE CAUSE DESIGN DE 10429 1 4 FICIENCY. UPON VERIFICATION THAT RELEASED EO REFLECTS ENGINEERING DRAW 10429 1 5 ING, CLOSE THIS PR. 10465 1 1 THIS PR AFFECTED THE RH INBD ELEVON COVE, OTBD SEAL PNL ASSY ITEM 1 AN 10465 1 2 D 2 ALSO EXISTED ON LH SIDE ON STR-3527. IN ITEM 1, THE LINEAR SEAL HO 10465 1 3 USING WAS BINDING IN THE SEAL PANEL ASSY. THE HOUSING HW WAS REMOVED. 10465 1 4 THE SEAL PANEL FLANGES AND THE LINEAR SEAL FLANGES WERE TRIMMED PER MR 10465 1 5 TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. (STEPS 1.0-17.0) WHILE REINSTALLING THE HW 10465 1 6 , BINDING STILL EXISTED--HARD CONTACT BETWEEN LINEAR SEAL END CAPS AND 10465 1 7 RETAINERS--AND WAS WRITTEN UP AS ITEM 4, PAGE 1C. THIS WAS RESOLVED B 10465 1 8 Y RE-SHIMMING THE LINEAR SEAL. (STEPS 16.1-16.7) PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE 10465 1 9 BINDING WAS TOLERANCE BUILD-UP IN ITEM 1 AND WORKMANSHIP IN ITEM 4. I 10465 1 10 N ITEM 2, THE DISCOLORED AND BUBBLED KOROPON ON THE ENBD END OF THE SE 10465 1 11 AL PANEL WAS REMOVED, AND NEW KOROPON APPLIED. (STEPS 21.0-22.0) PROBA 10465 1 12 BLE CAUSE WAS HEAT DUE TO AIR FLOW FROM ELEVON COVE LEAKS, WHICH SHOUL 10465 1 13 D BE FIXED BY THE STR-3-12-484 ELEVON COVE REWORK. IN ITEM 3, THE (4) 10465 1 14 MINOR NICKS/GOUGES FOUND AT PRIMARY SEAL FLANGE LOCATIONS WERE FILED/S 10465 1 15 ANDED PER MR AND GIVEN NEW CORROSION PROTECTION. (STEPS 17.0-20.0) THE 10465 1 16 YW=259 LOCATION WAS RELATED TO STR-3-12-3543, A GOUGED RETAINER. PROB 10465 1 17 ABLE CAUSE WAS TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 10546 1 1 THE V070-326874-001 BULB SEAL ON THE NLG DOOR HAS BEEN REMOVED AND REPLA 10546 1 2 CED PER THIS PR. THE SEAL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO A PRINT CONFIGURATION. NO 10546 1 3 FURTHER ENGINEERING EVALUATION IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: DEGRADATION 10546 1 4 DURING VEHICLE PROCESSING. 10546 1 5 10690 1 1 REF ITEM 1, PG 1, PINHOLE AND MISSING COATING ON INCONEL FACESHEET OF 10690 1 2 FIPPER DOOR RUB PANEL #2, INBOARD RH ELEVON, P/N V070-198002-077. DISC 10690 1 3 REPANCY WAS RESOLVED BY DRILLING OUT PINHOLE AND POTTING UNDERLYING HO 10690 1 4 NEYCOMB CELLS WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE PER MR DISPO. THE EXPOSED INCON 10690 1 5 EL FACESHEET WAS COATED WITH HIGH TEMPERATURE-RESISTANT COATING. FLIPP 10690 1 6 ER DOOR RUB PANEL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THIS PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABL 10690 1 7 E CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 10956 1 1 O2 TKI SUPPLY LINE/TANK I/F INDICATED LEAKAGE GREATER THAN ALLOWABLE ( 10956 1 2 WAS 4.53 X 10 -6 SCCS, S/B <1 X 10 -7). INSPECTION OF SEALING SURFACE 10956 1 3 S REVEALED LINE SIDE WAS NICKED AT THE 7 OCLOCK POSITION. (REF PG 1A) 10956 1 4 LINE/TANK SEALING SURFACES WERE CLEANED AND RE-CONNECTED. SUBSEQUENT 10956 1 5 LOW PRESSURE MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK FAILED(8.5 X 10 -7 SCCS). LINE WAS 10956 1 6 DISCONNECTED AND ADDITIONAL INSPECTION NOTED THAT SUPPLY LINE WAS MIS 10956 1 7 ALIGNED APPROXIMATLY 1/2" BELOW TANK SUPPLY INTERFACE (REF PG 1B) SUBS 10956 1 8 EQUENT ATTEMPT TO REALIGN AND LOW PRESSURE MASS SPEC FAILED. V070-454 10956 1 9 865-110 AND -111 O2 SUPPLY LINES WERE REMOVED AND NEW LINES MOCKED UP. 10956 1 10 DURING REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS, TUBE V070-454865-011 WAS KINKED 10956 1 11 (REF PG 1C). NEW TUBE WAS FABRICATED. NEW TUBES V070-454865-010 AND - 10956 1 12 011 WERE INSTALLED AS V070-454865-110 AND0-111 O2 TANK 1 SUPPLY LINES 10956 1 13 RESPECTIVELY. DURING V070-454865-110 LINE INSTLN, MISALIGNMENT WITH T 10956 1 14 ANK SUPPLY LINE WAS NOTED. (REF. PG 1D) MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED/WOR 10956 1 15 KED TO REMOVE 1/4" OF FOAM INSULATION FROM LINE V070-454865-110 AND -1 10956 1 16 18 AT RESTRICTION POINTS. UPON LINE INSTALLATION (SUBSEQUENT TO MR FO 10956 1 17 AM INSTALLATION RMVL) IT WAS NOTED THAT LINE DID NOT FIT SNUGGLY IN V0 10956 1 18 70-454578-001 LINE SUPPORT (REF PG 1E). MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED/WORK 10956 1 19 ED TO ADD INSULATION MATERIAL TO LINE TO ENABLE SECURE FIT IN LINE SUP 10956 1 20 PORT. SUBSEQUENT LOW PRESSURE MASS SPEC LEAK CHECKS ON O2 TANK 1 SUPP 10956 1 21 SUPPLY LINES BRAZES/MECH FTGS (8 TOTAL) ALL PASSED (REF STEP 94). HIG 10956 1 22 H PRESSURE MASS SPEC LEAK CHECKS WERE PERFORMED PER OMI V1022 AND VERI 10956 1 23 FIED BY STEP 107 OF THIS PR. (ALL PASSED) CLOSE THIS PR. 11402 1 1 ON FLIGHT 7, DURING PERFORMANCE OF PR MEQ-3-07-0201, UPON REMOVAL AND 11402 1 2 REINSTALLATION OF THE RH OUTBOARD FWD AND AFT ET DOOR UPLATCH 11402 1 3 ASSEMBLIES, EIGHTEEN OCN NUMBERS FOR INTERNAL COMPONENTS OF THE 11402 1 4 ASSEMBLIES WERE NOT RECORDED. THE ASSEMBLIES WERE NOT TORN DOWN, ALL 11402 1 5 PARTS WERE REPLACED IN THEIR ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION. THIS PR 11402 1 6 (MEQ-3-07-0361, LATER RENAMED TO MEQ-3-A0022) WAS WRITTEN TO ADDRESS 11402 1 7 THE MISSING OCN NUMBERS. WAIVER H76262 WAS WRITTEN TO ALLOW FLIGHT OF 11402 1 8 THE HARDWARE AND THIS PR WAS DEFERRED UNTIL ACCESS TO THE PARTS BECAME 11402 1 9 AVAILABLE. WHEN ACCESS TO THE PARTS WAS AVAILABLE (DURING WORKING OF 11402 1 10 MEQ-A0054), STEP 4 OF THE ORIGINAL DISPO WAS PARTIALLY COMPLETED WHEN 11402 1 11 TEN OF THE MISSING OCN NUMBERS WERE VISUALLY VERIFIED AND RECORDED (SEE 11402 1 12 ATTACHMENT A). THE REMAINING EIGHT NUMBERS, WHICH WERE NOT VISUALLY 11402 1 13 VERIFIABLE, WERE ESTABLISHED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF CVAS. THE CVAS 11402 1 14 NUMBERS WHICH WERE NOT VISUALLY VERIFIABLE CAN BE RE-ASSIGNED AS 11402 1 15 RECORDED IN ATTACHMENT A. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEMS 11402 1 16 OR SERIAL NUMBERS. RETEST HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED PER V1097 ET DOOR 11402 1 17 FUNCTIONAL TEST AND V1283 ET DOOR LATCH PULL TEST. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS 11402 1 18 WORKMANSHIP. 11402 9405 1 VERIFIED OFFICIAL PER OISR, STATUS AS OF 6-15-94. VERIFIED OPEN PER PRIM 11402 9405 2 E BOARD LISTING 5-18-94. 11476 1 1 DEFECTIVE AREAS DESCRIBED ON PG. 1 SEEMED TO BE 11476 1 2 CAUSED BY TRAFFIC THROUGH AIRLOCK & THE ACTUAL CLO 11476 1 3 SING OF "A" & "B" HATCHES. THEREFORE THIS IS NOR- 11476 1 4 MAL WEAR & IS EXPECTED TO REOCCUR IN THE FUTURE. 11476 1 5 THE DEFECTS WERE CORROSION PROTECTED & FOUND NOT 11476 1 6 TO BE ON THE ACTUAL HATCH SEALING SURFACES. A LK 11476 1 7 CHK WAS PERFORMED & RESULTS WERE NOMINAL. THE RE- 11476 1 8 MAINING DAMAGE WAS MR'd. 11534 1 1 THE MISSING HI-LOC'S WERE SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED. 11534 1 2 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. 11606 1 1 HOLE WITHIN TOLERANCE/RAISED EDGE COSMETIC ONLY. 11937 1 1 BOTH ITEMS OF THIS PR WERE IN THE RH INBD ELEVON COVE AT THE LOWER CEN 11937 1 2 TER HINGE SEAL, Yw=210, AND WERE DEFERRED UNTIL COVE REWORK. IN ITEM 1 11937 1 3 , THE CHARRED POLYIMIDE SEAL WAS ROUTED TO HDA FOR SCRAP, AND A NEW SE 11937 1 4 AL REPLACED IT AS PART OF THE FLIGHT 12 ELEVON COVER REWORK IN STR-3-1 11937 1 5 2-484. IN ITEM 2 THE CHARRED RTV, WHICH WAS A PREVIOUS MR FIX. WAS REM 11937 1 6 OVED DURING STR-3-12-484 ELEVON COVE REWORK. THIS RETURNED THE HINGE S 11937 1 7 EAL TO PRINT CONDITIONS, AND RTV IS NOT EXPOECTED TO BE NEED THERE AGA 11937 1 8 IN. PROBABLE CAUSE OF BOTH ITEMS DUE TO HOT GAS FLOW OVER THE EXPOSED 11937 1 9 LOWER ELEVON COVE DURING FLIGHT. 12204 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: THE AIR LEAK PATH WAS CAUSED BY A GAP IN THE WELDING BE 12204 1 2 TWEEN FLANGE FITTINGS. PER DWG V070-198850 FLAG NOTE 1 THE GAP WAS SEA 12204 1 3 LED USING MBO130-119 TYPE II WITH MBO125-050 PER MAO106-303. PROBABLE 12204 1 4 CAUSE FOR LEAK PATH IS DEGRADATION OF RTV DURING ORBITER FLIGHT AND PR 12204 1 5 OCESSING. ITEM 2 PG 1A: THE V070-198862-006 WIPER SEAL NOT SEATINGPRO 12204 1 6 PERLY IS DUE TO DEGRADATION OF THE SEAL DURING ORBITER FLIGHT AND PROC 12204 1 7 ESSING. DURING STR-3-11-454, THE SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE TORN ON ITS O/B 12204 1 8 END. PER STR-3-11-3285 DISPOSITION, THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED 12204 1 9 WITH A NEW V070-198862-006 SEAL. MR RTV PLUG WAS REMOVED DURING R&R OF 12204 1 10 WIPER SEAL. NO FURTHER SHOP IR ENG ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBAB 12204 1 11 LE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 12292 1 1 ALTHOUGH MOLD IMPRESSION SHOWED ALL SCRATCHES TO B 12292 1 2 E WITHIN THE ALLOWABLE DESIGN CRITERIA OF .003 IN. 12292 1 3 (THE DEEPEST BEING .0019 IN). EVIDENCE OF CUT BOR 12292 1 4 ON FIBERS WERE FOUND WHEN THE STRUT WAS INSPECTED 12292 1 5 WITH A 10X GLASS WHICH VIOLATES THE DESIGN CENTER 12292 1 6 CRITERIAL OF NO CUT FIBERS ALLOWED. AN LRU PR HAS 12292 1 7 BEEN WRITTEN TO ROUTE THE STRUT BACK TO THE VENDOR 12292 1 8 WHERE IT WILL UNDERGO FUNCTIONAL INTEGRITY TESTS 12292 1 9 AND EVALUATION DUE TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED DISCREPA 12292 1 10 NCY. R.C. ACTION -DEVELOPE BETTER METHODS AND 12292 1 11 CRITERIA FOR THE HANDLING UNCRATING, AND THE STORA 12292 1 12 GE OF THE BORON STRUTS BY ALL PARTIES INVOLVED, (I 12292 1 13 E SHOP, LOGISTICS ECT.) THIS STRUT WAS A REPLACMEN 12292 1 14 T STRUT UPGRADED ON FCP-3-07-0134. 12301 1 1 THE DEFECTIVE HATCH ATTENUATOR BOOT WAS REPLACED AND THE DOOR OPEN POS 12301 1 2 ITION RIGGING WAS ADJUSTED TO OBTAIN THE SPECIFIED 88 +/- 2 DEGREES. H 12301 1 3 ATCH ATTENUATOR LEAK CHECK WAS PERFORMED AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF ALL W 12301 1 4 ORK TO REVALIDATE THE SYSTEM (REF ATTACHED OMRS ACCOMPLISHED DATA SHEE 12301 1 5 T). ALL WORK IS COMPLETE ON THIS WAS AND NO FURTHER RETEST IS REQUIRED 12301 1 6 . 12317 1 1 THE TK CLEARANCE SCARF IN THE H2 VENT LINE WAS DIS 12317 1 2 COVERED WHILE TK WAS REMOVED. MISSING KEVLAR/RESI 12317 1 3 N "SKIN" & FIRE RESISTANT COATING WERE APPLIED TO 12317 1 4 RAW FOAM OF SCARF PER SPEC. SCARF IN FOAM INSULAT 12317 1 5 ION DOC'D & ID'D BY MR ACTION. H2 SYSTEM INTEGRIT 12317 1 6 Y IS NOT COMPROMISED. 12356 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THE FILLER SPLICE TUBES AT THE ENDS OF THE V0 12356 1 2 70-351993-001 AND V070-351993-002 SEALS WERE SUSPECTED TO BE FILLED WI 12356 1 3 TH RTV. THE FILLER SPLICE TUBES WERE REMOVED AND FOUND TO BE FILLED WI 12356 1 4 TH RTV. THIS CONDITION, WHICH REDUCED THE COMPRESSIBILITY OF THE SEAL 12356 1 5 JOINTS PREVENTED THE R/H ET DOOR FROM CYCLING PROPERLY. WITH THE SEALS 12356 1 6 REMOVED, THE DOOR WAS CYCLED AND SATISFACTORY RESULTS WERE OBTAINED. 12356 1 7 NEW SPLICE TUBES WERE MADE AND THE SEALS WERE REINSTALLED. THE COMPRES 12356 1 8 SABILITY OF THE JOINTS WERE RESTORED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY I 12356 1 9 S IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF FILLER SPLICE TUBES (WORKMANSHIP). NO FURTH 12356 1 10 ER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 12493 1 1 THE THREAD PROTRUSION DISCREPANCY WAS ALLEVIATED BY REMOVING THE WASHE 12493 1 2 R UNDER THE NUT PER MR ACTION. THE SUSPECTED OVER TORQUED PIN ACCEPTED 12493 1 3 PER MR. THE PIN CURRENTLY IS TORQUED PER PRINT CONFIG'N. NO FURTHER D 12493 1 4 ISCREPANCIES EXIST, ON C/P. 12514 1 1 NINE VR70-354241-002 SPACERS WERE FOUND DEBONDED FROM THE 50-02 DOOR P 12514 1 2 ERIMETER (REFERENCE ATTACHMENT "A" FOR LOCATIONS). THESE SPACERS DEBON 12514 1 3 DED WHEN THE CARRIER PANEL FASTENERS WAS REMOVED POST-FLIGHT. NINE NEW 12514 1 4 VR70-354241-002 SPACERS WERE BONDED PER PRINT TO THE ORIGINAL CONFIGU 12514 1 5 RATION AROUND THE 50-02 DOOR PERIMETER. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DE 12514 1 6 GRADATION. 12615 1 1 THE FIRST DISCREPANCY WAS THE ALIGNMENT KEYS ON THE 1170183-1 SLEEVE I 12615 1 2 NNER SURFACE WERE BURRED. THE BURRS WERE REMOVED BY FILING FLUSH WITH 12615 1 3 THE EXISTING SURFACES. THE SECOND DISCREPANCY WAS THAT THE ALIGNMENT K 12615 1 4 EYS WERE SUSPECTED TO BE SLIGHTLY OFF FROM 180 DEG. APART. THOUGH DIFF 12615 1 5 ICULT TO USE, THE SLEEVE WAS USED FOR ONE FLIGHT ONLY (FLIGHT 7) AND W 12615 1 6 AS SCRAPPED. THE NEW SLEEVE WAS ORDERED, RECEIVED, AND INSTALLED. CAUS 12615 1 7 E: POOR CONSTRUCTION. CLOSE THIS PR. 12682 1 1 PAGE 1 WAS PICKED UP ON LH AND RH VENT DOOR 5 AFT HINGES HAVING GAPS B 12682 1 2 ETWEEN BUSHINGS AND DINGE. ATTACHMENTS 1 AND 2 WERE WRITTEN TO REMOVE 12682 1 3 AND INSPECT THE HARDWARE. DURING INSPECTION IT WAS NOTED THAT THE FW 12682 1 4 D HINGE BOLT GRIP LENGTH WAS TOO LONG TO ALLOW THE COTTER PIN TO ENGAT 12682 1 5 E THE NUT. E.O. TO FOLLOW RATIONALE WAS WRITTEN TO CHANGE THE RWD HIN 12682 1 6 GE BOLT FROM A NAS1004-18 TO A NAS1004-16. ALSO, THE V070-384312-001 12682 1 7 AND V070-384318-001 BUSHINGS WERE BINDING IN THE CLEVIS AND IT WAS DEC 12682 1 8 IDED TO REPLACE THEM. ATTACHMENTS 3 AND 4 WERE WRITTEN TO ACCOMPLISH 12682 1 9 THIS AND -001 BUSHINGS WERE ORDERED FROM RI. PAGE 1A WAS PICKED UP WH 12682 1 10 EN THE -001 BUSHINGS RECEIVED FROM RI WOULD NOT FIT INTO THE VEHICLE 12682 1 11 CLEVISES. INSPECTION OF THE -001 BUSHINGS SHOWED THAT MANY WERE ACTUA 12682 1 12 LLY OVERSIZED. LSOC, RI AND NASA ENGINEERING DECIDED THAT AN E.O. WAS 12682 1 13 NEEDED TO BOTH V070-384312 AND V070-384318 TO CHANGE THE VUSHING O.D. 12682 1 14 FROM 3727 (+0.0/-0.0005") TO .3711 (+0.0/-0.0010") TO ALLOW ADEQUATE 12682 1 15 CLEARANCE FOR THE BUSHINGS TO ROTATE FREELY IN THE CLEVIS (THIS E.O. C 12682 1 16 REATED THE -003 BUSHINGS) AND ALSO TO V070-384305 TO ALLOW THE INSTALL 12682 1 17 ATION OF THE -003 BUSHINGS. E.O. TO FOLLOW RATIONALE WAS WRITTEN TO A 12682 1 18 CCOMPLISH THIS AND ALL AVAILABLE -001 BUSHINGS WERE SENT TO RI SERVICE 12682 1 19 CENTER ON PR MEQ-3-07-0227 FOR REWORK TO -003 DIMENSIONS. THE NEW -0 12682 1 20 03 BUSHINGS WERE RETURNED TO KSC AND ALL WERE WITHIN SPEC. A FIT CHEC 12682 1 21 K OF THE -003 BUSHINGS IN THE VEHICLE SHOWED AN EXCELLENT FIT WITH FRE 12682 1 22 E ROTATION. DOOR INSTALLATION RESUMED IN ATTACHMENTS 3 AND 4 USING TH 12682 1 23 E -003 BUSHINGS AND DOOR SET UP WAS PERFORMED. PAGHES 1B AND 1C WERE 12682 1 24 PICKED UP IN STEP 17 OF ATTACHMENTS 3 AND 4 RESPECTIVELY BECAUSE THE A 12682 1 25 FT HINGE GAPS C AND D WERE NOT EQUAL WITHIN +/-.005" PER THE INSTALLAT 12682 1 26 ION AND RIGGING INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH INDICATE TO CENTER THE FWD HINGE I 12682 1 27 N IT'S CLEVIS AND THEN POSITION THE AFT HINGE SUCH THAT THE AFT BUSHIN 12682 1 28 G/CLEVIS GAPS ARE EQUAL (+/-.005") AND DRILL THE HINGE MOUNTING HOLES 12682 1 29 IN THE DOOR. THE AFT HINGE GAPS WERE MEAASURED AND FOUND TO BE .110"/ 12682 1 30 .070" AND .033"/.074" RESPECTIVELY. THIS DEMENSION IS NOT ADJUSTABLE 12682 1 31 AFTER MANUFACTURE. THESE GAPS ARE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW FOR MOVEMENT AN 12682 1 32 D EXPANSION/CONTRACTION IN BOTH DIRECTIONS, BECAUSE THE FWD HINGE CONF 12682 1 33 IGURATION LIMITS DOOR MOVEMENT TO .005" - .010". THEREFORE, THIS COND 12682 1 34 ITION DOES NOT AFFECT THE FIT, FORM OR FUNCTION OF THE VENT DOORS FOR 12682 1 35 INTENDED USE. THIS CONDITION WAS MR'D "ACCEPTABLE AS IS FOR UNRESTRIC 12682 1 36 TED USE" AND MR ID WAS APPLIED. PAGE 1D WAS PICKED UP BECAUSE THE EL 12682 1 37 ECTRICAL BOND TEST OF THE BOND STRAP ON LH VENT DOOR 5 WAS OUT OF SPEC 12682 1 38 . ATTACHMENT "ELECTRICAL BOND TEST" WAS WRITTEN TO CORRECT THIS DISCR 12682 1 39 EPANCY BY REMOVING THE JUMPER, CLEANING THE FAYING SURFACES, REINSTALL 12682 1 40 ING THE JUMPER AND RETESTING THE BOND. A RESISTANCE OF LESS THAN 2.50 12682 1 41 MILLIOHMS WAS OBTAINED ON RETEST. THE VENT DOOR FUCTIONAL RETEST WAS 12682 1 42 PERFORMED PER V1016. THESE DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXIST. UPON VERIF 12682 1 43 ICATION IN STEPS 7 AND 12 THAT RELEASED E.O.'S REFLECT ENGINEERING DIS 12682 1 44 POSITION, CLOSE THIS PR. 12877 1 1 VOID THIS PR. CLOSE: WHEEL ASSEMBLY IS PROCESSED AS AN ASSEMBLY, BLOW T 12877 1 2 IRE CONDITION IS DOCUMENTED ON MEQ-3-05-0144 PR, ITEM 2. 13106 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-80005- 13106 1 2 1007 NUT AT LOCATION R/H Xo779.25 Zo396.50 IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORIGINA 13106 1 3 L RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 0.0 INCH POUNDS. 13106 1 4 NUT WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE 13106 1 5 TO THE APPROPIATE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURETO PR 13106 1 6 INT CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. T 13106 1 7 HIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 13159 1 1 WHILE REMOVING INSULATION & TYWRAPS FROM FUEL CELL #1 H2 PURGE LINE PE 13159 1 2 R TPS FCP-3-07-020 THE LINE'S HEATER WIRE WAS INADVERTENTLY CUT. SUBSE 13159 1 3 QUENT INSPECTION PROVED THE LINE HEATER WIRE ELEMENT WAS REF DES 40V45 13159 1 4 HR050. THE LINE HEATER WIRE ELEMENT WAS REPLACED WITH LIKE PART, P/N-M 13159 1 5 C363-0038-0003 PER MLO 310-0064. RESISTANCE CHECK OF REPLACEMENT LINE 13159 1 6 HEATER WIRE ELEMENT WAS PERFORMED PRIOR TO AND AFTER INSTALLATION WITH 13159 1 7 ACCEPTABLE RESULTS. HEATER WIRE TERMINAL ENDS WERE SPLICED, AND I.D.' 13159 1 8 D PER STEP 18,19 &20. FUEL CELL #1 H2 PURGE LINE WAS THEN REWRAPPED WI 13159 1 9 TH MBO135-024, TYPE 1 INSULATION PER STEP 21. FUEL CELL #1 H2 PURGE LI 13159 1 10 NE AND HEATER INSTALLATION HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO DWG. CONFIGURATION AN 13159 1 11 D ARE FLIGHT WORTHY. SUCCESSFUL H2 PURGE LINE HEATER RETEST WAS PERFOR 13159 1 12 MED PER OMI V1022, SEQ 25. 13308 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES NOTED ON PAGES 1 THROUGH 1C HAVE 13308 1 2 BEEN RESOLVED BY MR DISPOSITION CONSISTING MAINLY 13308 1 3 OF (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POTTING AND TRIMMING. DE 13308 1 4 SIGN INTENT OF THE RTV HEAT SINK INSTALLATION HAS 13308 1 5 BEEN MAINTAINED. 13320 1 1 AS STATEDIN THE SUMMARY ON PAGE 8 FUEL CELL #1 CO 13320 1 2 OLANT FILTER WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED AFTER SIX FL 13320 1 3 IGHTS. A SECTION OF THE COOLANT LINES ON THE UPST 13320 1 4 REAM SIDE OF THE FILTER WAS FLUSHED AND SUCCESSFU 13320 1 5 LLY SAMPLED. THE SYSTEM CLEANLINESS HAS BEEN REST 13320 1 6 ORED. INITIALLY THE PLAN WAS TO KEEP THE PR OPEN 13320 1 7 PENDING THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYZED FILTER. THE F 13320 1 8 ILTER ANALYSIS RESULTS DO NOT CONSTRAIN THE CLOSUR 13320 1 9 E OF THIS PR. AS STATED THE SYSTEM HAS BEEN RESTO 13320 1 10 RED TO FLIGHT STATUS. THE REMOVED FILTER WILL BE 13320 1 11 INSPECTED BY LSS TO EVALUATE FILTER PERFORMANCE AF 13320 1 12 TER EXPERIENCING SIX FLIGHTS. FUEL CELL #1 COOLAN 13320 1 13 T LINES ARE RESTORED AND ARE FLIGHT WORTHY. 13523 1 1 MOLD IMPRESSION WAS TAKEN OF GOUGE IN FITTING. 13523 1 2 GOUGE WAS MINOR IN NATURE. SHARP EDGES WERE REMOV 13523 1 3 ED AND AREA CORROSION PROTECTED. PART MR ID'D. 13652 1 1 PER DISPO ON PG. 3, STEP 5.0 GLASS TAPE STRIPS 13652 1 2 WERE USED 1/2" WIDE PER MR APPROVAL & PEEL 13652 1 3 STRENGTH & CURE WAS OBTAINED PER SPECIFICATION. 13689 1 1 ITEM 1.0, PAGE 1.0 WAS TRANSFERRED TO TPS ENGINEERING TO RESOLVE INTER 13689 1 2 ERENCE BETWEEN THE FILLER BAR AND THE V070-395966-004 CARRIER PANEL. T 13689 1 3 HE CARRIER PANEL IS PER PRINT AND IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 13807 1 1 GAPS ADJUSTED PER DWG. CLOSE THIS PR. 14283 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 14283 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 14283 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACTI 14283 1 4 ON TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W 14283 1 5 TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 14283 1 6 THE CARRIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. CLOSE PR. 14345 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY IN THE INSULATOR PLUG/INSULATOR FIT IS DUE TO THE INSU 14345 1 2 LATOR NOT BEING MANUFACTURED PER PRINT SPECIFICATION. THE INSULATOR PL 14345 1 3 UG WAS REWORKED PER MR ACTION AND PRIME BOARD CONCURRENCE TO FIT THE I 14345 1 4 NSULATOR. THE SPANNER BEAM INSULATOR AND THE INSULATOR PLUG ARE BOTH I 14345 1 5 NSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. THE DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS AND THE PR CAN C 14345 1 6 LOSE. 14346 MD115 1 MD115-2002-0003 THREADED INSERTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED AT Yw LOCAT 14346 MD115 2 IONS: 163.23, 172.25, 187.80, 196.40 AND 207.00 LAMINATED SHIMS WERE R 14346 MD115 3 EMOVED AND RE-BONDED USING MB0130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE AT Yw 196.40 AN 14346 MD115 4 D Yw 207.00 14408 1 1 THE DAMAGE NOTED ON PG. 1 IS FROM A DESIGN DEFICIE 14408 1 2 NCY. HOLES 2, 3, 4 & 7 DID NOT REQ REAMING PAST P 14408 1 3 RINT TOLEANCE, WHILE HOLES 1, 6, 9 & 11 DID NOT RE 14408 1 4 Q MR REAMING TO REMOVE THREAD DAMAGE. THE DAMAGE 14408 1 5 NOTED ON PG. 1A IS A RESULT OF TEMPORARILY INSTL'G 14408 1 6 CLECO CLAMPS IN HOLES TO ALLOW MAX ACCESS TO THE 14408 1 7 FASTENER HOLES. MRB CONCURRENCE WAS OBTAINED TO A 14408 1 8 CCEPT HOLE #5 W/O ADDT'L REAMING. 14653 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE PEELED TO PROPER FIT PE 14653 1 2 R STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTIO 14653 1 3 N. R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING HARDWARE TO 14653 1 4 PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87-103-C1) THE DENTS AT THE SHIM 14653 1 5 LOCATIONS WERE FILLED WITH STRUCTURAL ADHESIVE, PER MR ACTION. THE CAR 14653 1 6 RIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 14748 1 1 BOLT EXHIBITS CHARACTERISTICS OF NORM WEAR DUE TO 14748 1 2 NUT ENGAGEMENT. BOLT IS PER PRINT. NO PR CONDITI 14748 1 3 ON EXISTS. NEW NUT INSTL'D PER JC V30-14438. 14818 1 1 A 2" DIA SECTION OF SILVER-TEFLON TAPE WAS REMOVED AROUND THE NOTED DI 14818 1 2 NG AREA TO EXPOSE THE RADIATOR FACESHEET. MOLD IMPRESSIONS OF THE DISC 14818 1 3 REPANT AREA SHOWED A MAX DEPTH OF .0079". X-RAYS WERE TAKEN TO VERIFIE 14818 1 4 D THAT THE LOCATION OF DING WAS NOT OVER A DADIATOR FREON LINE. THE DI 14818 1 5 NG WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS-IS. THE EXPOSE FACESHEET AR 14818 1 6 EA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND TOPCOATED WITH CHEMGLAZE. DING WAS MOST 14818 1 7 LIKELY CAUSED BY IN-FLIGHT DEBRIS. 14823 1 1 ABOVE WORK ON BOLTS ALLOWS INSTALLATION PER PRINT 14961 1 1 MR DISPOSITION WAS REQ'D TO RESOLVE INTERFERENCE 14961 1 2 BETWEEN A SCREW HOLDING THE WIRE TRAY TO THE MID-B 14961 1 3 ODY MAIN FRAME AND A CONVAIR FITTING INSTALLED UND 14961 1 4 ER THE FRAME. THIS INTERFERENCE WAS CAUSED BY DESI 14961 1 5 GN DEFICIENCY. PG 1A WAS GENERATED WHEN INITIAL TR 14961 1 6 IMMING OF MR WASHER WAS NOT SUFFICIENT. THE MR WAS 14961 1 7 HER WAS INSTALLED IN CONJUNCTION WITH TPS VSTR-3-0 14961 1 8 7-135. 15044 1 1 AS PER ROCKWELL DOWNEY, NO DISCREPANT CONDITION EX 15044 1 2 ISTS W/ THE ME128-0047 FASTENER CALLOUT. IT IS PE 15044 1 3 R RI DOWNEY DESIGN NOT TO CALL OUT THE USE OF A ME 15044 1 4 128-0040 RETAINING RING, W/ THE INSTL'N OF A ME128 15044 1 5 -0047 FASTENER. THE RI DESIGN WILL ALLOW THE REMO 15044 1 6 VAL OF THE V070-731885-001 ADAPTER PLATE W/O THE R 15044 1 7 EMOVAL OF THE LARGER V070-731875-044 PNL. ENG NOT 15044 1 8 E: THIS PR WAS WRITTEN W/ THE ENG CORNER, THAT ONC 15044 1 9 E THE V070-731875-044 PNL IS REMOVED, ALL H/W; FOU 15044 1 10 R MD153-0018-005 WASHERS, FOUR V070-650630-001 CUP 15044 1 11 CUPS, FOUR MD153-0019-0001 REC WASHERS & ONE V070- 15044 1 12 371885-001 ADAPTER PLATE WILL "FALL FREE", DUE TO 15044 1 13 THE FACT THAT THE ME128-0047-0169 FASTENER WILL NO 15044 1 14 T BE RETAINED TO THE PNL W/O THE USE OF ME128-0040 15044 1 15 -044 RETAINING RINGS. 15190 1 1 THE CLIP WAS TRIMMED TO RELIEVE THE INTERFERENCE. 15190 1 2 THIS WAS A DESIGN PROBLEM UNIQUE TO THIS CLIP ON T 15190 1 3 HE ORBITER. CLOSE THIS PR. 15564 1 1 THE LOWER GAP VALVE HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT BY 15564 1 2 ADJUSTING THE INSULATOR'S SHIMS. MR ACTION WAS REQ 15564 1 3 UIRED TO ADJUST CLEVIS PLATE SHIMS TO OBTAIN A GAP 15564 1 4 VALVE WITHIN TOLERANCE. THE V070-199838-010 IS NO 15564 1 5 W VISIABLE ON THE INSULATOR TEE #10 IS O.K. FOR FL 15564 1 6 IGHT AND WILL BE INSTALLED INTO RIB SPLICE #11 PER 15564 1 7 VSTR-3-07-155. 15636 1 1 GAP FILLERS MESH ON GAP FILLERS IN ITEMS 1 THROUGH 9 AND 14 THROUGH 20 15636 1 2 WERE FOUND TO BE TORN, UNRAVELED AND FRAYED IN VARIOUS PLACES AND WER 15636 1 3 E REBONDED PER PAGES 2 TO 17. ITEMS 10 THROUGH 13 WERE ALREADY WRITTEN 15636 1 4 UP OHN PR STR-3-07-2240 AND REBONDED PER THAT PR. BURRED SCREW HEADS 15636 1 5 LISTED IN ITMES 2 THROUGH 20 ARE REPLACED WHERE REMOVAL & REPLACEMENT 15636 1 6 MATRIX IS PROVIDED IN TPS ENV-3-07-014 MOD 003. 15766 1 1 THE VOIDS IN THE AFT CLOSEOUT DEPRESSOR SEAL WERE FILLED WITH ADHESIVE 15766 1 2 . THE DISCOLORIZATION IN THE FIBERGLASS SURFACE IS MBO-120-008 ADHESIV 15766 1 3 E, USED TO FILL THE AREA BECAUSE IT WAS RESIN STARVED. THE ADHESIVE WA 15766 1 4 S APPLIED BY YTHE MANUFACTURER. 15875 1 1 THE STRUCTURE WAS RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION 15875 1 2 BY REMOVING/REPLACING THE ALUMINUM SCREENING A- 15875 1 3 ROUND THE V070-591402-004 Z AXIS (1Z-05) DOOR. 15875 1 4 IPD SHEETS AND THE DOOR HAVE BEEN REVIEWED BY ENG. 15875 1 5 ALL WORK IS COMPLETE. 15951 1 1 FUEL CELL NO 1 COOLANT LOOP OF APPROX 9.37 CUBIC 15951 1 2 INCHES IN FOUR MONTHS. A FREON DETECTOR WAS USED 15951 1 3 TO PROBE FUEL CELL NO 2 COOLANT LINES IN SEARCH OF 15951 1 4 A LEAK. NO LEAKS WERE FOUND. THE FUEL CELL WAS 15951 1 5 REMOVED PER TPS FCP-3-07-016 ON 7/2/86. THE REMOV 15951 1 6 ED FUEL CELL (S/N 114) WAS ROUTED TO THE VENDOR (I 15951 1 7 NTERNATIONAL FUEL CELLS) WITH LRU PR FCP-3-07-0079 15951 1 8 ATTACHED. THE LRU PR INDICATED THE NOTED COOLANT 15951 1 9 LOSS. THE VENDOR PERFORMED A COOLANT LEAK CHECK 15951 1 10 ON THE FUEL CHELL AND CONFIRMED THAT THE FUEL CELL 15951 1 11 DID LEAK. THE INDICATED COOLANT LOSS WAS INTERNA 15951 1 12 L ON THE FUEL CELL. THE FUEL CELL WAS REMOVED. F 15951 1 13 UEL CELL NO 1 COOLANT LINES ARE FLIGHT WORTHY. 15957 1 1 THE V070-190310-001 SPAR INSULATOR FOR THE L/H #11 RCC PANEL HAD A SMA 15957 1 2 LL CRACK IN THE FOIL. THE INSULATOR WAS SENT CRACK IN THE FOIL. THE IN 15957 1 3 SULATOR WAS SENT TO RSC FOR REPAIR. THE REPAIR HAS RETURNED THE INSULA 15957 1 4 TOR TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: MATERIAL DEGRADATION. 16181 1 1 ITEMS 1 PAGE 1 WHICH IDENTIFIES CHIP ON L/H RCC TEE #315 IS NOT A PR C 16181 1 2 ONDITION. TH ECHIP IS FLAKING OF THE "A" COATING AND NO CARBON SUBSTRA 16181 1 3 TE FIBERS ARE EXPOSED. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE PROBABLE CAUSE: NO 16181 1 4 PR CONDITION. 16275 1 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSPECTION OF THESE DAMAGE CON 16275 1 2 DITIONS INDICATES THAT THE DAMAGE IS MINOR. THESE 16275 1 3 CONDITIONS ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO REQUIRE A 16275 1 4 REPAIR. IN ITEMS 1 AND 2, THE DAMAGE IS TO THE SI 16275 1 5 LVER TEFLON TAPE ONLY. THIS MINOR TAPE DAMAGE IS A 16275 1 6 LLOWABLE PER BOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL (SECT. 16275 1 7 3-11B) IN ITEM 3, THE DING IS MINOR AND DOES NOT R 16275 1 8 EQUIRE A REPAIR. THESE CONDITIONS WILL NOT ADVERSE 16275 1 9 LY AFFECT THE HEAT TANSFER CAPABILITY OF THE RADIA 16275 1 10 TOR PANEL OR STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. THIS CONDITION 16275 1 11 IS ACCEPTABLE "AS IS" FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO MR 16275 1 12 I.D. REQUIRED. 16394 1 1 2 EA CONVENTIONAL RIVETS NOT INSTALLED HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED OKAY-AS-IS P 16394 1 2 ER MR. MR MARKS APPLIED. 16441 1 1 THE DISCREPANT V070-199621-002 INSULATOR FOR RCC P 16441 1 2 NL #4 R/H WAS REPAIR AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. T 16441 1 3 HE INSULATOR WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT PER STR- 16441 1 4 3-02-253 MOD 002. CLOSE THIS PR. 16997 1 1 RE-PERFORM V6003 IN CAVITY FOR DOOR 56-34 R/H 16997 1 2 INSTALLATION. 17040 1 1 RESISTANCE WAS INCORRECTLY CALCULATED FOR MLO310-0 17040 1 2 064 INSTL SPEC. HTRs AS TESTED ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR 17040 1 3 FLT. EO-TO-FOLLOW WILL CORRECT RESISTANCE VALUE 17040 1 4 FROM 86.0 +/- 5.25 TO 111.5 +/- 9.5 OHMS (TESTED V 17040 1 5 ALUE WAS 109.8 OHMS, SEE PG. 1). VERIFY EO CHANGE 17040 1 6 TO SPEC CORRECTS PROBLEM. MLO310-0064 EO F01. 17066 1 1 DISCREPANT PART WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW PART TO BE USED DURING POD INS 17066 1 2 TALLATION. CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. CLOSE THIS PR 17282 1 1 THRU IPR T/SING, SPECIFIC H/W COND WERE DETERMINED TO CAUSE A POTENTIA 17282 1 2 L FOR HINGE COVER "POPPING". THESE H/W COND'S THAT SHOWED A TENDENCY O 17282 1 3 F AN ANOMALOUS COND HAVE BEEN MR REPAIRED BY CHAMFERING THE PISTONS PE 17282 1 4 R MR REPAIR (HINGE PISTONS LH & RH 8, L/H & RH 10 & RH 1). ALL OTHER M 17282 1 5 INOR DISCREPANCIES ON PISTON H/W HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED OK-AS-IS PER MR. ( 17282 1 6 REF ITEMS 7 THRU 15) PLBD'S HAVE BEEN THRU 3 COMPLETE CYCLES PER V9023 17282 1 7 & HAVE SHOWN NO ANOMALIES WITH ALL DISCREPANCIES ADDRESSED AS ABOVE. 17282 1 8 SYS RETURNED TO FLIGHT ACCEPTABLE UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR. 17908 1 1 THE SEAL WAS MR REPAIRED BY APPLYING WHITE RTV TO ITS LOWER SURFACE. P 17908 1 2 ROBABLE CAUSE: DAMAGE CAUSED BY RE-ENTRY HEAT. 18092 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 18092 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 18092 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 18092 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 18092 1 5 3-01. 18155 1 1 THE SUMMARY CONCLUSION FOR HOLES 1 THRU 12 IS ON P 18155 1 2 G. 8 WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HOLE #6. THE ADDITIONAL 18155 1 3 DISPO FOR HOLE #6 IS ON PG. 9 WITH MRB APPROVAL T 18155 1 4 O ACCEPT THE HOLES AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. STR 18155 1 5 UCTURE IS RETURNED TO USABLE CONDITION PER REWORK 18155 1 6 AND MRB ACTION. CLOSE PR. 18214 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY WAS THAT MINOR DENTS WERE FOUND ON THE UPPER FACE SHEE 18214 1 2 T OF THE V070-198555-002 CLOSE OUT PANEL. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN 18214 1 3 AND STUDIED. ANALYSIS SHOWED THE DENTS TO BE MINOR IN NATURE AND THE D 18214 1 4 ENTS WERE MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. CLOSE THIS PR. 18433 1 1 PR CONDITION EXISTS DUE TO THE BRACKET BEING INSTALLED 1/2" TO FAR INB 18433 1 2 OARD. BRACKET POSITION AND SUBSEQUENT DELETION OF (1) WIRE HARNESS CLA 18433 1 3 MP HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED OKAY-AS-IS PER UNRESTRICTED MR. SYSTEM IS OKAY-A 18433 1 4 S-IS WITH NO COMPROMISE TO DESIGN INTENT PER MR. CLOSE THIS PR. 18544 1 1 PRSD H2 TANK TRUNNION BOLT V070-454843-001 WAS TOR 18544 1 2 QUED TO 320 IN LBS. BACKED OFF AND RETORQUED TO PR 18544 1 3 OPER VALUE. INSTALLATION TORQUE IS DETERMINED BY R 18544 1 4 UNNING TORQUE ADDED TO RANGE OF 12-15 FT. LBS. (14 18544 1 5 -180 IN LBS). ALLOWED RUNNING TORQUE RANGE TORQUE 18544 1 6 WAS DETERMINED TO BE 75 IN LBS. THUS INSTALLATION 18544 1 7 TORQUE RANGE WAS 219-255 IN LBS. IF RUNNING TORQUE 18544 1 8 OF TRUNNION NUT/BOLT WERE AT THE HIGH END OF ALLO 18544 1 9 WED RUNNING TORQUE RANGE (300 IN LBS MAX), INSTALL 18544 1 10 ATION TORQUE RANGE WOULD HAVE BEEN 444-480 IN LBS, 18544 1 11 WELL ABOVE CITED TORQUE OF 320 IN. LBS. MOMENTARY 18544 1 12 320 IN LBS TORQUE IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE AN EXCES 18544 1 13 SIVE LOAD ON THIS INSTALLATION, AND HARDWARE INVOL 18544 1 14 VED IS RATED FOR SUCH A TORQUE LOAD. AFFECTED HARD 18544 1 15 WARE HAS NOT BEEN IMPAIRED BY 320 IN LBS TORQUE. T 18544 1 16 RUNNION BOLT INSTALLATION IS NOW TORQUED TO PROPER 18544 1 17 RANGE FOR FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. 18573 1 1 DURING RSI-3-11-154, THE RTV AROUND THE CENTER HINGE ON THE LHIB ELEVO 18573 1 2 N WAS FOUND TO BE CHARRED AND FLAKING. THE AREA WAS REWORKED PER RSI-3 18573 1 3 -11-0157 AND RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION, PER MR APPROVAL ON R 18573 1 4 SI-3-11-0157. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING OR SHOP ACTION REQURIED ON THIS P 18573 1 5 R. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 18574 1 1 V070-335050-002 FRAME HAS BEEN REPAIRED BY THE APPLICATION OF A DOUBLE 18574 1 2 R, PER THE MRB APPROVED PER MR PROCEDURE 18574 1 3 ** 18574 1 4 ** 18574 1 5 ** 18592 1 1 THE PROBLEM WAS THAT SOME NOSE LANDING GEAR MOUNTING HOLES HAD NICKS & 18592 1 2 SCRATCHES THRUOUT THE ENTIRE HOLE. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN OF EAC 18592 1 3 H HOLE & THE DEFECTS WERE ANALYZED. THE DISCREPANCIES IN THE TRUNION F 18592 1 4 ITTING HOLES WERE FOUND TO BE MINOR IN NATURE & DO NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT 18592 1 5 THE DESIGN INTENT. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY REMAINS POSITIVE. 18793 1 1 THE DISCREPANT HOLES WERE MR OK AS IS. THE DISCRE 18793 1 2 PANT NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED & REPLACED W/ AN MR TO 18793 1 3 USE THE SAME H/W AS REMOVED, INSTEAD OF THE H/W C 18793 1 4 ALLED OUT ON THE PRINT. THE HOLES & NUTPLATES WER 18793 1 5 E GALLED, DUE TO THE NUMEROUS INSTL & REMOVAL OF T 18793 1 6 HE BOLTS. THE HOLES ARE THE NUTPLATES THAT WERE R 18793 1 7 EPLACED, ARE ACCEPTABLE PER FLT. 18920 1 1 TEE #9 LH WAS REMOVED FROM RIB SPLICE #10 BY STR-3-07-155 FOR STRUCTUR 18920 1 2 AL INSPECTION. THE TEE WAS TEMPORARILY INSTALLED BY STR-3-07-319 TO S 18920 1 3 UPPORT TILE LESS CARRIER FIT CHECK. UPON INSTALLATION THIS PR WAS GEN 18920 1 4 ERATED ON DISCREPANT INSULATOR GAPS. THE TEE WAS REMOVED, THE INSULAT 18920 1 5 ORS ADJUSTED TO CORRECT THE GAP PROBLEMS AND THEN REINSTALLED TEMPORAR 18920 1 6 ILY. WHEN THE TILE WORK IS COMPLETE, THE TEE WILL BE REMOVED PER STR- 18920 1 7 3-07-319. THE FINAL INSTALLATION FOR FLIGHT OF THE TEE WILL BE PER ST 18920 1 8 R-3-07-155. THE DISCREPANCY IN THIS PR NO LONGER EXISTS SO THE PR CAN 18920 1 9 CLOSE. 18979 1 1 DRAWING V070-596001 VIEW J & Z ZN42E SHOWS MD111-1002-0517 BOLT HAVING 18979 1 2 SAFETY WIRE. THERE IS NO HOLE DRILLED ON DRAWINGS FOR SAFETY WIRE TO 18979 1 3 INSTALL IT TO STRUCTURE. HOLE WAS FOUND TO BE DRILLED AND SAFETY WIRE 18979 1 4 INSTALLED TO RH AND LH SIDES ON B91B20108 SUPPORT WHICH IS INSTALLED O 18979 1 5 N DWG B91B20111. A EO-TO-FOLLOW WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE HOLE. PR 18979 1 6 OBABLE CAUSE IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. UPON VERIFICATION THAT RELEASED E.O 18979 1 7 REFLECTS ENGINEERING DISPOSITION. 19084 1 1 THE EVA HATCH RING WAS CRACKED AT THE STARBOARD HINGE CUT OUT (REF ITE 19084 1 2 M 1). THE PR WAS DISPO'D TO REPAIR THE CRACK WITH ADHESIVE AND FIBERGL 19084 1 3 ASS CLOTH. AFTER THE REPAIR WAS DONE, VOIDS WERE NOTICED IN THE ADHESI 19084 1 4 VE (REF ITEM 2). THESE VOIDS WERE MR ACCEPTED OK AS IS. THE PR WAS DEF 19084 1 5 ERRED FOR ONE FLIGHT. AFTER THE RETURN FROM FLIGHT, THE RING HAD ANOTH 19084 1 6 ER CRACK IN THE SAME LOCATION AS THE ORIGINAL CRACK (REF ITEM 3). THE 19084 1 7 PR WAS DISPO'D TO REPAIR THE RING WITH ADHESIVE AND FIBERGLASS CLOTH. 19084 1 8 THIS TIME A DIFFERENT, MORE FLEXIBLE ADHESIVE WAS USED. DURING THE REP 19084 1 9 AIR AN ELECTRICAL BLADKOUT OCCURRED AND THE VACUUM ON THE BOND WAS LOS 19084 1 10 T. MECHANICAL PRESSURE WAS USED TO IN PLACE OF THE VACUUM PRESSURE (RE 19084 1 11 ITEM 4). USE OF MECHANICAL PRESSURE WAS ACCEPTABLE PER THE SPECIFICAT 19084 1 12 ION (MAO106-347). THE DEVIATION FROM THE ORIGINAL DISPO WAS MR ACCEPTE 19084 1 13 D. THE RING WAS INSTALLED UPON COMPLETION OF THE REPAIR WORK. PROBABLE 19084 1 14 CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 19107 A 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THE DISCREPANT AREA ON THE V070-198219-002 RUB PL 19107 A 2 ATE WAS DEBURRED AND CORROSION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED. THE CHAFFED AREA 19107 A 3 WAS THEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. MR IDENTIFICATION APPLI 19107 A 4 ED. PROBABLE FOR DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATON (NORMAL WEAR ON T 19107 A 5 HE RUB SURFACE). NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS 19107 A 6 PR. 19107 A 7 19152 1 1 THIS IS A DUPLICATE PR OF TES-3-07-0047. THE DATA SHEETS WILL BE TRAN 19152 1 2 SFERRED SO THE DATA ISN'T LOST & WILL BE WORKED ON TES-3-07-0047. THE 19152 1 3 STEPS & GAPS WILL NOT BE ADDRESSED ON THIS PR, THEREFORE THE PR CAN B 19152 1 4 E CLOSED. 19291 1 1 THE SEAL WAS MR REPAIRED BY APPLYING A LAYER OF WHITE RTV TO ITS LOWER 19291 1 2 SURFACE. DAMAGE CAUSED BY RE-ENTRY HEAT. 19436 1 1 THE DENT IN THE RH RADIATOR #2 IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS INSPECTE 19436 1 2 D AND FOUND THAT THE FACE SHEET WAS NOT CRACKED OR SPLIT. THE RADIATOR W 19436 1 3 AS CORROSION PROTECTED WITH CHEM GLAZE AFTER INSPECTION, WITH RESTRICTED 19436 1 4 MR APPROVAL, AND FLOWN. AFTER FLIGHT 12 (STS 39) A .020" THICK BY 2.9" 19436 1 5 DIA. DOUBLER WAS BONDED OVER THE DENT AND SILVER TEFLON RADIATOR TAPE WA 19436 1 6 S REAPPLIED OVER THE REPAIRED AREA WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. THE LO 19436 1 7 W LAP SHEAR RESULTS FROM THE ADHESIVE USED TO BOND THE 2.9" DIA DOUBLER 19436 1 8 IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2, PAGE 1A WAS UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED. THE USE OF A 19436 1 9 TC-44239 ADHESIVE IN LIEU OF MBO120-008 ADHESIVE IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 3, P 19436 1 10 AGE 1B WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ALL 19436 1 11 THREE ITEMS IS WORKMANSHIP. CONCLUDE THAT NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED AN 19436 1 12 D THIS PR MAY CLOSE. 19458 1 1 PRSD TANK BORON STRUT ME270-0006-0019 SURFACE SCRA 19458 1 2 TCHES WERE NOT DETERMINED TO BE WITHIN ROCKWELL DE 19458 1 3 SIGN STATED CRITERIA, VISUAL INSPECTION REVEALED T 19458 1 4 HAT THERE WERE BORON FIBERS VISIBLE, BUT NOT CUT. 19458 1 5 THIS CONDITION REQURIES FUNCTIONAL INTEGRITY CHECK 19458 1 6 OF STRUT IN QUESTION. BORON STRUT ME217-0006-0019 19458 1 7 WAS ROUTED TO ROCKWELL DOWNEY FOR EVALUATION PER 19458 1 8 LRU PR. REPLACEMENT STRUT OBTAINED FROM SPARES. RE 19458 1 9 PLACEMENT STRUT WILL BE REINSTALLED PER OMI V5R02. 19464 1 1 (2) DISCREPANT NUTPLATES HAVE BEEN REPLACED WITH P 19464 1 2 ER PRINT SLEEVE RECEPTACLES, AND CAPTIVE FASTENERS 19477 1 1 BY REPAIRING THE TEE INSULATOR RESTORED THE PART T 19477 1 2 O ITS INTENDED THERMAL INTEGRITY. 19541 1 1 PR IS A DUPLICATE OF PVD-3-08-0352 (ATTACHED) THEREFORE THIS PR CAN C 19541 1 2 LOSE./CLOSE THIS PR 19583 1 1 LOWER CENTER AVIONICS BAY 4 DOOR WAS ORIGINALLY INSTALL WITH (1) EACH 19583 1 2 WRONG FASTENER. DOOR WAS REMOVED AND A PER PRINT CAPTIVE FASTENER WAS 19583 1 3 INSTALLED. DOOR REINSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. 19657 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF THE V070-340458-004 BRACKET CONTACTING THE SYSTEM # 19657 1 2 3 HYDRAULIC LINE LOCATED IN THE R/H MLG WHEEL WELL, IDENTIFIED AS ITEM 19657 1 3 1.0 OF THIS PR, WAS SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED PER MR REPAIR. THE BRACKET 19657 1 4 WAS TRIMMED TO ALLEVIATE THE INTERFERENCE, AND THE DESIGN INTENT WAS M 19657 1 5 AINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS MANUFACTURER'S TOLERANCE BUILDUP. 19948 1 1 CABLES P1A0 P1B0 HAVE HAD LONGER SECTIONS OF SPIRA 19948 1 2 L SLEEVING INSTALLED ON CABLES IN AREA OF ECU, AND 19948 1 3 CABLES ARE NO LONGER RIDING ON CORNER OF ECU (ELE 19948 1 4 CTRICAL CONTROL UNIT). (SEE ITEM, PG 1). THE DISCR 19948 1 5 EPANCY NOTED ON ITEM 2, PG 1 IS NOT A DISCREPANCY. 19948 1 6 THE 2 CABLES NOTED, P1A0 & P1B0, ARE NOT RIDING O 19948 1 7 N BOTTOM OF REGULATOR, BUT ACTUALLY RIDING ON A CA 19948 1 8 BLE TRAY, DESIGNED FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE CONFORMAL 19948 1 9 COATING ON CABLE 76999 HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER SPEC 19948 1 10 . (SEE ITEM 1, PG 1A) PER STEP 2, PG 3. THIS FUEL 19948 1 11 CELL IS FLIGHT WORTHY. 19989 1 1 BOTH THE UPPER AND LOWER DEBRIS DIAPHRAMS WERE CRACKED ON THE V075-333 19989 1 2 118-003 CLOSEOUT FAIRING. THESE DIAPHRAMS WERE REPLACED, WHICH RETURNE 19989 1 3 D THE CLOSEOUT FAIRING ASSY TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OP 19989 1 4 ERATIONAL DEGRADATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 20122 1 1 UNABLE TO INSTALL VR70-341162-004 RADIUS BLOCKS 20122 1 2 DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM CARGO FITTINGS. RADIUS 20122 1 3 BLKS TRIMMED PER MR. CLOSE PR. 20467 1 1 FAIRING PANEL IN L/H INTERDECK DEVELOPED L-SHAPED 20467 1 2 CRACK. THE CRACK WAS FIXED BY REMOVING THE PANEL & 20467 1 3 FIBERGLASS PATCHING EA. SIDE OF THE CRACK. THE PN 20467 1 4 L HAS BEEN REPAIRED AND HAS BEEN RE-INSTALLED IN T 20467 1 5 HE INTERDECK. ITEM #2 WAS RESOLVED BY PAINTING ON 20467 1 6 STEP 8.0 WMM 10-6-87 EOTF TO CORRECT WASHER CALLOU 20467 1 7 T ON DWG. CLOSE PR. 20549 1 1 THE SUSPECTED OUT-OF-SPEC-TOLERANCE FASTENER INSTALLATION (ITEM 1, PAG 20549 1 2 E 1) WAS PROVEN TO BE INVALID (SEE MEASUREMENTS STEP 2.0, PAGE 3). CAU 20549 1 3 SE OF THIS PR IS DUE TO ORIGINATOR'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF HARDWARE AND 20549 1 4 INSTALLATION SPECIFICATION. CONCLUDE THAT THE INSTALLED HARDWARE IS PE 20549 1 5 R SPECIFICATION AND NOT A PR CONDITION, AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRE 20549 1 6 D. 20564 1 1 THE DEBONDED TAPE HAS BEEN REBONDED USING RTV 142 PER THE PROCEDURE SP 20564 1 2 ECIFIED IN THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL. TWO OF THE DISCREPANT IT 20564 1 3 EMS ON PAGE ONE WERE MR ACCEPTED WITHOUT REPAIR. BOTH MR ACTIONS WERE 20564 1 4 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 20599 1 1 ITEM 1.0: (3) OF (28) HOLES IN THE XO-1307 BULKHEAD AND MATING V070-85 20599 1 2 6187-003 PANEL WERE FOUND TO BE OVERSIZED. THESE HOLES WERE REAMED TO 20599 1 3 .250" WITH MR APPROVAL. TWO NUTPLATE CHANNELS WERE TRIMMED TO PROVIDE 20599 1 4 INSTALLATION OF A MR NUTPLATE STRIP WHICH ACCOMODATES THE LARGER SIZE 20599 1 5 NUTPLATES. TWO RIVET HOLES WERE PLUGGED AND ONE 1/4" NUTPLATE WAS INST 20599 1 6 ALLED TO THE XO-1307 BULKHEAD. TO SUPPORT THIS REWORK. THE HOLES WERE 20599 1 7 OVERSIZED DURING INITIAL MANUFACTURING. THIS MR REWORK IS STRUCTURALY 20599 1 8 ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS MANUFACTURING ERROR 20599 1 9 . ITEM 2: NUTPLATE CHANNEL WAS RELOCATED PER ATTACHMENT F. 20605 1 1 DAMAGED ROSAN INSRT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH AN OVERSIZE INSERT W 20605 1 2 ITH MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS INSUFFICIENT P 20605 1 3 ARENT MATERIAL AT SWAGED AREA DUE TO PRIOR REPLACEMENT. 20731 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 20731 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 20731 1 3 EARING MARKS AND THE INDENTATION/GOUGE WERE ACCEPT 20731 1 4 ED "AS IS" PER MR HOLES PER MR ACTION TO RESOLVE T 20731 1 5 HE MISALIGNMENT PROBLEM. R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIGAT 20731 1 6 E POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING HARDWARE TO PREVENT 20731 1 7 FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87-103-C1) 20874 1 1 THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE V070-358002-007 DRAWING CALLS OUT A V070-3572 20874 1 2 57-003 DOOR FOR USE ON OV-103. A V070-357257-002 DOOR IS INSTALLED. IT 20874 1 3 WAS DETERMINED THAT THE -003 AND THE -002 DOORS ARE INTERCHANGEABLE O 20874 1 4 N OV-103 AND AN EO WILL BE RELEASED AGAINST V070-358002- TO REFLECT TH 20874 1 5 IS COMMONALITY. CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT OF THE EO PER STEP 1.0. 20995 1 1 OLD NOSE LANDING GEAR WHEEL/TIRE ASSY WAS REMOVED 20995 1 2 AND NEW NLG WHEEL/TIRE ASSY WAS INSTALLED PER OMI- 20995 1 3 V1165 21010 1 1 REWORK PER PRECEEDING STEPS HAS RETURNED CHAIN CON 21010 1 2 FIGURATION. 21242 1 1 REF ITEM 1: TORQUE TIP FASTENERS REPLACED WITH HE 21242 1 2 X HEAD EO TO FOLLOW. REF ITEM 2: HOLE OPENED BY 21242 1 3 HAND TO CLEAR DEBRIS IN HOLE. FINAL DIM BELOW MAX 21242 1 4 ALLOWED BY PRINT. 21298 1 1 EO-TO-FOLLOW WAS APPROVED TO RE-LOCATE V070-120131 21298 1 2 -001 DOUBLER TO ALLOW PROPER EDGE DISTANCE TO BE M 21298 1 3 AINTAINED. CAUSE OF THIS PROBLEM WAS DESIGN DEFIC 21298 1 4 IENCY. 21470 1 1 REFERENCE ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 1. THE RTV (APPLIED DURING FLIGHT 11 PRO 21470 1 2 CESSING) FILLING THE TAPERED GAP BETWEEN THE V070-198771-002 COLUMBIUM S 21470 1 3 EAL AND THE PRIMARY SEAL PANEL WAS INSPECTED BY ENGINEERING AND SHOWS NO 21470 1 4 SIGNS OF DEGRADATION. NO DEGRADATION HAS BEEN NOTED SINCE THE INITIAL A 21470 1 5 PPLICATION OF THE ADHESIVE. THE OUT OF TOLERANCE GAP AND TRAVEL HAS BEEN 21470 1 6 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHI 21470 1 7 P (MISALIGNMENT OF SEAL HALVES DURING INSTALLATION AND IMPROPER CLEANING 21470 1 8 ). NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 21484 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN PITTING, LOSS OF DRY LUBE AND LACK OF FREE 21484 1 2 ROTATION WAS NOTED ON THE RH MLG UPLOCK ROLLER. THE ROLLER AND ASSOCIA 21484 1 3 TED HARDWARE WAS REMOVED (REF ATTACHED CHIT K3177). DENTAL MOLDS WERE 21484 1 4 TAKEN ON THE PITTED ROLLER AND ANALYZED ON THE OPTICAL COMPARATOR WHIC 21484 1 5 H YIELDED THE FOLLOWING AVERAGE DIMENSIONS: LENGTH=0.5507", WIDTH=0.03 21484 1 6 160", DEPTH=0.0110". PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN TO VISUALLY DOCUMENT THE P 21484 1 7 ITTED CONDITIONS. THE NUT, BOLT, AND SLEEVE WERE INSPECTED AND NO DISC 21484 1 8 PREPANCIES WERE NOTED. THE NUT, BOLT, SLEEV, WERE REINSTALLED WITH A N 21484 1 9 EW ROLLER. FREE ROTATION OF THE NEW MLG UPLOCK ROLLER WAS VERIFIED, AN 21484 1 10 D SUCCESSFUL RETEST HAS BEEN PERFORMED BY GEAR RETRACTION AND EXTENSIO 21484 1 11 N. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. ENGR NOTE: ALTHOUHG PROB 21484 1 12 ABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT BALLED 21484 1 13 UP DRYLUBE WAS FOUND BETWEEN THE SLEEVE AND ROLLER. ONCE THE LOOSE DRY 21484 1 14 LUBE WAS REMOVED AND THE SLEEVE ROTATED FREELY INSIDE THE ROLLER. LACK 21484 1 15 OF ROLLER AND UPLOCK HOOK SURFACES WHICH COULD CAUSE ROLLER PITTING. 21484 1 16 PERHAPS AN ALTERNATE ROLLER AND SLEEVE LUBE PROCESS COULD PREVENT RE-O 21484 1 17 CCURRENCE OF THIS PR CONDITION. AFTER THE ORIGINAL SUMMARY/CONCLUSION 21484 1 18 WAS SIGNED, WORKSTEPS WERE ADDED TO THIS PR TO OBTAIN CLAY MEASUREMENT 21484 1 19 S OF THE GAP BETWEEN THE UPLOCK ROLLER AND HOOK (REF FIGURE 2). THE GA 21484 1 20 P MEASUREMENTS WERE WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS, AND NO RIGGING WAS REQUIR 21484 1 21 ED. NO FURTHER RETEST REQUIRED. NO MR ID REQUIRED. CLOSE THIS PR. 21622 1 1 THE CRACK IN THE V070-340360-020 WIRE TRAY COVER, IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1 21622 1 2 , PAGE 1, WAS RESOLVED, WITH MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, BY REMO 21622 1 3 VING THE TCS BLANKET RETAINERS, STOP DRILLING THE CRACK AND REINSTALLI 21622 1 4 NG THE BLANKET RETAINERS. THE INCORRECT PART NUMBER AND EFFECTIVITIES 21622 1 5 ON DWG V070-340360 IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2, PAGE 1B WAS RESOLVED BY EO-TO 21622 1 6 -FOLLOW. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE CRACK (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) IS DUE TO IM 21622 1 7 PROPER HANDLING OF TH WIRE TRAY COVER AFTER REMOVAL FROM THE ORBITER. 21622 1 8 THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE INCORRECT PART NUMBER AND EFFECTIVITIES ON T 21622 1 9 HE FACE OF THE DRAWING (ITEM 2, PAGE 1A) IS DUE TO DRAFTSMAN ERROR. CO 21622 1 10 NCLUDE THAT THE WIRE TRAY IS ACCEPTABLE AS REWORKED AND NO FURTHER WOR 21622 1 11 K IS REQUIRED. 21631 1 1 REF ITEM 1 PAGE 1A-NEW RETAINER CUP OBTAINED 21631 1 2 INSTEP 13 WILL ALLOW FOR INSTALLATION OF NEW 21631 1 3 BARREL NUT AND ALLOW BASIC PR TO BE USED PER WORK 21631 1 4 STEPS. BOLT HOLE COVERS WERE KSC OPTION THIS FLT 21648 1 1 THE PROBLEM WAS THAT HOLES REQUIRED TO BE DRILLED THROUGH THE AFT RETA 21648 1 2 INERS WOULD CAUSE INTERFERENCE WITH THE FRAME STRUCTURE. THIS WAS AT X 21648 1 3 O 378 AND YO +/-21. FRAME STRUCTURE INTERFERENCE WAS AVOIDED BY MOVING 21648 1 4 THE FASTENER (RIVET) INSTALLATION TOWARD YO +/- 20 BY THE AMOUNT OF . 21648 1 5 25, +.12, -.00 "TRUE". THIS WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NOTE 21648 1 6 : "TRUE" IS RELATIVE TO PIECE PARTS ONLY. 21814 1 1 INSULATOR HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUFACTURER SPEC. 21935 1 1 ORBITER IS PROPERLY POSITIONED AT MAINTENANCE HEIG 21935 1 2 HT. RECORDED HEIGHT IN OI V5069 SEQ 23-027 WAS A 21935 1 3 MISREPRESENTED MEASUREMENT. 21961 1 1 ITEM 1: A TOTAL OF SEVEN CRACKS WERE REWORKED. THE 2 EA CRACKS STARTIN 21961 1 2 G AT THE OUTBD EDGE AND RUNNING INBD WERE REMOVED BY CUTTING A RECTANG 21961 1 3 ULAR SECTION FROM THE RING AND INSTALLING A MR DOUBLER OVER THE AREA. 21961 1 4 THE OTHER 5 EA CRACKS WERE MR REWORKED BY INSTALLING MR DOUBLERS OVER 21961 1 5 THE AREAS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS NORMAL WEAR 21961 1 6 AND TEAR. ITEM 2: DURING THE MATCH DRILLING OF THE -002 MR DOUBLER, TH 21961 1 7 E HOLES WERE MISSED DRILLED. A NEW DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLE 21961 1 8 D. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 3: 21961 1 9 IN ORDER TO REMOVE THE V070-351928-001 RING A MD114-5015-0302 NUTPLATE 21961 1 10 HAD TO BE REMOVED. ONE NUTPLATE ATTACH HOLE WAS MISSED DRILLED. THE S 21961 1 11 TRUCTURE WAS MR REWORKED BY DOUBLE FLUSH PLUGGING THE DOME SHIELD STRU 21961 1 12 CTURE, AND THE DOME RING AND BLANKET RETAINER WERE PLUGGED USING ADHES 21961 1 13 IVE. A MD114-5009-0402 NUTPLATE WAS THEN INSTALLED. NO FURTHER ACTION 21961 1 14 REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP. 21992 1 1 BY REPAIRING THE TEE INSULATOR, RESTORED THE PART 21992 1 2 TO IT'SINTENDED THERMAL INTEGRITY. 22021 1 1 BRAZE JOINT AT ORB LINE V070-454110-053 & MD273-00 22021 1 2 29-0420 TEE FITTING FAILED X-RAY DUE TO POOR FLOW 22021 1 3 PATTER, NO RE-HEATS WERE ATTEMPTED & BRAZE JOINT W 22021 1 4 AS DEBRAZED. ORB LINE ENDS WERE CLEANED & PREPPED 22021 1 5 FOR REBRAZING OPS. MENTIONED LINE I/F WAS REBRAZ 22021 1 6 ED & SUBSEQUENT X-RAY RESULTS WERE ACCEPTABLE. IP 22021 1 7 D SHTs ATTACHED TO THIS PR & COPIES OF SAME ADDED 22021 1 8 TO TPS FCP-3-07-020 FOR BUILD TRACEABILITY. NON-C 22021 1 9 ONFORMANCE HAS BEEN RECTIFIED. BRAZE JOINT ACCEPT 22021 1 10 ABLE. 22033 1 1 4 EA MD112-0015-0604 AND 4 EA MD112-0015-0603 HI-LOCKS COULD NOT BE VE 22033 1 2 RIFIED AS INSTALLED DUE TO DWG V070-856020 INSTALLATION NOTE STATING " 22033 1 3 FASTENERS TO BE INSTALLED PER SPEC AFTER INSTALLATION OF HIGH POINT BL 22033 1 4 EED SYSTEM (V070-434121)." TPS VSTR-3-07-224 INSTALLED HI-LOCKS FOR V0 22033 1 5 70-856018-001 ANGLE. STEP 2.0 VERIFIES HI-LOCKS ARE INSTALLED PER SPEC 22033 1 6 DUE TO COLLARS BEING TORQUED OFF. 22119 1 1 THE "RIVETS:" DESCRIBED IN ITEM 1 OF THIS PR ARE ACTUALLY THREADED POR 22119 1 2 TION OF BOLTS. THIS PROTRUSION IS A PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE PROTRUSIO 22119 1 3 N HAS ALREADY BEEN ADDRESSED PER EO TO DWG V070-191035 (EOB13). THE PR 22119 1 4 OTRUSION WAS RESOLVED ON RSI-3-11-0155. THE PR ALLOWS THE SIP AND TILE 22119 1 5 IML TO BE CUT OUT AT THE BOLT LOCATIONS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPAN 22119 1 6 CY. 22130 1 1 A MINI-GRINDER WAS USED TO REMOVE PROTRUDING EDGES IN THE CRACK AREA. 22130 1 2 THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND THE 1/4" CRACK WAS ACCEPTED AS IS 22130 1 3 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2 IS BEING DISPOSITIONED ON PR STE-3-09-29 22130 1 4 38 AS STATED IN THE NOTE PAGE 1 OF THIS PR. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMA 22130 1 5 GE IS HANDLING DURING MAITENANCE AND PROCESSING. 22182 1 1 THE V070-858081-001 STIFFENER, V070-858087-001/002 22182 1 2 DOUBLERS WERE SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED USING THE 22182 1 3 NEW HARDWARE. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 22280 1 1 ABOVE DISCREPANCY SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN AGAINST 22280 1 2 PR STR-3-07-1702 WHICH ALREADY DOCUMENTS HEATSINK 22280 1 3 PROBLEMS IN L/H BAY 5. A PAGE 1B HAS NOW BEEN WR 22280 1 4 ITTEN CORRECTING THIS ERROR. THIS PR IS NO LONGER 22280 1 5 REQUIRED. 22430 1 1 REF ITEM 1, PG 1, DETACHED NUTPLATE ON LH #4 PLBD O/B STRONGBACK ATTAC 22430 1 2 H POINT AT HINGE LOCATION XO1164.20. REF DWG T01P31152, VIEW C-C, ZONE 22430 1 3 B11. DURING INSTALLATION OF C/P, NUTPLATE WAS FOUND TO BE DETACHED AN 22430 1 4 D MISSING NUT ELEMENT. MR REPAIR FOR ONE FLIGHT ONLY WAS PERFORMED TO 22430 1 5 HOLD CARRIER PANEL TO PLBD STRUCTURE WITH FURTHER REPAIR TO FOLLOW FLI 22430 1 6 GHT 11. C/P WAS BONDED TO STRUCTURE AT CORNER OF DISCREPANT NUTPLATE W 22430 1 7 ITH CARE TAKEN NOT TO FILL EMPTY FASTENER HOLE WITH ADHESIVE FLASH. C/ 22430 1 8 P WAS SECURED ADDITIONALLY WITH REMAINING 7 OF 8 FASTENERS WITH FILLER 22430 1 9 BAR AND FRSI PLUG INSTALLED TO COVER FASTENER INSERT HOLES. POST FLIG 22430 1 10 HT: C/P REMOVED AND INSPECTION MADE OF DISCREPANT NUTPLATE. DUE TO THE 22430 1 11 DIFFICULTY IN REPLACING THE ENTIRE NUTPLATE, THE DISCREPANCY WAS REPAI 22430 1 12 RED BY REPLACING THE MISSING NUT ELEMENT WITH A NUT ELEMENT REMOVED FR 22430 1 13 OM A NEW NUTPLATE. REPAIR OF NUT PLATE BY REPLACING NUT ELEMENT WAS MR 22430 1 14 APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE; OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 22430 1 15 N. 22527 1 1 BORON TUBE 70B2010-1 WAS FOUND TO NOT ALIGN WITH RIB BRACKET. A LOAD 22527 1 2 WAS APPLIED TO ALIGN ATTACH HOLES AND STRUT WAS INSTALLED AND VERIFIED 22527 1 3 PER STEP 1.0. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 22561 1 1 THE DISCREPANT V070-190253-002 INSULATOR FOR RCC P 22561 1 2 ANLE #3 R/H WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTE 22561 1 3 R THE INSULATOR WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT PER S 22561 1 4 TR-3-07-253 MOD 002. 22616 1 1 BRACKET CARRIER PANELS STEPS DID NOT MEET THE DESIGN INSTALLATION REQU 22616 1 2 IREMENTS. BRACKETS AND CARRIER PANELS (STEPS) DO MEET THE INSTALLATION 22616 1 3 DESIGN INTENT. 22617 1 1 THE FWD RTV-STOP AT X0705 STRINGER 25, BECAME 22617 1 2 DELAMINATED ON THE FWD EDGE. THE MBO130-173 22617 1 3 TYPE II RTV STOP WAS REMOVED & RE-BONDED USING 22617 1 4 MBO130-085 ADHESIVE. CLOSE PR. 22842 1 1 THE V070-198702-001 BULB SEAL'S OUTER METAL SHEATH IS SLIGHTLY TORN. T 22842 1 2 HE DISCREPANT BULB SEAL WAS SENT TO HDA WITH THE RECOMMEDATION TO SENT 22842 1 3 TO RI SERVICE CENTER FOR REPAIR AND RETURN TO STOCK. A NEW BULB SEAL 22842 1 4 WAS OBTAINED AND STORED IN THE MIDBODY SHOP. PROBABLE CAUSE: DISCREPAN 22842 1 5 CY CAUSED DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 22848 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE RPLCD & WILL BE PEELED 22848 1 2 TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 22848 1 3 NG MARKS & THE INDENTATION/GOUGE WERE ACCEPTED "AS 22848 1 4 IS" PER MR ACTION. THE SHIM(S) WERE CNTR'D OVER 22848 1 5 THE BOLT HOLES PER MR ACTION TO RESOLVE THE MISALI 22848 1 6 GNMENT PROBLEM. RC ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE 22848 1 7 CHANGE OF ATTACH'G H/W TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE 22848 1 8 (CARR #5121-87-103-C1) 22969 1 1 THE MR -001/-002 SHIMS, BONDED IN PLACE, ELIMINATE 22969 1 2 D THE INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE PREVIOUS MR DOUBLER 22969 1 3 AND THE ANGLE. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 22976 1 1 HOLE WAS RELOCATED PER EO D05 OF DWG V070-346048, 22976 1 2 WHICH ELIMINATES THE INTERFERANCE PROBLEM WITH THE 22976 1 3 SENSOR AT THE OLD LOCATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 23178 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 23178 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 23178 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 23178 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 23178 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 23178 1 6 7-103-C1). 23281 1 1 THE CORRECT PARTS WERE OBTAINED PER STEP 2. THE M 23281 1 2 ISIDENTIFIED PARTS WERE SENT TO THE VENDOR. CLOSE 23281 1 3 THIS PR. 23358 1 1 CRACKED SECTION WAS REMOVED BY TRIMMING TO PREVENT 23358 1 2 PROPAGATION, MCR 11817 MOD WILL PREVENT FURTHER C 23358 1 3 RACKS DUE TO STEPPING ONWIRE TRAY. CLOSE PR. 23484 1 1 THE HYDRAULIC SPILL IN THE AFT AROUND THE ET LO2 AREA, DOCUMENTED ON V 23484 1 2 070-3-10-0302, RESULTED IN THE LO2 ET CURTAIN BEING CONTAMINATED WITH 23484 1 3 HYDRAULIC FLUID, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1. A NEW CURATION WAS OBTA 23484 1 4 INED PER THIS THIS PR AND WILL BE INSTALLED PER V35-90006. THE DISCREP 23484 1 5 ANT CURTAIN ASSY HAS BEEN ROUTED TO RI SERVICE CENTER REWORK AND THEN 23484 1 6 RETURN TO STOCK. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN ADDRESSED AND NO LONGER EXITS 23484 1 7 . PROBABLE CAUSE: HYDRAULIC LEAK. 23778 1 1 O2 MANF 2 PNL VIBRATION MOUNT ME196-0017-0001 WAS 23778 1 2 FOUND TO BE DAMAGED & WAS REMOVED FROM INSTL'D POS 23778 1 3 ITION. REPLACEMENT UNIT WAS INSTL'D TO IT PER TPS 23778 1 4 FCP-3-07-017. VIBRATION ISOLATOR MOUNT/MANF PNL 23778 1 5 INSTL WAS RTN'D TO FLT CONFIG. 24149 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE, IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS RESOLVED, W 24149 2 ITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL, BY REMOVING THE NUTPLATE AND RE-INSTALLI 24149 3 NG A NEW NUTPLATE USING BLIND RIVETS. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS DUE TO NORM 24149 4 AL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE NUTPLATE IS ACCEPTABLE AS INSTALLED AND NO 24149 5 FURHTER WORK IS REQUIRED. 24417 1 1 OK FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 24878 1 1 ITEMS 1.0, 2.0, AND 3.0: STEP 2.0 CALLS OUT TO OBTAIN (4) REPAIRED V07 24878 1 2 0-198702-001 TUBE SEALS FROM HDA; (4) NEW V070-198702-001 TUBE SEALS W 24878 1 3 ERE OBTAINED FROM LOGISTICS INSTEAD AND STORED WITH THEIR CORRESPONDIN 24878 1 4 G (LEFT HAND FLIPPER DOORS #3, #5, #13, AND RIGHT HAND #3) HARDWARE IN 24878 1 5 MIDBODY SHOP BAY 1. THE NEW V070-198702-001 TUBE SEALS WILL BE INSTAL 24878 1 6 LED IN THE VEHICLE PER THE RESPECTIVE JOB CARD. THE REPAIRED V070-1987 24878 1 7 02-001 TUBE SEALS WILL BE SEND BACK TO LOGISTICS FOR RESTOCK. THE V070 24878 1 8 -198702-001 TUBE SEALS ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURES. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAM 24878 1 9 AGE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 25255 1 1 OMRSD REQUIREMENT OF 275 SCIM MINIMUM AT 8 PSIG IS IN ERROR, SHOULD BE 25255 1 2 250 SCIM (15.26 SCIM) MINIMUM AT 8 PSIG. LSS HAS AGREED TO SUBMIT RCN 25255 1 3 TO CHANGE OMRSD. CHECK VALVE IS FUNCTIONING AS DESIGNED, CHECK VALVE 25255 1 4 FLOWS 229 SCIM AT 8 PSIG. 25258 1 1 WHEN HOLES WERE DEBURRED AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF MA 25258 1 2 TERIAL WAS REMOVED CAUSING A KNIFE EDGE CONDITION 25258 1 3 . OV-103'S DOUBLER WAS SCRAPPED. A NEW DOUBLER WAS 25258 1 4 FABRICATED USING BLANK DOUBLER OBTAINED FROM OV-1 25258 1 5 04'S MOD KIT. ANOTHER BLANK WAS ORDERED FOR OV-104 25258 1 6 . THIS WAS A WORKMANSHIP PROBLEM. 25283 1 1 THE (2) MD114-5004-0005 NUTPLATES UNDER THE V070-146070-001 AND V070-1 25283 1 2 46070-002 LINKS WERE NOT PROPERLY CENTERED WHEN RIVET HOLES WERE DRILL 25283 1 3 ED ON THE LINKS. THIS CONDITION WAS FOUND WHEN WORKING PER STR-3-11-32 25283 1 4 03 (REFERENCE ATTACHMENT "A" OF SUCH PR). THE ABOVE DISCREPANCY WAS CA 25283 1 5 USING THE V070-146068-002 BOLT THREADS TO COME INTO CONTACT WITH THE N 25283 1 6 UTPLATE METAL AND THUS BECOMING FLAT. THESE ARE THE KEYSTONE BOLTS THA 25283 1 7 T CLOSE OUT RIGHT HAND FLIPPER DOOR #4. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO SL 25283 1 8 OT (1) RIVET HOLE IN EACH OF THE (2) MD114-5004-0005 NUTPLATES PROVIDI 25283 1 9 NG MORE FLEXIBILITY DURING NUTPLATE INSTALLATION. THIS ALLOWS THE CORR 25283 1 10 ECT ALIGNMENT OF THE LINK AND NUTPLATE HOLES. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANS 25283 1 11 HIP. WHEN THE V070-146070-001 AND -002 LINKS WERE OBTAINED THE RIVET H 25283 1 12 OLES WERE NOT DRILLED IN THE PROPER LOCATION FOR ALIGNMENT OF THE LINK 25283 1 13 AND NUTPLATE HOLES. 25335 1 1 ALL ITEMS ARE LOCATED ON THE LH OUTBOARD ELEVON FLIPPER DOOR RUB PANELS. 25335 1 2 ITEMS 1,2,3 AND 5 ARE MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS REPAIRED BY C 25335 1 3 OATING WITH HIGH-EMISSITY COATING. ITEM 4 IS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTE 25335 1 4 D USE AS IS. DUE TO THE LOCATIONS OF THE DINGS AND FLAKED COATING UNDER 25335 1 5 THE ENVELOPE OF FLIPPER DOOR SEALING SURFACE. ITEMS 1 THROUGH 5 DO NOT P 25335 1 6 RESENT A LEAK PATH. THE RUB PANELS ARE NOT STRUCTURAL AND THEREFORE THE 25335 1 7 PRESENCE OF THE DINGS WILL NOT DEGRADE THE INTERGRITY OF STRUCTURE. THIS 25335 1 8 PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 25337 01 1 VOID - DUPLICATE PR. 25404 1 1 MBO130-173 RTV STOPS AT Xo 1024.62 WERE BONDED, OVERLAPPING STRINGER 8 25404 1 2 BY .075" & .220". THE RTV STOPS WERE REMOVED & REBONDED. 25615 1 1 PAGE 1 ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED (9) AREAS OF CORROSION ON THE ELEV 25615 1 2 ON UPPER SKIN SURFACE UNDER RUB PANEL 14. PAGE 1A ITEM 2 DESCRIBED ONE 25615 1 3 ADDITIONAL PIT. TO CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS, THE PITTED AREAS WERE CLEA 25615 1 4 NED-UP (KOROPON REMOVED) AND ETCHED TO REMOVE OXIDE. THE PITTED AREAS 25615 1 5 WERE MEASURED WITH AN OPTICAL MICROMETER TO DETERMINE PIT DEPTH. FROM 25615 1 6 THE RESULTS OF THE MEASUREMENTS, IT WAS DETERMINED THE PITS DID NOT DE 25615 1 7 GRADE THE STRUCTURAL FUNCTION OF THE ELEVON AND WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR U 25615 1 8 NRESTRICTED USE AFTER (3) COATS OF KOROPON WAS APPLIED TO INCREASE THE 25615 1 9 SKINS ABILITY TO RESIST CORROSION. 25683 1 1 REPLACEMENT OF INSERTS PER PR RETURNS TO PRINT CON 25683 1 2 FIGURATION. 26091 1 1 THE OCN OF THE V070-198771-001 COLUMBIUM SEAL SET IS IN QUESTION DUE T 26091 1 2 O DISCONTINUITIES IN THE CVAS COMPUTER SYSTEM. FLIGHT 11 FLOW WAS THE 26091 1 3 FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE SEAL TO DETERMINE ITS ACTUAL O 26091 1 4 CN AND SERIAL NUMBER. THESE NUMBERS WERE RECORDED PER STEP 2.0 OF THIS 26091 1 5 DISPOSITION. CLOSURE OF THIS PR WILL RECTIFY CVAS DISCONTINUITY. NO F 26091 1 6 URTHER ENG OR SHOP ACTION REQUIRED. 26409 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1: WHILE INSTALLING HYD LINE SUPPORT TO THE HYDRAULIC ISO 26409 1 2 LATOR A BACKSIDE NUPLATE BROKE LOOSE. THIS NUTPLATE WAS TRAPPED BETWEE 26409 1 3 N THE HYDRAULIC ISOLATOR AND THE NUTPLATE AND ATTACHING HARDWARE WAS R 26409 1 4 ETRIEVED. A PATCH WAS FABRICATED TO FIT OVER THE HOLE WITH A BACKSIDE 26409 1 5 NUTPLATE ATTACHED. PATCH BONDED AND ATTACHED WITH JoBOLTS TO THE HYDRA 26409 1 6 ULIC ISOLATOR. UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR. ITEM 2, PG 1A: HYDRAULICLINE 26409 1 7 IS MISALIGNED WITH WITH THE ISOLATOR. HYDRAULIC LINE WAS MANUALLY MOVE 26409 1 8 D WITHIN SPEC. REQUIREMENTS TO A LOCATION THAT ALLOWED FOR PROPER INST 26409 1 9 ALLATION. ITEM 3 PG 1B: UNABLE TO VERIFY 1 - 10 PSI PER STEP 34.0 DELE 26409 1 10 TED, INSTALLING THE PATCH WITH 8 JoBOLTS WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY PR 26409 1 11 ESSURE FOR BONDING. UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR. ITEM 4, PAGE 1C: LAP SHEA 26409 1 12 RS FAILED LOAD TEST. WAS: 1988 AVG PSI S/B: 2500 PSI THIS CONDITION OK 26409 1 13 AY AS IS SINCE THE PATCH WAS INSTALLED WITH 8 JoBOLTS. UNRESTRICTED US 26409 1 14 E PER MR. 26435 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1,THREAD MARKS AT ATTACH POINTS 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 AND 1 26435 1 2 WERE BURNISHED TO ELIMINATE ANY RAISED METAL AND SHARP EDGES AT THREAD 26435 1 3 MARKS THEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2 PAGE 1, ORBITER 26435 1 4 SURFACE SCORED AROUND BUSHINGS AT ATTACH POINTS 6,8, AND 10 WERE BURNI 26435 1 5 SHED IN STEP 17 TO SMOOTH AND BLEND AREA AND MR ACCEPTED. ITEM 3 PAGE 26435 1 6 1, ELONGATED ATTACH POINTS 4,8 AND 1 WERE MEASURED IN STEPS 7.0 AND 8. 26435 1 7 0 AND 9.0 AND DETERMINED WITHIN DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. ITEM 4 PAGE 1, M 26435 1 8 INOR GROOVE STARTING TO APPEAR ON TOP SURFACE OF BUSHINGS NEAR ATTACH 26435 1 9 POINTS 7 AND 1 WERE BURNISHED IN STEP 17 TO SMOOTH AND BLEND AREA AND 26435 1 10 MR ACCEPTED. ITEM 5 PAGE 1A, ATTACH POINT 8 NUTPLATE WAS FOUND TO BE 26435 1 11 DISCREPANT AND WAS REPLACE PER STEPS13 THROUGH 15. ITEM 6 PAGE 1A, TH 26435 1 12 IS DISCREPANCY ON KOROPON TOUCHUP AROUND BEARING AREA IS NO DISCREPANC 26435 1 13 Y DUE TO NO DWG REQUIREMENT FOR KOROPON IN BEARING AREA. CORROSION PRO 26435 1 14 TECTION IS APPLIED ON BOLT INSTALLATION PER DWG. ITEM 7 PAGE 1A, BOND 26435 1 15 (GROUND) STRAP WAS CORRODED AND FRAYED ON ATTACH POINT 10 AND IT WAS R 26435 1 16 EPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ALL ITEM IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO FR 26435 1 17 EQUENT R & R OF POD. CLOSE THIS PR. 26565 1 1 FUNCTION MAINTAINED. 26565 1 2 THE STRUCTURAL REPAIR METHOD "A" REPAIRS PANEL. 26565 1 3 FUNCTION IS MAINTAINED. 26736 1 1 THE DISCREPANT 70C3718-1 PLATE ASSEMBLY, IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, 26736 1 2 WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE PLATE ASSEMBLY AND INSTALLING A NEW PLAT 26736 1 3 E ASSEMBLY OBTAINED FROM STOCK. THE GOUGE (ITEM 1)WAS PROBABLY DUE TO 26736 1 4 WORKMANSHIP, AND THE BACKED OUT INSERT (ITEM 2) WAS PROBABLY DUE TO NO 26736 1 5 RMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THAT THE PLATE ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN RETURNED 26736 1 6 TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 26779 1 1 THE B91B11477-36 SUPPORT CLIP WAS SUCCESSFULLY INS 26779 1 2 TALLED USING HILOC'S IN PLACE OF JOBOLTS. NO FURT 26779 1 3 HER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 26877 1 1 AT THE L/H WIRE TRAY AT Xo 979.5, HOLES 1, 2, 3, 5 26877 1 2 , 6, 7, 8 & 11 WERE DAMAGED DUE TO THREADS IN BEAR 26877 1 3 ING. HOLES 7, 8 & 11 WERE REAMED TO .214". HOLE 26877 1 4 2 WAS REAMED TO .217" & HOLES 1, 3, 5 & 6 WERE REA 26877 1 5 MED TO .2185". NDE WAS PERFORMED (RPT 30,396) & N 26877 1 6 O ADDT'L DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED, THESE REPAIRS CLEA 26877 1 7 R THE HOLES FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. HOLES 4, 9, 10 26877 1 8 & 12 WERE REAMED TO .196". AND NO DAMAGE DETECTED 26877 1 9 LT. REAMS MARKS IN HOLE #3 MR'D "OK AS IS". 26902 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN A TORN STRAIN RELIEF SLEEVE ON THE #1 AND T 26902 1 2 HE !18 LATCH PEDESTAL MICROSWITCHES WAS OBSERVED. THE SLEEVES HAVE BEE 26902 1 3 N MR REPAIRED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BY USING AN RTV SILICONE COMPOUND T 26902 1 4 O REBOND AND SEAL THE SLEEVES. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE IS ELASTOM 26902 1 5 ER FATIGUE FROM NORMAL USAGE. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 27064 1 1 DEFECTS 1 & 2 WERE CAUSED BY DESIGN DEFICIENCY. DE 27064 1 2 FECT 1 WAS RESOLVED BY MR DISPO TO TRIM WASHERS TO 27064 1 3 ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. DEFECT 2 WAS RESOLVED BY 27064 1 4 ADDING ADD'L WASHERS TO WIRE TRAY INSTL'N PER TPS 27064 1 5 STR-3-07-135 & BY INSP'G FOR DAMAGE PER TPS STR-3 27064 1 6 -07-308. NO DAMAGE WAS FOUND. 27101 1 1 DISCREPANT CONDITION OF ITEM 1 PG. 1 HAS BEEN EVAL 27101 1 2 UATED BY STR-ENG. AND CONCLUDED THAT PER PRINT INS 27101 1 3 TALLATION OF CLIPS CAN BE PERFORMED. NO FURTHER DI 27101 1 4 SPO/ACTION REQ'D. ON THIS PR. CLIP WILL BE INSTALL 27101 1 5 ED PER STR-3-07-221, ITEM 30.1. CLOSE PR. 27254 1 1 THE PUPROSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO TRIM A RADIUS BLOCK LOCATED ON 27254 1 2 THE RIGHT HAND LONGERON, FORWARD END OF BAY 7. THIS ELIMINATED AN INTE 27254 1 3 RFERENCE WITH AN ADJACENT TURNBUCKLE THAT COULD NOT BE FREELY ROTATED. 27254 1 4 THE WORK WAS PEFORMED AS AN MR, UNRESTRICTED FLIGHT USE. THE VR70-341 27254 1 5 162-004 RADIUS BLOCK IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREP 27254 1 6 ANCY WAS TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 27301 1 1 THE COLUMBIUM SEAL HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND THE SPRING PRESSURE IS ADEQU 27301 1 2 ATE. THE GAP BETWEEN THE COLUMBIUM SEAL AND ITS MATING SURFACE ON THE 27301 1 3 SEAL RETAINER IS WITHIN THE PRINT SPECIFICATIONS WHEN MEASUREMENT ERRO 27301 1 4 R IS ACCOUNTED FOR. THE V070-198552-001 ANGLE WAS REPLACED TO INSURE T 27301 1 5 HE PRINT CONFIGURATION IS RETAINED. THE SEAL AND THE ANGLE ARE SECONDA 27301 1 6 RY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY THE ORIGINAL GAP IS WITHI 27301 1 7 N DRAWINGS SPECIFICAITONS. 27453 1 1 UNDER L/H ELEVON FLIPPER DOOR NO. 9, V070-59675-001 ELEVON STRUT WAS H 27453 1 2 ITTING A HI-LOCK INSTL'D IN BRKT V070-198476-001. THIS HI-LOCK WAS NOT 27453 1 3 ED ON PR STR-3-07-1469. MOLD IMPRESSION OF DISCREPANT AREA GAVE READIN 27453 1 4 GS OF L-.21, W-.162 D-.0081 ("). THE STRUT WAS DISCONNECTED & DYE-PENE 27453 1 5 D, (REF 1B) NO DAMAGE WAS NOTED. A ADDITIONAL MD153-1001-0004 WASHER W 27453 1 6 AS ADDED IN THE STRUT ASSY, WHICH SHIFTED THE POSITION OF THE STRUT AW 27453 1 7 AY FROM THE HI-LOCK THAT THE STRUT WAS MAKING CONTACT WITH. DURING THI 27453 1 8 S RE-ASSY IT WAS NOTED THAT THE MD111-1002-0414 BOLT WAS SHORT (REF 1C 27453 1 9 ). THIS COND WAS CORRECTED BY OBTAINING A THICKNESS OF .009" ON A MD15 27453 1 10 3-0016-2004 LAMINATED WASHER PRIOR TO FINAL INSTL'N. AFTER A FULL ELEV 27453 1 11 ON CYCLE WAS PERFORMED, THE DISCREPANT HI-LOCK WAS INSPECTED FOR SIGNS 27453 1 12 OF CONTACT WITH THE STRUT. (REF STR-1469). THIS INSP SHOWED NO SIGNS 27453 1 13 OF CONTACT BETWEEN STRUT & HI-LOCK PG 1A IS SUSPECT OF BEING WRITTEN U 27453 1 14 P AFTER ELEVON CYCLE REQUESTED IN PR STR-1469. 1A IS DUPLICATE OF INIT 27453 1 15 IAL PR ITEM. 27483 1 1 THE "PUNCTURE" HOLE INDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS ORIGINALLY THOUGHT 27483 1 2 TO BE A DISCREPANCY AND WAS THEREFORE, TEMPORARILY SEALED WITH LT-80 TA 27483 1 3 PE. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE HOLE IS A VENT HOLE PER THE 27483 1 4 NEXT HIGHER ASSEMBLY DRAWING (V070-857039) AND THE TAPE WAS REMOVED. THE 27483 1 5 TWO "CUT" HOLES INDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS DETERMINED TO BE AN I 27483 1 6 NTEGRAL PART OF THE WEB'S DESIGN AND IS NOT A DISCREPANCY. INVESTIGATION 27483 1 7 OF THE NHA DRAWING DETERMINED THAT THESE HOLES SHOULD BE SEALED WITH TR 27483 1 8 V SEALANT WHICH WAS NOT PRESENT, REFERENCE ITEM 2, PAGE 1A. THIS PR SEAL 27483 1 9 THE HOLES PER THE NHA DRQWING REQUIREMENTS. DISCREPANCY 1 WAS NOT A PR 27483 1 10 CONDITION AND IEM 2 WAS RETURNED TO DESIGN REQUIREMENT. CONCLUDE THAT NO 27483 1 11 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 27698 1 1 70C2067-3 BUSHING IS SLIGHTLY ENLONGATED. AN EDDY CURRENT PERFORMED ON 27698 1 2 THE PERIMETER OF THE BUSHING REVEALED NO DAMAGE. OK AS IS. 27821 1 1 ENLARGING THE ONE DISCREPANT HOLE FROM .223 TO .25 27821 1 2 0 WILL CLEAN UP THE ELONGATION AND ALLOW USE OF TH 27821 1 3 E STIFFENER AS THE DRAWING INTENDED. THIS REWORK 27821 1 4 WILL NOT EFFECT THE FORM, FIT, AND/OR FUNCTION OF 27821 1 5 THE INSTALLIATION, AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRIC 27821 1 6 TED USAGE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 28069 1 1 DISCREPANT CONDITION AS DESCRIBED ON PG. 1 NO LONG 28069 1 2 ER EXISTS AS DOCUMENTED ON PG. 1A. TILE CAVITY PRO 28069 1 3 PARATION HAS REMOVED SUSPECTED DISCREPANCY. THIS H 28069 1 4 AS BEEN VERIFIED BY QC THAT FOUND ORIGINAL DISCREP 28069 1 5 ANCY. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS AT THIS TIME. NO MR R 28069 1 6 EQ'D. CLOSE PR. 28144 1 1 WORK WAS PERFORMED PER DISPOSITION INTERFERENCE 28144 1 2 W/ PLATE NO LONGER EXISTS 28158 1 1 SCREWS WERE OBTAINED & INSTALLED TO PER PRINT CONDITION. CLOSE THIS PR 28214 1 1 PRSD CRYO TANK BORON STRUT ME270-0006-0015 WAS FOU 28214 1 2 ND TO HAVE THREE SCRATCHES ON THE STRUT SURFACE. M 28214 1 3 OLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN AND RESULTANT DIMENSTIO 28214 1 4 NS OF SCRATCHES WERE FOUND TO BE WITHIN DESIGN CEN 28214 1 5 TER CRITERIA OF 0.0030 INCHES IN DEPTH. VISUAL INS 28214 1 6 PECTION WAS ALSO PERFORMED AND NO BORON FIBERS WER 28214 1 7 E SCRATCHED. TANK BORON STRUT HAS BEEN MR APPROVED 28214 1 8 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, MR MARKED, PAINT SURFACE RE 28214 1 9 PAIRED, AND RETURNED TO LOGISTICS SPARES.BORON STR 28214 1 10 UT OBTAIN IN STEP 3 DEFECTIVE(REF PR FCP-3-07-0143 28340 1 1 THE SHIM IS PART OF THE AFT ATTACH BLOCK ASSY, LOC 28340 1 2 ATED BELOW RUB PNL #11, R/H OUTBD ELEVON. THE SHI 28340 1 3 M WAS REMOVED AND REINSTALLED CORRECTLY WITH THE A 28340 1 4 TTACH BLOCK HARDWARE. CAUSE - MANUFACTURING ERROR 28372 1 1 ITEM 1, 2, AND 3 - THE BEND AND SPLIT AT THE INBOARD END OF THE V070-1 28372 1 2 98715-006 SEAL AND THE SMALL DING AT THE OUTBOARD END OF THE SEAL WERE 28372 1 3 REWORKED PER MR DISPO BY USING A MINI-GRINDER TO REMOVE ALL SHARP EDG 28372 1 4 ES AT THESE DISCREPANCIES. THIS REWORK OF THE V070-198715-006 SEAL WAS 28372 1 5 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTICTED USED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS POOR HANDLING (WORK 28372 1 6 MANSHIP). 28388 1 1 DURING RADIATOR REMOVAL THE HINGE BOLTS WERE DAMAG 28388 1 2 ED. THIS PR ORDERS NEW BOLTS TO BE USED IN THE RE 28388 1 3 INSTL'N OF THE R/H RADIATORS ON TPS MEQ-3-07-100. 28388 1 4 PR MEQ-3-07-0254 INSPECTS ALL HINGE LOCs. ON THE 28388 1 5 RADIATOR & VEH SIDE FOR DAMAGES. ENG NOTE: BOLTS 28388 1 6 TO BE REINSTL'D BY TPS MEQ-100 WHICH REPLACES TPS 28388 1 7 MEQ-086. 28405 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 28405 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 28405 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 28405 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 28405 1 5 3-C1. 28805 1 1 THE RIVET TAIL THAT WAS LODGED IN THE RSB PANEL (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) WAS S 28805 1 2 UCCESSFULLY REMOVED IN STEP 1.0. THEREFORE, THE DRAIN HOLE IS CLEARED 28805 1 3 AND NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. CAUSE OF THE RIVET TAIL PROTRUDING THROUGH 28805 1 4 THE VENT HOLE IS THAT DURING FABRICATION OF THE RSB PANEL RIVET STEMS 28805 1 5 MAY BE LEFT IN THE PANEL. DURING PROCESSING AND FLIGHT THE RIVET TAIL 28805 1 6 PROGRESSED TO THE DRAIN HOLE WHERE IT WAS REMOVED. CONCLUDE THAT THE R 28805 1 7 SB PANEL IS RETURNED TO PRINT AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS 28805 1 8 PRIMARY STRUCTURE. 28823 1 1 THE OPEN TOOLING HOLES (ITEM 1. PAGE 1) WAS DEFERRED TO FUTURE FLIGHT 28823 1 2 DUE TO ACCESS. AFTER FLIGHT 11 THE R/H OMS POD WAS REMOVED AND THE TOO 28823 1 3 LING HOLES WERE PLUGGED USING UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED MS20470A12 RIVE 28823 1 4 TS. THE MR RIVETS WERE REQUIRED BECAUSE THE PER PRINT MD121-0003-12XX 28823 1 5 RIVETS WERE TOO HARD FOR THE TOOLING CAPABILTY AT KSC. CONCLUDE THAT T 28823 1 6 HE HOLES IN THE BULKHEAD ARE PLUGGED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED O 28823 1 7 N THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR 28830 01 1 X 28953 1 1 STOP DRILLING CRACK AT BOTH ENDS WILL STOP FURTHER 28953 1 2 GROWTH. 29046 1 1 DURING POD INSTALLATION (1) V070-359106-001 BOLT WAS FOUND TO HAVE NIC 29046 1 2 KS & SCRATCHES. THIS BOLT WAS SCRAPPED & REPLACED WITH A NEW ONE. PROB 29046 1 3 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 29065 1 1 DISCREPANCY #1.0 HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT BY POTTING OPEN HOLE IN ED 29065 1 2 GE OF PNL. DELAMINATED AREAS DESCRIBED IN ITEMS 2 AND 3 HAVE BEEN FOUN 29065 1 3 D TO BE NON-EXISTENT AND VALIDATED AS SUCH CAUSE OF DISCREPANCIES IN U 29065 1 4 NKNOWN, APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED THRU PREVIOUS INSPECTIONS. CLOSE 29065 1 5 PR. 29077 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO CORRECT LEAKS IN THE LEFT HAND 29077 1 2 AND RIGHT HAND SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLIES. THE LEAKS WERE DETECTED DURING 29077 1 3 V5069. AFTER RE-TORQUE OF THE STRUTS HEX SWIVEL NUTS, ZERO LEAKAGE WAS 29077 1 4 FOUND. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS DEFICIENCY WAS INSUFFICIENT SEATING OF 29077 1 5 THE FILLER VALVE SEAL. 29113 1 1 DENTS DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, HAVE BEEN INSPECTED WITH KOROPON R 29113 1 2 EMOVED AND NO CRACKS EXIST. THE DENTS HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS PER MR. 29113 1 3 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN ADDRESSED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUS 29113 1 4 E: EXCESSIVE HANDLING. 29198 1 1 (2) SHIMS THAT WERE DEBONDED FROM C/P HAVE BEEN REINSTALLED. SHIMS HAV 29198 1 2 E BEEN RETURNED TO INSTALLATION REQUIRMENTS. 29289 1 1 ITEM 1,2,3 PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS DISCREPANCIES IN R/H TEE #09 (R/S 10 29289 1 2 ) V070-199839-008 INSULATOR WAS RESOLVED BY ROUTING THE INSULATOR TO R 29289 1 3 1 SERVICE CENTER FOR REPAIR INSULATOR WAS RETURNED AND REINSTALLED FOR 29289 1 4 FLIGHT. REWORK RETURNED THE INSULATOR TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABL 29289 1 5 E CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 29489 1 1 WHITE SUBSTANCES ARE RUN OFF OF PRIMER FOR RTV JOB 29489 1 2 S DONE IN THE VICINITY OF THE DISCREPANT AREAS. W 29489 1 3 HITE SUBSTANCES WERE REMOVED WITH MEK AND WIPES. 29489 1 4 CLOSE THIS PR. 29527 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 29527 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 29527 1 3 EARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. 29527 1 4 THE SHIM(S) WERE CENTERED OVER THE BOLT HOLES PER 29527 1 5 MR ACTION TO RESOLVE THE MISALIGNMENT PROBLEM. R.C 29527 1 6 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHIN 29527 1 7 G HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121- 29527 1 8 87-103-C1) 29528 1 1 TWO SEAL JOINTS ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE SILL LONGERON AT THE Xo790 AN 29528 1 2 D THE Xo595 DID NOT PROTRUDE FAR ENOUGH ON ONE SIDE IN TO THE PRIMARY 29528 1 3 BULB SEAL. AT BOTH LOCATIONS THE SEALS JOINTS WRE REMOVED AND INSTALLE 29528 1 4 D SO THAT THEY WERE CENTERED IN BETWEEN THE PRIMARY SEALS. THIS RETURN 29528 1 5 ED THE SHIP TO A PER PRINT CONFIGURATION. 29542 1 1 INSTALLATION OF THE RETAINING RINGS WILL RETURN THE SLEEVE BOLT INSTAL 29542 1 2 LATION TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE, OF THE MISSING RETA 29542 1 3 INER RINGS, IS THE ACCESS PANEL WAS RECEIVED WITHOUT THEM. THE INSTALL 29542 1 4 ATION OF THE RETAINING RINGS IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 29586 1 1 INSTL RESTORED TO ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. 29623 1 1 ABOVE CONFIGURATION CHANGE WILL BE EO TO FOLLOW & 29623 1 2 WILL ELIMINATE DISCREPANT CONDITION CLOSE PR 29684 1 1 THE MR ACCEPTED DISCREPANT SEAL WAS FURTHER DAMAGED DURING FRT (V1034) 29684 1 2 . A NOW PR (STR-3-07-2628) WAS WRITTEN ON THE SERAL. THE SEAL WAS RE 29684 1 3 MOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW SEAL. THE DISCREPANT SEAL WAS SCRAPPED. 29684 1 4 THEREFORE THIS DEFERRED PR IS NO LONGER REQUIRED AND CAN CLOSE. CLOS 29684 1 5 E THIS PR. 29741 01 1 VOID PR. 29789 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN BINDING WAS OBSERVED DURING INSTALLATION OF 29789 1 2 THE F/H I/B WHEEL ASSEMBLY (MWA-028/022). THE WHEEL ASSY WAS REMOVED 29789 1 3 AND THE BRAKE INSPECTED. ALL BRAKE ROTORS ROTATED NORMALLY. THE R/H IN 29789 1 4 BD BRAKE ASSY ROTORS HAD ABOUT 1/4" MORE LATERAL PLAY THAN THE R/H OTB 29789 1 5 D BRAKE ASSY. WHEN THE WHEEL WAS INSPECTED IT WAS NOTED THAT THE TORQU 29789 1 6 E BARS WERE NOT SEATED ON THEIR INNER WHEEL HALF KEYWAYS. ALL NINE TOR 29789 1 7 QUE BARS WERE RESEATED USING A RUBBER MALLET, AND SECURED BY RETORQUIN 29789 1 8 G THEIR FASTENERS. THE WHEEL ASSY WAS THEN REINSTALLED AND INSPECTED F 29789 1 9 OR BINDING. BINDING WAS OBSERVED UPON REINSTALLATION AND A PAGE 1A WAS 29789 1 10 INITIATED. INSPECTION OF THE WHEEL AND BRAKE, AFTER WHEEL REMOVAL, RE 29789 1 11 VEALED THAT THE WHEEL HEAT SHIELD WAS CONTACTING THE OTBD MOST BRAKE R 29789 1 12 OTOR AT THE LOCATION WHERE THE TPMS HARNESS IS ROUTED UNDER THE HEAT S 29789 1 13 HIELD. THE WHEEL ASSY WAS REINSTALLED USING A PIECE OF TILE SHIM STOCK 29789 1 14 INSIDE HEAT SHIELD INTERFERENCE AREA TO PREVENT HEAT SHIELD CONTACT W 29789 1 15 ITH BRAKE ROTOR DURING INSTALLATION.THE SHIM STOCK WAS REMOVED AND BI 29789 1 16 NDING WAS OBSERVED DURING SUBSEQUENT WHEEL ROTATION. THE WHEEL ASSY WA 29789 1 17 S AGAIN REMOVED FROM THE VEHICLE. EO-TO-FOLLOW DISPOSITION WAS INITIAT 29789 1 18 ED TO REMOVE THE SPACERS ADJACENT TO THE TPMS HARNESS, REROUTE THE HAR 29789 1 19 NESS, AND SECURE THE HARNESS WITH TAPE ("BANDAID" BOND). A PAGE 1B WAS 29789 1 20 INITIATED WHEN REROUTING OF THE TPMS HARNESS COULD NOT BE PERFORMED E 29789 1 21 XACTLY AS OUTLINES IN EO-TO-FOLLOW DISPOSITION. MINOR ALTERATIONS WERE 29789 1 22 MADE TO THE HARNESS INSTALLATION SKETCH WHICH SATISFIED THE INTENT OF 29789 1 23 THE ORIGINAL EO-TO-FOLLOW RATIONALE. THE WHEEL WAS TEMPORARILY REINST 29789 1 24 ALLED AND ROTATED AND NO BINDING WAS OBSERVED. A PAGE 1C WAS INITIATED 29789 1 25 WHEN DIFFICULTY WAS ENCOUNTERED WHILE INSTALLING HEAT SHIELD TORQUE B 29789 1 26 ARS. THE WHEEL WAS REMOVED FROM THE VEHICLE. RESTRICTED MR DISPO WAS I 29789 1 27 NITIATED TO LIGHTLY SAND THE PAINT AND KOROPON OFF THE RIBS (TORQUE BA 29789 1 28 R KEY) TO FACILITATE TORQUE BAR INSTALLATION. THE MR DISPOSITION WAS S 29789 1 29 UBSEQUENTLY VOIDED PRIOR TO ANY SANDING WHEN RI LSS DETERMINED THAT SE 29789 1 30 ATING THE TORQUE BARS USING A RUBBER MALLET WAS THE PREFERRED BF GOODR 29789 1 31 ICH INSTALLATION METHOD. THE TORQUE BARS AND HEAT SHIELD ASSEMBLY WAS 29789 1 32 REINSTALLED ON THE WHEEL. THE WHEEL ASSEMBLY WAS REINSTALLED ON THE VE 29789 1 33 HICLE AND NO BINDING WAS OBSERVEDDURING WHEEL ROTATION. THE PROBABLE 29789 1 34 CAUSE OF THIS PR IS INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE WHEEL HEAT SHIELD AND BRA 29789 1 35 KE ASSY. THIS INTERFERENCE WAS CAUSED BY A DRAWING MIS-ROUTING OF THE 29789 1 36 TPMS HARNESS AROUND THE HEAT SHIELD. 29843 1 1 PG. 1 ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED A V070-351111-001 BRKT THAT WAS BEN 29843 1 2 T 45 DEGREE WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 90 DEGREE. THIS PROBLEM WAS CORR 29843 1 3 ECTED BY REMOVING THE DISCREPANT BRKT & INSTL'N A NEW ONE. DISCREPANC 29843 1 4 Y NO LONGER EXISTS. 29879 1 1 TWO LEAK PATHS WERE FOUND AT ENDS OF RUB TUBS AT YW -281 AND YW -283. 29879 1 2 LEAK PATHS WERE SEALED PER DRAWING V070-198050. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR 29921 1 1 THE SEALS ON THE 50-1 DOOR HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND REPLACED PER THIS DIS 29921 1 2 POSITION. THE SEALS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE PRO 29921 1 3 BABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE IS THE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF THE DOOR ON A 29921 1 4 REGULAR BASIS. CLOSE THIS PR 30093 1 1 MR RATIONALE: THE V070-398558 SEALS ARE PROBABLY 30093 1 2 A BIT SHORTER ON EITHER SIDE OF THIS PARTICULAR 30093 1 3 SPLICE. USE OF A -041 SPLICE (SLIGHTLY LONGER) IN 30093 1 4 PLACE OF THE -040 TO OBTAIN CORRECT OVERLAP, IS OK 30093 1 5 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, NO AFFECT TO FORM, FIT OR 30093 1 6 FUNCTION OF SEAL. NO MR MARKING REQUIRED. THIS 30093 1 7 PROBLEM OCCURS ON 103 APPARENTLY DUE TO TOLERANCE 30093 1 8 BUILDUP. 30103 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1. THE DENT ON THE IML OF THE RH MLG DOOR IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 30103 1 2 1, PAGE WAS INSPECTED FOR DEBONDING BETWEEN THE FACE SHEET AND HONEYCOMB 30103 1 3 AND WAS PENETRANT INSPECTED FOR CRACKS. THE RESULTS OF INSPECTION WERE 30103 1 4 NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES BESIDES THE DENT ITSELF WERE EVIDENT. THE DENT 30103 1 5 WAS THEN MR ACCEPTED FOR ONE FLIGHT. POST FLIGHT REPAIR WAS PERFORMED TO 30103 1 6 BOND A .020" DOUBLER OVER THE DENTED AREA. THE DOUBLER APPLICATION WAS 30103 1 7 ACCEPTED BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. THE SUSPECTED CAUSE OF THE DENT 30103 1 8 WAS THAT THE MLG DOOR WAS MANUALLY PUSHED/PULLED INTO THE RH MLG ACCESS 30103 1 9 GSE PLATFORM. CONCLUDE THAT THE DOOR HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE 30103 1 10 CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. 30103 1 11 ITEM 2 PAGE 1A. THE LAP SHEARS FOR BONDED DOUBLER FAILED THEY PULLED AT 30103 1 12 A AVERAGE VALUE OF 1933 AND THEY SHOULD BE 2400 PSI. THE DOUBLER WAS 30103 1 13 REMOVED AND THE REBONDED PER ORIGINAL MR. THE NEW LAP SHEAR VALUE WAS 30103 1 14 3165. PROBABLE CAUSE IS TOO SHORT A CURE TIME OF ADHESIVE. 30103 1 15 30184 1 1 LAP SHEAR FINGER #4 PULLED AT 1917 PSI AND IT SHOULD BE 2000 PSI MINIM 30184 1 2 UM. THE BOND WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BASED ON GOOD LAP SH 30184 1 3 EARS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 30436 1 1 SEALING SLIT WILL RETURN BULB SEAL TO DESIGN IN- 30436 1 2 TENT. FORM, FIT OR FUNCTION ARE NOT ALTERED. NO 30436 1 3 LOSS OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY. 30558 1 1 CARRIER PANEL WAS INSTALLED ,PER JOB CARD USING NEW SCREWS OBTAINED FR 30558 1 2 OM THIS PR. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXISTS. CAUSE: DAMAGED HARDWARE U 30558 1 3 SED DURING ORIGINAL INSTALLATION. 30697 1 1 THE MISTAKENLY REMOVED INSULATOR/PLATE ASSY, WAS R 30697 1 2 EINSTALLED TO THE V070-199804-020 R.H. RIB SPLICE 30697 1 3 #5 TEE. THE TEE ASSY HAS BEEN SAFELY STORED. THE 30697 1 4 INSTALLATION OF THE TEE ASSY WILL BE PERFORMED ON 30697 1 5 VSTR-3-07-155. 30716 1 1 SPEC WAS MISREAD GIVING INCORRECT HOLE LAYOUT. CO 30716 1 2 NDITION WAS CORRECTED BY PLUGGING DISCREPANT HOLES 30716 1 3 AND DRILL CORRECT HOLE LAYOUT PER SPEC. SPEC HOL 30716 1 4 E CLEAR PLUGGED HOLE BY .266 C TO C. HOLES WILL B 30716 1 5 E DRILLED AT CORRECT LOCATION BY EPD-3-07-099 STEP 30716 1 6 6. 30770 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITITATED DURING POST FLIGHT INSPECTIONS. AN MR REQUEST W 30770 1 2 AS APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE TO PATCH THE FRAYED/TORN NLG DOOR HIN 30770 1 3 GE BOOT. THE DISCREPANT NLG HINGE BOOT WAS REMOVED AND REPAIRED WITH A 30770 1 4 N RTV PATCH. THIS REPAIR WAS MR IDENTIFIED AS AN MR REPAIR. THE BOOT W 30770 1 5 AS REINSTALLED SO AS TO AVOID RECURRANCE OF THIS CONDITION. PR CONDITI 30770 1 6 ON NO LONGER EXISTS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL SYSTEM 30770 1 7 WEAR. 30787 1 1 4 EA BOLTS IN RH ET UMBILICAL AREA SHOWN IN DWG. V070-351765 VIEW C ZN 30787 1 2 22E ARE INSTALLED WITH NO GAP WHEN THEY SHOULD HAVE .005 +.005/ -.000 30787 1 3 GAP. 4 EA LOCATIONS HAD NUTS OR BOLTS REMOVED AND REINSTALLED PER DWG 30787 1 4 . PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 30970 1 1 02 PURGE PORT FLIGHT FITTING V070-454720-003 HAS BEEN ASSIGNED AN OCN 30970 1 2 #. NO MARKING OF PART IS REQUIRED. 31052 1 1 THE NOSE LANDING GEAR DOOR ENVIORNMENTAL SEAL WAS PARTIALLY REMOVED FR 31052 1 2 OM THE LH HINGELINE AND FWD EDGES AROUND THE DOOR PERIMETER. THE NICOC 31052 1 3 ON PATCH IN THESE AREAS WAS ALSO REBONDED TO THE THERMAL BARRIER. THIS 31052 1 4 WORK WAS PERFORMED AFTER V1098 (LH FUNCTIONAL) WITH OUT MEQ KNOWLEDGE 31052 1 5 OR CONCURRENCE. OMRSD GENERAL REQUIREMENT V51GEN.010 STATES "THE LAND 31052 1 6 ING GEAR FLIGHT FUNCTIONAL SHALL BE PERFORMED WITH ALL LANDING GEAR ME 31052 1 7 CHANISMS, THERMAL BARRIER, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SEALS INSTALLED FOR FLIGH 31052 1 8 T." IN ORDER TO VERIFY PROPER NLG DOOR POSITION AFTER FINAL GEAR RETRA 31052 1 9 CTION FOR FLIGHT, A BREAKOUT BOX WAS INSTALLED IN BREAK THROUGH CONFIG 31052 1 10 URATION TO CHECK THE VOLTAGE OUT OF THE NLG DOOR UPLOCK PROXIMITY SENS 31052 1 11 OR. 4.58 VDC WAS MEASURED (S/B 5+1.1 VDC) INDICATING GOOD POSITION. TH 31052 1 12 E BREAK OUT BOX WAS REMOVED AND SCAN RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER DEV 08/0 31052 1 13 1 TO OMI S0008. THE OMRS VIOLATION WAS ACCEPTED PER WAIVER WK1373R1 AN 31052 1 14 D NO PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CONDITION WERE ENCOUNTERED DURING F 31052 1 15 INAL GEAR RETRACTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: HUMAN ERROR. 31123 1 1 ITEM 1: ENGINEERING RESEARCH REVEALED THAT THE COMPRESSION MARKS ARE D 31123 1 2 OCUMENTED AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE ON A PREVIOUS DISPOSITION, 31123 1 3 REF MR BG7963-000M. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED FOR ITEM 1. PROBABLE C 31123 1 4 AUSE WAS THE INABILITY TO FIND MR PRIOR TO WRITING THIS PR. ITEM 2: TH 31123 1 5 E DELAMINATION ON THE PANEL'S ATTACH LUG WS MR REWORKED BY BONDING THE 31123 1 6 DELAMINATION. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WE 31123 1 7 AR AND TEAR. 31160 1 1 (2) DELAMINATIONS WERE RECORDED AT PLBD #1 (Xo714.80) O/B STRONGBACK A 31160 1 2 TTACH POINT. THESE DELAMINATIONS WERE FOUND TO BE MINOR IN NATURE AND 31160 1 3 MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DE 31160 1 4 GRADATION. 31173 1 1 PG 1 ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY DISCRIBED A MOUNTING HOLE FLANGE BENT FWD PROH 31173 1 2 IBITING A PANEL FROM BEING INSTL'D. THIS PROBLEM WAS CORRECTED BY BEND 31173 1 3 ING THE FLANGE BACK TO PRINT CONFIG & CK'G THE FLANGE FOR CRACKS. PG 1 31173 1 4 ITEM 2 DISCREPANCY DISCRIBED A NUT PLATE THAT CONTACTING A HARD DUCT. 31173 1 5 THIS PROBLEM WAS CORRECTED BY BENDING THE FLANGE THAT HELD THE NUT PL 31173 1 6 ATE (AS DESCRIBED ABOVE) & PATCHING THE HARD DUCT PER MR APPROVAL. DIS 31173 1 7 CREPANCIES NO LONGER EXIST. 31174 1 1 AN LRU PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE DEFECTIVE V070-565062-004 AFT CENT 31174 1 2 ERLINE LATCH ASSEMBLY FOUND DURING IPR 26RV-0433 TROUBLSHOOTING .THE A 31174 1 3 SSEMBLY WAS SENT TO THE ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER FOR REPAIR (CONNECTOR 31174 1 4 REPLACEMENT) AND BENCH CHECK. THE REWORKED ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN REINSTALL 31174 1 5 ED, AND FUNCTIONALLY CHECKED PRIOR TO, AND POST TILE INSTALLATION. COM 31174 1 6 PLETE RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED PER RUN 2 OF V1097 ET DOOR FUNCTIONAL C 31174 1 7 HECKOUT. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. 31247 1 1 WORK WAS PERFORMED PER DISPO. USING RADIUS BLOCK & 31247 1 2 PICKING UP EXISTING HOLE ALLOWED STIFFNER TO BE I 31247 1 3 NSTALLED PER DWG INTENT. 31456 1 1 THE BOLT THAT WAS RETORQUED IN STEP 10.. OF STR 3-07-317, WAS NOT READ 31456 1 2 ILY ACCESSIBLE DIR TO INTERFERENCE FROM A STRUT AND A BRACKET. SPECIA 31456 1 3 L TOOLING WAS MADE AND ORDERED TO GAIN ACCESS. ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A IS T 31456 1 4 HE SANE PROBLEM DOCUMENTED ON PAGE1. BOTH ITEMS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED A 31456 1 5 ND RESOLVED. THE BOLT WAS SUCCESSFULLY RETORQUED USING THE SPECIAL TO 31456 1 6 OLING. CLOSE THIS PR. 31502 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WHICH IDENTIFIES SCORED MARKS ON R/H OMS POD ATTACH PO 31502 1 2 INT #2'S BOLT SHANK HAS BEEN RESOLVED BY ORDERING A NEW BOLT AND ROUTI 31502 1 3 NG DISCREPANT BOLT TO HDA. THREADS OF NUTPLATE WERE INSPECTED AND NO D 31502 1 4 AMAGE WAS FOUND. SCORE MARKS IN THE ATTACH POINT #2 BOLT HOLE HAVE BEE 31502 1 5 N DOCUMENTED ON PR STR-3-12-3522 AND WILL BE ADDRESSED ON THAT PR. PRO 31502 1 6 BABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 31582 1 1 DISCREPANCIES RESOLVED IN THIS PR WERE CAUSED BY D 31582 1 2 ESIGN DEFICIENCY. THIS THREAD DAMAGE WAS REAMED OU 31582 1 3 T OF THE HOLES UNTIL MR DISPOSITION COULD ACCEPT T 31582 1 4 HE HOLES "OK AS IS". HOLES 9,10 & 11 WERE REAMED T 31582 1 5 O 0.196 DIA (PRINT TOLERANCE). HOLES 2,3,4,5,6,& 1 31582 1 6 2 WERE REAMED TO .213 DIA BY MR DISPOSITION. 31706 1 1 TWO GOUGES WERE FOUND IN THE LT-80 ALUMINUM TAPE C 31706 1 2 VR'G THE FACE SHT OF THE L/H NEG DOOR. WHERE THE 31706 1 3 R/H DOOR STOPS I/F. THE DAMAGE WAS FOUND TO BE TO 31706 1 4 THE LT-80 TAPE ONLY & NOT TO THE DOOR STR. THE T 31706 1 5 APE WAS REPAIRED AFTER DOOR STR WAS VISUALLY & DYE 31706 1 6 PENETRANT INSP'D. SOME DOOR RETRACT RE-RIGGING W 31706 1 7 AS DONE ON PR MEQ-3-07-0269 WHICH MAY PREVENT REOC 31706 1 8 CURRENCE, HOWEVER TAPE DISPLACEMENT MAY OCCUR AGAI 31706 1 9 N. THIS PRESENTS NO PROBLEM TO NLG OPS & MAY BE C 31706 1 10 ONSIDERED NORM WEAR. 31726 1 1 UPON REMOVAL OF THE V070-198103-001 CARRIER PANEL, CLOSE INSPECTION OF 31726 1 2 THE SUSPECT AREA ON THE LEFT HAND OUTBOARD ELEVON HINGE TUBE REVEALED 31726 1 3 NO EVIDENCE OF A SCRATCH. NO EXPOSED METAL OR INDENTATIONS IN THE TUB 31726 1 4 E SURFACE WERE NOTED. SUSPECT SCRATCH WAS ACTUALLY A WATER MARK ON THE 31726 1 5 TUBE SURFACE. CONCLUDE NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 31802 1 1 HI-LOK WAS FILED DOWN TO ELIMINATE FURTHER CONTACT 31802 1 2 WITH ELEVON STRUT. REPAIR WAS MR'D FOR UNRESTRICT 31802 1 3 ED USE. ELEVON WAS CYCLED TO VERIFY NO CONTACT EXI 31802 1 4 STS. CAUSE IS UNKNOWN. 31858 1 1 V070-731874-037 LUMINOUS CEILING PANEL WAS NOTED AS HAVING A SMALL CRA 31858 1 2 CK ON THE OUTSIDE EDGE. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE -037 CEILING PANEL, FIVE 31858 1 3 (5) ADDITIONAL CRACKS WERE NOTED (REF PAGE 1A) THE REPAIR OF ALL CRACK 31858 1 4 S WERE MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE CRACKS WERE SOLVENT CLEAN 31858 1 5 ED USING WIPES DAMPENED WITH FREON TF. THE CRACKS WERE THEN SEALED USI 31858 1 6 NG A BRUSH MIX OF 35 +/- METHYLENE DICHKIRIDE WITH 65% METHYLENE CHLOR 31858 1 7 IDE. THE CRACKS/PANEL WAS MR ID'D AFTER BRUSHING/SEALING FIX. CLOSE TH 31858 1 8 IS PR 32051 1 1 THE BUBBLED TAPE IN THE VICINITY OF GSE ATTACH HOLES HAS BEEN REBONDED 32051 1 2 USING RTV F142 PER THE PROCEDURE SPECIFIED IN THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REP 32051 1 3 AIR MANUAL. THE DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXIST. THE MR REPAIR WAS ACCEP 32051 1 4 TED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 32267 1 1 THE CORROSION ON THE RSB WAS FOUND TO BE LOCALIZED MINOR PITTING. THE 32267 1 2 PITTING WAS REMOVED & MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICED USE. TWO RIVETS IN 32267 1 3 THE AREA WERE REMOVED & INSP'D. NO CORROSION WAS FOUND IN THE HOLE O 32267 1 4 R ON THE RIVET. ONE RIVET WAS RE-INSTL'D & THE OTHER WILL BE INSTL'D 32267 1 5 ON DR STR-3-07-2557. 32879 1 1 THE STRUCTURAL INTERFERENCES INSIDE THE WING PREVE 32879 1 2 NTED THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW PINS. AN EO-TO-FO 32879 1 3 LLOW WAS WRITTEN AND RELEASED TO RETURN THE ENGINE 32879 1 4 ERING DESIGN TO THE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THE WING. M 32879 1 5 R PINS WERE FABRICATED AND INSTALLED FOR UNRESTRIC 32879 1 6 TED USE. 32972 1 1 ALL THREE FUEL CELLS (FC) H2 PURGE LINES ARE MANIF 32972 1 2 OLED TO A COMMON OVERBOARD H2 PURGE PORT WHERE THE 32972 1 3 LEAKAGE OCCURED. THE INITIAL LEAKAGE WAS DETECTED 32972 1 4 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF TPS FCP-3-07-015 WITH T 32972 1 5 YGON HOSE AND WATER. TPS RESULTS ARE; FIRST BUBBLE 32972 1 6 IN 2 MINUTES THEN ONE BUBBLE EVERY 40 TO 60 SECON 32972 1 7 DS THEREAFTER DURING THE 4 MINUTE OBSERVATION PERI 32972 1 8 OD. THE FOLLOWING PR'S WERE ASSIGNED TO EACH FC 32972 1 9 PR FCP-3-07-0077 FC3 S/N 103 32972 1 10 PR FCP-3-07-0078 FC2 S/N 113 32972 1 11 PR FCP-3-07-0080 FC1 S/N 114 32972 1 12 VOLUMETRIC LEAK DETECTOR WAS USED DURING PR FCP-3- 32972 1 13 07-0080 FOR TWELVE (12) MINUTES. THE RESULTS WAS Z 32972 1 14 ERO (0) LEAKAGE FROM PORT. ALL THREE FUEL CELLS WE 32972 1 15 RE REMOVED AND ROUTED TO INTERNATIONAL FUEL CELL ( 32972 1 16 IFC) BY TPS FCP-3-07-016 FOR PLANNED MODIFICATIONS 32972 1 17 (MCR 10455). IFC ANALYSIS INDICATED NO H2 LEAKAGE 32972 1 18 FROM THE REMOVED FUEL CELLS. FUEL CELL'S ALLOWABLE 32972 1 19 LEAKAGE IS 25 BUBBLES IN 5 MINUTES (PER FUEL CELL) 32972 1 20 0 PER IFC'S ACCEPTANCE TEST CRITERIA. COMBINED LEA 32972 1 21 KAGE OF ALL THREE FC'S AT KSC WAS LESS THAN 1 BUBB 32972 1 22 LE PER MINUTE WHICH IS WELL WITHIN THE LIMITS OF I 32972 1 23 FC'S CRITERIA. 33002 1 1 (3) NUTPLATES WERE FOUND DISCREPANT IN ITEM 1, AND (3) IN ITEM 3 ON TH 33002 1 2 E LH BAY 2 LONGERON SILL. AN EO-TO-FOLLOW TO ALLOW THE R7R OF THESE OB 33002 1 3 SOLETE NUTPLATES USING EQUIVALENT ROCKWELL NUTPLATES WAS WRITTEN. IT W 33002 1 4 AS THEN DISCOVERED IN ITEM 2 THAT THE (2) OUTBOARD-MOST NUTPLATES COUL 33002 1 5 D NOT BE INSTALLED USING THE AVAILABLE RIVETING TOOLS. AN MR WAS APPRO 33002 1 6 VED TO USE BLIND POP RIVETS AT THOSE (2) LOCATIONS SINCE TOOLS EXIST W 33002 1 7 HICH CAN ACCESS THE LOCATIONS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE ORIGINAL DISC 33002 1 8 REPANT NUTPLATES (ITEMS 1 AND 3) IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. TH DEFINITE 33002 1 9 CAUSE OF THE ITEM 2 ACCESS PROBLEM WAS A LACK OF AN AVAILABE RIVET GUN 33002 1 10 AND BUCKING TOOL WHICH WOULD WORK FOR THE TIGHT OUTBOARD LOCATIONS. 33132 1 1 THE HYDROGEN INLET ON FUEL CELL 1 WAS PRESSURIZED WHILE THE CELL WAS D 33132 1 2 EPRESSURIZED DUE TO A FAULTY H2 REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE (REF IPR 26RV-03 33132 1 3 91). THIS COND VIOLATED OMRSD FILE III GENERAL CAUTION NOTE 3.2.5-"DUR 33132 1 4 ING ANY FCP PRESSURIZATION OXYGEN & HYDROGEN SUPPLY PRESSURES MUST BE 33132 1 5 GREATER THAN 100 PSIA BEFORE SIMULTANEOUSLY OPENING FCP REACTANT VALVE 33132 1 6 S". THE FUEL CELL REG IS DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN THE OXYGEN PRESS 5.25 (+ 33132 1 7 /- 0.75) PSI ABOVE THE HYDROGEN PRESS. THE REG ACCOMPLISHES THIS BY OP 33132 1 8 ENING/CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE REG INLET VALVES & (IF NECESSARY) VENTIN 33132 1 9 G THE HIGHER PRESSURIZED SIDE THRU A VENT VALVE SYS. WHEN THE FUEL CEL 33132 1 10 L IS DEPRESSURIZED, THE O2 REG INLET IS OPEN & THE HYDROGEN REG INLET 33132 1 11 IS CLOSED OFF SINCE BOTH SIDES OF THE FUEL CELL ARE AT AMBIENT. IF THE 33132 1 12 H2 REG SHOULD LEAK ACROSS THE VALVE ASSY, THE H2 VENT SYS WILL OPEN I 33132 1 13 MMEDIATELY TO VENT THE PRESS DUE TO THIS LEAKAGE. THUS, THE FUEL CELL 33132 1 14 REG IS DESIGNED TO BE FAULT TOLERANT TO THIS TYPE LEAKAGE & FUEL CELL 33132 1 15 DAMAGE IS NOT LIKELY. THE FUEL CELLS ARE TO BE STARTED FOR FRF & FUEL 33132 1 16 CELL PERFORMANCE WILL BE OBSERVED AT THAT TIME. WAIVER WK0553 WILL APP 33132 1 17 ROVE THE VIOLATION OF THE GENERAL CAUTION NOTE BASED UPON THE FACT THA 33132 1 18 T THE FUEL CELL IS DESIGNED TO PROTECT ITSELF AGAINST THIS H2 SYS OVER 33132 1 19 -PRESSURE. THIS PR WILL BE CLOSED UPON RECEIPT OF WAIVER. 33164 1 1 TORQUE TUBES ARE DESIGNED TO BE FLEXIBLE IN TWO DI 33164 1 2 RECTIONS (Z & Y). FAIRLEADS ARE INSTALLED IN PLBD 33164 1 3 RIBS TO PREVENT TUBE FROM CONTACTING/DAMAGING PLBD 33164 1 4 RIB. THEREFORE, POTENTIAL CONTACT OF TORQUE TUBE 33164 1 5 AND FAIRLEAD IS NOMINAL. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITIO 33164 1 6 N. CLOSE THIS PR. 33165 1 1 VISUAL AND RCORDED INSPECTION OF THIS/THESE DAMAGE 33165 1 2 CONDITIONS INDICATES THAT THE DAMAGE IS MINOR. T 33165 1 3 HIS/THESE CONDITIONS ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO 33165 1 4 REQUIRE A REPAIR. THE SCRATCHES AND/OR HOLES AND 33165 1 5 /OR DAMAGE IS TO THE SILVER TEFLON TAPE ONLY. THI 33165 1 6 S MINOR TAPE DAMAGE IS ALLOWABLE PER VOUGHT RADIAT 33165 1 7 OR REPAIR MANUAL (SECT. 3-11B.) THE DINGS IF ANY, 33165 1 8 ARE MINOR AND DO NOT REQUIRE A REPAIR. THIS/THES 33165 1 9 E CONDITIONS WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE FIT, FOR 33165 1 10 M, AND/OR FUNCITON OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CO 33165 1 11 DITION WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HEAT TRANSFER 33165 1 12 CAPACITY OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CONDITION IS 33165 1 13 ACCEPTABLE AS-IS FOR UN-RESTRICTED USE. NO MR I. 33165 1 14 D. REQ'D. (DING MAP) 33211 1 1 WORK WAS PERFORMED PER DISPO. PLUG HOLE PER MRB. 33409 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 33409 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION 1220.75 XO 396.50 ZO R/H IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORIGI 33409 1 3 NAL RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE TO THE APPROPRIA 33409 1 4 TE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO PRINT CONFIGURATI 33409 1 5 ON. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THIS IS A SECOND 33409 1 6 ARY STRUCTURE. 33493 1 1 THE V070-339197-001 PANEL ASSY WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED BY THE V070-33 33493 1 2 9197-002 ASSY ON VSTR-3-07-299 PER MCR 11075 (REF. PRCBD S60243R7). TH 33493 1 3 E V070-339197-001 ASSY WAS ROUTED TO ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER FOR REWOR 33493 1 4 K PER VSTR-3-07-299, STEP 2.0. 33550 1 1 V070-198371 SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE FLAKING OFF. MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHE 33550 1 2 SIVE WAS APPLIED TO AREA. SEAL WITH ADHESIVE INSTALLED WILL MAINTAIN T 33550 1 3 HERMAL INTEGRITY OF THE INSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE OPERATION DEGRADA 33550 1 4 TION. 33589 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 33589 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 33589 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 33589 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 33589 1 5 3-C1. 33804 1 1 FOR ITEM 1 WHERE A WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL WAS BENT DOWN WHEN IT S/B E 33804 1 2 VEN WITH THE WING: THE DISCREPANT SEALS WERE REMOVED & ROUTED TO THE H 33804 1 3 DA FOR DISPO'ING. NEW SEALS WERE INSTL'D WHERE THE DISCREPANT SEALS WE 33804 1 4 RE LOCATED. ITEM 2 WAS WRITTEN IN ERROR & WAS DOCUMENTED ON DR-STR-3-0 33804 1 5 7-2550 FOR DISPO'ING. 33980 1 1 DISCOLORED KOROPON WAS DUE TO HIGH HEAT CONDITIONS 33980 1 2 BUT DID NOT RESULT IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. DISCOLOR 33980 1 3 ED KOROPON WAS REMOVED AND NEW COAT OF CORROSION P 33980 1 4 ROTECTION APPLIED TO RETURN TO PRINT CONFIGURATION 34032 1 1 ITEM 1.0: THE (2) DISCREPANT V070-565247-001 INSERTS WERE SENT TO VEND 34032 1 2 OR FOR REPAIR AND REPLACED WITH NEW INSERTS. THE NEW INSERTS WERE INST 34032 1 3 ALLED PER V35-50002 STEP 10.0. THE CAUSE OF THE FRAYING WAS OPERATIONA 34032 1 4 L DEGRADATION. THE INSERTS ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURES. ITEM 2.0: THE (1) 34032 1 5 DISCREPANT V070-855059-001 SHELL ASSY WAS INSTALLED PER V35-50002 STEP 34032 1 6 10.0. THE CAUSE OF THE DEBOND TO THE LINER ON THE SHELL ASSY WAS OPER 34032 1 7 ATIONAL DEGRADATION. THE SHELL ASSY IS A PRIMARY STRUCTURE. ITEM 3.0: 34032 1 8 THE PR CONDITION DESCRIBED IN ITEM 3.0 WAS ADDRESSED PER STR-3-12-3593 34032 1 9 , ON STR-3-12-3593, THE RAISED METAL WAS SANDED USING 240 GRIT EMERY P 34032 1 10 PER TO BLEND NICKS INTO BASE MATERIAL AND THEN BURNISHED WITH 600 GRIT 34032 1 11 EMERY PAPER. 34365 1 1 TPS STR-3-07-265 WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED PRIOR TO I 34365 1 2 NSTALLATION OF CLAMPS. NO PROBLEM EXISTS. 34474 1 1 DISCOLORATION WAS PHOTOGRAPHED AND VISUALLY INSPEC 34474 1 2 TED BY ENGINEERING. PARTS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS-IS. 34497 1 1 NO ACTUAL PR CONDITION EXISTS. PR GENERATED DUE TO 34497 1 2 EO MISINTERPITATION. 34646 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 34646 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 34646 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 34646 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 34646 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 34646 1 6 7-103-C1). THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 34648 1 1 ALL GALLED HARDWARE, BUSHINGS AND BOLTS HAVE BEEN 34648 1 2 REPLACED WITH PER PRINT HARDWARE. 70B2010-1 BORON 34648 1 3 STRUT WILL BE RE-INSTALLED BY CM3-07-130 TPS. 34807 1 1 HOLES IN PANEL WERE ENLARGED TO MATCH THE REAMED HOLES IN BULKHEAD (RE 34807 1 2 F: STR-3-08-2810). ONE HOLE WAS OVERSIZED AND PANEL WAS SCRAPPED. (REF 34807 1 3 STR-3-08-2809). A REPLACEMENT PANEL WAS DRILLED USING A FABRICATED LA 34807 1 4 YOUT TEMPLATE WHICH HAD TO BE ALSO REPLACED, DUE TO MISALIGNMENT. THE 34807 1 5 PANEL IS NOW INSTALLED, USING BOLTS AND NUTS INSTEAD OF NUTPLATES. CON 34807 1 6 CLUDE THAT PANEL INSTALLED IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. DEFECT 34807 1 7 CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 35206 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY NOTED ON PAGE 1.0 HAS BEEN ELIMINATED TPS STR-3-09-424 35206 1 2 , MODIFIED ALL FOUR RAMP RUB PANELS BY REMOVING THE V070-198482-001 GU 35206 1 3 IDE PIN AND WELDING A NEWLY DESIGNED GUIDE PIN TO EACH PANEL. THE NEWL 35206 1 4 Y DESIGNED GUIDE PIN PROVIDES APPROXIMATELY DOUBLE THE WELDING SURFACE 35206 1 5 . THIS CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS ON THE LH INBD RAMP RUB PANEL GUIDE 35206 1 6 PIN WELD THEREFORE THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 35354 1 1 V070-337427-004 PANEL HAD A SMALL GOUGE/CRACK IN IT. GOUGE/CRACK WAS S 35354 1 2 TOP DRILLED AND PATCHED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS IN THE A 35354 1 3 REA. CLOSE THIS PR. 35408 1 1 SCRATCHES AND MINOR RAISED METAL AREAS/BURRS WERE FOUND ON THE V070-59 35408 1 2 3327-004 "B" HATCH HINGE ARMS (REF ITEM #1). MRB APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED 35408 1 3 TO REMOVE THE RAISED METAL AREAS USING A FINE EDGE JEWELER'S FILE AND 35408 1 4 LIGHTLY SANDING WITH CROCUS CLOTH (1000 GRIT) UNTIL SMOOTH. THE SCRAT 35408 1 5 CHED AREAS WERE ALSO FINISHED WITH CROCUS CLOTH. THE PR CONDITION NO L 35408 1 6 ONGER EXISTS AND THE V070-593327-004 HINGE ARMS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR U 35408 1 7 NRESTRICTED USE (REF MR RATIONALE PG 3). PROBABLE CAUSE: CONTACT OF TH 35408 1 8 E "B" HATCH WITH THE HINGE ARMS (WHILE OPENING AND LAYING THE HATCH DO 35408 1 9 WN INSIDE THE AIRLOCK). NO RETEST REQUIRED. DEV WRITTEN TO PROCEDURE T 35408 1 10 O ADD CAUTION NOTE WHEN LOWERING HATCH. 35467 1 1 THE DIAL TORQUE WRENCH, Z# 12328, IS DESIGNED FOR USE IN THE 0-600 IN 35467 1 2 LB RANGE. SINCE ONLY THE MIDDLE 60% OF THIS RANGE IS ACCURATELY CALIB 35467 1 3 RATED, THIS WRENCH SHOULD ONLY BE USED FROM 120-480 IN LBS. THIS WREN 35467 1 4 CH WAS USED TO APPLY AN INITIAL TORQUE OF 120 IN LBS TO A MLG AXLE NUT 35467 1 5 AND TO MEASURE ROLLING RESISTANCES OF 100, AND 500 IN LBS) WERE OUTSI 35467 1 6 DE OF THE 60% RANGE. THE TORQUE WRENCH WAS CHECKED ON A TORQUE ANALYZ 35467 1 7 ER AND FOUND TO BE ACCURATE FOR THE FIRST TWO VALUES AND OFF BY 8 IN L 35467 1 8 BS FOR THE THIRD VALUE (ACTUAL TORQUE WAS 508 IN LBS). ALL ACTUAL TORQ 35467 1 9 UE VALUES WERE WELL WITHIN THE TOLERANCE SPECIFIED. DEVIATIONS WERE W 35467 1 10 RITTEN TO V1165 TO CLARIFY THE PROCEDURE AND ADD TWO BETTER SUITED TOR 35467 1 11 QUE WRENCHES TO THE PARTS LIST (SEC 1.3.3). NO DAMAGE RESULTED FROM TH 35467 1 12 IS INCIDENT AND THE PROCEDURE WAS PERMANENTLY MODIFIED TO AVOID FUTURE 35467 1 13 PROBLEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE; PROCEDURAL ERROR. RC ACTION: EVALUATE AND 35467 1 14 COORDINATE POTENTIAL CORRECTIVE ACTION WITH COGNIZANT DESIGN AGENCY. 35674 1 1 THE DISCREPANT C/P (V070-399432-002) HAD (2) MISLOCATED, OUT-OF-ROUND 35674 1 2 HOLES AND WAS SCRAPPED. A NEW C/P WAS OBTAIED FITTED & DRILLED UNDER T 35674 1 3 PS & STR ENG SUPERVISION. THIS C/P WILL BE INSTALLED ON THE ORBITER BY 35674 1 4 WAD FWD-3-07-086 AFTER TPS IS BONDED TO IT. THIS PR RESTORES HARDWARE 35674 1 5 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION ITEM (2) PG (1)-IDENTIACAL OCN #'S, IS CORRECT 35674 1 6 & REQUIRES NO CHANGE. 35795 1 1 DURING V80-00456, TWO AREAS OF DELAMINATION WERE FOUND ON THE V070-354 35795 1 2 641-002 AVIONICS BAY #4 SHROUD. THE REGIONS OF DELAMINATION WERE REPAI 35795 1 3 RED PER MR DISPOSITION USING MBO120-037 ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRE 35795 1 4 STRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 35795 1 5 N. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 35934 1 1 THIS PR AFFECTED THE LH INBD ELEVON COVE, OUTBD SEAL PNL ASSY. ITEMS 1 35934 1 2 AND 5 ALSO EXISTED ON RH SIDE ON STR-3544. IN ITEM 1, THE LINEAR SEAL 35934 1 3 HOUSING WAS BINDING IN THE SEAL PANEL ASSY. THE HOUSING HARDWARE WAS 35934 1 4 REMOVED. THE LINEAR SEAL FLANGES WERE TRIMMED PER MR TO ELIMINATE INTE 35934 1 5 RFERENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE BINDING WAS TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. ITEMS 35934 1 6 2, 4 AND 6 DESCRIBE PROBLEMS WITH THE ROSAN THREADED INSERT INSTALLATI 35934 1 7 ON ON THE INBD SIDE OF THE LINEAR SEAL ASSY. ORIGINALLY, THE INSERT CA 35934 1 8 ME OUT WITH THE SCREW. THE R&R INSTALLATION ATTEMPT FAILED, CAUSING IT 35934 1 9 EM 4 TO BE WRITTEN. (STEPS 8.1-8.2) THE NEXT R&R INSTALLATION ATTEMPT 35934 1 10 FAILED, CAUSING ITEM 6 TO BE WRITTEN. (STEPS 13.1-13.2) THE DISCREPANT 35934 1 11 INSERT INSTALLATION WAS RESOLVED BY INSTALLING A NEW INSERT USING LOC 35934 1 12 -TITE SEALANT AND STAKING WITH A SMALL CENTER PUNCH AT (2) LOCATIONS P 35934 1 13 ER MR. (STEPS 13.3-13.5) PROBABLE CAUSE WAS AN OVERSIZED COUNTERBORE B 35934 1 14 Y WORKMANSHIP/VENDOR ERROR. ITEM 3 DISCOVERED THAT THE SEAL PANEL ASSY 35934 1 15 GROOVE FOR THE LINEAR SEAL ASSY HAD SPREAD WIDER THAN DRAWING LIMITS. 35934 1 16 ALSO, IT DESCRIBED THE LINEAR SEAL AS "TWISTED". THE SPREADING OF THE 35934 1 17 GROOVE WAS MR ACCEPTED, AND THE LINEAR SEAL HOUSING WAS DETERMINED TO 35934 1 18 NOT BE TWISTED. (PAGES 12 & 13) THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE GROOVE SPRE 35934 1 19 AD WAS TOLERANCE BUILD-UP, NOT "DUE TO EXCESSIVE HEAT". IN ITEM 5, THE 35934 1 20 DISCOLORED AND BUBBLED KOROPON ON THE SEAL PANEL WAS REMOVED, AND NEW 35934 1 21 KOROPON APPLIED. (STEPS 18.0-19.0) PROBABLE CAUSE WAS HEAT DUE TO AIR 35934 1 22 FLOW FROM ELEVON COVE LEAKS, WHICH SHOULD BE FIXED BY THE STR-3-12-48 35934 1 23 5 ELEVON COVE REWORK. 36055 1 1 THE V070-355165-001 KEEL BEAM CAP (LOCATION: LEFT HAND SIDE AFT, RUNNI 36055 1 2 NG FORWARD TO AFT BY THE LH2 DISCONNECT DOOR) WAS NOTCHED 2.0 INCHES I 36055 1 3 N LENGTH BY 0.25 INCHES IN HEIGHT. THE AREA NOTCHED IS ON THE SIDE FLA 36055 1 4 NGE (NOT ON TOP) OF THE CAP (REFERENCE ATTACHMENT "A"). THE NOTCHING O 36055 1 5 F THE KEEL BEAM CAP WILL PREVENT ANY CONTACT BETWEEN THE PRESSURE CAP 36055 1 6 OF THE RTLS LEAK CHECK TUBE WITH THE KEEL BEAM CAP STRUCTURE. THE NOTC 36055 1 7 HING OF THE V070-355165-001 KEEL BEAM CAP WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT TH 36055 1 8 E INTEGRITY, SAFETY, OR DESIGN INTENT OF SUCH STRUCTURE. THIS CHANGE T 36055 1 9 O THE KEEL BEAM CAP HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED ON AN EO TO THE CORRESPONDING 36055 1 10 DRAWINGS AS NOTED ON STEP 2.0. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 36295 1 1 G/F MESH ON G/F'S IN ITEMS 1 THRU 20 WERE FOUND TO BE TORN. UNRAVELED 36295 1 2 & FRAYED IN VARIOUS PLACES & WERE REBONDED PER PGS 2 TO 21. ITEM 21 ON 36295 1 3 G/F MESH BEING MISLOCATED WAS WORKED BY BONDING NEW MESH IN PROPER LO 36295 1 4 CATION. 36373 1 1 THE PURPOSES OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO MR REPAIR GOUGES, NICKS, AND C 36373 1 2 UTS IN THE DOOR FRAME GASKET FOR DOOR 75-02. THE GASKET WAS REPAIRED W 36373 1 3 ITH WITH RTV, MBO130-119 TYPE III. THIS REPAIR WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNR 36373 1 4 ESTRICTED USE. THIS DOOR AND FRAME ARE PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF 36373 1 5 THIS DISCREPANCY WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 36469 1 1 THE DOUBLERS WERE REBONDED PER PRINT AND CONFORM 36469 1 2 TO MAO106-347. CLOSE PR. 36719 1 1 ABOVE DISCREPANCIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN AGAIN 36719 1 2 ST PR STR-3-07-1704 WHICH ALREADY DOCUMENTS HEAT S 36719 1 3 INK PROBLEMS IN R/H BAY 5. A PAGE 1B HAS NOW BEEN 36719 1 4 WRITTEN CORRECTING THIS ERROR. THIS PR IS NO LON 36719 1 5 GER REQUIRED. 36766 1 1 THE SHIM AT ATTACH POINT 13 THAT WAS PARTIALLY DEBONDED WAS REMOVED AN 36766 1 2 D REBONDED INTO PLACE. BY REMOVING AND REPLACING THE SHIM, BOTH DISCRE 36766 1 3 PANCIES (1 AND 2) HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DEBOND 36766 1 4 IS POOR SURFACE PREP DURING ORIGINAL BOND OR A BAD LOT OF ADHESIVE. 36848 1 1 THE THREE DISCREPANT HOLES WERE SUCCESSFULLY REAME 36848 1 2 D AND THE FASTENERS WERE INSTALLED. NO FURTHER AC 36848 1 3 TION IS REQUIRED. CLOSE THIS PR. 36863 1 1 A DEPRESSION IN THE ELEVON UPPER SKIN SURROUNDING A FASTENER WAS ANALY 36863 1 2 ZED BY X-RAY AND FOUND TO BE DUE TO AN INCOMPLETE CORE-FILL. THIS COND 36863 1 3 ITION WAS DETERMINED BY MRB TO BE ACCEPTABLE AS IS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE 36863 1 4 OF DEFECT IS MANUFACTURING WORKMANSHIP. 36896 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS THE V070-198770-001 COLUMBIUM 36896 1 2 SEAL WHICH WAS NOT TRAVELING WHEN COMPRESSED. THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND 36896 1 3 THE FIXED HALF OF THE SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE INSTALLED OFF CENTER 36896 1 4 RESULTING IN HARD CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO SEAL HALVES. THE SEAL HALVES 36896 1 5 WERE REINSTALLED AND THE INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE FIXED AND FLOATING 36896 1 6 HALVES WAS ELININATED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS IMPROPER 36896 1 7 INSTALLATION OF THE FIXED HALF OF THE COLUMBIUM SEAL. (REF ITEM 2 ON 36896 1 8 PAGE 1A) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS AN OUT OF TOLERANCE TRAVEL OF THE V070- 36896 1 9 198770-001 COLUMBIUM SEAL. ENGINEERING EVALUATION DETERMINED THAT THE 36896 1 10 SEAL WAS BOTTOMING OUT ON THE WING STUB STRUCTURE AND ADDITIONAL TRAVEL 36896 1 11 CANNOT BE ACHIEVED. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED AS FOR UNRESTRICTED 36896 1 12 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPNACY IS A BUILD-UP OF TOLERANCES. NO 36896 1 13 FRUTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 36896 1 14 37056 1 1 PLUGGING MISLOCATED HOLES WITH RIVETS RETURNS THE 37056 1 2 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TO THE X01115.50 FRAME (SEC- 37056 1 3 ONDARY STRUCTURE) TO ALLOW ANY LOADS TO BE TRANS- 37056 1 4 FERED WITHOUT CREATING STRESS RISERS AROUND AN 37056 1 5 OPEN HOLE. 37120 1 1 THE DAMAGE TO THE PRESSURE SEAL IS A RESULT OF REPEATED INTERFERENCE W 37120 1 2 ITH THE ET DOOR DRIVE HINGES. THIS INTERFERENCE IS UNAVOIDABLE AND THE 37120 1 3 RESULTING DAMAGE WAS ACCEPTED PER MR. THE DAMAGE WAS MR IDENTIFIED ON 37120 1 4 THE NEARBY STRUCTURE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE ET PRES 37120 1 5 SURE SEAL. 37138 1 1 THE OCN AND SN RECORDED FOR O2 TK 2 OUTBOARD FWD STRUT WERE INCORRECT. 37138 1 2 BECAUSE THIS PR DID NOT AFFECT HARDWARE FUNCTION IT WAS DEFERRED TO F 37138 1 3 UTURE FLIGHT. BAY 3 RHS WAS OPENED DURING STS-41 FLOW PROCESSING AND T 37138 1 4 HE CORRECT OCN AND S/N OBTAINED AND RECORDED. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS 37138 1 5 LY ONLY THE S/N OF THE STRUT COULD BE OBTAINED. SINCE THIS PR WAS TAKE 37138 1 6 N CVAS HAS STARTED TRACKING S/N AND OCN FOR CROSS-REFERENCE. 37792 1 1 ITEM 1 - EO A04 TO ADD DIMENSIONS TO PRINT. ITEM 37792 1 2 2 - MR SHIMMED AROUND RIDGE ON BOTH FITTINS. ITEM 37792 1 3 3 - HOLE IN FITTING FILLED WITH DOUBLE FLUSH RIVE 37792 1 4 T, CORRECT SIZE HOLE DRILLED THRU RIVET, MR. 37840 1 1 FIT, FORM OR FUNCTION OF THE 57 DOOR IS NOT AFFECT 37840 1 2 ED, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS NOT DEGRADED. PANEL WI 37840 1 3 LL BE USED FOR ROLL OVER TO PAD ONLY. 37866 1 1 THE THREAD SCRATCHES INSIDE THE NLG FWD XO327 12:00 O'CLOCK TRUNNION H 37866 1 2 OLE ARE SUPERFICAIL IN NATURE. EDDY CURRENT HAS BEEN PERFORMED ON THE 37866 1 3 HOLE AND NO DISCONTINUTIES WERE NOTED. THE SCRATCHES DO NO EFFECT THE 37866 1 4 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OR DESIGN INTENT OF THE TRUNNION FITTING. MARGIN 37866 1 5 OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. NLG TRUNNION FITTINGS ARE PRIMARY STRUCTUR 37866 1 6 E. MR IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. WHILE WORKING V30-13409, STR INSPECTION 37866 1 7 OF NLG TRUNNION FITTING, IT WAS NOTED VISUALLY THAT THE FWD RH FITTIN 37866 1 8 G AT THE 12 O'CLOCK POSITION HAD SUPERFICIAL SCRATCHES IN THE HOLE. ED 37866 1 9 DY CURRENT TEST OF THE HOLE SHOWED NO DISCONTINUITIES. THEREFORE, THE 37866 1 10 HOLE WAS ACCEPTED MR UNRESTRICTED. MR ID WAS APPLIED TO THE FITTING. C 37866 1 11 LOSE THIS PR. 38057 1 1 THE PROBLEM WAS TAKEN CARE OF BY SUBSTITUTING H/W 38057 1 2 WHICH WOULD FIT THE LOCATION. THIS PROBLEM WAS FOR 38057 1 3 SEEN AND COVERED BY A GRUMMAN STANDARD SPEC. CLOSE 38057 1 4 THIS PR. 38096 1 1 DRILLING/GRINDING OF SCREW HEADS ALLOWS PANEL TO 38096 1 2 BE REMOVED 38210 1 1 THE MINOR TEAR IN THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE ON RIGHT HAND RADIATOR #1 HAS 38210 1 2 BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO REPAIR REQUIRED. TAPE DAMAG 38210 1 3 E CAUSED BY SPACE DEBRIS. CLOSE THIS PR. 38445 1 1 THE RATTLING HARDWARE HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE 0 (SIX) DRILLED OUT JO 38445 1 2 -BOLTS TAILS TRAPPED IN THE CLOSE-OUT TORQUE BOX AREA OF HINGE #13 AND 38445 1 3 HAS BEEN EXCEPTED OKAY-AS-IS PER UNRESTRITED MR. THE OPEN HOLES HAVE 38445 1 4 BEEN DETERMINED TO CONTAIN HI-LOK FASTENERS AND HI-LOK MATERIAL CONCE 38445 1 5 RNS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED TO BE STRUCTURALLY SOUND AND EXCEPTED OKAY-AS-I 38445 1 6 S PER UNRESTRICTED MR. CLOSE THIS PR. 38523 1 1 SHORT EDGE DISTANCE ACCEPTED BY MR. PROBLEM RESOL 38523 1 2 VED. 38725 1 1 DISCREPANT WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL. V070-198753-007,DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 38725 1 2 1, PAGE 1, HAS BEEN REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW SEAL. ITEM 1, PAG 38725 1 3 E 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: EXCESSIVE 38725 1 4 PRESSURE BETWEEN SEAL SECTIONS. ANALYSIS FOR POSSIBLE CORRECTION OF CO 38725 1 5 NDITION IS BEING PERFORMED BY ROCKWELL DESIGN (REF. PCIN R41169). CLOS 38725 1 6 E THIS PR. 38913 1 1 THE PRE-OPERATION SUPPORT SET-UP AND POST OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS FOR 38913 1 2 V5006 WERE PERFORMED PRIOR TO THE OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS. V5006 IS THE 38913 1 3 PAYLOAD BAY DOOR FUNTIONAL TEST. ALL PRE-OPS AND POST OPS ARE PERFORM 38913 1 4 ED PER V9023 AND ARE ONLY KICKED OFF BY STEPS IN V5006. THE V9023 RTOM 38913 1 5 I PACKAGES WERE BUILT FOR V5006 AND WRE READY TO WORK IN THE TAIR STA 38913 1 6 TION BUT THE PLBD'S WERE FIRST OPENED PER V9023, NOT V5006. SINCE THE 38913 1 7 PAPER WAS ALREADY PREPARED FOR V5006, THESE PACKAGES (PRE-OPS AND POST 38913 1 8 OPS) WERE WORKED WITH THE V9023 DOOR OPERATION AND THE V5006 KICK OFF 38913 1 9 STEPS WERE INADVERTENTLY VERIFIED SINCE THE RTOMI SEQUENCES WERE COMP 38913 1 10 LETED. A NEW SET OF PRE-OPS WAS ISSUED TO WORK WITH V5006 OPERATION IN 38913 1 11 STRUCTIONS AND THE TEST WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT PROBLEMS. THE OMI'S (V90 38913 1 12 23 AND V5006) HAVE ALL BEEN CLOSED AND WORK HAS BEEN COMPLETED. NO FUR 38913 1 13 THER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATOR ERROR. 38949 1 1 COMPLETED REPAIR RESTORES TO PRINT. 39045 1 1 ALL CATCHES WERE (P/N V070-339826-001) BONDED AND 39045 1 2 RIVETED TO COVER (P/N V070-339460-005). COVER WAS 39045 1 3 MARKED WITH PROPER OCN (F61609). ALL ITEMS WERE RE 39045 1 4 TURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. 39049 1 1 RETURNED BODY FLAP RIB TO STRUCTURAL SOUNDNESS,HOW 39049 1 2 EVER, RECURRENCE OF THIS DISCREPANCY INDICATES 39049 1 3 THAT FURTHER INVESTIGATION BY THERMAL PROTECTION 39049 1 4 ENGINEERING IS WARRANTED 39216 1 1 THE 0.190" DIA HOLE NOTED AS BEING IN THE VERY INBD EDGE OF THE RH OUT 39216 1 2 BD ELEVON, IS AN OLD MOD USED FOR ROUTING INSTRUMENTATION WIRING TO AD 39216 1 3 JACENT INSTRUMENTED TILE. THE HOLE IS NOT DRILLED IN THE LOWER ELEVON 39216 1 4 SKIN AS PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT, BUT IN A V070-193050-004 TILE SUPPORT ANG 39216 1 5 LE ATTACH TO THE INBD SIDE CARRIER PLATE. (REF V070-193017-ZN108B). TH 39216 1 6 IS HOLE IS NOT BEING USED PRESENTLY. THIS HOLE IS PER PRINT, NO DISCR 39216 1 7 EPANCY EXISTS. THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 39295 1 1 THE MISSING NUTPLATE WAS REPLACED WITH A SIMILAR NUTPLATE, BUT WAS INS 39295 1 2 TALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS INSTEAD OF CONVENTIONAL RIVETS, PER MR ACTION 39295 1 3 , BECAUSE OF LIMITED ACCESS TO BUCK THE RIVETS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS 39295 1 4 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING REQUIRED AND THIS PR C 39295 1 5 AN CLOSE. 39350 1 1 BROKEN BACKSHELL REPLACED. 39380 1 1 28 HOLES IN THE XO 1307 BULKHEAD AND MATING V070-356180-011 PANEL WERE 39380 1 2 FOUND TO BE OVERSIZED. THESE HOLES WERE FOUND TO BE OVERSIZED. THESE 39380 1 3 HOLES WERE REAMED TO .250" WITH MR APPROVAL. ONE NUTPLATE CHANNEL WAS 39380 1 4 TRIMMED TO PROVIDE INSTALLATION OF A MR NUTPLATE STRIP WHICH ACCOMODAT 39380 1 5 ES THE LARGER SIZE NUTPLATES. ONE RIVET HOLE WAS PLUGGED IN THE XO 130 39380 1 6 7 BULKHEAD TO SUPPORT THIS REWORK. THE HOLES WERE OVERSIZED DURING INI 39380 1 7 TIAL MANUFACTURING. THIS MR REWORK IS STRUCTURALLY ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRE 39380 1 8 STRICTED USE. ITEM 2: NUT WAS R & R'D WHICH RETURNED NUTPLATE TO PRINT 39380 1 9 CONFIGURATION. LOSS OF NUTPLATE LOCKING FEATURE WAS CAUSED BY STANDAR 39380 1 10 D WEAR. 39556 1 1 SAMPLE OF THE CORROSION FOUND ON THE ROLLER WAS AN 39556 1 2 ALYZED FOR COMPONENT ID. THE ANALYSIS IND'D THE M 39556 1 3 AJOR COMPONENTS TO BE DRY LUBRICANT & PRODUCTS OF 39556 1 4 STEEL AS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. QUALITY 39556 1 5 ENG WILL TAKE RECURRENCE CNTRL ACTION TO MONITOR 39556 1 6 THIS CONDITION. 39614 1 1 SEE ATTACHED SHEET FOR SUMMARY OF TROUBLESHOOTING PERFORMED PER THIS PR. 39614 1 2 ITEMS 1,2,3 AND 5 (PAGES 1,1A,1B, AND 1D, RESPECTIVELY) WERE RESOLVED B 39614 1 3 Y REPLACEMENT OF THE SEAL, PROBABLE CAUSE BEING SEAL DAMAGED DURING INST 39614 1 4 ALLATION OR DURING MOVEMENT OF EQUIPMENT THROUGH/NEAR HATCHWAY. ITEMS 4, 39614 1 5 AND 7 (PAGES 1C, 1E AND 1F, RESPECTIVELY) WERE RESOLVED BY REPLACING TH 39614 1 6 E SEAL IN THE HATCH GROOVE WITH A SEAL OF LOWER HARDNESS, AND BY REMOVIN 39614 1 7 G TAPE FROM ONE SIDE OF THE HATCH GROOVE. THESE ACTIONS SERVED TO EQUALI 39614 1 8 ZE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE REQUIRED TO COMPRESS EACH SEAL (ORIGINALLY, THE S 39614 1 9 EAL IN THE HATCH TOOK 3 TIMES THE FORCE TO COMPRESS THAN DID THE SEAL IN 39614 1 10 THE COLLAR), RESULTING IN SUFFICIENT COMPRESSION OF BOTH SEALS AND 39614 1 11 ELIMINATION OF THE LEAK PATH. PROBABLE CASUE IS UNEQUAL PAST THE COLLAR 39614 1 12 SEAL. RETEST OF ALL ITEMS PERFORMED PER STEP 187. 39727 1 1 THE (2) B91B11477 SUPPORTS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED ON 39727 1 2 REVERSED SIDES PER EO-TO-FOLLOW DISPOSITION. CAUSE 39727 1 3 OF PROBLEM WAS FABRICATION ERRORS. CLOSE PR. 39799 1 1 THIS SUSPECT PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE RH I/B MLG BRAKE ASSY (P/N M 39799 1 2 C621-0075-0001, S/N 0027) DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THERE BEING METAL 39799 1 3 SHAVINGS IN THE HYDRAULIC PORTION OF THE BRAKE HOUSING. THE SUSPICION 39799 1 4 IS BASED ON FINDINGS FROM 2 OTHER SIMILAR CARBON BRAKES WHICH HAD META 39799 1 5 L SHAVINGS INTERNAL TO THE BRAKE. NO SHAVINGS ARE VISABLE IN THIS ASSY 39799 1 6 THROUGH THE BLEED PORT BUT A DETAILED INSPECTION (INVOLVING BRAKE DIS 39799 1 7 SASSEMBLY) IS REQUIRED TO INSURE NO CONTAMINATION EXISTS. PR MEQ3-10-0 39799 1 8 451 HAS REMOVED THE BRAKE FROM OV-103 FOR A VENDOR (GOODRICH) INSPECTI 39799 1 9 ON AND WILL REINSTALL A RECENTLY INSPECTED REPLACEMENT BRAKE IN ITS PL 39799 1 10 ACE. THIS PR CAN BE CLOSED AS A DUPLICATE TO PR MEQ-0451. PROBABLE CAU 39799 1 11 SE: MANUFACTURING DEFECT. 39941 1 1 THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR INSTALLING A GROUND JU 39941 1 2 MPER WIRE. A 0.193 DIAMETER HOLE WAS DRILLED THROUGH THE PART (STRINGE 39941 1 3 R 10) AND THE PROVISION FOR THE WIRE WAS ACCOMPLISHED. THERE IS NO DEG 39941 1 4 RADATION OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. 40027 1 1 THE THREAD DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY A DESIGN DEFICIENC 40027 1 2 Y. MR DISPO REAMED THE HOLES TO A MAX DIA OF 0.218 40027 1 3 8. FURTHER MR APPROVAL ACCEPTED THE DAMAGE IN HOLE 40027 1 4 S 1,2,3,5, & 6 "OK AS IS". EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION 40027 1 5 CONFIRMED NO CRACKS WERE PRESENT. 40062 1 1 REF ITEM 2, PG 1 AND ITEM 3 PG 1A. CRACKED V070-351992-004 SEAL AFT IN 40062 1 2 BOARD ON RH LO2 ET DOOR. V070-351992-004 ET DOOR SEAL WAS R&R'D. DURIN 40062 1 3 G REMOVAL, SLICES AT BOTH ENDS OF SEAL WERE DAMAGED (REF ITEM 3, PG 1A 40062 1 4 ) AND REQUIRED REPLACEMENT BEFORE INSTALLATION OF SEAL. SPLICES WERE R 40062 1 5 &R'D. V070-351992-004 ET DOOR SEAL WAS RETURNED TO PRINT CONDITION. PR 40062 1 6 OBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 2: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITE 40062 1 7 M 3: WORKMANSHIP. REF ITEM 1, PG 1 AND ITEM 4 PG 1B. CRUSHED V070-3519 40062 1 8 93-003 SEAL (2 LOCATIONS) AT BELLCRANK ON RH LO2 ET DOOR. 40241 1 1 ITEM 1 DESCRIBED 2 HOLES WHICH WERE MISSING FOR GROUND LUG INSTALLATIO 40241 1 2 N FOR RTG COOLING AND GH2 PURGE WIRE HARNESS INSTALLATION. THESE HOLES 40241 1 3 WERE DRILLED PER EO-TO-FOLLOW TO THE MIDBODY MAKE WORK DRAWING. THE P 40241 1 4 ROBABLE CAUSE WAS DESIGN/MODIFICATION INCORPORATION ERROR. 40243 VO 1 VOID PR. 40464 1 1 TEE #21 FOR RIB SPLICE #22 R/H SIDE INSULATOR UPPE 40464 1 2 R GAP OF 0.040 WAS ACCEPTED BY MR ACTION. COVERING 40464 1 3 BOTH PAGES 1A AND 1B. THE INSULATORS WERE REPAIRE 40464 1 4 D AT RSC AND ARE OK FOR FLT. PER ML0311-0022 PARA 40464 1 5 3.1. CLOSE PR. 40716 1 1 THE V595-000003-009 SEAL WAS TORN IN SEVERAL AREAS ON THE L/H BLAST DO 40716 1 2 OR. TO SUPPORT INSTALLATION FOR F.R.F, THREE DISCREPANT FOAM AREAS OF 40716 1 3 THE SEAL WERE REMOVED AND NEW FOAM SEAL PIECES WERE CUT AND TAPED INTO 40716 1 4 PLACE. THIS WAS A TEMPORARY FIX TO SUPPORT F.R.F AND WAS APPROVED BY 40716 1 5 M.R AND PRIME BOARD. AFTER COMPLETION OF F.R.F THE DISCREPANT SEAL WAS 40716 1 6 REMOVED AND NEW V595-000003-009 SEAL WAS BONDED TO THE BLAST DOOR ON 40716 1 7 SS23B-0338. 40803 1 1 THE NOTED RUST STAINS ON THE RCC INCONEL INSULATORS HAVE BEEN CLEANED. 40803 1 2 THIS PROBLEM HAS OCCURRED IN THE PAST. RC ACTION WAS CONDUCTED. RE 40803 1 3 SULTS SHOW SUPERFICIAL RUST STAINS ARE NOT A RESULT OF INCONEL INSULAT 40803 1 4 ORS CORRODING. THE RUST STAINS WILL NOT EFFECT THE THERMAL OR STRUCTU 40803 1 5 RAL INTEGRITY OF THE INSULATOR. THEREFORE NO FURTHER ACTION SHOULD BE 40803 1 6 TAKEN ON THE OTHER LEADING EDGE INSULATORS. THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 40974 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2, PAGE 1 ARE NOT PR CONDITIONS. PER MLO601-0002 PIN HOLES 40974 1 2 ARE ACCEPTABLE IF < .060 IN AND CRACKS NOT EXCEEDING 0.25 IN ARE ACCE 40974 1 3 PTABLE, PROVIDING THE DISTANCE BETWEEN ANY TWO DEFECTS IS NOT LESS THA 40974 1 4 N 0.50 IN. PIN HOLE IS APPROX .020 IN AND THERE WERE NO SEPARATIONS IN 40974 1 5 THE SEAM WHICH WERE GREATER THAN .025 IN. ITEM 3, PAGE 1, WHICH DOCUM 40974 1 6 ENTS SURFACE CORROSION ON LOWER ATTACH POINT HAS BEEN CLEANED WITH IPA 40974 1 7 AND BEHR-TEX PADS. ITEMS 1 THRU 3 HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 40974 1 8 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 41008 1 1 ITEMS 1 THROUGH 4: ALL CORROSION ON L/H LOWER FACE SHEET WAS ADDRESSED 41008 1 2 BY REMOVING PAINT IN ALL SUSPECT AREAS. ALL AREAS WITH PITS WERE THEN 41008 1 3 LIGHTLY SANDED OUT BY MR AND ALL AREAS ERE THEN RE-CORROSION PROTECTE 41008 1 4 D PER PRINT. ITEM 5: EXCESSIVE MATERIAL REMOVED IS TO BE MR ACCEPTED F 41008 1 5 OR UNRESTRICTED USE PER PAGE 15 DUE TO METAL REMOVED NOT AFFECTING STR 41008 1 6 UCTURAL INTEGRITY. CLOSE THIS PR. 41119 1 1 THE MLG STRUTS WERE FOUND TO BE AT DIFFERENT EXTENSION DISTANCES. THE 41119 1 2 L/H MLG STRUT WAS MEASURED TO BE 416 PSIG (FROM POST LANDING OPERATION 41119 1 3 S) AND WAS VENTED DOWN TO 306 PSIG PER THIS PR. THE RH MLG STRUT WAS P 41119 1 4 RESSURIZEDTO 300+/-10 PSIG PER RTOMI V9028 AFTER A GN 2 LEAK WAS IDEN 41119 1 5 TIFIED AND CORRECTED PER IPR 41V-0013. BOTH STRUTS ARE NOW AT ROLL-ARO 41119 1 6 UND PRESSURE TO SUPPORT V1034 (FRT), AND NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIS 41119 1 7 T. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR- NON-STANDARD CONFIGURATION WAS CR 41119 1 8 EATED BY A LEAKY STRUT WHICH WAS RETURNED TO ROLL AROUNDPRESSURE WHIL 41119 1 9 E OTHER STRUT WAS AT A HIGHER PRESSURE. 41144 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN AGAINST TAPE WEAR ALONG THE OU 41144 1 2 TBD EDGE OF R/H #1 RADIATOR PNL AT LATCH #1. AFTE 41144 1 3 R ENG INVESTIGATION & EVALUATION THIS WAS DETERMIN 41144 1 4 ED NOT TO BE WEAR, BUT APPEARS AS NORM TAPE APPLIC 41144 1 5 ATION TOLERANCES DURING MANUFACTURING. THEREFORE, 41144 1 6 IT IS NOT A DISCREPANT CONDITION. THESE AREAS OC 41144 1 7 CUR AT BUTT JOINTS OF THE TAPE INSTL'N. 41215 1 1 INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER 41215 1 2 AND IS "OK" FOR FLIGHT. V070-199621-001 INSULATOR 41215 1 3 WILL BE INSTALLED INTO RCC PNL #4 LH SIDE BY STR-3 41215 1 4 -07-253. 41252 1 1 RIVET MISSING FROM MOD STRAP HAS BEEN CORRECTED BY 41252 1 2 INSTL'G RIVET IN LOC DESCRIBED IN ITEM #1. PG. 1 41252 1 3 & CORROSION PROTECTING PER MAO608-301 CODE -08-AA 41252 1 4 -21-XX. 41271 1 1 THE ALIGNMENT OF THE PURGE CURTAIN RETAINER HOLES WAS DUE TO THE PROCU 41271 1 2 REMENT OF A WRONG OCN PART NUMBER. THE CORRECT OCN PART NUMBER WAS OBT 41271 1 3 AINED AND THE PURGE CURTAIN RETAINER INSTALLED. PG 1A WAS TRANSFERRED 41271 1 4 TO MEQ PR -3-08-0404. CLOSE THIS PR UPON RI LSS AND JSC RO CONCURRENCE 41271 1 5 . 41323 1 1 THE PROBLEM FOR ITEM #1 WAS THAT THE V070-351457-001 BRACKET WAS BROKE 41323 1 2 N. THE BRACKET WAS REMOVED, SCRAPPED LOCALLY, AND REPLACED. FOR ITEM # 41323 1 3 2 THE PROBLEM WAS THAT PILOT HOLES IN THE NEW BRACKET DID NOT LINE UP 41323 1 4 WITH THE VEHICLE HOLES. ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT THE 41323 1 5 HOLES WERE NOT TOO FAR APART AND THAT THE PILOT HOLES COULD BE PULLED 41323 1 6 TO MATCH THE EXISTING HOLES. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. ITEM #3 WAS THAT T 41323 1 7 HE NEW BRACKET WAS TOO WIDE. ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT 41323 1 8 THE BRACKET IS PER PRINT AND THAT A MINIMAL OVERHANG DOES NOT COMPROMI 41323 1 9 SETHE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. MR OKAY AS IS. 41452 1 1 THE THREADS IN THE MD114-5003-0007 NUTPLATE AT Xo 1040, Zo 401.75 WERE 41452 1 2 CLEANED WITH IPA. RUNNING TORQUE WAS RECHECKED WITH A V073-340114-002 41452 1 3 BOLT HOLE COVER AND VERIFIED TO BE WITHIN PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABL 41452 1 4 E CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 41454 1 1 THE V070-352209-004 LEFT HAND LONGERON WAS FOUND WITH THE LOWER HOLE (3/ 41454 1 2 8 INCH HOLE) EXCEEDING ITS PER PRINT DIMENSION. THIS ELONGATED AND OVERS 41454 1 3 IZED CONDITIONOF THE HOLE WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS PER 41454 1 4 PR STR-3-11-3298. THE NEW MEASUREMENTS OF THE HOLE, ARE LESS THAN THE P 41454 1 5 REVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED DIMENSION BY 0.009 INCHES. THIS CONDITION HAS BEEN 41454 1 6 MR ACCEPTED PER THIS PR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPE 41454 1 7 RATIONAL DEGRADATION. 41454 1 8 41527 1 1 PART RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION BY INSTL'N OF 41527 1 2 INSERTS. 41637 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 41637 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 41637 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 41637 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 41637 1 5 3-C1. 41868 1 1 THE TWO MD112-1002-0308 FASTENERS WHICH COULD NOT BE REMOVED, DOCUMENT 41868 1 2 ED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WERE REMOVED USING VICE-GRIPS. FASTENERS WERE RE 41868 1 3 MOVED USING VICE-GRIPS ON THE SCREW HEADS AND NO DRILLING WAS REQUIRED 41868 1 4 . NUTPLATE THREADS AND LOCKING FEATURE WERE FOUND TO BE GOOD USING NEW 41868 1 5 HARDWARE. PROBABLE CAUSE: USING FASTENERS WITH WORN HEADS, NORMAL WEA 41868 1 6 R AND TEAR. 42361 1 1 FASTENERS DESCRIBED IN ITEMS 1 AND 2 WERE FOUND TO BE TOO SHORT. GRIP 42361 1 2 LENGTHS WERE CHANGED TO CORRECT LENGTH BY EO-TO-FOLLOW. PROBABLE CAUSE 42361 1 3 : DESIGN DEFICIENCY. UPON VERIFICATION THAT RELEASED EO REFLECTS ENGIN 42361 1 4 EERING DISPOSITION, CLOSE THIS PR. 42489 1 1 NO CARBON FIBER SUBSTRATE IS EXPOSED, PART IS 42489 1 2 RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION PER STANDARD 42489 1 3 REPAIR. 42523 1 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSPECTION OF THIS CONDITION 42523 1 2 INDICATES THAT THE DAMAGE IS MINOR. THIS CONDITION 42523 1 3 IS NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO REQUIRE A REPAIR. THE 42523 1 4 DAMAGE/HOLE(S) DID NOT PUNCTURE THE ALUM. FACE 42523 1 5 SHEET. THERE IS ONLY MINOR DAMAGE TO THE SILVER- 42523 1 6 TEFLON TAPE AND THIS IS ACCEPTABLE PER VOUGHT 42523 1 7 RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL. THIS CONDITION WILL NOT 42523 1 8 ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HEAT TRANSFER CAPABILITIES OF 42523 1 9 THE RADIATOR PNL. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE AS- 42523 1 10 IS FOR UN-RESTRICTED USE.NO MR I.D. REQ'D. 42681 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 42681 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 42681 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 42681 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 42681 1 5 3-C1. 42693 1 1 ADHESIVE TYPE WAS CORRECTED BY PEN AND INK CHANGE TO TPS. DISCREPANCY 42693 1 2 NO LONGER EXISTS. 42773 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO MR ACCEPT AS IS THE WRINKLE IN 42773 1 2 THE V070-398558-035 BULB SEAL'S OUTER TEFLON TUBE. THE CAUSE OF THE WR 42773 1 3 INKLE IS ATTRIBUTED TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THE BULB SEAL INSTALLATIO 42773 1 4 NS ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURES. 42830 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND THE RIVET HOLES CLEANED UP. A 42830 1 2 MD114-5004-0006 NUTPLATE WAS SUBSTITUTED FOR THE PER PRINT MD114-5017 42830 1 3 NUTPLATE. THE ADJACENT STRUCTURE WAS MR ID'D THIS WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNR 42830 1 4 ESTRICTED USE. CLOSE THIS PR 42834 1 1 DISCREPANT SCREW COULD NOT BE REPLACED WITHOUT REMOVING CARRIER PANEL 42834 1 2 DUE TO TILE INTERFERENCE. CARRIER PANEL WAS REMOVED ALLOWING SCREW TO 42834 1 3 BE CHANGED OUT PER STR-3-A020. PROBABLE CAUSE: LOCATION OF PLUG IN TIL 42834 1 4 E. 42860 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES IN THIS PR ARE IN THE LH INBOARD ELEVON COVE. IN ITE 42860 1 2 M 1, THE GAP BETWEEN THE END FITTING AND THE SEAL PANEL WAS FILLED WIT 42860 1 3 H RTV PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS INCONSISTENCY DURING MANUFACTURING 42860 1 4 . IN ITEM 2 & 3, THE DEGRADED SPRINGS FROM THE POLYIMIDE AND COLUMBIUM 42860 1 5 SEALS WERE REPLACED AND INSTALLED ON STR-3-12-485. THE DISCREPANT SPR 42860 1 6 INGS WERE SCRAPPED ON AN LRU PR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE THERMAL DEGRADA 42860 1 7 TION WAS HEAT EXPOSURE. THIS SAME CONDITION WAS FOUND ON SOME OUTBOARD 42860 1 8 ELEVON SPRINGS DURING EXTENSIVE TESTING LAST FLOW. 42883 1 1 USE SHOP AID STRUT AS A TEMPORARY FLT STRUT REPLAC 42883 1 2 EMENT FOR GRD OPS WITH MR CONCURRENCE. 42957 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 42957 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 42957 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE C 42957 1 4 ARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. R.C. ACTION TO INVE 42957 1 5 STIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING HARDWARE TO P 42957 1 6 REVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 43181 1 1 WORK HAS BEEN COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY IN THE WORKIN 43181 1 2 G STEPS OF THIS PR TO RELIEVE INTERFERENCE FOR INS 43181 1 3 TALLATION OF REF MMU PANEL. 43303 1 1 WHILE WORKING V30-14329 STRUCTURAL INSPECTION OF LH RCC ASSEMBLY AT PA 43303 1 2 NELS 12,13, AND 14, CORROSION WAS FOUND ON THE WING SPAR BEHIND PANEL 43303 1 3 #12 AT (6) LOCATIONS. FURTHER INSPECTION OF WING SPAR BETWEEN PANELS 7 43303 1 4 THRU 19 REVEALED (11) ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS. AT ALL THE LOCATIONS THE 43303 1 5 CORROSION WAS REMOVED AND THE PITS WHERE MEASURED AND LOCATED ON ATTAC 43303 1 6 HED MAPS. THREE OF THE LOCATIONS WERE NOTED AS BEING NEXT TO FASTENER 43303 1 7 HEADS. INSPECTION WITH THESE FASTENERS REMOVED SHOWED NO SIGNS OF CORR 43303 1 8 OSION EXTENDING UNDER THE HEAD AND INTO THE FASTENER HOLE. ALL THE ARE 43303 1 9 AS WERE LIGHTLY ABRADED TO BLEND WITH THE ADJACENT SURFACE. THE AREAS 43303 1 10 WERE CORROSION PROTECTED AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE C 43303 1 11 AUSE OF CORROSION IS DUE TO A COLLECTION OF MOISTURE LAYING ON THE WIN 43303 1 12 G SPAR WHEN THE ORBITER IS IN THE VERTICAL POSITION. 43430 1 1 THE CHIPPED V070-398547-003 PLATE ASSEMBLY, IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 43430 1 2 , WAS A RESULT OF THE PLATE BEING FABRICATED UPSIDE DOWN. THIS PR TRIMME 43430 1 3 D THE PLATE TO REMOVE THE INTERFERENCE WITH MATING STRUCTURE AND RETURNS 43430 1 4 THE PART TO ORIGINAL DESIGN INTENT. THE TRIMMED PART WAS MR ACCEPTED FO 43430 1 5 R UNRESTRICTED USE. CONCLUDE NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 43430 1 6 43461 1 1 ITEMS 1, 2 & 3 ARE DUPLICATE DISCREPANCIES AND WIL 43461 1 2 L BE WORKED ON STR-3-07-1702. ITEM 4 - ONE OF THE 43461 1 3 FOUR MINOR ROLLUP AREAS WAS A DUPLICATE DISCREPAN 43461 1 4 CY AND WILL BE WORKED ON STR-1702. THE OTHER THRE 43461 1 5 E MINOR ROLLUP AREAS WERE MR'D OK AS-IS. NO MR ID 43461 1 6 WAS REQUIRED. 43760 1 1 MRB APPROVAL REQUESTED TO BOND A FIBERGLASS PIECE/ 43760 1 2 DOUBLER OVER CRACKED PORTION OF FIBERGLASS PANEL. 43760 1 3 INSTALLATION OF FIBERGLASS DOUBLER WILL RESTORE TH 43760 1 4 E STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND RETURN PANEL TO DESIGN 43760 1 5 INTENT. THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 43914 1 1 REF ITEM 2 PAGE 1 AND ENGINEERING NOTE 1 ON PAGE 2 43914 1 2 , 4 HOLES IN STRUCTURE WERE MATCH DRILL THRU STIFF 43914 1 3 ENER AND STIFFENER WAS ATTACHED TO 1307 BULKHEAD U 43914 1 4 SING JO-BOLTS. EO V070-856001 D15 WAS RELEASED TO 43914 1 5 REFLECT ACCOMPLISHED ENGINEERING. 44446 1 1 THE BROKEN OFF PIECE OF LUMINOUS CEILING PANEL WAS BONDED PER MR DISPO 44446 1 2 AT ITS PROPER LOCATION. BUT THEN BROKE OFF AGAIN DURING TEMPORARY INS 44446 1 3 TALLATION. THE PIECE WAS REBONDED, PER MR DISPO, WITH THE ADDITION OF 44446 1 4 A LEXAN DOUBLER BONDED OVER THE DEFECT AREA TO ADD STRENGTH. CAUSE: HA 44446 1 5 NDLING CLOSE THIS PR. 44448 1 1 CAPTIVE BOLT P/N ME128-0027-4007 TURNING RECEPTACLE IS SAME FASTENER A 44448 1 2 DDRESSED ON PR STR-3-08-2870 ITEM 1. ITEM 3 PAGE 1B WAS WRITTEN TO STR 44448 1 3 -3-08-270 TO DOCUMENT THIS PROBLEM AND HAS TO BE ADDRESSED ON THAT PR 44448 1 4 DUE TO BEING A RELATED NONCONFORMANCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: DUP. DOCUMENTAT 44448 1 5 ION. CLSOE THIS 44505 1 1 THE VENT SCREEN ASSY'S FLANGE WAS SUCCESSFULLY 44505 1 2 TRIM TO CLEAR FASTENER LOCATIONS, INSTALLED DURING 44505 1 3 WING SPAR MOD. NO OTHER ACTION WAS REQUIRED THE 44505 1 4 SCREEN WAS REINSTALLED PER DWG 44565 1 1 THE NUTPLATE AT Xo776.90, Zo408.25 WAS FOUND TO BE STRIPPED. THE NUT W 44565 1 2 AS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW NUT. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR 44565 1 3 AND TEAR. 44698 1 1 V5K03 WAS LOST DURING FLIGHT 12 (STS-39) PROCESSING 12-14-90. CM HAD NOT 44698 1 2 COMPLETED ACCOUNTING OF THE RADIATOR INSTALLATION. THIS PR DOCUMENTED A 44698 1 3 ND DEFERRED THE OPEN CONFIGURATION ISSUES TO FUTURE FLIGHT - RADIATOR 3 44698 1 4 & 4 REMOVAL. DURING OMDP AT PALMDALE RADIATORS 3 & 4 WERE REMOVED AND RE 44698 1 5 PLACED PER OMI V5K03. THE CLOSURE OF OMI V5K03, SPECIFICALLY SEQUENCES 1 44698 1 6 1 & 12, PROVIDES DOCUMENTATION OF THE RADIATOR INSTALLATION AND SATISFIE 44698 1 7 S ALL OPEN ISSUES OF THE DEFERRAL. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR 44698 1 8 . PROBABLE CAUSE: LOST DOCUMENTATION. 44721 1 1 THE YW-342.5 ELEVON SECONDARY SEAL'S WIPER SEAL WAS REWORKED TO IMPROV 44721 1 2 E THE SEATING OF THE SEAL. THE WIPER SEAL WAS REMOVED, A STIFFNER INST 44721 1 3 ALLED (PER MR ACTION), AND RE-INSTALLED. THE ADDITION OF THE STIFFNER 44721 1 4 TO THE WIPER SEAL FORCES IT TO SEAT ON THE KNUCKLE SEALS. THE PROBABLE 44721 1 5 CAUSE IS A BUILD UP OF TOLERANCES. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED 44721 1 6 AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 44868 1 1 PREVIOUS MR HAS OBTAINED APPROVAL TO TRIM STRINGER 44868 1 2 #29, FLUSH WITH SUPPORT TO ALLOW BOLT REMOVAL WOR 44868 1 3 K HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND BOLT WILL BE REMOVED P 44868 1 4 ER VSTR-3-07-218, STEP 12.0. CLOSE THIS PR. 45053 1 1 PRSD CRYO O2 TANK1 CONTROLLER "AUTO MODE" FAILED 45053 1 2 IN FLT (REF IN FLT ANOMALLY NO.1/IRP 25V0052.) T/S 45053 1 3 (AS DIRECTED BY JSC) REVEALED ANOMALLY WAS INTER- 45053 1 4 NAL TO PRSD H2/O2 CONTROL BOX NO.1 45053 1 5 (P/NV070-764470-018). IPR 25V0052 UPGRADED TO PR 45053 1 6 FEP-3-05-0054 TO REMOVE AND REPLACE H2/O2 CONTROL 45053 1 7 BOX NO.1 AT COMPLETION OF R/R OPERATIONS,H2/O2 45053 1 8 CONTROL BOX NO.1 FUNCTIONAL CK PERFORMED PER THIS 45053 1 9 PR(REF SHEETS 8-12).H2/O2 CONTROL BOX NO.1 RETEST 45053 1 10 SUCCESSFUL, ALL CNTRL FUNCTIONS NOMIANL 45062 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY WAS THAT THE V070-354541-010 SHROUD ASSEMBLY WITH OCN 45062 1 2 E70059 DID NOT HAVE THE PART NUMBER AND OCN ON THE SHROUD. THE SUB-ASS 45062 1 3 EMBLY PART NUMBER AND OCN WERE MARKED ON THE PART. THE RESOLUTION WAS 45062 1 4 TO MARK THE PROPER PART NUMBER AND OCN ON THE SHROUD ASSEMBLY AND TO P 45062 1 5 UT THE WORDS "SUB-ASSEMBLY" OVER THE NUMBERS ORIGINALLY. THE MIS-IDENT 45062 1 6 IFICATION NO LONGER EXISTS. 45376 1 1 LOOSE HARDWARE IN ELEVON IS A RESULT OF THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS. ALL 45376 1 2 ACCESSIBLE HARDWARE HAS BEEN REMOVED PER TPS VSTR-3-07-241. INACCESSI 45376 1 3 BLE HARDWARE IS ALLOWED TO REMAIN PER PRINT. 45723 1 1 RIVET INSTALLATION RETURNS TO DRAWING CONFIGURATIO 45723 1 2 N. CLIP WILL BE DELETED FROM DRAWING(V070-156850). 45723 1 3 CLOSE THIS PR. 45845 1 1 ITEM 1.0 OF THIS PR HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO PR STR-3-11-3348 PAGE 1 AL 45845 1 2 ONG WITH OTHER DISCREPANT STRUTS IN THE LEFT WING (REF ATTACHED COPY O 45845 1 3 F STR-3-11-3348). THIS TRANSFER WILL KEEP THE DISCREPANT STRUTS IN THE 45845 1 4 LEFT WING TOGETHER WHICH WILL MAKE THEM EASIER TO ADDRESS SINCE THEY 45845 1 5 ALL HAVE SIMILAR PROBLEMS. 46167 1 1 THE TWO (2) OUTSIDE SCREW HOLES OF THE V070-39315-001 CARRIER PANEL HA 46167 1 2 D SCRATCHES OF .0041 AND .0027 INCH ALL RAISED METAL WAS REMOVED AROUN 46167 1 3 D THE SCREW HOLES AND THE HOLES WERE CORROSION PROTECTED. THE SCREW HO 46167 1 4 LES WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AFTER CORROSION PROTECTION WAS 46167 1 5 APPLIED. 46363 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO MR FOR UNRESTRICTED FLIGHT TWO 46363 1 2 OVERSIZED HOLES IN THE V070-351426-009 AFT FUSELAGE CENTER VERTICAL TH 46363 1 3 RUST STRUCTURE ENGINE SUPPORT TRUSS ASSEMBLY. THE HOLES WERE FOUND DUR 46363 1 4 ING THE REMOVAL OF A GUSSET FOR REPLACEMENT BY STR-3-10-451. THIS IS P 46363 1 5 RIMARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS VENDOR WORKMANSHIP 46485 1 1 DRIVE PIN ON LEFT HAND LATCH ROD ON STOWAGE LOCKER MD76C WAS FOUND TO 46485 1 2 BE NOT INSTALLED. A NEW PIN WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED IN STEP 2.0 TO 46485 1 3 RETURN TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: HANDLING WHILE REMOVED 46485 1 4 FROM ORBITER. CLOSE THIS PR. 46601 1 1 FUEL CELL 2 O2 SUPPLY LINE V070-454865-115 WAS NOT ALIGNED PROPERLY FO 46601 1 2 R EASY INSTALLATION TO O2 MANIFOLD #2 SUPPLY PORT. LINE TIE WRAPS WERE 46601 1 3 REMOVED FROM MENTIONED LINE AS WELL AS ATTACHED LINE V070-454705-017 46601 1 4 FOR LINE ALIGNMENT ADJUSTMENT TO MANIFOLD PANEL. PROPER ALIGNMENT OBTA 46601 1 5 INED BY SHIFTING LINE IN LINE SUPPORT BLOCKS. TIE-WRAPS RE-INSTALLED T 46601 1 6 O HOLD LINE POSITION FOR NOMINAL HOOKUP. LINE MIS-ALIGNMENT CORRECTED 46601 1 7 FOR EASE OF INSTALLATION. LINE V070-454865-115 HAS BEEN CONNECTED PER 46601 1 8 TPS FCP 3-07-017, RETURNING INSTALLATION TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. 46602 1 1 TH TRUSS TUBE MOUNTING IS DESIGNED TO BE FLEXIBLE 46602 1 2 AND BE ABLE TO MOVE, IT DOES AND WILL AHVE MOVE- 46602 1 3 MENT. THE DOUBLER AS INSTALLED DOES NOT RESTRICT 46602 1 4 THE MOVEMENT OF THE PIN, BUSHING ON WASHER, THE 46602 1 5 DOUBLER AS INSTALLED DOES PROTRUDE SLIGHTLY UNDER 46602 1 6 THE EDGE OF THE WASHER, BUT DOES NOT BIND ON RES- 46602 1 7 TRICT MOVEMENT, THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR 46602 1 8 UNRESTRICTED USAGE AS IS 46712 1 1 THE AFT LO2 ET UMBILICAL STRUT WAS INSTALLED WITH THE INCORRECT SHOULD 46712 1 2 ER BOLT. THE BOLT WAS REMOVED AND THE PER PRINT BOLT WAS REMOVED AND T 46712 1 3 HE PER PRINT BOLT WAS INSTALLED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. NO 46712 1 4 FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. CLOSE THIS PR. 46857 1 1 THE DISCREPANT STEP CONDITIONS FOUND FOR THE CARRIER PANEL TO WING TRA 46857 1 2 ILING EDGE STEPS WERE REPAIRED TO MEET AND ACCEPTABLE STEP CONDITION O 46857 1 3 F .070"/+.015"/=.030". ITEM 1.0 AND 2.0, PAGES 1 AND 1A (CARRIER PANEL 46857 1 4 TO FILLERBAR SUPPORT STEPS):SHIMS WERE BONDED TO THE V070-191072-002 46857 1 5 CARRIER PANEL STIFFINER FEET AND THE ADJACENT FILLER BAR SUPPORTS TO B 46857 1 6 RING DISCREPANT STEP CONDITIONS BACK WITHIN ACCEPTABLE MR TOLERANCE (. 46857 1 7 040" - ,035"). THE FINAL MEASUREMENTS FOR THE CARRIER PANEL TO FILLER 46857 1 8 BAR SUPPORT STEPS WERE AS FOLLOWS: INBD "A": .654" (ATT. H); "B":.0580 46857 1 9 (ATT. H); "A": .535" (ATT. H); "A": .68" (STEP 86). OUTBD "A": .0671" 46857 1 10 (ATT. H); "A": .0714" (ATT H.); "A": .065" (STEP 74); "A": .0671 (STE 46857 1 11 P 86). ITEM 3.0, PAGE 1B (CARRIER PANEL TO WING TRAILING EDGE STRUCTUR 46857 1 12 E): SHIMS WERE BONDED ON THE WING TRAILING EDGE STRUCTURE TO BRING DIS 46857 1 13 CREPANT STEP CONDITION BACK WITHIN THE MR TOLERANCE (.040" - .080"). T 46857 1 14 HE FINAL MEASUREMENTS WERE AS FOLLOWS: (STEP 75.0) 46857 1 15 I/B O/B 46857 1 16 .0491 .0517 .0646 .0607 .0780 .0701 .0530 .0605 .0454.0489 .0691 46857 1 17 (STEP 85.0) .045. 46857 1 18 ITEM 4,5, AND 6, PAGE 1C (SHIM SHIFTER): THE DISCREPANT SHIMS THAT HAD 46857 1 19 SHIFTED DURING BOND WERE REMOVED AND RE-BONDING. (REF. STEPS 55-57). 46857 1 20 ITEM 7, PAGE 1D (SHIMS TOO WIDE): SHIMS BEING BONDED ON THE WING TRAIL 46857 1 21 ING EDGE IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS NEEDED TO BE .40" WIDE, INSTEAD OF .75" 46857 1 22 WIDE. THESE SHIMS WERE TRIMMED ACCORDINGLY. ITEM 8, PAGE 1E: PAGE 1E W 46857 1 23 AS WRITTEN ADDRESSING INSUFFICIENT FILLER BAR CONTACT SURFACE AND WAS 46857 1 24 DETERMINED TO BE A THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM (TPS) CONCERN ONLY. NO ST 46857 1 25 RUCTURAL WORK WAS REQUIRED. PR RWNG-3-07-1306 WAS INITIATED PER STEP A 46857 1 26 ND WILL ADDRESS IMPROPER F/B SEAL ZONE. ITEM 9, PAGE 1F (SAME AS ITEM 46857 1 27 3): AT LOCATION #2 A STEP WAS MEASURED TO BE .0117". THE SHIM BONDED T 46857 1 28 O THE THE WING TRAILING EDGE STR AT THIS LOCATION WAS TRIMMED AND PART 46857 1 29 IALLY REMOVED (REF STEP 78.0) BRINGING STEP CONDITION BACK WITHIN MR T 46857 1 30 OLERANCE. ITEM 10, PAGE 1G (BAD MEASUREMENT): THE STEP MEASUREMENT IN 46857 1 31 HTIS LOCATION WAS PERFORMED IMPROPERLY. THE CARRIER PANEL TO WING TRAI 46857 1 32 LING EDGE STRUCTURE WAS RE-MEASURED IN STEP 85.0 WAS FOUND TO BE WITHI 46857 1 33 N THE MR TOLERANCE. 47052 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY NOTED ON PAGE 1 HAS BEEN ANNOTATED ON STR-3-07-2502 WI 47052 1 2 TH SIMILAR DISCREPANCIES ON OTHER RUB PANELS. THE DISCREPANCY WILL NOT 47052 1 3 BE WORKED ON THIS PR. NO OTHER DISCREPANCY EXIST IN THIS PR. CLOSE TH 47052 1 4 IS PR. 47084 1 1 THE INSULATED COVER IDENTIFIED ON PAGE 1 ITEM 1 WAS REMOVED FROM FUEL 47084 1 2 CELL #3 H2O DISCHARGE R/H. FIBROUS THERMAL INSULATION WAS INSTALLED ON 47084 1 3 FLEXHOSE PER SPEC MAO105-317. H2O DISCHARGE F/H INSULATION COVER HAS 47084 1 4 BEEN RETURNED TO DWG. CONFIGURATION AND IS FLIGHT READY. 47362 1 1 17 OF 28 BULKHEAD HOLES WERE FOUND TO BE OVERSIZE AND WERE REAMED TO 0 47362 1 2 .250. AFTER REAMING, TWO HOLES WERE OVERSIZE AND WERE MR ACCEPTED. EXI 47362 1 3 STING NUTPLATES AND CHANNELS WERE REMOVED TO ACCOMODATE PANEL INSTALLA 47362 1 4 TION WITH BOLTS PER STR-3-08-2772. THE BULKHEAD REWORK IS ACCEPTABLE F 47362 1 5 OR UNRESTRICTED USE. DEFECT CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 47539 1 1 THE TRIMMING OF THE DOUBLER WILL PREVENT INTERFER- 47539 1 2 ENCE AND MEET INSTALLATION. REMOVING .100 + .050 47539 1 3 FROM DOUBLER WILL NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCTURAL INTE- 47539 1 4 GRITY. OUTER EDGE DISTANCE TO FASTENER HOLE WILL 47539 1 5 BE MET AFTER TRIMMING DOUBLER. 47674 1 1 TUVE RE-INSTALLED AND SEALED. 47811 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING RIB CARBON BRAKE "Y" FITTING INSTALLATION 47811 1 2 , WHEN METAL SHAVINGS WERE SEEN INSIDE THE INBOARD AFT BLEED PORT. THE 47811 1 3 OTHER BLEED PROTS ON THE RIGHT HAND BRAKE ASSY'S WERE INSPECTED AND F 47811 1 4 OUND TO HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF METAL FILINGS. THE LEFT HAND BRAKE ASSY'S 47811 1 5 WERE ALSO INSPECTED WITH NO ANOMALIES. PHOTOS WERE TAKEN OF THE CONTAM 47811 1 6 INATED BRAKE ASSY PORT, AND THE RIB BRAKE ASSY REMOVED. AN LRU PR WAS 47811 1 7 INITIATED TO ROUTE THE RIB BRAKE ASSY BACK TO THE MANUFACTURER FOR EVA 47811 1 8 CUATION. A REPLACEMENT CARBON BRAKE ASSY, S/N MC621-0075-0001-0027, WA 47811 1 9 S OBTAINED AND INSTALLED ON THE RIB MLG. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING 47811 1 10 DEFICIENCY NO RETEST REQUIRED. 47951 1 1 THE GOUGES IN TEH V070-198363-001 PRIMARY SEAL PANEL, IDENTIFIED IN IT 47951 1 2 EM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY SANDING THE RAISED METAL TO FLUSH WITH TH 47951 1 3 E SURFACE OF THE PANEL. AFTER SANDING, THE REWORK AREA WAS CORROSION P 47951 1 4 ROTECTED PER THE DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE REWORKED PANEL WAS MR ACCET 47951 1 5 ED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. SUSPECTED CAUSE OF THE GOUGES WAS DUE TO INTE 47951 1 6 RFERENCE OF THE PRIMARY SEAL PANEL WITH THE FLANGES ON THE ELEVON COVE 47951 1 7 R TUBE, WHICH IS A KNOWN AND ACCEPTED INTERFERENCE. CONCLUDE NO FURTHE 47951 1 8 R INTERFERENCE IS EXPECTED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SEC 47951 1 9 ONDARY STRUCTURE. 48132 1 1 THE MILLING OF THE FOUR EXISTING PLUG RIVITS, AND 48132 1 2 THE INSTALLATION OF AN ADDITIONAL SHIM WILL ALLOW 48132 1 3 THE IONSTALLATION OF STIFFINER AS DESIGNED, AND 48132 1 4 WILL NOT EFFECT THE FORM, FIT, OR FUNCTION OF THE 48132 1 5 ORIGINAL. 48230 1 1 DRILLING A HOLE BEYOND THE CHAMFERED EDGE OF THE RADIUS BLOCK IS NOT A 48230 1 2 DISCREPANT CONDITION. THE LOCATION OF THE HOLE IS PER DESIGN. THE 48230 1 3 CHANGE IN THICKNESS OF THE FITTING REQUIRES HOLE TO BE DRILLED CLOSE 48230 1 4 TO THE EDGE. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. 48411 1 1 CARIER PANEL V070-194126-002 WOULD "BOTTOM OUT" ON 48411 1 2 THE STRUCTURE WHEN SMALL SHIMS WERE USED BUT A GR 48411 1 3 EATER RANGE OF MOVEMENT IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO AD 48411 1 4 JUST THE STEP FOR THE THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM. T 48411 1 5 O BE ABLE TO ALLEVIATE BOTH PROBLEMS, THE CARRIER 48411 1 6 PANEL WAS SHAVED SO IT WOULDN'T "BOTTOM OUT" LEAVI 48411 1 7 NG A GREATER RANGE OF SHIMS(V070-194107-001) THAT 48411 1 8 COULD BE USED. THIS REPAIR IS CLEARED FOR UNRESTRI 48411 1 9 CTED USE BY PREVIOUS MR ACTION. 48439 1 1 EQUIVALENT WASHERS WERE MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS AN EQUIVAL 48439 1 2 ENT SUBSTITUTION. 48446 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY WAS DETECTED DURING V1165 TASK 02 RUN 1 BY THE TIME & 48446 1 2 CYCLE. FOUR (4) XC2455CE MLG WHEEL BEARINGS, INSTALLED ON OV-103, WERE 48446 1 3 IDENTIFIED AS FLIGHT EXPIRED (TWICE FLOWN). THE DISCREPANT BEARINGS W 48446 1 4 ERE RMEOVED AND AN LRU PR WAS INITIATED TO RETURN THEM TO THE VENDOR P 48446 1 5 ER THIS WAD AND V1165 TASK 01 RUN 2. REPLACEMENT BEARINGS, VERIFIED AS 48446 1 6 NOT TWICE FLOWN, WERE INSTALLED PER THIS DOCUMENT AND V1165 TASK 02 R 48446 1 7 UN 2. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. CAUSE: PROCEDURE DEV AHS BEEN WRI 48446 1 8 TTEN TO V1165 TO PREVENT THIS IN THE FUTURE. 48629 1 1 THIS ITEM HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED BY BOTH LSOC & RI/LSS ENG & AF 48629 1 2 TER CONSULTING W/ RI DOWNEY DESIGN ENG IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT IT 48629 1 3 IS ACCEPATABLE TO HAVE SHEAR TYPE WASHERS INSTL'D UNDER TENSION TYPE B 48629 1 4 OLTS AT THIS LOC DUE TO THE RELATIVELY LOW (CLASS ONE) TORQUE APPLIED. 48629 1 5 THIS CONDITION IS PER DWG & NO CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQ'D. 48642 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DUE TO SUSPECTED LEAKAGE ON BOTH NOSE WHEEL OVER 48642 1 2 -INFLATION VALVES. A VOLUMETRIC LEAK DISPLACEMENT UNIT (VLD) WAS ATTAC 48642 1 3 HED TO EACH WHEEL'S OVER-INFLATION VALVE. THE VLD WAS MONITORED FOR ON 48642 1 4 E HOUR AND NO LEAKAGE WAS OBSERVED FROM EITHER WHEEL'S OVER-INFLATION 48642 1 5 VALVE. A THOROUGH BUBBLE LEAK CHECK WAS THEN PERFORMED ON ALL WHEEL CO 48642 1 6 MPONENTS AND THE TIRE. THE ONLY LEAKAGE OBSERVED DURING THE BUBBLE LEA 48642 1 7 K CHECK WAS FROM THE TIRE "WEEP" HOLES. THIS LEAKAGE IS ACCEPTABLE SIN 48642 1 8 CE THE TIRE "WEEP" HOLES ARE DESIGNED TO VENT GN2 BETWEEN THE TIRE FAB 48642 1 9 RIC PILES AND PREVENT POTENTIAL TIRE BULGING. SINCE NO OVER-INFLATION 48642 1 10 VALVE LEAKAGE WAS DETECTABLE THE SUSPECT CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR 48642 1 11 A ONE FLIGHT USAGE (OV-103 FLIGHT 9). THE NOSE WHEELS HAVE BEEN REMOV 48642 1 12 ED POST FLIGHT AND NOSE WHEEL ASSEMBLY PR'S (PR NWA-031-0007 & PR NWA- 48642 1 13 038-0007)HAVE BEEN INITIATED TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION ON THE SU 48642 1 14 SPECT OVER-INFLATION VALVE LEAKAGE PROBLEM. NO ADDITIONAL RETEST REQUI 48642 1 15 RED IN THIS PR. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS TWO MAIN WHEEL ASSEMB 48642 1 16 LY OVER-INFLATION VALVES (P/N 49-284) WHICH WERE LEAKING FROM THE BURS 48642 1 17 T DISK AREA (ONE FROM CORROSION AND ONE PROBABLY FROM A MANUFACTURING 48642 1 18 FLAW) WHICH ARE SIMILAR IN DESIGN TO THE NOSE WHEEL OVER-INFLATION VAL 48642 1 19 VES (P/N 49-293). 48702 1 1 THIS SUSPECT PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE LH INBOARD MLG BRAKE ASSY (P 48702 1 2 /N MC621-0075-0007, S/N 0021) DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THERE BEING ME 48702 1 3 TAL SHAVINGS IN THE HYDRAULIC PORTION OF THE BRAKE HOUSING. THE SUSPIC 48702 1 4 ION IS BASED ON FINDINGS FROM 2 OTHER SIMILAR CARBON BRAKES WHICH HAD 48702 1 5 METAL SHAVINGS INTERNAL TO THE BRAKE. NO SHAVINGS ARE VISABLE IN THIS 48702 1 6 BRAKE ASSEMBLY THROUGH THE BLEED PORT BUT A DETAILED INSPECTION (INVOL 48702 1 7 VING BRAKE DISSASSEMBLY) IS REQUIRED TO INSURE NO CONTAMINATION EXISTS 48702 1 8 . PR MEQ 3-10-0451 HAS REMOVED THE BRAKE FROM OV-103 FOR A VENDOR (GOO 48702 1 9 DRICH) INSPECTION AND WILL REINSTALL A RECENTLY INSPECTED REPLACEMENT 48702 1 10 BRAKE IN ITS PLACE. THIS PR CAN BE CLOSED AS A DUPLICATE TO PR MEQ-045 48702 1 11 1. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING DEFECT. 48708 1 1 UPPER INSULATOR AT R/S #11 TEE HAS BEEN REMOVED, REPAIRED, RE-INSTALLE 48708 1 2 D AND GAPPED PER PRINT. FINAL INSTALLATION OF TEE WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED 48708 1 3 PER TPS STR-3-07-155. WORK ON THIS PR IS COMPLETE. 48810 1 1 WITH THE COMPLETION OF STEPS 73 THRU 95 THE INTENT OF TH E.O. TO FOLLO 48810 1 2 W TO DRAWING V070-594360 HAS BEEN SATISFIED. (REFER PAGE 30 OF THIS PR 48810 1 3 FOR E.O. TO FOLLOW DESCRIPTION) THE WORK COMPLETED IN THESE STEPS INCL 48810 1 4 LUDED: 1) REPLACING ALL MD111-4001-04XXX BOLTS WITH MD111-4025-04XXX B 48810 1 5 OLTS OF PROPER GRIP LENGTH FOR NUT PLATE PROTRUTION. 2) REPLACING ANY 48810 1 6 MD111-4025-04XXX BOLTS THAT DID NOT PROTRUDE THROUGH THEIR MATINGNUT 48810 1 7 PLATE FASTENER W/ MORE THAN ONE THREAD W/ A LONGER MD111-4025-04XXX GR 48810 1 8 IP LENGTH BOLT. THE WORK COMPLETED IN STEPS 73 THRU 95 ALSO SATISFIES 48810 1 9 TH PR DESCRIPTIONS ON PGS 1 THRU 1E OF THIS PR. NOTE: CLOSE THIS PR AF 48810 1 10 TER THE RELEASE AN E.O. TO DRAWING V070-594360. REFER TO PG 30 OF THIS 48810 1 11 PR FOR DESCRIPTION OF E.O. VERIFY RELEASED EO REFLECTS AS-ACCOMPLISHED 48810 1 12 ENGINEERING. CLOSE THIS PR. 49073 1 1 BY REMOVING BROKEN FASTENERS & RECEPTACLES & REPLA 49073 1 2 CING THEM PER PRINT, THE VEH IS RETURNED TO ORIGIN 49073 1 3 AL CONDITION. 49075 1 1 DISCREPANCY 1 ON PG 1 CONSISTS OF MINOR WRINKLES IN V070-197152-001 IN 49075 1 2 SULATION STRIP WHICH WAS MRB ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CLOS 49075 1 3 E PR. 49428 1 1 LH#22 UPPER LESS CARRIER PANEL HAD ACTIVE CORROSION. THE CORROSION WAS 49428 1 2 REMOVED AND THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE COR 49428 1 3 ROSION WAS PROBABLY CAUSED DUE SOME OF THE KORPON COMING OFF THE CARRI 49428 1 4 ER PANEL THUS EXPOSING BARE METAL. 49450 1 1 DURING ORBITER AFT SHAKE DOWN INSPECTION, THE FWD AND AFT ATTACHING HARD 49450 1 2 WARE FOR THE LH V070-355718-007 SUPPORT STRUT WAS FOUND WITH LOOSE HARDW 49450 1 3 ARE. AN ADDITIONAL WASHER WAS ADDED UNDER THE NUT WHICH PROVIDES THE NUT 49450 1 4 FROM BOTTOMING OUT ON TH BOLT SHANK. THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT M 49450 1 5 R APPROVAL PER THE THREADED FASTENER INSTALLATION SPEC, MAO101-301. PROB 49450 1 6 ABLE CAUSE: ORIGINAL INSTALLATION WAS NOT PER SPEC. 49450 1 7 49631 1 1 WMC DOOR WAS FOUND TO BE DIFFICULT TO OPEN. ENG EVALUATION REVEALED TH 49631 1 2 E FOOT RESTRAINTS WERE CAUSING THE WMC DOOR NOT TO OPERATE PROPERLY AL 49631 1 3 ONG WITH DOOR MAKING CONTACT WITH FRAME CAUSING LATCH TO BE DIFFICULT 49631 1 4 TO OPEN. THE FOOT RESTRAINTS WERE STOWED PROPERLY AND THE DOOR WAS TRI 49631 1 5 MMED PR MRB PAGE 4 OF THIS PR. DOOR LATCH AS VERIFIED PER STEP 11.0 CY 49631 1 6 CLES WITH NO DIFFICULTIES. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 49704 1 1 STRICKER BLOCK (V070-398439-003) AT Xo1122.63 HAS A GOUGE IN IT. THE G 49704 1 2 OUGE WAS REPAIRED PER MR DISPOSITION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CA 49704 1 3 USE: FLIGHT DAMAGE. 49839 1 1 THE INTERFERENCE WHICH DID NOT ALLOW THE INSTALLAT 49839 1 2 ION OF TEE #7 INTO RIB SPLICE #8 WAS CAUSED BY THE 49839 1 3 INBOARD INSULATORS OF RC PNL #8 AND NOT THE OUTBO 49839 1 4 ARD INSULATORS OF RCC PNL #7 (V070-199627-002 AND 49839 1 5 V070-199863-002). THE INBOARD INSULATORS WERE REMO 49839 1 6 VED AND RE-INSTALLED PER STR-3-07-1745 WHICH RESOL 49839 1 7 VED THE TEE INTERFERENCE. TEE #7 IS INSTALLED INTO 49839 1 8 RIBSPLICE #8 AND IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 49882 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF AN UPPER AFT TAILCONE FITTING STRUCTURAL BOLT SHACK 49882 1 2 ING OUT, IDENTIFIED AS ITEM 1.0 OF THIS PR, WAS SUCCESSFULLY RESLOVED 49882 1 3 AFTER DEVIATIONS WERE WRITTEN TO PROVIDE PROPER GRIP THROUGH US OF WAS 49882 1 4 HERS PROBABLE CAUSE IS INCORRECT CALLOUTS ON JOB CARD. 49921 1 1 THIS PR IS NO CONSTRAINT TO V595-350208-006 BLAST DOOR FRAME INSTALLAT 49921 1 2 ION MEASUREMENTS TAKEN BETWEEN THE FRAME AND ORBITER WHICH WOULD REPRE 49921 1 3 SENT ANY FURTHER BLANKET COMPRESSION BY THE BLAST DOOR FRAME WS FOUND 49921 1 4 TO BE ACCEPTABLE THE FIB BLANKETS INSTALLED AROUND THE 50-2 DOOR/(BLA 49921 1 5 ST DOOR FRAME) ARE COMPRESSABLE AND NO DAMAGE IS EXPECTED DUE TO -006 49921 1 6 BLAST DOOR FRAME INSTALLATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 49998 1 1 NOSE WHEEL TIRE PRESSURE COULD NOT BE TAKEN WITHIN THE 24 HOUR PERIOD 49998 1 2 DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS THAT PREVENTED JACK AND LEVEL OF THE ORBITER 49998 1 3 . PRESSURES CANNOT BE TAKEN WITH WEIGHT ON WHEELS DUE TO THE CALCULATI 49998 1 4 ON PROCEDURE OF DECAY RATES. A WAIVER HAS BEEN PROCEDDED TO ACCEPT THI 49998 1 5 S CONDITION (WK1795). PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS MOTHER NATURE. 50106 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE, IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS RESOLVED, W 50106 1 2 ITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL, BY REMOVING THE NUTPLATE AND RE-INSTALLI 50106 1 3 NG A NEW NUTPLATE USING BLIND RIVETS. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS DUE TO NORM 50106 1 4 AL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE NUTPLATE IS ACCEPTABLE AS INSTALLED AND NO 50106 1 5 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 50132 1 1 3 EACH V070-398938-003 WERE FOUND TO BE DELAMINATING AT THE EDGES. SHI 50132 1 2 MS WERE FILED TO ELIMINATE DELAMINATED EDGES AND TO PROVIDE FOR A FLUS 50132 1 3 H SURFACE FOR BONDING OF PADS OVER SHIMS. PROBABLE CAUSE UNAVOIDABLE D 50132 1 4 AMAGE. 50184 1 1 AFTER EVALUATION OF THE BOLT HEAD PROTRUSION AND T 50184 1 2 ORQUE DISCREPANCY PROBLEM WITH ROCKWELL KSC AND RO 50184 1 3 CKWELL DOWNEY, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THE BOLT INST 50184 1 4 ALLATION MAINTAINS ITS DESIGN INTENT AND STRUCTURA 50184 1 5 L INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. THE BOLT HEAD PROTRUSIO 50184 1 6 NS ARE MINOR IN NATURE, THEY RANGE FROM (.001 TO . 50184 1 7 010) INCH ABOVE SPECIFICATION TOLERANCE OF .010" M 50184 1 8 AX PROTRUSION FROM SURFACE OF STRUCTURE(SEE ATTACH 50184 1 9 MENT B). THE INSPECTION OF HARDWARE REMOVED SHOWED 50184 1 10 NO ABNORMALITIES. THE PROPER GRIP LENGTH OF 50184 1 11 HARDWARE HAS BEEN USED AND THE BOLT THREADS ARE NO 50184 1 12 T IN BEARING. THESE BOLTS ARE PART OF THE PRIMARY 50184 1 13 STRUCTURE. THE BOLT PROTRUSIONS FROM THE LOWER IML 50184 1 14 SURFACE WERE MR APPROVED AKAY AS IS. THE BOLTS TH 50184 1 15 AT WERE MEASURED BELOW MINIMUM INSTALLATION TORQUE 50184 1 16 WERE RAISED TO MEET THE INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS 50184 1 17 AND THE BOLTS MEASURED AT THE TOP END OF THE INST 50184 1 18 ALLATION TORQUE WERE LOOSENED AND RETORQUED TO MEE 50184 1 19 T THE INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS. 50234 1 1 S/C: PER MR THE SEAL ASSY WAS REBONDED TO STRUCTURE AT A LOCATION THAT 50234 1 2 ELIMINATED INTERFERENCE WITH RETAINER INSTALLATION. DISCREPANCY NO LO 50234 1 3 NGER EXISTS. THE SEAL WAS COUNTER BORED PER MR TO ELIMINATE RIVET INTE 50234 1 4 RFERENCE. 50324 1 1 INSULATOR HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUFACTURER SPEC. 50514 1 1 THE (24) LOCATIONS WHERE THE PLBD ENVIRONMENTAL BULB SEAL SPLICES WERE N 50514 1 2 OT BONDED THE ENTIRE LENGTH THAT WERE DOCUMENTED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WERE 50514 1 3 RESTRICTED MR APPROVED FOR (1) FLIGHT (FLIGHT 12, STS 39). POST FLIGHT P 50514 1 4 ROCESSING, THE SEAL WAS INSPECTED ON TPS STR-3-13-507. AT (12) OF THE (2 50514 1 5 4) LOCATIONS (REFERENCE INTERIM SUMMARY ON PAGE 9) THE SEAL SPLICE WAS R 50514 1 6 EPLACED. THE REMAINING (12) LOCATIONS WERE UNRESTRICTED MR ACCEPTED AS-I 50514 1 7 S. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR AT ORIGINAL MANUFACTURE CONCLUDE NO FURTHER 50514 1 8 WORK OR INSPECTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 50633 1 1 THE RUB PANEL & FASTENER CALLOUTS ARE "TYPO" ERRORS WITHIN THE DWG. TH 50633 1 2 ERE IS NO WORK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED ON THIS PR OTHER THAN VERIF'N OF THE 50633 1 3 RELEASED E.O. & THAT THE TPS DOCUMENT INSTALLS THE PANELS & FASTENER 50633 1 4 IN THE PROPER CONFIG'N. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS & THE PR CAN CLO 50633 1 5 SE. CLOSE THIS PR, UPON VERIF'N THAT RELEASED EO REFLECTS PROPER CONFI 50633 1 6 G'N. 50931 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: REMOVED UNSEATED CENTER HINGE'S SEAL AND INSTALLED A NE 50931 1 2 W ONE. THERE WERE NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF A LEAK PATH. (SEE PAGE 2) PROBAB 50931 1 3 LE CAUSE: INITIAL INSTALLATION. ITEM 2 PAGE 1: MR UNRESTRICTED ACCEPTA 50931 1 4 NCE OF THE ACTUATOR HINGE'S INBOARD SEAL P/N V070-198383-001 AS IS. NO 50931 1 5 LEAK PATH CONCERNS. (SEE PAGE 4). PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCESSING/WEAR. 50971 1 1 REPLACEMENT RIVET DOES NOT ALTER FORM, FIT OR FUNC 50971 1 2 TION. 50981 1 1 COSMETIC SCRATCHES INSIDE THE NLG AFT X0 375 R/H #1 BOLT POSITION 12 O 50981 1 2 'CLOCK. EDDY CURRENT PERFORMED. NO DISCONTINUITIES FOUND. CLOSE PR. 50988 1 1 ON THE LEFT HAND WIRE TRAY AT THE XO636 FRAME, HOL 50988 1 2 ES 2,3,4,5,8 AND 10 WERE DAMAGED BY THREADS IN BEA 50988 1 3 RING. HOLE 2 WAS REAMED TO 0.217 INCHES, AND HOLES 50988 1 4 4,5,8, AND 10 TO 0.213 INCHES. NDE WAS PERFORMED( 50988 1 5 ATTACHED AND REPORT 30,406 & NDE 30,416) AND NO AD 50988 1 6 DITIONAL DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED. THIS REPAIR CLEARS 50988 1 7 THE HOLES FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 51165 1 1 PRSD CRYO TANK BORON STRUT ME270-0006-0003 S/N 517 51165 1 2 292-001 HAD NUMEROUS SURFACE SCRATCHES ALONG ITS L 51165 1 3 ENGTH. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN AND RESULTS SHO 51165 1 4 WED SCRATCH NUMBER 3 HAD A SCRATCH DEPTH GREATER T 51165 1 5 HAN 0.003 INCHES, WHICH IS THE MAXIMUM DEPTH ALLOW 51165 1 6 ED AS STATED BY ROCKWELL ENGINEERING. STRUT WAS RE 51165 1 7 TURNED TO VENDOR FOR STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY EVALUATI 51165 1 8 ON AND SPARE STRUT WAS OBTAINED FROM LOGISTICS SPA 51165 1 9 RES. CRYO TANK STRUT ME270-0006-0003 IS INSTALLED 51165 1 10 TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION FOR FLIGHT. CLOSE THIS PR 51167 1 1 HOLES MR'D OK AS IS. 51309 1 1 GAP FILLERS IN LOCATIONS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1 WERE FOUND TO BE TORN. N 51309 1 2 EW MESH WAS BONDED PER PAGES 11 THROUGH 16 RETURNING GAP FILLER ASSY T 51309 1 3 O PRINT CONFIGURATION. 4 EA GAP FILLERS REMOVED PER THIS DOCUMENT WERE 51309 1 4 INSTALLED ON TPS ENV-3-07-014. INSTALLATION WAS VERIFIED IN STEP 47 F 51309 1 5 OR REMOVED GAP FILLERS. 51427 1 1 STEP 11 OF TEMP-DEV T-04 (FCP-OMI V5R03 SEQ 09-047 51427 1 2 ) WAS INADVERTENTLY STAMPED IN ERROR BY TECH & Q.C 51427 1 3 . WORK WAS NOT PERFORMED ON TANK. TECH & Q.C. STAM 51427 1 4 PS HAVE BEEN VOIDED AND NOT PERFORMED OPTION STAMP 51427 1 5 ED. 51470 1 1 THE SHEARED RIVET IDENTIFIED ON PAGE 1, ITEM 1, WAS RESTRICTED MR APPR 51470 1 2 OVED TO USE FOR FLIGHT 11. POST FLIGHT 11, (FLIGHT 12 PROCESSING), THE 51470 1 3 NUTPLATE RIVETS WERE BOTH REMOVED AND NEW RIVETS INSTALLED PER DRAWIN 51470 1 4 G SPECIFICATIONS. SUSPECTED CAUSE OF SHEARED NUTPLATE RIVET IS NORMAL 51470 1 5 WEAR AND TEAR. THE BASE HEAT SHIELD IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. CONCLUDE THA 51470 1 6 T THE NUTPLATE AND RIVETS ARE RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION AND NO F 51470 1 7 URTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 51567 1 1 THE PITTED AREAS (10 AREAS TOTAL) ON THE ELEVON 51567 1 2 SKIN SURFACE BELOW RUB PNL #11, R/H OUTBD ELEVON 51567 1 3 (Yw 341.372 TO Yw 362.165) WERE CLEANED, INSP'd & 51567 1 4 ACCEPTED AS "OK AS IS" BY RI DOWNEY/STRESS. THERE 51567 1 5 WAS (3) LAYERS OF KOROPON APPLIED TO EACH PITTED 51567 1 6 AREA TO INCREASE THE SKIN SURFACES ABILITY TO RE- 51567 1 7 SIST ADDITIONAL CORROSION. THE CORROSION HAD BEEN 51567 1 8 CAUSED BY GALVANIC ACTION BETWEEN THE ALUMINUM 51567 1 9 SKIN & THE INCONEL BLKTS. THE B91B30111-86 SKIN 51567 1 10 BETWEEN THE NOTED COORDINATES HAS BEEN MR ID'd. 51567 1 11 PAGE 1, ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED 10 AREAS OF CORROSION ON UPPER SK 51567 1 12 IN SURFACE OF THE OUTBD ELEVON UNDER RUB PANEL 11.TO CORRECT THIS DISC 51567 1 13 REPANCY, THE CORROSION WAS ETCHED AND THE DEPTH OF EACH PIT WAS MEASUR 51567 1 14 E. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PITTED AREAS DID NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCTU 51567 1 15 RAL FUNCTION OF THE ELEVON AND WAS ACCEPTED "OK AS IS" BY RI/DOWNEY ST 51567 1 16 RESS. THE DISCREPANT AREAS WERE THEN COATED WITH 3 LAYERS OF KOROPON T 51567 1 17 O INCREASE THE SKING SURFACE ABILITY TO RESIST CORROSION. DISCREPANT A 51567 1 18 REA HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. REF MR RATIONALE P6 7.0 51661 1 1 LOOSE HARDWARE IN ELEVON IS A RESULT OF THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS. ALL 51661 1 2 ACCESSIBLE HARDWARE HAS BEEN REMOVED PER TPS VSTR-3-07-241. INACCESSI 51661 1 3 BLE HARDWARE IS ALLOWED TO REMAIN PER PRINT. 51809 1 1 USE SHOP & STRUT AS A TEMP FLT STRUT REPLACEMENT 51809 1 2 FOR GRD OPS WITH MR CONCURRENCE. 51845 1 1 REFERENCING TPS STR-3-07-285 MOD 007 THE V070-8527 51845 1 2 06-007 SUPPORT CHANNEL ASSEMBLY WAS UPGRADED TO A 51845 1 3 V070-852706-021 ASSEMBLY WITH THE ADDITION OF AN E 51845 1 4 XTRA NUT-PLATE LOCATION PER E.O. A03. THE INSTALLA 51845 1 5 TION DRAWING V070-852102-013 WAS UPGRADED TO USE T 51845 1 6 HE V070-852706-021 ASSY. PER E.O. D04. THESE CHANG 51845 1 7 ES BRING BOTH DRAWINGS INTO AGREEMENT WITH ONE ANO 51845 1 8 THER AND THE DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 51867 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN A STOP BOLT JAM NUT ON THE N.L.G. BUNGEE AS 51867 1 2 SEMBLY WAS FOUND LOOSE. THE STOP BOLT HAD VIBRATED OUT AND WAS INTERFE 51867 1 3 RINGWITH THE BUNGEE OVERCENTER MECHANISM. A SECOND STOP BOLT, WHICH I 51867 1 4 S DESIGNED TO HOLD THE OVERCENTER DIMENSION,WAS FOUND TO HAVE A .100" 51867 1 5 GAP TO THE ADJACENT LINK(S/B 0"). THE LOOSE STOP BOLT WAS ADJUSTED AN 51867 1 6 D TORQUED PER SPEC AND LOCKWIRE WAS ADDED PER E.O. TO FOLLOW. THE OVER 51867 1 7 CENTER STOP BOLT WAS VERIFIED TO CONTACT THE ADJACENT LINK. ATTEMPTS W 51867 1 8 ERE MADE TO MEASURE THE NLG DOOR BUNGEE ROLLER TO STRIKER PLATE GAPS W 51867 1 9 ITH CLAY AND WITH DENTAL MOLD BUT ACCURATE MEASUREMENTS COULD NOT BE V 51867 1 10 ERIFIED. SUGGEST PLASTI-GAUGE STRIPS OR QUICK SET RTV FOR FUTURE USE. 51867 1 11 TECHNIQUE DID VERIFY A GAP EXISTED. REF: MR IN PR MEQ-3-07-0269. AS A 51867 1 12 RESULT OF THE ADJUSTMENT MADE TO THE LOOSE STOP BOLT. THE NLG BUNGEE A 51867 1 13 RMING SLIDER LINK DID NOT ENTER THE HOUSING LINK FAR ENOUGH FOR THE PL 51867 1 14 UNGER LATCH TO ENGAGE AND LOCK THE 2 LINES DURING GEAR RETRACTION. SIN 51867 1 15 CE THE LINKS WERE NOT LOCKED THE BUNGEE DID NOT FIRE. IPR 26RV-0535 WA 51867 1 16 S INITIATED AND USED TO READJUST THE SLIDER LINK LENGTH AND MICROSWITC 51867 1 17 H POSITION. THE BUNGEE WAS ARMED AND FIRED DURING A SUBSEQUENT NLG RET 51867 1 18 RACT/EXTEND CYCLE (OMRS V51ABO.020). THE BUNGEE WAS RECORDED AND INSPE 51867 1 19 CTED FOR PROPER CORE DIMENSION (OMRS VSI ABO.0A0). ALL DISCREPANCIES H 51867 1 20 AVE BEEN CORRECTED AND ENGINEERING WILL FOLLOW TO ADD LOCKWARE TO THE 51867 1 21 JAM NUT. UPON RECEIVING ENGINEERING FOR STEP 10, CLOSE THIS PR. 51887 1 1 UPPER INBOARD INSULATOR IN R/H RCC PANEL #11 WHICH HAD A .400" SPLIT, 51887 1 2 DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS REPAIRED BY THE RI SERVICE CENTER. R 51887 1 3 EWORK RETURNED THE INSULATOR TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OP 51887 1 4 ERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 51890 1 1 DEFECT 1-A 0.7 DIA CIRCLE PF RTV WAS REMOVED FROM 51890 1 2 L/H BAY 8 SO THAT BUSHING COULD BE INSTALLED PER T 51890 1 3 PS STR-3-07-219, STEP 17.0. THIS RETURNS THIS AREA 51890 1 4 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. 51895 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUT PLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. A NEW FASTENER WAS 51895 1 2 OBTAINED TO REPLACE THE BEHEADED FASTENER FOR THE CARRIER PANEL INSTAL 51895 1 3 LATION. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST AND THE PR CAN BE CLOSED. CAUSE 51895 1 4 : REPEATED USE OF NUTPLATE. 51979 1 1 THE DOUBLER WAS INSTL'D, IN THE WING, AFTER BEING 51979 1 2 TRIMMED PER EO V070-156861 A02. THE DOUBLER COULD 51979 1 3 NOT BE INSTL'D BECAUSE OF A DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 51979 1 4 THE DOUBLER WAS ALSO MR AS IS, FOR UNRESTRICTED 51979 1 5 USE, W/ INSUFFICIENT EDGE DISTANCE ON FIVE FASTEN- 51979 1 6 ERS. THE INSUFFICIENT EDGE DISTANCE WAS CAUSED, 51979 1 7 WHEN THE DOUBLER WAS MATCH DRILLED TO THE EXISTING 51979 1 8 HOLES IN THE WING SURFACE. 52028 1 1 REF. DWG V070-341003: O.D. OF WASHER MD153-1002-00 52028 1 2 10 UNDER NUT IS W.070 IN. O.D. OF NUT MD114-3007-0 52028 1 3 010 IS 1.195 IN. DIAMETER DIFFERENCE IS .125 IN. O 52028 1 4 .D. OF WASHER MD153-5004-0010 UNDER BOLT HEAD IS 1 52028 1 5 .070 IN. O.D. OF BOLT HEAD MD111-4020-1028 IS 1.19 52028 1 6 5 (MAX). DIAMETER DIFFERENCE IS .125 IN. BOTH DIFF 52028 1 7 ERENCES APPROXIMATE WHAT INSTALLATION SHOWS PER VI 52028 1 8 SUAL INSPECTION. THE ATTACHING HARDWARE IS PER DWG 52028 1 9 . ROCKWELL DOWNEY STRESS GROUP HAS REVIEWED INSTAL 52028 1 10 LATION, AND CONCLUDED THAT NO STRUCTURAL PROBLEM 52028 1 11 EXISTS. NO DISPOSITION OR WORK IS REQURIED. CLOSE 52028 1 12 THIS PR. 52580 1 1 O2 TANK 1 FILL FLT CAP WAS INADVERTENTLY REMOVED. 52580 1 2 INSTALLED NEW SEAL AND TORQUE THE FLT CAP TO SPEC. 52580 1 3 PERFORMED BUBBLE LEAK CHECK AND THE RESULTS WERE 52580 1 4 GOOD. 52788 1 1 THE TAPERED GAP (ITEM 1, PG 1) AND THE DEGRADED RTV (ITEM 2, PG 1) WAS 52788 1 2 RESOLVED BY REPLACING THE RTV PRIOR TO FLIGHT 11 WITH NEW RTV. THE ZE 52788 1 3 RO SEAL TRAVEL (ITEM 3, PG 1A) WAS REMEASURED BY ENGINEERING AND FOUND 52788 1 4 TO BE .070". THE LIMITED TRAVEL WAS THEN MR ACCEPTED FOR ONE FLIGHT. 52788 1 5 POST FLIGHT 11, THE INTERFERING TPS AND ADJACENT STRUCTURE WAS REMOVED 52788 1 6 AND REWORKED ON STR-3-11-454 AND THE GAP WAS REMEASURED (SEE ITEMS 12 52788 1 7 AND 13.) THE DEGRADED FLOW BARRIER, BLOCK SEAL AND SPRINGS AND CHARRE 52788 1 8 D POLYMIDE SEALS, (ITEMS 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 AND 10, PAGES 1C THRU 1E) WE 52788 1 9 RE SCRAPPED AND NEW PARTS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED ON TPS STR-3-11-454. 52788 1 10 THE OVERSIZED POLYMIDE SEAL (ITEM 11, PAGE 1F) WAS SANDED TO DRAWING D 52788 1 11 DIMENSIONS AND THEN INSTALLED ON STR-3-11-454. THE OUT OF TOLERANCE TR 52788 1 12 AVEL OF THE COLUMBIUM SEAL (ITEM 12, PG 1G) WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR 52788 1 13 UNRESTRICTED USE. THE OUT OF TOLERANCE GAP (ITEM 13, PG 1G) WAS RESOLV 52788 1 14 ED WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL BY FILLING THE GAP WITH RTV. THE OUT 52788 1 15 OF TOLERANCE TRAVEL OF THE COLUMBIUM SEAL (ITEM 14, PG 1G) WAS REMEASU 52788 1 16 RED AND FOUND TO BE WITHIN TOLERANCE. ITEMS 1, 12 AND 13 WERE DUE TO A 52788 1 17 BUILD-UP OF TOLERANCES OF ASSOCIATED HARDWARE. ITEMS 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 52788 1 18 , 9 AND 10 WERE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 3 WAS DUE TO WORKMAN 52788 1 19 SHIP. ITEM 11 WAS DUE TO VENDOR AND ITEM 14 WAS NOT A DISCREPANCY. CON 52788 1 20 CLUDE ALL ITEMS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 52841 1 1 THE DEBONDED CONICAL WASHER (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) IS A PREVIOUS MR REPAIR T 52841 1 2 O AN INCORRECTLY COUNTERSUNK HOLE. THE DEBONDED WASHER WAS REBONDED IN 52841 1 3 USING MB0120-008 ADHESIVE. THE REPAIR WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTE 52841 1 4 D USE. THE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS DUE TO ORIGINAL MANUFACTURING AT THE VE 52841 1 5 NDOR. CONCLUDE THAT THE CLOSEOUT HAS BEEN RETURNED TO DESIGN INTENT AN 52841 1 6 D NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 53068 1 1 SPECIAL TOOLS ALLOWED THE BOLT TO BE TORQUED. STEP 9.0 OF STR-3-07-31 53068 1 2 7 WAS BOUGHT. 53164 1 1 #22 R/H SPAR INSULATOR HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER PRINT 53164 1 2 AT THE RI SERV CENTER. 53193 1 1 THE ORIGINAL PILOT HOLE WAS PLUGGED WITH A DOUBLE 53193 1 2 FLUSH RIVET. THE INSTALLATION USED THE MISDRILLED 53193 1 3 HOLE LOCATION. THIS WAS WORKMANSHIP ERROR. 53207 1 1 S/C PART RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION 53238 1 1 DWG CLARIFICATION PROVIDED EO-TO-FOLLOW. UPON VERIFICATION THAT RELEAS 53238 1 2 ED ENGINEERING REFLECTS PROPER CORROSION PROTECTION CALLOUT, CLOSE THI 53238 1 3 S PR. 53254 1 1 THE (5) DENTS WERE APPROVED TO BE WITHIN ACCEPTABL 53254 1 2 E LIMITS BY MR. THE SUSPECTED CAUSE OF DENTS WAS 53254 1 3 DUE TO CARELESSNESS BY SHOP PERSONNEL. 53264 1 1 THE MINOR DING IN THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE ON R/H RADIATOR PANEL #1 HAS 53264 1 2 BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "AS-IS". NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIE 53264 1 3 S EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: SPACE DEBRIS DURING FLIGHT. 53364 1 1 THE AFT SEPERATION BOLT MISSING THE DATA PACK WAS ROUTED TO THE VAB AN 53364 1 2 D IS BEING HELD IN LOGISTICS WITH ITS DATA PACK. THE BOLT WITH A NICK 53364 1 3 IN IT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED PER MR ACTION AND RETURNED TO STOCK. THREE N 53364 1 4 ON-DISCREPANT BOLTS HAVE BEEN OBTAINED/FIT CHECKED AND ROUTED TO THE V 53364 1 5 AB TO JOIN THE ROURTH BOLT TO CONTINUE WORK WITH S0004. NO FURTHER DI 53364 1 6 SCREPANCIES EXIST ON THIS PR. CLOSE THIS PR. 53581 1 1 THE V070-367052-009 LINER RETAINER WAS SANDED DOWN 0.015" TO 0.020" FO 53581 1 2 R ITEM 1.0 (POINT DIRECTLY FORWARD OF FORWARD ATTACH BOLT) AND 0.010" 53581 1 3 TO 0.015" FOR ITEMS 2.0 AND 3.0 (POINT 9" FORWARD OF SILL ATTACH BOLT 53581 1 4 AND POINT 2" TO 12" AFT OF SILL ATTACH BOLT) PER THE ABOVE DISPOSITION 53581 1 5 . THIS MR REPAIR ALLOWED FOR PROPER FIT OF THE GAS BEAM IN BAY #3. A M 53581 1 6 INIMAL AMOUND OF THE LINER RETAINER'S. THICKNESS OF 0.060" +/- .005" W 53581 1 7 AS REMOVED AND THIS WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 53581 1 8 F THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY IS DESIGN I 53581 1 9 NTERFERENCE FROM THE GAS BEAM INSTALLATION. 53628 1 1 RCC PNL #8's SPAR INSULATOR (V070-190308-002) HAS 53628 1 2 BEEN REPAIRED PER MLO311-0022 PARA. 3.1 AT ROCKWEL 53628 1 3 L SERVICE CNTR & IS OK FOR FLT. Q.E. NOTE: REINST 53628 1 4 L PER STR-3-07-1745 53814 1 1 THIS EICN ALSO APPEARS ON PV-6-038113. 53836 1 1 THE S/N /OCN RECORDED IN OMI V5R02 FOR H2 TANK 1 OUTBOARD FWD STRUT (M 53836 1 2 E270-0006-0013) DURING OV-103 FLT 7 PROCESSING WAS INCORRECT. THIS PR 53836 1 3 WAS DEFERRED TO FLT 8 DUE TO ACCESS RESTRICTION (BAY 6 LHS CLOSEOUT) D 53836 1 4 URING FLT 8 PROCESSING ACCESS WAS OBTAINED AND TANK STRUT S/N /OCN WAS 53836 1 5 OBTAINED (REF STEPS 3,4, AND 5) CLOSE THIS PR 54239 1 1 INSULATOR'S HAVE BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUFACTURER'S 54239 1 2 SPECIFICATIONS. RC ACTION STILL IN WORK. 54284 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SPAR INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCK 54284 1 2 WELL SERVICE CENTER AND IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 54329 1 1 UNABLE TO INSTALL VR70-341162-003 RADIUS BLOCK 54329 1 2 DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM CARGO FITTING. RADIUS 54329 1 3 BLK TRIMMED PER MR. CLOSE PR. 54350 1 1 THE V070-340870-001 SUPPORT HAD A CRACK EXTENDING THROUGH A DAMAGED AR 54350 1 2 EA ON ONE OF FOUR LEGS. THE CRACK WAS STOP DRILLED TO STOP ITS PROPAGA 54350 1 3 TION AND THE LEG WAS REINFORCED WITH GLASS FABRIC PATCHES. THIS MR REP 54350 1 4 AIR WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE PANEL. PROBABLE CAU 54350 1 5 SE: OPERATONAL DEGRADATION. 54402 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 54402 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 54402 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACTI 54402 1 4 ON TO INVESTIGAGTE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/ 54402 1 5 W TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 54402 1 6 THE CARRIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. CLOSE PR. 54588 1 1 IT WAS NOTED THAT WATER INTRUSION OCCURRED IN THE AFT C/L LATCH PDU CA 54588 1 2 VITY. INSPECTION OF THE AFT PDU UPON REMOVAL SHOWED NO SIGNS OF DAMAGE 54588 1 3 . THE PDU AND CAVITY WERE CLEANED AND THE PDU REINSTALLED. CLOSEOUT PH 54588 1 4 OTOS WERE TAKEN PER STEP 13.3. STEPS 26 THROUGH 89 SUCCESSFULLY COMPLE 54588 1 5 TED A PRELIMINARY "SMOKE TEST" TO VERIFY PERFORMANCE PRIOR TO TPS INST 54588 1 6 ALLATION. OMRSD REQUIREMENTS WILL BE SATISFIED PER OMI V1097. THE PROB 54588 1 7 ABLE CAUSE IS INCLEMENT WEATHER. 54591 1 1 THE FASTENERS ATTACHING THE BRACKETS TO THE RIB IN 54591 1 2 STALLATION WERE FOUND TO BE OF THE WORONG TYPE. TH 54591 1 3 E WRONG FASTENERS (MS20615M RIVETS) WERE REMOVED A 54591 1 4 ND THE CORRECT FASTENERS (MD121-0004-0504 BLIND RI 54591 1 5 VETS) WERE PUT IN THEIR LOCATION, 8 PLACES. STRUCT 54591 1 6 URAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. CLOSE THIS PR. 54933 1 1 THE SLIGHTLY FRAYED ARIMID FABRIC ON THE V070-198874-008 CURTAIN SEAL 54933 1 2 (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) WAS RESOLVED BY BONDING THE FABRIC TO THE SEAL WITH M 54933 1 3 B0130-119, TYPE II ADHESIVE. THE BONDED FABRIC WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNR 54933 1 4 ESTRICTED USE. THE INTERFERENCE OF THE CURTAIN SEAL AND POLYMIDE SEAL 54933 1 5 (ITEM 2 PAGE 1A) WAS RESOLVED BY SLOTTING THE LOCATOR HOLE IN THE SEAL 54933 1 6 AND INSTALLING THE SEAL .110 TO .120 INCHES FURTHER OUTBOARD. THE SLO 54933 1 7 TTED HOLE WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE FRAYED FABRIC WAS 54933 1 8 CAUSED BY OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION (NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR). THE INTERFER 54933 1 9 ENCE WAS DUE TO IMPROPER INSTALLATION AT ORIGINAL ASSEMBLY. CONCLUDE T 54933 1 10 AHT THE CURTAIN SEAL HAS BEEN INSTALLED PER DESIGN INTENT AND NO FURTH 54933 1 11 ER WORK IS REQUIRED. 55259 1 1 DISCREPANCY NOTED ON PG 1 (17) HAS BEEN FOUND TO B 55259 1 2 E A HOIST PICK-UP PT, 1/4" IN DIAMETER. WITH A NUT 55259 1 3 PLATE ON FAR SIDE OF SKIN, THIS IS PER PRINT DWG. 55259 1 4 170441200 ZN 4A FOR OV103. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS A 55259 1 5 T THIS LOCATION. PER RI/FAIRCHILD NO FASTENER SHAL 55259 1 6 L FILL THIS HOLE TEMP OR OTHERWISE. 55261 1 1 IT WAS FOUND DURING VISUAL INSP THAT THE V070-510 55261 1 2 345 SW HARNESS WAS NOT PER DWG. IF HARNESS WAS TO 55261 1 3 BE INSTL'D PER PRINT ACCESS WOULD NOT BE INSTL'D 55261 1 4 PER PRINT ACCESS WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MATE 55261 1 5 CONNECTOR TO SW ASSY. E.O. HAS BEEN INITIATED TO 55261 1 6 CORRECT THE DWG., TO THE AS INSTL'D CONDITION. 55624 1 1 THE BOLT WAS SUCESSFULLY ROTATED TO FACILITATE THE BOLT REMOVAL. THERE 55624 1 2 IS NO EVIDENCE OF A LOAD ON THE FITTING. NO HARDWARE DISCREPANCY WAS 55624 1 3 NOTED ON THIS PR. THE BOLT WAS STUCK IN THE HOLE FROM HARDENED KOROPON 55624 1 4 . THE BOLT WILL BE REMOVED, THE HOLE INSPECTED, AND THE BOLT REINSTALL 55624 1 5 ED ON JOB CARD V30-13305. THIS P.R. DOES NOT AFFECT THE AIR WORTHINESS 55624 1 6 OF THE ORBITER. 55822 1 1 THE INSTALLATION OF THE NOTED RIVETS ARE SLIGHTLY RECESSED BELOW THE F 55822 1 2 ITTING SURFACE. THIS IS DUE TO SLIGHTLY LARGE COUNTERSUNK HOLES IN THE 55822 1 3 FITTING. THIS CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE C 55822 1 4 AUSE: IMPROPER VENDOR INSTALLATION. 55874 1 1 DISPO INCLUDED M.R. ACCEPTANCE OF MINOR SCRATCH 55874 1 2 (2.75" L, .01" W, .001" D, .013" R). THE SCRATCH 55874 1 3 WAS SANDED, CHEM FILMED & TOP COATED W/ FLAT BLACK 55874 1 4 POLYURETHANE. REPAIR OF PRIMARY STR RETURNED TO 55874 1 5 DESIGN INTENT. 55887 1 1 THE PURGE AIR LEAK THROUGH THE R/H MLG WHEEL WELL, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 55887 1 2 1, PG 1, IS NOT CAUSED BY AN OVER-COMPRESSED ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL BUT IS 55887 1 3 CAUSED BY THE SEAL NOT BEING COMPRESSED. THE ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL IS IN 55887 1 4 GOOD CONDITION AND THE STRUCTURE DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEFECTS WHICH CAUS 55887 1 5 E THE SEAL FROM NOT SEATING. MEQ-3-11-0476 IS ADDRESSING THE RIGGING O 55887 1 6 F THE R/H MLGD WHICH WILL PULL THE DOOR UP TIGHTER AND COMPRESS THE SE 55887 1 7 AL. PROBABLE CAUSE: MLGD RIGGING. 55905 1 1 DEFECT WAS NOTED DURING INSPECTION PER OMI V1058. DENTAL MOLD IMPRESSI 55905 1 2 ONS WERE TAKEN AND MEASURED, V1058 WAS ALLOWED TO PROCEED THROUGH SEAL 55905 1 3 LEAK CHECK WHICH SHOWED "O" LEAKAGE. BASED ON THIS, SEAL WAS MR ACCEP 55905 1 4 TED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. RETEST WAS V1058. PROBABLE CAUSE IS CONTACT 55905 1 5 FROM TOOL/EQUIPMENT USED NEAR SEAL. 56026 1 1 DISCREPANT WASHERS HAVE BEEN REPLACED WITH PER 56026 1 2 PRINT WASHERS. 56028 1 1 THE V070-510474 FITTING IS NICKED DUE TO INTERFERE 56028 1 2 NCE BETWEEN THE FITTING AND THE V070-510432 ARM. T 56028 1 3 HE ARM HAS BEEN REWORKED PER MCR11784(V070-510432 56028 1 4 -1303). THE FITTING HAS BEEN MR'D PER THIS PR AND 56028 1 5 FUNCTIONALLY RETESTED BY A MAIN LANDING GEAR CYCLE 56028 1 6 . THE FITTING WAS INSPECTED WITH NOMINAL RESULTS. 56028 1 7 A PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS.NOTE-DENTAL MOLDS 56028 1 8 MAY BE SCRAPPED. RESULTS ARE TO REMAIN WITH THIS P 56028 1 9 R. 56054 1 1 THE V070-338760-013 FIBERGLASS CLOSEOUT PANEL HAD A GOUGE APPROXIMATEL 56054 1 2 Y 1" LONG. THE PANEL WAS REPAIRED USING TWE FIBERGLASS PATCHES CENTER 56054 1 3 ED OVER THE GOUGE. THIS MR REPAIR WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE INTEG 56054 1 4 RITY OF THE PANEL. THIS PANEL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAU 56054 1 5 SE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AND FAULTY WORKMANSHIP. 56145 1 1 JUST PRIOR TO CLOSING OUT THE R/H WING GLOVE, IT WAS NOTED, THAT (33) 56145 1 2 OF (34) FASTENERS ATTACHING THE V070-794356-006 ELECT. PANEL WERE NOT 56145 1 3 INSTALLED PER SPEC. AFTER FURTHER INVESTIGATION, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE 56145 1 4 SCREW CALL-OUT, HAD FULL THREADS, AND WASHER CALL-OUT WAS INCORRECT S 56145 1 5 IZE. A EO WAS RELEASED TO CHANGE THE SCREWS TO A SHANKED FASTENER AND 56145 1 6 CORRECT THE SIZE OF THE WASHER. THE PANEL WAS THEN INSTALLED WITH THE 56145 1 7 NEW HARDWARE. 56241 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM (S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE 56241 1 2 PEELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD 56241 1 3 BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 56241 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHIN 56241 1 5 G HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121- 56241 1 6 87-103-C1) THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 56600 1 1 V070-856899-003 AND V070-856899-008 RETAINER STRIPS WERE FOUND TO INTE 56600 1 2 RFERE WITH TCS RETAINERS INSTALLATION. V070-856899-003 STRIP WAS TRIMM 56600 1 3 ED BY MR PER STEP 3.0 TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. 6.0 ABD 9.0 WHICH ALL 56600 1 4 OWED FOR TCS RETAINER TO BE TRIMMED TO FIT. 56699 1 1 HOLES WERE REAMED OUT TO NEXT STANDARD SIZE. OVER 56699 1 2 SIZE HI-LOKS INSTALLED. POOR REAMING TECHNIQUE CA 56699 1 3 USED PROBLEM. 56764 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO INSTALL A MD112-1002-0303 SCREW 56764 1 2 IN PLACE OF A MD112-1002-0302 SCREW TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT THREAD PROT 56764 1 3 RUSION. MAO101-301 SPEC. ALLOWED FOR THE ONE GRIP LONGER SCREW. REFERE 56764 1 4 NCE PROBLEM ITEM 1.0 PAGE 1.0 IS RESOLVED. THIS DISPOSITION ALSO MODIF 56764 1 5 IED TWO WASHERS TO BE PLACED AT LOCATION Xo914.0 Yo103.7 (L/H SIDE) BE 56764 1 6 CAUSE THE ORIGINAL WASHERS INTERFERED WITH THE EDGE OF THE SILL STRING 56764 1 7 ER. THE MODIFICATION WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SAFETY MARGIN, DURA 56764 1 8 BILITY, RELIABILITY, OR PERFORMANCE OF THE INSTALLATION. THE STRINGER 56764 1 9 IS A PRIMARY STRUCTURE. REFERENCE PROBLEM ITEM 2.0 AND PAGE 1.0 IS RES 56764 1 10 OLVED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 56817 1 1 STEPS 1,2 AND 3 HAVE BEEN COMPLETED SATISFYING THE 56817 1 2 REQUIREMENT OF THIS PR. THE DISCREPANT AND MISSIN 56817 1 3 G OMS POD HARDWARE WAS REPLACED. 56855 1 1 THERE WERE 2 WHITE SPOTS LOCATED APPROX 8" AFT OF THE FWD SPAR IN ZONE 56855 1 2 4 IN THE BODYFLAP. A SAMPLE WAS OBTAINED AND THE ANALYSIS FROM THE LA 56855 1 3 B INDICATES THAT THE POWDER IS RTV RESIDUE, NOT CORROSION. THE TWO SPO 56855 1 4 TS WERE CLEANED UP. PROBABLE CAUSE: DURING AN RTV BOND, SOME OF THE RT 56855 1 5 V THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLEANED UP WAS MISSED 57073 1 1 THE V070-199625-001 DISCREPANCY WAS A DUPLICATE DI 57073 1 2 SCREPANCY AS THAT OF PR STR-3-07-2077. STR-3-07-20 57073 1 3 77 WILL REPAIR THE INSULATOR. THE LOWER OUTBOARD I 57073 1 4 NSULATOR ATTACHING HARDWARE WAS INTERCHANGED AND A 57073 1 5 LL BOLTS WERE TORQUED TO MANUFACTURER SPECIFICATIO 57073 1 6 NS. WORK WILL CONTINUE ON RCC PANEL PER STR-3-07-2 57073 1 7 077. 57123 1 1 THE DAMAGED TRUSSTUBE ASSY' WAS REMOVED, THE NEW T 57123 1 2 RUSS TUBEASSY' WAS INSTALLED W/OUT TROUBLE. NO FUR 57123 1 3 THER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 57331 1 1 EQUILVANT WASHERS WERE MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS AN EQUIVALE 57331 1 2 NT SUBSTITUTION. CLOSE THIS PR. 57358 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO CLEAN THE ID OF A GALLED BUSHIN 57358 1 2 G. THE BUSHING WAS RESTORED BY REAMING. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. P 57358 1 3 ROBABLE CAUSE: MATERIALS DEFICIENCY/DEGRADATION. 57555 1 1 LRU PR INITIATED AGAINST STRUT TO ROUTE BACK TO VENDOR FOR REPAIR. NEW 57555 1 2 STRUT OBTAINED AND RETURNED TO LOGISTICS STAGING FOR USE. 57659 1 1 NICK IN FITTING PROBABLY OCCURRED DURING UNLOADING 57659 1 2 OF THE TURNBARREL. RAISED METAL REMOVED AND NICK 57659 1 3 SANDED SMOOTH. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY REMAINS POSITI 57659 1 4 VE. SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 57699 1 1 ONE OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FUEL CELL ALTERNATE H20 CHECK VALVES I 57699 1 2 S THAT THE DELTA PRESSURE ACROSS THE CHECK VALVE BE 6.0-8.0 PSI WHEN T 57699 1 3 HE FLOWRATE IS 8.0 LBMS/HR (60.6 M1/MIN) MINIMUM. WHEN TPS FCP-3-07-02 57699 1 4 6 WAS PERFORMED THE ONLY PRESSURE GAGE IN THE ALT H20 LINE WAS A STAND 57699 1 5 ARD GAGE TEMPORARILY INSTALLED UPSTREAM OF THE CHECK VALVE. USING SYST 57699 1 6 EM SCHEMATICS THE PRESSURE ON THE BACKSIDE(DOWNSTREAM SIDE) OF THE CHE 57699 1 7 CK VALVE WAS CALCULATED TO BE 1.4 PSI DUE TO HEAD PRESSURE. UNDER FLOW 57699 1 8 CONDITIONS THIS CALCULATED BACK PRESSURE IS NOT CORRECT. THE ALT H20 L 57699 1 9 INE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER WAS INSTALLED PER TPS EPD-3-07-035. THE DATA G 57699 1 10 ATEHERED DURING THE RETEST IS (TPS VFCP-3-07-028) SHOWED THAT THE BACK 57699 1 11 PRESSURE IS MUCH HIGHER THAN 1.4 PSI UNDER FLOW CONDITIONS. FC2 ALT H2 57699 1 12 0 C/V TEST WAS REPEATED PER TPS-VFCP-3-07-028 STEPS 67-92, USING A STA 57699 1 13 NDARD GAGE AND THE ALT H20 PRESSURE TRANSDUCER. THE RESULTS WERE ACCEP 57699 1 14 TABLE. AT A FLOWRATE OF 70 M1/MIN THE DELTA PRESSURE ACROSS THE C/V WA 57699 1 15 S 7.1 PSI. THE INITIAL DISCREPENCY WAS PICKED UP DUE TO A PROCEDURAL E 57699 1 16 RROR. 57699 1 17 * 57699 1 18 * 57716 1 1 BREAKING TORQUE ON THE (4) ACTUATOR MOUNTING BOLTS 57716 1 2 ON R/H PLBD #1 WERE CHECKED. (3) OF THE (4) SHOW 57716 1 3 ED LOW TORQUE VALUES. THE BOLTS WERE THEN RE-INST 57716 1 4 ALLED PER MAO101-301. THE MOUNTING BOLTS ON THE O 57716 1 5 THER (3) ACTUATORS WILL BE CHECKED ON MEQ WADS. ( 57716 1 6 REF: MEQ-3-07-0245). 57760 1 1 A NEW NUT PLATE WAS ORDERED AND WAS INSTALLED ONTHECEILING PANEL PER P 57760 1 2 RINT. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THEN NUT PLATE BREAKING FREE COULD HAVE BEEN F 57760 1 3 ROM BEING HIT BY EITHER A CREW MEMBER OF SHOP PERSONNEL. 57788 1 1 THE TIRE IN QUESTION HAS EXCESSIVE FLTS. THIS PR MR'D THE TIRE FOR ROL 57788 1 2 LAROUND USE ONLY AND MARKED THE TIRE AS SUCH ALONG WITH A MR ID. A PR 57788 1 3 CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. CLOSE PR. 57884 1 1 DURING STR-3-11-454 STEP 36.0, THE V070-198520-001 PRIMARY SEAL PANEL 57884 1 2 WAS FOUND TO HAVE AN ELONGATED HOLE. SUSPECTED SHIP SIDE HOLE ALSO ELO 57884 1 3 NGATED. MAJOR AND MINOR DIMENSIONS OF HOLES WERE RECORDED. HOLES WERE 57884 1 4 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 57967 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE1: INSULATION STRIP WAS REMOVED AND SENT TO THE HDA FOR RE 57967 1 2 PAIR. AFTER MRB REPAIR AND ACCEPTANCE AT THE ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER, 57967 1 3 THE INSULATION STRIP WAS INSTALLED ON THE FLIPPER DOOR ASSY. ITEMS 1 A 57967 1 4 ND 2 ON PAGE 1A: THESE ITEMS HAD BEEN MRB ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED US 57967 1 5 E AT THE ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. 58030 1 1 VERTICAL STABILIZER SKIN PANEL DENT WAS MEASURED B 58030 1 2 Y MOLD IMPRESSION. FACE SHEET WAS REMOVED AND CORE 58030 1 3 WAS PLUGED. A HOT-BONDED DOUBLER WHICH FAILED VER 58030 1 4 IFICATION WAS REMOVED BY GRINDING A NEW DOUBLER WA 58030 1 5 S INSTALLED. CAUSE OF DEFECT AS WELL AS CAUSE OF V 58030 1 6 ERIFICATION FAILURE IS UNKNOWN. CONCLUDE THAT REPA 58030 1 7 IR HAS RESTORED ANY LOSS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY T 58030 1 8 O THE SKIN PANEL AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTE 58030 1 9 D USE. 58047 1 1 THERE IS NO DISCREPANCY IN THIS PR. ACCORDING TO 58047 1 2 RIC DOWNEY THEY WERE AWARE OF DRILLING THROUGH THE 58047 1 3 SPLICE PLATES AT STRINGER. 58338 1 1 SUSPECTED NLG AXLE INTERFERENCE CONDITION WAS DOCUMENTED WHILE VEHICLE 58338 1 2 WAS AT PAD AND NO ACCESS TO NLG WAS AVAILABLE. MR DEFERRAL RATIONALE 58338 1 3 TO FLY VEHICLE WAS ACCEPTED FOR ONE FLIGHT ONLY. UPON RETURN TO KSC, T 58338 1 4 HE NLG LOWER PISTON ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED BY MEQ ENGINEERING AND ROUTED 58338 1 5 TO VENDOR (MENASCO). INSPECTION BY THE VENDOR SHOWED NO ANOMALIES TO 58338 1 6 THE NLG AXLE OR THE AXLE HOUSING. VENDOR MACHINED DOWN AXLE LAND DIAME 58338 1 7 TER TO PROVIDE GREATER AXLE TO HOUSING CLEARANCE. THE NLG LOWER PISTON 58338 1 8 ASSEMBLY WAS REASSEMBLED AND RETURNED TO KSC. VENDOR REPRESENTATIVES 58338 1 9 REINSTALLED SAID LOWER PISTON ASSEMBLY, SERVICED HYDRAULIC FLUID AND G 58338 1 10 N2, AND PERFORMED A ONE-HOUR LEAK CHECK, WITH NO ANOMALIES. RETESTS WE 58338 1 11 RE SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED ON THE NLG NO-WEIGHT-ON-WHEELS (NWOW) SENSOR 58338 1 12 1 RIGGING AND THE NLG UPLOCK HOOK/UPLOCK ROLLER RIGGING. NO ADJUSTMENT 58338 1 13 WERE REQUIRED. VENDOR INSPECTION WAS VERIFIED THAT THE SUSPECTED COND 58338 1 14 ITION IS PER PRINT AND NO ABNORMALITIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: SUSPECT 58338 1 15 ED ANOMALY. 58628 1 1 DISCREPANCY #1: THE VR70-357005-001 BRACKET WAS S 58628 1 2 PLIT UP INTO A VR70-357005-002 AND -003 BRACKETS P 58628 1 3 ER E.O.-TO-FOLLOW. THIS REWORK ELIMINATED INTERFE 58628 1 4 RENCE WITH THE BODY FLAP PDU. CAUSE OF THIS DISCR 58628 1 5 EPANCY WAS DESIGN ERROR. 58628 2 1 DISCREPANCY #2: RIVETS WERE SUBSTITUTED WITH HI-L 58628 2 2 OKS PER E.O.-TO-FOLLOW TO ALLOW INSTALLATION OF BR 58628 2 3 ACKETS. CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS DESIGN ERRO 58628 2 4 R. 58709 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 58709 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION L/H Xo950.00 Zo396.50 IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORIGINAL 58709 1 3 RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 0.0 INCH POUNDS. N 58709 1 4 UT WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE T 58709 1 5 O THE APPROPRIATE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO PR 58709 1 6 INT CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. T 58709 1 7 HIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 58823 1 1 REFERENCE ITEM 1.0, PG 1, RH AFT INBOARD V07-351993-003 SECONDARY SEAL 58823 1 2 ON LH2 ET DOOR WAS FOND TO BE CREASED IN REGION OF BELL CRANK HINGE. 58823 1 3 DEFORMED SEAL WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. DEFORMED CON 58823 1 4 DITION WAS DUE TO INTERFERENCE BETWEEN DOOR AND HINGE FITTING AND NOT 58823 1 5 CAUSED BY HEAT. THE DEFORMED SEAL DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY OR 58823 1 6 PERFORMANCE OF ET DOOR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 58866 1 1 THE STIFFENERS WERE "MR OK-AS-IS" AFTER BEING INST 58866 1 2 L'D FACING THE WRONG DIRECTION. THE STIFFENERS WE 58866 1 3 RE INSTL'D WRONG DUE TO A WORKMANSHIP ERR. THE ST 58866 1 4 IFFENER INSTL'N IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLT. THIS IS PR 58866 1 5 IMARY STR. 58870 1 1 THE SEAL JOINT AT THE CENTER LINE THAT WAS PARTIALLY DEBONDED WAS REBO 58870 1 2 NDED PER PRINT. THE SEAL THAT WAS SPLIT AT THE Yo+63 LOCATION WAS MR R 58870 1 3 EPAIRED WITH RED TRV. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 58914 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 58914 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PNLS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLT. RC ACTION 58914 1 3 TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO 58914 1 4 PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. CLO 58914 1 5 SE PR. 58932 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 - FASTENERS WERE INSTALLED PER EPD-3-07-213, STEP 23 IT 58932 1 2 EM 2, PAGE 1 - SHIM WAS INSTALLED PER ROCKWELL MOR TICKET #ED-8273 58957 1 1 DISCREPANCY FROM THIS PR (1550) WAS TRANSFERRED TO 58957 1 2 PR-STR-3-07-1760 TO CONSOLIDATE THE REPAIR EFFORT 59164 1 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSPECTION OF THIS/THESE DAMAG 59164 1 2 E CONDITIONS INDICATES THAT THE DAMAGE IS MINOR. 59164 1 3 ENOUGH TO REQUIRE A REPAIR. THE SCRATCHES AND /OR 59164 1 4 HOLES AND/OR DAMAGE IS TO THE SILVER TEFLON TAPE 59164 1 5 ONLY. THIS MINOR TAPE DAMAGE IS ALLOWABLE PER VOU 59164 1 6 GHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL (SECT. 3-11B). THE DIN 59164 1 7 GS, IF ANY, ARE MINOR AND DO NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT T 59164 1 8 HE FIT, FORM, AND/OR FUNCTION OF HTE RADIATOR PANE 59164 1 9 L. THIS CONDITION WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HE 59164 1 10 AT TRANSFER CAPACITY OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS 59164 1 11 CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE "AS-IS" FOR UN-RESTRICTED 59164 1 12 USE. NO MR I.D. REQ'D (DING MAP) 59208 1 1 DURING INSTALLATION OF THE TAILCONE SIDE ATTACH FITTINGS, IT WAS NOTED 59208 1 2 THAT THE TWO LOWER BOLTS IN EACH FITTING SHANKED OUT. INVESTIGATION R 59208 1 3 EVEALS THAT THESE BOLTS SHOULD BE MD111-4019-0614, THE DRAWING, MO72-3 59208 1 4 5000Z, CALLS OUT THE BOLTS TO BE MD111-4019-0618, WHICH ARE TOO LONG. 59208 1 5 MD111-4019-0614 BOLTS WERE INSTALLED, PER A DEVIATION TO OMI V5021, FO 59208 1 6 R FERRY FROM DFRC. AN E.O. TO FOLLOW WAS REQUESTED TO CORRECT THE M072 59208 1 7 -35000Z DRAWING. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING ACTION IS REQUESTED. CAUSE: WR 59208 1 8 ONG HARDWARE. UPON VERIFICATION OF THE E.O. TO FOLLOW, CLOSE THIS PR. 59223 1 1 BEAM INSULATOR HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUFACTURER 59223 1 2 SPECIFICATION. 59346 1 1 CORRECT PART INSTALLED PER REWORK DRAWING. PART 59346 1 2 WILL BE MODIFIED PER (STR) TPS. NO DISCREPANCY WI 59346 1 3 LL EXIST. 59354 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THE AREAS WHERE CORROSION WAS FOUND AT THE SECO 59354 1 2 NDARY SEAL CURTAIN ATTACH LOCATIONS ON THE V070-198320 SEAL PANEL ABRA 59354 1 3 DED WITH BEHR-TEX. ETCHED WITH TURCO METALGLO NO. 6, AND MR ACCEPTED F 59354 1 4 OR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS IMPROPER CORROSION PROTECTION A 59354 1 5 PPLICATION DURING INITIAL ASSEMBLY ALLOWING CATHODIC CORROSION DUE TO 59354 1 6 DISSIMILAR METAL CONTACT. (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1). THE NUTPLATES AT THE 59354 1 7 LOCATIONS WHERE CORROSION WAS FOUND WERE REMOVED TO ALLOW FOR INSPECT 59354 1 8 ION OF UNDERLYING STRUCTURE. NO PITS WERE FOUND INDICATING ACTIVE CORR 59354 1 9 OSION. THE DISCREPANT AREAS WERE ETCHED WITH TURCO METALGLO NO. 6 TO R 59354 1 10 EMOVE ANY RESIDUAL CORROSIVE PARTICLES. CHEMFILM AND KOROPON HAVE BEEN 59354 1 11 REAPPLIED AND NEW NUTPLATES WERE INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS IMPROPE 59354 1 12 R CORROSION PROTECTION APPLICATION DURING INITIAL ASSEMBLY ALLOWING CA 59354 1 13 THODIC CORROSION DUE TO DISSIMILAR METAL CONTACT. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 59354 1 14 1A) AFTER SURFACE OXIDATION WAS REMOVED FROM THE SECONDARY SEAL CURTAI 59354 1 15 N ATTACH HOLES, THREAD MARKS WERE FOUND IN THE HOLES. THE THREADS MARK 59354 1 16 S WERE DETERMINED TO BE COSMETIC AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 59354 1 17 PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. CONCLUDE ITEM 1 THROUGH 3 59354 1 18 HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED AND ALL SUBSEQUENT REWORK COMPLETE. NO FURTHER ENG 59354 1 19 INEERING OR SHOP ACTION REQUIRED. 59662 1 1 THE PR WAS GENERATED ON STR- PAPER, BUT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON TILE PAPAE 59662 1 2 R. THE DISCREPANCY IS NOW DOCUMENTED ON TILE PAPER. (SEE ATTACHMENT) N 59662 1 3 O DISCREPANCY EXISTS ON THIS PR. (REF. AFT-3-07-1507). 59821 1 1 TO FACILITATE INSTALLATION OF ANGLES, THE TOLERANC 59821 1 2 ES HAVE BEEN INCREASED AND ONE OF THE ANGLES HAS H 59821 1 3 AD EACH END TRIMMED. REWORK HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR 59821 1 4 UNRESTRICTED USE PER MRB ACTION. 59858 1 1 REPAIRED TO FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY. 59890 1 1 GOUGES DESCRIBED ON PG 1 OF THIS PR CAUSED SOME SH 59890 1 2 ARP EDGES WHICH WERE REMOVED USING A FINE FILE. 59890 1 3 THE REMAINING GOUGES WERE ACCEPTED AS IS AND THE D 59890 1 4 AMAGED AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED. 60523 1 1 STRAIGHTENING THE FLOW RESTRICTOR WILL ALLOW IT 60523 1 2 TO BE USED.NO SPARES ARE AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME 60523 1 3 BOND IN PLACE WITH HOT MIX WARE ALLOW THE OMS 60523 1 4 POD TO BE INSTALLED WITH OUT IMPACTING THE 60523 1 5 INSTRUMEMTATION. AND WILL NOT EFFECT THE FORM,PIT 60523 1 6 OR FUNCTION OR THE FLOW RESTRICTOR (STIFFNER) 60590 1 1 (THIS INFO WAS ENTER IN BY MISTAKE) 60590 1 2 *ORRESPONDING UPPER TORQUE LIMITS PER DWG. SUBSEQ 60590 1 3 *ASS SPEC LEAK CKS SHOWED JOINT 144(LV25 INLET), 60590 1 4 *OINT 290 (LV35 OUTLET), AND JOINT-727(PV12 ACTUA) 60590 1 5 *O HAVE ACCEPTABLE LEAK RATES. 60590 1 6 *INCE JOINTS 529/530 (PV8 ACTUATOR)WERE STILL LEAK 60590 1 7 *NG OUT OF SPEC, THE B-NUT WAS DISCONNECTED AND 60590 1 8 *HE SDYNATUBE ADAPTER AND SEAL REPLACED. AFTER 60590 1 9 *ORQUING, ANOTHER LEAK CK INDICATED ZERO LEAK RATE 60590 1 10 *T JOINTS 529/530. ALL LK CK WERE DONE PER METHOD 60590 1 11 THIS PR IS A DUPLICATE TO STR-3-07-1255. 60590 1 12 ALL WORK WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED ON STR-3-07-1255. 60590 1 13 A COPY OF STR 1255 IS ATTACHED. 60647 1 1 V070-298112-021 THERMAL BARRIER SPRING SEAL WAS FOUND TO HAVE TEAR. V0 60647 1 2 70-298112-019 THERMAL BARRIER WAS FOUND TO HAVE V070-298112-027 TAB MI 60647 1 3 SSING. BOTH THERMAL BARRIERS WERE REPLACED WITH NEW ONES. A MR FOR UNR 60647 1 4 ESTRICTED USE WAS REQUIRED DUE TO 1.00 INCH OVERHANG OF V070-298108-00 60647 1 5 2 COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT REMOVING ADJACENT THERMAL BARRIERS 60647 1 6 WHICH ARE INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DE 60647 1 7 GRADATION. CLOSE THIS PR 60658 1 1 THE FITTING WAS INSTL'D W/ MR APPROVAL, TO MOVE TW 60658 1 2 O FASTENERS & USE THE LWR FASTENER THRU THE 1307 B 60658 1 3 LKHD W/ INSUFFICIENT EDGE DISTANCE. THE FITTING C 60658 1 4 OULD NOT BE INSTL'D BECAUSE OF A TOLERANCE BUILDUP 60658 1 5 . THE INSTL'N OF THE FITTING IS ACCEPABLEFOR FLT 61245 1 1 DURING INSPECTION OF ENG #3 HEAT SHIELD NUTPLATES PER V41-10016, THE R 61245 1 2 ETAINER OF THE NOTED NUTPLATE WAS BROKEN. THE NUTPLATE WAS ORIGINALLY 61245 1 3 INSTALLED PER AN MANUFACTURING MR (MRD-BE9449-000M). THIS PR R&R'D THE 61245 1 4 NUTPLATE RETURNING IT TO THE ORIGINAL MR CONDITION. CLOSE THIS PR. 61258 1 1 THE STRAIGHTENING OF THE SPRING FINGERS WILL ALLOW 61258 1 2 THE OMRSD REQUIREMENT TO BE MET, AND WILL NOT EF- 61258 1 3 FECT THE FORM, FIT OR FUNCTION OF THE ORIGINAL IN- 61258 1 4 STALLATION. 61266 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 THE DISCREPANT MD114-5003-0007 NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND 61266 1 2 REPLACED. RUNNING TORQUE WAS VERIFIED TO BE WITHIN PRINT REQUIREMENTS 61266 1 3 AND BOLT HOLE COVER WAS REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DE 61266 1 4 GRADATION. 61411 1 1 THREADED INSERTS MD115-2002-0003 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED AT ALL LOCA 61411 1 2 TIONS NOTED IN ITEM 1 OF PAGE 1. LAMINATED SHIMS WERE REMOVED AND RE-B 61411 1 3 ONDED USING MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE AT -YW 207.00 AND -YW 200.25. 61482 1 1 THE OUTBD WIRE HARNESS BRACKET ON TOP OF AV BAY 4 WAS CRACKED. THE BRA 61482 1 2 CKET WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS INTERFERENCE DUR 61482 1 3 ING INSTALLATION OF THE GSE HYDROLICS TRAY. RC ACTION WAS CHECKED IN B 61482 1 4 LOCK 37 BECAUSE THIS HAS HAPPENED REPEATEDLY ON ALL ORBITERS. RI/LSS I 61482 1 5 S ALREADY WORKING ON A DESIGN CHANGE SOLUTION. 61560 1 1 THE VR70-100061-001 DOUBLER COULD NOT BE INSTALLED ON THE FORWARD SIDE 61560 1 2 OF THE XO 1365 WING SPAR BECAUSE THE EDGES OF THE DOUBLER PROTRUDED I 61560 1 3 NTO THE SPAR CORRUGATION RADIUS. THIS PROBLEM WAS CORRECTED BY INSTALL 61560 1 4 ING THE DOUBLER ON THE AFT SIDE OF THE XO 1365 WING SPAR PER EO TF. CL 61560 1 5 OSE THIS PR UPON VERIFICATION THAT THE EO REFLECT WORKED PERFORMED. 61809 1 1 THE LOOSE BACKSHELL ON FUEL CELL #1 (S/N 54794P60104) CONNECTOR PC174 61809 1 2 WAS CORRECTED BY DEMATING ELECTRICAL CABLE P16 FROM P SWITCH (J16) AND 61809 1 3 REPAIRNG BACKSHELL ON CONNECTOR P16 PER I.F.C. PROCEDURE E.C.P. 8.3.3 61809 1 4 1. CABLE P16 WAS REMATED TO THE P SWITCH. FEUL CELL #1 WAS SUCCESSFULL 61809 1 5 Y STARTED AND FUNCTIONALLY CHECKED PER V5R01. 61943 I 1 ENG. NOTE: AN INSPECTION OF THE NOTED DISCREPANCY 61943 I 2 WAS MADE AFTER QC RED TAGGED IT. THIS INSPECTION 61943 I 3 SHOWED THAT IT IS THE SAME DISCREPANCY NOTED ON P 61943 I 4 R STR-03-06-0972. THE CRACK IS APPROX. 2" LONG AS 61943 I 5 NOTED ON STR-0972. THEREFORE, THIS PR NEEDS TO B 61943 I 6 E CLOSED BECAUSE OF DUPLICATION. 61966 1 1 O2 TANK 2 FILL PORT INTERFACE HAD AN UNACCEPTABLE LEAK OF 7.9 X 10-6 S 61966 1 2 CCS. (MAX ALLOWABLE IS 1.0 X 10-7 SCCS). O2 TANK 2 WAS REMOVED FROM SH 61966 1 3 IP PER FCP-3-07-0163 & REPLACED WITH SPARE O2 TANK DUE TO LEAK IN VENT 61966 1 4 LINE, WITHIN THE FOAM BLK OF THE TANK. O2 TANK 2 WAS AGAIN REMOVED/RE 61966 1 5 PLACED IN SUPPORT OF OTBD AFT TANK STRUT REPLACEMENT PER PR FCP-3-07-0 61966 1 6 190. SUCCESSFUL LOW PRESS MASS SPEC LEAK CK OF O2 TANK 2. FILL PORT I/ 61966 1 7 F WAS PERFORMED PER FCP-3-07-0190. SUCCESSFUL HIGH PRESS MASS SPEC LEA 61966 1 8 K CK WAS PERFORMED PER V1022 REV N SEQ 18, STEP 181. ITEM 1 PG 1 HAS B 61966 1 9 EEN CORRECTED. ITEM 2 & 3, PG 1A & 1B WILL BE CORRECTED BY THE VENDOR. 61966 1 10 O2 TANK, V070-454853-002, S/N-SXT0014 HAS BEEN RETURNED TO THE VENDOR 61966 1 11 O2 TANK, V070-454853-002, S/N SXT0014 HAS BEEN RETURNED TO THE VENDOR 61966 1 12 PER LRU-PR-FCP-3-07-0178, WITH DISCREPANCIES (ITEM 2 & 3) ADDRESSED. 61994 1 1 LINE V070-454705-050 FOUND TO HAVE GENTLE BOW IN I 61994 1 2 T AT LENGTH JUST FORWARD OF WING BOX AT FLOOR LEV 61994 1 3 EL IN MIDBODY. STEP 2 THIS PR RECORDED MAXIMUM LI 61994 1 4 NE DEFLECTION OF 0.3125 IN. IN 15 INCH LINE SPAN 61994 1 5 BETWEEN SUPPORTS, SUPPORT SADDLE. IN STEP 3, OB 61994 1 6 SERVATION OF LINE 'DETENT' NOTED. MOLD IMPRESSION 61994 1 7 OF THIS AREA YIELDED RESULTS OF NO DISCERNABLE DE 61994 1 8 FECT IN LINE. ENGINEERING INSPECTION CONFIRMED MO 61994 1 9 LD IMPRESSION RESULTS. LINE V070-454705-050 MR AP 61994 1 10 PROVED AND ID SYSTEM WAS NOT INVALIDATED BY THIS P 61994 1 11 R, NO RETEST REQ. 62031 1 1 CRACKED INSULATOR, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS REPAIRED BY RI SE 62031 1 2 RVICE CENTER AND RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. ITEM 1 HAS BEEN RESO 62031 1 3 LVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 62062 1 1 H2 TK 2, S/N SHT 0017 WAS SCRATCHED IN (4) LOCs ON 62062 1 2 THE TK OUTER SKIN (REF. PG. 1, ITEM #1, SCRATCH # 62062 1 3 1, #2, #3 & #4). MR ACTION WAS TAKEN & TK SCRATCH 62062 1 4 ES WERE COVERED W SUPER KOROPON, (REF. PGS. 3 & 4) 62062 1 5 . ITEM #1, PG. 1, SCUFF #5 IS A VERY SLIGHT SCUFF 62062 1 6 W/ A NEGLIGIBLE AMOUNT ACTION. PROBABLE CAUSE OF 62062 1 7 SCRATCHES WAS TK PROTECTIVE METALLIC BUCKLES/CLIP 62062 1 8 S. ITEM #2 ON PG. 1, "STICKY RESIDUE ALL OVER TK 62062 1 9 SURFACE", IS SLIGHTLY TACKY POLYURETHANE RESIN THA 62062 1 10 T IS USED IN CLOSING OUT H2 TK MECHANICAL CONNs. 62062 1 11 RESIN RISIDUE ON TK IN 2 AREAS CLOSE TO TK MECHANI 62062 1 12 CAL I/Fs, NOT ALL OVER TK SURFACE INADVERTENTLY AP 62062 1 13 PLIED DUE TO CLOSE PROXIMITIES DURING TK LINE CLOS 62062 1 14 EOUT. RESIDUE DOES NOT AFFECT FORM, FIT OR FUNCTI 62062 1 15 ON OF H2 TK & NO CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQ'D. TK I 62062 1 16 S FLT WORTHY. 62262 1 1 THE IDMRD FILE 13 45V016.S10 AND OMRSD FILE 3 V45Y00.020 WHICH STATE T 62262 1 2 HE VAC-ION PUMP IS TO BE POWERED UP AT LEAST EVERY 6 MONTHS (180 DAYS) 62262 1 3 AND SATISFY THE SPEC OF NLT 87 MV IN LESS THAN 48 HOURS WAS NOT ACCOM 62262 1 4 PLISHED ON H2 TANK 2 (S/N SHT0017). H2 TANK2 VAC-ION PUMP WERE TESTED 62262 1 5 ON THIS PR AND ACHIEVED THE SPEC OF NLT 87 MV IN 48 HRS. H2 TANK 2 WIL 62262 1 6 L BE MONITORED WITH EACH ORBITER POWER UP. UPON RECEIPT OF THE WAIVER, 62262 1 7 CLOSE THIS PR. 62332 1 1 THIS PROBLEM WAS DETECTED DURING RETRACTION PER MEQ-3-07-0351. THE PRO 62332 1 2 BLEM WITH THE NLG SPRING ENGAGE LIGHT WAS DUE TO THE COMPONENTS OF THE 62332 1 3 V070-510814 LINK ASSY DID NOT PROPERLY ACTUATE THE V070-510821 SWITCH 62332 1 4 . THE LIGHT WAS RETESTED IN THIS DOCUMENT, THE LINK WAS READJUSTED IN 62332 1 5 THIS DOCUMENT, THE DAMAGED SWITCH WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED IN THIS PR. 62332 1 6 THE NLG BUNGEE MEASUREMENTS FOR OVERCENTER WERE CHECKED IN THIS DOCUM 62332 1 7 ENT. WHILE THE COCKING TOOL WAS INSTALLED THE OVERCENTER DIMENSION WAS 62332 1 8 CHECKED BY ENGR AND WAS ~ 0.142", THE OVERCENTER WAS CHECKED WITH NO 62332 1 9 COCKING TOOL IN PLACE USING AN INCLINOMETER. AFTER ALL WORK WAS COMPLE 62332 1 10 TE AND WAS RECORDED TO BE 0.192" WHICH IS WITHIN THE 0.180" +/- 0.015" 62332 1 11 REQ'D PER SPEC. MLO308-0028. UPON COMPLETION OF READJUSTMENT OF LINK A 62332 1 12 ND SWITCH R/R THE BUNGEE WAS ACTUATED NORMALLY PER MEQ-3-07-0351. RETE 62332 1 13 ST COMPLETED PER THIS WAD AND PR MEQ-3-07-0351 62417 1 1 O2 TANK 2 VENT LINE TANK INTERFACE DYNATUBE FITTING LEAKAGE OF 1.95 X 10 62417 1 2 (-6) HAS EXISTED SINCE STS-26R (FLT 07). THREE PREVIOUS WAIVERS (WK0540 62417 1 3 , WK0939 AND WK1193) HAVE BEEN PROCESSED WITH THE LAST WAIVER EFFECTIVE 62417 1 4 THRU FLT 15. O2 TANK 2 WAS NOT REMOVED AND THE SUBJECT FITTING WAS NOT D 62417 1 5 ISTURBED PRIOR TO FLT 15 AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED AND NO FURTHER WORK ON O2 62417 1 6 TANK 2 IS ANTICIPATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. NO INDICATIONS OF LEAKAGE HAV 62417 1 7 E BEEN OBSERVED TO DATE. WAIVER WK02713R1 HAS BEEN APPROVED TO ACCEPT TH 62417 1 8 IS CONDITION ON ALL SUBSEQUENT FLIGHTS. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON 62417 1 9 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: FITTING MISALIGNMENT. 62436 1 1 AT THE TIME OF OPF ROLLOUT, V070-390339-002 FRCS CENTER Yo THRUSTER CA 62436 1 2 RRIER PANEL (21-38) HAD MISSING INSTALLATION DOCUMENTATION. THE PANEL 62436 1 3 WAS REMOVED AND THE P/N AND OCN # WAS VERIFIED. PANEL WAS THEN REINSTA 62436 1 4 LLED FOR FLIGHT. 62569 1 1 DAMAGE WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. DAMAGE WAS COVERED 62569 1 2 WITH TAPE DURING SEAL INSTALLATION AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, PROBABL 62569 1 3 E CAUSE IS GROOVE WAS STRUCK BY EQUIPMENT BEING TRASPORTED THROUGH HAT 62569 1 4 CH PORTAL. NO RETEST REQUIRED. RC ACTION: PROVIDE PROTECTIVE COVERS OV 62569 1 5 ER HATCH SEAL AND GROOVE. 62583 1 1 DURING INSTALLATION OF L.E.S.S CARRIER PANELS SHIMS DEBONDED FROM LOWE 62583 1 2 R SIDE OF C/P'S. SHIMS WERE REINSTALLED AND RETURNED TO DRAWING INSTAL 62583 1 3 LATION REQUIREMENTS. 62780 1 1 THE .010" SHIM WAS INSTALLED (5 LOC) BETWEEN (2) PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED 62780 1 2 (MR) SHIMS. INSTALLATION AND CLOSING UP OF GAP HAS MET THE MR REWORK 62780 1 3 INTENT. 62782 1 1 ALL NLG TIRES SHOULD UNDERGO A 14 DAY PRESSURE DE 62782 1 2 CAY TEST PER JSC REQUEST. 62891 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLCD & WILL BE PEELE 62891 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE EDGE DISTAN 62891 1 3 CE WAS CORRECTED BY CENTERING THE SHIM(S) OVER THE 62891 1 4 BOLT HOLES PER MR ACTION. THE THREAD BEARING MAR 62891 1 5 KS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. RC ACTION 62891 1 6 TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W T 62891 1 7 O PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CAAR #5121-87-103-C1) 62971 1 1 THE (2) V070-146068-002 KEYSTONE BOLTS OF RIGHT HAND FLIPPER DOOR #12 62971 1 2 WERE FOUND FLATTENED WHEN REMOVED AT EDWARDS AT THE CONCLUSION OF STS- 62971 1 3 41. THE NUTPLATES UNDER THE DISCREPANT BOLTS WERE CLEANED AND THE DISC 62971 1 4 REPANT BOLTS WERE INSTALLED FOR THE RETURN FLIGHT TO KSC. THESE V070-1 62971 1 5 46068-002 BOLTS WERE LOOKED AT LAST FLOW (FLIGHT 11 PROCESSING, REF PR 62971 1 6 STR-3-11-3203) SINCE THE SAME DISCREPANCY WAS FOUND. EXTENSIVE RESEAR 62971 1 7 CH AND REPAIR WAS PERFORMED DURING THAT FLOW TO SOLVE SUCH PROBLEM. MO 62971 1 8 LD IMPRESSION WERE TAKEN OF THE FLIPPER DOOR BOLT HOLES AND SHOWED NO 62971 1 9 SIGNIFICANT DEVIATIONS FROM THE DRAWING DIMENSIONS. IT WAS OBSERVED DU 62971 1 10 RING THE WORK OF THIS PR AND THE PREVIOUS FLOW PR THAT THE (2) V070-14 62971 1 11 6068-002 BOLTS AND THE NUTPLATES MAY NOT BE PERPENDICULAR TO EACH OTHE 62971 1 12 R DURING INSTALLATION AND TORQUING DUE TO TIGHT TOLERANCES. IT WAS ALS 62971 1 13 O OBSERVED THAT DURING BOLT INSTALLATION THE LINK ASSEMBLY HAS A LOT O 62971 1 14 F FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WHICH MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO ALIGN THE BOLT AND N 62971 1 15 UTPLATE IN THE V070-146070 LINK. CLOSE ATTENTION WILL BE PAID AT THE I 62971 1 16 NSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF THESE BOLTS TO FIND IF THE CAUSE IS THE MET 62971 1 17 HOD OF INSTALLATION/REMOVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. POSSIBLE HOLE MIS 62971 1 18 ALIGNMENT BETWEEN FLIPPER DOOR AND V070-146070 LINK. 63218 1 1 THE S/N /OCN RECORDED IN OMI V5R02 FOR H2 TANK 1, INBOARD LOWER STRUT 63218 1 2 (ME270-0006-0021) DURING OV-103 FLT 7 PROCESSING WAS INCORRECT/ THIS P 63218 1 3 R WAS DEFERRED TO FLT 8 DUE TO ACCESS RESTRICTIONS (BAY 6 LHS CLOSE OU 63218 1 4 T) DURING FLT 8 PROCESSING ACCESS WAS OBTAINED AND TANK STRUT S/N /OC 63218 1 5 N WAS OBTAINED (REF STEPS 3,4, AND 5) CLOSE THIS PR 63358 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN BRAKE HEAT SHIELD WAS THOUGHT TO INTERFER W 63358 1 2 ITH TEMPILAQ PAINT INSTALLATION ON CARBON BRAKE ASSY. PAINT CAN BE APP 63358 1 3 LIED, BUT EO-TO-FOLLOW WAS REQUESTED TO DELETE REQUIREMENT FOR TEMILAQ 63358 1 4 PAINT ON CARBON BRAKES TO ELIMINATE UNNECESSARY WORK AT KSC SINCE PAI 63358 1 5 NT RARELY YIELDS MEANINGFUL DATA. NO PROBABLE CAUSE. NO RETEST REQUIRE 63358 1 6 D. 63603 1 1 "A" HATCH WAS CLOSED, AND A SEAL LEAK TEST PERFORMED WITH 0 PSI/MIN LE 63603 1 2 AKAGE PRIOR TO FLIGHT 8 OF OV-103. SEAL WAS THEN MR DEFERRED TO FLT 9 63603 1 3 FLOW DURING WHICH THE SEAL WAS TO BE REPLACED. NO REPLACEMENT SEALS WE 63603 1 4 RE RECEIVED FROM VENDOR., SEAL WAS LEAK CHECKED AGAIN PER OMI V1058 WI 63603 1 5 TH 0.1 PSI/MIN LEAKAGE (1.0 PSI/MIN MAX ALLOWABLE). SEAL WAS THEN MR A 63603 1 6 CCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. RETEST PERFORMED PER STEP 18. PROB 63603 1 7 ABLE CAUSE IS USE AND MOVEMENT OF TOOLS/EQUIPMENT NEAR SEAL. RECURRENC 63603 1 8 E CONTROL-PROVIDE REUSEABLE PROTECTIVE COVERS FOR SEALS TO REPLACE TAP 63603 1 9 E PRESENTLY USED. CLOSE THIS PR. 63729 1 1 REMOVED & REPLACED. 63746 1 1 CRACKS IN R/H #12 SPAR INSULATOR, DOCUMENTED BY ITEMS 1 & 2, PAGE 1, H 63746 1 2 AVE BEEN REPAIRED BY ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. REWORK HAS RETURNED THE 63746 1 3 INSULATOR TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND THE INSULATOR WILL BE INSTALLED PE 63746 1 4 R JOB CARD V80-96920. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 63883 1 1 THE 15 FASTENERS WHERE THE HEIGHT EXCEEDED THE MAX 63883 1 2 ALLOWABLE WERE MICRO-SHAVED UNTIL THEY WERE WITHI 63883 1 3 N TOLERANCE. FOR THE HI-LOK NUTS THAT DIDN'T FIT T 63883 1 4 HE HI-LOK SCREWS-NEW NUTS WERE ORDERED, OF A DIFFE 63883 1 5 RENT SIZE, & INSTL'D. FOR THE SHIM THAT WAS MISSIN 63883 1 6 G A NEW SHIM WAS MANUF & INSTL'D. UPON RECEIPT OF 63883 1 7 E.O'S PER STEP 3 ABOVE. 64353 1 1 CONTAMINATION ON SEALS WAS REMOVED BY CLEANING. SCRATCHES ON SEAL WERE 64353 1 2 INSPECTED AND MEASURED, AND DETERMINED TO BE LONGER THAN ALLOWABLE PE 64353 1 3 R DWG V070-332504 EO A03. A SEAL LEAK TEST WAS PERFORMED PER V1058 AND 64353 1 4 PASSED WITH 0.1 PSI/MIN LEAKAGE (1.0 PSI/MIN MAX ALLOWABLE). SEAL WAS 64353 1 5 THEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. RETEST PERFORMED PER STE 64353 1 6 P 5. PROBABLE CAUSE IS USE OF AN ABRASIVE NEAR UNPROTECTED SEAL. RECUR 64353 1 7 RENCE CONTROL- PROVIDE REUSABLE PROTECTIVE COVERS FOR SEALS TO REPLACE 64353 1 8 TAP PRESENTLY USED. 64460 1 1 DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE HARDWARE INSTALLATION NOTED IN ITEM 1 REVE 64460 1 2 ALED A FIT INTERFERENCE OF THE NOMINAL DIMENSIONS. AN MR WAS DISPOSITI 64460 1 3 ONED TO REPLACE THE RD153-5002-0005 WASHER WITH A THINNER NAS1587-6L W 64460 1 4 ASHER UNDER THE HEAD OF THE V070-510628-003 PIN AS A TEMPORARY INSTALL 64460 1 5 ATION PENDING AN EO SOLUATION. EO F09 TO DRAWING V070-510601 SPECIFIED 64460 1 6 THE SAME HARDWARE INSTALLATION AS WAS MR'D. HARDWARE INSTALLATION, TO 64460 1 7 RQUE, AND FIT WERE VERIFIED AS CORRECT. PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXIST. 64460 1 8 PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 64473 1 1 H2 TANK 1 SUPPLY LINE V070-454866-117 WOULD NOT LINE UP WITH INTERFACE 64473 1 2 FITTING ON H2 MANIFOLD PANEL #1. A REPLACEMENT LINE WAS FABRICATED BY 64473 1 3 MOD SQUAD. THE BRAZE JOINT BETWEEN LINE V070-454866-017 SECTION AND E 64473 1 4 LBOW FITTING ME273-0127-0004 FAILED X-RAY INSPECTION. ELBOW FITTING WA 64473 1 5 S DEBRAZED, TUBE END CLEANED AND A NEW ELBOW FITTING USED FOR BRAZE OP 64473 1 6 ERATION. (REF PG 1A) SUBSEQUENT X-RAY INSPECTION WAS GOOD. LINE V070-4 64473 1 7 54866-117 WAS REINSTALLED IN SHIP, AND SUCCESSFUL MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK 64473 1 8 PERFORMED. LINE SUPPORT V070-454696-001 WAS REMOVED FROM SHIP POSITIO 64473 1 9 N TO FACILITATE LINE V070-454866-117 FOAM INSULATION INSTALLATION. FOL 64473 1 10 LOWING FOAM CURE & CLOSEOUT THE LINE WAS REMOVED, LINE SUPPORT REINSTA 64473 1 11 LLED, & SUCCESSFUL MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK REPEATED (REF PG 1B). HIGH PRE 64473 1 12 SSURE MASS SPEC LEAK CHECKS OF LINE V070-454866-117 BRAZE JOINTS (2) A 64473 1 13 ND MECHANICAL JOINTS (2) PERFORMED PER V1022 AND WERE ACCEPTABLE. 64511 1 1 ITEMS 1 & 2 PAGE 1A HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY INSTALLINGRADIUS BLOCKS PER 64511 1 2 MR DISPO. THE REAIUS BLOCKS ALLOW THE NUTPLATES TO LAY FLAT AND NOT R 64511 1 3 IDE ON THE RADIUS OF THE LONGERON. ITEMS 3 & 4, PAGE 1A, HAVE BEEN RES 64511 1 4 OLVED BY INSTALLING THE CORRECT GRIP LENGTH FASTENERS TO OBTAIN REQUIR 64511 1 5 ED THREAD PROTRUSION AS A RESULT OF THE RADIUS BLOCKS. ITEM 5, PAGE 1B 64511 1 6 , IS NOT A PR CONDITION. NUT PLATES ARE BEING DAMAGED AS A RESULT OF T 64511 1 7 HE NUMEROUS DIFFERENT INSTALLATIONS AT THESE LOCATIONS AND BOLTS SHANK 64511 1 8 ING OUT RESULTING IN THE FINGERS BEING SPREAD BY THE NUT BASE. DEV'S H 64511 1 9 AVE BEEN WRITTEN TO REFLECT THE CORRECTGRIP LENGTH FASTENERS AS A RES 64511 1 10 ULT OF THE RADIUS BLOCKS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ORIGINAL MANUFACTURING INSTA 64511 1 11 LLATION OF NUTPLATE CAUSING THE NUTPLATE HOLES BEING DRILLED IN THE RA 64511 1 12 DIUS. 64593 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1, 2 EXTRA HOLES ARE LOCATED AT RADIUS OF V070-332112-003 FL 64593 1 2 OOR BEAM SO THEY WERE PLUGGED WITH RIVETS THROUGH OLD LATCH FITTINGS A 64593 1 3 ND FLOOR BEAM. NEW LATCH FITTINGS REQUIRED HOLES IN NEW LOCATION SO HO 64593 1 4 LES WERE PLUGGED IN FLOOR BEAM ALONE BY MR ACTION. PROBABLE CAUSE IS V 64593 1 5 ENDOR. ITEM 2 PG 1A, .030 THICK DOUBLER WAS FOUND INSTALLED TO UPPER H 64593 1 6 ALF OF V070-332112-003 FLOOR BEAM AT LEFT HAND FWD LATCH FITTING. A MR 64593 1 7 SHIM WAS ADDED TO LOWER HALF TO COMPENSATE FOR DOUBLER. PROBABLE CAUS 64593 1 8 E IS VENDOR. ITEM 3 PG 1A, ELECT BONDING STRAP FOR SMOKE DETECTOR WAS 64593 1 9 FOUND TO INTERFERE WITH INSTALLATION OF RH FWD LATCH FITTINGS. BONDING 64593 1 10 STRAP WAS MOVED O/B BY E-O-T-F TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE WITH BONDING 64593 1 11 STRAP. PROBABLE CAUSE IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. ITEM 4 PG 1B, THE MD112-10 64593 1 12 03-0305 SCREW (NO 8) AND MD114-1001-0004 NUT (NO 10) CALLED OUT BY DWG 64593 1 13 WERE FOUND TO BE NOT COMPATIBLE AND GRIP TOO SHORT. THE SCREW WAS ADD 64593 1 14 ED TO E-O-Y-F TO MD112-1003-0406 TO PROVIDE FOR PROPER INSTALLATION. P 64593 1 15 ROBABLE CAUSE IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. UPON VERIFICATION THAT RELEASED EO 64593 1 16 FOR ITEM 3 AND 4 REFLECTS ENG DISPO, CLOSE THIS PR. 64867 1 1 WHEN REACTANTS WERE SUPPLIED TO FUEL CELL #2 IN PERFORMANCE OF V1093 ( 64867 1 2 FUEL CELL DIAGNOSTICS TEST) IT WAS NOTED THAT S/S 1 (SUB STACK 1) ON T 64867 1 3 HE CPM (CELLPERFORMANCE MONITOR) WAS READING FULL SCALE (500 MV). THE 64867 1 4 SINGLE CELL DATA OBTAINED FROM V1093 INDICATED THAT THE READING SHOUL 64867 1 5 D HAVE BEENLESS THAN 100MV. THIS FAILURE MODE IS INDICATING OF A CPM 64867 1 6 FAILURE DURING ITS SELF TEST MODE. THE CPM GOES THROUGHA SELF TEST AP 64867 1 7 PROXMATELY EVERY 7.5 MINUTES, IF THE SELF TEST FAILS THE CPM LOCKS UP 64867 1 8 AT THE FULL SCALE READING OF 500 MV. AFTER REMOVAL THE VENDOR WAS ABLE 64867 1 9 TO REPRODUCE THE FAILURE. THE SUSPECTED FAILURE IS A SHIFT IN A TIMIN 64867 1 10 G CIRCUIT COMPONENT WHICH THE VENDOR HAS EXPERIENCED BEFORE. SHOULD TH 64867 1 11 IS FAILURE OCCURR DURING FUEL CELL START UP, THE CPM LOCK UP CAN BE CL 64867 1 12 EARED BY REMOVING POWER TO THE CPM. RETEST OF THE REPLACEMENT CPM WAS 64867 1 13 SUCCESSFUL. PROBABLE CAUSE: FUNCTIONAL FAILURE. CLOSE THIS PR. 64892 1 1 THIS CONDITION HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED AND REPAIRED 64892 1 2 (VOID FILLER) PER MEQ-3-A0012. IT IS LISTED ON THE 64892 1 3 MAP 65141 1 1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: ITEM 1: RH FD#15, THERE IS A SMALL GAP BETWEEN 65141 1 2 THE TRAILING EDGE SEAL AND THE RUB PANEL. THE .045" WIDE BY 1.50"LONG 65141 1 3 GAP WAS DEFERRED FOR 1 FLIGHT AS IS. UPON FLIPPERDOOR OPENING IN THE 65141 1 4 OPF ITEM 2 WAS PICKED UP. THE ORIGINAL GAP WAS ELIMINATED BY BENDING T 65141 1 5 HE TRAILING EDGE SEAL TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. ITEM 2: THE TRAILING 65141 1 6 G EDGE SEAL IS CRIMPED ON THE LWR OUTBD FWD SIDE. PER MR ON PG. 4 THE 65141 1 7 CRIMPED AREA WAS GROUND OUT, CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR ID'D. PROBABLE 65141 1 8 CAUSE: ITEM 1: THIS WAS A SUSPECT PR WRITTEN UP DUE TO A PR ON OV-102 65141 1 9 OV-102'S GAP WAS DUE TO A WARPED FLIPPER DOOR. OV-103'S GAP WAS DUE TO 65141 1 10 A SLIGHTLY BENT TRAILING EDGE SEAL DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 2 65141 1 11 CRIMPED AREA DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 65450 1 1 BROKEN LANYARD WAS REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 65519 1 1 THE DAMAGE WAS FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE AS IS AND WAS MR'D. 65830 1 1 THE SEPARATION BETWEEN THE FOAM BLOCK AND CRYO TNA 65830 1 2 K(H2 TANK 3) WAS REPAIRED AS ALLOWED PER MAO605-30 65830 1 3 3 WITH MBO-135-053 FABRIC AND MBO-130-136 RESIN. F 65830 1 4 IRE BARRIER(MBO-120-065) WAS ALSO APPLIED PER MA06 65830 1 5 05-303. NON-CONFORMANCE NO LONGER EXISTS. 65840 ALLP 1 ARTS INVOLVED PER PRINT. NO PROBLEM EXISTS. CLOSE THIS PR. 65846 1 1 DURING FLIGHT 10 PROCESSING, A GAP WAS FOUND BETWEEN THE V070-198313-0 65846 1 2 01 POLYIMIDE SEAL AND THE PRIMARY SEAL PANEL. THIS GAP WAS CAUSED BY T 65846 1 3 HE IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF THE V070-198552-002 RETAINER. PER MR APPRO 65846 1 4 VAL, THE GAP WAS FILLED WITH RTV AND DEFERRED UNTIL FLIGHT 11. DURING 65846 1 5 FLIGHT 11 PROCESSING, V1164 WAS PERFORMED AND PASSED. THE CONDITION WA 65846 1 6 S DEFERRED TO FUTURE FLIGHT FOR REWORK WHEN POSSIBLE. DURING FLIGHT 12 65846 1 7 PROCESSING, THE PRIMARY SEAL PANEL'S WERE REMOVED AND THIS CONDITION 65846 1 8 WAS REWORKED PER PR STR-3-12-3545 (ITEM 2 PAGE 1A). PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 65846 1 9 DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP DURING INITIAL INSTALLATION. 65860 1 1 PROBLEM ITEMS #1 & 2: AS NOTED IN DEFERRAL RATIONAL ON PAGE 22 AND INT 65860 1 2 ERIM SUMMARY ON PAGE 24, LEAKAGE CONDITION WAS CORRECTED BY REPLACING 65860 1 3 FUEL CELL AND BY CAREFULL ALIGNMENT/MATING OF O2 SUPPLY LINE TO NEW FU 65860 1 4 EL CELL. SUBSEQUENT SUCCESSFUL MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK OF O2 SUPPLY LINE 65860 1 5 JOINT AT PROT F3 WAS 2 X 10(-9) SCCS. ACCEPTABLE IS 1 X 10(-7) SCCS MA 65860 1 6 X. SMALL SCRATCHES ON O2 SUPPLY LINE FITTING IS ACCEPTABLE PER MR (REF 65860 1 7 PG19). PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL DIFFICULTY IN MATING DYNATUBE SURFACES 65860 1 8 DUE TO DIFFICULTY OF GETTING PROPER ALIGNMENT. (PLUS SCRATCH ON FUEL C 65860 1 9 ELL). PROBLEM ITEM #3: FOAM DEFORMITY ON O2 SUPPLY LINE WAS REPAIRED P 65860 1 10 ER SPEC MA0605-303 PARA 3.6.6.2. PR CONDITION HAS BEEN REMOVED. PROBAB 65860 1 11 LE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 65894 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO MR ACCEPT FOR UNRESTRICTED FLIG 65894 1 2 HT A NOT-PER-PRINT CARRIER PANEL AND ITS ATTACHMENT HARDWARE CONFIGURA 65894 1 3 TION. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS A 65894 1 4 MANUFACTURING ERROR. 65972 1 1 ITEM 1: STRAP WRITTEN IN ITEM 1 IS NOT CALLED OUT IN DWG V070-731873 W 65972 1 2 ITH CEILING PANEL. STRAP IS JSC DESIGNED HARDWARE UNDER LOCKHEED FLIG 65972 1 3 HT CREW SYSTEMS RESPONSIBILITY SO SEPARATE PR FCS-3-08-0314 WAS GENERA 65972 1 4 TED BY FLIGHT CREW SYSTEMS ENGINEERING. ITEM 2: DOUBLER OR V070-73187 65972 1 5 3-029 SPACER AS CALLED OUT ON DWG WAS REBONDED PER SPEC. PROBABLE CAU 65972 1 6 SE NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 65975 1 1 THE SPLIT IN LH PANEL#11 SPARE INSULATOR WAS REPAI 65975 1 2 RED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. THE INSULATOR IS O 65975 1 3 K FOR FLIGHT. 66031 1 1 ELONGATED HOLES 2 EA. WERE DRILLED TO NEXT LARGER 66031 1 2 FASTENER SIZE #10. NO FURTHER WORK OR DISPO. IS RE 66031 1 3 Q'D. CLOSE PR. 66056 1 1 A NEW SEAL WAS INSTALLED REPLACING THE BENT SEAL. THE DISCREPANT SEALS 66056 1 2 WERE ROUTED DOWN TO HDA. THE CONDITION WRITTEN UP ON PAGE 1A IS NOT A 66056 1 3 DISCREPANCY AND IS EXPLAINED ON PAGE 7. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIS 66056 1 4 T ON THIS PR. 66439 1 1 SCREWS WHICH WERE FOUND LOOSE ON CARRIER PANEL V070-390071-034, DOCUME 66439 1 2 NTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW SCREWS. THE 66439 1 3 NUTPLATES WERE CLEANED OF DEBRIS AND INSPECTED PRIOR TO SCREW INSTALL 66439 1 4 ATION. NO DAMAGE TO THE NUTPLATES WERE FOUND. NEW SCREWS WERE INSTALLE 66439 1 5 D AND TORQUED FOR FLIGHT. PROBABLE CAUSE: DEBRIS IN NUTPLATE. 66716 1 1 THE USE OF JOBOLTS IN PLACE OF BLIND (HUCK) RIVETS 66716 1 2 WILL ALLOW THE FASTENERS TO BE INSTALLED WITHOUT 66716 1 3 REMOVING THE LOADED TRUSS TUBE. THE JO BOLT FASTE 66716 1 4 NERS ARE ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUES FOR THE BLIND RIVET 66716 1 5 S AND WILL NOT EFFECT THE FORM, FIT, OR FUNCTION O 66716 1 6 F TH EINSTALLATION. THIS REWORK IS ACCEPTABLE FOR 66716 1 7 UNRESTRICTED USAGE. 66730 1 1 ENGINEERING INSPECTED THE V070-634447-002 FREON CONNECTION BOX AND ATT 66730 1 2 ACHED LINEAR RETAINERS AND THE PSA AND FOUND NO ANOMALIES. QC WAS REQU 66730 1 3 ESTED TO RE-INSPECT THE FREON BOX AND PSA AND FOUN NO ANOMALIES. DUE T 66730 1 4 O THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF THE FREON AND PSA BOXES THE FREON BOX APPEARS 66730 1 5 TO BE BENT BUT INSPECTION HAS DETERMINED THAT THERE IS NO DISCREPANCY 66730 1 6 . THEREFORE, ITEM 1, PAGE 1 IS A NON-DISCREPANCY. CONCLUDE ALL HARDWAR 66730 1 7 E IS INSTALLED PER PRINT AND NO ACTION IS REQUIRED. 66837 1 1 DISCREPANCY 1 ON PAGE 1- THE 1307 BULKHEAD WITH THE DELETION OF THE CO 66837 1 2 UNTERBORE AT THE V070-856396-012 WEB ASSY WAS MRB ACCEPTED AS IS FOR U 66837 1 3 NRESTRICTED USE. CLOSE THIS PR. 66838 1 1 REF PG 1 SUPPORT (V070-856387-001) INSTALLATION HOLES DID NOT MATCH EX 66838 1 2 ISTING HOLES IN STRUCTURE. EXISTING HOLES WOULD HAVE GONE THRU A STIFF 66838 1 3 ENER IN SUPPORT. THE SUPPORTS (V070-856387-001 OR-002) WERE RELOCATED 66838 1 4 TO MATCH HOLES. WHEN SUPPORTS WERE RELOCATED IT INTERFERED WITH A BRAC 66838 1 5 KET (V070-856705-006) BRACKET WAS TRIMMED. (REF PG 1A) RELOCATING THE 66838 1 6 SUPPORTS BROUGHT 2 ATTACH HOLES NEAR WEB STRUCTURE PREVENTING HILOK IN 66838 1 7 STALLATION; HOLES WERE PLUGGED. (REF PG 1B) IT WAS FOUND THAT A SUPPOR 66838 1 8 T (V070-856706-005) WOULD INTERFERE WITH BRIDGE INSTALLATION (BRIDGE I 66838 1 9 NSTALLATION IS TO BE DONE SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE). SUPPORT WAS RELOCA 66838 1 10 TED TO CLEAR BRIDGE INSTL. (REF PG 1C) TWO HOLES WERE IN STRUCTURE. NO 66838 1 11 DOCUMENTATION WAS FOUND FOR THE HOLES. THE HOLES WERE PLUGGED (REF PG 66838 1 12 1D) OTHER SUPPORTS (V070-856706-005) WERE FOUND TO BE DEBONDED NEAR T 66838 1 13 HIS INSTALLATION, AND WERE REBONDED PER THIS PR. SECONDARY STRUCTURE I 66838 1 14 NSTALLATION PROBLEMS WERE CORRECTED AROUND YO-58 TO YO-70, ZO 345, XO 66838 1 15 1307 TO SUPPORT RTG MOD. NO FURTHER DISPOSITION OR WORK IS REQUIRED FO 66838 1 16 R ITEMS PG 1 THRU PG 1D. 66955 1 1 SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED INSTL OF HI-LOC INTO OVER- 66955 1 2 SIZE HOLE OF STRINGER. FASTENER WAS FOUND TO BE 66955 1 3 MISSING FROM STRINGER PER DWG, STRUCTURAL INTEGRI- 66955 1 4 TY OF STRINGER IN Xo 1307 BULKHEAD AS PRIMARY STR 66955 1 5 HAS BEEN SATISFACTORILY RESTORED, CLOSE THIS PR. 66957 1 1 ATTACH PT #12 BOLT WAS SENT TO ROCKWELL DOWNEY FOR 66957 1 2 FURTHER EVALUATION ON LRU PR 3-07-2064. A NEW BOL 66957 1 3 T WAS OBTAINED, AND IS IN V5011 MERL. NO FURTHER D 66957 1 4 ISPOSITION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 66976 1 1 HOLES WERE INITIALLY CREATED DURING HARDWARE REMOV 66976 1 2 AL TO SUPPORT STIFFENER INSTALLATION BUT THE H/W R 66976 1 3 EQUIREMENTS WERE NOT ADDRESSED. THESE HOLES WERE M 66976 1 4 ATCH-DRILLED FROM THE BULKHEAD THROUGH THE STIFFEN 66976 1 5 ER. THE STIFFENER WAS THEN ATTACHED TO THE BULKHEA 66976 1 6 D UTILIZING THESE HOLES AS WELL AS OTHERS. THE HOL 66976 1 7 E DRILLING OR THE INSTALLATION OF FASTENERS DOES N 66976 1 8 OT DEGRADE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE STIFFEN 66976 1 9 ER OR BULKHEAD. INSTALLATIONS ON THIS PR WERE MR'D 66976 1 10 UNRESTRICTED. 67094 1 1 REPAIR RESTORES TO PRINT. 67212 1 1 #10 R/H SPAR INSULATOR HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER PRINT 67212 1 2 AT THE RI SERV CENTER. 67225 1 1 USE OF COUNTERSUNK SCREW INSTEAD OF FLATHEAD BOLT 67225 1 2 IN COUNTERSUNK HOLE DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT 67225 1 3 DESIGN FUNCTION OF CONTAINER. FORM AND FIT ARE NOT 67225 1 4 AFFECTED OUT OF PRINT COUNTERSINKING OF HOLE ALSO 67225 1 5 DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT FORM, FIT OR FUNCTION 67326 1 1 ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT THE STRUT MOVEMENT IS DUE TO 67326 1 2 GAPS BETWEEN THE B91B10613-11 AND B91B10620-13 ROD ENDS WHICH WHEN TH 67326 1 3 E STRUT IS UNLOADED, ALLOW THE STRUT TO MOVE. WHEN THE STRUT IS LOADED 67326 1 4 , THE GAPS WILL STILL EXIST YET THE STRUT WILL HAVE NO MOVEMENT. USING 67326 1 5 METALLIC FEELER GAUGES, ENGINEERING MEASURED THE MAXIMUM GAP AT EITH 67326 1 6 ER ROD END TO BE WITHIN THE PRINT ALLOWABLE REF. DRAWING B91B10077 NOT 67326 1 7 E 9. NO DISCREPANCIES EXIST. LOCATION Xw 1192.75 MAX GAP COMBINED 0.03 67326 1 8 . LOCATION Xw 1220.00 MAS GAP COMBINED 0.040". PRINT ALLOWABLE: 0.020" 67326 1 9 EACH INTERFACE. 67385 1 1 THE CHAIN SEAL WAS TRIMMED TO ELIMINATE THE INTERF 67385 1 2 ERENCE CAUSING THE CIRCULAR DEPRESSION ON THE RUB 67385 1 3 PLATE. THE CIRCULAR DEPRESSION WAS BURNISHED OUT. 67385 1 4 THE WORST CONDITION PITTED AREAS WERE NEUTRALIZED 67385 1 5 WITH TURCO METAL GLO NO. 6. THE PITTING WAS THE RE 67385 1 6 SULT OF CORROSIVE PRODUCTS THAT LEACHED THROUGH TH 67385 1 7 E SURFACE COATING. ALL REPAIRS AND PITTED AREAS AR 67385 1 8 E MR ACCEPTABLE THE RUB PLATE AND SEAL ARE ACCEPTA 67385 1 9 BLE FOR FLIGHT. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 67398 1 1 NASA LEVEL II CHANGE REQUEST #6153GA WAS INITIATED TO HAVE AN EO WRITT 67398 1 2 EN DELETING THE V070-350102 ALIGNMENT BLOCKS FROM THE ORBITERS. EO C01 67398 1 3 TO DRAWING V070-855312 DELETES THE -037 ASSY AND REPLACES IT WITH A - 67398 1 4 040 ASSY. THE -040 ASSY IS IDENTICAL EXCEPT FOR THE DELETIONOF THE V0 67398 1 5 70-350102-003 AND -004 ALIGNMENT BLOCKS. TH CAUSE OF THE V070-350102-0 67398 1 6 04 BLOCK BOND FAILURE (DOCUMENTED ON PAGE 1) IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 67398 1 7 N. THE BLOCK IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. TPS STR-3-10-453 CVR'S THIS EO. 67598 1 1 DISCREPANCIES ON THIS PR WERE CORRECTED ON STR-3-0 67598 1 2 7-185 MOD 004. THIS MOD WAS EO TO FOLLOW TO DE- 67598 1 3 LETE THE RQMTS OF EO B13, V070-100008 AND TO SW 67598 1 4 THE STIFFENERS FWD & AFT. NO FURTHER DISPO REQ'D 67598 1 5 FOR THIS PR. 67716 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 67716 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION L/H Xo835.75 Zo396.50 IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORIGINA 67716 1 3 L RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNING TORQUE OF 12.0 INCH POUNDS. 67716 1 4 NUT WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORECETED THE TORQUE 67716 1 5 TO THE APPROPRIATE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO P 67716 1 6 RINT CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 67716 1 7 THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 67772 1 1 A PRESS FIT BUSITANCE WAS SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED, 67772 1 2 TO ELEMINATE THE DOUBLER DRILLED HOLE, WITHOUT FUR 67772 1 3 THER PROBLEM. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 67814 1 1 A REVIEW OF CLOSE OUT PHOTO'S (REF TPS TCS-03-07-095) FOR BAY 5 RHS, B 67814 1 2 AY 6 LHS, AND BAY 8 LHS SHOW THAT ALL PROTECTIVE COVERS HAVE BEEN REMO 67814 1 3 VEDFROM THE PRSD H2 TANKS. ENGINEERING HAS DETERMINED THAT THERE IS N 67814 1 4 O NEED TO REOPEN AND INSPECT THE BAYS IN QUESTION. CLOSE THISBPR. 68013 1 1 DENTS AND DISCOLORATIONS WERE DISCOVERED DURING AN INSPECTION (REF STR 68013 1 2 -3-07-325) FOR HEAT DAMAGE. TWO OF THE DENTS WERE DEEMED SHARP AND DEE 68013 1 3 P ENOUGH TO WARRANT REPAIR WORK. MRB APPROVAL WAS GIVEN TO STOP DRILL 68013 1 4 , POT, AND BOND DOUBLERS OVER THE TWO DENTS. PAGE 1A WAS WRITTEN AFTE 68013 1 5 R POTTING THE DENTS BECAUSE OUTGASSING PUSHED SOME ADHESIVE OUT OF THE 68013 1 6 HOLE, LEAVING A VOID IN THE ADHESIVE. THE VOID WAS POTTED SUCCESSFULL 68013 1 7 Y. PAGE 1B WAS WRITTEN BECAUSE THE LAP SHEARS FAILED. THE DOUBLERS WER 68013 1 8 E REMOVED. A DRY BONDING RUN WAS PERFORMED TO DETERMINE THE ARRANGEMEN 68013 1 9 T OF HEAT BLANKETS NEEDED TO PRODUCE UNIFORM TEMPERATURES ON THE CLOSE 68013 1 10 OUT PANEL. THE DOUBLERS WERE THEN SUCCESSFULLY BONDED OVER THE DENTS 68013 1 11 . THE OTHER DENTS WERE MRB ACCEPTED "OK AS IS". THE DISCOLORATION WAS 68013 1 12 NOT HEAT DAMAGE, BUT PENCIL MARKINGS AND OTHER DEBRIS. THE DEBRIS WAS 68013 1 13 CLEANED UP. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE CLOSEOUT PANELS IS MAINT 68013 1 14 AINED. PRIMARY STRUCTURE. 68084 1 1 THE INITIAL DISCREPANCY WAS THAT THE INSULATION ON THE PRSD H2 MANIFOL 68084 1 2 D NO. 1 RELIEF VALVE INLET LINE WAS IN CONTACT WITH A VERTICLE WIRE TR 68084 1 3 AY SUPPORT, AND THAT THE INSULATION WAS DAMAGED AT THE POINT OF CONTAC 68084 1 4 T. THE WIRE TRAY WAS MOVED AWAY FROM THE LINE AND RESECURED SO THAT I 68084 1 5 T WAS NOT LESS THAN 1/4 INCH FROM LINE (REF STEPS 1-4). THE NOTED DAM 68084 1 6 AGE TO THE LINE INSULATION WAS INSPECTED PER STEPS 4.5 AND 5 OF THIS P 68084 1 7 R. AS STATED THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF CRACKS OR TEARS. THE DAMAGE DOE 68084 1 8 S NOT AFFECT FIT OR FUNCTION OF THE LINE. THE LINE HAS BEEN MR IDENTI 68084 1 9 FIED PER STEP 6. THE SYSTEM IS RESTORED AND IS FLIGHT WORTHY. CLOSE T 68084 1 10 HIS PR. 68179 1 1 THE V070-198373-002 SEAL LOCATED ON THE RIGHT HAND INBOARD ELEVON ACTU 68179 1 2 ATOR HING WAS NOT POSITIONED PER PRINT. DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO REMOVE AN 68179 1 3 D REBOND THE SEAL PER PRINT. UPON REMOVAL, THE DAMAGED -001 SEAL WAS M 68179 1 4 ISIDENTIFIED AS BEING A -002 SEAL WAS DAMAGED (REF STR-3-07-2334 FOR I 68179 1 5 NFORMATION ON -001 SEAL). THE MISTAKE WAS LATER DISCOVERED AND DOCUMEN 68179 1 6 TED ON PAGE 1B. THE -002 SEAL WAS NOT DAMAGED. THE V070-198373-002 SEA 68179 1 7 L HAS BEEN BONDED IN PLACE AND RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. SECOND 68179 1 8 ARY STRUCTURE. 68335 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2 DESCRIBE CORROSION ON A SECONDARY SEAL RETAINER AND ITS 68335 1 2 NUTPLATES AND RIVITS AND SOME THREAD-SCORING IN THE RETAINER HOLES. TH 68335 1 3 E LOCATION OF THIS RETAINER IS ON THE RH INBD ELEVON COVE (RH PER MR) 68335 1 4 THE CORRODED NUTPLATES AND RIVITS WERE R & R'D AFTER INSPECTION. THE S 68335 1 5 CORED, CORRODED HOLES IN THE RETAINER WERE DEBURRED, HAD CORROSION REM 68335 1 6 OVED, AND WERE CORROSION PROTECTED. THE THREAD-SCORING REPAIR WAS MR A 68335 1 7 CCEPTED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE CORROSION AND THE THREAD-SCORING WE 68335 1 8 RE OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION IN THE ELEVON COVE. 68504 1 1 BROWN RESIDUE (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING IT USING IPA D 68504 1 2 AMPENED WIPES. MISSING KOROPON (ITEM 2, PAGE 1) WAS RESOLVED BY SCUFF 68504 1 3 SANDING EXPOSED EPOXY CORE FILL AND REAPPLYING KOROPON. ITEM 1 WAS A R 68504 1 4 ESULT OF ACCEPTABLE OUT GASSING AROUND THE ACTUATOR WHICH IS A KNOWN N 68504 1 5 ORMAL FLIGHT CONDITION - NO DISCREPANCY. ITEM 2 IS SUSPECTED IMPROPER 68504 1 6 SURFACE PREP PRIOR TO ORIGINAL KOROPON APPLICATION. CONCLUDE DISCREPAN 68504 1 7 CIES ARE RESOLVED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDARY ST 68504 1 8 RUCTURE. 68659 1 1 JO-BOLT MEETS OR EXCEEDS STRENGTH OF RIVET, DESIGN 68659 1 2 INTENT IS MAINTAINED. NO EFFECT ON STR INTEGRITY. 68678 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES NOTED ON PGS. 1 THRU 1H HAVE BEE 68678 1 2 N RESOLVED BY MR DISPO CONSISTING MAINLY OF (BUT N 68678 1 3 OT LIMITED TO) VENTING OF VOIDS & REWORKING OF DEB 68678 1 4 ONDS. DESIGN INTENT OF THE RTV-HEAT SINK INSTL'N 68678 1 5 HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. 68717 1 1 THE 44-11 DOOR IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1 AS BEING INSTALLED WITHOUT WAD WAS 68717 1 2 FOUND TO BE TEMPORARILY INSTALLED THEN REMOVED ON 1-16-91 PER MID-3-1 68717 1 3 2-1803. DOOR INSTALLATION IS PROPERLY DOCUMENTED SO NO DISCREPANCY EXI 68717 1 4 TS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS IMPROPER REVIEW OF TIR LOG. REF LOG #MO35.1. 68848 1 1 AT THE SMALL DENT IN THE EDGE OF CENTER HOLE, THE SHARP EDGES WERE FIL 68848 1 2 ED TO BLEND INTO THE ADJACENT SURFACE PER MR DISPO. THIS WAS PERFORMED 68848 1 3 TO RELIEVE THE STRESS RISER OF THE DENTED AREA. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WO 68848 1 4 RKMANSHIP. CLOSE THIS PR. 68959 1 1 THE DISCREPANT HOLE WAS DRILLED OUT PER MR ACTION. THE NEXT SIZE LARGE 68959 1 2 R RIVET WAS USED DUE TO THE ENLARGED HOLE. THE NUT PLATE IS INSTALLED 68959 1 3 PER THIS MR DISPO. 69131 1 1 THE V070-346090-022 INNER CHANNEL BLOCKS WERE RELO 69131 1 2 CATED 1" INCH INBOARD ON EACH STRAP V070-346095-10 69131 1 3 0 FOR LOCATIONS XO1024.62 AND XO1026.37. THE RELOC 69131 1 4 ATION OF THE -022 BLOCKS ALLOWED THE CHANNEL STRAP 69131 1 5 S TO FIT PER DESIGN INTENT. 69198 1 1 MISSING BOLT REPLACED. SUBSTRATE INSPECTED & BOTH 69198 1 2 WERE FOUND TO HAVE NO DAMAGE. 69285 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE RPLCD & WILL BE PEELED 69285 1 2 TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 69285 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACT 69285 1 4 ION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/ 69285 1 5 W TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87-103-C 69285 1 6 1) THE C/P IS OK FOR FLT. 69549 1 1 THE TIRE IN QUESTION HAS EXCESSIVE FLIGHTS. THIS PR MR'D THE TIRE FOR 69549 1 2 ROLLAROUND USE ONLY AND MARKED THE TIRE AS SUCH ALONG WITH A MR ID. A 69549 1 3 PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. 69706 1 1 ITEM 1 IS A DUPLICATE OF ITEM 19 OF PR STR-3-07-17 69706 1 2 02. THE PROBLEM WILL BE DISPO'D BY -1702. ITEM 2 69706 1 3 HEAT SINK IS THE SAME AS ITEM 1. PR STR-1702 DIS 69706 1 4 PO REMOVED THE HEAT SINK. THE PROBLEM NO LONGER E 69706 1 5 XISTS. 69715 1 1 DURING THE FES R&R POWER DOWN PERIOD O2 TANK 1 DECAYED FROM APPROX 300 69715 1 2 PSIA TO 14 PSIA. (APPROX 17 DAYS OF POWER DOWN) TROUBLE SHOOTING STEP 69715 1 3 FOUDN A LEAK AT THE O2 TANK 1 VENT FLT CAP. FURTHER INSPECTION FOUND 69715 1 4 4 DAMAGED FLT CAP SEAL. THE SEAL WAS REPLACED AND THE FLT CAP REINSTAL 69715 1 5 LED. RETEST SHOWED NO LEAKAGE. ALSO A TANK MOISTURE CHECK WAS PERFORME 69715 1 6 D AND MOSITURE CONTENT WAS LESS THAN 2 PPM MAX ALLOWABLE IS 20 PPM. CL 69715 1 7 OSE THIS PR 69846 1 1 MISLOCATED BRACKETS WERE RELOCATED AND INSTALLED AT CORRECT STGR. THE 69846 1 2 RE WAS NO ACCESS TO INSTALL BRACKETS WITH RIVETS, SO HI-LOKS WERE USED 69846 1 3 PER MRD DISPOSITION. HOLES IN STGR FROM WHICH BRACKET WAS REMOVED, WE 69846 1 4 RE PLUGGED WITH RIVETS BY MRB DISPOSITION. CLOSE THIS PR. 70517 1 1 THE PART NUMBER MARKING ERROR WAS CORRECTED ON THE RH MLG DOOR BUNGEE 70517 1 2 ASSEMBLY BY CHANGING A -012 TO A -014 (W20-510101). UPON CLOSURE OF T 70517 1 3 HIS WAS, CVAS WILL UPDATE TRACENING TO REFLECT SAME. NO FURTHER DISCR 70517 1 4 EPANCY EXISTS. CLOSE THIS PR. 70621 1 1 THE PAYLOAD BAY DOOR BULB SEAL HAD A SPLIT AT THE JOINT SEAL LOCATION 70621 1 2 AND SEAL WAS THE WRONG LENGTH. THE BULB SEAL WAS MR REPAIRED BY BONDIN 70621 1 3 G THE SPLIT WITH RED RTV. A NEW JOINT WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT. PROBABL 70621 1 4 E CAUSE OF THE BULB SEAL SPLIT IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. CLOSE THIS 70621 1 5 PR. 70955 1 1 SCRATCHES ON BORON STRUT ARE CONTAINED TO THE UTER SURFACE AND ARE ACC 70955 1 2 EPTABLE PER SPEC. (REF. 70B0001-G ITEM 3, 4.). CLOSE THIS PR 71124 1 1 THE TOP LH CORNER RECEPTICAL SUPPORTING MF52H STR PANEL, AV BAY 2, WAS 71124 1 2 R&R'D. THIS RETURNED THE V070-338500-010 SUPPORT TO PRINT CONFIGURAT 71124 1 3 ION. 71230 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF MIDBODY AIRBORNE HALF COUPLING (AHC) INSPECTION 71230 1 2 TPS (FCP-3-08-034), THREE (3) AHC'S WERE FOUND TO HAVE GAPS (RANGING 0 71230 1 3 .004 TO 0.016 INCHES) BETWEEN MOUNTING BOLT BUSHING HEADS(S) AND V070- 71230 1 4 454910 SPACER(S). SUBSEQUENT REPLACEMENT OF AFFECTED BUSHINGS ELIMINAT 71230 1 5 ED GAPS IN 5 OR 6 REPLACEMENTS. FOLLOWING BUSHING TO SPACER GAPS STILL 71230 1 6 EXIST AND RECEIVED MR APPROVAL (REF STEPS 39 & 40). 40V45DD031 UPPER 71230 1 7 AFT (0.0015 INCHES) 40V45PD040 LOWER FWD (0.003 INCHES). THESE DISCREP 71230 1 8 ANCIES EXIST DUE TO SLIGHT IRREGULARITIES IN BUSHING HEAD/SPACER SEATI 71230 1 9 NG SURFACES, AND HAVE NO EFFECT ON AHC STRUCTURAL SUPPORT OR PERFORMAN 71230 1 10 CE. 71284 1 1 PIN & SPRING WERE INSTALLED TO THE LINK PRIOR TO I 71284 1 2 NSTALLATION OF THE CHAIN SEAL LOCATOR CLIP. RETRIE 71284 1 3 VAL WOULD REQUIRE REMOVAL OF L/H CARRIER PANELS, R 71284 1 4 UB PLATE AND CHAIN SEAL. THEN RODDING OUT THRU CUR 71284 1 5 TAIN SEAL LINKS POSSIBLY CAUSING DAMAGE. LEAVING P 71284 1 6 LUG AND SPRING IN PLACE WILL NOT CAUSE ANY DAMAGE 71284 1 7 NOR WILL IT AFFECT THE THERMAL OR MECHANICAL FUNCT 71284 1 8 IONING OF THE CURTAIN SEAL. 71396 1 1 ITEM #1-NO PROBLEM FOUND WITH L/H PART. R/H PART WAS CORRODED & ADDRES 71396 1 2 SED PER ITEM #7. ITEM #2-SANDED STR REMOVING DEFECTS. ITEM #3-SANDED S 71396 1 3 TR REMOVING DEFECTS. ITEM #4-INSTALLED MR BUSHING. ITEM #5 SANDED STR 71396 1 4 REMOVING DEFECTS. ITEM #6 SANDED STR REMOVING DEFECTS. ITEM #7REPLACE 71396 1 5 D ROD END. ITEM #8 SANDED STR REMOVING DEFECTS. ITEM #9 SANDED STR REM 71396 1 6 OVING DEFECTS. ITEM 10 SANDED STR REMOVING DEFECTS. ITEM 11 INSTALLED 71396 1 7 MR BUSHING. ITEM 12 SANDED STR REMOVING DEFECTS. ITEM 13 SANDED STR RE 71396 1 8 MOVING DEFECTS. THESE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR & TEAR. 71415 1 1 KOROPON WAS REMOVED FROM ALL AREAS WITH OXIDIZE DAMAGE. NO DAMAGE WAS 71415 1 2 FOUND FROM OXIDIZER OTHER THAN TO KORONDON WHICH WAS REMOVED AND COROS 71415 1 3 ION PROTECTED PER STEP 3.0. PROBABLE CAUSE OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. CL 71415 1 4 OSE THIS PR. 71464 1 1 NAME PLATE WAS COATED USING SUBSTITUTE MATERIAL 21 71464 1 2 1-220. 71517 1 1 RUB PANEL DAMAGE IS ON FWD EDGE OF PNL & IS FWD OF 71517 1 2 THE AREA CONTACTED BY FLIPPER DOOR SEALS AT ELEVO 71517 1 3 N FULL DOWN POSITION. DENTS ARE MINOR & COSMETIC I 71517 1 4 N NATURE & WILL NOT AFFECT STR OF THERMAL INTEGRIT 71517 1 5 Y OF RUB PANELS 10 & 11. INSULATION PKGS. UNDER PA 71517 1 6 NELS ARE INTACT & WILL PERFORM ORIGINAL FUNCTION T 71517 1 7 O PROTECT STR FROM RUB PANEL HEATING. 71706 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN BINDING WAS OBSERVED DURING INSTALLATION OF 71706 1 2 THE RIGHT HAND OUTBOARD WHEEL ASSEMBLY (WA-072/025). THE WHEEL ASSEMB 71706 1 3 LY WAS REMOVED FROM THE VEHICLE. HEAT SHIELD INTERFERENCE WITH THE BRA 71706 1 4 KE WAS SUSPECTED UE TO A SIMILAR PROBLEM ENCOUNTERED ON THE RIGHT HAND 71706 1 5 INBOARD WHEEL ASSY (REF PR-3-10-0446). THE HEAT SHIELD AND ASSOCIATED 71706 1 6 HARDWARE WAS REMOVED FROM THE WHEEL. EO-TO-FOLLOW DISPOSITION (AUTHORI 71706 1 7 ZED BY PR MEQ-3-10-0446) WAS PERFORMED TO REMOVE THE SPACERS ADJACENT 71706 1 8 TO THE TPMS HARNESS, REROUTE THE HARNESS, AND SECURE THE HARNESS WITH 71706 1 9 TAPE AND "BANDAID" TYPE BOND. A PAGE 1A WAS INITIATED WHEN DIFFICULTY 71706 1 10 WAS ENCOUNTERED WHILE INSTALLING HEAT SHIELD TORQUE BARS. RESTRICTED 71706 1 11 MR DISPOSITION WAS INITIATED TO LIGHTLY SAND THE PAINT AND KOROPON RIB 71706 1 12 S (TORQUE BAR KEYWAYS) TO FACILITATE TORQUE BAR INSTALLATION. THE MR D 71706 1 13 ISPOSITION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY VOIDED PRIOR TO ANY SANDING WHEN RI LSS DE 71706 1 14 TERMINED THAT SEATING THE TORQUE BARS ONTO THE RIBS USING A FUBBER MAL 71706 1 15 LET WS THE INSTALLATION METHOD PREFFERED BY B.F.GOODRICH. THE TORQUE B 71706 1 16 ARS AND HEAT SHIELD ASSEMBLY WAS REINSTALLED ON THE WHEEL. THE WHEEL A 71706 1 17 SSEMBLY WAS REINSTALLED ON THE VEHICLE AND BINDING WAS OBSERVED DURING 71706 1 18 WHEEL ROTATION. THIS BINDING WAS CAUSED BY THE HEAT SHIELD "LIP/TAB" 71706 1 19 SNAGGING THE BRAKE ROTOR FARTHEST FROM THE STRUT. THE WHEEL ASSY WAS R 71706 1 20 EMOVED AND THEN REINSTALLED WHILE EXERCISING CARE TO PREVENT THE HEAT 71706 1 21 SHIELD FROM SNAGGING THE BRAKE. AFTER REINSTALLATION, NO BINDING WAS O 71706 1 22 BSERVED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE WHE 71706 1 23 EL HEAT SHIELD AND BRAKE ASSEMBLY. THIS INTERFERENCE WAS CAUSED BY A D 71706 1 24 ESIGN FLAW IN THE ROUTING OF THE TPMS HARNESS AROUND THE HEAT SHIELD, 71706 1 25 AND THE HEAT SHIELD EDGE BEING ROLLED/BENT IN TOWARDS THE BRAKE INSTEA 71706 1 26 D OF OUT TOWARD THE WHEEL. 71899 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS A CRACK EXTENDING OUT OF PREVIOUS REPAI 71899 1 2 R IN R/H TEE #12 (R/S 13) INSULATOR WAS RESOLVED BY ROUTING THE INSULA 71899 1 3 TOR TO RI SERVICE CENTER FOR REPAIR. REWORK HAS RETURNED INSULATOR TO 71899 1 4 PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. STR-3-12- 71899 1 5 3597 REMOVED INSULATOR AND REINSTALLED INSULATOR. 72011 1 1 THE LAMINATED SHIMS ON THE ET FERRY DOORS WERE BONDED PER SPEC MAO106- 72011 1 2 347 USING MBO 120-037. THE TEST SAMPLE WAS LOST SO THE SHORE "D" COULD 72011 1 3 NOT BE VERIFIED. THIS CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED FOR THIS FERRY FLIGHT AN 72011 1 4 D THE SHIMS WILL BE REMOVED FOR OV-104 SHIMMING POST FERRY FLIGHT. 72041 1 1 EXISTING RIVET WAS INSTALLED BY PREVIOUS MR (XX-73 72041 1 2 27-000M) TO PLUG HOLE AND THUS WAS REMOVED TO ALLO 72041 1 3 W FOR 0.44 DIA HOLE TO BE DRILLED PER PRINT. THIS 72041 1 4 IS A RETURN TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. (REF: V070-1 72041 1 5 56850) CLOSE THIS PR. 72081 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: CRACK IN EDGE FILL WAS ROUTED OUT AND REFILLED (SEE PAG 72081 1 2 E 15). PROBABLE CAUSE: AN IMPACT THAT CAUSED THE FACESHEET TO DIMPLE D 72081 1 3 UE TO NO POTTING IN HONEYCOMB CORE. ITEM 2 PAGE 1A: MR UNRESTRICTED US 72081 1 4 E TO ACCEPT THE DIMPLED FACESHEET WITH A BONDED SHIM INSTALLED TO FILL 72081 1 5 THE ADDITION GAP (SEE PAGE 35) PROBABLE CAUSE: HONEYCOMB CORE NOT POT 72081 1 6 TED AND IMPROPER HANDLING. ITEM 3 PAGE 1A: THE JO-BOLT HOLE WAS POTTED 72081 1 7 TO A 1" DIA (SEE PAGE 35) PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP FROM FACTORY. I 72081 1 8 TEM 4 PAGE 1B: CRACK WAS ROUTED OUT (SEE APGE 15.1). PROBABLE CAUSE: D 72081 1 9 ID NOT ROUTE CRACK FAR ENOUGH DURING INITIAL WORK. 72207 1 1 FUEL CELL 3 COOLANT LINE V070-454500-041 WAS INSPE 72207 1 2 CTED VISUALLY BY PROCESS ENGINEERING AND DESIGN EN 72207 1 3 GINEERING. LINE HAS A VERY SLIGHT DEVIATION TO ST 72207 1 4 RAIGHT LINE PATH, WHICH MAY BE DETECTED WITH SEVER 72207 1 5 E SCRUTINY AND INSPECTION. LINE DEVIATION AND SPA 72207 1 6 N DIMENSIONS WERE TAKEN BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN ST 72207 1 7 EP 5 THIS PR. LINE DEVIATION IS SMALL AND GRADUAL 72207 1 8 , MORE OF A GENTLE BOW THAN A SHARP BEND. ORBITER 72207 1 9 FLOOR MOLD LINE HAS A GENTLE ARC, INCLINING UPWAR 72207 1 10 D FROM CENTERLINE OF SHIP. LINE SUPPORTS MAINTAIN 72207 1 11 AN EQUAL HEIGHT OF LINE FROM FLOOR, THUS CREATING 72207 1 12 A NOMINAL SLIGHT ARC TO LINE PATH IN QUESTION. L 72207 1 13 INE V070-454500-041 MR ID'D WITH THIS PR NO. MR R 72207 1 14 ATIONALE COORDINATED WITH DOWNEY ENGINEERING. FUE 72207 1 15 L CELL COOLANT SYSTEM INTEGRITY WAS NOT INVALIDATE 72207 1 16 D BY THIS PR. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 72215 1 1 DISCREPANCY WAS CORRECTED PER STEP 177 PG 112 OF 72215 1 2 PR STR-3-05-0762. CORRECTION TO SHIM WAS MADE 72215 1 3 PER PRINT(SEE ATTACHMENT COPY) 72252 1 1 THE CARRIER PANEL ALIGNMENT HOLE LOCATION WAS SWITCHED WITH A SCOTTED 72252 1 2 INSTALLATION HOLE, THIS WAS ACCEPTED PER MR ACTION. THIS HOLE LOCATION 72252 1 3 DOES NOT ADVERSELY EFFECT INSTALLATION OF THE CARRIER PANEL. THE PROB 72252 1 4 ABLE CAUSEIS THE HOLE WAS LOCATED INCORRECTLY DURING MANUFACTURING. NO 72252 1 5 FURTHERR ENGINEERING ACTION IS REQUIRED AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. CLOSE 72252 1 6 THIS PR. 72409 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS (1) ELONGATED HOLE IN CARRIER PANEL V07 72409 1 2 0-395250-002 HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR. CARR 72409 1 3 IER PANEL WAS MR ID'D TO REFLECT THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR 72409 1 4 AND TEAR. 72474 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 - THE V070-198702-023 TRAILING EDGE SEAL WAS MR ACCEPTE 72474 1 2 D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE WITH MINOR 'BENDS' OR WRINKLES AT THE ENDS. PRO 72474 1 3 BABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 72514 1 1 ITEM 1 PG. 1 I.B. EDGE: "A" (.063) "B" (.067) AND 72514 1 2 "C" (.077) STEP DIMENSIONS ARE WITHIN DESIGN TOLER 72514 1 3 ANCE OF .070 +/- .008. "D" (.053) STEP DIMENSION 72514 1 4 WAS APPROVED DUE TO SLIGHT OVERCOMPRESSION OF F/B 72514 1 5 WHICH WILL NOT RESULT IN OVERSTRESS OF TILE, SIP O 72514 1 6 R STR. ITEM 1 PG. 1 O.B EDGE: "A" (.072) "B" (.07 72514 1 7 5) AND "C" (.075) STEP DIMENSIONS ARE WITHIN DESIG 72514 1 8 N TOLERANCE OF .070 +/- .008. STEP .108 WAS REWOR 72514 1 9 KED TO REDUCE STEP TO .057 WHICH REQ'D MR APPROVAL 72514 1 10 . REWORKED STEP OF .057 RESULTS IN SLIGHT OVERCOM 72514 1 11 PRESSION OF F/B WHICH WILL NOT RESULT IN OVERSTRES 72514 1 12 S OF TILE, SIP OR STR. 72987 1 1 DISCOLORATION OF THE PANEL WAS RESIDUE FROM THERMA 72987 1 2 L PROTECTION ELEMENTS, NOT FROM BEING SCORCHED. TH 72987 1 3 E DISCOLORATION WAS CLEANED OFF AND A TEMPERILABLE 72987 1 4 WAS APPLIED TO THE SURFACE TO RECORD AIR TEMPERATU 72987 1 5 RE FLOW. TO AVOID REDUNDANT PROCEDURES BETWEEN DEP 72987 1 6 ARTMENT WADS, THE KOROPON APPLICATION WAS PERFORME 72987 1 7 D IN WAD # RWNG-3-07-1072 AND VERIFIED BY QC. 73073 1 1 REF. ITEM 3 PG. 1A RIVET INTERFERENCE WAS CORRECTE 73073 1 2 D BY SUBSTITUTION OF CSK RIVET AND MR CONCURRENCE 73073 1 3 OF REWORK. (ITEM 4.0 PG. 4). REF. ITEMS 1 AND 2 PG 73073 1 4 . 1 INTERFERING RIVETS WERE REPLACED WITH FLUSH RI 73073 1 5 VETS PER RELEASED EO V070-852102-002 (ITEM 10.0 PG 73073 1 6 . 7). REF. ITEM 4 PG. 1B AND ITEM 7 PG. 1D WERE RE 73073 1 7 PAIRED WITH MR CONCURRENCE 9ITEM 13.0 PG. 11) REF. 73073 1 8 ITEM 5 ON PG. 1C, EO V070-852102 D02 ADDED NINE F 73073 1 9 ASTENER LOCATIONS TO INSTL DWG TO MATCH CHANNEL AS 73073 1 10 SY PART (ITEM 14.0 PG. 12) REF. ITEM 6 ON PG. 1C, 73073 1 11 CHANNEL ASSY WAS INSTLD BY OMITTING 1 FASTENER & L 73073 1 12 EAVING ONE PILOT HOLE OPEN WITH MR CONCURRENCE (IT 73073 1 13 EM 15.0 PG. 13). CLOSE PR. 73211 1 1 ITEM 1.0 AND 2.0: STEP 2.0 CALLS OUT TO OBTAIN THE REPAIRED V070-19870 73211 1 2 2-003 TUBE SEAL FROM HDA: A NEW V070-198702-003 TUBE SEAL WAS OBTAINED 73211 1 3 FROM LOGISTICS INSTEAD AND STORED WITH THE LEFT HAND FLIPPER DOOR #14 73211 1 4 HARDWARE IN MIDBODY SHOP BAY 1. THE NEW V070-198702-003 TUBE SEAL WIL 73211 1 5 L BE INSTALLED IN THE VEHICLE PER THE RESPECTIVE JOB CARD. THE REPAIRE 73211 1 6 D V070-198702-003 TUBE SEAL WILL BE SEND BACK TO LOGISTICS FOR RESTOCK 73211 1 7 . THE V070-198702-003 TUBE SEAL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAU 73211 1 8 SE OF DAMAGE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 73355 1 1 MAIN WHEEL TIRE PRESSUE COULD NOT BE TAKEN WITHIN THE 24 HOUR PERIOD D 73355 1 2 UE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS THAT PREVENTED JACK AND LEVEL OF THE ORIBITER 73355 1 3 . PRESSURE CANNOT BE TAKEN WITH WEIGHT ON WHEELS DUE TO THE CALCULATIO 73355 1 4 N PROCEDURE OF DECAY RATES. A WAIVER HAS BEEN PROCESSED TO ACCEPT THIS 73355 1 5 CONDITIONS (WK1795) PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS MOTHER NATURE. 73564 1 1 DURING A S0014 ICE TEAM ENGINEERING INSPECTION. A SUSPECTED TEAR WAS I 73564 1 2 DENTIFIED INT HE INBOARD FORWARD CPORNER OF THE LO2 ET DOOR BAGGIE. CL 73564 1 3 OSER INSPECTION FROM A TEMPORARY WORK PLATFORM SHOWED THAT THE SUSPECT 73564 1 4 ED TEAR WAS MERELY AN OVERLAP OF EXCESS BAGGIE MATERIAL. THIS INSPECTI 73564 1 5 ON ALSO FOUND SEVERAL OTHER MINOR TEARS AND TAPE DELAMINATIONS ON BOTH 73564 1 6 THE LO2 AND LH2 BAGGIES. ALL DAMAGED AREAS WERE MR REPAIRED PER THE I 73564 1 7 NSTALLATION SPECIFICATIONS (WIPE CLEAN & TAPE). NO FURTHER DISCREPANCI 73564 1 8 ES EXIST WITH THE ET DOOR BAGGIES. 73573 1 1 STRUT ASSY IS WELL WITHIN TOLERANCE FOR END PLAY 73573 1 2 AS CALLED OUT ON DWG. V070-565429 AND NO DISCREPAN 73573 1 3 CY EXISTS. 74066 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE "A" HATCH SEAL (HATCH SIDE) HAVING 74066 1 2 A CUT AT THE 10 O'CLOCK POSITION (REF ITEM 1) AND AN ABRADED AREA AT T 74066 1 3 HE 4 O'CLOCK POSITION (REF ITEM 2). DENTAL MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN A 74066 1 4 ND REVELAED THAT BOTH DEFECTS WERE NOT WITHIN SPEC (REF DWG V070-332504 74066 1 5 EO A11). A SEAL LEAK CHECK WAS PERFORMED AND PASSED WITH A ZERO PSIG LEA 74066 1 6 K RATE. THE DEFECTIVE "A" HATCH SEAL WAS MR ACCEPTED DOR ONE FLIGHT ONLY 74066 1 7 (REF MR PG 3). UPON RETURNING FROM FLIGHT12, THE "A" HATCH SEAL WAS REM 74066 1 8 OVED AND REPLACED PER LRU OMI V5K17. THE NEW SEAL WAS SUCCESSFULLY 74066 1 9 RETESTED PER OMI V1058.002. THE PR CONDITIONS NO LONGER EXIST. PROBABLE 74066 1 10 CAUSE (ITEMS 1 & 2): NORMAL OPERTIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 74195 1 1 ANY BENT/DAMAGED BRIDGE SPRINGS HAVE BEEN REPLACED 74195 1 2 PER PRINT. INSTALLATION OF GSE STRUTS PER STEP 3 74195 1 3 , CORRECTED ANY CURTAIN DISTORTION. CLOSE THIS PR 74209 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1: 2 NEW V070-146068-002 BOLTS WERE OBTAINED TO REPLACE T 74209 1 2 HE GALLED BOLTS WHICH WERE SCRAPPED LOCALLY. ITEM 2, PAGE 1: THE 2 DIS 74209 1 3 CREPANT MD114-5004-0005 NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH 2 NEW 74209 1 4 MD114-5004-0005 NUTPLATES. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION 74545 1 1 A 0.80 INCH DIAMETER OPENING WAS FOUND AT THE LEFT HAND AFT END OF BAY 74545 1 2 #13 (X01304,Yo-90,Zo363). THIS OPENING WAS BEING USED FOR THE OMS HI 74545 1 3 GH POINT BLEED OVERBOARD DUMP THAT HAS BEEN PERMANTENTLY ROUTED TO THE 74545 1 4 RIGHT HAND SIDE OF BAY #13. SINCE THIS OPENING IS NOT IN USE, THERE W 74545 1 5 AS A POSSIBLILITY THAT ARTICULATE MATTER COULD PENETRATE THROUGH THE H 74545 1 6 OLE AND CONTAMINATE THE PAYLOAD BAY. AN EO WAS RELEASED BY ROCKWELL TO 74545 1 7 CLOSE THE OPENING USING MB0135-050 TYPE V METALLIZED TAPE. A PIECE OF 74545 1 8 THIS TAPE WAS TRIMMED TO FIT THE HOLE SURROUNDING AND INSTALLED. PROA 74545 1 9 BABLE CAUSE: DESIGN CHANGE. 74572 1 1 ITEM 1 & ITEM 3: WHEN THE (2) V070-856167-001 MOU 74572 1 2 NTS WERE REMOVED, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE FASTE 74572 1 3 NERS & THEIR MOUNTING HOLES IN THE BRACKETS & STRU 74572 1 4 CTURE WERE OVERSIZED (NOT PER PRINT) AS AUTHORIZED 74572 1 5 BY PREVIOUS RI PALMDALE MR YY7053. AN EO-TO-FOLL 74572 1 6 OW DISPO WAS WORKING IN THIS PR TO PROVIDE AUTHORI 74572 1 7 ZATION TO PLUG THE STRUCTURAL HOLES WITH HI-LOKS. 74572 1 8 AN MR WAS APPROVED TO USE LARGER DIA HI-LOKS FOR 74572 1 9 PLUGGING THE STRUCTURAL HOLES (FULLFILLING INTENT 74572 1 10 OF EO-TO-FOLLOW). 74572 1 11 ITEMS 2, 4 & 5: DUE TO THE OVERSIZED HOLES IN THE 74572 1 12 REMOVED MOUNTS, THEY WERE SCRAPPED & NEW MOUNTS O 74572 1 13 RDERED FOR USE BY TPS VSTR-3-07-224 ON R/H SIDE. 74572 1 14 WHEN NEW MOUNTS ARRIVED, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT TH 74572 1 15 EIR MOUNTING HOLES WERE DISCREPANT (ITEMS 4 & 5). 74572 1 16 THEY WERE ALSO SCRAPPED & NEW MOUNTS RE-ORDERED. 74572 1 17 THESE NEW MOUNTS WERE INSTALLED BY TPS VSTR-3-07- 74572 1 18 224. ALL DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. 74745 1 1 THE WORKSTEPS OF THIS PR DETERMINED THAT THE G070-505210 T-TOOL CONTAC 74745 1 2 TS SIDE OF T-TOOL ACCESS HOLE BUT DOES NOT AFFECT NOMINAL OPERATION WI 74745 1 3 TH VEHICLE VERTICAL. INTERFERENCE WITH T-TOOL INSTALLATION IS ADDRESSE 74745 1 4 D IN PR A70-0788-00-002-0006. THIS IS A SUSPECT PR, AND NO PROBABLE CA 74745 1 5 USE EXISTS. 74749 1 1 MR WASHERS WITH A .62" O.D HAVE BEEN FABRICATED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL 74749 1 2 BEARING SURFACE FOR USE AT ELONGATED HOLES. DEV'S HAVE BEEN WRITTEN FO 74749 1 3 R THE REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION JOBCARDS TO DOCUMENT MR INSTALLATION. D 74749 1 4 ISCREPANCY DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PGE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER 74749 1 5 EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS MR WHICH ELONGATED HOLES BUT DID NOT 74749 1 6 ADDRESS HARDWARE CHANGE REQUIREMENT. 74822 1 1 THE V070-298117-002 THERMAL BARRIER WITH A CRACK 74822 1 2 IN IT WAS MR'D AND DEFERED FROM FLIGHT 5 TO FLIGHT 74822 1 3 6 UNDER DOCUMENT STR-3-A0058. THE DISPOSITION TO 74822 1 4 CHANGE OUT THERMAL BARRIER IS PART OF STR-3-A0058 74822 1 5 AND WILL BE WORKED THIS FLOW USING THAT DOCUMENT. 74903 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO: 1) MR REPAIR FOR UNRESTRICTED 74903 1 2 FLIGHT A DAMAGED HOLE IN THE 45 DOOR, 2) MR ACCEPT AS IS FOR UNRESTRIC 74903 1 3 TED FLIGHT A PILOT HOLE DRILLED IN ERROR IN THE 45 DOOR AND 3) MR ACCE 74903 1 4 PT AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED FLIGHT A SLIGHT IMPRESSION IN THE 45 DOOR FR 74903 1 5 AME CAUSED WHEN THE PILOT HOLE OF THE PREVIOUS ITEM WAS DRILLED. THE 4 74903 1 6 5 DOOR IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS WORKM 74903 1 7 ANSHIP. 75035 1 1 ITEM #1 HAD A SEAL SET CRACKED DUE TO OVERHEATING. THE SEAL SET WAS R 75035 1 2 EMOVED & RPLCD. ITEM #2 HAD TO REMOVE TWO BOLTS FROM THE PRIMARY SEAL 75035 1 3 , THE BOLTS WERE REINSTL'D LATER IN THE WAD. ITEM #3 HAD STEPS 3, 11 75035 1 4 & 12 WORKED W/ NO TECH OR QUALITY BUYS. THE STEPS HAVE SINCE BEEN BOU 75035 1 5 GHT OFF. ITEM #4 WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE ORIGIN OF SOME BAGGED PA 75035 1 6 RTS. ENG ASSISTED IN PROPERLY ID'G & TAGGING THE PARTS. ITEM #5 HAD 75035 1 7 A SCREW HOLE THE WRONG SIZE. THE ELONGATED/OVERSIZE HOLE WAS MR'D OK 75035 1 8 "AS IS" AND THE H/W INSTL'D DURING STR-2149 (ATTACHED). ITEM #6 HAD A 75035 1 9 SPRING THAT WAS TOO SHORT. THE SPRING WAS REMOVED & RPLCD W/ A CORRE 75035 1 10 CT ONE. ITEM #7 HAD A BOLT THAT WAS TOO LONG. A H/W CHANGE WAS EFFEC 75035 1 11 TED TO USE A SHORTER BOLT W/ AN EO TO FOLLOW. 75090 1 1 DOUBLER WAS REWORKED PER MR AS SPECIFIED IN STEPS 75090 1 2 1, 2, & 3 AND WAS INSTALLED PER TPS 3-07-183. 75201 1 1 THE TOIP31170-039 INTERCOSTAL BETWEEN 1ST AND 2ND RIB ON R/H PLBD #2 F 75201 1 2 IRST FROM CENTER LINE WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED. THE INTERCOSTAL WAS REP 75201 1 3 LACED PER DRAWING. A PAGE 1A WAS GENERATED ON EDGE DISTANCES AND AFTER 75201 1 4 ENGINEERING EVALUATION 1 HOLE WAS OUT OF DRAWING REQUIREMENTS AND WAS 75201 1 5 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER PAGE 3.2. PROBABLE CAUSE WORKMAN 75201 1 6 SHIP. 75224 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING A SURVEILLANCE INSPECTION (FLT 12) WHEN IT 75224 1 2 WAS NOTED THAT THE V070-510613-001 FORWARD NLG DOOR UPLOCK ROLLER WAS WO 75224 1 3 RN AND HAD AREAS WHERE THE METAL SURFACE WAS RAISED (ITEM 1). PHOTOS OF 75224 1 4 THE DISCREPANT AREA AND THE ASSOCIATED V070-510702-001 FWD NLG DOOR UPLO 75224 1 5 CK HOOK (ITEM 2) WERE TAKEN. DENTAL MOLD IMPRESSIONS OF THE ROLLER AND H 75224 1 6 OOK PROVIDED DIMENSIONAL DATA. THE DISCREPANT DEFECTS ON THE ROLLER AND 75224 1 7 HOOK WERE MR SANDED UNTIL SMOOTH AND THE PR WAS DEFERRED UNTIL THE NEXT 75224 1 8 FLOW (FLT 13). POST FLIGHT (FLT 12) DENTAL MOLD IMPRESSIONS OF THE ROLLE 75224 1 9 R AND HOOK INDICATED THAT THE WEAR PATTERN WAS PROGRESSING. THE RIGGING 75224 1 10 OF THE ROLLER AND HOOK WAS CHECKED WITH CLAY AND VERIFIED TO BE WITHIN 75224 1 11 SPEC. PR WAS AGAIN DEFERRED UNTIL THE NEXT FLOW (FLT 14) TO GATHER MORE 75224 1 12 WEAR DATA AND TRACK THE DISCREPANT CONDTION. POST FLIGHT (FLT 13) DENTAL 75224 1 13 MOLD IMPRESSIONS OF THE ROLLER AND HOOK INDICATED THAT THE WEAR PATTERN 75224 1 14 WAS STILL PROGRESSING AND THE DISCREPANT DEFECTS DIMENSIONS HAD 75224 1 15 INCREASED TO THE SAME AS ORIGINALY REPORTED. WORK WAS PERFORMED TO 75224 1 16 REMOVE AND REPLACE THE V070-510702-001 FWD NLG DOOR UPLOCK HOOK AND THE 75224 1 17 V070-510613-001 FWD NLG DOOR UPLOCK ROLLER WITH NEW HARDWARE (ITEMS 1 75224 1 18 AND 2). THE RIGGING OF THE NEW ROLLER AND HOOK WAS CHECKED WITH CLAY AND 75224 1 19 VRIFIED TO BE WITHIN SPEC. PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE 75224 1 20 CAUSE: SURFACE PLATING DELAMINATING FROM THE TIP OF THE V070-510702-001 75224 1 21 FWD NLG DOOR UPLOCK HOOK WAS CAUSING EXCESS WEAR TO THE V070-510613-001 75224 1 22 FWD NLG DOOR UPLOCK ROLLER. 75362 1 1 REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF DAMAGED THERMAL BARRIER WILL RESTORE THE INST 75362 1 2 ALLATION TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. 75362 1 3 75393 1 1 FLUID LEAKING FROM THE NLG STRUT WAS IN EVIDENCE D 75393 1 2 OWN TO THE WHEEL/TIRE AXLE. AFTER CLEANING AND SET 75393 1 3 TING UP MATRIX, MONITORING FOR DROPS SHOWED NO LEA 75393 1 4 KAGE TO BE IN EVIDENCE OVER A PERIOD OF 44 HRS. TH 75393 1 5 E FLUID WHICH WAS APPARENT IS BELIEVED TO BE FROM 75393 1 6 THE HYDRAULIC ACTUATOR. MEQ PR X-FERRED TO HYDRAUL 75393 1 7 ICS PR HYD-071 IS DOCUMENT OF THIS PROBLEM. THE NL 75393 1 8 G STRUT THUS MEETS SPECS AND IS NOT A DISCREPANCY. 75399 1 1 FUEL CELL H2 PURGE PORT WAS INADVERTENTLY 75399 1 2 PRESSURIZED WITH 120 PSIG GHE. THIS PNT PRESSURE 75399 1 3 AGAINST H2 PURGE PORT CHECK VLV. BECAUSE OF THIS 75399 1 4 FUEL CELL IS BEING RETURNED TO VENDOR FOR RE- 75399 1 5 VALIDATION. THIS WILL CERIFY ANY DOUBT WHETHER 75399 1 6 CK VLV AND FUEL CELL STACK HAS BEEN DAMAGED 75508 1 1 R/H OTBD BRAKE,PACKED AND SENT TO B.F. GOODRICH 75508 1 2 THRU HDAON 4/20/85 #92179B 75570 1 1 DISCREPANT C/P WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS WITH SURFACE CR 75570 1 2 ACKS, PROBABLE CAUSE: BACKING PLATE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN USED DURING. DRI 75570 1 3 LLING OF PANEL HOLES CLOSE THIS PR. 75675 1 1 2 EA HI-LOKS WERE INSTALLED WITH THE COLLARS ON TH 75675 1 2 E MID-BODY SIDE, WITH MR APPROVAL, TO ELIMINATE TH 75675 1 3 E INTERFERENCE. DESIGN INTENT HAS BEEN MAINTAINED 75936 1 1 DISCREPANCY IS WITHIN SPEC TOLERANCE FOR RCC 75936 1 2 INSULATORS. 75973 1 1 TRUSS HAS BEEN RE-VALIDATED AT DOWNEY FOR FLIGHT 75973 1 2 USE. 75981 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO RETURN A PREVIOUSLY MR-REPAIRED 75981 1 2 LIGHTING SHIELD TO ITS MR ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. THE LIGHTNING SHIELD 75981 1 3 IS LOCATED IN THE ASSEMBLY OF THE ET H2 DOOR. THIS REPAIR WAS A MR REP 75981 1 4 AIR THAT RETURNED THE PART TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON-DESIGN CONDITION. 75981 1 5 THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS OPERTIONAL DEGRADATION. 76196 1 1 DOOR 10-07 (P/N V070-310126-003) WAS REMOVED WITHO 76196 1 2 UT AUTHORIZATION. DOOR HAS BEEN INSTALLED FOR FLIG 76196 1 3 HT PER STEP 7.0 OF JC V30-13317. THIS IS VERIFIED 76196 1 4 IN WORK STEP 1.0 ON PAGE 2.0 76265 1 1 THRU NRL PART DEGRADATION, T01P31371-005 BECAME FRACTURED & WAS REMOVE 76265 1 2 D & REPLACED WITH STANDOFF T01P31371-009. THIS P/N CHANGE WILL BE REFL 76265 1 3 ECTED PER EO TO FOLLOW ON DWG T01P31382. UPON RECEIPT & VERIF OF EO TO 76265 1 4 FOLLOW, STEP 6.0, CLOSE THIS PR. 76309 1 1 NASA LEVEL II CHANGE REQUEST #6153GA WAS INITIATED TO HAVE AN EO WRITT 76309 1 2 EN DELETING THE V070-350102 ALIGNMENT BLOCKS FROM THE ORBITERS. EO C01 76309 1 3 TO DRAWING V070-855312 DELETES THE -037 ASSY AND REPLACES IT WITH A - 76309 1 4 040 ASSY. THE -040 ASSY IS IDENTICAL EXCEPT FOR THE DELECTION OF THE V 76309 1 5 070-350102-003 AND -004 ALIGNMENT BLOCKS. THE CAUSE OF THE V070-350102 76309 1 6 -003 BLOCK BOND FAILURE (DOCUMENTED ON PAGE 1) IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 76309 1 7 ION. THE BLOCK IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. TPS STR-3-10-453 CVR'S THIS EO. 76382 1 1 THE SUSPECT SCHRADER VALVE WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR USE ON FLIGHT 10 ONLY. 76382 1 2 UPON RETURN, THEVALVE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED BY THE VENDOR DURING W 76382 1 3 ORK PERFORMED PER PR MEQ-3-A0036. REPLACEMENT VALVE WAS RETURNED TO ST 76382 1 4 OCK. OMRS V51AC0.012-A AND V51AC0.040-A WILL BE SATISFIED PER V1165 TA 76382 1 5 SK 8. RETEST (LEAK CHECK) WAS PERFORMED PER PR MEQ-3-11-0472. PROBABLE 76382 1 6 CAUSE IS DISCREPANT TORQUE WRENCH. 76515 1 1 SUSPECT THE INSIDE DIAMETER OF THE MD131-6005-0010 BEARING IS NOT PER 76515 1 2 PRINT. THE INSIDE DIAMETER OF THE BEARING WAS MEASURED AND WAS FOUND N 76515 1 3 OT TO BE PER PRINT AND THAT THE INBD SIDE OF THE BEARING HAD A RAISED 76515 1 4 EDGE ABOUT THE INSIDE CIRCUMFERENCE. THE RAISED EDGE WAS REMOVED AND 76515 1 5 POLISHED AND THE INSIDE DIAMETER MR ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE 76515 1 6 TO IMPROPER USE OF THE LOCKING PIN. 76711 1 1 INSULATORS HAVE BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUFACTURER'S 76711 1 2 SPECIFICATIONS. RC ACTION STILL IN WORK. 76756 1 1 STIFFENER WAS TRIMMED SUCCESSFULLY, STIFFENER IN- 76756 1 2 STALLED W/ SUFFICIENT EDGE DISTANCE. 76871 1 1 BY REPAIRING THE SPANNER BEAM INSULATOR (INCONEL 76871 1 2 SHEETING) WILL RETURN IT TO ITS INTENDED THERMAL 76871 1 3 INTEGRITY. CLOSE PR 76885 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE RPLCD & WILL BE PEELED 76885 1 2 TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE EDGE DISTANC 76885 1 3 E WAS CORRECTED BY CENTERING THE SHIM(S) OVER THE 76885 1 4 BOLT HOLES PER MR ACTION. THE THREAD BEARING MARK 76885 1 5 S WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. RC ACTION 76885 1 6 TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO 76885 1 7 PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87-103-C1) 77034 1 1 THE DAMAGE WAS FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE AS IS & WAS MR'D. 77333 1 1 THE OMRS VIOLATED HAS HAD A WAIVER PROCESSED AND APPROVED (WK0956R2 í2 77333 1 2 EAù). THIS WHEEL DOES NOT EXCEED MAXIMUM LEAK RATE REQUIREMENTS OF .4 77333 1 3 PSI/DAY. THE POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS VARIATIONS IN GAGE READING 77333 1 4 S. THIS WHEEL AND TIRE IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT, NO PR CONDITION EXIST 77333 1 5 S. (COPY OF WAIVER ATTACHED). 77463 1 1 DURING INSTALLATION OF L.E.S.S. CARRIER PNLS SHIMS DEBONDED FROM LOWER 77463 1 2 SIDE OF C/P'S. SHIMS WERE REINSTALLED & RETURNED TO DWG INSTLN REQ'MT 77463 1 3 S. CLOSE PR. 77496 1 1 OPERATION WAS CLARIFIED AND REPERFORMED. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE 77496 1 2 CAUSE IS INTENT OF OPERATION WAS NOT CLEAR. 77547 1 1 INSULATOR WAS FOUND TO BE CRUSHED AND DUE TO INCONEL COVER NOT BEING T 77547 1 2 ORN OR MOUNTING BRACKETS AFFECTED IT ID MR OK FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 77723 1 1 PR WAS INCORRECTLY INITIATED-SHOULD NOT BE A VEHICLE PR. PROBABLE CAUS 77723 1 2 E: WORKMANSHIP. 77783 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 77783 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 77783 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 77783 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 77783 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 77783 1 6 7-103-C1). CLOSE THIS PR. 77852 1 1 THE SERIAL NUMBER 2187A00443 TIRE HAS BEEN REMOVED 77852 1 2 BY TPS MWA-022-002 AT THE WHEEL & TIRE SHOP (VAB). 77852 1 3 THIS TIRE WILL NOT BE REUSED FOR FLIGHT. 77964 1 1 HOLES WERE REAMED OUT FOR OVERSIZE HI-LOKS. OVERS 77964 1 2 IZE HI-LOKS WERE INSTL'D. POOR REAMING TECHNIQUE 77964 1 3 CAUSED PROBLEM. 77969 1 1 CHANNEL V070-351539-002WHICH IS PART OF BRACKET ASSY. V070-351599-001 77969 1 2 , WAS BROKEN AT ITS HOLD DOWN FASTENER AS DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1 77969 1 3 . THE ENTIRE BRACKET ASSY V070-351599-001 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WI 77969 1 4 TH A NEW ASSY PER THIS PR. DISCREPENCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 78100 1 1 ITEM 1: THERE IS EXPOSED METAL, SCORING AND RAISED METAL ON THE V070-1 78100 1 2 98219-001 TEE AND V070-198201-001 RAMP ASSEMBLY UNDER FLIPPER DOOR RH 78100 1 3 #1. PER MR THE AREA WAS SANDED SMOOTH AND CORROSION PROTECTED. ITEM 2: 78100 1 4 SPOT OF DISCOLORED KOROPON. THE DISCOLORED KOROPON WAS REMOVED AND RE 78100 1 5 APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: DEFECTS CAUSED DUE TO ROUGH INTERFACE BETWEEN 78100 1 6 THE V070-198205-011 TITANIUM OUTER BLADE HOUSING AND THE ALUMINUM TEE 78100 1 7 AND RAMP ASSEMBLY. 78130 1 1 THE MOUNTING HOLES IN THE CABLE TRAY SUPPORT BRACKET WERE RE-LOCATED W 78130 1 2 HEN THE POSITION OF THE BRACKET WAS CHANGED (REF M072-710361). THE ORI 78130 1 3 GINAL MOUNTING HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH RIVETS. AN EOTF WILL COVER DRIL 78130 1 4 LING OF THE NEW MOUNTING HOLES. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS THAT WHEN THE L 78130 1 5 OCATION OF THE BRACKET WAS CHANGED THE MOUNTING HOLES WERE OVERLOOKED. 78130 1 6 NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. CLOSE THIS PR U 78130 1 7 PON VERIFICATION OF EOTF ON STEP 5.0 OF PAGE 3. 78181 1 1 FLIGHT DECK PANEL R-4 HAP A #10 TORQUE TIP SCREW BINDING IN THE UPPER 78181 1 2 FWD. ROW. A NEW NAS158C4TQ BOLT WAS INSTALLED IN THE DISCREPANT HOLE, 78181 1 3 BUT DID NOT TORQUE PROPERLY (REF PF. 1A). ALL FASTENERS OF THE SED391 78181 1 4 0208-301 (R14) CLOSE OUT PANEL WERE LOOSEND AND THE R14 PANEL WAS ADJU 78181 1 5 STED. AFTER THE R14 C/O PANEL WAS ADJUSTED, ALL FASTENERS WERE ABLE T 78181 1 6 O BE CORROSION PROTECTED AND INSTALLED TO THE PROPER TORQUE. THE PANE 78181 1 7 L AND FASTENERS ARE INSTALLED PER PRINT. TIGHT FIT WAS DO TO TOLERENC 78181 1 8 E BUILD-UP IN PANEL. O.J. STR ENG. CLOSE THIS PR. 78255 1 1 THE #40 PILOT HOLE THAT WAS MISDRILLED HAS BEEN PL 78255 1 2 UGGED PER ITEM NO 1.0, PG. 2 OF THIS PR. THERE IS 78255 1 3 NO LONGER DISCREPANCY STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS POSI 78255 1 4 TIVE & THE PLUGGED HOLE & SHIM HAVE BEEN MR'D FOR 78255 1 5 UNRESTRICTED USE. INITIAL DISCREPANCY CAUSED BY WO 78255 1 6 RKMANSHIP. CLOSE PR. 78475 1 1 AT CLOSER EXAMINATIN THE PART IS NORMAL 78475 1 2 IT IS DESIGNED FOR INTENSE HEAT AND HAS A MATTE FI 78475 1 3 NISH WHICH COULD BE MISCONSTRUED A A BLISTERED 78475 1 4 COVERING. 78756 1 1 ITEMS 1, PAGE 1 WHICH IDENTIFY CHIPS ON LH RCC PANEL #5 IS NOT A PR CO 78756 1 2 NDITION. THE CHIPS ARE FLAKING OF THE "A" COATING AND NO CARBON SUBSTR 78756 1 3 ATE FIBERS ARE EXPOSED. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE PER MLO601-0002 4 78756 1 4 .12.1.1. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO PR CONDITION. 78873 1 1 TWO OVERSIZE MR WASHERS WERE FABRICATED TO BE INSTALLED AT THE ELONGAT 78873 1 2 ED HOLE LOCATIONS ON THE V070-396425-001 CARRIER PANEL. DISCREPANT CON 78873 1 3 DITION NO LONGER EXISTS DUE TO INCREASED BEARING SURFACE AREA OF THE O 78873 1 4 VERSIZED WASHERS. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP DURING FABRICATION OF C/P. 79156 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO MR ACCEPT FRAYS NO LONGER THAN 79156 1 2 0.5 INCHES ON THE SEALS LISTED IN ITEM 1.0, PAGE 1.0. THE CAUSE OF THE 79156 1 3 FRAYING IS ATTRIBUTED TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THE SEAL INSTALLATIONS 79156 1 4 ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURES. 79221 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ON P 79221 1 2 AGE 1.0 (BROKEN AWAY AFT OUTBOARD ME128-0041-0001 RECEPTACLE USED FOR IN 79221 1 3 STALLATION OF MC434-0068-0021 OVERHEAD LIGHT). THE RECEPTACLE WAS RETRIE 79221 1 4 VED AND THE LIGHT INSTALLATION WAS ACCEPTED PER FCS-3-12-0406 WITH (3) O 79221 1 5 F (4) FASTENERS FOR FLIGHT 12. THE REPAIR OF THE DISCREPANT LOCATION WAS 79221 1 6 DEFERRED DUE TO LACK OF ACCESS (COULD NOT REMOVE THE V070-337884 CLOSEO 79221 1 7 UT PANEL BECAUSE SLEEP STATION WAS INSTALLED). POST FLIGHT DISPOSTION RE 79221 1 8 PLACED THE RECEPTACLE RETURNING THE LIGHT INSTALLATION TO PRINT REQUIREM 79221 1 9 TS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 79484 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN BECAUSE A PREVIOUS V070-851036-XXX MR'D PART DID N 79484 1 2 OT FIT PROPERLY. THE REASON THE APRT HAD TO BE MR DRILLED WAS BECAUSE 79484 1 3 THE V070-851032-011 RETAINER WAS ORIGINALLY DRILL INCORRECTLY. TO PUT 79484 1 4 THE AREA AS CLOSE TO PRINT AS POSSIBLE, A V070-851036-009 RETAINER (WH 79484 1 5 ICH IS THE PRINT PART) WAS LINE DRILLED AND INSTALLED TO THE V070-8510 79484 1 6 32-011 RETAINER. (WHICH IS THE PRINT PART). THE V070-851036-009 RETAIN 79484 1 7 ER WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT DURING S0007. 79606 1 1 UPPER AFT CORNER OF LEFT AFT STRINGBACK ALLEGEDLY COME IN CONTACT WITH 79606 1 2 PAYLOAD BAY DOOR. TILE QC LOOKED AT FIB BLANKET AND FOUND NO DAMAGE. 79606 1 3 NO SIGNS OF DAMAGE WAS FOUND ON STRUCTURE BY INSPECTION IN STEP 1.0. I 79606 1 4 NSPECTIONS FOUND NO DAMAGE THEREFORE NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS WITH VEHICL 79606 1 5 E. PROBABLE CAUSE NO DISCREPANCY. CLOSE THIS PR. 79684 1 1 THE BREAKING TORQUE ON THE 70B2000-84 STRUTS WERE 79684 1 2 HIGH - IND'G THE STRUTS WERE PRE-LOADED. A REACTI 79684 1 3 VE LOAD WAS APPLIED WHICH RELIEVED THE BREAKING TO 79684 1 4 RQUE (HIGH) & ALLOWED FOR STRUT REMOVAL. ALSO, EX 79684 1 5 CESSIVE GAPS WERE NOTED UNDER THE HEAD & NUTS OF T 79684 1 6 HE BOLTS AT THE UPPER ENDS OF THE 70B2000-61 & -69 79684 1 7 STRUTS. WASHERS WERE USED TO SHIM THE EXCESSIVE 79684 1 8 GAP & DOES NOT EFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. Q 79684 1 9 .C. NOTE: BOLTS ARE REINSTL'D BY TPS STR-3-07-279. 79742 1 1 DISCREPANT INSERTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW INSERTS RETURNIN 79742 1 2 G INSTALLATION TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXISTS. 80212 01 1 VOID PR. 80349 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATORS WERE REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. 80349 1 2 THE INSULATORS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED INTO THE RCC PANEL FLIGHT. THE CHI 80349 1 3 PS IN THE RCC MATERIAL WERE TRANSFERRED TO TES-3-07-0068 WHERE THEY WE 80349 1 4 RE REPAIRED LOCALLY. 80396 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY NOTED ON PAGE 1 HAS BEEN ANNOTATED ON STR-3-07-2502 WI 80396 1 2 TH SIMILAR DISCREPANCIES ON OTHER RUB PANELS. THE DESCREPANCY WILL NOT 80396 1 3 BE WORKED ON THIS PR. NO OTHER DISCREPANCY EXIST IN THIS PR. 80504 1 1 WHILE PERFORMING A STRUCTURAL INSPECTION, WORN THREADS WERE NOTICED ON 80504 1 2 4 BARREL NUTS. A RUNNING TORQUE CHECK WAS DONE AND 3 OUT OF THE 4 EXC 80504 1 3 EEDED THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE TORQUE. DUE TO THESE NUTS BEING ON A 10 FL 80504 1 4 IGHT CYCLE AND NOT BEING SERIALIZED, ALL 4 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. 80504 1 5 DISCREPANCY WAS A RESULT OF NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 80513 1 1 NO REWORK REQ'D FOR THIS PR. 80551 1 1 ULTRASONIC TESTING WAS PERFORMED AT THE LOCATIONS, WHERE STUDS DEBONDE 80551 1 2 D, BOTH BY KSCNDT PERSONNEL AND THE VENDOR (GRUMMAN) PERSONNEL. THERE 80551 1 3 WAS NO DEGRADATION OF THE SPAR WEB, GRAPHITE/EPOXY, FACE SHEET. AN EO 80551 1 4 DOA V070-156450, WAS RELEASED, TO AUTHORIZE THE BONDING CHANGE, TO REB 80551 1 5 OND STUDS THAT DEBONDED. MOD 005 TO TPS VSTR-3-07-185 WAS WRITTEN AND 80551 1 6 RELEASED, DETAILING INSTALLATION/BONDING OF THE STUDS. NO FURTHER ACTI 80551 1 7 ON IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 80717 I 1 RATIONAL HE MAX DEPTH OF THE THREE GOUGES (.005) 80717 I 2 IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE A REDUCTION IN THE STR- 80717 I 3 UTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VENT DOOR COVER. COVER RE- 80717 I 4 MAINS AS DESIGN INTENDED THIS IS A SECONDARY STRU- 80717 I 5 TURE. CLOSE PR. 81099 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 81099 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 81099 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 81099 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 81099 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 81099 1 6 7-103-C1). 81254 1 1 DURING OPF TO VAB OV103 ROLLOVER AN AUDIBLE NOISE, 81254 1 2 WHICH CAN BE BETTER DESCRIBED AS A CHATTER RATHER 81254 1 3 THAN A GRINDING WAS REPORTED OCMING FROM THE LH 81254 1 4 MLG OTBD WHEEL BY LO SAFETY ENG RON TASE. THIS 81254 1 5 CONDITION WAS NOT REPORTED TO MEQ ENG. UNTIL R/O 81254 1 6 WAS COMPLETE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO KNOW THAT PER RON 81254 1 7 TASE THE NOISE ONLY OCCURRED DURING MAX ROLL SPEED 81254 1 8 WHEN ORBITER ROLL SPEED WAS REDUCED THE NOISE WENT 81254 1 9 AWAY. ONCE IN THE VAB THE LH STRUT WAS JACKED UP 81254 1 10 USING RH JACK. THE WHEEL WAS MANUALLY ROTATED AND 81254 1 11 A REPEAT OF THE NOISE OCCURRED, THIS IS WHAT IS 81254 1 12 OCCURRING REF SKETCH (SEE PR FOR SKETCH). 81254 1 13 AS SHOWN ON SKETCH THE ROTORS HAVE A GAP AT THE 81254 1 14 TOP WHERE THE ROTORS ENGAGE THE WHEEL LUG INSERT 81254 1 15 KEY AND NO GAP AT THE BOTTOM BECAUSE GRAVITY HAS 81254 1 16 CAUSED THEM TO SETTLE. AS THE WHEEL TURNS 180 DG 81254 1 17 THE GAP IS NOW ON THE BOTTOM AND THE ROTORS FALL 81254 1 18 IF THE WHEEL IS ROLLED FAST YOU GET A PRONOUNED 81254 1 19 ROTOR FALL "CLUNK" IF THE WHEEL IS TURNED SLOW THE 81254 1 20 ROTOR SLIDES RATHER THAN FALLS AND THE NOISE IS 81254 1 21 NOT SO PRONOUNCED. THIS EXPLANS WHY RON ONLY HEARD 81254 1 22 THE NOISE AT MAX ROLL SPEED. AT THIS POINT LO SFT 81254 1 23 RON TASE AND LO MEQ ENGINEERING WERE SATISFIED 81254 1 24 THAT THENOISE WAS INDEED CAUSED BY ROTOR MOTION 81254 1 25 AND THAT NO DISCREPANT ROTOR MOTION AND THAT NO 81254 1 26 CONDITION EXISTS. BUT, PER NASA MGNT DIRECTION THE 81254 1 27 LH OTBD WHEEL WAS REMOVED AND A THOROUGH INSPECT- 81254 1 28 ION OF BRAKE ROTORS/STATORS AND BEARING SURFACES 81254 1 29 PERFORMED. RESULTS SHOWED NO DESCREPANICES, REF 81254 1 30 ATTACH 5 FOR INSPECTION RESULTS THE LH OTBD WHEEL 81254 1 31 WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RE-INSTALLED/TORQUED AND ORB 81254 1 32 JACKED DOWN 81483 1 1 THE OVERLAPPING OF THE V070-334021-003 FLOOR PANEL WAS RESOLVED BY MOV 81483 1 2 ING THE V070-334023-001 FLOOR PANEL AFT BE LOOSENING THE ATTACHING HAR 81483 1 3 DWARE. THE OVERLAPPING PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY A THE PLAY IN THE CAPTIVE 81483 1 4 FSTENERS AND THE V070-334023-001 FLOOR PANEL WAS INSTALLED TO FAR FOR 81483 1 5 WARD, THUS CAUSING THE INTERFERENCE. THE V070-334023-001 FLOOR PANEL W 81483 1 6 AS MOVE TO PROPER LOCATION AND ALLOW FOR THE INSTALLATION OF THE V070- 81483 1 7 334021-003 FLOOR PANEL WITHOUT ANY INTERFERENCE. CLOSE THIS PR. 81579 1 1 DISCREPANCIES ON V070-190248-002 TEE INSULATOR HAS 81579 1 2 BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUFACTURER SPECIFICATION.CLOSE 81579 1 3 PR 81714 1 1 A NEW V070-198702-002 TUBE SEAL WAS OBTAINED FROM LOGISTICS AND STORED 81714 1 2 WITH THE R/H FLIPPER DOOR #13 HARDWARE IN MIDBODY SHOP BAY 1. THE NEW 81714 1 3 V070-198702-002 TUBE SEAL WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE VEHICLE PER THE RE 81714 1 4 SPECTIVE JOB CARD. THE DAMAGED V070-198702-002 TUBE SEAL WAS SENT BACK 81714 1 5 TO RSC FOR REPAIR. THE V070-198702-002 TUBE SEAL IS A SECONDARY STRUC 81714 1 6 TURE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 81772 1 1 INSPECTION REVEALED NO EVIDENCE A CRACK WAS PRESENT. ONLY CHIPPED PAI 81772 1 2 NT WAS FOUND. PR WAS DISPO'S TO REPAINT AREA. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 81806 1 1 SCRAP DISCREPANT PART LOCALLY. 82007 1 THE ITEMS DESCRIBED IN PAGES 1 THRU 1J HAVE EACH BEEN ADDRESSED AS FOL 82007 2 LOWS: ITEMS 1,5,6 - WERE EACH MR FIXES AT YW 312 THAT WERE DEFERRED FO 82007 3 R ONE FLIGHT. THE FIXES FOR FLT 10 WERE RTV BEADS THAT BLOCKED FLOW PA 82007 4 THS AT COLUMBIUM SPRINGS AND POLYIMIDE SEAL LOCATIONS FLT II REWORK PE 82007 5 R STR-3-11-456 R& R'D COLUMBIUM SEALS AND VERIFIED PER PRINT GAPS PER 82007 6 STEP 51.0. ITEMS 2,3,4 -DISCREPANCIES WRITTEN AGAINST FLOW PATHS AT LO 82007 7 ATIONS WHERE GAPS ARE ALLOWABLE PER DESIGN. (REF. INTERIM SUMMARY ON P 82007 8 AGE 4.0) ITEMS 7 THRU 12 - EACH OF THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE AGAINST PO 82007 9 LYMIDE SEALS, FLOW RESTRICTERS, OR THE SPRINGS USED WITH THE POLYMIDE 82007 10 OR COLUMBIUM SEALS. EACH OF THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE ADDRESSED DURING 82007 11 THE RECENT ELAVON COVE REWORK. THE DISCREPANT SEALS, SPRINGS AND FLOW 82007 12 RESTRICTERS WERE REPLACED WITH NEW PARTS DURING THE REWORK. (REF. R/H 82007 13 OUTBD ELEVON REWORK PER STR-3-11-456) ITEM 13 - MR'D FOR UNRESTRICTED 82007 14 USE. TO ACHIEVE THE PROPER FIT OF THE SEAL IT HAD TO BE TRIMMED SLIGHT 82007 15 LY. PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEMS 1 THRU 4 AND 7 THRU 12 IS NORMAL WEAR AND 82007 16 TEAR AND PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEMS 5,6,&13 IS WORKMANSHIP. 82324 1 1 THE V070-510625 PIN WAS REMOVED AND REINSTALLED PER PRINT. A NEW COTTE 82324 1 2 R PIN WAS INSTALLED AND ALL WORK IS COMPLETE. SUCCESSFUL RETEST WAS VE 82324 1 3 RIFIED BY A NOSE LANDING GEAR CYCLE PER V9002. NO FURTHER WORK OR RETE 82324 1 4 ST IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. CLOSE THIS PR. 82380 1 1 THE SUPPORT DING AND CRACK HAVE BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 82380 1 2 WITHOUT REWORK. 82395 1 1 O2 TANK 2 INBOARD AFT STRUT WAS STRUCK BY AN UNKNOWN OBJECT CAUSING SE 82395 1 2 VERAL MINOR SCRATCHES AND A DENT, APPROXIMATELY 0.0171 INCHES DEEP. ST 82395 1 3 RUT WAS REMOVED & REPLACED PER PR FCP-3-07-0109 WITH A REPLACEMENT STR 82395 1 4 UT P/N ME270-0006-0006. DISCREPANT STRUT WAS ROUTED TO MSC FOR FURTHER 82395 1 5 DISPO. 82589 1 1 THE TILTMETER SUPPORT PLATE HAS BEEN REMOVED AND THE (4) EXISTING HOLE 82589 1 2 S HAVE BEEN PLUGGED WITH HILOKS. TWO EO'S WERE KICKED OUT AGAINST V070 82589 1 3 -000012 AND V070-000002 TO REFLECT THIS DESIGN CHANGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 82589 1 4 DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 82755 1 1 REFEERENCE ITEM 1.0, PAGE 1.0: DEPRESSION ON STARBOARD SIDE OF AIRLOCK 82755 1 2 FLOOR WAS MR REPAIREDWITH A DOUBLER BONDED TO THE DISCREPANT AREA. B 82755 1 3 RISKHEAT PROCESS 620 WAS USED AND THE LAP SHEAR STRENGTH RECORDED DURI 82755 1 4 NG TESTING WAS 3888 PSI. THE MINIMUM STRENGTH REQUIRED FOR A BOND USIN 82755 1 5 G MBO120-053 ADHESIVE IS 2800 PSI. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF TACKINESS 82755 1 6 OR LACK OF ADHESION DURING INSPECTION OF THE BONDEDDOUBLER AND THERE 82755 1 7 WERE NO VOIDS RECORDED IN THE BONDLINE. THE AIRLOCK FLOOR IS A PRIMARY 82755 1 8 STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP AND NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. REFER 82755 1 9 ENCE ITEM 2.0, PAGE 1A: DURING CURE OF THE MBO120-053 ADHESIVE THE M1 82755 1 10 THERMOCOUPLE RECORDED 195 DEGREES FARENHEIT. PER V9045 PROCESS 113, TH 82755 1 11 E TEMPERATURE RANGE FOR THE 053 ADHESIVE WAS 180-275 DEGREES FARENHEIT 82755 1 12 WHEN BONDING TO AN ALUMINUM HONEYCOMB SURFACE. THEREFORE, THE TEMPERA 82755 1 13 TURE READING RECORDED BY THE M1 THERMOCOUPLE WAS WITHIN THE REQUIRED R 82755 1 14 ANGE. AS A RESULT, THE DOUBLER WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. P 82755 1 15 ROBABLE CAUSE: TEMPERATURE LIMITS REQUIRED IN ORIGINAL DISPOSITION WER 82755 1 16 E SET AT 220 +/- 20 DEGREES FARENHEIT. REFERENCE ITEM 3.0, PAGE 1B: DU 82755 1 17 RING CURE OF THE MBO120-053 ADHESIVE THE PRESSURE RANGE WAS 18.5-25.2 82755 1 18 IN. MERCURY. PER PROCESS 113, THE MINIMUM PRESSURE TO BE APPLIED DURIN 82755 1 19 G CURE FOR MBO120-053 ADHESIVE IS 20 IN. MERCURY. THE LAP SHEARS WERE 82755 1 20 TESTED AND THE RESULTS CONFIRMED A SUCCESSFUL BOND. AS A RESULT, THE D 82755 1 21 OUBLER WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: LOW PRESS 82755 1 22 URE ATTRIBUTED TO LEAKAGE IN THE VACUUM BAGS. REFERENCE ITEM 4.0,PAGE 82755 1 23 1C: DURING CURE OF THE MBO120-053 ADHESIVE THE LIMIT TEMPERATURES FOR 82755 1 24 THE DOUBLER ZONE AND FOR THE LAP SHEAR ZONE WERE NOT RECORDED FOR THE 82755 1 25 TIME RANGE BETWEEN 1635 TO 1750. THE LIMIT TEMPERATUERS ARE RECORDED O 82755 1 26 N THE PRINT OUT FROM THE BRISKHEAT MACHINE. DURING THE DISCREPANT TIME 82755 1 27 INTERVAL THE BRISKHEAT MACHINE RAN OUT OF PAPER. DUE TO SUCCESSFUL LAP 82755 1 28 SHEAR RESULTS, THE DOUBLER WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS 82755 1 29 WITHOUT THE REQUIRED RECORDED LIMIT TEMPERATURES. PROBABLE CAUSE: BRIS 82755 1 30 KHEAT MACHINE RAN OUT OF PAPER 82999 1 1 TEAR IN R/H #13 SPAR, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, HAS BEEN REPAIRED 82999 1 2 BY ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. REWORK HAS RETURNED THE INSULATOR TO PRINT 82999 1 3 REQUIREMENTS AND THE INSULATOR WILL BE INSTALLED PER JOB CARD V80-969 82999 1 4 21. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 83071 1 1 THE OUTBOAD ELEVON ACTUATOR ACCESS PANEL WAS INSTALLED WITH WSHERS BEN 83071 1 2 EATH THE FASTENES HEADS. (THE PRINT DOES NOT CALLOUT FOR WASHES) UPON 83071 1 3 REMOVAL OF THE WASHERS AND INCEASING THE BOLT LENGTH ONE GRIP (WHERE E 83071 1 4 QUIRED) THE PROPER THREAD PROTRUSION WAS SCHIEVED (PER PRINT & PER SPE 83071 1 5 C MAO101-301). ONE ATTACH POINT (REF ATTACHMENT "B" LOC 59) REQUIRED A 83071 1 6 N ADDITIONAL GRIP LENGTH THEN THAT ALLOWED PER SPEC, WHICH IS ACCEPTED 83071 1 7 PER MR ACTION. THE ITEM ON PAGE 1B IS NOT A DISCREPANCY. ONLY ONE LEN 83071 1 8 TH FASENER (PER ATTACHMENT HOLE) WILL PROPERLY INSTALL THE PANEL. THE 83071 1 9 -06 BOLT SHANKS OUT & THE -05 DRAWS THE PANEL DOWN AND IS THEREFORE TH 83071 1 10 E ONLY FASTENER THAT WILL WORK. THE ACCESS PANEL HAS BEEN INSTALLED FO 83071 1 11 R FLIGHT. NO FURTHER DISCSREPANCIES EXIST & THE PR CAN CLOSE. CLOSE TH 83071 1 12 IS PR. 83120 1 1 THE V070-339467-001 FIBERGLASS CLOSEOUT PANEL HAD ONE CRACK WHICH WAS 83120 1 2 MR REPAIRED WITH TWO FIBERGLASS PATCH PLACED OVER THE CRACK ON THE FRO 83120 1 3 NT SIDE OF THE PANEL. THIS MR REPAIR WIL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE STRU 83120 1 4 CTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE PANEL. THE CLOSEOUT PANEL IS A SECONDARY STRUC 83120 1 5 TURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AND FAULTY WORKMANSHIP. 83648 1 1 THE NAS1578C3T11 SCREWS AND WASHERS WERE REPLACED WITH NAS-1003-12AHEX 83648 1 2 HEAD BOLTS AT TWO LOCATIONS ON EACH BRACKET. THIS ADDRESSED THE PAGE 83648 1 3 1 DISCREPANCY BY PROVIDING ADEQUATE LENGTH HARDQARE AND RESOLVED THE 83648 1 4 ACCESS CONCERN OF PAGE 1A. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. 83648 1 5 CLOSE THIS PR. 83854 1 1 DING IN FITTING IS MINOR & DOES NOT DEGRADE STRUCTURAL INTENT. DING & 83854 1 2 ALL SCRATCHES HAVE BEEN REPAINTED. 83894 1 1 HOLES WERE REQUIRED TO BE DRILLED TO ALLOW FOR RETAINER INSTALLATION. 83894 1 2 THIS ACTION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE PARTS WERE REINS 83894 1 3 TALLED PER THE OMI. ROUTE TO PMRB FOR SUB. OF PARTS. CLOSE THIS PR. 83934 1 1 THE RH MLG STURT WAS OBSERVED TO BE FURTHER COMPRESSED THAN THE LH STR 83934 1 2 UT FOLLOWING ROLL IN TO THE OPF. THE RH STRUT CONTINUED TO COMPRESS SL 83934 1 3 OWLY UNTIL NO POLISHED SURFACE WAS EXPOSED. A BUBBLE LEAK CHECK FOUND 83934 1 4 GN2 LEAKING FROM UNDER THE VALVE CAP. THE VALVE CAP WAS FOUND TO BE LO 83934 1 5 OSE WITH ONLY 1.5 IN. LBS. BREAK-AWAY TORQUE (S/B TORQUED TO 8-10 IN. 83934 1 6 LBS). 70 IN. LBS (MAX TORQUE) WAS APPLIED TO CLOSE THE VALVE RESULTING 83934 1 7 IN 1/4 TURN OF THE NUT. THE VAVLE WAS AGAIN BUBBLE LEAK CHECKED AND 83934 1 8 TESTED WITH VOLUMETERIC LEAK DISPLACEMENT UNIT WITHOUT THE CAP INSTALL 83934 1 9 ED AND NO LEAKS WERE FOUND. THE CAP WAS INSTALLED AND A FINAL LEAK CHE 83934 1 10 CK WAS PERFORMED WITH NO LEAKS. DURING A SUBSEQUENT JACK TRANSFER, THE 83934 1 11 STRUT WAS EXTENDED AND PRESSURIZED TO 300 PSIG, CHECKED WITH THE VLD A 83934 1 12 ND BUBBLE LEAK CHECKED AGAIN PER RTOMI V9028. THE LEAK WAS A DIRECT RE 83934 1 13 SULT OF IMPROPER TORQUEING OF BOTH THE VALVE NUT AND THE VALVE CAP WH 83934 1 14 ICH WERE LAST SECURED AT DFRF ON THE RUNWAY. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATOR 83934 1 15 ERROR-VALVE NUT AND CAP WERE NOT PROPERLY TORRQUED. 84076 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 84076 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 84076 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 84076 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 84076 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 84076 1 6 7-103-C1) THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 84080 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 - A NEW V070-198704-010 TRAILING EDGE RING WAS OBTAINED 84080 1 2 TO REPLACE THE DISCREPANT RING. A LRU PR WAS GENERATED FOR THE DISCRE 84080 1 3 PANT V070-198704-010 RING WHICH WAS ROUTED TO HDA. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS 84080 1 4 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 84139 1 1 ITEM 1.0 OF THIS PR HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO PR STR-3-11-3347 PAGE 1.0 84139 1 2 ALONG WITH OTHER DISCREPANT STRUTS IN THE RIGHT WING (REF ATTACHED COP 84139 1 3 Y OF STR-3-11-3347). THIS TRANSFER WILL KEEP THE DISCREPANT STRUTS IN 84139 1 4 THE RIGHT WING TOGETHER WHICH WILL MAKE THEM EASIER TO ADDRESS SINCE T 84139 1 5 HEY ALL HAVE SIMILAR PROBLEMS. 84264 1 1 PG. 1 ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED A SHIM CAUSING INTERFERENCE IN INST 84264 1 2 L'G THE EDGE MEMBER TO THE ET DOOR. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE SHIM W 84264 1 3 AS NOT CAUSING THE INTERFERENCE BUT A THERMAL PROTECTION PAD WAS. THI 84264 1 4 S PROBLEM WAS CORRECTED ON PR AFT-3-07-1406. PG. 1B ITEM 2 DISCREPANC 84264 1 5 Y DESCRIBED O/T GAPS BETWEEN SUPT FINGERS & TILE ON THE ET DOOR. THIS 84264 1 6 PROBLEM CORRECTED BY BENDING THE FINGERS BACK IN TOLERANCE. THE BEND 84264 1 7 ING OF THE FINGERS WAS MR APPROVED. DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXIST. 84347 1 1 OMRS REQUIREMENT S00E00.690 SPECIFIES FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN IS REQUIRED I 84347 1 2 F ESTIMATED HOLD PERIOD IS GREATER THAN 48 HOURS. FUEL CELLS WERE NOT 84347 1 3 SHUTDOWN FOR WCDDT 72 HOUR SCRUB TURN AROUND. PURPOSE OF REQUIRMENT IS 84347 1 4 TO MINIMIZE FUEL CELL RUN TIME (LIMITED LIFE ITEM). DUE TO ET LH2 T-O 84347 1 5 REPAIR WORK (DURING 72 HOUR SCRUB TURN AROUND), FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN WO 84347 1 6 ULD HAVE COMPLICATED GH2 T-O SAFING REQUIRED TO SUPPORT LH2 REPAIRS RE 84347 1 7 ULTING IN ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL IMPACTS/IMPLICATIONS. AVOIDANCE OF TH 84347 1 8 ESE OPERATIONAL IMPACTS WAS DEEMED BY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT TO BE MORE IM 84347 1 9 PORTANT THAN MINIMIZING FUEL CELL RUN TIME. (REFERENCE WAIVER WK0686). 84347 1 10 FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT SCRUB TURN AROUND PERIOD WAS NOMINAL 84347 1 11 . CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT/APPROVAL OF WAIVER WK0686. 84367 1 1 THREE SCRATCHES ON KORPONED PRIMED ALUMINUM SUBSTR 84367 1 2 ATE LWR BODY FLAP. THE LOC. CAVITY V070-395015-070 84367 1 3 . SCRATCHES WERE MINOR IN DEPTH & THE ROUGH EDGES 84367 1 4 WERE SMOOTHED OUT & KORPON REAPPLIED. STRUCTURAL I 84367 1 5 NTEGRITY REMAINS POSITIVE. UNRESTRICTED USE, PRIMA 84367 1 6 RY STRUCTURE. CLOSE PR. 84498 1 1 ITEM 1 OF PAGE 1 WAS ENGINEERING EVALUATED, TO BE SELF CORRECTING. DUE 84498 1 2 TO GAPS BETWEEN THE INNER BATHTUB FITTINGS AND THE V070-399451 ANGLE, 84498 1 3 THE MISALIGNING BOLT HOLES BETWEEN ONE BATHTUB FITTING AND THE V070-3 84498 1 4 99451 ANGLE SHOULD ALIGN ONCE THE ANGLE WAS INSTALLED TO THE NOSE CAP 84498 1 5 BULKHEAD. AFTER ATTEMPTING INSTALLATION OF THE V070-399451-001 ANGLE, 84498 1 6 ONE (1) ANGLE HOLE, STILL DID NOT ALIGN BETWEEN THE -001 ANGLE AND TH 84498 1 7 E V070-399429-009 FITTING. (SEE ITEM 2 PAGE 1A). THE -009 FITTING WA 84498 1 8 S REMOVED FROM THE -001 ANGLE AND RE-INSTALLED. THIS DID NOT RESOLVE 84498 1 9 THE MISALIGNMENT OF THE FITTING TO ANGLE BOLT HOLES. (SEE ITEM 3 PAGE 84498 1 10 1B). ALL FIVE BATHTUB FITTINGS WERE REMOVED FROM THE -001 ANGLE,THEN 84498 1 11 REINSTALLED IN THE ANGLE WITH THE GAP ON THE FWD SIDE OF THE ANGLE. 84498 1 12 THE GAPS WERE FOUND TO BE, .054", .015", .018", .040" AND .045". THE 84498 1 13 GAPS WERE FILLED WITH MIL-S-22499 STAINLESS LAMINATED SHIMS, AND ALL F 84498 1 14 INAL GAP MEASUREMENTS WERE UNDER .008 INCH. AFTER SHIM INSTALLATION, 84498 1 15 FITTING V070-399429-009 WAS REMOVED, AND THE TWO (2) NAS1581C4T5 BOLT 84498 1 16 HOLES WERE REAMED TO A MAXIMUM OF .2812 DIA AFTER REAMING THE -009 FIT 84498 1 17 TING, IT WAS REINSTALLED INTO THE V070-399451 ANGLE. THE SHIMMING AND 84498 1 18 REAMING OF THE BATHTUB FITTINS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 84498 1 19 RC ACTION: EVALUATE AND COORDINATE POTENTIAL CORRECTIVE ACTION WITH 84498 1 20 THE COGNIZANT DESIGN AGENCY. 84584 1 1 ENG SPEC MAO101-301 ALLOWS FOR USE OF SCREW LENGTH 84584 1 2 ONE SIZE LONGER OR ONE SIZE SHORTER THAN SIZE CAL 84584 1 3 LED OUT ON ASSY DWG & REMAIN WITHIN SPEC. SUBSTIT 84584 1 4 UTED LONGER SCREWS MD112-1003-0415 REPLACED THE CA 84584 1 5 LLED FOR MD112-1003-0414 SCREWS, ONE SIZE LONGER, 84584 1 6 THUS REMAINING WITHIN SPEC (REF. STEP 2). ONE THR 84584 1 7 EAD IS NOW VISIBLE BEYOND THE MANF PNL FASTENERS. 84584 1 8 NON-CONFORMANCE CORRECTED & PNL RTN'D TO FLT CONF 84584 1 9 IG. EO REQUEST HAS BEEN CANCELLED BECAUSE SPEC MA 84584 1 10 O101-301 IS SATISFIED. 84659 1 1 THE DAMAGED AREA ON THE LAMINATED SHIM (OVERHANG) WAS FLATTENED OUT AN 84659 1 2 D MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR ID WAS APPLIED TO A NEARBY STRU 84659 1 3 CTURAL MEMBER. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST ON THE ET DOOR STRIKER B 84659 1 4 OLT. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 84682 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING IPR 41V-0112 TROUBLESHOOTING WHEN A BLOWN 84682 1 2 FUSE WAS DISCOVERED IN AFT MCA-2 POSITION F5. THIS FUSE POWERS THE LA 84682 1 3 TCH/RELEASE LIMIT SWITCHES FOR LH ET DOOR LATCH MOTOR 2. A NEW FUSE WA 84682 1 4 S OBTAINED AND INSTALLED. THIS DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE 84682 1 5 CAUSE-FUSE CURRENT LIMIT OF 1 AMP WAS EXCEEDED. IPR 41V-0112 WILL CONT 84682 1 6 INUE TO LOOK FOR THE SOURCE OF THIS PROBLEM. RETEST WAS VERIFIED BY IP 84682 1 7 R 41V-0112. 84763 1 1 THE DISCREPANT CORROSION PROTECTION (KOROPON) IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PA 84763 1 2 GE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE BUBBLED PAINT AND APPLYING A NEW COA 84763 1 3 TF PER THE DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE INCORRECTLY INSTALLED V070-198552 84763 1 4 -002 ANGLE, IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2, PAGE 1A WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE 84763 1 5 DISCREPANT ANGLE AND INSTALLNG A NEW ANGLE IN ITS' PLACE, PER THE DRA 84763 1 6 WING REQUIREMENTS. THE INTERFERENCE OF THE LINEAR SEAL WITH THE V070-1 84763 1 7 98552 SEAL RETAINERS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 3 PAGE 1B WAS RESOLVED BY RESH 84763 1 8 IMMING THE LINEAR SEAL DURING INSTALLATION OF THE RETAINER (REF ITEM 2 84763 1 9 ). CAUSE OF ITEM 1 WAS A RESULT OF ACCEPTABLE HOT GAS FLOW DURING RE-E 84763 1 10 NTRY. CAUSE OF ITEM 2, WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CAUSE OF ITEM 3, WAS 84763 1 11 DUE TO REPLACEMENT OF HARDWARE TO RESOLVE ITEM 2 AND THEREFORE IS NOT 84763 1 12 A DISCREPANCY. CONCLUDE THAT THE SEAL PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT 84763 1 13 REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCT 84763 1 14 URE. 84836 1 1 ITEMS 1, PAGE 1 WHICH IDENTIFIES CHIP ON LOWER AFT EDGE OF THE NOSE CA 84836 1 2 P IS NOT A PR CONDITION. THE CHIP IS FLAKING OF THE "A" COATING AND NO 84836 1 3 CARBON SUBSTRATE FIBERS ARE EXPOSED. REF MLO-601-0002. PROBABLE CAUSE 84836 1 4 : NO PR CONDITION. 85044 1 1 BUSHINGS WERE REVERSED IN BOTH L/H & R/H MLG WHEEL 85044 1 2 WELL BUNGEE MTG HOLES. THE LMLG BUNGEE WAS REQUIR 85044 1 3 ED TO BE REMOVED TO PERFORM THIS TASK, SO UPON REI 85044 1 4 NSTALLATION, RIGGING CHECKS WERE MADE TO VERIFY/PL 85044 1 5 ACE BUNGEE IN A FLT CONFIGURATIUON. INITIAL PROBLE 85044 1 6 M OF REVERSED BUSHINGS WAS CORRECTED & NO FURTHER 85044 1 7 PROBLEMS ARE ANTICIPATED. 85224 1 1 LSOC & RI ENGINEERING HAVE INSPECTED THE NLG DOOR AND HAVE FOUND NO AN 85224 1 2 OMALLIES TO DOOR STRUCTURE OR RIGGING. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS AT THIS 85224 1 3 TIME. MOLDS WERE TEMPORARY/NON-FLIGHT AND ARE NOW REMOVED. 85380 1 1 DISCREPANT PLUG ASSEMBLIES ARE TPS RESPONSIBLY AND NOT STRUCTURES. PRO 85380 1 2 BABLE CAUSE PR WRITTEN AGAINST WRONG SYSTEM. 85418 1 1 FUEL CELL 3 (FC3) OXYGEN SUPPLY TUBE V070-454865-114 DYNATUBE FITTING 85418 1 2 WAS POLISHED AND RECONNECTED. MASS SPEC RESULTS OF THE FC3 O2 SUPPLY F 85418 1 3 ITTING ARE ACCEPTABLE. CLOSE PR. 85679 1 1 PR DISCREPANCY TRANSFERRED TO EXISTING PR AT SAME 85679 1 2 LOC. THIS PR IS NO LONGER REQ'D. 85753 1 1 ITEM 1.0 AND 2.0: THE 70C3718-1 LOWER SCURB PLATE FITTING ON THE RIGHT 85753 1 2 HAND SIDE OF BAY #11 (Xo1166, LOWER LONGERON STABILIZER BOLT FITTING) 85753 1 3 WAS FOUND WITH A SCRATCH ON ITS SURFACE AND A LOCKSCREW BROKEN OFF IN 85753 1 4 ITS AFT HOLE. THE FITTING WAS REMOVED AND A NEW FITTING WAS OBTAINED 85753 1 5 AND INSTALLED IN PLACE PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 85753 1 6 ION. 85797 1 1 THE INSULATOR PLUG ATTCH HARDWARE WHICH WS INITIALLY INSTALLED WHILE W 85797 1 2 ORKING JOBCARD V80-96919 WAS INCORRECT (DID NOT MATCH THE JOBCARD REQU 85797 1 3 IREMENT). THIS CONFIGURATION (GRIP LENGTH) ERROR WAS DETERMINED WHEN E 85797 1 4 NGINEERING WAS REQUESTED TO ALTER THE HARDWARE CALLOUT ON THE JOBCARD. 85797 1 5 AFTER REVIEW, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE JOBCARD CALLOUT WAS CORRECT PER D 85797 1 6 RAWING AND THAT THE DRAWING HAD BEEN MISINTERPRETED (AN EARLIER CONFIG 85797 1 7 URATION THAN THAT WHICH IS PRESENTLY USED HAD BEEN VIEWED) DURING INST 85797 1 8 ALLATION. THE CORRECT HARDWARE HAS BEEN INSTALLED PER THE JOBCARD AND 85797 1 9 NO DISCREPANT CONDITION EXISTS. THE PROBLEM DESCRIPTION ON PAGE ONE DO 85797 1 10 ES NOT PROVIDE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THIS CONDITION EXISTS AT ANY OTHER LO 85797 1 11 CATION (INSPECTION RESULTS, DOCUMENTATION REVIEW, ETC.)AND CORRECTIVE 85797 1 12 ACTION CANNOT BE PROVIDED WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF A SPECIFIC PROBLEM. A G 85797 1 13 OVERMENT SPECIAL ACTION REQUEST MAY BE ISSUED IF A 100% INSPECTION IS 85797 1 14 DESIRED TO DETERMINED IF THIS CONDITON EXISTS AT ANY OTHER POSITION. 86133 1 1 ABOVE NOTED DISCREPANCIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN 86133 1 2 AGAINST PR STR-3-07-1704 WHICH ALREADY DOCUMENTS 86133 1 3 HEATSINK PROBLEMS IN R/H BAY 5. A PAGE 1B HAS NOW 86133 1 4 BEEN WRITTEN CORRECTING THIS ERROR. THIS PR IS NO 86133 1 5 LONGER REQ'D. 86255 1 1 REPLACEMENT DOUBLER OBTAINED, DISCREPANCY DOCUMENT 86255 1 2 ED ON NEW DOUBLER REF. STR-3-07-1348. CLOSE THIS 86255 1 3 PR. 86370 1 1 GOUGE ON HATCH ACTUATOR LOCKING STEM WAS NOTED PER INSPECTION OF TPS M 86370 1 2 EQ-3-10-167. STEM AND CAVITY WERE CLEANED AND GOUGING WAS MR ACCEPTED 86370 1 3 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. NOMINAL RETEST OF ACTUATOR WAS PERFORMED P 86370 1 4 ER V1058. PROBABLE CAUSE IS IMPROPER USE OF LOCKING HATCH INGRESS/EGRE 86370 1 5 SS T-TOOL. 86441 1 1 THE DISCREPANT LOOSE SCREW ON THE LWR RH S-BAND AN 86441 1 2 TENNA WAS CAUSED BY BURRED THREADS IN THE ATTACHIN 86441 1 3 G NUT PLATE. USING A TAPERED TAP THE BURRS WERE RE 86441 1 4 MOVED. THE RUNNING TORQUE WAS THEN TESTED TO VERIF 86441 1 5 Y THE LOCKING FEATURE REMAINED IN THE NUT PLATE(15 86441 1 6 IN-1BS). SINCE THE LOCKING FEATURE DID EXIST, THE 86441 1 7 ANTENNA WAS NOT REMOVED AND THE ACCESS PLATE WAS 86441 1 8 REINSTALLED. THE NUT PLATE IS NOW BACK TO PRINT CO 86441 1 9 NFIG. 86519 1 1 MOLD IMPRESSION RESULTS OF A SCRATCH IN THE BORON 86519 1 2 STRUT SURFACE SHOW A DEPTH OF THE SCRATCH GREATER 86519 1 3 THAN THE ALLOWABLE DESIGN CRITERIA OF .003 IN. (SC 86519 1 4 RATCH MEASURED .0042 IN.) AN LRU PR HAS BEEN WRITT 86519 1 5 EN TO ROUTE THE STRUT BACK TO THE VENDOR WHERE IT 86519 1 6 WILL UNDERGO FUNCTIONAL INTEGRITY TESTS AND EVALUA 86519 1 7 TION DUE TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED DISCREPANCY. R.C. 86519 1 8 ACTION-DEVELOP BETTER METHODS AND CRITERIA FOR THE 86519 1 9 HANDLING, UNCRATING, AND THE STORAGE OF THE BORON 86519 1 10 STRUTS BY ALL PARTIES INVOLVED. (I.E. SHOP, LOGIS 86519 1 11 TICS, ETC). THIS STRUT WAS A REPLACEMENT STRUT AND 86519 1 12 NEVER INSTALLED IN SHIP. CLOSE THIS PR. 86828 1 1 MB0130-144 SILICONE SEALANT WAS USED TO SEAL ALL GAPS, HOLES AND OPENI 86828 1 2 NGS ON THE SEAL SUPPORT STRUCTURE ON THE FWD FUSE. AND D/M AND AT JOIN 86828 1 3 TS BETWEEN SEALS AS REQUIRED PER V070-320570-003 INSTALLATION PRINT. 87109 1 1 R/H INBRD BRAKE S/N0044,WAS PACKED AND SENT TO B.F 87109 1 2 GOODRICH THRU HDA ON 4/20/85,PRR 92180B 87232 1 1 NOTED LINE DENTS WERE INVESTIGATED BY SYS ENG, AND 87232 1 2 UPON WLKDWN INSP, LINE V070-454895-104 HAS TWO DE 87232 1 3 NTS APPROX. 8" APART ON UPPER SIDE OF TUBE, EA CLE 87232 1 4 ARLY MARKED W/ AN MR NO. THE FWD MOST DENT IS MAR 87232 1 5 KED W/ MR NO. BF 7675-000M & THE AFT DENT IS MARKE 87232 1 6 D W/ MR NO. BD 6814-000M. THE MR ID OF THESE NON- 87232 1 7 CONFORMANCES IND THAT THEY HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY AD 87232 1 8 DRESSED & VEH LINE V070-454895-104 WAS FOUND TO BE 87232 1 9 ACCEPTABLE FOR USE. THE MR MARKING CONVENTION IS 87232 1 10 ONE USED BY RIC & WAS PROCESSED BY RIC DURING OV- 87232 1 11 103 BUILD CYCLE IN PALMDALE, CA. LINE DENTS HAVE 87232 1 12 BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED, MR APPROVES & MARKED. 87232 1 13 NO FURTHER ACTION REQ'D. 87304 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 87304 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION 717.75 XO 396.50 ZO RH IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORIGINA 87304 1 3 L RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 0 INCH POUNDS. NU 87304 1 4 T WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE TO 87304 1 5 THE APPROPRIATE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO PRI 87304 1 6 NT CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. TH 87304 1 7 IS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 87544 1 1 STEP 2.0 CALLS OUT TO OBTAIN THE REPAIRED V070-198702-001 TUBE SEAL FR 87544 1 2 OM HDA; A NEW V070-198702-001 TUBE SEAL WAS OBTAINED FROM LOGISTICS I 87544 1 3 NSTEAD AND STORED WITH THE LEFT HAND FLIPPER DOOR #10 HARDWARE IN MIDB 87544 1 4 ODY SHOP BAY 1. THE NEW V070-198702-001 TUBE SEAL WILL BE INSTALLED I 87544 1 5 N THE VEHICLE PER THE RESPECTIVE JOB CARD. THE REPAIRED V070-198702-0 87544 1 6 01 TUBE SEAL WILL BE SEND BACK TO LOGISTICS FOR RESTOCK. THE V070-198 87544 1 7 702-001 TUBE SEAL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE: 87544 1 8 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 87835 1 1 THE UNIDENTIFIED "MR" DOUBLER WAS SUCCESSFULLY 87835 1 2 TRIMMED AND THE B91B15009-20 STIFFNER WAS SUCESS- 87835 1 3 FULLY INSTALLED PER THE DWG REQUIREMENT 87885 1 1 ITEM 1.0, PAGE 1.0 WAS TRANSFERRED TO TPS ENGINEERING TO RESOLVE INTER 87885 1 2 FERECE BETWEEN THE FILLER BAR AND THE V070-395967-010 CARRIER PANEL. T 87885 1 3 HE CARRIER PANEL IS PER PRINT AND IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 87887 1 1 BY REPAIRING THE CRACKED INSULATORS, PARTS ARE RES 87887 1 2 TORED TO THEIR INTENDED THERMAL INTEGRITY. NO MR R 87887 1 3 EQ'D, REPAIR IS PER PRINT SPEC. 87891 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY IN THE INSULATOR PLUG/INSULATOR FIT IS DUE TO THE INSU 87891 1 2 LATOR NOT BEING MANUFACTURED PER PRINT SPEC. THE INSULATOR WAS MR'D A 87891 1 3 CCEPTABLE AS IS. THE INSULATOR PLUG WAS REWORKED FOR PER MR ACTION & 87891 1 4 PRIM BD CONCURRENCE TO FIT THE INSULATOR. THE SPANNER BEAM INSULATOR 87891 1 5 & THE INSULATOR PLUG ARE BOTH INSTL'D FOR FLT. THE DISCREPANCY NO LON 87891 1 6 GER EXISTS & THE PR CAN CLOSE. 88124 1 1 TWO DENTS ARE VISIBLE ON FUEL CELL 2 COOLANT FILTER HOUSING. VISUAL IN 88124 1 2 SPECTION, DENTAL MOLD IMPRESSION ANALYSIS AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION 88124 1 3 REVEALED SHALLOW INDENTATIONS WITH NO REMOVED METAL OR CRACKS AT DENT 88124 1 4 LOCATIONS. SINCE THIS IS LOW PRESSURE SYSTEM (OPERATING PRESSURE IS 6 88124 1 5 5 +/- 10 PSIA AND FILTER BODY BURST PRESSURE IS RATED AT 500 PSI) THE 88124 1 6 LENGTH, WIDTH AND DEPTH OF INDENTATIONS IS ACCEPTABLE. TWO NOTED DENTS 88124 1 7 DO NOT COMPROMISE THE INTEGRITY OF THE SYSTEM. FILTER WAS MR MARKED A 88124 1 8 ND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 88263 1 1 THE IDMRD FILE 13 45V016.S10 AND OMRSD FILE 3 V45Y00.020 WHICH STATE T 88263 1 2 HE VAC-ION PUMP IS TO BE POWERED UP AT LEAST EVERY 6 MONTHS (180 DAYS) 88263 1 3 AND SATISFY THE SPEC OF NLT 87 MV IN LESS THAN 48 HOURS WAS NOT ACCOM 88263 1 4 PLISHED ON H2 TANK 1 (S/N SHT 0014). H2 TANK 1 VAC-ION PUMP WERE TESTE 88263 1 5 D ON THIS PR AND ACHIEVED THE SPEC OF NLT 87 MV IN 48 HRS. H2 TANK 1 W 88263 1 6 ILL BE MONITORED WITH EACH ORBITER POWER UP. UPON RECEIPT OF THE WAIVE 88263 1 7 R CLOSE THIS PR. 88289 1 1 THE ITEM 1 OF THIS PR HAS BEEN REPAIRED AS FOLLOWS: FIRST, AT F/N LOCA 88289 1 2 TIONS 18, 17 AND 13 THE SCREWS WRE REMOVED FROM THE DOOR AND CONICAL W 88289 1 3 ASHERS WERE BONDED TO THE STRUCTURE. SECOND, AT F/N LOCATION 20 A CONI 88289 1 4 CAL WASHER WAS REMOVED FROM THE STRUCTURE AND A SCREW WAS INSTALLED TO 88289 1 5 FASTEN THE DOOR. THE DOOR HAS BEEN RETURNED TO A PRINT CONFIGURATION. 88289 1 6 THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCY IS IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF THE 88289 1 7 SE PARTS AT THE HMF. 88350 1 1 THE ANCHOR NUT AND NUTPLATE FOR L/H LOWER L.E.S.S. CARRIER PANEL #9 HA 88350 1 2 VE LOST THEIR LOCKING FEATURE. THE ANCHOR NUT AND NUTPLATE WERE R &R U 88350 1 3 SING BLIND RIVETS INSTEAD OF CONVENTIONAL RIVETS PER MR ACTION BECAUSE 88350 1 4 OF LIMITED ACCESS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO 88350 1 5 FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 88475 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPALCED AND WILL BE PEELED TO PROPER FIT 88475 1 2 PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER M 88475 1 3 R ACTION. THE SHIM(S) WERE CENTERED OVER THE BOLT HOLES PER MR ACTION 88475 1 4 TO RESOLVE THE MISALIGNMENT (EDGE DISTANCE) PROBLEM. VOIDED/DEBONDED S 88475 1 5 HIM(S) WERE REBONDED IN PLACE. R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE GHA 88475 1 6 NGE OF ATTACHING HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CAAR #5121-87-10 88475 1 7 3-C1) 88527 1 1 STEP 30 TPS A012 REMOVES FASTENER PER PRINT PRO- 88527 1 2 VISIONS BRACKET CAN BE INSTALLED PER PRINT AND TPS 88557 1 1 GAP EXISTS BETWEEN THE WASHER AND SUPPORT RIB. V070-334151-004 SPACER 88557 1 2 IS .280" +.005/-.000 THICK.SPACER GOES THROUGH V070-338568-001 RIB. R 88557 1 3 IB IS .250" +.000/-.010. PER THE HARDWARE CALLOUT IN DRAWING V070-3385 88557 1 4 42 ZN39E, THERE WILL BE A GAP BETWEEN .030 TO .045. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE 88557 1 5 TO DESIGN. 88585 1 1 THE 1/4" HOLE IN THE AFT GUSSET OF THE Xo 693 FRAME WAS DOUBLE FLUSH W 88585 1 2 ITH AN MD121-0001-08XX RIVET. THE .070" DEEP COUTERSINK ON THE INBOARD 88585 1 3 D SIDE OF THE HOLE AS ACCEPTED WITH MR APPROVAL (REF ITEM 2). A NEW 1/ 88585 1 4 4" HOLE WAS DRILLED AND SPOTFACED ON THE FWD GUSSET OF THE Xo693 FRAME 88585 1 5 SO THE GROUND STRAP COULD BE INSTALLED PER GNC-3-09-073. THIS REWORK 88585 1 6 WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER EO-TO-FOLLOW AND MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE W 88585 1 7 AS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. UPON VERIFICATION THAT THE RELEASED EO REFLECTS 88585 1 8 THE PROPER CONFIGURATION (REF STEP 7.0) CLOSE THIS PR. 88595 1 1 ON THE LEFT SIDE WIRE TRAY, HOLES 5, 6, 8 & 11 AT 88595 1 2 Xo 807 WERE DAMAGED DUE TO THREADS IN BEARING. HO 88595 1 3 LE 5 WAS REMED TO .2185", HOLE 6 TO .217" & HOLES 88595 1 4 8 & 11 TO .218". NDE WAS PERFORMED (RPTs 30,325 & 88595 1 5 30, 396) & NO ADDT'L DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED. THIS 88595 1 6 REPAIR CLEARS THE HOLES FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 88721 1 1 ON THE RH OB ELEVON THE IB SEAL PANEL HAD A WORN AND DETERIORATED KNUC 88721 1 2 KLE SEAL (V070-198860-016) AND WIPER SEAL (V070-198863-001) (ITEMS 1 A 88721 1 3 ND 2). BOTH SEALS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW SEALS. THE KNUCKL 88721 1 4 E SEAL WAS BONDED IN THE WRONG LOCATION (ITEM 4) AND HAD TO BE REBONDE 88721 1 5 D IN THE CORRECT LOCATION. THE NEW WIPER SEAL ARRIVED WITHOUT TWO PER 88721 1 6 PRINT ATTACH HOLES DRILLED (ITEM 5) AND HAD TO BE MATCH DRILLED TO V07 88721 1 7 0-198520 PANEL. WHEN THE HOLES WERE MATCH DRILLED THERE WAS LESS THAN 88721 1 8 1.5D EDGE DISTANCE (ITEM 7). THIS CONDITION HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED OK AS 88721 1 9 IS. THE SPANWISE WIPER SEAL HOUSING (V070-198507-002) WOULD NOT MOVE 88721 1 10 FREELY IN THE SEAL RETAINER (ITEM 3). THE WIPER SEAL ASSEMBLY WAS DISA 88721 1 11 SSEMBLED AND CLEANED TO REMOVE CONTAMINATION. THE SEAL WAS THEN REASSE 88721 1 12 MBLED AND VERIFIED TO MOVE FREELY WITHIN THE RETAINER. GAP BETWEEN ANG 88721 1 13 LE AND BOTH ENDS OF ASSEMBLY EXCEED PRINT TOLERANCE (ITEM 6). SHIMS WE 88721 1 14 RE ADDED TO RETURN THE INSTALLATION TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE C 88721 1 15 AUSES: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION (ITEMS 1,2,3,6); WORKMANSHIP (ITEMS 4,5 88721 1 16 ); BUILD UP OF TOLERANCES (ITEM 7). 89096 1 1 A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE BODYFLAP SEAL DURING MOVEMENT AND WITH LIGH 89096 1 2 T AND 10X MAGNIFICATION; SHOWED NO SIGNS OF BINDING, SEPERATION, OR CR 89096 1 3 ACKS IN THE SEAL. A CONDUCTIVITY TEST FOR HARDNESS WAS CONDUCTED, AND 89096 1 4 THE HARDNESS OFTHE DISCOLORED AREAS. WERE THE SAME HARDNESS AS UNAFFE 89096 1 5 CTED AREAS INTHE BODYFLAP COVE. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE RTV BEAD WA 89096 1 6 S NOT PER DWG. REQUIRMENTS. THE RTV WAS REMOVED AND REAPPLIED PER ANOT 89096 1 7 HER STRUCTURES WAD (TPS-294). THE DISCOLORATION WAS CAUSED BY SOOT BEI 89096 1 8 NG DRAWN INTO THE BODYFLAP COVE AREA BY AERODYNAMIC AIR FLOW OVER THE 89096 1 9 BODY FLAP. THE DISCOLORATION WAS SUPERFICIAL SOOT DEPOSITS AND WAS CLE 89096 1 10 ANED FROM THE STRUCTURE. THE STRUCTURE AFFECTED BY THE SOOT DEPOSIT IS 89096 1 11 ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 89187 1 1 THE INCORRECT LENGTH FASTENERS AND RECESSED WASHERS FOR THE FORWARD HO 89187 1 2 IST RH ATTACH POINT WAS REPLACED WITH LONGER FASTENERS AND FLAT WASHER 89187 1 3 S PER EO-TO-FOLLOW. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS A DESIGN DEFICIENCY. THE CAR 89187 1 4 RIER PANEL THICKNESS WAS INCREASED BUT THE FASTENERS WERE NOT LENGTHEN 89187 1 5 ED TO COMPENSATE THE DIFFERENCE. 89235 1 1 THE DENT ON STRINGER #21, X0 773, L/H, IS VERY MIN 89235 1 2 OR WITH DIMENSIONS OF .350 LENGTH, .085 WIDTH AND 89235 1 3 .023 DEPTH. NO CRACKS WERE DETECTED USING A DYE PE 89235 1 4 NETRANT INSPECTION. THE DENT WAS CORROSION PROTECT 89235 1 5 ED AND MR ACCEPTED TO BE USED AS IS. 89296 1 1 ITEM 1.0 RIVET PATTERN ON THE L/H SPLICE PLATE IS NOT PER PRINT, BUT I 89296 1 2 S MR ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. R/H SPLICE PLATE IS INSTL'D PER 89296 1 3 PRINT. ITEM 2.0 THE R/H & L/H FWD RIVET INSTL'N WAS RELOC'D SLIGHTLY 89296 1 4 TO PREVENT THE RIVET HEAD FROM ENTERING THE RETAINER RADIUS. THIS WA 89296 1 5 S ACCEPTED MR UNRESTRICTED. 89308 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN CONTACT BETWEEN THE MAIN WHEEL ASSEMBLY (MW 89308 1 2 A-025/015) HEAT SHIELD AND STRAIN GAGE INSTRUMENTATION HARNESS WAS OBS 89308 1 3 ERVED PRIOR TO WHEEL INSTALLATION. BY RE-ORIENTING THE HEAT SHIELD, SU 89308 1 4 CH THAT THE TWO ENDS OF THE HEAT SHIELD WERE ATTACHED AT THE WHEEL TOR 89308 1 5 QUE BAR KEYWAY CLOSEST TO THE WIRE HARNESS, MORE WIRE HARNESS CLEARAN 89308 1 6 CE WAS AVAILABLE. AFTER RE-ORIENTING THE HEAT SHIELD, THEWIRE HARNESS 89308 1 7 NO LONGER EXPERIENCED THE HARD COMPRESSIVE CONTACT INITIALLY OBSERVED 89308 1 8 , HOWEVER MINIMAL POINT CONTACT INITIALLY OBSERVED. HOWEVER MINIMAL PO 89308 1 9 INT CONTACT WAS STILL OBSERVED. A DEVIATION WAS INITIATED TO OMI V1165 89308 1 10 TO INDICATE PROPER HEATSHIELD ORIENTATION FOR MAXIMUM WIRE HARNESS CL 89308 1 11 EARANCE AND THAT SLIGHT WIRE CONTACT MAY STILL BE OBSERVED (REF. ATTAC 89308 1 12 HED DEV COPY). THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS INSUFFICIENT WIRE CLE 89308 1 13 ARANCE. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 89329 1 1 TPS EPD-3-10-303 REROUTED THE R/H MLG DOWNLOCK SENSOR HARNESS. DURING 89329 1 2 SENSOR R&G CHECK PRIOR TO REMOVAL, THE GAP BETWEEN THE SENSOR AND THE 89329 1 3 TARGET WAS .112" (S/N .094 +/- .010_. THE SENSOR WAS REMOVED AND PAGE 89329 1 4 1A WAS INITIATED WHEN 2 EACH V070-510515-002 WASHERS WERE NOTED TO BE 89329 1 5 MISSING. REPLACEMENT WASHERS WERE OBTAINED PER TPS EPD-3-10-303 AND TH 89329 1 6 E SENSOR WAS RERIGGED PER THIS PR. V1098 LANDING GEAR FUNCTIONAL TEST 89329 1 7 VERIFIED RETEST FOR THE DOWNLOCK INDICATION. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EX 89329 1 8 ISTS WITH THE R/H MLG SENSOR OR DOWNLOCK INDICATION. PROBABLE CAUSE WA 89329 1 9 S WASHERS BETWEEN V070-510007-001 ANGLE AND V070-510004-002 BRACKET WE 89329 1 10 RE NOT RECORDED IN TPS EPD-3-10-303 PRIOR TO SENSOR REMOVAL AND THEREF 89329 1 11 ORE INITIAL SENSOR RIGGING DATA WAS LOST. 89525 1 1 THE PROBLEM DETECTED WAS THAT SHARP ENDS OF SAFETY WIRE WERE FOUND TO 89525 1 2 BE EXPOSED DURING V6034. TECHNICIANS TURNED THE SHARP WIRE ENDS BACK T 89525 1 3 O ELIMINATE THE HAZARD. THIS DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 89695 1 1 THE "BURR" WAS REMOVED AND THE SLOTTED HOLE IN THE LEADING EDGE ELEVON 89695 1 2 CARRIER PANEL WAS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE CARRIER PANEL I 89695 1 3 S OK FOR FLIGHT & NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. 89960 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP DURING TPS MEQ-3-07-079 BECAUSE THE ELECTRICAL B 89960 1 2 OND TEST OF THE BOND STRAP ON RH VENT DOOR 7 WAS OUT OF SPEC. ATTACHME 89960 1 3 NT "ELECTRICAL BOND TEST" WAS WRITTEN TO CORRECT THIS DISCREPANCY BY R 89960 1 4 EMOVING THE JUMPER, CLEANING THE FAYING SURFACES, REINSTALLING THE JUM 89960 1 5 PER AND RETESTING THE BOND. A RESISTANCE OF 2.40 MILLIOHMS WAS OBTAINE 89960 1 6 D ON RETEST. THIS DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 89963 1 1 DURING FLIGHT 10 PROCESSING, A GAP WAS FOUND TO EXIST BETWEEN THE V070 89963 1 2 -198313 SEAL AND THE PRIMARY SEAL PANEL. THIS GAP WAS CAUSED BY THE SE 89963 1 3 CONDARY SEAL CURTAIN PUSHING THE SEAL AWAY FROM THE PANEL ALLOWING A L 89963 1 4 EAK PATH. RTV WAS APPLIED AND THIS PR WAS DEFERRED AGAIN TO FLIGHT 12. 89963 1 5 DURING FLIGHT 12 PROCESSING, THE SECODARY SEAL SYSTEM WAS REWORKED PE 89963 1 6 R STR-3-12-485. UPON COMPLETION OF THE REWORK, THE SEAL CURTAIN WAS RE 89963 1 7 INSTALLED CORRECTLY AND THE GAP BETWEEN THE SEAL PANEL AND THE POLYIMI 89963 1 8 DE SEAL WAS REDUCED TO LESS THAT 0.010" WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE PER PRINT 89963 1 9 REQUIREMENTS. CONCLUDE ALL ENG AND SHOP ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR IS 89963 1 10 COMPLETE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP DURING PREVIO 89963 1 11 US INSTALLATION OF CURTAIN SEAL. 89997 1 1 USE OF RETAINER AS-IS WILL NOT AFFECT DESIGN IN- 89997 1 2 TENT. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS NOT COMPROMISED. 89997 1 3 CRACK IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CRACK 89997 1 4 DUE TO MISHANDLING AND NOT CAUSED BY FUNCTIONING 89997 1 5 OF ELEVON. 90027 1 1 THE LIGHT NICK ON THE ELECT. SUPPORT BRACKET AND 90027 1 2 RIVET HEAD WILL NOT CHANGE THE FIT OR FUNCTION OF 90027 1 3 THE BRACKET. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE, AND SIN- 90027 1 4 CE THERE IS A TOTAL OF (15) RIVETS INSTALLED, 90027 1 5 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS NOT COMPROMISED. CORROSION 90027 1 6 PROTECTION HAS BEEN APPLIED TO EXPOSED AREAS. 90035 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1. THE V070-198507-003 LINEAR WIPER SEAL HOUSING WA 90035 1 2 S NOT TRAVELING FREELY DUE TO INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE FLANGES OF THE 90035 1 3 HOUSING AND THE INSIDE WALLS OF THE V070-198541 RETAINER CHANNEL. A MI 90035 1 4 NIMUM AMOUNT OF MATERIAL WAS REMOVED FROM THE FLANGES OF V070-198507-0 90035 1 5 03 HOUSING WITHOUT EXCEEDING PRINT REQUIREMENTS TO FACILITATE FREE TRA 90035 1 6 VEL OF THE HOUSING. FREE TRAVEL OF THE HOUSING WAS RESTORED. PROBABLE 90035 1 7 CAUSE FOR INTERFERENCE WAS A BUILD-UP OF TOLERANCE. REF. ITEM 2 ON PAG 90035 1 8 E 1. THE V070-198862-007 WIPER SEAL AT THE INBOARD END OF THE V070-019 90035 1 9 8525 WAS FOUND TO BE DEGRADED. THE O/B END FLANGE MATERIAL WAS TORN CA 90035 1 10 USING A POSSIBLE LEAK PATH. THE DISCREPANT SEAL WAS REMOVED AND ROUTED 90035 1 11 TO THE HDA FOR REWORK. A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED FOR FLIG 90035 1 12 HT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. RE 90035 1 13 F ITEM 3.0 AND 4.0 ON PAGE 1A, REF ITEM 5.0 ON PAGE 1B, REF ITE 6.0 AN 90035 1 14 D 7.0 ON PAGE 1C. THE V07-198860-015 KNUCKLE SEALS AT Yw 345 AND Yw 34 90035 1 15 1 AND THE V070-198860-026 SEAL AT Yw 318 WERE FOUND TO BE SPLIT AND PR 90035 1 16 EFORMED, ALLOWING POSSIBLE LEAK PATHS. THE DISCREPANT SEALS WERE REMOV 90035 1 17 ED AND ROUTED TO THE HDA FOR REWORK. NEW SEALS WERE OBTAINED AND COULD 90035 1 18 NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH THE RADII ON THE FLANGES OF 90035 1 19 THE V070-198541 PANEL. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALED AN E.O. THAT RA 90035 1 20 DIUSES THE INSIDE CONERS OF THE SEALS TO ALLEVIATE THE INTERFERENCE. D 90035 1 21 UE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF V070-198860-031 AND V070-198860-034 SEALS, ROC 90035 1 22 KWELL LOGISTICS DELIVERED THE -015 AND -026 SEALS. PER TPS STR-3-11-47 90035 1 23 5, THE SEALS WERE REWORKED TO INCORPORATE THE EO. THE -031 AND -034 SE 90035 1 24 ALS WERE THEN INSTALLED ON THE V070-198541 PANEL FOR FLIGHT. PROBABLE 90035 1 25 CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCIES WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION DUE TO A MISALIGNM 90035 1 26 ENT OF HARDWARE WHEN ORIGINALLY INSTALLED. REF ITEM 8.0 ON PAGE 1D. TH 90035 1 27 E GAP BETWEEN THE V070-198576 END CAP AND V070-198552 ANGLE EXCEEDING 90035 1 28 PRINT REQUIREMENT OF LESS THAN 0.001" AT EACH END WAS ADDRESSED BY RET 90035 1 29 URN TO PRINT DISPO. THE END CAPS WERE REMOVED AND THE V070-198577 LAMI 90035 1 30 NATE SHIMS WERE REPLACED TO OBTAIN THE MAX 0.001 GAP AT EACH END. THE 90035 1 31 END CAPS WERE REINSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREPANCY IS 90035 1 32 WORKMANSHIP DURING ORIGINAL INSTALLATION OF HARDWARE. REF ITEM 9.0 ON 90035 1 33 PAGE 1E. THE GAPS BETWEEN THE V070-198552 ANGLES AND THE V070-198541 90035 1 34 PANEL RESULTED FROM THE IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF THE V070-198552 ANGLE 90035 1 35 S. THE ANGLES WERE REMOVED AND REINSTALLED SUCH THAT A ZERO GAP EXISTS 90035 1 36 . NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. REF ITEM 10.0 ON PAGE 1F. AFTER THE DISCREPAN 90035 1 37 T SEALS DOCUMENTED PER ITEMS 3.0 THROUGH 7.0 WEREREINSTALLED, THE EXC 90035 1 38 ESS RTV ADHESIVE WAS REMOVED FROM THE SEAL PER SPECIFICATION. NEXT SHI 90035 1 39 FT, ANOTHER TECHNICIAN INCORRECTLY TRIMMED THE RTV FROM THE EDGES OF T 90035 1 40 HE KNUCKLE SEALS CREATING A POTENTIAL LEAK PATH. PER MR DISPOSITION, T 90035 1 41 HE RTV WAS RE-APPLIED AND A PROPER SEALING SURFACE WAS RE-ESTABLISHED. 90035 1 42 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS POOR WORKMANSHIP. 90136 1 1 THE B91B15040-12 DOUBLER CHEM-MILL LINE WAS WIDER 90136 1 2 THAN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. THIS CAUSED INTERFER- 90136 1 3 ENCE W/ THE B91B15040-22 DOUBLER. THE CHEM-MILL 90136 1 4 LINE WAS CHAMFERED TO ALLOW PROPER INSTL'N. THIS 90136 1 5 WAS APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 90137 1 1 MBO130-173 RTV STOPS, TWO (2) AT Xo1178.50 AND TWO (2) AT Xo1152.92, W 90137 1 2 ERE BONDED OVERLAPPING STRINGER 22 BY .050 INCH OR GREATER. ALL FOUR 90137 1 3 (4) RTV STOPS WERE REMOVED AND NEW STOPS WERE REBONDED. 90157 1 1 DURING FLIGHT 11 PROCESSING, THE V070-198313-001 POLYIMIDE SEAL WAS FO 90157 1 2 UND TO BE CHIPPED ALONG THE FORWARD EDGE OF THE SEAL. THE DISCREPANT C 90157 1 3 ONDITION WAS DEFERRED FOR ONE FLIGHT PENDING INBOARD ELEVON PRIMARY SE 90157 1 4 AL REWORK. DURING THE FLIGHT 12 REWORK, THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND A NEW 90157 1 5 SEAL WAS INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 90326 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2 PAGE 1 WHICH IDENTIFY CHIPS ON L/H RCC PANEL #14 IS NOT 90326 1 2 A PR CONDITION. THE CHIPS ARE FLAKING OF THE "A" COATING AND NO CARBON 90326 1 3 SUBSTRATE FIBERS ARE EXPOSED. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE PER MLO601 90326 1 4 -0002 4.12.1.1. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO PR CONDITION. 90459 1 1 DURING OPF PROCESSING FOR FLIGHT 11 (STS-041) AN INSPECTION OF THE RH PL 90459 1 2 BD 3 STRONGBACK ATTACH POINTS WAS PERFORMED. AS A RESULT OF THAT INSPECT 90459 1 3 ION, THE GRAPHITE AROUND SERVERAL OF THE HOLES WAS IDENTIFIED AS "CHIPPE 90459 1 4 D" (REF ITEM 1 PAGE 1) RI TULSA PERSONNEL MR REPAIRED FOR UNRESTRICTED U 90459 1 5 SE THE CHIPPED AREAS BY FILLING THE AREAS WITH EA934 ADHESIVE. DURING IN 90459 1 6 VESTIGATION OF THE CHIPPED GRAPHITE AROUND THE HOLES SEVERAL WERE FOUND 90459 1 7 TO BE OUT OF ROUND. THE OUT OF ROUND HOLES WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UN 90459 1 8 RESTRICTED USE. IN ITEM 2 PAGE 1A AREAS FOUND THE STRONG BACK ATTACH 90459 1 9 POINTS AT XO988.70, YO48 (INBOARD) AND ZO470 (OUTBOARD) AND AT 90459 1 10 XO1078.10, YO48 (INBOARD) AND XO 470 (OUTBOARD) WERE IDENTIFIED AS 90459 1 11 HAVING MISSING CORROSION PROTECTION AND/OR MINOR CHIPS AND SCRATCHES 90459 1 12 MARKS. RI TULSA PERSONNEL MR REPAIRED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE THE CHIPPED 90459 1 13 AND SCRATCHED AREAS BY FILLING THEM WITH EA934 ADHESIVE AND THEN 90459 1 14 APPLYING CORROSION PROTECTION PER THE DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. ALSO DURING 90459 1 15 INVESTIGATION OF ITEM 1, INSPECTION REVEALED 5 INDIVIDUAL AREAS OF 90459 1 16 DELAMINATION OF THE GRAPHITE EPOXY SKIN AROUND ATTACH HOLES 2 AND 4, 90459 1 17 IN-LINE WITH THE FORWARD FLANGE OF THE XO1078 FRAME AT YO 48 (REF ITEM 3 90459 1 18 PAGE 1B). THE DELAMINATED AREAS WERE INJECTED WITH ADHESIVE BY MR 90459 1 19 APPROVAL IN ATTEMPT TO FILL/REBOND THE DELAMINATED AREAS. POST MR 90459 1 20 REPAIR, ULTRASONIC INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE ADHESIVE DID NOT FILL 90459 1 21 ALL OF THE DELAMINATED AREAS. LARGE DIAMETER WASHERS WERE THEN INSTALLED 90459 1 22 UNDER THE HEADS OF (8) EXISTING FASTENERS AND AN ADDITIONAL (6) 90459 1 23 FASTENERS, WITH LARGE DIAMETER WASHERS, WERE INSTALLED IN THIS AREA TO 90459 1 24 PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CLAMPING FORCE WITH RESTRICTED 1 FLIGHT MR APPROVAL. 90459 1 25 POST FLIGHT 11 (FLIGHT 12 STS 39 PROCESSING), A SECOND ULTRASONIC 90459 1 26 INSPECTION REVEALED NO CHANGE IN MAGNITUDE OF THE DELAMINATIONS. THIS PR 90459 1 27 WAS THEN RESTRICTED MR APPROVED TO FLIGHT 13 (STS-48) PROCESSING. A 90459 1 28 THIRD ULTRASONIC INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED PREPARATORY TO FLIGHT 13 90459 1 29 (STS-48) AND THE INSPECTION REVEALED NO CHANGE IN MAGNITUDE OF THE 90459 1 30 DELAMINATIONS. ULTRASONIC INSPECTION OF THE DELAMINATED AREAS 90459 1 31 PREPARATORY TO FLIGHT 15 WERE ALSO NEGATIVE. ULTRASONIC INSPECTION PRIOR 90459 1 32 TO FLIGHT 19 PROCESSING WAS AGAIN FOUND TO BE NEGATIVE. MR ACTION HAS 90459 1 33 BEEN OBTAINED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE PLB DOOR 3, CONSIDERING THAT 90459 1 34 NO PROPAGATION OF THE DELAMINATIONS HAS BEEN DETECTED OVER SEVERAL 90459 1 35 FLIGHTS. THEREFORE, THE PROBLEM MAY BE CONSIDERED FIXED, AND THIS PR 90459 1 36 CLOSED, AS NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NOMINAL 90459 1 37 OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 90519 1 1 REPLACEMENT OF DAMAGED STRUT W/ A NEW STRUT HAS 90519 1 2 RETURNED PART TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION 90592 1 1 MR ACTION REQUESTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE TO EXCEPT 90592 1 2 PREVIOUS DRILLED/FILLED HOLES. CORRECT LOCATION 90592 1 3 AND INSTALLATION OF INSERTS MEETS THE DWG REQUIREM 90592 1 4 ENTS. THE PREVIOUS INCORRECT HOLES WILL NOT ALTER 90592 1 5 FORM, FIT OR FUNCTION OF PART. LOAD OF P/P IS TR 90592 1 6 ANSMITTED THRU INSERT. CLOSE THIS PR. 90622 1 1 THE 14 AREAS OF CORROSION ON THE ELEVON SKIN WERE MANUALLY & CHEMICALL 90622 1 2 Y CLEANED. AN OPTICAL INSP OF EA PIT DEPTH WAS PERFORMED & ANALYZED B 90622 1 3 Y RI/DOWNEY STRESS & RI/DOWNEY DESIGN. 12 OF THE CORROSION AREAS WERE 90622 1 4 VERIFIED OXIDE FREE & TWO AREAS REQ'D A DOUBLER. THE DOUBLER HAS BEE 90622 1 5 N BONDED OVER THE 2 DEFECT AREAS & THE PROCESS VERIFICATION PNLs HAVE 90622 1 6 BEEN VERIFIED ABOVE SPEC RQMTS. 90816 1 1 FASTENERS FOR V070-397057-001 CARRIER PANEL WERE FOUND TO BE SHORT. 6 90816 1 2 EA HOLES WERE MEASURED PER STEP 1.0 TO DETERMINE GRIP LENGTH REQUIRED 90816 1 3 FOR CARRIER PANEL. A E.O.T.F. WAS GENERATED TO CHANGE DRAWING TO REFLE 90816 1 4 CT GRIP LENGTHS AS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. UPON V 90816 1 5 ERIFICATION OF RELEASED E.O. REFLECTS ENGINEERING DISPOSITION CLOSE TH 90816 1 6 IS PR. 90856 1 1 THE R/H CALLOUT ON EO H14 IS INCORRECT. THE EO TO 90856 1 2 FOLLOW WILL CORRECT THIS MISTAKE. 91073 1 1 THE MISLOCATED PILOT HOLES WERE SUCCESSFULLY CONSU 91073 1 2 MED WHILE BRINGING THE HOLES UP TO SIZE. NO FURTH 91073 1 3 ER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 91192 1 1 PROB 1, INCORRECT RESISTANCE VALUES, CORRECTED BY EO CHANGE TO SPEC. P 91192 1 2 ROB 2,3 INCORRECT HEATER SEGMENT LENGTHS, CORRECTED BY EO CHANGE TO SP 91192 1 3 EC. UPON COMPLETION OF: SS1 STEP 1, SS2 STEP 8, CLOSE THIS PR. 91273 1 1 THE HARDWARE CALLED OUT ON THE DRAWING WAS NOT THE SAME FOR BOTH (44-1 91273 1 2 1, 44-12) DOORS. THOUGH BOTH DOORS HAVE THE SAME PART NUMBERS. A E.O. 91273 1 3 INITIATED THAT CHANGED THE DRAWING TO REFLECT THE DISPOSITION INSTALLI 91273 1 4 NG (4) WASHERS AND A DIFFERENT FASTENER. CAUSE WRONG HARDWARE. CLOSE T 91273 1 5 HIS PR UPON VERIFICATION OF REVEASED E.O. THAT REFLECTS ENGINEERING DI 91273 1 6 SPOSITION. 91348 1 1 DISCREPANCY WAS BUFFED OUT & MR FOR FLT. 91439 1 1 FRAYED ENDS WERE TRIMMED ON DISCREPANT MONEL MESH OF ET UMBILICAL CLOS 91439 1 2 EOUT CURTAIN. MESH IS ACCEPTABLE AS IS BASED ON DWG V070-565396. PRO 91439 1 3 BABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR, WITHIN DESIGN CRITERIA. 91514 1 1 WHERE THE RIGHT SIDE CABLE TRAY ATTACHES TO THE Xo 91514 1 2 807 FRAME, HOLES 2, 6, 7, 9 & 11 WERE REAMED UP T 91514 1 3 O .2180" & HOLE 12 WAS REAMED UP TO .2188" TO PREV 91514 1 4 ENT HAVING DAMAGE DONE TO THE HOLES BY HAVING THE 91514 1 5 FASTENER THREADS IN BEARING. EDDY CURRENT INSPs W 91514 1 6 ERE DONE W/ NO DAMAGE DETECTED. THIS REPAIR MAKES 91514 1 7 THE HOLES ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE S 91514 1 8 PACERS & WASHERS REMOVED BY STEP 4 OF THIS PR WILL 91514 1 9 BE REINSTL'D BY STEP 14 OF BASIC STR-3-07-135. 91562 1 1 THE RCC PANELS' STEP AND GAP WERE REMEASURED BY RI/DOWNEY UPON THE RET 91562 1 2 URN OF OV-103 FROM FLIGHT 07 (26R). THE MEAUSURMENTS OBTAIN BY RI/DOWN 91562 1 3 EY POST FLIGHT 07 ARE DIFFERECNT THAN THOSE OBTAINED PREFLIGHT 07, THE 91562 1 4 REFORE, THE MEASUREMENTS IN THIS PR ARE OBSOLETE. ANY FUTURE MEASUREME 91562 1 5 NTS OF THE RCC PANELS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED EITHER BY A TYPE 'B' TPS (P 91562 1 6 ER A CHIT) OR BY RI/DOWNEY. IF A CONCERN EXISTS AS RESULT OF THE MEASU 91562 1 7 REMENTS, AT THAT TIME A PR WILL BE GENERATED AND ADDRESSED. THE PROBAB 91562 1 8 LE CAUSE FOR THE VARIANCE IN MEASUREMENTS IS IN FLIGHT MOVEMENT (SELF- 91562 1 9 ADJUSTMENT) OF THE RCC PANELS. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING ACTION IS REQUIR 91562 1 10 ED AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. FLIGHT 8 DATA TO BE ADDRESSED ON STR-3-08-28 91562 1 11 85. CLOSE THIS PR 91649 1 1 THE STRINGER WAS DYE PEN INSP'D TO DETERMINE THE EXACT LOC OF THE END 91649 1 2 OF THE SPLIT. THE STGR WAS STOP DRILLED & CORROSION PROTECTED, W/ MR 91649 1 3 APPROVAL TO PREVENT THE SPLIT FROM PROPAGATING ANY FURTHER. THE STGR 91649 1 4 USED AS IS W/ THE STOP DRILLED SPLIT, IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLT. 91745 1 1 THE V070-351562-001 STRUT HAS A NICK AND SEVERERAL SCRATCHES. THE NICK 91745 1 2 AND SEVERAL OF THE SCRATCHES WERE FILLED WITH ADHESIVE AND SANDED SMO 91745 1 3 OTH PER MR AND THE OTHERS ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO GSE PL 91745 1 4 ATFORM INTALLATION. 91835 1 1 THE CHAFFING BETWEEN THE V070-351088-001 BRACKET AND V070-852289-001 B 91835 1 2 RACE IDENTIFITED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS RESOLVED WITH UNRESTRICTED MR 91835 1 3 APPROVAL BY TRIMMING THE BRACKET .030" TO .050" BY 1.00". THE CORROSIO 91835 1 4 N ON THE BRACE WAS REMOVED BY SHAVING AND RE-CORROSION PROTECTING TO P 91835 1 5 REVENT FURTHER CORROSION. THE CAUSE OF THE INTERFERENCE AND CORROSION 91835 1 6 WAS DUE TO A BUILD-UP OF TOLERANCES AND POOR VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. CONCL 91835 1 7 UDE THAT THE BRACE AND BRACKET ARE ACCEPTABLE AS REWORKED AND INSTALLE 91835 1 8 D PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. THE BRACE AND BRACKET ARE SECONDARY STRUCTUR 91878 1 1 ITEM 1: EVIDENCE OF WRINKLING FOUND ONLH PLBD ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL 19" F 91878 1 2 ROM THE AFT END OF LH PLBD #4. MR ACCEPTED AS IS. ITEM 2: TEFLON TUBE 91878 1 3 IN ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL IS DEBONDED ON LH PLBD #3. LOCATION IS 49" FROM 91878 1 4 FWD END OF THE DOOR. THE DEBONDED AREA WAS WRAPPED IN 3M61 TAPE PER MR 91878 1 5 . ITEM 3: MINOR CRACK, 1/4" LONG IN THE RTV ON LH PLBD #2, LOCATION IS 91878 1 6 4" FROM THE FWD END OF THE DOOR. PER MR, THE CRACK WAS FILLED WITH MB 91878 1 7 O130-085 ADHESIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEMS 1, 2 AND 3 WERE CAUSED BY NOR 91878 1 8 MAL WEAR AND TEAR OF PLBD OPERATIONS. 92076 1 1 INITIATE A DR TO RESOLVE ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY RECRD DR#: STR-3-10-0148. 92243 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 92243 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 92243 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 92243 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 92243 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 92243 1 6 7-103-C1) THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 92305 1 1 STRINGER B91B4236.14 WAS GOUGED IN TWO PLACES WITH 92305 1 2 A DRILL CHUCK. THE GOUGES HAD A DEPTH OF .023 AND 92305 1 3 .013 AND A LENGTH OF .515 AND .365, RESPECTIVELY. 92305 1 4 THE GOUGES WERE POLISHED OUT AND FILLED WITH LIQU 92305 1 5 ID SHIM, TO RESTORE FLATNESS. A DOUBLER WAS FABRIC 92305 1 6 ATED & INSTLD OVER BOTH GOUGES USING NINE (9) BLIN 92305 1 7 D RIVETS. CLOSE PR. 92414 1 1 STEP 10 OF MOD 001 TO TPS VSTR-3-07-179 WAS NUT IN 92414 1 2 CORPORATED. THE WRONG H/W WAS INSTL'D. THIS CAUS 92414 1 3 ED THE PR CONDITION. THE TPS WAS CORRECTED & COR- 92414 1 4 RECT H/W INSTL'D. NO FURTHER PROBLEM EXISTS. HI- 92414 1 5 LOK NUTS (REF. STEP 5.3, STR-179) CAN NOW BE IN- 92414 1 6 STL'D. 92712 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, (CHARRED RTV) IS DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO, AND RELATED TO 92712 1 2 THE CHARRED POLYIMIDE SEAL DOCUMENTED ON PR: STR-3-A0116. ITEM 1, IS T 92712 1 3 HEREFORE TRANSFERRED TO ITEM 2, PAGE 1A ON STR-3-A0116. 92719 1 1 ITEMS 1,2, AND 4 WERE MR TO REMOVE THE RAISED EDGE 92719 1 2 S, AND TO BURNISH OUT THE GOUGES, AND CORROSION PR 92719 1 3 OTECTED. ITEM 3, THE SALAD BOWL WAS SENT TO VENDOR 92719 1 4 TO REFURBISH THE KARLON SURFACE AND RETURNED. THE 92719 1 5 RESISTANCE FOR ITEM 5 WAS CHANGED TO 40 M OHMS PE 92719 1 6 R E.O. READING PER STEP 20 IS NOW ACCEPTABLE. 92850 1 1 THE EO CHANGES EO-D01 TO USE EXISTING NUTPLATE ON 92850 1 2 V070-340366-002 WIRE TRAY, NO STR CHANGE. 92855 1 1 SUBSTITUTION OF TENSION TYPE WASHERS IN PLACE OF S 92855 1 2 HEAR TYPE WASHERS AT ET FITTING/SIDEWALL ATTACH PO 92855 1 3 INT #2 R/H RESTORES DESIGN INTENT AND INTEGRITY OF 92855 1 4 THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. NO MR I.D. REQUIRED. CL 92855 1 5 OSE THIS PR. 92903 1 1 BROKEN ALLEN WRENCH WAS SUCCESSFULLY REMOVED FROM THE END OF THE HI-LO 92903 1 2 K STUD. THE STUD WAS NICKED DURING DRILL OUT OF THE ALLEN WRENCH AS DO 92903 1 3 CUMENTED ON PAGE 1A DENTAL MOLDS OF THE NICK WERE TAKEN AND THIS CONDI 92903 1 4 TION WAS MR'D OK AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR ID WAS APPLIED AND NO 92903 1 5 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. 92922 1 1 DISCREPANT WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL, V070-198753-006, DOCUMENTED BY ITE 92922 1 2 M 1, PAGE 1, HAS BEEN REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW SEAL. ITEM 1, P 92922 1 3 AGE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: SEAL D 92922 1 4 ESIGN DEFICIENCY OF WHICH RI IS AWARE OF. NEW SEAL DESIGN IS BEING RE 92922 1 5 SEARCHED. 92950 1 1 THE DISCREPANT HOLES ARE ACCEPTABLE AS IS WITH MR 92950 1 2 DISPOSITION. THE NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND REPLAC 92950 1 3 ED. THE GALLING OF THE HOLES AND NUTPLATES IS DUE 92950 1 4 TO THE NUMEROUS INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF THE BO 92950 1 5 LTS. THE HOLES AND NUTPLATES, THAT WERE REPLACED, 92950 1 6 ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 92998 1 1 TPS RETURNS KIT TO PRINT CONFIGURATION PER EO V070 92998 1 2 -370008 REV A SEQ 13 CAUSE DUE TO ENGINEERING OVER 92998 1 3 SIGHT. 93141 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PG 1, ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL (V070-398564-004) WAS MISSING AFT 93141 1 2 ER FLIGHT. SEAL WAS FOUND BEHIND AFT BULKHEAD BLANKETS. THE SEAL FOUND W 93141 1 3 AS USED FOR BONDING DATA. A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND BONDED PER DWG. PR 93141 1 4 OBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR REF ITEM 2 ON PG 1A. SEAL V070-398564-004 93141 1 5 (3-2438-1) SHELF LIFE OR ETCHING HAS EXPIRED. SEAL WAS SENT TO RISC WHE 93141 1 6 RE IT WAS IDENTIFIED AS AN -001, AND COULD NOT BE USED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 93141 1 7 EXPIRED SHELF LIFE REF ITEM 3 ON PG 1B. SEAL V070-398564-004 (N19493) SH 93141 1 8 ELF LIFE OR ETCHING HAD EXPIRED. SEAL WAS SENT TO RISC WHERE NEW TEFLON 93141 1 9 WAS INSTALLED WITH ETCHING. SEAL (V070-398564-004 N19493) WAS THEN 93141 1 10 INSTALLED PER DWG. PROBABLE CAUSE: EXPIRED SHELF LIFE REF ITEM 4 ON PG 93141 1 11 1C AFTER REMOVING PRESSURE FROM SEAL IT WAS NOTICED THAT 2 GAPS EXISTED 93141 1 12 BETWEEN SEAL AND GBASE. ADHESIVE WAS APPLIED TO SEAL GAPS PER MR 93141 1 13 CONCURRENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP 93238 1 1 THE QUANTITY OF HARDWARE CALLED OUT DISCREPANCY (ITEM 1) IS A DUPLICAT 93238 1 2 E PR WHICH WAS ADDRESSED PER RP03-A0010. THE DOOR WAS RE-ID'D WITH THE 93238 1 3 CORRECT PART NUMBER (ITEM 2) AND OCN NUMBER (ITEM 3). THE PROBABLE CA 93238 1 4 USE IS THAT THE DOOR WAS MIS-ID'D DURING MANUFACTURING OR NEVER RE-ID' 93238 1 5 D DURING A MODIFICATION. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED AND THIS P 93238 1 6 R CAN CLOSE. 93316 1 1 MOLD IMPRESSIONS OF THE NICK NOTED ON PAGE 1 WERE TAKEN AND RECORDED ( 93316 1 2 .00 X .0074 X .0187). THE NICK WAS THEN MR REWORKED IN ORDER TO REMOVE 93316 1 3 ANY RAISED METAL. THE NICK WAS THEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 93316 1 4 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP. 93337 1 1 DURING OMI V1022 TESTING THE FC#2 READY-FOR-LOAD INDICATION CAME ON 70 S 93337 1 2 EC AFTER THE COOLANT PUMP INDICATION> (S/B 30+/-15 SEC). TROUBLESHOOTING 93337 1 3 STEPS REPEATED THE TEST AND THE TIME BETWEEN THE INDICATORS WAS 58 SEC. 93337 1 4 THE IPR WAS UPGRADED TO A PR AGAINST THE FUEL CELL ELECTRICAL CONTROL UN 93337 1 5 IT, WHICH CONTAINS THE TIMING CIRCUITRY FOR THE FUEL CELL. THE ECU WAS R 93337 1 6 EMOVED AND REPLACED BY INTERNATIONAL FUEL CELL CORP (VENDOR) ALL ASPECTS 93337 1 7 OF THE ECU WERE RETESTED IN THE OPF SUCCESSFULLY EXCEPT THE START UP HT 93337 1 8 R CIRCUITRY. THIS CIRCUITRY WAS RETESTED SUCCESSFULLY DURING FC#2 START 93337 1 9 AT PAD A FOR STS39. 93365 1 1 THE HEAT SINK SILICONE RUBBER RTV WAS INSTALLED AT 93365 1 2 STA Xo378 BEFORE NASA INSPECTION. TWO INCHES OF 93365 1 3 THE SILICONE RUBBER WAS REMOVED FROM THE SKIN IN T 93365 1 4 HE FIRST THREE STRINGERS BAYS (FWD OF STA Xo378). 93365 1 5 THE NASA INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED AND THE SILICON 93365 1 6 E RUBBER WAS RE-INSTALLED. 93375 1 1 NUTS AT LOCATIONS LISTED ON PAGE ONE WERE FOUND TO HAVE BAD RUNNING TO 93375 1 2 RQUE. NUTS WERE REPLACED WITH A NEW NUT. PROBABLE CAUSE NORMAL WEAR AN 93375 1 3 D TEAR. CLOSE THIS PR. 93589 1 1 SEALS ARE FALLING OFF FLIPPER DOORS. PERMANENT DEV WAS WRITTEN TO TAPE 93589 1 2 SEALS IN PLACE PREVENTING SEALS FROM COMING LOOSE. 93758 1 1 PAGE 1 ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED 11 AREAS OF CORROSION ON UPPER SKI 93758 1 2 N SURFACE OF THE OUTBD ELEVON UNDER RUB PANEL 10. TO CORRECT THIS DISC 93758 1 3 REPANCY, THE CORROSION WAS ETCHED AND THE DEPTH OF EACH PIT WAS MEASUR 93758 1 4 ED. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PITTED AREAS DID NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCT 93758 1 5 URAL FUNCTION OF THE ELEVON AND WAS ACCEPTED "OK AS IS" BY RI-BOWNEY S 93758 1 6 TRESS. THE DISCREPANT AREAS WERE THEN COATED WITH 3 LAYERS OF KOROPON 93758 1 7 TO INCREASE THE SKIN SURFACE ABILITY TO RESIST CORROSION. DISCREPANCY 93758 1 8 NO LONGER EXISTS. 93799 1 1 WHILE WORKING J/C V80-91205, WHICH INSTALLS V070-390258-002 CARRIER PA 93799 1 2 NEL A MD112-1002-0310 SCREW SHANKED OUT APPROX 1/4" FROM FLUSH. THE J/ 93799 1 3 C DOES CALL OUT TO INSTALL A MD112-1002-0305 SCREW IN THE HOLE THAT TH 93799 1 4 E -0310 SCREW SHANKED OUT, BUT THE J/C DOES NOT SHOW THE PROPER LOCATI 93799 1 5 ON OF THE SCREW HOLES, WHEN COMPARED TO THE -002 C/P (REF: PAGE 1A). A 93799 1 6 E.O. TO DWG V070-391020 WILL BE RELEASED TO SHOW PROPER FASTENER CALL 93799 1 7 OUT LOCATIONS. MR ACCEPTANCE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE -002 C/P WAS 93799 1 8 APPROVED FOR THE PANEL HOLES DRILLED (AS BUILT) AND FOR INSTALLING THE 93799 1 9 PROPER FASTENERS IN THOSE HOLES. ALSO MR'D WAS TO FILL A OPEN HOLE UN 93799 1 10 DER THE -002 C/P, DRILLED IN THE FUSELAGE, WITH MBO130-119 RTV. A TYPE 93799 1 11 II RTV FELL THROUGH THE HOLE WHEN ATTEMPTING TO FILL FLUSH (REF: PG 1 93799 1 12 B) THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "AS IS" IN WHIC 93799 1 13 H THE RTV IS BONDED JUST BELOW THE HOLE AND OUTSIDE OF THE STARTRACKER 93799 1 14 CAVITY. A TYPE III RTV WAS USED TO FILL THE OPEN HOLE. UPON VERIFICAT 93799 1 15 ION THAT RELEASED E.O. REFLECTS ENGINEERINTG DISPOSITION, CLOSE THIS P 93799 1 16 R. 94127 1 1 TWO SCREWS WERE INSTALLED WITH KOROPON ON THEM, MAKING REMOVAL IN FLIG 94127 1 2 HT DIFFICULT. THESE SCREWS WERE REPLACED WITH NEW ONES INSTALLED WITH 94127 1 3 NONCURING SEALANT MBO 120-083. CODE 28 OF MAO 608-301 STATES TO USE 94127 1 4 THIS SEALANT WHEN REMOVAL OF THE FASTENER IS ANTICIPATED (REF NOTE 13 94127 1 5 ON PAGE 17 OF SPEC). THIS INSTALLATION HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT CON 94127 1 6 FIGURATION. CAUSE OF PROBLEM: WORKMANSHIP DURING ORIGINAL SCREW INST 94127 1 7 L'N. CLOSE THIS PR. 94133 1 1 THE DISCREPANT ORBITER GROUNDING WAS RETURNED TO P 94133 1 2 ROPER CONFIGURATION BY CONNECTING THE CORRECT GROU 94133 1 3 NDING CABLES. CLOSE PR. 94222 1 1 THE LOWER INSULATOR FOR TEE #13 LEFT HAND SIDE HAS 94222 1 2 BEEN DISCOLORED BUT SHOWS INTEGRITY. EVIDENCE OF 94222 1 3 AN INSULATOR BEING OVER HEATED WOULD BE INDICATED 94222 1 4 BY FOIL OR LOSS OF INSULATION. NONE OF THE ABOVE C 94222 1 5 ONDITIONS WERE OBSERVED IN THIS INSULATOR. THEREFO 94222 1 6 RE THE INSULATOR IS PER DESIGN REQUIREMENT AND NO 94222 1 7 DISCREPANT CONDITION EXISTS. 94351 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE PEE 94351 1 2 LED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEA 94351 1 3 RING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE CAR 94351 1 4 RIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE 94351 1 5 POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO PREVENT FURTH 94351 1 6 ER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. CLOSE PR. 94395 1 1 REF. ITEM 1 PG. 1 ENGR INVESTIGATION REVEALED SIZE 94395 1 2 D HOLE WAS DONE BY VENDOR DURING WING BUILD-UP. US 94395 1 3 E OF OVERSIZED HI LOC AND NUT IN PLACE OF H/W CALL 94395 1 4 ED OUT BY DWG WAS APPROVED BY MR AS ACCEPTABLE FOR 94395 1 5 UNRESTRICTED USAGE. CLOSE PR. 94650 1 1 ALUMINUM SHT. & LT-80 TAPE WHICH WAS NOT PER PRINT 94650 1 2 HAS BEEN REMOVED. Zo 409 BEAM HAS BEEN INSP'D FO 94650 1 3 R DAMAGE. 94782 1 1 FUEL CELL 3 OXYGEN SUPPLY LINE V070-454865-114 FAILED MASS SPEC LEAK C 94782 1 2 HECK AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS, INSPECTIONS AND CLEANING. LINE FITTING AL 94782 1 3 IGNMENT WAS NOTED TO BE VERY POOR AT FUEL CELL PORT F3. LINE WAS NUT F 94782 1 4 ITTING RE-INSPECTED. FITTING FACE WAS FOUND TO HAVE A NICK IN ITS INNE 94782 1 5 R EDGE OF SEALING SURFACE. NICK WAS UN-OBSERVED PREVIOUSLY DUE TO POOR 94782 1 6 VIEWING ANGLE WHEN FITTING INSTALLED AT FUEL CELL. FITTING HAD ALSO B 94782 1 7 EEN POLISHED IN A PREVIOUS FLOW. FITTING WAS REPLACED AND LINE RE-INST 94782 1 8 ALLED AS MR LINE SECTION. SUBSEQUENT MASS SPEC LEAK CHECKS WERE SUCCES 94782 1 9 SULE. PAGE 1A TAKEN ON LINE POSITION AT LINE SUPPORT JUST FORWARD OF F 94782 1 10 UEL CELL 3. LINE SITS HIGH AND OUTBOARD OF NORMAL POSITION. MR FOAM SP 94782 1 11 ACER MADE AND INSTALLED IN PLACE TO PROVIDE SECIRING AT THIS LINE SUPP 94782 1 12 ORT WITHOUT INTRODUCING PRELOAD TO FITTING. PROBABLE CAUSE OF FAILURE 94782 1 13 WAS SEALING SURFACE NICK AND MIS-ALIGNMENT. SYSTEM RETURNED TO FLIGHT 94782 1 14 CONFIGURATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 94909 1 1 THE WHITE TOP COAT THAT CAME OFF WAS SECOND COAT THAT WAS NOT REQUIRED 94909 1 2 PER THE DRAWING SO WAS NOT REPLACED. OTHER LOOSE PAINT IN THE AREA WA 94909 1 3 S REMOVE FOR CONTAMINATION PURPOSES. THE XO # WAS RESTAMPED ON THE SIL 94909 1 4 L LONGERON. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 94921 1 1 SILICONE RUBBER EXTRUSIONS, WHICH ARE USED TO PREVENT CHAFING BETWEEN 94921 1 2 WIRE HARNESSES & LEB FRAMES, WERE FOUND TO BE DEBOND FROM THE STRUCTUR 94921 1 3 E IN SEVERAL PLACES. A 15" SECTION OF EXTRUSION WAS FOUND TO HAVE IT'S 94921 1 4 TOP HALF TORN AWAY. LOOSE & FLAKING RTV ADHESIVE WAS OUT AWAY & ALL 94921 1 5 LOOSE EXTRUSION WAS REBONDED. THE 15" SECTION WAS COMPLETELY REPLACED. 94921 1 6 THIS REPAIR HAS RETURNED THESE PROTECTIVE STRIPS TO PRINT CONFIGURATIO 94921 1 7 N AND THEIR FUNCTION IS MAINTAINED. 95080 1 1 DURING WORK IN LH BAY #2, A 70C6401-1 ELECTRICAL S 95080 1 2 UPPORT BRACKET WAS BROKEN Y A SHOP TECHNICIAN. THE 95080 1 3 OLD HARDWARE WAS REMOVED AND HI-LOKS WERE FOUND T 95080 1 4 O BE USED IN PLACE OF THE RIVETS ORGINALLY CALLED 95080 1 5 OUT ON THE INSTALLATION DRAWING. A NEW BRACKET AND 95080 1 6 HI-LOKS WERE ORDERED AND MR APPROVAL WAS RECIEVED 95080 1 7 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE INSTALLATION (WITH HI 95080 1 8 -LOKS). THE NEW HARDWARE WAS INSTALLED AND RETURNE 95080 1 9 D TO ITS PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION. 95178 1 1 OLD NOSE LANDING GEAR WHEEL/TIRE ASSY WAS REMOVED 95178 1 2 NAD NEW NLG WHEEL/TIRE ASSY WAS INSTALLED PER OMI- 95178 1 3 V1165 95200 1 1 LO2 UPPER - EXISTING COLLET HAD A 2 DEGREE BEVEL- 95200 1 2 ED WASHER INSTALLED (REF STR-3-01-0240). THIS 2 95200 1 3 DEGREE WASHER WAS REMOVED & REPLACED WITH A 2.5 95200 1 4 DEGREE WASHER. THERE WERE NO SHIMS, ONLY THE BE- 95200 1 5 VELED WASHER. LO2 LOWER - EXISTING COLLET HAD A 95200 1 6 3 DEGREE BEVELED WASHER & A 0.065" THICK WASHER 95200 1 7 (NOT SHIMS) INSTALLED THE WASHER WAS REMOVED & 95200 1 8 0.052" SHIM WAS ADDED. THE 3 DEGREE WASHER WAS 95200 1 9 REINSTALLED WITH THE NEW 0.052" SHIM. (REF STR-3- 95200 1 10 01-0240) 95274 1 1 INSTL RETURNED TO CONFIGURATION. 95283 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SILVER-TEFLON TAP DELAMINATIONS DOCUMENTED ON THIS PR H 95283 1 2 AVE BEEN REPAIRED WITH TRV 142 PER THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR PROCEDUR 95283 1 3 E. THE DISPLACED TAPE DISCREPANCIES ARE LOCATED NEAR GSE ATTACH HOLES. 95283 1 4 THIS DAMAGE IS ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THE DISPLACED T 95283 1 5 APE WAS ALSO REBONDED USING RTV 142. ONE ITEM WAS AN INDENTATOIN IN TH 95283 1 6 E SILVER-TEFLON TAPE THAT WAS NOT OF SUFFICIENT DEPTH TO HAVE PENETRAT 95283 1 7 ED THE TAPE LAYERS. THIS DEFECT WAS ACCEPTED "AS-IS". MR APPROVAL WAS 95283 1 8 RECEIVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF ALL ITEMS ON THIS PR. 95693 1 1 ITEM 1.0 OF THIS PR HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO PR STR-3-11-3347 PAGE 1A A 95693 1 2 LONG WITH OTHER DISCREPANT STRUTS IN THE RIGHT WING (REF ATTACHED COPY 95693 1 3 OF STR-3-11-3347). THIS TRANSFER WILL KEEP THE DISCREPANT STRUTS IN T 95693 1 4 HE RIGHT WING TOGETHER WHICH WILL MAKE THEM EASIER TO ADDRESS SINCE TH 95693 1 5 EY ALL HAVE SIMILAR PROBLEMS. 95713 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN PITTING, LOSS OF DRY LUBE, AND LACK OF FREE 95713 2 ROTATION WAS NOTED ON THE LH MLG UPLOCK ROLLER. THE ROLLER AND ASSOCI 95713 3 ATED HARDWARE WAS REMOVED (REF ATTACHED CHIT K3177). DENTAL MOLDS WERE 95713 4 TAKEN ON THE PITTED ROLLER AND ANALYZED ON THE OPTICAL COMPARATOR WHI 95713 5 CH YIELDED THE FOLLOWING AVERAGE DIMENSIONS: LENGTH=0.5507" WIDTH=0.03 95713 6 160" DEPTH=0.0110". PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN TO VISUALLY DOCUMENT THE PI 95713 7 TTED CONDITION. THE NUT, BOLT, AND SLEEVE WERE INSPECTED. THE NUT SHOW 95713 8 ED GALLING ON ITS FACING SURFACE, THE SLEEVE WAS GALLED ON THE OUTER E 95713 9 ND SURFACE, AND THE BOLT HAD A SMALL RIDGED AREA. THE NUT AND SLEEVE W 95713 10 ERE MR SANDED TO BLEND THE GALLED SURFACES. DENTAL MOLDS OF THE BOLT R 95713 11 IDGED AREA WERE BARELY READABLE ON THE OPTICAL COMPARATOR. THE BEST AT 95713 12 TEMPT AT A MOLD READING INDICATED 0.0004" DEPTH AND 0.034" LENGTH. SIN 95713 13 CE THE RIDGED AREA WAS BARELY DETECTABLE AND THE BOLT HAS A 0.999" DIA 95713 14 METER, THE BOLT WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE SLEEVE, NUT, AND BOLT, WERE 95713 15 REINSTALLED WITH A NEW ROLLER. FREE ROTATION OF THE NEW MLG UPLOCK RO 95713 16 LLER WAS VERIFIED. SUCCESSFUL RETEST HAS BEEN PERFORMED BY GEAR RETRAC 95713 17 TION AND EXTENSION. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE WAS DUE TO OPERATIONAL DE 95713 18 GRADATION FROM NUMEROUS LANDING GEAR CYCLES. AFTER THE ORIGINAL SUMMAR 95713 19 Y/CONCLUSION WAS SIGNED, WORKSTEPS WERE ADDED TO THIS PR TO OBTAIN CLA 95713 20 Y MEASUREMENTS OF THE GAP BETWEEN THE UPLOCK ROLLER AND HOOK (REF FIGU 95713 21 RE 2). THE GAP MEASUREMENTS WERE WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS, AND NO RIGGI 95713 22 NG WAS REQUIRED. NO FURTHER RETEST REQUIRED. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 95903 1 1 THE AVG. LOAD TO FAILURE OF THE TEST SPECIMENS WAS 95903 1 2 BELOW MIN. ACCEPTABLE AVERAGE BY 1.8%, WHICH IS V 95903 1 3 ERY CLOSE. REVIEW OF THE TEST SPECIMEN VALUES REVE 95903 1 4 ALS THAT FINGERS #1,3 & 4 ARE FAIRLY CLOSE TO EACH 95903 1 5 OTHER, WHILE FINGER #2 WAS NOTICEABLY LOWER THAN 95903 1 6 THE OTHER 3. THE AVERAGE VALUE OF FINGERS #1,3,& 4 95903 1 7 IS 2464 PSI, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE. ON 95903 1 8 LY THE VERY LOW VALUE OF FINGER #2 CAUSED THE AVER 95903 1 9 AGE LOAD TO DROP BELOW 2400 PSI. IT IS POSSIBLE TH 95903 1 10 AT FINGER #2 WAS IMPROPERLY PREPARED & THEREFORE 95903 2 1 IS NOT A GOOD INDICATOR OF THE BOND ON THE ORBITER 95903 2 2 . STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS THERFORE MAINTAINED & DE 95903 2 3 MONSTRATED BY THE 3 GOOD FINGERS. 95947 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SRVC CNTR AND IS INS 95947 1 2 TL'D. THE INSULATOR & PNL ARE OK FOR FLT. 95998 1 1 ITEM 1.0 PG. 1.0 I/B EDGE O/T C/P TO F/B BRKT STEPS WERE REWORKED BY B 95998 1 2 ONDING 1 EA MR -003 SHIM TO CORRECT O/T "A", "B" & "C" DIMENSIONS. "D 95998 1 3 " DIMENSION WAS REMEASURED IN STEP 43 PG. 26 & IS WITHIN DESIGN TOLERA 95998 1 4 NCE OF .070 +/- .008. "A" (.076), "B" (.056) & "C" (.060) WERE MEASUR 95998 1 5 ED IN STEP 76 PG. 39 AFTER SHIM WAS BONDED W/ SCREED INSTL'D TO CORREC 95998 1 6 T IML MISMATCH. ALL STEP DIMENSIONS ARE WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE O 95998 1 7 F .040 TO .085. ITEM 1.0 PG. 1.0 O/B EDGE O/T C/P TO F/B BRKT STEPS W 95998 1 8 ERE REWORKED BY BONDING 1 EA MR -002 SHIM TO CORRECT "A", "B" & "C" D 95998 1 9 IMENSIONS. "D" (.082) DIM WAS REMEASURED IN STEP 43 PG. 26 & IS WITHI 95998 1 10 N ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085. "A" (.081), "B" (.072) & "C" 95998 1 11 (.053) DIMENSIONS WERE MEASURED IN STEP 76 PG. 39 PENDING COMPLETION O 95998 1 12 N SHIM BOND ALL STEP DIMENSIONS ARE WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .04 95998 1 13 0 TO .085. ITEM 2.0 PG. 1A C/P TO STR STEPS WERE REWORKED BY BONDING 95998 1 14 1 EA MR -001 SIM TO WING T/E AT O/B EDGE OF C/P LOC. DIMENSIONS WERE 95998 1 15 REMEASURED IN STEP 5.0 & ARE ALL WITHIN DESIGN TOLEANCE OF .070 +/- .0 95998 1 16 10. ITEM 3.0 PG. 1B O/T C/P TO C/P STEPS WERE REWORKED BY BONDING SHI 95998 1 17 M ON ADJC/Ps. ITEM 8 PG. 1G & ITEM 9 PG. 1H DOCUMENTS O/T STEP FROM 95998 1 18 ADJ CARRIERS. SHIMS ARE BONDED ON PGS. 30 & 34. ALL C/P TO C/P STEPS 95998 1 19 ARE NOW WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF FLUSH TO -.045 AS MEASURED IN 95998 1 20 STEP 63 PG. 35. ITEM 4 PG. 1C DISCREPANT SHIM WAS TRIMMED BY MR IN ST 95998 1 21 EP 13.0 PG. 9 TO ELIMINATE DOC'D INTERFERENCE. ITEM 5 PG. 1D THREAD C 95998 1 22 UTS IN CENTERING HOLE WERE REMOVED PER PRINT, PER STEP 27 PG. 16 & INS 95998 1 23 P'D ON STEP 28. ITEM 6 PG. 1E GUIDE PIN ALIGNMENT PROBLEM W/ HOLE IN 95998 1 24 C/P WAS ELIMINATED AFTER RADIUS BLOCK REWORK (MR) FROM PG. 19. ALL GU 95998 1 25 IDE PIN HOLES IN C/P WERE RELOC'D BY THIS REWORK. ITEM 7 PG. 1F ENLAR 95998 1 26 GED HOLES LISTED IN THIS ITEM IS APPROVED BY MR ON PG. 41. ITEM 8 PG. 95998 1 27 1G & ITEM 9 PG. 1H SEE ITEM 3 PG. 1B SUMMARY FOR O/T C/P TO C/P STEP 95998 1 28 SUMMARY. 96002 1 1 THE INITIAL DISCREPENCY NOTED (H2 MANIFOLD 1 PRESSURE DECAY RATE TOO H 96002 1 2 IGH) WAS CAUSED BY THE H2 TANK 1 CHECK VALVE LEAKING IN THE REVERSE DI 96002 1 3 RECTION. THE CHECK VALVE IS PART OF THE LRU MANIFOLD PANEL. THE PANEL 96002 1 4 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PRE STEPS 112-136 OF THIS PR. THE REMOVED PAN 96002 1 5 EL WAS ROUTED TO THE ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER FOR REPAIR. THE HIGH PRES 96002 1 6 SURE MASS SPECS WERE PERFORMED PER STEP 159 (EXCEPT FOR SUPPLY LINE - 96002 1 7 TO BE PERFORMED PER V1022 SEQ 19). DURING OTHER PANEL RETESTS PER STEP 96002 1 8 193 AND ATTACHMENT 82A IPR 26RV-0391 WAS PICKED UP DUE TO A LEAKY H2 96002 1 9 REACTANT VALVE. THE IPR WAS UPGRADED TO A PR AGAINST THE SAME PNL AS W 96002 1 10 AS JUST REPLACED IN THIS PR (REF PR FCP-3-07-0189). THE PANEL WAS REMO 96002 1 11 VED, REPLACED AND RETESTED AS STATED IN PR FCP-3-07-0189. THIS PR WILL 96002 1 12 BE CLOSED UPON SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF PR FCP-3-07-0189 STEP 181. TH 96002 1 13 E FUEL CELL INTERFACES WERE MASS SPEC LEAK CHECKED PER STEP 183 AND FC 96002 1 14 2 AND FC3 O2 SUPPLY PARTS FAILED (REF PRS FCP-0186, 0187). THESE PR'S 96002 1 15 (FCP-0186, 0187) WILL RESOLVE THESE LEAKS WHILE RE-CONNECTING THE FC2 96002 1 16 O2 SUPPLY LINE TO THE FUEL CELL AND INSTALLING TYE-WRAPS THE INSULATIO 96002 1 17 N ON THE LINE WAS COMPRESSED AS NOTED ON PAGE 1A. THE LINE WAS MR MARK 96002 1 18 ED (STEP 194 AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE SYSTEM IS RES 96002 1 19 TORED TO FLIGHT STATUS. CLOSE THIS PR UPON SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF ST 96002 1 20 EP 181 OF PR FCP-3-07-0189. 96050 1 1 THE LH INBD MLG TIRE SHOWED A CONTINOUS LEAK FROM THE VALVE STEM WHEN 96050 1 2 BUBBLE LEAK CHECKED. THE VALVE STEM WAS "BURPED" TO ATTEMPT TO FREE AN 96050 1 3 Y LODGED DEGRIS BUT THE LEAK PERSISTED. THE VALVE CORE WAS TORQUED TO 96050 1 4 5" LBS. RESULTING IN 1 TURN. THE STEM WAS LEAK CHECKED AGAIN AND NO LE 96050 1 5 AK WAS DETECTED. THE CAP WAS INSTALLED AND AGAIN NO LEAK WAS DETECTABL 96050 1 6 E. ALL SURFACES WERE CLEANED WITH DI-IONIZED WATER TO REMOVE BOBBLE SO 96050 1 7 AP. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: VALVE STEM WAS NOT 96050 1 8 PROPERLY TORQUED WHEN CHECKED. 96059 1 1 CHIP IN RCC TEE ASSY. V070-199803-020 HAS BEEN REP 96059 1 2 AIRED PER STANDARD REPAIR. NO CARBON FIBER SUBSTRA 96059 1 3 TE IS EXPOSED. 96299 1 1 THE NICKS HAD THEIR RAISED EDGES REMOVED. DYE-PEN 96299 1 2 INSPECTION REVEALED NO CRACKS. THE NICKS ARE MR'D 96299 1 3 OK AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBLEM CAUSED BY I 96299 1 4 MPROPER HI-LOK NUT REMOVAL. 96383 1 1 CARRIER PNL SURFACE SHAVED TO ELIMINATE INTERFEREN 96383 1 2 CE WITH SEAL RETAINER. CARRIER PNL BEING I.D.'D WI 96383 1 3 TH TEST PNL P/N IS NOT A DISCREPANCE, P/N REMOVED 96383 1 4 TO AVOID FUTURE CONFUSING DISCREPANCES AGAINST C/P 96383 1 5 HAVE BEEN CORRECTED. CLOSE PR. 96505 1 1 SEVERAL SMALL DINGS WERE DISCOVERED NEAR A NUTPLATE ON HE 1307 BULKHEA 96505 1 2 D. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN TO ACCURATELY DESCRIBE DIMENSIONS OF TH 96505 1 3 E DINGS. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE DISCREPANCY IS MR ACCEPTABLE AS IS 96505 1 4 . PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. 96516 1 1 ABOVE DISCREPANCY SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN AGAINST 96516 1 2 PR STR-3-07-1702 WHICH ALREADY DOCUMENTS HEATSINK 96516 1 3 PROBLEMS IN L/H BAY 5. A PAGE 1B HAS NOW BEEN WR 96516 1 4 ITTEN CORRECTING THIS ERROR. THIS PR IS NO LONGER 96516 1 5 REQUIRED. 96547 1 1 FOR ITEM #1: THE FAYING SURFACES ON THE L-BAND ANTENNA ACCESS COVERS W 96547 1 2 ERE SEALED USING THE WRONG SEALANT: THE ACCESS COVERS WERE REMOVED AND 96547 1 3 THE CORRECT SEALANT WAS APPLIED. FOR ITEM #2: THE LH AND RH COVERS WE 96547 1 4 RE SWITCHED INTO THEIR CORRECT POSITIONS. THE DISCREPANCY FOR ITEM #3 96547 1 5 DOESN'T EXIST. 96554 1 1 THE DAMAGE TO THE PRESSURE SEAL IS A RESULT OF REPIEATED INTERFERENCE 96554 1 2 WITH THE ET DOOR DRIVE HINGES. THIS INTERFERENCE IS UNAVOIDABLE AND TH 96554 1 3 E RESULTING DAMAGE WAS ACCEPTED PER MR. THE DAMAGE WAS MR IDENTIFIED O 96554 1 4 N THE NEARBY STRUCTURE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE ET PRE 96554 1 5 SSURE SEAL. 96677 1 1 NOTED SCRATCHES WERE SANDED SMOOTH AND CORROSION PROTECTION RE-APPILED 96677 1 2 . REPAIR WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. NO RETEST REQUIRE 96677 1 3 D. 96781 1 1 THE DISCREPANT V070-199857-002 INSULATOR FOR RCC A 96781 1 2 PNEL #4 R/H WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTE 96781 1 3 R THE INSULATOR WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT PER S 96781 1 4 TR-3-07-253 MOD 002 96795 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES NOTED ON PAGES 1 THRU 1G HAVE BE 96795 1 2 EN ACCEPTED AS IS OR RESOLVED BY MR DISPO. CONSIST 96795 1 3 ING MAINLY OF (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) TRIMMING AND RE 96795 1 4 WORKING OF DEBONDS. DESIGN INTENT OF THE RTV-HEAT- 96795 1 5 SINK INSTLN HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. CLOSE PR. 96931 1 1 THE R/H V070-194106-004 C/P WAS INTERFERING W/ THE 96931 1 2 V070-198502 ROTARY SEAL HOUSING. THE C/P WAS SHA 96931 1 3 VED (PER MR) TO ALLOW A POSITIVE MRGIN OF CLEARANC 96931 1 4 E TO ELIMINATE THE INTERFERENCE. THIS WAS VERIFIE 96931 1 5 D BY A FIT CHK. THIS CLEARS THE PNL FOR UNRESTRIC 96931 1 6 TED USE. 96942 1 1 THE GAP WAS SHIMMED OUT USING ONE NAS1587-7 AND ON 96942 1 2 E NAS1587-7L WASHER FOR A COMBINED THICKNESS OF .0 96942 1 3 93". THE WASHERS WERE PLACED BETWEEN THE NUTS AND 96942 1 4 FITTING. 96995 1 1 A CUT WAS IDENTIFIED ON THE R/H OUTBOARD TIRE AFTER ROLL TO THE VAB FO 96995 1 2 R STACK. THE CUT WAS WITHIN SPEC BUT WAS DETERMINED TO NEED FURTHER EV 96995 1 3 ALUATION PRIOR TO FLIGHT BY THE B.F. GOODRICH VENDOR. THE WHEEL ASSEMB 96995 1 4 LY WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED BY S/N 070 WHEEL ASSEMBLY. THE WHEEL IN QU 96995 1 5 ESTION WITH THE CUT IS TO BE INSPECTED BY THE VENDOR PER PR MWA-078-00 96995 1 6 03 WHICH DOCUMENTS THE TIRE CONDITION. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE 96995 1 7 DAMAGE TO THE TIRE IS DUE TO ROLLING OVER DEBRIS DURING ROLLOVER. A F 96995 1 8 LIGHT WORTHY TIRE HAS REPLACED THE CUT TIRE, A PR CONDITION NO LONGER 96995 1 9 EXISTS. 97067 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 97067 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C 97067 1 3 . ACTIN TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHIN 97067 1 4 G HARDWARE TO PREVENT FUTHER DAMAGE. (CAAR #5121-8 97067 1 5 7-103-010. THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 97100 1 1 THE CRACK IN THE V070-351085-001 BRACKET HAS BEEN STOP DRILLED, AND IT 97100 1 2 HAS BEEN REPAIRED WITH AN ADHESIVE AND FIBERGLASS CLOTH PATCH. THE GH 97100 1 3 2 AND GN2 LINE CLAMPS HAVE BEEN CHANGED PER EO TO RELIEVE THE PRELOAD 97100 1 4 THAT EXISTED WHEN THE LINES WERE INSTALLED WITH THE ORIGINAL HARDWARE. 97100 1 5 THE NUTPLATES USED AS MATING HARDWARE FOR THE CLAMPS' ATTACHING FASTE 97100 1 6 NERS HAD TO BE RELOCATED TO ALLOW FOR REPOSITIONING OF THE GH2 AND GH2 97100 1 7 LINE CLAMPS. THE ORIGINAL HOLES WERE FILLED WITH ADHESIVE AND GLASS F 97100 1 8 ABRIC. THIS WORK WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 97100 1 9 TOLERANCE BUILD UP IN THE ROUTINE OF THE MPS LINES CAUSED A PRELOAD A 97100 1 10 T THE V070-351085-001 BRACKET ATTACH POINTS. THIS CAUSED THE CRACK. 97144 1 1 MD112-1002-0306 SCREW WILL PROVIDE SUFFICIENT LENGHT FOR PROPELL PENET 97144 1 2 RATION. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. 97203 1 1 THE DISCREPANT FLIGHT CAP WILL BE ROUTED TO HDA FO 97203 1 2 R RETURN TO THE MANUFACTURE, FAIRCHILD. THEY WILL 97203 1 3 RESURFACE OR REPAIR THE FLIGHT CAP TO CONFORM TO T 97203 1 4 HE MANUFACTURER'S STANDARD. 97429 1 1 THE TORN AREAS OF THE LH ET DOOR PURGE CURTAIN WAS REPAIRED WITH APPRO 97429 1 2 VED MATERIAL AND PER AN APPROVED METHOD. WIND AND TURBULENCE IS THE PR 97429 1 3 OBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 97438 1 1 FOR ITEM 1: THE PRINT CONFIF SHOWS THE USE OF A MD 97438 1 2 112-1002-0310 SCREW, A NAS620C10L WASHER, & A MD11 97438 1 3 4-1001-0004 NUT. MR ACTION APPROVED THE USE OF AN 97438 1 4 MD112-1002-0313 SCREW, THE SAME WASHER & A MD114-5 97438 1 5 003-0004 NUTPLATE THAT WAS ALREADY INSTL'D. FOR IT 97438 1 6 EM 2: THE PRINT CONFIG SHOWS THE USE OF A MD112-30 97438 1 7 02-0311 SCREW, A NAS620C10L WASHER, & A MD114-1001 97438 1 8 -0004 NUT. BECAUSE THIS FASTENER WILL NOW HAVE TO 97438 1 9 GO THROUGH THE V070-198069 RETAINER & THE V070-198 97438 1 10 071 SEAL, MR ACTION HAS APPROVED THE USE OF AN 97438 1 11 MD112-1002-0315 SCREW, THE SAME WASHER & THE SAME 97438 1 12 NUT. PMRB AGREES WITH THE ACTION TAKEN FOR BOTH DI 97438 1 13 SCREPANCIES. 97462 1 1 THE WIPER SEALS FOR THE L/H INBOARD ELEVONS WERE NOT PROVIDING A PROPE 97462 1 2 R SEAL. RTV STRIPS WERE BONDED IN PLACE TO SEAL THE ELEVON COVE. THE T 97462 1 3 HIN WIPER SEAL WAS ACCEPTED FOR ONE FLIGHT AS IS. THE REWORK OF WIPER 97462 1 4 SEALS WAS DEFERRED FOR (1) FLIGHT. OV-103'S L/H I/B ELEVON FAILED THE 97462 1 5 164 LEAK TEST DURING FLIGHT 11 PROCESSING, AND A NEW PR WAS GENERATED 97462 1 6 (STR-3-11-3372). THE NEW PR REMOVED THE WIPER SEALS, REWORKED THE AREA 97462 1 7 , AND INSTALLED NEW WIPER SEALS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEG 97462 1 8 RADATION. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING OR WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR AND IT 97462 1 9 CAN CLOSE. 97552 1 1 THE 70B2000-120 BORON-ALUMINUM STABILIZING STRUT LOCATED UNDER THE RIG 97552 1 2 HT HAND AFT OF BAY #11 (Xo1191, Yo26.25, Zo282.5) HAD A SCRATCHED AREA 97552 1 3 ON ITS SURFACE. AN ENGINEERING INSPECTION USING A FLASHLIGHT AND A 10 97552 1 4 X MAGNIFYING GLASS SHOWED NO SIGNS OF BLACK BORON FIBERS. THE SCRATCHE 97552 1 5 D AREA IS MAXIMUM .001 INCHES IN DEPTH MAXIMUM (REFERENCE STEP 3.0 AND 97552 1 6 ATTACHMENT "A" FOR ALL DIMENSIONS AND LOCATIONS). THE SCRATCHED AREA 97552 1 7 WAS SLIGHTLY SANDED TO OBTAIN A SMOOTH SURFACE AND KOROPONED. THE BORO 97552 1 8 N-ALUMINUM STRUT IS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE C 97552 1 9 AUSE: AREA WAS SCRATCHED WHEN THE STRUT COVER WAS IMPROPERLY REMOVED. 97700 1 1 A 0.58 X 0.28 INCH SMALL CHIP WAS REMOVED FROM THE 97700 1 2 EPOXY GRAPHITE SEAL CENTERLINE SUPPORT, TO1P31077 97700 1 3 . THE CHIP WAS REMOVED USING A DREMEL TOOL AND A D 97700 1 4 IAMOND POINT TIP BY ROCKWELL TULSA TECHNICIANS. 97767 1 1 RECEPTACLES 67V77W133J90 & J91 WERE UNABLE TO BE 97767 1 2 INSTALLED BECAUSE MOUNTING BRACKETS V070-156131-00 97767 1 3 1 & -002 HAD NO PROVISIONS FOR COUNTERSUNK SCREWS. 97767 1 4 COUNTERSINK ADDED TO BRACKET INSTALLATION DRAWIN 97767 1 5 G BY EO. DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 97909 1 1 DISCREPANT BUSHING R&R HAS BEEN WORKED BY STR-3-07 97909 1 2 -1542, STEP 10.0 THIS MAKES THIS A REDUNDANT P.R. 97909 1 3 AND NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 97940 1 1 DURING OMI V5RO1 (FUEL CELL 1 & 3R/R), FC3 COOLANT QD'S WHERE MISTAKE 97940 1 2 NLY DEMATED INSTEAD OF FC1 COOLANT QD'S. THIS ERROR SUBSEQUENTLY RESUL 97940 1 3 TED IN THE INSERTION OF APPROX 12 CU. IN. OF COOLANT INTO FC1 ACCUMUAL 97940 1 4 TOR WITH THE FUEL CELL IN A DEPRESSURIZED STATE. FUEL CELL PRESSURIZAT 97940 1 5 ION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED DURING COOLANT SERVICING OPERATIONS TO PRECLU 97940 1 6 DE: 1) POSSIBLE FC ACCUMULATOR OVERFILL, FUEL CELL ACCUMULATORS HOLD A 97940 1 7 PPROX 100 CU. IN. OF COOLANT AT AMBIENT TEMPERATURE WITH NORMAL SERVIC 97940 1 8 E OF 27 CU. IN. AT AMBIENT TEMP. SINCE ONLY 12 CU. IN. WERE INSERTED, 97940 1 9 ACCUMULATOR OVERFILL IS NOT A CONCERN. 2) POSSIBLE FC 02/H2 PRESSURE I 97940 1 10 MBALANCE. FC1 WAS REPRESSURIZED PRIOR TO THE EXTRACTION OF THE 12 CU. 97940 1 11 IN. OF COOLANT. THIS PRECLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN 02/H2 PRESSURE IM 97940 1 12 BALANCE. IN ADDITION, FC1 HAS BEEN REMOVED AND REPLACED SINCE THIS INC 97940 1 13 IDENT AS PART OF A MODIFICATION (MCR 10455) AND WILL BE RETURNED TO VE 97940 1 14 NDOR FOR UPGRADE/ATP. IN CONCLUSION, NO FUEL CELL DAMAGE OCCURRED AS A 97940 1 15 RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT. CLOSE THIS PR. 98136 1 1 SCRATCHES ON ROD ASSY, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAVE BEEN BLENDED- 98136 1 2 OUT AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER MR DISPOSITION. THE SCRATCHES WERE CAU 98136 1 3 SED BU THE ROD ASSY RUBBING AGAINST THE INCONEL INSULATOR ON THE FLIPP 98136 1 4 ER DOOR DURING REMOVAL OF THE ROD ASSEMBLY. THE SCRATCHES WERE NOT CAU 98136 1 5 SED DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF THE FLIPPER DOORS. ITEM 2, PAGE 1 WHICH 98136 1 6 DOCUMENTS THE L/H ROD END BEARING BINDS IN LOLLIPOP HAS BEEN EVALUATE 98136 1 7 D AND IS NOT A DISCREPANCY. THE BEARING CAN BE MOVED FREELY BY HAND WI 98136 1 8 TH A BOLT IN THE BEARING WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF BINDING. THE BEARING ALSO 98136 1 9 EXHIBITS A POLISHED SURFACE WITH NO SIGNS OF GALLING. ITEMS 1 AND 2 H 98136 1 10 AVE BEEN ADDRESSED AND RESOLVED. 98259 1 1 REWORK PER PRECEEDING STEPS RETURNS CURTAIN 98259 1 2 SEAL TO PRINT CONFIGURATION 98645 1 1 V070-397519-008 CARRIER PANEL HAD A 1/4" X 3/8" CHIP MISSING IN THE ON 98645 1 2 E CORNER OF THE FIBERGLASS PANEL BACKING. THE CHIPPED AREA WAS LIGHTLY 98645 1 3 SANDED AND CLEANED. A MIXTURE OF MB0120-037 TYPE 2 ADHESIVE AND CUT U 98645 1 4 P MB0135-009 TYPE 6 OR 8 FINISH B CLOTH WAS SMOOTHED OUT IN THE SMALL 98645 1 5 CHIPPED AREA AND ALLOWED TO CURE. THIS REPAIR OF THE -008 PANEL WAS MR 98645 1 6 ACCEPTED FOR UNRISTRICTED USE. CLOSE THIS PR. 98772 1 1 DISCREPANT PORTION OF LT80 TAPE IN HATCH SEAL GROOVE WAS REMOVED AND R 98772 1 2 EPLACED. HATCH RETEST AND SEAL LEAK TEST WERE PERFORMED PEE V1058 RUN 98772 1 3 2. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 98803 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1- A LRU PR WAS GENERATED FOR THE DISCREPANT V070-198153-0 98803 1 2 03 SEAL WHICH WAS REMOVED AND ROUTED TO HDA. A NEW V070-198153-003 ELE 98803 1 3 VON SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED TO REPLACE THE DISCREPANT SEAL. PR 98803 1 4 OBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 98829 1 1 AFTER LONG TERM STORAGE IN THE VAB, APPROX 60 DAYS 98829 1 2 OV-103 H2 MANIFOLD WERE FOUND TO HAVE DROPPED BELO 98829 1 3 W 100 PSIA. THIS IS A VIOLATION OF OMRSD V45BEO.02 98829 1 4 0 WHICH STATES THAT THE H2 MANIFOLDS MAY NOT DROP 98829 1 5 BELOW 100 PSIA WITH THE FUEL CELLS INSTALLED. THIS 98829 1 6 DISCOVERY WAS MADE UPON INITIAL POWER-UP OF THE OR 98829 1 7 BITER AFTER ITS RETURN TO THE OPF. PAST EXPERIENCE 98829 1 8 S HAVE SHOWN THAT WHEN THE PRSD SYSTEMS (O2/H2) AR 98829 1 9 E LEFT UNTENDED FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME, THE SYST 98829 1 10 EMS WILL EXPERIENCE PRESSURE DEGRADATIONS. WHEN 98829 1 11 THE ORBITER IS STORED IN THE VAB, PRSB HAS NO MEAN 98829 1 12 S TO MAKE UP PRESSURE THAT IS LOST DUE TO SYSTEM 98829 1 13 DEGRADATION. TROUBLESHOOTING WAS PERFORMED TO SEE 98829 1 14 IF THE LEAKAGE EXPERIENCED WAS CAUSED BY SOMETHING 98829 1 15 OTHER THAN NORMAL SYSTEM DEGRADATION. THE H2 TANKS 98829 1 16 WERE PUMPED UP TO FLIGHT PRESSURE AND FLIGHT CAPS 98829 1 17 INSTALLED TO THE H2 FLIGHT POPPETS. LEAK CHECKS WE 98829 1 18 RE PERFORMED ON THE FLIGHT CAPS WITH NO LEAKS RECO 98829 1 19 RDED THE SYSTEM WAS THEN MONITORED OVER A PERIOD O 98829 1 20 F TIME WITH NO GROSS LEAKAGE INDICATED. IT CAN BE 98829 1 21 CONCLUDED THAT THE LEAKAGE THAT OCCURED WAS DUE TO 98829 1 22 NORMAL ALLOWABLE LEAKAGE. ALLOWABLE LEAKAGE FOR H2 98829 1 23 MANIFOLDS JOINTS IS 1 X 10 SCCS, LEAKAGE FOR H2 AI 98829 1 24 RBORNE HALP COUPLINGS IS 900 SCCM. THE AMOUNT OF A 98829 1 25 LLOWABLE LEAKAGE COMBINED WITH THE LENGTH OF TIME 98829 1 26 THE ORBITER WAS IN STORAGE EQUATED TO THE LEAKRATE 98829 1 27 THAT WAS EXPERIENCED, APPROX 1 PSI/DAY. THE PRSD M 98829 1 28 ANIFOLDS ARE KEPT ABOVE 100 PSIA TO PREVENT A PRES 98829 1 29 SURE INBALANCE ON THE FUEL CELLS. A PRESSURE INBAL 98829 1 30 ANCE COULD CAUSE AN ELECTROLYTE SHIFT WITHIN THE 98829 1 31 CELL WHICH IN TURN WOULD AFFECT THE CELLS PERFORMA 98829 1 32 NCE. THE FUEL CELLS COUPLED REACTANT REGULATOR RED 98829 1 33 UCES THE SUPPLY GAS FROM IT SUPPLY PRESSURE DOWN T 98829 1 34 O G5 PSIA FOR DELIVERY TO THE POWER SECTION, H2 PR 98829 1 35 ESSURE IS REGULATED 5 PSI BELOW THAT OF THE 02. AS 98829 1 36 LONG AS THE SUPPLY GASES ARE ABOVE 65 PSIA THE REG 98829 1 37 WILL ACT NORMALLY AND NO DAMAGE WILL OCCUR TO THE 98829 1 38 FUEL CELL. THE ORBITERS H2 MANIFOLDS DROPPED TO 37 98829 1 39 4 PSIA AND 379 PSIA, FROM THIS DATA IT CAN BE CONC 98829 1 40 LUDED THAT NO DAMAGE OCCURRED TO OV-103 FUEL CELLS 98829 1 41 THIS IPR WILL BE UPGRADED TO A PR THEN CLOSED UPON 98829 1 42 RECEIPT OF WAIVER. 98835 1 1 DISCREPANCY IS WITHIN SPEC TOLERANCE FOR RCC 98835 1 2 INSULATORS. 98975 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED ON ITEM 1, PAGE 1 OF STR 98975 1 2 -3-A0116. THIS PR IS THEREFORE, A DUPLICATE PR. ITEM 1 WILL BE WORKED 98975 1 3 AND RESOLVED ON PR-3-A0116 99056 1 1 DESCREPANT PART WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED AND RETESTED. THE BUNGEE INDI 99056 1 2 CATOR SWITCH WHEN DEPRESSED DID NOT PROPERLY INDICATE ON THE C70-0894 99056 1 3 LOG CONTROL UNIT. THE CONECTOR WAS DEMATED AND CONTINUITY CHECKS WERE 99056 1 4 PERFORMED. THE SWITCH SHOWED AN OPEN CONTACT WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN FR 99056 1 5 EE TO ACTUATE. THE SWITCH WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED AND RIG CHECKS WERE 99056 1 6 PERFORMED TO VERIFY RIGGING AND MAKE ADJUSTMENTS. RIGGING WAS ACCOMPL 99056 1 7 ISHED AND A GEAR CYCLE WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY PROPER PERFORMANCE OF T 99056 1 8 HE SWITCH. RESULTS WERE NOMINAL. THE SWITCH AFTER BEING REMOVED ACTUAT 99056 1 9 ED NORMALLY INDICATING THE CONTACT FREEING UP. THE SWITCH HAS BEEN SEN 99056 1 10 T TO MSC TO BE ROUTED TO VENDOR FOR ANALYSIS AND REPAIR. PROBABLE CAUS 99056 1 11 E IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 99143 1 1 DURING STS-39 FLOW IN THE OPF, THJENLG BUNGEE SWITCH WAS REMOVED AND REP 99143 1 2 LACCED WITH A NEWLY DESIGNED UNIT ER TPS MEQ-3-12-176. DURING GEAR RETRA 99143 1 3 CTION, THE ELECTRICAL SIGNAL FROM THE OLD SWITCH IS (ON-OFF-OFF). DURING 99143 1 4 S5023 GEAR RETRACTION THE NLG SPRING ENGAGE LIGHT DS8 ON THE C70-0894 B 99143 1 5 OX WAS OBSERVED TO GO OFF AS EXPECTED WITH THE NEW SWITCH IN PLACE. S502 99143 1 6 3 WAS DEV'D TO ALLOW FOR THE NEW SWTICH RESPONSE BUT OMRSD V51AAO.030 AN 99143 1 7 D V51ABO.020 STILL CALLED FOR THE LIGHT TO COME BACK ON. WAIVER WK2101R1 99143 1 8 WAS APPROVED TO WAIVE THESE REQUIREMENTS ON STS-39. RCN OV10175M WAS AP 99143 1 9 PROVED TO CHANGE THESE REQUIREMENTS FOR LATER FLIGHTS. THIS PR CONDITION 99143 1 10 NO LONGER EXISTS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE-NLG SWITCH MOD WAS 99143 1 11 MADE ONE FLIGHT EARLIER THEN EXPECTED AT TIME RCN WAS PROCESSED. 99267 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY ON THIS PR WAS ADDRESSED BY ENGINEERING ON PR MEQ-3-06 99267 1 2 -0185. BOTH PR'S ACCEPTED THE DAMAGE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "AS-IS". THI 99267 1 3 S DISCREPANCY IS DOCUMENTED IN THE R/H RADIATOR PANEL DAMAGE DOCUMENTA 99267 1 4 TION LOG/GRID MAP. ONCE A DISCREPANCY IS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 99267 1 5 USE AND DOCUMENTED, IT IS UNNECESSARY TO RE-ADDRESS THE SAME DAMAGE. T 99267 1 6 HIS DISCREPANCY HAS NOT WORSENED AND REMAINS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICT 99267 1 7 ED US "AS-IS". NO MR ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS "NO DISCREPANC 99267 1 8 Y". 99487 1 1 WHEN HOLES WERE DEBURRED AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF MA 99487 1 2 TERIAL WAS REMOVED CAUSING A KNIFE EDGE CONDITION. 99487 1 3 OV-103 DOUBLER WAS SCRAPPED. A NEW DOUBLER WAS MA 99487 1 4 DE USING BLANK DOUBLER OBTAINED FROM OV-104. MOD K 99487 1 5 IT ANOTHER BLANK WAS ORDERED FOR OV-104. THIS WAS 99487 1 6 A WORKMANSHIP PROBLEM. CLOSE PR. 99563 01 1 VOID PR, DUPLICATE. 99584 1 1 RELOCATIONG OF NUT PLATE AND ROTATING ALLOWS PRO 99584 1 2 PER ALIGNMENT OF ADAPTER PLATE FASTNER WITH NUT- 99584 1 3 PLATE 99609 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATORS WERE REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CNTR. THE 99609 1 2 INSULATORS HAVE BEEN INSTL'D INTO THE RCC PNL FLT. 99619 1 1 MBO-130-173 RTV STOPS AT Xo 707.25 WERE BONDED, OV 99619 1 2 ERLAPING STRINGER 25 BY .100 INCH. THE TWO RTV STO 99619 1 3 PS WERE REMOVED AND REBONDED. AT Xo 735.75, ONE RT 99619 1 4 V STOP OVERLAPED STRINGER 25 BY .025 INCH. THE OVE 99619 1 5 RLAP (.025") WAS REMOVED AND THE RTV STOP WAS MR'E 99619 1 6 D. 99657 1 1 ONE MD111-4020-1226 BOLT WAS TORQUED PER STEP 7.0 OF STR-3-07-317. "E 99657 1 2 LEPYHANT HIDE" WAS ADDED TO ADJACENT LINES TO INCREASE ACCESS TO THE W 99657 1 3 ORK AREA WHICH RESOLVED THE ORIGINAL DISCREPANCY. EXTENSIONS WERE OBT 99657 1 4 AINED TO APPLY THE REQ'D TORQUE. 99840 1 1 3 EA V070-852159-001 BRACKET ASSY. WERE FOUND TO BE BROKEN. BRACKETS W 99840 1 2 ERE REPLACED RETURNING BRACKETS AND WIRE HARNESS INSTALLATION TO PRINT 99840 1 3 CONFIGURATION. NASA EPD ENGINEERING INSPECTED WIRE HARNESS AND NO DAM 99840 1 4 AGE WAS FOUND. PROBABLE CAUSE: MAN TRIPPED CAUSING DAMAGE 3/8/89 CLOSE 99840 1 5 THIS PR. 100026 1 1 THE 0 GRAVITY COUNTERWEIGHT SYS WAS RECONFIG & CONNECTED TO THE PORT R 100026 1 2 ADIATORS PER TPS MEQ-3-07-109 MOD 002. THE WEIGHT BASKET WAS PINNED & 100026 1 3 SLACK WAS REMOVED FROM THE CABLE. IN THIS CONFIG THE SYS IS ADEQUATELY 100026 1 4 SUPPORTED PER DESIGN CENTER RQM'TS. THE DESIGN CENTER HAS DONE A THEO 100026 1 5 RETICAL ANALYSIS OF SUPPORTING THE RADIATROS WITH Z SUPPORT RODS & NO 100026 1 6 0 GRAVITY SYS & CONCLUDED THAT "NO DAMAGE IS LIKELY TO HAVE OCCURRED & 100026 1 7 NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQ'D". REFER TO PAR RESPONSE NO. LSS 2410. THE 100026 1 8 PORT RADIATORS ARE STOWED & LATCHED FOR FLIGHT. PERFORMANCE OF THESE 100026 1 9 STEPS OUT OF ORDER IS NO LONGER A DISCREPANT COND. REF PER FOR ITEM 1 100026 1 10 OF PG 1. 100098 1 1 MINOR DAMAGE TO THE B91B10058-38 ELEVON ACTUATOR P 100098 1 2 NL PROBABLY OCCURRED DURING REMOAL FROM THE WING T 100098 1 3 O SUPPORT ACTUATOR INSP. MINOR REPAIR ACCOMPLISHE 100098 1 4 D BY FILING THE VOID IN THE EDGE OF THE PNL W/ MBO 100098 1 5 120-008 ADHESIVE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY REMAINS PO 100098 1 6 SITIVE. 100117 1 1 HI-LOK REVERSED PRECLUDING FURTHER INTERFERENCE 100117 1 2 NICK IN DOOR STOP SMOOTHED & PAINTED CLOSE PR 100332 1 1 THE DISCOLORED METAL IS NOT HEAT DAMAGE TO THE 100332 1 2 STRUCTURE. IT IS SOOT DEPOSITS FROM THE SUPERFICI- 100332 1 3 AL HEATING OF THE BLANKETS ON THE INTERIOR OF THE 100332 1 4 NOSE CAP. THESE SOOT DEPOSITS WERE ALSO BLOWN BY 100332 1 5 THE DOOR/STRUCTUREINTERFACE AND DEPOSITED ON THE 100332 1 6 EXTERIOR OF THE DOOR AND STRUCTURE. THIS CONDITION 100332 1 7 IS CONSIDERED NORMAL. QC NOTE: ACTION TO INVESTI- 100332 1 8 GATE REASON FOR PAST TILE OVEN TEMP POSSIBLE OVER- 100332 1 9 TEMP OF THE STR. IN FURTURE FLIGHTS. 100541 1 1 L/H INBD ELEVON OUTBD BLADE SEAL WHICH BINDS IN THE HOUSING DOCUMENTED 100541 1 2 BY ITEM 1 PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED BY MACHINING THE OUTBD HOUSING HAL 100541 1 3 F AND BLADE SEAL PER MR DISPO. ENGINEERING HAS CYCLED THE BLADE WITHIN 100541 1 4 THE HOUSING AND THE BLADE MOVES FREELY WITHOUT BINDING. ITEM 1 PAGE 1 100541 1 5 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: SLIGHT BOW OF 100541 1 6 BLADE AND HOUSING. 100570 1 1 ALL THREE FUEL CELLS (FC) H2 PURGE LINES ARE MANIF 100570 1 2 OLDED TO A COMMON OVERBOARD H2 PURGE PORT WHERE TH 100570 1 3 E LEAKAGE OCCURED. THE INITIAL LEAKAGE WAS DETECTE 100570 1 4 D DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF TPS FCP-3-07-015 WITH 100570 1 5 TYGON HOSE AND WATER. TPS RESULTS ARE EVERY 40 TO 100570 1 6 60 SECONDS THEREAFTER DURING THE 4 MINUTE OBSERVAT 100570 1 7 ION PERIOD. FOLLOWING PR'S WERE ASSIGNED TO EACH F 100570 1 8 C PR FCP-3-07-0077 FC3 S/N 103 100570 1 9 PR FCP-3-07-0078 FC2 S/N 113 100570 1 10 PR FCP-3-07-0080 FC1 S/N 114 100570 1 11 VOLUMETRIC LEAK DETECTOR WAS USED DURING PR FCP-3- 100570 1 12 07-016 FOR TWELVE (12) MINUTES. THE RESULTS WAS ZE 100570 1 13 R (0) LEAKAGE FROM PORT. ALL THREE FUEL CELLS WERE 100570 1 14 REMOVED AND ROUTED TO INTERNATIONAL FUEL CELL (IF 100570 1 15 C) BY TPS FCP-3-07-016 FOR PLANNED MODIFICATIONS ( 100570 1 16 MCR 10455). IFC ANALYSIS INDICATED NO H2 LEAKAGE F 100570 1 17 ROM THE REMOVED FUEL CELLS. FUEL CELLS'S ALLOWABLE 100570 1 18 LEAKAGE IS 25 BUBBLES IN 5 MINUTES (PER FUEL CELL 100570 1 19 ) PER IFC'S ACCEPTANCE TEST CRITERIA. COMBINED LEA 100570 1 20 KAGE OF ALL THREE FC'S AT KSC WAS LESS THAN 1 BUBB 100570 1 21 LE PER MINUTE WHICH IS WELL WITHIN THE LIMITS OF I 100570 1 22 FC'S CRITERIA. 100610 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO CORRECT AN UNSATISFACTORY FIT O 100610 1 2 F THE +X COAS BRACKET ON THE EYEBROW OVERHEAD CONSOLE. THIS WAS ACCOMP 100610 1 3 LISHED BY REAMING ONE OF THE THREE MOUNTING HOLES UP TO PRINT SPECIFIC 100610 1 4 ATION. THE OTHER TWO HOLES WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED FLIGHT IN 100610 1 5 THEIR UNDERSIZED CONDITION. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CA 100610 1 6 USE OF THIS DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. 100616 1 1 REPLACEMENT DOUBLER OBTAINED, DISCREPANCY DOCUMENT 100616 1 2 ED ON NEW DOUBLER REF. STR-3-07-1348. CLOSE THIS 100616 1 3 PR. 100761 1 1 NO HOLES WERE FOUND TO BE DRILLED IN 70Q3821 SIDE SKIN SUPPORTS ON LH 100761 1 2 SIDE XO703.50 & XO693.00. 2 EA HOLES PER LOCATION ARE REQUIRED FOR PAY 100761 1 3 LOAD INSTALLATION FOR THIS FLIGHT PER M072-710456. THE HOLES WERE DRIL 100761 1 4 LED PER EO-TO-FOLLOW TO CORRECT THIS DISCREPANCY. PROBABLE CAUSE: DRAW 100761 1 5 ING DEFICIENCY. UPON VERIFICATON THAT RELEASED EO REFLECTS ENGINEERING 100761 1 6 DISPOSITION, CLOSE THIS PR. 100837 1 1 GRUMMAN DRAWING B91B15013 CALLED OUT, IN FLAG NOTE #1, THE USE OF PROT 100837 1 2 ECTIVE FINISH ON NAME PLATES PER GN11AC TYPE 7 OR 7A. REV "N" OF GN11 100837 1 3 AC CALLS OUT TYPE 7 AND 7A COATING AS GP110HF12 FINISH #527. FINISH # 100837 1 4 527 IS PROTECTIVE COATING, KNOWN COMMERCIALLY AS, Z11-220 FLAT CLEAR C 100837 1 5 OATING, ALKYD ENAMEL, MANUFACTURED BY NAE-DAR/K.C. COATING CO. TETERB 100837 1 6 ORO, N.J. SPEC #GN11AC WAS REVISED ON 12-3-87 TO REV "N". 100837 1 7 THE NAME PLATE WAS OVERCOATED USING THE ABOVE LISTED MATERIAL DURING A 100837 1 8 SSEMBLE/REWORK OF THE WING STRUCTURE MOD B91B15013, THEREFORE THE DISC 100837 1 9 REPANCY LISTED IN BLOCK #17 PG #1 OF THIS PR NO LONGER EXISTS. REV "M 100837 1 10 " AND "N" OF GN11AC ENCLOSED FOR CLEARIFICATION. 101013 1 1 DUE TO THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT SURROUNDING MATERIAL THE ROSAN INSERT WO 101013 1 2 ULD NOT LOCK INTO THE ELEVON STRUCTURE AND WOULD UNSCREW WHEN THE C/P 101013 1 3 BOLT WAS REMOVED. NEW INSERT WAS INSTALLED WITH LOCKING COMPOUND, BUT 101013 1 4 ALSO FAILED. AN OVERSIZE (O.D.) INSERT WAS INSTALLED AND INSERT LOCKIN 101013 1 5 G WAS FINALLY OBTAINED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY REMAINS POSITIVE AND STAN 101013 1 6 DARD SIZE BOLT IS STILL USED TO FASTEN THE C/P TO THE UNDERLYING SEAL 101013 1 7 PANEL. PRIOR TO INSTALLING THE OVERSIZE INSERT, A NEW ORBITER CERT REQ 101013 1 8 UIREMENT (CS # 060 "INSTALLATION OF THREADED INSERTS") WAS PUT INTO EF 101013 1 9 FECT. SINCE THERE ARE NO TECHS IN THE OPF CERTIFIED TO PERFORM THIS TA 101013 1 10 SK YET; QE HAS ALLOWED, THROUGH MRB APPROVAL, A PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENED 101013 1 11 TECH TO COMPLETE THIS INSTALLATION. A CAAR WILL TRACK AND COORDINATE A 101013 1 12 N EFFORT TO HAVE TECHS CERTIFIED IN THE FUTURE. THIS MR ACTION IS NOT 101013 1 13 A CONSTRAINT TO CLOSURE. 101110 1 1 THE INSTALLATION WAS REPAIRED AS FOLLOWS: REF DISC 101110 1 2 REPANCY ITEM 1. FASTENER HOLES WERE REAMED OVERSIZ 101110 1 3 E TO REMOVE THREAD MARKS. ALL HOLES WERE THEN EXAM 101110 1 4 INED UNDER 10X MAGNIF. AND NO DEFECTS WERE NOTED. 101110 1 5 THE HOLES WERE THEN CHECKED BY EDDY CURRENT TEST ( 101110 1 6 EXCEPT FOR ONE WHICH WAS NOT ACCESSIBLE AND TWO WH 101110 1 7 ICH WERE OUT OF ROUND), NO CRACKS WERE FOUND. THE 101110 1 8 HOLES WERE ACCEPTED PER MR RATIONALE ON PG. 9. REF 101110 1 9 DISCREPANCY ITEM 2. THE CORROSION PROTECTION WAS 101110 1 10 ACCEPTED PER MR RATIONALE ON PG. 10. REF DISCREPAN 101110 1 11 CY ITEMS 3,4,&5 FASTENER HOLES WERE REAMED OVERSIZ 101110 1 12 E TO REMOVE THREAD MARKS. ALL HOLES WERE EDDY CURR 101110 1 13 ENT TESTED AND NO CRACKS WERE FOUND. THE HOLES WER 101110 1 14 E ACCEPTED PER MR RATIONALE ON PG 14. 101177 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL REQUIRED FOR USE OF THE 101177 PMRB 2 V070-198500-025 LEFT HAND SEAL INSTALLATION WITH THE V070-198520-001 101177 PMRB 3 SEAL RETAINER AS INSTALLED WITH 23 OF 24 FASTENERS. THE HOLE FOR THE 101177 PMRB 4 FASTENER AT THE -YW435 POSITION (AS SHOWN IN DRAWING V070-198500) WAS 101177 PMRB 5 NOT DRILLED DURING ORIGINAL BUILD. DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT 101177 PMRB 6 HARDWARE, THE HOLE CAN NOT BE DRILLED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE 101177 PMRB 7 FASTENER WOULD ATTACH THE INBOARD PANEL TO THE ELEVON STRUCTURE. ANY 101177 PMRB 8 LOADS THIS FASTENER WOULD INCUR DURING THE FLIGHT WILL BE TRANSFERRED 101177 PMRB 9 THROUGH THE PANEL TO THE ADJACENT FASTENER GROUPS AND ARE WITHIN THE 101177 PMRB 10 ACCEPTABLE LIMITS OF THOSE FASTENERS. NO EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS MRB 101177 PMRB 11 ACTION WAS NOTED ON THE SEAL RETAINER OF ELEVON STRUCTURE. THE 101177 PMRB 12 V070-198520-001 SEAL RETAINER WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION, AS INSTALLED 101177 PMRB 13 WITH 23 OF 24 FASTENERS, PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF 101177 PMRB 14 SAFETY FOR THE LIFE OF THE VEHICLE. THE SEAL RETAINER IS SECONDARY 101177 PMRB 15 STRUCTURE. SAFETY, FIT OR FUNCTION IS NOT COMPROMISED. THIS MR ACTION 101177 PMRB 16 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES 101177 PMRB 17 NOT AFFECT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OF HAZARD CONTROLS. MR ID HAS 101177 PMRB 18 BEEN PERFORMED. DEFERRAL RATIONALE: MRB APPROVAL IS REQUIRED FOR 101177 PMRB 19 RESTRICTED LIFE FOR ONE FLIGHT. MR IDENTIFICATION WAS INADVERTENTLY 101177 PMRB 20 OMITTED (ACCESS IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE). THIS MR ID WILL BE PERFORMED 101177 PMRB 21 POST FLIGHT 22. THIS DEFERRAL DOES NOT AFFECT THE TECHNICAL RATIONALE 101177 PMRB 22 ON PAGE 6. PR MAY BE CLOSED AFTER APPLICATION OF MR ID. SAFETY, FIT AND 101177 PMRB 23 FUNCTION IS MAINTAINED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS 101177 PMRB 24 FOR CERTIFICATION, NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE CIL, RETENTION RATIONALE OR 101177 PMRB 25 HAZARD CONTROLS. MR ID HAS NOT BEEN PERFORMED. POST FLIGHT DISPOSITION 101177 PMRB 26 ON PAGE 5. 01/28/97 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 23 OF OV-103. 101177 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THIS PR DOCUMENTS A MISSING FASTENER HOLE IN THE 101177 1 2 V070-198520-001 RETAINER AND THE ELEVON LEADING EDGE SPAR. THE HOLE COU 101177 1 3 LD NOT BE DRILLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT HARDWARE (ELEVON AND 101177 1 4 HINGE TUBE REMOVAL REQUIRED). PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION, THE V070 101177 1 5 -198520-001 RETAINER WAS ACCEPTED AS INSTALLED WITH 23 OF 24 FASTENERS. 101177 1 6 MR ID HAS BEEN APPLIED. PREVIOUS MR RESTRICTED DISPO FOR FLIGHTS 11-22 W 101177 1 7 AS CHANGED TO UNRESTRICTED FOR FLIGHT 23. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS 101177 1 8 VENDOR. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 101312 1 1 DISCREPANT CONDITION OF ITEM 1 PG. 1 HAS BEEN EVAL 101312 1 2 UATED BY STR-ENG AND CONCLUDED THAT PER PRINT INST 101312 1 3 ALLATION OF CLIPS CAN BE PERFORMED. NO FURTHER DIS 101312 1 4 PO/ACTION REQ'D ON THIS PR. CLIP WILL BE INSTALLED 101312 1 5 PER STR-3-07-221 ITEM (S) 28.1 AND 29.1. CLOSE PR 101484 1 1 DISCREPANCY 1 WAS DESIGN DEFICIENCY & HAS BEEN RES 101484 1 2 OLVED BY MR DISPO TO REAM THE HOLES TO A LARGER DI 101484 1 3 A. DISCREPANCY 2 WAS AN INTERMEDIATE ACCESS PROBL 101484 1 4 EM & WAS RESOLVED BY A MOD TO STR-135. DISCREPANC 101484 1 5 Y 3 WAS A RESULT OF WORKMANSHIP & HAS BEEN MR'D TO 101484 1 6 ACCEPT HOLES "OK AS IS" OR REAM ADDITIONALLY & TH 101484 1 7 EN ACCEPT. DISCREPANCIES 4, 5 & 6 WAS A RESULT OF 101484 1 8 WORKMANSHIP & HAS BEEN RESOLVED BY MR DISPO TO RE 101484 1 9 AM UNTIL DAMAGE IS REMOVED & THEN TO ACCEPT HOLE. 101527 1 1 V070-198330-001 SEAL ASSY IS NOT PART OF SYSTEM THAT LEAKS IN ELEVON C 101527 1 2 OVE. THIS SEAL CLOSES OUT AREA BETWEEN ELEVON ATTACH POINT AT YW212 AN 101527 1 3 D SEAL PANEL WHICH IS NOT PRESSURUZED FOR V1164. THERE ARE NOT REQUIRE 101527 1 4 MENTS FOR THIS SEAL WITH RESPECT TO LEAK RATE. SEAL WAS INSPECTED BY E 101527 1 5 NGINEER AND IT IS INSTALLED PER DESIGN. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NO DISCREPAN 101527 1 6 CY. 101544 1 1 THIS WAD WAS INITIATED AS AN IPR WHEN THE DS3 NLG BUNGEE LITE ON THE C 101544 1 2 70-0894 BOX FAILED TO GO OFF UPON FINAL GEAR RETRACTION, MOST LIKELY I 101544 1 3 NDICATING FAILURE OF THE PLUNGER TO FULLY ACTUATE THE SWITCH, AND THUS 101544 1 4 INABILITY TO VERIFY THAT THE BUNGEE IS ARMED. THE GEAR WAS LOWERED, A 101544 1 5 LL BUNGEES WERE RECOCKED, AND AN INSPECTION OF THE SWITCH SHOWED NO DA 101544 1 6 MAGE. THE SWITCH WAS CHECKED OUT ELECTRICALLY AND MECHANINCALLY AND VE 101544 1 7 RIFIED TO BE OPERATING PROPERLY. THE SWITCH WAS THEN REMOVED AND RE-RI 101544 1 8 GGED BY ADJUSTING WASHERS AS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE PROPER SWITCH ACTUAT 101544 1 9 ION AND GAP "A" (SEE FIG 1). THE NEW RIGGING WAS VERIFIED USING THE 08 101544 1 10 94 BOX AND FINAL GEAR RETRACTION WAS REPERFORMED AND COMPLETED WITHOUT 101544 1 11 ANOMALIES. THE IPR WAS UPGRADED TO AN MEQ PR AGAINST THE NLG MECHANIC 101544 1 12 AL INSTALLATION DUE TO IMPROPER RIGGING. THIS FAILURE HAS OCCURRED ON 101544 1 13 THIS VEHICLE BEFORE AS WELL AS ON EACH OF THE OTHER VEHICLES AND IS TH 101544 1 14 E RESULT OF A DESIGN DEFICIENCY IN THE SWITCH ACTUATION LINKAGE. THIS 101544 1 15 SWITCH (AND ITS RIGGING) WAS VERIFIED TO BE OPERATING PROPERLY DURING 101544 1 16 V1098, LANDING GEAR FUNCTIONAL, ONLY EIGHT DAYS PRIOR TO THIS ANOMALY. 101544 1 17 THE POTENTIAL FOR THE REPEAT OF THIS ANOMALY DURING ANY GIVEN CYCLE I 101544 1 18 S HIGH DUE TO THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE MECHANISM. MCR 13290 HAS BEE 101544 1 19 N APPROVED FOR A DESIGN MOD THAT WILL PROVIDE A MUCH MORE RELIABLE MEA 101544 1 20 NS OF POSITIVE SWITCH ACTUATION (AND THEREFORE VERIFICATION THAT THE B 101544 1 21 UNGEE IS ARMED). THE MOD IS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED TO BE IMPLEMENTED DURI 101544 1 22 NG NEXT FLOW. (FLIGHT 12) OF OV-103. 101695 1 1 PAGE 1 ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED (4) HOLES IN THE XO1307 BULKHEAD T 101695 1 2 HAT COULD NOT BE PLUGGED PER TPS VSTR-3-07-224 BECAUSE THEY WERE OVERS 101695 1 3 IZED. THIS PROBLEM WAS CORRECTED BY MEASURING THE HOLES AND INSTALLING 101695 1 4 LARGER DIAMETER HI-LOKS PER MR APPROVAL. DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS 101695 1 5 . 101896 1 1 TWO FASTENERS HOLES 229 AND 221 ON THE LOWER WING 101896 1 2 SURFACE DOUBLER INSTLN WERE LOCATED TOO CLOSE TO T 101896 1 3 HE BORDER TO HAVE AN ACCEPTABLE EDGE DISTANCE. THE 101896 1 4 FASTENERS WERE RELOCATED W/O AFFECTING THE WAY TH 101896 1 5 E DOUBLER IS INTENDED TO BE INSTLD. ANOTHER FASTEN 101896 1 6 ER LOCATION HOLE 209 WAS DELETED FOR THE SAME REAS 101896 1 7 ON. THIS WILL NOT SIGNIFICANTLY EFFECT THE STRUCTU 101896 1 8 RAL INTEGRITY OF THE DOUBLER INSTLN AND THEREFORE, 101896 1 9 IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR ACTION. 101896 1 10 THE NON-PERPENDICULAR HOLES WILL NOT EFFECT THE 101896 1 11 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE DOUBLER INSTLN AND IS 101896 1 12 ACCEPTABLE PER MR. CLOSE PR. 101942 1 1 CONDITION ONLY EXISTS WHEN ON THE GROUND, NO COINS 101942 1 2 TRAINT TO LAUNCH. 102060 1 1 HOLE ELONGATION WILL NOT AFFECT FORM, FIT, OR FUNC 102060 1 2 TION 102060 1 3 ENLARGEMENT OF THE THREE ENLOGATED HOLES TO .250 - 102060 1 4 .253 WILL CLEAN UP THE ELONGATIONS, AND WILL ALLOW 102060 1 5 USE OF THE DOUBLER AS THE DRAWING INTENDED. THIS 102060 1 6 REWORK WILL NOT EFFECT THE FORM, FIT OR FUNCTION 102060 1 7 OF THE INSTALLATION, AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRES- 102060 1 8 TRICTED USAGE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 102331 1 1 OCN NO. FOR 02 T/C RELIEF PORT FLT FTG (V070-454721-002) WAS NOT RECOR 102331 1 2 DED DURING INSTALLATION PER JC V45-50007. NOTE: OCN NO'S ARE NOT MARKE 102331 1 3 D ON FLT FITTIGS. IN ADDITION, JOB CARD DID NOT REQUIRE OCN # RECORDIN 102331 1 4 G. CVAS TRACKING SYSTEM WAS UPDATED AND OCN # OBTAINED PER STEP 1 OF T 102331 1 5 HIS PR. IN ADDITION, JOB CARD V45-50007 HAS BEEN UPDATED TO INCLUDE OC 102331 1 6 N # RECORDINGS. 02 T/C RELIEF PORT IT IN DRAWING CONFIGURATION. 102622 1 1 ITEM 1 & 2 PAGE 1, 1A, THE V070-198718-003 FLIPPER DOOR TRAILING EDGE 102622 1 2 SEAL RETAINER WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE WITH MINOR WRINKLIN 102622 1 3 G IN THE METAL AT THE OUTBOARD END. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS POOR HANDLING O 102622 1 4 F RETAINER. 102642 1 1 DURING RADIATOR REMOVAL THE HINGE BOLTS WAS DAMAG- 102642 1 2 ED. THIS PR ORDERS NEW BOLTS TO BE USED IN THE IN 102642 1 3 STL'N OF THE R/H RADIATORS ON TPS MEQ-3-07-100. 102642 1 4 PR MEQ-3-07-0254 INSPECTS ALL HINGE LOCs ON THE RA 102642 1 5 DIATOR & VEH SIDE FOR DAMAGES. NOTE: BOLTS WERE 102642 1 6 REMOED BY TPS MEQ-086 WHICH IS REPLACED. 102796 1 1 JO-BOLTS REPLACED RIVETS AT 25 LOCATION, PER MR DI 102796 1 2 SPO, ON THIS PR. THE JO-BOLTS WERE INSTALLED PER T 102796 1 3 PS VSTR-3-07-285 MOD 005. EXISTING FASTENERS PREVE 102796 1 4 NTED USE OF RIVETS. INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR 102796 1 5 FLIGHT. 103014 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF V070-353591-001 BULB SEAL DAMAGES IDENTIFIED AS ITE 103014 2 M 1.0 OF THIS PR WAS SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED PER MR REPAIR. THE SEAL WAS 103014 3 REPAIRED WITH RTV SILICONE ADHESIVE RESTORING THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRIT 103014 4 Y AND DESIGN INTENT OF THE SEAL. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADA 103014 5 TION. 103047 1 1 DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN TRANSFERED TO PR STR 3-07- 103047 1 2 1799. 103093 1 1 TWO PILOT HOLES USED FOR INSTALLING A NUT PLATE ON 103093 1 2 THE V070-856558 STIFFENER WERE MISDRILLED BY A TE 103093 1 3 CHNICIAN. ONE HOLE WAS CONSUMED AFTER THE PILOT HO 103093 1 4 LE WAS DRILLED UP TO SIZE & THE OTHER HOLE WAS FIL 103093 1 5 LED WITH A DOUBLE FLUSHED RIVET. THE STRUCTURAL IN 103093 1 6 TEGRITY OF THE STIFFENER REMAINS POSITIVE. CLOSE P 103093 1 7 R. 103206 1 1 THE V070-193024-001 C/P FWD ATTACH LOCATIONS WERE SHIMMED TO ACHIEVE A 103206 1 2 CCEPTABLE C/P TO C/P STEP COND'S. THE DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. MR 103206 1 3 BOLTS WERE ADDED TO REFLECT SHIMMING OF THE C/P. 103286 1 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSP OF THIS/THESE DMG CONDIT. 103286 1 2 INDICATES THAT THE DMG IS MINOR. THIS/THESE CONDIT 103286 1 3 ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO REQ A REPAIR. THE SC 103286 1 4 RATCHES AND/OR HOLES AND/OR DMG IS TO THE SILVER T 103286 1 5 EFLON TAPE ONLY. THIS MINOR TAPE DMG IS ALLOWABLE 103286 1 6 PER VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL. THE DING, IF 103286 1 7 ANY, ARE MINOR AND DO NOT REQ A REPAIR. THIS/THESE 103286 1 8 CONDIT WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE FIT, FORM, AND 103286 1 9 /OR FUNTION OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CONDIT WIL 103286 1 10 L NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HEAT TRANSFER CAPACITY 103286 1 11 OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CONDITION IS ACCABLE 103286 1 12 "AS-IS" FOR UN-RESTRICTED USE. NO MR I.D. REQ'D 103286 1 13 (DING MAP) 103722 1 1 THE SPLIT IN R/H RCC PANEL #3 INSULATOR WAS REPAIR 103722 1 2 ED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. THE INSULATOR IS OK 103722 1 3 FOR FLIGHT AND WILL BE INSTALLED ONTO PANEL #3 PE 103722 1 4 R STR-3-07-253 MOD 002. 103782 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM (S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE 103782 1 2 PEELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD 103782 1 3 BEARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. 103782 1 4 THE SHIM (S) WERE CENTERED OVER THE BOLT HOLES PE 103782 1 5 R MR TO RESOLVE THE MISALIGNMENT PROBLEM. R.C. ACT 103782 1 6 ION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING HA 103782 1 7 RDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87-1 103782 1 8 03-C1). 103949 1 1 FITTING V070-856731-001 (OCN F87285) WAS FOUND TO 103949 1 2 BE UNUSABLE DUE TO GALLED THREADS & WAS REMOVED. 103949 1 3 ALL ATTACH'G H/W WAS SCRAPPED LOCALLY. THE V070-3 103949 1 4 50511-004 HYD LINE SUPT & THE V070-856967-001 INTE 103949 1 5 RCOASTAL APU #1 MOUNT WERE ALSO REMOVED TO ALLOW F 103949 1 6 OR THE FITTING REMOVAL. A REPLACEMENT FITTING WAS 103949 1 7 INSTL'D (OCN S00536) W/ THE GALLED ONE BEING ROUT 103949 1 8 ED TO HDA FOR DISPO (LRU STR-3-07-1988). THE HYD 103949 1 9 LINE SUPT & THE INTERCOASTAL APU MOUNT WERE REATTA 103949 1 10 CH'D PER PRINT. 103959 1 1 DENTS 1-5 ARE MINOR AND SUPERFICIAL IN NATURE. STR 103959 1 2 UCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE AVONICS BAY COVER REMAINS 103959 1 3 AS DESIGN INTENDED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THIS 103959 1 4 SECONDARY STRUCTURE IS NOT COMPROMISED. 104016 1 1 ACCESS WAS OBTAINED & REWORK TO PRINT CONDITION 104016 1 2 WAS ACCOMPLISHED. 104342 1 1 THE TOP PNL OF AVIONICS BAY 4 HAS SEVERAL SMALL DENTS. SEE FAILURE ANA 104342 1 2 LYSIS REQUEST ATTACH SHT FOR MEASUREMENTS OF ALL DEFECTS. A DYE PENETR 104342 1 3 ANT INSP WAS PERFORMED TO SEVERAL WORST CASE DENTS, AS WAS AN ULTRASON 104342 1 4 IC INSP. BOTH INSP'S SHOWED NO DEBONDING OR CRACKS WERE PRESENT. PER M 104342 1 5 R ACCEPTANCE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, AN ALUMINUM DOUBLER WAS BONDED OVER 104342 1 6 DENTS ZA & B USING MBO 120-037 TYPE II ADHESIVE. THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO 104342 1 7 BOND THIS DOUBLER RESULTED IN PGS 1; A,B,C, & D. EACH OF THESE POINT- 104342 1 8 PGS WERE RESOLVED WITH A SECOND SUCCESSFUL DOUBLER BONDING ATTEMPT. AL 104342 1 9 L OTHER MINOR DENTS WERE CORROSION PROTECTED & MR ACCEPTED OK "AS IS" 104342 1 10 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 104347 1 1 AFTER WORKING V30-13305, INSPECTION OF DRAG LINK SUPPORT TUBE FITTINGS 104347 1 2 , AT Xo 378 CT BLKD, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE (6) INSTALLATION BOLTS WERE 104347 1 3 UNDER TORQUED. THE (6) BOLTS AND RELATED H/W WERE THEN TORQUED CORREC 104347 1 4 TLY PER MAO101-301, CLASS 1. THE LATEST REV. OF THE INSTALLATION DWG. 104347 1 5 WAS NOT UPDATED CORRECTLY. AN EARLIER EO CHANGED THE INSTALLATION GRDW 104347 1 6 . A NEW EO WAS RELEASED TO CORRECT THE LATEST DWG. REV. 104735 1 1 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF PR RP03-13-0492, NO POWER (ZERO VOLTS) WAS 104735 1 2 DETECTED FROM THE ALCA-3 RECEPTACLE 56V76A123J11 PIN -G. TROUBLESHOOTING 104735 1 3 ON IPR 39V-0171 DETERMINED THAT A TYPE III DRIVER IN THE LCA HAD FAILED 104735 1 4 AND THIS IPR WAS UPGRADED TO PR OEL-3-12-0001. THE AFT LCA NO. 3 WAS 104735 1 5 THEN REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW ALSA PER OMI V5C17.006. (REFER TO 104735 1 6 THE OEL SUMMARY ON PAGE 13 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMTION). RETEST OF THE 104735 1 7 ALCA-3 WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED PER THE SYSTEMS SYGNATURES/WADS ON 104735 1 8 PAGE 14. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO 104735 1 9 THE WIRE BEING SHORTED TO GROUND DURING THE TROUBLESHOOTING ON PR 104735 1 10 RP03-13-0492. 104735 1 11 104773 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. THE 104773 1 2 INSULATOR HAS BEEN INSTALLED INTO THE RCC PANEL AND THE PANEL IS INSTA 104773 1 3 LLED FOR FLIGHT. 104816 1 1 DURING V1058 TASK 04, CREW HATCH VERTICAL FUNCTIONAL, THE FORCE MEASUR 104816 1 2 ED TO OPEN THE HATCH FROM INSIDE WAS 47 LBS., S/B 40 LBS. MAX. THE TES 104816 1 3 T WAS REPERFORMED WITH ENG SUPERVISION AND THE HATCH WAS OPENED WITH A 104816 1 4 FORCE OF 37 LBS. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS WITH THE CREW HATCH. P 104816 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATOR ERROR. 104875 1 1 THE V070-339856-001 SUPPORT ASSY WAS REMOVED FROM THE CREW MODULE STRU 104875 1 2 CTURE DUE TO DEBONDING AT THE FORWARD END. THE -001 SUPPORT ASSY WAS R 104875 1 3 EBONDED, USING MBO130-136 ADHESIVE. THIS ADHESIVE WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR 104875 1 4 SUE IN PLACE OF MBO120-053 TYPE III ADHESIVE WHICH IS PER DRAWING. THE 104875 1 5 MBO130-136 ADHESIVE SUBSTITUTION WAS NECESSARY DUE TO THE MBO120-053 A 104875 1 6 DHESIVE REQUIRED HEAT WHICH WAS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF DAMAGE TO WIRING 104875 1 7 /TUBING AND PYROS IN THE BONDING AREA. JSC RO NOTE: ITEM 2 PAG 1 TAKEN 104875 1 8 CARE OF STEP 4.0 PG 2. 104888 1 1 FOR ITEM #1 THE V070-191066-002 C/P HAD O/T STEPS 104888 1 2 TO A F/B BRKT. A SHIM WAS MADE (MR-001) OF .010" 104888 1 3 +/- .003" & BONDED TO THE F/B TO BRING STEPS WITHI 104888 1 4 N TOLERANCE. FOR ITEM #2 THE C/P HAD O/T STEPS W/ 104888 1 5 THE LWR SKIN IML. A SHIM WAS MADE (MR-002) OF .0 104888 1 6 10" +/- .003" & BONDED TO THE WRING TRAILING EDGE 104888 1 7 STR TO BRING STEPS WITHIN TOLERANCE. FOR ITEM #3 104888 1 8 THE SHIM MR-002 WAS UNABLE TO BE BONDED DUE TO INT 104888 1 9 ERFERENCE W/ A F/B UNDER THE TILE. THE SHIM WAS T 104888 1 10 RIMMED FROM .75" TO .40" TO CLEAR THE INTERFERENCE 104888 1 11 . FOR ITEM #4 THE BOND JOINT OF THE MR-001 SHIM H 104888 1 12 AD VOID ON THE UPPER INBD CORNER. THE VOID WAS F 104888 1 13 ILLED W/ RTV. FOR ALL ITEMS' STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 104888 1 14 HAS NOT BEEN COMPROMISED. 105259 1 1 PAGE 1 ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED ATTACH BOLTS IN A BORON STRUT THAT 105259 1 2 COULD NOT BE REMOVED USING THE USUAL METHOD. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A 105259 1 3 BOLT WAS GALLED PREVENTED THE PREVENTING THE REMOVAL OF THE BOLTS. TH 105259 1 4 IS PROBLEM WAS CORRECTED BY RIGGING A C-CLAMP, A SOCKET, AND A SMALLER REF_RPT_NO TEXT_ SEQ_NO DISPOSITION ---------- ----- ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 105259 1 5 BOLT AS PIN TO DRIVE THE DISCREPANT ATTACH BOLT OUT. THE HARDWARE WAS 105259 1 6 REPLACED AND THE STRUT WAS INSPECTED. THE INSPECTION LED TO THE PAGE 105259 1 7 1A ITEM 2 DISCREPANCY OF (3) SCRATCHES ON THE OUTER LIP OF THE ATTACH 105259 1 8 HOLE ON THE STRUT. THIS PROBLEM WAS CORRECTED BY LIGHTLY ABRADING THE 105259 1 9 OUTER LIP OF TF THE HOLE TO REMOVE RAISED SURFACES PER MR APPROVAL. PA 105259 1 10 GE 1B ITEM 3 DISCREPANCY AROSE UPON INSTALLATION OF THE STRUT. IT WAS 105259 1 11 DISCOVERED THAT THE AFT ATTACH BOLT (XO1181 FITTING) COULD NOT BE INST 105259 1 12 ALLED WITHOUT APPLYING A DOWNWARD LOAD ON THE STRUT. THE STRUT WAS INS 105259 1 13 TALLED USING A DOWNWARD LOAD OF UP TO 20 LBS. PER RI DOWNEY APPROVAL. 105259 1 14 ADDITIONALLY, THE THREE SUPPORT HOLES ON THE ORBITER WERE REAMED AFTER 105259 1 15 A FIT CHECK REVEALED THAT THE BOLTS COULD NOT BE INSTALLED. THE REAMI 105259 1 16 NG ALLOWED THE BOLTS TO BE INSTALLED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. DISCREP 105259 1 17 ANCIES NO LONGER EXIST. 105479 PMRB 1 MR ACTION IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED USE TO ACCEPT DELAMINATIONS AT LH 105479 PMRB 2 PLBD 4 XO 1164.20 INBOARD STRONGBACK ATTACH HOLE 7 AND LH PLBD 4 XO 1244 105479 PMRB 3 .20 INBOARD STRONGBACK ATTACH HOLE 7 (REFERENCE ATTACHMENT "MOD 003") UN 105479 PMRB 4 TIL. OMDP. DEFERRAL RATIONALE: LH PLBD 4 XO 1164.20 INBOARD STRONGBACK A 105479 PMRB 5 TTACH HOLE 7 AND LH PLBD 4 XO 1244.20 INBOARD STRONGBACK ATTACH HOLE 7 A 105479 PMRB 6 RE DELAMINATED AROUND HOLES. THE DELAMINATIONS WERE DETECTED ON OV-103 F 105479 PMRB 7 LIGHT 11. THE FLIGHT 12, 13, 15 & 19 ULTRASONIC INSPECTIONS SHOWED NO FU 105479 PMRB 8 RTHER INCREASE IN DELAMINATIED AREAS. DELAMINATED AREA WILL BE INSPECTED 105479 PMRB 9 DURING OMDP AND EVALUATED FOR REPAIR. THE DELAMINATIONS ARE LCOATED 105479 PMRB 10 UNDER THE FASTENER HEADS THAT PROVIDE A MECHANICAL CLAMPING FORCE TO THE 105479 PMRB 11 GRAPHITE/EPOXY SKIN WHEN STRONG BACK PADS AND CARRIER PANELS ARE 105479 PMRB 12 INSTALLED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND DESIGN INTENT OF THESE DELAMINATED 105479 PMRB 13 AREAS OF THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS ARE MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS 105479 PMRB 14 POSITIVE. THIS IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR ACTION IS NO IMPACT ON 105479 PMRB 15 CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS 105479 PMRB 16 MR ACTION IS NO IMPACT ON CERTIFICATION AND ASSOCIATED RATIONALE. MR 105479 PMRB 17 ACTION IS RESTRICTED LIFE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. PMRB APPROVAL FOR DEFER 105479 PMRB 18 RAL TO FUTURE FLT(OMDP) OF OV-103. 08/12/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL 105479 PMRB 19 TO FUTURE FLT (OMDP) OF OV-103. 105479 1 1 ITEMS 1 THRU 4: THE 10 NOTED DELAMINATIONS AT THE STRONG BACK ATTACH HOL 105479 1 2 ES ON THE LH PLBD SEGMENT 4 WERE INITIALLY MR ACCEPTED, 8 OF THE LOCATIO 105479 1 3 NS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND THE OTHER 2 WERE ACCEPTED F 105479 1 4 OR RESTRICTED USE ON A FLIGHT BY FLIGHT BASIS UNTIL OMDP J2. FOR OMDP, J 105479 1 5 SC ISSUED A CHIT P4609 TO REPAIR AS A MINIMUM THE 140 DAMAGED HOLES NOTE 105479 1 6 D ON 8 PRS INCLUDING THIS PR. ROCKWELL DETERMINED IT WOULD BE BEST TO IN 105479 1 7 STALL ACRES SLEEVES AT ALL 272 BOLT LOCATIONS AND STR-3-J2-676 HAS BEEN 105479 1 8 RELEASED TO DO THE WORK. THE WORK ON STR-3-J2-676 WILL REPAIR THE 10 HOL 105479 1 9 ES ON ITEMS 1 THRU 3 OF THIS PR. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS 105479 1 10 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 105611 1 1 V070-856383-005 BRACKET WAS FOUND TOO LOW TO MOUNT TUBE SADDLE CLAMP. 105611 1 2 BRACKET WAS INSTALLED 1 HI-LOK TOO LOW AND WAS MOVED UP INTO CORRECT P 105611 1 3 OSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 105682 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1: DURING INSPECTION OF #4 PLBD NUMEROUS AMOUNT OF 105682 1 2 CHIPPING WAS DETECTED AROUND STRONGBACK ATTACH POINT HOLES. THE DISCRE 105682 1 3 PANCIES WERE MEASURED AND RECORDED. THE OVERSIZED HOLES WERE REPAIRED 105682 1 4 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BY MR ACTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEA 105682 1 5 R. REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A: DURING INSPECTION OF #4 PLBD THE AREA WHERE 105682 1 6 THE STONGBACK ARE ATTACHED EXHIBITS WEAR (SCRATCHES) THROUGH THE KOROP 105682 1 7 ON. THE WEAR WAS REPAIRED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BY MR ACTION. PROBABLE 105682 1 8 CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1B: DURING INSPECTION 105682 1 9 OF #4 PLBD DELAMINATION WAS FOUND AROUND (1) ATTACH POINT HOLE. DELAMI 105682 1 10 NATION WAS REPAIRED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BY MR ACTION. REF ITEM 4,5 ON 105682 1 11 PAGE 1B, ITEM 6,7 ON PAGE 1C. DURING INSPECTION OF #4 PLBD DELAMINATIO 105682 1 12 NS WERE FOUND AROUND (4) ATTACH POINT HOLES. THE DELAMINATIONS WERE EV 105682 1 13 ALUATED AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BY MR ACTION. REF ITEM 8 ON 105682 1 14 PAGE 1D: DURING INSPECTION OF #4 PLBD IT WAS NOTICED THAT (1) FASTENER 105682 1 15 WAS LOOSE OR NOT TORQUED. A CLOSER INSPECTION VERIFIED THAT NUT PLATE 105682 1 16 WAS NOT DAMAGED. NO DISCREPANCY EXIST. 105804 1 1 THE 70B2000-87 BORON-ALUMINUM STABILIZING STRUT LOCATED UNDER THE RIGH 105804 1 2 T HAND OF BAY #12 HAS A VERY GRADUAL DENT ON ITS SURFACE. THIS DENT IS 105804 1 3 ONLY .0046 INCHES IN DEPTH MAXIMUM (REFERENCE STEP 4.0 AND ATTACHMENT 105804 1 4 "A" FOR ALL DIMENSIONS AND LOCATION) AND HAS NO SHARP EDGES. THE BORO 105804 1 5 N-ALUMINUM STRUT IS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE C 105804 1 6 AUSE: INADVERTELY HIT (MAYBE AN ELBOW) WHILE WORKING ON THE AREA. 105821 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WHICH IDENTIFIES SCORE MARKS ON RH OMS POD ATTACH POIN 105821 1 2 T #3'S BOLT SHANK HAS BEEN RESOLVED BY ORDERING A NEW BOLT AND ROUTING 105821 1 3 DISCREPANT BOLT TO HDA. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 105890 01 1 VOID PR, DUPLICATE. 105901 1 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSPECTION OF THIS/THESE DMG 105901 1 2 CONDIT INDICATES THAT THE DMG IS MINOR. THIS/THESE 105901 1 3 CONDIT ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO REQ A REPAIR. 105901 1 4 THE SCRATCHES AND/OR HOLES AND/OR DMG IS TO THE SI 105901 1 5 LVER TEFLON TAPE ONLY. THIS MINOR TAPE DMG IS ALLO 105901 1 6 WABLE PER VOUGHT REAIATOR REPAIR MANUAL. THE DINGS 105901 1 7 ,IF ANY, ARE MINOR AND DO NOT REQ A REPAIR. THIS/ 105901 1 8 THESE CONDIT WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE FIT, FOR 105901 1 9 M, AND/OR FUNCTION OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CON 105901 1 10 DIT WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HEAT TRANSFER 105901 1 11 CAPACITY OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CONDITION IS 105901 1 12 ACCABLE "AS-IS" FOR UN-RESTRICTED USE. NO MR ID 105901 1 13 REQ'D(DING MAP) 106011 1 1 THIS PR CONDITION IS THE CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCY RECORDED ON PR-STR-3 106011 1 2 -12-3463. THIS PR WILL BE CLOSED AND WRITTEN AS A PAGE 1A TO STR-3463. 106056 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING FLIGHT 10, AFTER FINAL GEAR RETRACTION, T 106056 1 2 O DOCUMENT A SUSPECT CONDITION WHICH WAS IDENTIFIED ON OV-102 AND NO L 106056 1 3 ONGER ACCESSIBLE ON OV-103 FOR INSPECTION. ON OV-102, THE NLG AXLE BEA 106056 1 4 RING RETAINING NUTS WERE FOUND TO BE COCKED WITH RESPECT TO THE AXLE H 106056 1 5 OUSING. THAT LOWER STRUT PISTON WAS REMOVED FROM OV-102 AND INSPECTED 106056 1 6 BY THE VENDOR (MENASCO). IT WAS DETERMINED THAT BEARING END PLAY WAS N 106056 1 7 OT COMPROMISED BUT THE AXLE NUTS WERE CROSSTHREADED AND DAMAGED. OV-10 106056 1 8 3'S NLG AXLE SUSPECT CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED FOR FLIGHT 10 PER RESTRICT 106056 1 9 ED MR. THE AXLE NUTS WERE INSPECTED POST FLIGHT AND THE "COCKED NUT" C 106056 1 10 ONDITION DID NOT EXIST. DURING OPF PROCESSING FOR FLIGHT 11, THE PISTO 106056 1 11 N/AXLE ASSY WAS REMOVED AND RETURNED TO MENASCO FOR INSPECTION PER PR 106056 1 12 MEQ-3-A0036. THE AXLE WAS MODIFIED DUE TO A SEPARATE PROBLEM AND THE P 106056 1 13 ISTON WAS REINSTALLED AND SERVICED PER THAT SAME PR. THE SUSPECT CONDI 106056 1 14 TION, "BEARING END PLAY", NEVER EXISTED. 106104 1 1 PG 1 ITEMS 1 & 2 DISCREPANCIES DESCRIBE A BORON STRUT THAT CAN'B BE IN 106104 1 2 STL'D BECAUSE THE STRUT MOUNTING HOLES DID NOT LINE UP & THE VLEVIS & 106104 1 3 X0636 FITTING WERE MISALIGNED. AFTER MEAS'S OF THE MISALIGNMENT WERE T 106104 1 4 AKEN, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT REAMING THE FWD HOLE BUSHING ON THE X0636 106104 1 5 BUSHING WOULD CORRECT THIS PROBLEM. THE FWD HOLE BUSHING WAS ENLARGED 106104 1 6 FROM .250 (+.002,-.000) TO .265. DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXIST. 106114 1 1 SURFACE CORROSION IS IN SURFACE COATING ONLY AND 106114 1 2 HAS BEEN REMOVED BY SANDING AND SUBSEQUENTLY RE- 106114 1 3 FINISHING. 106128 1 1 THE ITEM 1.0 DISCREPANCY WAS CORRECTED BY RELOCATING THE FASTENER ATTA 106128 1 2 CH POINT AND FILLING THE DISCREPANT HOLE IN THE SUBSTRATE WITH APPROVE 106128 1 3 D POTTING MATERIAL AND RIVETING THE CORRESPONDING RETAINER HOLE. 106134 1 1 CONTACT WITH STRUT WAS ELIMINATED BY REWORK OF ELE 106134 1 2 VON STRUT ON PR STR-3-07-1384. BRAKCET DAMAGE WAS 106134 1 3 MR'D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AFTER REWORK. CAUSE WAS 106134 1 4 UNKNOWN. 106176 1 1 THIS PR WHICH DOCUMENTS LO2 CURTAIN CONTAMINATED WITH HYDRAULIC FLUID 106176 1 2 IS A DUPLICATED OF STR-3-10-3088 WHICH HAS ALREADY ORDERED A NEW CURTA 106176 1 3 IN. THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL DISCREPANCY DUPLICATE PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: W 106176 1 4 RITTEN IN ERROR. 106567 1 1 BOND STRAP REPLACED AND RETURNED TO PRINT 106622 1 1 CLEANED UP/REAMED HOLES NUMBERS 1,3 AND 5. (REF AT 106622 1 2 TACHED SKETCH FOR HOLES LOCATIONS AND INSTALLED MD 106622 1 3 127-0002-0305 BLIND FASTENERS IN HOLES NO. 1 AND 5 106622 1 4 MD127-0002-0306 IN HOLE NO. 3 PER DWG. INSTALLED 106622 1 5 HL 410-6-6 OVERSIZE HI-LOK WITH ME114-0028-0006 CO 106622 1 6 LLAR THE ABOVE REF WORK WAS COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY 106622 1 7 WITH SYS STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MAINTAINED. WITH PR 106622 1 8 OPER MR ID MARKING. CLOSE PR. 106690 1 1 TWO VERY SMALL AREAS OF SILVER-TEFLON TAPE PEEL WE 106690 1 2 RE FOUND ALONG THE C/L LATCHES ON RH #1 RADIATOR P 106690 1 3 ANEL. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE AREA AFFECTE 106690 1 4 D WAS EXTREMELY SMALL (APPROXIMATELY 0.014 SQUARE 106690 1 5 INCHES). LSOC, ROCKWELL AND NASA ENGINEERING DECID 106690 1 6 ED TO REMOVE THE DELAMINATING TAPE TO PREVENT ANY 106690 1 7 FURTHER PEELING AND THE PANEL WAS MR'D AS ACCEPTAB 106690 1 8 LE FOR UN-RESTRICTED USE. THE REPAIR LOCATIONS AND 106690 1 9 DESCRIPTIONS WERE RECORDED IN THE OV-103 RADIATOR 106690 1 10 PANEL DING MAP LOG BOOK. 106764 1 1 THE SPAR INSULATOR (V070-190317-001) FOR RCC PNL # 106764 1 2 17 L/H SIDE HAS BEEN REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE 106764 1 3 CNTR PER MLO311-0022 PARA. 3.1. THE INSULATOR IS 106764 1 4 OK FOR FLT & WILL BE INSTL'D PER STR-3-07-155. 106832 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO MR ACCEPT FOR UNRESTRICTED FLIG 106832 1 2 HT A NOT-PER-PRINT CARRIER PANEL (V070-395962-007) AND A CHANGE IN THE 106832 1 3 ORIENTATION OF ITS ATTACHMENT HARDWARE. THIS CARRIER PANEL IS SECONDA 106832 1 4 RY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS A MANUFACTURING ERROR. 106874 1 1 THE FLOW RATES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PG 1, ARE WELL BELOW THE MAXIMUM 106874 1 2 ALLOWABLE FLOW RATE OF 65 SCFM. THE FLOW RATES DO EXCEED THE MAXIMUM I 106874 1 3 NCREASE OF 25% ABOVE THE PREVIOUS PREFLIGHT FLOW RATES. DUE TO THE REB 106874 1 4 UILD OF THE ELEVON COVE SEAL SYSTEMS (REF STR-3-11-454), OMRSD WAIVER 106874 1 5 WK 1930 WAS REQUESTED AND APPROVED TO WAIVE THE 25% MAXIMUM INCREASE R 106874 1 6 EQUIREMENT.SINCE THE 25% MAXIMUM INCREASE REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN WAIVED 106874 1 7 AND THE FLOW RATES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PG 1, ARE BELOW THE 65 SCFM M 106874 1 8 AXIMUM FLOW RATE, ITEM 1 IS NO LONGER A PR CONDITION. CONCLUDE THAT TH 106874 1 9 E PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SEAL SYSTEM IS WITHIN DESIGN INTENT AND NO FUR 106874 1 10 THER WORK IS REQUIRED. 107008 1 1 ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL TEFLON TUBE IS RIPPED FROM BASE OF SEAL. THE TEFLON 107008 1 2 TUBE WAS REPAIRED BY WRAPPING IT WITH (3M61) TAPE PER MR CONCURRACE. 107008 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 107138 1 1 ITEM 1: THE STRIKER ASSY BETWEEN RH PLBD'S 2 AND 3 INDICATED AS HITTING 107138 1 2 HARD AGAINST A HI LOK AND CAUSING A SEPERATION AT THE SPLICE LINE WAS FO 107138 1 3 UND TO ACTUALLY BE LIGHT CONTACT WITH A HI LOK JTHAT WAS INSTALLED PER A 107138 1 4 PREVIOUS UNRESTRICTED MR REPAIR. THE LIGHT CONTACT WAS MR APPROVED FOR 107138 1 5 UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. ITEM 2: THE CRACK PROPAGATING IN COMPOSITE MATER 107138 1 6 IAL AT 12 O'CLOCK POSITION FROM HI LOK HOLE WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR RESTRICT 107138 1 7 ED USE FOR FLIGHTS 11 AND 12. DURING FLIGHT 13 PROCESSING OF THE DISCREP 107138 1 8 ANT AREA AN NDE INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE CRACK WAS ACTUALLY A SMALL 107138 1 9 DELAMINATION. ADHESIVE WAS INJECTED INTO THE VOIDS AND ADDITIONAL RIVETS 107138 1 10 WERE INSTALLED AROUND THE DELAMINATED AREA THEREBY PREVENTING FUTURE 107138 1 11 DELAMINATION PROPAGATION AND RESTORING THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE 107138 1 12 BELLYBAND WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. THE HI LOK THAT CONTACTED THE 107138 1 13 STRIKER PLATE (ITEM 1) AND CAUSED THE DELAMINATION (ITEM 2) WAS REPLACED 107138 1 14 WITH A PER PRINT RIVET DURING THIS UNRESTRICTED MR REPAIR. 107369 1 1 THE V070-346141-001 TEE BRACKET COULD NOT BE INSTALLED PER TPS STR-3-0 107369 1 2 9-426 DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH AN ADJACENT BRACKET. AFTER INVESTIGATIN 107369 1 3 G THE DRAWINGS, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE LOCATION FOR BONDING THE TE 107369 1 4 E BRACKET WAS INCORRECT ON THE TPS. THE PRINT LOCATES THE BRACKET AT Y 107369 1 5 o -8.2 WHICH ELIMINATES THE INTERFERRENCE DOCUMENTED IN ITEM 1. THE TP 107369 1 6 S HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO CORRECT THE Yo COORDINATE AND THE PR CONDITION 107369 1 7 NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR. 107392 1 1 THE MISSING MD114-5004-0004 (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) AND MD114-5003-0004 (ITEM 107392 1 2 2, PAGE 1A) NUTPLATES WERE REPLACED WITH MD114-0001-0004 NUTS WITH MR 107392 1 3 APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE CAUSE OF THE MISSING NUTPLATES WAS 107392 1 4 DUE TO THE VENDOR NOT INSTALLING NUTPLATES AT THESE LOCATIONS DURING 107392 1 5 ORIGINAL ASSEMBLY. CONCLUDE THAT DESIGN INTENT HAS BEEN MAINTAINED AND 107392 1 6 NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 107444 1 1 DRIVE SHAFTS ARE DESIGNED TO BE FLEXIBLE IN TWO DI 107444 1 2 RECTIONS (Z & Y). FAIRLEADS ARE INSTALLED IN PLBD 107444 1 3 RIBS TO PREVENT SHAFTS FROM CONTACTING/DAMAGING PL 107444 1 4 BD RIB. THEREFORE, POTENTIAL CONTACT OF DRIVE SHAF 107444 1 5 T AND FAIRLEAD IS NOMINAL. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDIT 107444 1 6 ION. CLOSE THIS PR. 107513 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPO WAS TO REPAIR THE V070-395984-001 ANGLE SUPP 107513 1 2 ORT (ITEM 1.0, PAGE 1.0). THE ANGLE SUPPORT WAS FIXED BY BENDING IT BA 107513 1 3 CK INTO CORRECT SHAPE AND PERFORMING A DYE-PEN TEST TO SEE IF ANY CRAC 107513 1 4 KS WERE DEVELOPED. NO CRACKS RESULTED, THEREFORE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRES 107513 1 5 TRICTED USE. THE REPAIR DID NOT AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY 107513 1 6 OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 107618 1 1 A NEW V070-858088-002 SHIM WAS OBTAINED. NO FURTH 107618 1 2 ER ACTION REQ'D. 107737 1 1 H2 TK SURFACE SCRATCH (ITEM 1) HAD A DEPTH OF .002 107737 1 2 3" W/ WORST CASE PAINT THICKNESS OF .0012", PENETR 107737 1 3 ATION OF SCRATCH INTO OUTER TK METAL SKIN IS .0011 107737 1 4 ". OUTER TK THICKNESS IS .070". THUS A SUFFICIEN 107737 1 5 T DESIGN MARGIN EXIST FOR OUTER TK STRUCTURAL INTE 107737 1 6 GITY W/ THIS DEFECT IN ITS SURFACE. THE SCRATCH I 107737 1 7 N THE TK TRUNNION (ITEM 2) IS .0049" DEEP W/ .0012 107737 1 8 " OF THAT DEPTH PAINT THICKNESS, SO THE EFFECTIVE 107737 1 9 SCRATCH DEPTH IS .0037". THE TRUNNION PLATE THICK 107737 1 10 NESS IS APPROX. .500" THICK AT AREA OF SCRATCH, TH 107737 1 11 US A SUFFICIENT DESIGN MARGIN EXISTS FOR TRUNNION 107737 1 12 PLATE TO RETAIN ITS STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. H2 TK 1 107737 1 13 HAS BEEN MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR ID 107737 1 14 MARKED, & HAD PAINT SURFACE (2 PLACES) RESTORED. 107778 1 1 THE V070-339614-004 PNL IS PART OF THE V070-339616-004 PNL ASSY. THIS 107778 1 2 ASSY WAS RPLCD BY THE V070-339883-002 ASSY ON VSTR-3-07-229 PER MCR 1 107778 1 3 1075 (REF. PRCBD S60243R7). THE V070-339616-004 PNL ASSY WAS ROUTED T 107778 1 4 O ROCKWELL SERVICE CNTR FOR REWORK PER VSTR-3-07-299, STEP 2.0. 108281 1 1 AN EO HAS BEEN DIRECTED BY RIC TO FIX DWG ERROR 108281 1 2 STEP 1 WAS IMPLEMENTED TO HELP SHOP IN LOCATING 108281 1 3 HOLE TO BE DRILLED FROM VIEW W,ZN62A ON V070-15685 108281 1 4 0 DWG CLOSE PR 108383 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES IN THIS PR ARE IN THE RH INBOARD ELEVON COVE. IN ITE 108383 1 2 MS 1 AND 2, THE DEGRADED SPRINGS FROM THE POLYIMIDE AND COLUMBIUM SEAL 108383 1 3 S WERE REPLACED AND INSTALLED ON STR-3-12-484. THE DISCREPANT SPRINGS 108383 1 4 WERE SCRAPPED ON AN LRU-PR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE THERMAL DEGRADATION 108383 1 5 WAS HEAT EXPOSURE. THIS SAME CONDITION WAS FOUND ON SOME OUTBOARD ELEV 108383 1 6 ON SPRINGS DURING EXTENSIVE TESTING LAST FLOW. IN ITEM 3, THE CHARRED 108383 1 7 POLYIMIDE SEAL WAS ROUTED TO HDA FOR SCRAP, AND A NEW SEAL REPLACED IT 108383 1 8 AS PART OF THE FLIGHT 12 ELEVON COVE REWORK IN STR-3-12-484. PROBABLE 108383 1 9 CAUSE WAS DUE TO HOT GAS FLOW ON THE EXPOSED LOWER ELEVON COVE SURFAC 108383 1 10 E DURING FLIGHT. 108416 1 1 5 GOUGES WERE PUT IN V070-332129-003 FLOOR BEAM DURING REMOVAL. GOUGES 108416 1 2 WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. A DOUBLER TO BE INSTALLE 108416 1 3 D AS PART OF LIOH DOOR MOD IS BONDED OVER GOUGES. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WO 108416 1 4 RKMANSHIP. 108434 1 1 ITEMS 1.0 AND 2.0: STEP 2.0 CALLS OUT TO OBTAIN THE REPAIRED V070-1987 108434 1 2 02-038 TUBE SEAL FROM HDA; A NEW V070-198702-038 TUBE SEAL WAS OBTAINE 108434 1 3 D FROM LOGISTICS INSTEAD AND STORED WITH THE LEFTHAND FLIPPER DOOR #8 108434 1 4 HARDWARE IN MIDBODY SHOP BAY 1. THE NEW V070-198702-038 TUBE SEAL WILL 108434 1 5 BE INSTALLED IN THE VEHICLE PER THE RESPECTIVE JOB CARD. THE REPAIRED 108434 1 6 V070-198702-038 TUBE SEAL WILL BE SENT BACK TO LOGISTICS FOR RESTOCK. 108434 1 7 THE V070-198702-038 TUBE SEAL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUS 108434 1 8 E: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 108653 1 1 CONN ATTACH HOLE WAS ENLARGED FROM .593" TO .765" 108653 1 2 IN PER EO-TO-FOLLOW ON DWG V070-856898. THE WEB I 108653 1 3 S A SECONDARY STR. 108776 1 1 WHILE WORKING V30-14249 THE RH FWD PLBD LIMIT STRIKER WAS NOTED AS HAV 108776 1 2 ING A CREASE. THE STRIKER WAS STRAIGHTENED OUT AND DYE PEN'ED. NO DEFE 108776 1 3 CTS NOTED DURING THE INSPECTION. THE RIGGING OF THE LIMIT SWITCH WAS C 108776 1 4 HECKED AND NO ADDITIONAL RIGGING WAS NECESSARY, STRIKER REMAINED STRAI 108776 1 5 GHT. 108819 1 1 REWORK OF DIVIDER TO REMOVE CRACKED PORTION, & FAS 108819 1 2 TENER DELETION HAS BEEN MR APPROVED DUE TO PREVIOU 108819 1 3 S MR'S. INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLT. CLOSE 108819 1 4 PR. 108945 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 108945 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 108945 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACTI 108945 1 4 ON TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W 108945 1 5 TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 108945 1 6 THE CARRIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. CLOSE PR. 108982 1 1 FOR ITEM #1 WHERE THE PANEL DIDN'T HAVE THE REQUIR 108982 1 2 ED DASH NUMBERS - THE PANEL WAS PROPERLY MARKED AS 108982 1 3 REQUIRED BY THE DRAWING. FOR ITEM #2 WITH THE DEL 108982 1 4 AMINATED METAL - THE VOID IN THE DELAMINATED AREA 108982 1 5 WAS FILLED WITH ADHESIVE. FOR ITEM #3 WHERE THERE 108982 1 6 WAS METAL DELAMINATION AND A GOUGE - THE DAMAGED A 108982 1 7 REA WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH AN ADHESIVE FILL 108982 1 8 ER TO MATCH THE ORIGINAL GEOMETRY. ALL MR REPAIRS 108982 1 9 ARE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 109060 1 1 THE PROBLEM WS THAT 4 NAS1581C3T4 SCREWS WERE FOUND TO BE TOO SHORT FO 109060 1 2 R USE IN THEIR REQ'D LOCATIONS. GRIP LENGTHS WERE MEASURED & FOUND TO 109060 1 3 BE INADEQUATE BY ENG'G EVAL. NAS1581C3T8 SCREWS WERE OBTAINED (1/4" LO 109060 1 4 NGER) & UTILIZED FOR THE PANEL INSTL'N. PER EO TO FOLLOW. 109302 1 1 THE V070-190254-001 INSULATOR FOR LH RCC PNL #$ HA 109302 1 2 S BEEN REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER PER ML0 109302 1 3 311-0022 PARA. 3.1. ADDITIONAL DISPO FOR V070-1902 109302 1 4 54-001 INSULATOR WILL BE ADDRESSED PER VSTR-3-07-2 109302 1 5 53. MOD 00S. CLOSE PR. 109334 1 1 V070-352550-003 LAMINATED SHIM WAS TORN. SHIM REPLACED BACK TO DWG CON 109334 1 2 FIGURATION. DISCREPANT CONDITION CAUSED DURING REMOVAL OF PERIMETER AN 109334 1 3 GLES. CLOSE PR. 109388 1 1 THE R/H AFT HINGE BOOT OF THE NLG HAD SEVERAL DISCREPANCIES WRITTEN AG 109388 1 2 AINST IT ( INSTALLED INSIDE OUT, TEARS, & PEELING RTV). THE DISCREPAN 109388 1 3 T BOOT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW BOOT. ALL (4) DISCREANCY IT 109388 1 4 EMS HAVE BEEN ELIMATED. CLOSE THIS PR. 109449 1 1 BOLTS COULD NOT BE RETORQUED DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM OTHER BOLTS. DIS 109449 1 2 PO WAS WRITTEN TO ALLOW THE REMOVAL OF THE INTERFERING BOLTS FOR ACCES 109449 1 3 S. THIS ALLOWED BOLTS TO BE RETORQUED PER VSTR 3-07-317 STEP 14.0. STE 109449 1 4 P 14.0 IN TPS IS COMPLETE. 109483 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY NOTED ON PAGE 1.0 HAS BEEN ELIMINATED. TPS STR-3-09-42 109483 1 2 4, MODIFIED ALL FOUW RAMP RUB PANELS BY REMOVING THE V070-198482-001 G 109483 1 3 UIDE PIN AND WELDING A NEWLY DESIGNED GUIDE PIN TO EACH PANEL. THE NEW 109483 1 4 LY DESIGNED GUIDE PIN PROVIDES APPROXIMATELY DOUBLE THE WELDING SURFAC 109483 1 5 E. THIS CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS ON THE RH INBD RAMP RUB PANEL GUIDE 109483 1 6 PIN WELD THEREFORE THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 109489 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES DOCUMENTED IN THIS PR ARE MINOR AND DO NOT ADVERSELY 109489 1 2 AFFECT THE DESIGN CAPABILITIES OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. DISCSPRENACY IT 109489 1 3 EM #1 HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "AS-IS". DISCREPANCY I 109489 1 4 TEM #2 DID NOT REQURIE MR CONCURRENCE AS THE OIL DID NOT DAMAGE THE RA 109489 1 5 DIATOR THERMAL CONTROL COATING. DISCREPANCY ITEM #3 IS A REDUNDANT PR 109489 1 6 CONDITION AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DOCUMENTED ON THIS PR. 109681 1 1 CORROSION/DISCOLORATION WAS OBSERVED ON H2 RELIEF PORT 2 LOCATED AT (9 109681 1 2 90.00,105.00,355.22). THE PORT WAS CLEANED WITH IPA AND IS NOW FREE OF 109681 1 3 CORROSION. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITION.(DIRT) 109728 1 1 THE DIAL TORQUE WRENCH, Z# 87724, IS DESIGNED FOR USE IN THE 0-600" LB 109728 1 2 RANGE. SINCE ONLY THE MIDDLE 60% OF THIS RANGE IS ACCURATELY CALIBRAT 109728 1 3 ED, THIS WRENCH SHOULD ONLY BE USED FROM 120-480" LBS. THIS WRENCH WAS 109728 1 4 USED TO APPLY AN INITIAL TORQUE OF 120" LBS TO A MLG AXLE NUT AND TO 109728 1 5 MEASURE ROLLING RESISTANCES OF 110, 150, 498 AND 528" LBS. THREE OF TH 109728 1 6 ESE VALUES (110, 498, 528" LBS) WERE OUTSIDE OF THE 60% RANGE. THE TOR 109728 1 7 QUE WRENCH WAS CHECKED ON A TORQUE ANALYZER AND FOUND TO BE ACCURATE T 109728 1 8 O WITHIN 2" LBS OF ITS READING FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS. ALL ACTUAL TORQUE 109728 1 9 VALUES WERE WELL WITHIN THE TOLERANCE SPECIFIED. DEVIATIONS WERE WRIT 109728 1 10 TEN TO V1165 TO CLARIFY THE PROCEDURE AND ADD TWO BETTER SUITED TORQUE 109728 1 11 WRENCHES TO THE PARTS LIST (SECT 1.3.3). NO DAMAGE RESULTED FROM THIS 109728 1 12 INCIDENT AND THE PROCEDURE WAS PERMANENTLY MODIFIED TO AVOID FUTURE PR 109728 1 13 OBLEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR. 109749 1 1 THE MR PART THAT WAS WORKED ON MEQ-3-07-0359 WAS NOT DRILLED IN THE CO 109749 1 2 RRECT PLACES CAUSING AN INTERFERENCE FIT THAT ALSO PLACES CAUSING AN I 109749 1 3 NTERFERENCE FIT THAT ALSO CAUSED THE SCREWS TO CROSS THREAD WHEN INSTA 109749 1 4 LLED. A PER PRINT PART WAS FIT CHECKED AND COULD BE INSTALLED SO IT WI 109749 1 5 LL BE USED IN PLACE OF THE MR PART. 109789 1 1 THE 20 EA DISCREPANT NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. NO FURTHER A 109789 1 2 CTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 110089 1 1 DISCREPANCY ITEM 1: UNABLE TO REMOVE 3/8" BOLT; AFTER CUTTING THE BOLT 110089 1 2 HEAD AND THREADED SHANK OFF, THE REMAINING SHANK WAS FINALLY DRIVEN OUT 110089 1 3 USING A DRIFT PIN AND HAMMER. DISCREPANCY ITEM 2, 4 & 6: WHILE 110089 1 4 REMOVING THE 3/8" BOLT SHANK, THE UPPER AND LOWER MR BUSHINGS CAME OUT; 110089 1 5 THE UPPER HOLE IN THE LONGERON HAD DAMAGE AND WAS REAMED UP TO APPROX 110089 1 6 .509" DIAMETER TO CLEAN IT UP. THE LOWER HOLE WAS IN GOOD SHAPE, AND 110089 1 7 MEASURED APPROX .501" DIAMETER. NEW MR BUSHINGS WERE FABRICATED AND 110089 1 8 INSTALLED. ID OF BUSHINGS WERE DRILLED/REAMED TO PRINT DIMENSION (.375 110089 1 9 +.002/-.000). THE INSTALLATIN OF THE BUSHINGS WERE ACCEPTED FOR 110089 1 10 UNRESTRICTED USE. DISCREPANCY ITEMS 3 & 5: (3) EXISTING MR PLUGS IN THE 110089 1 11 LONGERON HAD PULLED OUT SLIGHTLY; THESE PLUGS WERE TAPPED BACK INTO 110089 1 12 PLACE, AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. DISCREPANCY ITEM 7: 110089 1 13 CALIBRATION ON THE DIAL BORE GAGE (Z#: 20911) AN OUT ON 1/20/91.; THE 110089 1 14 GAGES WERE RECALIBRATED ON 1/23/91. THE EXTENSION OF THE DUE DATE IS 110089 1 15 ACCEPTABLE PER QA-001, APPENDIX A, PART I. ALL REQUIRED PERSONNEL SIGNED 110089 1 16 INTO THE EXTENSION OF THE DUE DATE. NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND DURING 110089 1 17 RECALIBRATION. DISCREPANCY ITEM 8: THE V070-353297-003 SUPPORT PLATE 110089 1 18 WAS FOUND DAMAGED UPON REMOVAL; A NEW SUPPORT PLATE WAS ORDERED AND 110089 1 19 INSTALLED. THE DAMAGED SUPPORT PLATE WAS SHIPPED TO RI/DOWNEY ENG. FOR 110089 1 20 FAILURE ANALYSIS. WHILE REMOVING THE RH LOWER 3/8' DIA T-0 BOLT, THE 110089 1 21 EXISTING UPPER AND LOWER MR BUSHINGS CAME OUT OF THE V070-352209 110089 1 22 LONGERON. NEW BUSHINGS WERE FABRICATED AND INSTALLED, RETURNING THE RH 110089 1 23 LOWER T-0 CARRIER PLATE ATTACH POINT ASSY TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. 110089 1 24 THIS REWORK WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: BOLT WAS 110089 1 25 BENT DURING INSTALLATION OF T-0 UMBILICAL CARRIER PLATE. HOLE DAMAGE 110089 1 26 OCCURRED DURING BOLT REMOVED. 110089 1 27 110182 1 1 THE OUT OF TOLERANCE STEPS AND GAPS BETWEEN RIB SPLICE #13 TEE AND RCC P 110182 1 2 ANEL #13 NOTED AS ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 WERE ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED 110182 1 3 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR OUT OF TOLERANCE STEPS AND GAPS IS A BUILD UP OF 110182 1 4 TOLERANCE BETWEEN THE RCC AND MOUNTING HARDWARE. NO FURTHER SHOP OF ENG 110182 1 5 INEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 110182 1 6 110402 1 1 THE DOUBLER WAS TRIMMED AND SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED 110402 1 2 , THE HILOC COLLARS WERE EXCHANGED FOR NUTS AND WA 110402 1 3 SHERS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. 110437 1 1 OUT OF TOLERANCE CONDITION IS DOCUMENTED PROPERLY 110437 1 2 IN STR-3-07-2108 FOR THIS C/P TO CHANNEL STEP. THI 110437 1 3 S PR DOCUMENTING O/T CONDITION IS NOT REQUIRED. 110576 1 1 THE FOLLOWING STRUTS WERE FOUND TO BE UNDERSIZED BY .001 TO .003" IN D 110576 1 2 IAMETER: ITEM 1.0, P/N B91B60080-39, LOC: XW891.0, YW GLOVE BOX; 2.0, 110576 1 3 B91B60081-27, 979.5, GLOVE BOX; 3.0, B91B10147-27, 1191.0, 254.0; 4.0, 110576 1 4 B91B10357-43, 1307.0, 254.0; 4.0, B91B10357-29, 1249.0, 282.0. A DETA 110576 1 5 ILED STRESS ANALYSIS PERFORMED BY ROCKWELL DOWNEY ON THE DISCREPANT CO 110576 1 6 NDITIONS OF THE STRUTS REVEALED THAT A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY EXIST 110576 1 7 S FOR EACH STRUT INSTALLATION. THESE STRUTS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR FLIGH 110576 1 8 T. AFTER RETURN FROM FLIGHT 11 (STS-41), THE STRUTS WERE MR ID'D AND N 110576 1 9 O NEW DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND. PROBABLE CAUSE; VENDOR. 110802 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE THE TWO DISCREPANT INSE 110802 1 2 TRS REFERENCED BY ITEM 1.0 AND 2.0. THESE TWO PR CONDITIONS WERE ADDRE 110802 1 3 SSED ON PR STR-3-12-3515 (REFERENCE ATTACHMENT A). STR-3515 SENT BOTH 110802 1 4 INSERTS TO VENDOR FOR REPAIR AND REPLACED BOTH WITH NEW INSERTS. THE P 110802 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE TO THE KAHRLON SURFACE WAS OPERATIONAL DEG 110802 1 6 RADATION. THE V070-565247 INSERTS ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURES. 110937 1 1 THE DISCREPANT OUTBD CNTR. THE INBD INSULATOR WAS REMOVED IN SUPT OF 110937 1 2 TES-3-07-0067. BOTH OF THE INSULATORS HAVE BEEN INSTL'D INTO THE RCC 110937 1 3 PNL & THE PNL IS INSTL'D FOR FLT. 110971 1 1 FOR ITEMS 1 AND 2: THE OLD BAFFLE WAS REMOVED AND 110971 1 2 SCRAPPED. A NEW BAFFLE WAS INSTALLED PROPERLY WITH 110971 1 3 THE CORRECT NUMBER OF FASTENRES AND WASHERS. FOR 110971 1 4 ITEM 3: THE BAFFLE WAS MARKED WITH THE PROPER DASH 110971 1 5 # WHEN REMOVED. THIS DISCREPANCY WENT AWAY WHEN T 110971 1 6 HE NEW BAFFLE WAS ORDERED. FOR ITEM 4: WHEN THE OL 110971 1 7 D BAFFLE WAS REMOVED AND SCRAPPED, THE NEW BAFFLE 110971 1 8 WITH PROPERLY ALIGNED HOLES WAS INSTALLED. FOR ITE 110971 1 9 M 5: THE MISDRILLED PILOT HOLE WAS PLUGGED WITH A 110971 1 10 RIVET. FOR ITEM 6: THE IMPROPER EDGE DISTANCE 110971 1 11 MR'D OK AS IS. 110975 1 1 ABOVE DISCREPANCIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN AGAIN 110975 1 2 ST PR STR 3-07-1704 WHICH ALREADY DOCUMENTS HEAT S 110975 1 3 INK PROBLEMS IN R/H BAY 5. A PAGE 1B HAS NOW EEN W 110975 1 4 RITTEN CORRECTING THIS ERROR. THIS PR IS NO LONGER 110975 1 5 REQ'D. 111014 1 1 THE V070-856179-002 SHROUD WAS TRIMMED APPROX. 3/4" X 3/8" PER MRB APP 111014 1 2 ROVED DISPO TO REMOVE INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE SHROUD AND THE CONNECTO 111014 1 3 R ON THE PLBD SWITCH. TRIMMING THE SHROUD WAS PERFORMED TO ALLOW FOR F 111014 1 4 ULL ROTATION OF THE SWITCH FOR PROPER PLBD FUNCTIONALS. PROBABLE CAUSE 111014 1 5 WAS TOLERANCE BUILD UP DURING SWITCH RIGGING. 111040 1 1 IT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY ULTRASONIC TESTING THA 111040 1 2 T THE PLBD HINGE PINS ARE NOT DEFECTIVE(REPORT #27 111040 1 3 606-B). HOWEVER, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE V070-3 111040 1 4 70003 DRAWING DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR HINGE PIN COMPO 111040 1 5 NENT TOUCH-UP AFTER INSTALLATION. THIS PR AUTHORIZ 111040 1 6 ED THE RELEASE OF AN EO-TO-FOLLOW TO CLARIFY DWG. 111040 1 7 V070-370003, FOR ALL VEHICLES, FOR PAINT TOUCH-UP 111040 1 8 AFTER INSTALLATION. RECURRENCE CONTROL ACTION IS A 111040 1 9 LSO SATISFIED BY THE EO WHICH ALLOWS TOUCH-UP CAPA 111040 1 10 BILITY. 111286 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS FOUND TO BE SPREAD APART. NUTPLATE WAS FOUND T 111286 1 2 O BE A MANUFACTURING MR (MRD-BE-000M) WHICH WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. 111286 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 111314 1 1 THE PARTS INSTALLED TO LOCATE RH VENT DOOR #7 FWD 111314 1 2 & AFT ARE NOT PER PRINT V070-384307. THE "AS INST- 111314 1 3 ALLED" PARTS DO MEET THE FWD/AFT GAP CRITERIA OF 111314 1 4 .005" - .010" THERE IS AN EXTRA V070-384318-001 111314 1 5 BUSHING IN THE FWD HINGE ASSY AND NO V070-384312- 111314 1 6 001 AS CALLED FOR. THE AFT HINGE ASSY HAS THE MD 111314 1 7 153-0016-2006 LAMINATED SHIM INSTEAD OF THE FWD 111314 1 8 HINGE ASSY PER PRINT. THE FUNCTION OF THE PARTS 111314 1 9 LISTED ARE TO ALLOW SMOOTH OPERATION (HINGE ACTION 111314 1 10 OF THE VENT DOOR #37 (RH) AND TO CENTER THE VENT 111314 1 11 DOOR IN ITS OPENING. A CHANGE OF THE PARTS TO THE 111314 1 12 PRINT CONFIGURATION WOULD ULTIMATELY REQUIRE MATOR 111314 1 13 RE-RIGGING OF THE DOOR TO GET BACK TO THE FUNCTION 111314 1 14 AL CONFIGURATION WE ARE IN NOW. THE "AS-BUILT" 111314 1 15 CONDITION DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FIT, FORM 111314 1 16 OR FUNCTION OF THE RH VENT DOOR #7. THIS CONDITION 111314 1 17 IS ACCEPTABLE "AS-IS" FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. RE- 111314 1 18 ASSEMBLE AS FOUND/AS BUILT. 111388 1 1 SIDEWALL ATTACH BOLTS ARE PRIMARILY SHEAR LOADED A 111388 1 2 ND THEIR REVERSAL WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE IN 111388 1 3 TEGRITY OR SAFETY MARGIN OF THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE 111388 1 4 . FUTURE TORQUING WILL BE BETTER ACCOMPLISHED BY 111388 1 5 INSTALLING BOLTS WITH HEAD INBOARD. BOLTS ARE TO 111388 1 6 BE INSTALLED PER TPS VSTR-3-07-218. CLOSE THIS PR 111498 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1- A NEW V070-198702-004 SEAL WAS OBTAINED TO REPLACE THE 111498 1 2 DISCREPANT SEAL. A LRU PR WAS GENERATED FOR THE DISCREPANT V070-198702 111498 1 3 -004 SEAL WHICH WAS ROUTED TO THE HDA. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL 111498 1 4 DEGRADATION. 111504 1 1 THE V070-361399-005 EVA HATCH INSTULATION SUPPORT RING WAS BROKEN AT T 111504 1 2 HE LOWER CENTER STARBOARD HOLE BY BEING INADVERTANTLY STEPPED ON. THE 111504 1 3 BREAK WAS REPAIRED USING MBO135-009 TYPE 6 FINISH B GLASS FABRIC AND M 111504 1 4 BO120-008 ADHESIVE. THIS MR ACTION IS GOOD FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE 111504 1 5 SUPPORT RING. CLOSE THIS PR. 111564 1 1 RIVETS REMOVED & REPLACED WITH RIVETS OF CORRECT 111564 1 2 LENGTH 111843 1 1 ERRONEOUS MARKINGS REMV'D & CORRECTLY REID'D. 112032 1 1 MOLD IMPRESSION RESULTS OF SCRATCH IN BORON STRUT 112032 1 2 SURFACE SHOWS DEPTH OF SCRATCHES (0.0033 & 0.0036 112032 1 3 IN.) IS GREATER THAN ALLOWABLE DESIGN CRITERIA (<0 112032 1 4 .003 IN). THERE IS EVIDENCE OF CUT OR DISPLACED BO 112032 1 5 RON FIBERS. BORON STRUT WILL UNDERGO FUNCTIONAL IN 112032 1 6 TEGRITY TEST AT VENDOR SITE FOR EVALUATION DUE TO 112032 1 7 DEPTH OF SCRATCH AND EXPOSED BORON FIBERS. LRU PR 112032 1 8 WRITTEN TO ROUTE DISCREPANT STRUT TO VENDOR FOR EV 112032 1 9 ALUATION. REPLACEMENT STRUT OBRTAINED FROM SPARES. 112032 1 10 REPLACEMENT STRUT WILL BE INSTALLED PER OMI V5R02 112109 1 1 PRSD CRYO TANK STRUT ME270-0006-0020 (S/N 517177-0 112109 1 2 01) WAS FOUND TO HAVE 5 MINOR SCRATCHES ON THE STR 112109 1 3 UT SURFACE. THE DIMENSIONS OF THESE SCRATCHES WERE 112109 1 4 FOUND TO BE WITHIN THE DESIGN CENTER CRITERIA OF 112109 1 5 .003 IN. IN DEPTH. (THE DEEPEST SCRATCH BEING .002 112109 1 6 3 IN.). ALSO A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE SCRATCHES 112109 1 7 WITH A 10X GLASS SHOWED NO EVIDENCE OF CUT BORON F 112109 1 8 IBERS. (ANOTHER DESIGN CENTER CRITERIA). THE STRUT 112109 1 9 WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICKED USE, REPAIRED, A 112109 1 10 ND MR MARKED. THE REPLACEMENT STRUT THAT WAS OBTAI 112109 1 11 NED IN STEP 3 (S/N 189150-001) WAS INSTALLED INTO 112109 1 12 OV-103 PER OMI V5R02 AND THE S/N 517177-001 STRUT 112109 1 13 WAS RETURNED TO LOGISTICS TO RETAIN AS A SPARE. 112139 1 1 THE BRKT WAS INSTLD WITH MR APPROVAL, .017 OUT OF 112139 1 2 TOLERANCE. THE PROBLEM WAS DUE TO A TOLERANCE BUIL 112139 1 3 D-UP OF THE STRUCTURE. THE BRKT INSTLN IS ACCEPTAB 112139 1 4 LE FOR FLT. CLOSE PR. 112154 1 1 NUTPLATES (2EA) HAVE BEEN INSTALLED PER MOD (EO TO 112154 1 2 FOLLOW) TO VSTR-3-07-215. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY 112154 1 3 EXISTS. 112188 1 1 TWO DISCREPANCIES WERE NOTED ON FCP #3 RESULTING I 112188 1 2 N PR FCP-3-07-0076: 1) "COOLANT IN" QD AT F6 ON F 112188 1 3 CP #3 LEAKED. 2) FLUID APPEARS TO BE CONTAMINATED 112188 1 4 (H2O) OR AN AIR BUBBLE. DISCREPANCY 2 SUMMARY: 112188 1 5 THE FC-40 ANALYZED DID CONTAIN H2O AND OTHER CONTA 112188 1 6 MINANT (REF ANALYSIS ATTACHED TO THIS PR). THE FU 112188 1 7 EL CELL (S/N 103) WAS REMOVED PER TPS VFCP-3-7-016 112188 1 8 ON 7-3-86 AND ROUTED TO THE VENDOR (INTERNATION F 112188 1 9 UEL CELLS). THE VENDOR EXAMINED THE FCP AND DID N 112188 1 10 OT FIND ANY CONTAMINATION IN THE FUEL CELL COOLANT 112188 1 11 SYSTEM. FUEL CELL #3 ORBITER COOLANT LINES WERE 112188 1 12 FLUSHED PER PR FCP-3-07-0082 AND SAMPLED. THE SAM 112188 1 13 PLES MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SE-S-0073 SPEC (SEE 112188 1 14 ATTACHMENT 11A). FUEL CELL 3 COOLANT SYSTEM IS RE 112188 1 15 STORED. DISCREPANCY 1 SUMMARY: AS STATED ABOVE F 112188 1 16 CP #3 (S/N 103) WAS REMOVED AND ROUTED TO THE VEND 112188 1 17 OR (IFC). UPON EXAMIANTION THE VENDOR DISCOVERED 112188 1 18 A SLIVER OF METAL LODGED IN THE FCP "COOLANT IN" D 112188 1 19 ISCONNECT I/F. THIS METAL WAS ANALYZED AND FOUND 112188 1 20 TO BE A GOLD-NICKEL ALLOY AS USED IN ORBITER BRAZI 112188 1 21 NG OPERATIONS. THIS SLIVER OF METAL PREVENTED THE 112188 1 22 QD FROM SEALING PROPERLY WHEN DEMATED. THEREFORE 112188 1 23 , CAUSING THE LEAK. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED THE VEND 112188 1 24 OR EXAMINED THE FUEL CELL COOLANT SYSTEM AND FOUND 112188 1 25 NO OTHER CONTAMINATION. 112247 1 1 THE RIBS & CLIPS WERE TRIMMED AS NEEDED TO GIVE 112247 1 2 CLEARANCE BETWEEN THEM AND THE DOUBLER. 112401 1 1 BOLT EXHIBITS CHARACTERISTICS OF NORM WEAR DUE TO 112401 1 2 NUT ENGAGEMENT. BOLT IS PER PRINT. NO PR CONDITI 112401 1 3 ON EXISTS. NEW NUT INSTL'D PER JC V30-14440. 112466 1 1 DURING STRUCTURAL INSP V30-14676 A GAP IN THE BOTT 112466 1 2 OM TK SUPT ATTACH PT WAS FOUND. THE ATTACH'G H/W 112466 1 3 WAS REMOVED AND INSP'D. THE SPACER USED WAS TOO S 112466 1 4 ML FOR THE ASSY & AS A RESULT CREATED THE ABOVE ME 112466 1 5 NTIONED GAP. THE NEXT LARGER (LONGER) SPACER WAS 112466 1 6 OBTAINED & TEMPORARILY INSTL'D. THE LARGER SPACER 112466 1 7 RESOLVED THE GAP PROBLEM & AN EO-TO-FOLLOW WAS AP 112466 1 8 PROVED FOR THE INSTL'N OF THE NEW SPACER. 112603 1 1 INSULATOR HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUFATURER SPEC. 112649 1 1 V070-510395-003 SW ASSY WAS REMOVED & REPLACED WITH V070-510395-004 AS 112649 1 2 SY WHICH IS THE PROPER LEFT HAND PART. DWG V070-501201 WAS ALSO FOUND 112649 1 3 TO BE IN ERROR & WAS EO'D TO INDICATE PROPER INSTL'N. BUNGEE SW IS TO 112649 1 4 BE RETESTED PER V1098 (LANDING GEAR FUNCTIONAL) & NO FURTHER WORK IS R 112649 1 5 EQ'D. MEQ ENG VERIFY RETEST OF BUNGEE SW BY V1098. 112688 1 1 TWO FWD/OUTBD. MOST HOLES HAVE 0.180" AND 0.20" 112688 1 2 EDGE DISTANCE RESPECTIVELY (SEE ATTACHMENT "A"). 112688 1 3 EDGE DISTANCE SHOULD BE 0.240 (1 1/2 D). SINCE 112688 1 4 EDGE DISTANCE IS GOOD ON 11 OTHER FASTENERS STRUC- 112688 1 5 TURAL INTEGRITY WILL NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY DECREAS- 112688 1 6 ED. DOUBLER CAN BE INSTALLED AND FUNCTION AS DE- 112688 1 7 SIGN INTENDED. SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 112724 1 1 OUTER SURFACE OF SEAL IS STILL A CONT. PIECE 112724 1 2 THERE IS NO PENETRATION FROM THE INNER SPRING TO 112724 1 3 THE OUTER SURFACE. ONCE THE SEAL IS INSTALLED FOR 112724 1 4 FLIGHT IT IS COMPRESSED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT ANY 112724 1 5 DEFORMITIES WILL BE WORKED OUT TO TAKE ON THE NEW 112724 1 6 SHAPE. NO LOSS OF THERMAL INTEGRITY IS GIVEN. 112737 1 1 STEP & GAP MEASUREMENTS BETWEEN SUPT & ADJACENT C/ 112737 1 2 Ps WERE CORRECTED BY THE INSTL'N OF MR SUPT. DISC 112737 1 3 REPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 112851 STAT 1 TAIR INDEX IS CLOSED. THIS PR IS BEING DUPLICATED FOR DATABASE CLOSURE 3 112851 STAT 2 /30/93. 112851 1 1 ORIGINAL LOST IN CLOSURE LOOP ITEM 1 WAS WORKED ON ORIGINAL PR AND CLOSE 112851 1 2 D (REF ATTACHED TAIR INDEX). 112917 1 1 OUT OF TOLERANCE CONDITION IS DOCUMENTED PROPERLY 112917 1 2 IN STR-3-07-2108 FOR THIS C/P TO BRACKET STEP. 112985 1 1 MD111-4019-0304 BOLT NOT SEATING PROPERLY WAS CORRECTED BY CHANGING MO 112985 1 2 UNTING HARDWARE TO ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR NAS1587-3 WASHERS WHICH INTE 112985 1 3 RFERED WITH RADIUS OF BOLT. MD111-4020-0303 BOLTS WILL PROVIDE THE PRO 112985 1 4 PER GRIP FOR THE C/P WHICH IS ONE GRIP LONGER THAN PRINT DUE TO MR PR 112985 1 5 STR-3-07-2050 WHICH ADDED SHIM AND CHANGED HARDWARE. MR IS NOT NECESSA 112985 1 6 RY. RETURNING TO PRINT. 113064 1 1 THE INFLATION VALVES ON THE RIGHT HAND INBD AND OTBD MAIN WHEEL ASSEMB 113064 1 2 LIES WERE SUSPECTED TO HAVE BEEN OVER TORQUED. AT THE TIME THE VALVES 113064 1 3 WERE INSTALLED IN THE KSC WHEEL/TIRE SHOP. THE ROCKWELL SPECIFICATION 113064 1 4 CALLED FOR A TORQUE OF 190-210 IN LBS BUT THE B.F. GOODRICH SPECIFICAT 113064 1 5 ION CALLS FOR 70-80 IN LBS. SEPARATE PR'S HAVE BEEN INITIATED AGAINST 113064 1 6 THE MAIN WHEEL ASSEMBLIES TO INSPECT FOR DAMAGE AND AN E.O. WAS PROCES 113064 1 7 SED TO CORRECT THE ROCKWELL SPEC. NO FURTHER VEHICLE HARDWARE DISCREPA 113064 1 8 NCIES EXISTS DUE TO THIS PROBLEM SINCE THE MAIN WHEEL ASSEMBLIES HAVE 113064 1 9 BEEN REMOVED. CLOSE THIS PR FOLLOWING E.O. VERIFICATION PER STEP 1. 113088 1 1 ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 IS NOT A PR CONDITION. 113117 1 1 POLYIMIDE SEAL WAS RETURNED TO ITS CORRECT POSITION AND REMEASURED AND 113117 1 2 FOUND TO BE WITHIN DRAWING TOLERANCE OF 0.010 MAXIMUM GAP. NOTE THAT 113117 1 3 ORIGINAL MEASUREMENTS ARE ALSO WITHIN TOLERANCE. CONCLUDE THAT NO PR C 113117 1 4 ONDITION EXISTED. SEAL HAS FREE MOTION AND RETURNS TO SEALED POSITION 113117 1 5 UNDER EXISTING SPRING PRESSURE. 113142 1 1 THE DISCREPANT WIRE TRAY DIVIDER WAS MEAS'D TO BE 113142 1 2 BENT DOWN LESS THAN 2 DEGREES. THE WIRE TRAY DIVI 113142 1 3 DER WAS THEN MR. ACCEPT "AS IS". TWO RUBBER GROM 113142 1 4 METS WERE RE-BONDED ONTO THE WIRE TRAY DIVIDERS US 113142 1 5 ING MBO130-085 ADHESIVE. 113162 01 1 VOID - DUPLICATE PR. 113222 1 1 ITEM 1 AND 2: THE V070-198720-001 RETAINER IS NOT IDENTIFIED AND THE 6 113222 1 2 .50" RADIAL BEND IS GONE. A NEW RETAINER WAS OBTAINED AND THE DISCREPA 113222 1 3 NT RETAINER SENT TO HDA FOR REWORK. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR 113222 1 4 AND TEAR FROM REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION. 113525 1 1 BRAZE JOINTS (2) AT ORB LINE INTERFACES V070-45411 113525 1 2 0-058 TO V070-454110-063 (ITEM 1) & V070-454110-15 113525 1 3 7 TO MD273-0029-0420 TEE FITTING (ITEM 2) HAD FAIL 113525 1 4 ED X-RAY ANALYSIS RESULTS OF 40% AND 50% VOID AREA 113525 1 5 S RESPECTIVELY. BOTH BRAZE JOINTS WERE DEBRAZED & 113525 1 6 LINE ENDS CLEANED UP/PREPPED FOR RE-BRAZING. LINE 113525 1 7 JOINTS WERE FITTED UP & BRAZED. DOCUMENTATION ON B 113525 1 8 RAZE JOINT IPD SHEETS CONTAINED WITHIN THIS PR & I 113525 1 9 DP SHEET COPIES ATTACHED TO TPS FCP-3-07-020 TO MA 113525 1 10 INTAIN BUILD TRACEABILITY. BRAZE JOINT X-RAY ANA- 113525 1 11 LYSIS IS ACCEPTABLE FOR BOTH BRAZE JOINTS. NON-CON 113525 1 12 FORMANCE HAS BEEN RECTIFIED. CLOSE PR. 113583 1 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSPECTION OF THIS/THESE 113583 1 2 DAMAGE CONDITION INDICATES THAT THE DAMAGE IS 113583 1 3 MINOR. THIS/THESE CONDITIONS ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT 113583 1 4 ENOUGH TO REQUIRE A REPAIR. THE SCRATCHES AND/OR 113583 1 5 HOLE AND/OR DAMAGE IS TO THE SILVER TEFLON TAPE 113583 1 6 ONLY. THIS MINOR TAPE DAMAGE IS ALLOWABLE PER 113583 1 7 VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL (SECT. 3-11B). THE 113583 1 8 DING, IF ANY ARE MINOR AND DO NOT REQUIRE A REPAIR 113583 1 9 THESE CONDITIONS WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE FIT, 113583 1 10 FORM, AND FUNCTION OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. 113622 1 1 REMOVED & REPLACED. 113710 1 1 PART IS RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. REPAIR 113710 1 2 SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 113785 1 1 THE .750" HOLE HAS THREADS FORMED INTO THE FWD AREA EXTENDING FROM .5" 113785 1 2 TO .8" INSIDE THE IML. THREADS ARE COSMETIC IN SIZE. THREADS LIGHTL 113785 1 3 Y SMOOTHED WITH BEHR-TEX AND OKAY AS IS. 114105 1 1 THIS SUSPECT PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE LH O/B MLG BRAKE ASSY (P/N M 114105 1 2 C621-0075-0001, S/N 0022) DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THERE BEING METAL 114105 1 3 SHAVINGS IN THE HYDRAULIC PORTION OF THE BRAKE HOUSING. THE SUSPICION 114105 1 4 IS BASED ON FINDINGS FROM 2 OTHER SIMILAR CARBON BRAKES WHICH HAD META 114105 1 5 L SHAVINGS INTERNAL TO THE BRAKE. NO SHAVINGS ARE VISABLE IN THIS BRAK 114105 1 6 E ASSEMBLY THROUGH THE BLEED PORT BUT A DETAILED INSPECTION (INVOLVING 114105 1 7 BRAKE DISSASSEMBLY) IS REQUIRED TO INSURE NO CONTAMINATION EXISTS. PR 114105 1 8 MEQ 3-10-0451 HAS REMOVED THE BRAKE FROM OV-103 FOR A VENDOR (GOODRIC 114105 1 9 H) INSPECTION AND WILL REINSTALL A RECENTLY INSPECTED REPLACEMENT BRAK 114105 1 10 E IN ITS PLACE. THIS PR CAN BE CLOSED AS A DUPLICATE TO PR MEQ-0451. P 114105 1 11 ROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING DEFECT. 114215 1 1 HEAT SINK STRIPS WERE DAMAGED OR DID NOT MEET THE 114215 1 2 DESIGN INSTL RQMTS. THIS HEAT SINK WAS EITHER REW 114215 1 3 ORKED OR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. REWORK OR 114215 1 4 ACCEPTANCE OF HEAT SINK MEETS THE INSTL DESIGN IN 114215 1 5 TENT. 114345 1 1 EOs V070-156850 B06 AND V070-156854 A02 REFLECTS T 114345 1 2 HE WORK ACCOMPLISHED ON THIS PR. CAUSE: DOUBLER WA 114345 1 3 S MODIFIED (IN TPS) AND CLIP NOT REQUIRED. CLOSE T 114345 1 4 HIS PR. 114495 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WHICH IDENTIFIES SCORE MARKS ON RH OMS POD ATTACH POIN 114495 1 2 T #1'S BOLT SHANK HAS BEEN RESOLVED BY ORDERING A NEW BOLT AND ROUTING 114495 1 3 DISCREPANT BOLT TO HDA. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 115080 1 1 THE NOTED RUST STAINS ON THE RCC INCONEL INSULATORS HAVE BEEN CLEANED. 115080 1 2 THIS PROBLEM OCCURED IN THE PAST. RC ACTION WAS CONDUCTED. RESULTS SH 115080 1 3 OW SUPERFACIALRUST STAINS ARE NOT A RESULT OF INCONEL INSULATORS CORR 115080 1 4 ODING. THE RUST STAINS WILL NOT EFFECT THE THERMAL OR STRUCTURAL INTEG 115080 1 5 RITY OF THE INSULATOR. THEREFORE NO FURTHER ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN ON 115080 1 6 THE OTHER LEADING EDGE INSULATORS. THIS PR CAN BE CLOSED. 115130 1 1 3 EACH HOLES IN ITEM 1 IS IN MONEL MESH OF V070-565371 CURTAIN ASSEMBL 115130 1 2 Y. HOLES ARE ACCEPTABLE PER DWG V070-565371 WHICH ALLOWS FOR HOLES UP 115130 1 3 TO 3/4" DIAMETER. PROBABLE CAUSE OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 115286 1 1 DURING TIRE PRESSURE CHECKS, RIGHT-HAND NOSE TIRE VALVE STEM WAS FOUND 115286 1 2 TO BE LEAKING (F70-0043 PANEL GAUGE PRESSURE WAS INCREASING WITH TIRE 115286 1 3 CONNECTOR VALVE CLOSED). VALVE STEM NEEDLE VALVE WAS CYCLED SEVERAL T 115286 1 4 IMES TO RELEASE ANY DEBRIS AND SCHRADER VALVE O-RING WAS REPLACED (ENG 115286 1 5 INEERING NOTE: TPS MEQ-3-09-152 CONTAINS OPTION TO REPLACE SCHRADER VA 115286 1 6 LVE O-RING). NO FURTHER LEAKAGE DETECTED. NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED ON 115286 1 7 THIS WAD. PROBABLE CAUSE: DEBRIS IN VALVE STEM. CLOSE THIS PR. 115364 1 1 WHEN WORK ISD COMPLETED THE STRUCTURE INTEGRITY WI 115364 1 2 LL HAVE BEEN RESTORED. 115404 1 1 THE V070-351537-001 CHANNEL HAD BEEN DAMAGED BEYOND REPAIR. THE CHANNE 115404 1 2 L ASSY WAS R&R'D WITH A NEW CHANNEL ASSY. DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY CHANNEL 115404 1 3 BEING STEPPED ON. 115421 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO CORRECT AN UNTORQUED BOLT LOCAT 115421 1 2 ED IN THE LEFT HAND ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM. AND INCORRECT WASHER 115421 1 3 WAS REPLACED AND THE BOLT WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND PROPERLY TORQUED 115421 1 4 . NO MR ACTION WAS REQUIRDED. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 115433 1 1 WHITE SPOT WAS FOUND ON R/H #2 RADIATOR PNL. DISPO 115433 1 2 WAS WRITTEN TO CLEAN THE SPOT OFF THE PNL. THE SP 115433 1 3 OT WAS APPARENTLYCLEANED OFF THE PNL PRIOR TO PLB 115433 1 4 D CLOSING. THE AREA WAS CLEANED AGAIN IN STEP 1. T 115433 1 5 HE SPOT HAS BEEN REMOVED & THEREFORE THE PROBLEM N 115433 1 6 O LONGER EXISTS. DISCARD THE WIPES & PLASTIC ZIP L 115433 1 7 OCK BAG RETAINED FROM STEP 1 IN A SUITABLE CONTAIN 115433 1 8 ER. CLOSE PR. 115434 1 1 HOT BONDING OF DOUBLER OVER DENTED AREA IN PANEL F 115434 1 2 ACE SHEET RESTORES THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE 115434 1 3 AVONICS BAY COVER DESIGN INTENT OF THIS SECONDARY 115434 1 4 STRUCTURE IS MAINTAINED. DENTS 2 AND 3 ARE ALL MI 115434 1 5 NOR AND SUPERFICIAL IN NATURE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRIT 115434 1 6 Y IS NOT COMPROMISED. 115502 1 1 RCC PNL #16'S SPAR INSULATOR (V070-190316-001) HAS 115502 1 2 BEEN REPAIRED PER MLO311-0022 PARA. 3.1 AT RIC SE 115502 1 3 RVICE CENTER & IS OK. FOR FLT. INSULATOR WILL BE I 115502 1 4 NSTLD PER STR-TPS-3-07-155. CLOSE PR. 115538 1 1 MR ACTION W/ PRIME BD SIGNATURES REQ'D FOR PART SU 115538 1 2 BSTITUTION FROM CONVENTIONAL RIVETS TO BLIND RIVET 115538 1 3 S. THEREFORE ALLEVIATING THE ACCESS PROBLEM. WIR 115538 1 4 E TRAY INSTL'N WORK ON STR-3-07-224 MOD 004 CAN CO 115538 1 5 INUE. 115805 1 1 REF ITEM 1 PG 1,CORROSION PROTECT EXPOSED SPOT 115805 1 2 FACE AREA PER MA0608-301 CODE 00-CF-33-XX 115900 1 1 THE V070-156856-001 BACKPLATE WAS MODIFIED AND CHA 115900 1 2 NGED DASH #'S BY AN EO TO FOLLOW DISPO. A MR INSTL 115900 1 3 N WAS REQ'D TO INSTALL ON OV-103. PR STR-3-07-1436 115900 1 4 CAME ALONG AND CHANGED BRACKET AGAIN WITH AN EO T 115900 1 5 O FOLLOW BUT DID NOT CHANBE THE MR PORTION. EO'S L 115900 1 6 ISTED ON PG. 8 REFLECT DESIGN CHANGES MADE ON THIS 115900 1 7 PR. CLOSE PR. 115926 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 115926 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 115926 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACTI 115926 1 4 ON TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W 115926 1 5 TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 115926 1 6 THE CARRIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. CLOSE PR. 116259 1 1 DURING INSPECTION ON VSTR-3-08-423, SLIGHT HAIRLINE FRACTURES IN THE K 116259 1 2 OROPON WHERE THE FLANGES MEET THE BASE OF THE ATTACH POINT WERE NOTICE 116259 1 3 D. THE KOROPON WAS REMOVED AND A DYE PEN INSPECTION OF THE AREA WAS PE 116259 1 4 RFORMED. THE RESULTS OF THE DYE PEN SHOWED NO DISCREPANCIES, ONLY A SL 116259 1 5 IGHT SURFACE BLEMISH AND DISCOLORATION WAS FOUND. THE ORIGINAL SUSPECT 116259 1 6 FRACTURES WERE IN THE KOROPON ONLY. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TE 116259 1 7 AR. 116268 1 1 THE ELONGATED HOLE WAS CAUSED BY THE TECHNICIAN 116268 1 2 HAVING DIFFICULT ACCESS TO THE HOLE LOCATION. THE 116268 1 3 HOLE WAS MR ACCEPTED "OK AS IS" FOR UNRESTRICTED 116268 1 4 USE. THIS PR WAS COORDINATED WITH STR-3-07-2292 116268 1 5 WHICH ALSO DEALT WITH INSTLN OF THE V070-754122- 116268 1 6 001 BRACKET. CLOSE PR. 116484 1 1 THE FRAME WEBBING HAS BEEN CLEANED WITH BEHR-TEX PADS AND IPA TO REMOV 116484 1 2 E SURFACE CORROSION. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 116536 1 1 THE 14 AREAS OF CORROSION ON THE ELEVON SKIN WERE MANUALLY AND CHEMIC 116536 1 2 ALLY CLEANED. AN OPTICAL INSPECTION OF EACH PIT DEPTH WAS PERFORMED A 116536 1 3 ND ANALYZED BY RI/DOWNEY STRESS AND RI/DOWNEY DESIGN. TWELVE OF THE C 116536 1 4 ORROSION AREAS WERE VERIFIED OXIDE FREE AND TWO AREAS REQUIRED A DOUBL 116536 1 5 ER. THE DOUBLER HAS BEEN BONDED OVER THE TWO DEFECT AREAS AND THE PRO 116536 1 6 CESS VERIFICATION PANELS HAVE BEEN VERIFIED ABOVE SPECIFICATION REQUIR 116536 1 7 EMENTS. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE ELEVON SKIN HAS BEEN MAINT.'D. NO 116536 1 8 DISCREPANCIES EXIST. 116830 1 1 IT WAS FOUND DURING THE EVALUATION OF THE FASTENER HOLE THAT THE HOLE 116830 1 2 IN THE FLIPPER DOOR HAD A BURR ON IT AND THE HOLE IN THE LINK ASSY WAS 116830 1 3 UNDERSIZED PREVENTING THE RETAINER BOLT TO BE INSTALLED PROPERLY. THE 116830 1 4 HOLES WERE REAMED TO SIZE, FIT CHECKED GOOD WITH BOLT AND A NEW NUT-P 116830 1 5 LATE WAS INSTALLED ON THE LINK ASSY. ITEM 1, PAGE 1, HAS BEEN ADDRESSE 116830 1 6 D AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: BURR IN HOLE & HOLE UNDERSIZE. 116830 1 7 CLOSE THIS PR. 116929 2 1 REPAIR RESTORES THE FINISH TO DWG CONFIGURATION. 116943 1 1 THE L/H RIVET HOLE WAS FILLED WITH AN OVERSIZE RIV 116943 1 2 ET. THE R/H RIVET HOLE WAS RETURNED TO PRINT CONFI 116943 1 3 G. THE L/H DENT WAS MR'D OK AS IS THE R/H DENT & C 116943 1 4 RACK WAS MR'D FILED TO PREVENT CRACK PROPOGATING. 116943 1 5 MR REPAIRS ARE UNRESTRICTED. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. C 116943 1 6 LOSE PR. 116990 1 1 THE TOP AFT END OF THE R/H UPPER THRUST STRUCT WAS GOUGED .016" DEEP. 116990 1 2 THE GOUGE WAS FILLED WITH MB0120-037, TYPE II ADHESIVE. THIS REPAIR WA 116990 1 3 S MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR ID APPLIED. THRUST STRUCT WAS D 116990 1 4 AMAGED WHILE WORKING TORQUE VERIFICATION OF ATTACH BOLTS (STR-3-A0077) 116990 1 5 . 117003 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 117003 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 117003 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACTI 117003 1 4 ON TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W 117003 1 5 TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 117003 1 6 THE CARRIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. CLOSE PR. 117175 1 1 2EA ROSAN INSERTS LOCATION DESCRIBED ON PG1 WERE FOUND TO BE DISCREPAN 117175 1 2 T. INSERTS WERE CHANGED OUT PER DWG AND C/O REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUS 117175 1 3 E IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 117484 1 1 DOWNGRADE ITEM 1 TO A DR AND RECORD DR #STR-3-10-0149. 117551 1 1 CONDITION ACCEPTED AS IS. CLOSE THIS PR. 117566 1 1 SCREWS NOT INSTALLED, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, HAVE BEEN INSTALLE 117566 1 2 D TO MEET PRINT REQUIREMENTS. ACCESS WAS OBTAINED BY PULLING BACK TCS 117566 1 3 LINER AND INSTALLING THE 1 MISSING SCREW AT FRAME X0693 AND THE (2) MI 117566 1 4 SSING SCREWS AT FRAME X0750. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 117619 1 1 THREAD MARKS WERE SMOOTHED OUT PER MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. C 117619 1 2 AUSE: WORKMANSHIP 117676 1 1 THE RUB PLATE GOUGES WHERE BURNISHED OUT, THE CORR 117676 1 2 OSION IN THE PITS WAS DEACTIVATED, THE BODYFLAP SE 117676 1 3 AL WAS TRIMMED TO PREVENT MORE GOUGING, AND THE RA 117676 1 4 ISED EDGES REMOVED FROM FUSELAGE STRUCTURE PER MR 117676 1 5 REPAIR. THE GOUGES WERE CAUSED BY AN INTERFERENCE 117676 1 6 BETWEEN THE RUB PLATE AND BODYFLAP SEAL. THE CORRO 117676 1 7 SION WAS DUE TO AN IMPROPER SURFACE PREPARATION PR 117676 1 8 IOR TO COATING APPLICATION. THE RAISED EDGES ON TH 117676 1 9 E AFT FUSALAGE STUB WAS CAUSED BY THE NUMEROUS INS 117676 1 10 TALLATIONS OF THE RUB PLATE. THE RUB PLATE IS ACCE 117676 1 11 PTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 117813 1 1 CLAMP REBONDED PER PRINT. 118595 1 1 DURING RWNG-3-12-2911, THE V070-194103-002 CARRIER PANEL WAS FIT CHECK 118595 1 2 ED ON THE R/H O/B ELEVON. DURING THIS FIT CHECK, INTERFERENCE WAS FOUN 118595 1 3 D TO EXIST BETWEEN THE MD114-1001-0003 NUT AT THE END OF THE PRIMARY S 118595 1 4 EAL PANEL AND THE STANDUP FRSI EDGE RESTRICTOR. SINCE THE NUT IS PER P 118595 1 5 RINT, A TPS PR, RWNG-3-12-3035, WAS GENERATED TO TRIM THE FRSI TO ALLE 118595 1 6 VIATE THE INTERFERENCE. NO STRUCTURAL DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 118666 1 1 ENVIRONMENTAL BULB SEALS AT LOCATION Xo890 AND Xo1307 ARE DEBONDED. TH 118666 1 2 E BULB SEAL WAS REBONDED PER MR CONCURRENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATION 118666 1 3 DEGRADATION. 118876 1 1 AN ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION REVEALS THAT THE THREE COSMETIC SCRATCHES 118876 1 2 DO NOT GO THRU THE MBO125-063 SURFACE COATING. THE TITANIUM FACESHEET 118876 1 3 HAS NOT BEEN PENETRATED. SCRATCHES ACCEPTED AS IS PER MR. PROBABLE CA 118876 1 4 USE: THE SCRATCHES ARE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR EXPERIENCED DURING 118876 1 5 ORBITER PROCESSING. 118978 1 1 AS A RESULT OF A WOOD CHIP FOUND IN NWA 035 ON OV-103, SUSPECT PR'S WERE 118978 1 2 INITIATED AGAINST KSC'S EXISTING STOCK OF NWA TIRES. IN ADDITION TO THE 118978 1 3 PRESENCE OF VARIOUS LEVELS OF DEBRIS, THE VENDOR PERFORMED HOLOGRAPHY O 118978 1 4 N FLIGHT TIRES AND FOUND VARYING DEGREES OF A PHENOMENON REFERRED TO AS, 118978 1 5 "SOCKETING. THIS LOCALIZED LOSS OF ADHESION CAN LEAD TO CORD SEPARATION 118978 1 6 AND EVENTUAL TIRE FAILURE. LATE IN THE LANDING ROLLOUT. THE SUBSEQUENT 118978 1 7 ANALYSIS CONDUCTED BY THE VENDOR CLEARED BOTH THE RNLG NWA 042 (TIRE S/ 118978 1 8 N 5141A00677) TIRES ON OV-103/FLT 12, STS-39 OF ANY VOID ANOMALIES. NWA 118978 1 9 042 DOES HAVE TWO DEFECTS (0.100" X 0.050" & 0.250" X 0.075 TO 0.30 118978 1 10 (TAPERED) WHICH HAVE BEEN MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE (REF PR 118978 1 11 NWA-042-04-0012). NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. A PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXITS. 118978 1 12 PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING DEFECT. 119034 1 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: AN EO WAS RELEASED TO CHANGE WORDING OF NOTE. TH 119034 1 2 ERE IS NO HARDWARE DISCREPANCY. 119057 1 1 THE O2 T-O FLIGHT POPPET WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED (STEPS 23-29) WITH A 119057 1 2 CLEAN LRU UNIT. RETEST WHICH CONSISTED OF 1) A MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK OF 119057 1 3 THE LINE CONNECTION (STEP 34) AND 2) A FLIGHT POPPET FLOW TEST (STEP 119057 1 4 38) WERE BOTH SUCCESSFUL AND WITHIN SPECS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS ATTRIBUTED 119057 1 5 TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION OF THE FLIGHT POPPET. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING 119057 1 6 ACTION IS REQUIRED. 119057 1 7 119119 1 1 MAXIMUM DEPTH OF SCRATCH (REF: REPLICA) WAS 0.0000 119119 1 2 35" PER MTO501-514 THIS DOES NOT CLASSIFY AS A PR 119119 1 3 CONDITION (DEPTH MUST BE GREATER THAN 0.0015" TO 119119 1 4 CLASSIFY AS A PR CONDITION) 119170 1 1 V070-337863-002 PANEL WAS CRACKED DUE TO A PROTRUDING FASTENER HEAD LO 119170 1 2 CATED DIRECTLY BEHIND -002 PANEL. THE DISCREPANT FASTENER WAS REPLACED 119170 1 3 PER PR STR-3-07-2721. THIS P/P/ (2721) REPLACED TWO (2) PROTRUDING FA 119170 1 4 STENERS WITH TWO (2) HI-LOKS THE V070-337863-002 PANEL WAS MR REPAIRED 119170 1 5 BY BONDING MBO 135-009 TYPE 6 FINISH B GLASS FABRIC PATCHES USING MBO 119170 1 6 120-079 ADHESIVE OVER CRACKED AREA. THIS REPAIR WAS MR ID'D AND ACCEPT 119170 1 7 ED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CLOSE THIS PR 119206 1 1 THE CREW MODULE INGRESS/EGRESS HATCH SEAL (HATCH SIDE) PULLED OUT OF I 119206 1 2 TS GROOVE ALONG APPROX. 4" OF CIRCUMFERENCE OF SEAL. THE SEAL WAS RE 119206 1 3 SEATED AND INSPECTED. THREE MINOR DISCREPANCIES WERE NOTED BUT ALL AR 119206 1 4 E ACCEPTABLE (PER V070-332559 EOA03). THE CIRTICAL GROOVE DIMENSION I 119206 1 5 S THE DEPTH WHICH DETERMINES SEALING LOADS. THIS DIMENSON IS NOT IN Q 119206 1 6 UESTION THE WIDTH OF THE HATCH GROOVE HAS BEEN MODIFIED IN THE PAST US 119206 1 7 ING METAL TAPE TO SHIM UP THE GAP. THAT TAPE IS STILL INSTALLED. THE 119206 1 8 L/M I/E KATCH IS NOT OPENED IN FLIGHT SO THIS CONDITION IS NOT VISIBL 119206 1 9 E DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS. THE HATCH SEALS PROPERLY AND HAS PASSED S 119206 1 10 EAL LEAK CHECKS REPEATEDLY. THIS CONDITION IS NOT A DISCREPANCY. CLO 119206 1 11 SE THIS PR. 119304 1 1 DISCREPANT BRACKET HAS BEEN R&R'D USING PREVIOUS 119304 1 2 MR ACCEPTED FASTENERS (REF STC-3-07-1983) BRACKET 119304 1 3 INSTLN COMPLETES DESIGN INTENT WITH NO STRUCTURAL 119304 1 4 DEGRADATION. NO RC ACTION REQ'D. CAUSE OF DAMAGE 119304 1 5 WAS HIGH TRAFFIC AREA AT BRACKET LOCATION. CLOSE 119304 1 6 PR. 119545 1 1 H2 RELIEF PORT #2 FLIGHT FITTING V544-454154-001 HAS BEEN ASSIGNED AN 119545 1 2 OCN #. NO MARKING OF PART IS REQUIRED. 119652 1 1 DING IN BRACKET HAS BEEN SANDED SMOOTH & CORROSION PROTECTED PER MR AP 119652 1 2 PROVAL DESIGN INTENT AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY HAS BEEN MAINTAINED ON T 119652 1 3 HIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 119690 1 1 AFTER INSTALLATION OF THE RGA PANELS IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THEY WERE 119690 1 2 HARD AGAINST THE ADJACENT PURGE LINES. THE PANELS WERE REMOVED AND TRI 119690 1 3 MMED TO CLEAR THE PURGE LINE REFERENCED IN ITEM 1. A PRSD PR WAS GENER 119690 1 4 ATED TO ADDRESS THE CONDITION NOTED IN ITEM 2. DISCREPANCIES WERE DIE 119690 1 5 TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY. CLOSE THIS PR. 119743 1 1 TO ENSURE PROPER GRIP PROTRUSION, EO'S WILL INCORPORATE THE LONGER BOL 119743 1 2 TS REQUIRED FOR THE LOWER LESS CARRIER PANEL INSTALLATIONS. NO FURTHER 119743 1 3 DISCREPANCIES EXIST ON THIS PR. UPON VERIFICATION THAT RELEASED EO'S 119743 1 4 REFLECT PROPER CONFIGURATION. 119854 1 1 RTV INSTALLATION AS IT EXISTS IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FL 119854 1 2 IGHT. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. THIS IS P 119854 1 3 RIMARY STRUCTURE. 119962 1 1 FOR ITEM 1 THE V070-191069-002 CARRIER PANEL HAD O 119962 1 2 UT OF TOLERANCE STEPS TO FILLER BAR BRACKETS. SHIM 119962 1 3 S WERE MADE TO .010" +/-.003" WITH MR-001 BONDED T 119962 1 4 O THE V070-191091-004 BRACKET & MR-002 BONDED TO T 119962 1 5 HE V070-191091-005 BRACKET TO BRING STEPS WITHIN T 119962 1 6 OLERANCE. FOR ITEM 2 THE CARRIER PANEL HAD OUT OF 119962 1 7 TOLERANCE STEPS TO THE LOWER SKIN IML.THE STEPS WE 119962 1 8 RE MR OK'D AS IS. ITEM 3 HAD SHIM MR-002 NOT BONDE 119962 1 9 D AT ITS' UPPER END & IT WAS MISALIGNED. THE SHIM 119962 1 10 WAS REMOVED & REBONDED, TAKING CARE OF BOTH DISCRE 119962 1 11 PANCIES. FOR ALL ITEMS THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS 119962 1 12 N'T COMPROMISED. 119991 1 1 ITEMS 1.0 AND 2.0: STEP 2.0 CALLS OUT TO OBTAIN THE REPAIRED V070-1987 119991 1 2 02-023 TUBE SEAL FROM HDA; A NEW V070-198702-022 TUBE SEAL WAS OBTAINE 119991 1 3 D FROM LOGISTICS INSTEAD AND STORED WITH THE RIGHTHAND FLIPPER DOOR #1 119991 1 4 HARDWARE IN MIDBODY SHOP BAY 1. THE NEW V070-198702-023 TUBE SEAL WIL 119991 1 5 L BE INSTALLED IN THE VEHICLE PER THE RESPECTIVE JOB CARD. THE REPAIRE 119991 1 6 D V070-198702-023 TUBE SEAL WILL BE SENT BACK TO LOGISTICS FOR RESTOCK 119991 1 7 . THE V070-198702-023 TUBE SEAL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAU 119991 1 8 SE OF DAMAGE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 120020 1 1 MBO 120-048 TYPE 3 ADHESIVE WAS CALLED OUT ON 120020 1 2 STR-3-07-137 STEP 8, INSTEAD MBO 170-037 TYPE 2. 120020 1 3 MBO 120-048 TYPE 3 MEETS DESIGN INTENT AND STRUCT- 120020 1 4 URAL INTEGRITY IS NOT AFFECTED. DOUBLER INSTALLA- 120020 1 5 TION CAN BE USED AS IS. DOUBLER WAS INSTALLED AT 120020 1 6 CORRECT LOCATION. E.O. G02 HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH 120020 1 7 EXCEPT FOR ADVHESIVE USED. 120184 1 1 FOR ITEM #1 WHERE SCRATCHES WERE FOUND ON THE VERTICAL FIN OML. MOLD I 120184 1 2 MPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN TO ASSISTIN MEASUREING THE SEVERITY OF THE SCRA 120184 1 3 TCHES. THE DEFECT WAS FOUND TO BE MINOR AND THE AREA WAS SANDED TO OBT 120184 1 4 AIN A SCRATCH-FREE SURFACE. THE AREA WAS THEN CORROSION PROTECTED. FOR 120184 1 5 ITEM #2 WHERE STEPS 3 & 4 OF THIS WAD COULD NOT BE PERFORMED DUE TO P 120184 1 6 RIOR WORK PER VERT-3-07-0173. THE ORIGINAL SCRATCHES WERE FOUND NOT TO 120184 1 7 BE IN THE AREA WORKED BY VERT-3-07-0173 AND THEREFORE, STEPS 3 AND 4 120184 1 8 OF THIS WAD COULD INDEED BE WORKED. ITEM #2 SHOULD BE DISGUARDED. ITEM 120184 1 9 #3 WAS VOIDED AS A DISCREPANCY. 120228 1 1 THE V070-351510-005 STRUT HAS A SMALL NICK (APPROX .2365" X .0760 S .0 120228 1 2 256"). THE NICK WAS FILLED WITH ADHESIVE AND SANDED SMOOTH PER MR. PRO 120228 1 3 BABLE CAUSE DUE TO GSE PLATFORM INSTALLATION. 120246 1 1 PROTRUDING HI-LOK INTERFERENCE IN TILE CAVITY WAS 120246 1 2 RESOLVED BY EO-TO-FOLLOW DISPO TO RPLC W/ THINNER 120246 1 3 HEAD HI-LOK. THE HI-LOK INSTL'N IS FOUND IN DWG V 120246 1 4 070-857108. 120366 1 1 BOTH LH LATCHES WERE FOUND TO INTERFERE WITH LATCH FITTINGS. THEY WERE 120366 1 2 TRIMMED BY MR TO ALLOW PROPER LATCH PIN MOVEMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE IS T 120366 1 3 OLERANCE BUILD-UP. 120402 1 1 THE TONGUE OF LH FLIPPER DOOR #9 WAS NOT PROPERLY SEATED IN THE GROOVE 120402 1 2 OF THE BLADE SEAL. A FIT CHECK WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY PROPER TONGUE 120402 1 3 AND BLADE SEAL ENGAGEMENT. THE FLIPPER DOOR AND ELEVON WERE INSPECTED 120402 1 4 AND SHOWED NO SIGNS OF ANY DAMAGE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP ( 120402 1 5 FAILURE TO VERIFY PROPER TONGUE AND GROOVE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE FLIP 120402 1 6 PER DOOR AND BLADE SEAL). NO FURTHER ENGINEERING REQUIRED. 120420 1 1 THE L/H SIDE ET CAMERA DOOR WAS REMOVED AND THE DISCREPANT (INCORRECT) 120420 1 2 FASTENERS WERE REPLACED WITH THE FASTENERS CALLED OUT PER PRINT. THE 120420 1 3 DOOR HAS BEEN RE-INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. THE PROBABLE CAUSE: THE INCORRE 120420 1 4 CT CAPTIVE FASTENERS WERE INSTALLED INTO THE DOOR AT SOME TIME AND THE 120420 1 5 OMI WHICH INSTALLS THE DOOR MERELY STATED TORQUE DOWN THE CAPTIVE FAS 120420 1 6 TENERS NOT INSTALL THE CAPTIVE FASTENERS, THEREFORE THE FASTENERS WERE 120420 1 7 NEVER CHECKED. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 120558 1 1 MR ACTION HAS RELIEVED THE PROBLEM WITH THE ADDITI 120558 1 2 ON OF TWO 5/32 JO BOLTS THROUGH THE V070-856558-00 120558 1 3 4 STIFFENER. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED AN 120558 1 4 D THE MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. 120571 1 1 FUEL CELL WAS TESTED & PROBLEM WAS ISOLATED TO 02 120571 1 2 PURGE VALVE &/OR DUAL COUPLED REGULATOR IN FUEL CE 120571 1 3 LL S/N102. IT WAS DECIDED THAT FUEL CELL S/B RETUR 120571 1 4 NED TO VENDOR FOR REPAIR. REPLACEMENT FUEL CELL S/ 120571 1 5 N 108 WAS OBTAINED & INSTALLED PER OMI V5R01. THEN 120571 1 6 OMI V1077 PERFORMED FC-40 COOLANT SERVICING & F6 120571 1 7 & F7 PORTS LEAK CHK. OMI V1022 PERFORMED REACTANT 120571 1 8 & PURGE VALVES CYCLING & F1 & F3 PORTS MASS SPEC. 120571 1 9 THIS PR PERFORMED F5 WATER DISCHARGE PORT LEAK CHE 120571 1 10 CK AT 12.3 PSIG H20. OMRSD REQ. 16 PSIG. 120606 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPO WAS TO MR ACCEPT FOR UNRESTRICTED FLIGHT FOU 120606 1 2 R OVERSIZED HOLES IN A SUPPLRT FOR A SURGE TANK IN THE AFT. A GUSSET W 120606 1 3 ILL BE ATATCHED TO THE SUPPORT. THE DISCREPANT HOLES WERE FOUND DURING 120606 1 4 THE REMOVAL OF THE GUSSET FOR REPLACEMENT BY STR-3-10-451. THIS IS SE 120606 1 5 CONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS VENDOR WORKMANSHI 120606 1 6 P. 120639 1 1 ENGINEERING INSPECTION OF THE ET FITTING LUG THRUS 120639 1 2 T STRUCTURE SHOWS SIGNS OF HEAT FLOW AND A MATERIA 120639 1 3 L DEPOSIT. THE HEAT FLOW WAS DETERMINED TO BE A NO 120639 1 4 RMAL FLIGHT CONDITION. THE RESIDUE FROM THE ET FIT 120639 1 5 TING, NEAR THE LO2 DISCONNECT, WAS ANALYZED USING 120639 1 6 INFRARED SPECTROPHOTOMETRIC TECHNIQUES AND DETERMI 120639 1 7 NED TO BE OUTGASSING OF TPS RTV MATERIAL. THERE IS 120639 1 8 NO EVIDENCE OF WHITE CORROSION PRODUCTS. S/C HEAT 120639 1 9 FLOW IS AN ACCEPTED CONDITION IN THIS AREA. NO DI 120639 1 10 SCREPANCY EXISTS. 120756 1 1 THE WING STRUB SEAL ELEMENT AT Yw=-310 IN THE LH INBD-OUTBD ELEVON COV 120756 1 2 E WAS BINDING. THE SEAL ELEMENT WAS REMOVED, CLEANED AND CHECKED-OUT, 120756 1 3 AND REINSTALLED WITH NO BINDING PROBLEMS REMAINING. THE PROBABLE CAUSE 120756 1 4 WAS RTV CONTAMINATION. 120846 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES LISTED ONPAGES 1 THOUGH 1H HAVE 120846 1 2 BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS OR RESOLVED BY MR DISPOSITON C 120846 1 3 ONSISTING MAINLY OF (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) TRIMMING 120846 1 4 AND REWORKING OF DEBONDS. DESIGN INTENT OF THE RTV 120846 1 5 -HEAT SINK INSTALLATION HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. 120848 1 1 THE REWORK WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE PER THE PR/MR 120848 1 2 DISPOSITION. THE INTENT OF THE B91B15010-Z WING 120848 1 3 SPARE MOD WAS ACCOMPLISHED 120881 1 1 THE INSTALLATION OF THE MISSING MD121-0001-05 RIVET RESTORES THE INSTA 120881 1 2 LLATION TO THE DRAWING CONFIGURATION. TPS VSTR-3-09-416 WILL REINSTALL 120881 1 3 THE DOOR. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING ERROR. 120974 1 1 THE MD111-4020-1226 BOLT WAS RETORQUED TO A LOWER VALUE (REF STR-3-07- 120974 1 2 317). DUE TO INADEQUATE TOOLING, THE BOLT COULD NOT BE RETORQUED WITH 120974 1 3 OUT THE DANGER OF POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO ADJACENT STRUCTURE. PADDING THE A 120974 1 4 DJACENT STRUCTURE REDUCED THE POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE AND Q.C. ALLOWED TH 120974 1 5 E BOLT TO BE RETORQUED. AFTER THE BOLT WAS RETORQUED, PAGE 1A DOCUMENT 120974 1 6 ED THAT THE BOLT WAS INITIALLY FOUND LOOSE. DISPO WAS GIVEN TO REMOVCE 120974 1 7 THE HARDWARE WAS LOST IN ROUTE TPO LABS. NEW HARDWARE WAS ORDERED AND 120974 1 8 INSTALLED. CLOSE THIS PR. 120981 1 1 FILLER BAR BRACKET WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED FROM STRUCTURE ON RH OTBD 120981 1 2 ELEVON COVE Yw437.18. THE DISCREPANT TAB WAS REBONDED PER DWG. PROBABL 120981 1 3 E CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 121121 1 1 PAGE 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1A ITEM 2: INBOARD BRACKET: STEP MEASURMENTS AT A( 121121 1 2 .055), B(.004) AND D(.075) FALL WITHIN ACCEPTABLE MR TOLERANCE OF (0.0 121121 1 3 40-0.085). C(.0542) WAS SHIMMED TO FILL WITHIN MR TOLERANCE. OUTBOARD 121121 1 4 BRACKET: REF. ATTACHMENT B STEP MEASURMENTS AT A(.0654), B(.0760) AND 121121 1 5 D(.0580) FALL WITHIN MR TOLERANCE. C(.060) WAS SHIMMED TO FALL WITHIN 121121 1 6 MR TOLERANCE. PAGE 1B ITEM 3: WING STRUCTURE SHIMMED TO BRING STEP MEA 121121 1 7 SURMENTS WITHIN (0.040 - 0.085) TOLERANCE. PAGE 1C ITEM 4: SHIM WIDTH 121121 1 8 CHANGED TO CLEAR THE TILE FILLER BAR. PAGE 1D ITEM 5: DISCREPANT SHIM 121121 1 9 REMOVED AND REBONDED. ALL DISCREPANCIES ANSWERED AND CORRECTED. 121310 1 1 THE FORWARD ATTACHMENT HOLE FOR THE MR RETAINER WAS RELOCATED DURING T 121310 1 2 HE CREW ESCAPE "POLE" MODIFICATION (REFERENCE: RI DR DH3256-000M). THE 121310 1 3 MOVING OF THE FORWARD ATTACHMENT HOLE PREVENTED THE MR RETAINER INSTA 121310 1 4 LLATION. THE OLD ATTACHING HOLE IN THE MR RETAINER WAS PLUGGED WITH AN 121310 1 5 MD121-0001-08XX RIVET. A NEW FORWARD ATTACHMENT HOLE ON THE FLIGHT DE 121310 1 6 CK. THE FINAL LOCATION OF THE NEW ATTACHMENT HOLE IN THE MR RETAINER H 121310 1 7 AS BEEN NOTED ON ATTACHMENT "BB". DUE TO THE REPOSITIONING OF THE FORW 121310 1 8 ARD ATTACHMENT HOLE FOR THE MR RETAINER PLATE, THE PLATE HAD TO BE MOD 121310 1 9 IFIED TO ACCOMODATE THE NEW CONFIGURATION. 121383 1 1 S/N WITH THE RI P/N WASN'T SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR "W 121383 1 2 ORK STOPPAGE" SINCE THE RCC PNL #3 HAS THE UNIQUE 121383 1 3 CHARACTERISTICS IN THAT IT IS NOT INTERCHANGEABLE 121383 1 4 WITH ANY OTHER RCC PNL ON THE ORBITER. A VIABLE SO 121383 1 5 LUTION TO THIS PROBLEM IS EXPECTED IN THE FUTURE B 121383 1 6 ECAUSE: 121383 1 7 A QUALITY DEFICIENCY NOTICE, QDN-06-310 HAD BEEN W 121383 1 8 RITTEN ON A SIMILAR PROBELM 121383 1 9 BLOCK 37 OF THIS PR ADDRESSED THE NECESSITY FOR RE 121383 1 10 CURRENCE CONTROL ACTION. 121605 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY FROM THIS PR (1652) WAS TRANSFERRE 121605 1 2 D TO PR STR-3-07-1760 TO CONSOLIDATE THE REPAIR EF 121605 1 3 FORT. 121729 1 1 SEVERAL SMALL DINGS & SCRATCHES WERE FOUND ON THE R/H PLBD #3. THESE D 121729 1 2 ISCREPANCIES ARE CONSIDERED COSMETIC AND DO NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCTURAL 121729 1 3 INTEGRITY OF THE DOOR. ALL DISCREPANCIES WERE SEALED WITH MBO120-037 121729 1 4 ADHESIVE AND WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WO 121729 1 5 RKMANSHIP. 121749 1 1 THE DEBONDED RTV (ITEM 1, PG 1) WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE DEBONDED 121749 1 2 RTV AND REPLACING IT WITH NEW RTV WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. THE S 121749 1 3 USPECTED CAUSE OF THE RTV BECOMING DEBONDED IS POOR SURFACE PREPARATIO 121749 1 4 N PRIOR TO APPLICATION OF THE RTV. CONCLUDE THAT THE RTV HAS BEEN REPL 121749 1 5 ACED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 121937 1 1 THE OVER-TORQUED HUBCAP FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW H 121937 1 2 ARDWARE PER THIS PR. A DEV WAS WRITTEN TO V1165 TO CORRECT WRONG TORQU 121937 1 3 E CALLOUT (COPY ATTACHED). CAUSE: HUMAN ERROR. THE OCN RECORDED DURING 121937 1 4 REINSTALLATION OF THE HUBCAP WAS NOT THE SAME AS THE ONE RECORDED FRO 121937 1 5 M THE REMOVAL. THE HUBCAP WAS REMOVED AND INSPECTED, THE OCN NUMBER WA 121937 1 6 S RECORDED AND THE HUBCAP WAS REINSTALLED. THE AN0783 HUBCAP ORIGINALY 121937 1 7 REMOVED FROM THE LHOB WHEEL PER PR MEQ-3-08-0387 WAS REINSTALLED ON T 121937 1 8 HE LHIB WHEEL PER PR MEQ-3-08-0388 THE LHIB WHEEL. AN0784 HUBCAP FROM 121937 1 9 THE LHIB WHEEL. ANO784 WAS REINSTALLED ON THE LHOB WHEEL PER PR MEQ-3- 121937 1 10 08-0387. THE AN0783 AND AN0784 HUBCAPS ARE INTERCHANGEABLE. THE MAIN L 121937 1 11 ANDING GEAR WHEEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. CLOSE TH 121937 1 12 IS PR 122084 1 1 A NEW FITTING WAS ORDERED, AND OBTAINED. THE DISCR 122084 1 2 EPANT FITTING WAS SENT TO MSC REF PMR238145 FOR NE 122084 1 3 W FITTING. THE FITTING BROKE BECAUSE OF COMBINATIO 122084 1 4 N OF FALTORS. 1) INSTALLATION ACCESSABILTY IS LAIM 122084 1 5 ITED, AND 2) A WRENCH FAILED TO SECURE JO BOLT DUR 122084 1 6 ING INSTALLTION. NO FURTHER DISOP OR WORK IS REQUI 122084 1 7 RED. 122087 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP DURING TPS MEQ-3-07-124 WHEN THE LH OTBD MLG VAL 122087 1 2 VE STEM CORE IN THE WHEEL ASSY WAS FOUND TO BE LEAKING WITH A BUBBLE C 122087 1 3 K THE VALVE STEM CORE WAS DEPRESSED AND RELEASED SEVERAL TIMES TO FLUS 122087 1 4 H OUT THE DUST/POWDER THAT WAS PREVENTING THE VALVE SEAT TO SEAL. THIS 122087 1 5 POWDER IS PRESENT INSIDE THE TIRE ON THE INNER SURFACE TO ACT AS A MO 122087 1 6 LD RELEASE AGENT DURING MFG. AFTER FLUSHING THE VALVE STEM SEVERAL TIM 122087 1 7 ES THE POWDER WAS CLEARED & A SEAL WAS OBTAINED. THE TIRE WILL BE TOPP 122087 1 8 ED OFF TO FLIGHT PRESS PER TPS MEQ-3-07-124. THIS COND HAS BEEN CORREC 122087 1 9 TED & THE DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 122160 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 122160 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 122160 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 122160 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 122160 1 5 3-C1. 122217 1 1 THE MD112-1003-0414 SCREW WAS PROBABLY REMOVED BY MISTAKE, SO A NEW SC 122217 1 2 REW WAS INSTALLED. THE REST OF THE SCREWS WERE CHECKED TO VERIFY PROPE 122217 1 3 R TORQUE. THIS WILL RETURN THE HARDWARE TO A PRINT CONDITION. 122265 1 1 THE CONTACT INPRESSION OF THE BODY FLAP RTV BEAD AND THE ACCORDIAN SEA 122265 1 2 L HAS BEEN ACCEPTED PER MR ACTION. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXIST AND TH 122265 1 3 E PR CAN CLOSE. 122421 1 1 A NO-GO READING WAS NOTED ON ATTACH POINT NO. 6 DURING LH OMS POD INST 122421 1 2 ALLATION. SEVERAL ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO ACHIEVE DWG TOLERANCES PER THE 122421 1 3 OMI CLALOUT, AND TORQUE ON GSE, (END ITEM A70-1085) WAS INCREASED TO 122421 1 4 A HIGHER TORQUE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE THE TOLERANCES REFERENCED IN 122421 1 5 OMI V5011 VOL. 1, REV O SEQ 03-256. WHEN HIGHER TORQUE WAS ACHIVED ON 122421 1 6 THE GSE (A70-1085 REF PAGE 1B THIS PR) IT BECAME DISTORTED AND CLOSE T 122421 1 7 O BREAKDOWN. OMS POD MAY BE REMOVED AFTER STS-26R FLT. 7 FROM OV-103. 122421 1 8 OMS PODS ARE CONSIDERED ASMISSION KITS, AND ARE CHANGED TO SUIT THE RE 122421 1 9 QUIRMENTS OF THE SPECIFIC FLIGHT. LP04 IS APPROVED FOR USE ON OV-103 U 122421 1 10 NTIL THE POD IS CHANGED PER MISSION KIT ORDER. THE .230 IN. GAP DOES 122421 1 11 NOT AFFECT THE USE OR EFFECTIVENSS OF THE OMS POD. NO FURTHER WORK IS 122421 1 12 TO BE DONE ON THIS PR AND THIS PR IS NOT A CONSTRAINT TO CONTINUING OM 122421 1 13 I V5011. 122641 1 1 DURING CAVITY PRECLEAN ON LW-2087, A SMALL GOUGE (LENGTH .7378, WIDTH 122641 1 2 .0665, DEPTH .0053) LOCATED NEAR SCREW HOLE #4 CARRIER PANEL V070-1950 122641 1 3 15-001. GOUGE WAS SANDED, BLENDING IT INTO THE SURROUNDING AREA AND CO 122641 1 4 RROSION PROTECTED. MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 122710 1 1 SMALL CRESCENT SHAPED TEAR IN V070-190317-002 SPAR INSULATOR. TORN MAT 122710 1 2 ERIAL REMOVED AND A PATCH WELDED IN ITS PLACE. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO N 122710 1 3 ORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 122771 1 1 THE (3) DISCREPANT SCREWS (ITEMS 1 AND 2, PAGE 1) WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR 122771 1 2 ONE FLIGHT (FLIGHT 11). POST FLIGHT 11 THE (3) DISCREPANT SCREWS WERE 122771 1 3 REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH LONGER SCREWS. THE SCREWS NOW HAVE THE MINI 122771 1 4 MUM (2) THREAD PROTRUSION FROM THE NUTS AS REQUIRED PER MA0101-301 SPE 122771 1 5 C. CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANT SCREW INSTALLATIONS IS SHOP AND QUALITY NOT 122771 1 6 FOLLOWING THE MA0101-301 SPEC. CONCLUDE THAT THE FILLER BAR SUPPORT B 122771 1 7 RACKET AND THE SECONDARY SEAL CURTAIN ARE INSTALLED PER DRAWING AND SP 122771 1 8 EC REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 122834 1 1 LR3D-N-33 PIN WAS FIT CHECKED AND CAN BE INSTALLED WITH NO PROBLEMS ON 122834 1 2 RH SIDE. LH SIDE HAD INTERFERENCE WITH V070-359012 CLOSEOUT BEAM FROM 122834 1 3 STEP 8.0 SO BEAM HOLE WAS SLIGHTLY ELONGATED, BY MR, TO COMPENSATE FO 122834 1 4 R MISALIGNMENT. V070-355065 ACCESS DOOR FROM STEP 16.0 WAS DETERMINED 122834 1 5 TO HAVE IMPROPER SHIM WHICH WAS CAUSING INTERFERENCE. CORRECT SHIM THI 122834 1 6 CKNESS WAS THEN REBONDED DUE TO DEBONDED SHIMS ON ITEM 2 PAGE 1A. FIT 122834 1 7 CHECK WAS THEN DONE PER STEP 22 AND LR3D-N-33 PIN WILL FIT AT LH LOCAT 122834 1 8 ION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR RH SIDE IS NOT DISCREPANCY WHILE LH SIDE IS TO 122834 1 9 LERANCE BUILD UP. 122861 1 1 THE LH2 T-O UMBILICAL COLLET RECEPTACLES WERE SHIMMED TO CORRECT A MIS 122861 1 2 ALIGNMENT ON A MR RESTRICTED BASIS IN SUPPORT OF OV-103, FLIGHT 1. THI 122861 1 3 S FIX HAS PROVEN TO BE SATISFACTORY FOR OV-103 FLIGHTS 1 THROUGH 8. TH 122861 1 4 E PR WAS DEFERRED EACH FLIGHT WHILE RI DOWNEY DETERMINED A RESOLUTION. 122861 1 5 MCR 11240 AS APPROVED IN SEPTEMBER, 1987 AND ENGINEERING IS IN WORK T 122861 1 6 O IMPLEMENT THE NECESSARY MODIFICATIONS. MCR 11240 HAS BEEN RELEASED B 122861 1 7 Y DOWNEY BUT HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED TO LOCKHEED YET. THE MODIFICATION W 122861 1 8 ILL PROVIDE NEW COLLET RECEPTACLES AS WELL AS REMACHINING OF THE COUNT 122861 1 9 ER-BORE SURFACES. THE EXISTING MR APPROVED TAPERED SHIM INSTALLATION I 122861 1 10 S SATISFACTORY AND WILL SUPPORT OV-103'S FLIGHT 9, ON AN MR UNRESTRICT 122861 1 11 ED BASIS. FUTURE WORK WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF MCR 122861 1 12 11240. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY 122861 1 13 IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 122867 1 1 THE MLG WHEEL/TIRE ASEMBLIES WERE SUSPECTED OF EXHIBITING LEAKAGE THRO 122867 1 2 UGH THE OVERINFLATION VALVES. THE SUSPICION WAS BASED ON A PRESSURE LE 122867 1 3 AK IDENTIFIED ON A SIMILAR (P/N 49-248) VALVE INSTALLED ON A WHEEL IN 122867 1 4 THE WHELL & TIRE SHOP DURNG BUILD UP. THE FLIGHT TIRES PERFORMED NOMIN 122867 1 5 ALLY THROUGH OUT THE STS33 PROCESSING FLOW AND IN FLIGHT. THE WHEELS H 122867 1 6 AVE BEEN REMOVED FROM OV-103 AND PR'S WRE INITIATED AGAINST EACH ASSEM 122867 1 7 BLY TO REMOVE THE SUSPECT 49-248 VALVES AND REPLACE THEM WITH 49-333 V 122867 1 8 ALVES. THIS SUSPECT CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. THE ACTUAL LEAKAGE IN 122867 1 9 OTHER WHEEL VALVES WAS CAUSED BY CORROSION. PROBABLY DUE TO A MANUFAC 122867 1 10 TURING DEFECT. 122897 1 1 DISCREPANT PRSD CRYO TANK #2 INBRD AFT STRUT HAS B 122897 1 2 EEN ROUTED TO RI-DOWNEY VIA LRU PR FOR FAILURE ANA 122897 1 3 LYSIS UPON REMOVAL OF 02 TANK #2 PER OMI V5R02. RE 122897 1 4 PLACEMENT 02 TANK STRUT HAS BEEN ORDERED & REC'VD. 122897 1 5 H/W INSTLN WILL BE PERFORMED IN AUGUST 1987 PER O 122897 1 6 MI V5R02. RETURNING TANK SET 2 TO FLT. CONFIG. CLO 122897 1 7 SE PR. 122908 1 1 THE INABILITY TO SILK SCREEN THE PLUG/WIRE DESIGNATOR NUMBERS ON THE V 122908 1 2 070-355292-009, -010 AND -011 BRACKETS IN THE ORBITER AS IDENTIFIED IN 122908 1 3 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED, WITH MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, BY 122908 1 4 APPLYING THE NUMBERS WITH RUBBER STAMPS. THE DISCREPANCY OF THE REFER 122908 1 5 ENCE DESIGNATOR NUMBERS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2 PAGE 1A WAS RESOLVED BY E 122908 1 6 O-TO-FOLLOW TO CORRECT THE V070-355292 DRAWING TO AGREE WITH THE V070- 122908 1 7 356705 AND V070-795511 DWG. THE CAUSE OF ITEM 1 PAGE 1 IS DUE TO THE F 122908 1 8 ACT SILK SCREENINGIS NOT ALLOWED IN THE ORBITER AND THE BRACKETS CANN 122908 1 9 OT BE REMOVED FROM THE ORBITER. THE CAUSE OF ITEM 2 PAGE 1A IS DUE TO 122908 1 10 ROCKWELL DESIGN ERROR. CONCLUDE THAT THE BRACKETS ARE ACCEPTABLE AS ID 122908 1 11 ENTIFIED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. CLOSE THIS PR. 122926 1 1 LOWER INSULATOR AT R/S #11 TEE HAS BEEN REMOVED, REPAIRED, RE-INSTALLE 122926 1 2 D & GAPPED PER PRINT. FINAL INSTALLATION OF TEE WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED P 122926 1 3 ER TPS VSTR-3-07-155. WORK ON THIS PR IS COMPLETE. 122979 1 1 FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF TIRE UNDER BETTER CONDI- 122979 1 2 TION AND CLOSER SCRUTINY SHOWED THAT THE WHEEL/ 122979 1 3 TIRE ASSY. S/N 97153-056 DOES QUALIFY TO BE RE- 122979 1 4 USED. (PER CRITERIA ESTABLISHED ON DWG. V070- 122979 1 5 510002 REV. E REF. E.O. #E18). THE TIRE IS NOT 122979 1 6 REJECTED AND CAN BE REUSED FOR FUTURE FLIGHTS. 122979 1 7 (APPROX. 3/12" WEAR ON TIRE). HOWEVER, DUE TO THE 122979 1 8 FACT THAT THE OTHER THREE TIRES ARE BEING REPLACED 122979 1 9 WITH NEW ONES, WHEEL/TIRE ASSY. S/N 97153-056 WILL 122979 1 10 BE REMOVED FROM ORBITOR OV103 AND ROUTED TO HDA 122979 1 11 TO BE HELD IN STORAGE FOR REUSE IN FUTURE FLIGHTS. 123095 1 1 UPON THE REMOVAL OF L/H RADIATORS #3 AND #4, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT SE 123095 1 2 VERAL RADIATOR BEARINGS WERE EITHER SEIZED OR BINDING. ALL SUCH BEARIN 123095 1 3 GS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW BEARINGS PRIOR TO THE REINSTALLA 123095 1 4 TION OF THE RADIATORS. PROBABLE CAUSE: DRY LUBE/LUBRICANT FOULING THE 123095 1 5 SURFACE BETWEEN THE BEARING AND ITS HOUSING. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 123110 1 1 MARKS NOTED IN DISCREPANCY #1 ARE SUPER FISCIAL IN NATURE AND HAVE BEE 123110 1 2 N MR'D OKAY-AS-IS WITH NO STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION RESULTING FROM MR. SC 123110 1 3 RATCHES ARE RESULT OF REMOVAL/RE-INSTALLATION WITH HIGH TOLERANCE PIN. 123110 1 4 MR MARKING NOT REQ'D 123441 1 1 THE R/H ET DOOR POWER DRIVE UNIT (PDU) WAS SUSPECTED OF OPERATING ERRA 123441 1 2 TICALLY. REFER TO IPR 26RV-0344 CS. A SPARE PDU WAS SUCCESSFULLY BENCH 123441 1 3 TESTED PER THIS WAD AND CERTIFIED FOR FLIGHT BY A RECENT ATP. THE SUS 123441 1 4 PECT PDU WAS REMOVED AND ROUTED TO HOOVER (VENDOR) FOR FAILURE ANALYSI 123441 1 5 S AND RESOLUTION OF IPR-0344 CS. THE SPARE PDU WAS INSTALLED AND ALL R 123441 1 6 /H ET DOOR DRIVE RIGGING SPECIFICATIONS WERE VERIFIED. CIG TRACKING WI 123441 1 7 LL RETEST CONTINUITY THROUGH DEMATED AND REMATED CONNECTORS AND OMI V1 123441 1 8 097 FUNCTIONALLY RETESTED THE NEW PDU. NO FURTHER DISCREPANT CONDITION 123441 1 9 S EXIST WITH THE R/H ET DOOR PDU. 123532 1 1 ITEM 1.0 PG 1 (SIX DENTS ON TOP FACESHEET OF LH LOWER WING SKIN) WAS M 123532 1 2 R REPAIRED WITH DOUBLERS BONDED TO DISCREPANT AREA. BRISKHEAT PROCESS 123532 1 3 620 WAS USED WITH MBO120-053 ADHESIVE FILM. ITEM 2.0 PG 1A REFERS TO S 123532 1 4 USPECT INCOMPLETE CURE AT DENT #5. DOUBLER OVER DENT #5 WAS REMOVED TO 123532 1 5 BE REBONDED TO STRUCTURE. ITEM 3.0 PG 1B REFERS TO DENT LOCATED ADJAC 123532 1 6 ENT TO DENT #5 FOUND DURING WORK ON ITEM 2.0 PG 1A. DOUBLER FOR DENT # 123532 1 7 5 WAS ENLARGED TO COVER BOTH DENT #5 AND DENT ITEM 3.0 PG 1B. DOUBLER 123532 1 8 WAS BONDED TO STRUCTURE USING BRISKHEAT PROCESS 620 WITH MBO120-053 AD 123532 1 9 HESIVE FILM. ITEM 4.0 PG 1C REFERS TO CONTAMINATED PRIMER AT DENT #6. 123532 1 10 PRIMER WAS CONTAMINATED WITH FOD DURING CURE. PRIMER WAS REMOVED AND R 123532 1 11 EAPPLIED. LOWER WING SKIN IS A PRIMARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF AL 123532 1 12 L ITEMS : WORKMANSHIP. ALL DISPREPANT AREA REPAIRS WERE MR APPORVED FO 123532 1 13 R UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER REWORK IS REQUIRED. 123594 1 1 DISCREPANCY #1 WAS A DENT IN THE R/H OUTBOARD ELEVON WHICH WAS MR REPA 123594 1 2 IRED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BY BONDING A DOUBLER COVERING THE DENT AREA. 123594 1 3 DISCREPANCY #2 WAS A MINOR DENT WHICH WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRES 123594 1 4 TRICTED USE. CLOSE PR. 123913 1 1 STRICKER BLOCK (V070-398439-006) AT Xo1283.61 HAS A GOUGE IN IT. THE G 123913 1 2 OUGE WAS REPAIRED PER MR DISPOSITION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CA 123913 1 3 USE: FLIGHT DAMAGE. 124065 1 1 IN ORDER TO CORRECT OCN DISCREPANCY, THE V070-396270-016 CARRIER PANEL 124065 1 2 WAS REMOVED AND THE INCORRECT OCN NUMBER WAS CHANGED TO REFLECT THE C 124065 1 3 ORRECT NUMBER. THE V070-396270-016 CARRIER PANEL WAS THEN REINSTALLED. 124065 1 4 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP 124297 1 1 TO REDUCE EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE ON GROUND STRAPS MENTIONED IN PROBLEM 1 124297 1 2 THE FOLLOWING WORK WAS PERFORMED. THE STRAPS WERE REMOVED, MATING SUR 124297 1 3 FACES CLEANED, CORROSION PROTECTED AND STRAPS REINSTALLED.AN ELECTRICA 124297 1 4 L BOND TEST PERFORMED AT COMPLETION OF THIS WORK SHOWS RESISTANCE LEVE 124297 1 5 LS BELOW 2.5 MILLIOHMS 124548 1 1 PREVIOUS MR WILL ALLOW USE OF PNL. AS-IS, WITH 124548 1 2 DENTS. SURFACE COATING WAS APPLIED TO ANY OTHER 124548 1 3 DISCREPANT AREA'S, RETURNING ITEM TO PRINT CONFIG- 124548 1 4 URATION. 124592 1 1 SHINY OBJECT ON PAGE 1, ITEM 1 WAS ACTUALLY AN ARE 124592 1 2 A ON A STRINGER WHERE THE KORPON WAS REMOVED. THE 124592 1 3 DEFECT DOES NOT AFFECT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF STR 124592 1 4 INGER. SHINY AREA WAS PAINTED WITH KORPON. MRB APP 124592 1 5 ROVED TO PAINT SHINY AREA AND STRINGER WAS RETURNE 124592 1 6 D TO DESIGN INTENT. 124733 1 1 DISCREPANCY 1 LISTED ON PAGE 1 HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED AS IS BY MR DISPOS 124733 1 2 ITION. DESIGN INTENT OF THE RTV-HEAT SINK INSTALLATION HAS BEEN MAINTA 124733 1 3 INED. 124765 1 1 PREVIOUS MR DISPO ALLOWS USE OF V070-356735-012 AC 124765 1 2 ESS PNHL. "AS-IS" SURFACE COATING WAS APPLIED TO A 124765 1 3 NY OTHER AREAS WHERE CHIPPING/SCRATCHES OCCURRED I 124765 1 4 N SURFACE COATING, PER PRINT. 124893 1 1 THE THREE (3) SCRATCHES ON AVIONICS SHELF #4 (REF. 124893 1 2 DISCREPANCY ITEM 1 & ENG NOTE PG. 3) WERE MINOR. 124893 1 3 THE SCRATCHES WERE BUFFED OUT & RE-CORROSION PRO- 124893 1 4 TECTED. SHELF WAS MR ID. 125014 1 1 MR DOUBER ADDED. 125068 1 1 ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE VEHICLE WHERE THE CABLE T 125068 1 2 RAY IS ATTACHED TO THE XO 693 FRAME; HOLES 1,3,5,8 125068 1 3 ,10, & 12 WERE REAMED UP TO 0.2180" AND HOLES 4,6, 125068 1 4 7, & 9 WERE REAMED UP TO 0.2188". THIS WAS DONE TO 125068 1 5 AVOID HOLE DAMAGE BY FASTENER THREADS IN BEARING. 125068 1 6 NDE WAS DONE ON EACH AREA (#29522 AND #30209A) AN 125068 1 7 D NO DISCREPENCIES WERE NOTED. THIS REPAIR MAKES T 125068 1 8 HE HOLES ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. SPACERS 125068 1 9 AND WASHERS REMOVED BY STEP 4.0, WILL BE RE-INSTAL 125068 1 10 LED BY STEP 14 OF BASIC VSTR-3-07-135. 125150 1 1 REMOVED AND REPLACED THE CHARRED CENTER HINGE'S CENTER SEAL. SEAL WAS 125150 1 2 ALMOST BURNED THROUGH TO INNER CAVITY OF SEAL, BUT NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF 125150 1 3 A LEAK PATH WERE FOUND. (SEE PAGE 2). PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN - FRSI M 125150 1 4 OD TO PROTECT THE SEALS. ITEMS 2 & 3 PAGE 1: MR UNRESTRICTED ACCEPTANC 125150 1 5 E OF THE (2) ACTUATOR HINGE'S SIDE SEALS P/N V070-198383-001 & -002 AS 125150 1 6 ARE. NO LEAK PATH CONCERNS. (SEE PAGE 4). PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN - F 125150 1 7 RSI MOD TO PROTECT THE SEALS AND PROCESSING/WEAR. 125210 1 1 ON THE LHS Xo 693 LOC, DISCREPANT WIRE TRAY FASTEN 125210 1 2 ER HOLES 1 & 7 WERE REAMED TO A DIA OF .2180" TO R 125210 1 3 EMOVE THREAD BEARING DAMAGE. NDE WAS PERFORMED (# 125210 1 4 29996) & THE EDDY CURRENT INSP OF THE HOLES SHOW N 125210 1 5 O DISCREPANCIES. THE MR REPAIR IS ACCEPTABLE AS I 125210 1 6 S FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 125219 1 1 CARRIER PANEL V070-390225-001 IS CRACKED .290 INCHES ON THE LOWER SIDE 125219 1 2 . THE CRACK WAS STOP DRILLED AND CORROSION PROTECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE 125219 1 3 DUE TO EXCESSIVE FORCE USED TO REMOVE BLANKET BONDED TO CARRIER PANEL 125219 1 4 . 125255 1 1 1 OF 2 PROTRUDING HEAD ATTACHING FASTENERS CAUSES DAMAGE TO THE V070-3 125255 1 2 37863-002 CLOSEOUT PANEL. PR REMOVED 2 FASTENERS AND INSTALLED 2 HI-L 125255 1 3 OKS IN THEIR PLACE AND MR ID'D THE INTERCOSTAL. PROBLEM DUE TO A BUIL 125255 1 4 DUP OF TOLERANCES. 125397 1 1 MOLD IMPRESSION RESULTS OF SCRATCHES IN THE BORON 125397 1 2 STRUT SURFACE SHOW THE DEPTH OF THE SCRATCHES GREA 125397 1 3 TER THAN THE ALLOWABLE DESIGN CRITERIA OF .003 IN. 125397 1 4 (SCRATCH #1 MEASURED .0032 IN.) AN LRU PR HAS BEEN 125397 1 5 WRITTEN TO ROUTE THE STRUT BACK TO THE VENDOR WHE 125397 1 6 RE IT WILL UNDERGO FUNCTIONAL INTEGRITY TEST AND E 125397 1 7 VALUATION DUE TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED DISCREPANCY. 125397 1 8 A REPLACEMENT STRUT WAS OBTAINED FROM SPARES. R.C. 125397 1 9 ACTION-DEVELOPE BETTER METHODS AND CRITERIA FOR T 125397 1 10 HE HANDLING, UNCRATING, AND THE STORAGE OF THE 125397 1 11 BORON STRUTS BY ALL PARTIES INVOLVED. (I.E. SHOP, 125397 1 12 LOGISTICS, ETC) 125590 1 1 PROBLEMS 1 AND 2 ARE ASSOCIATED ITEMS AND BOTH PER 125590 1 2 TAIN TO BOLT #18. A GAP WAS FOUND UNDER THIS BOLT 125590 1 3 HEAD & INSUFFICIENT WRENCH CLEARANCE PREVENTED PRO 125590 1 4 PER TORQUING. A SPECIAL ADAPTER WAS FABRICATED & U 125590 1 5 SED. PROPER TORQUE WAS THEN APPLIED ON BOLT #18. P 125590 1 6 ROBLEM 3 IS ASSOCIATED WITH BOLT #19. THERE WERE N 125590 1 7 O GAPS FOUND UNDER THIS BOLTS HEAD BUT INSUFFICIEN 125590 1 8 T WRENCH CLEARANCE PREVENTED A TORQUE CK. THE WREN 125590 1 9 CH ADAPTER USED ON BOLT #18 FAILED. BEFORE A SUFFI 125590 1 10 CIENT TORQUE CK VLV WAS REACHED. SINCE BOLT #19 125590 1 11 DOESNT EXIBIT ANY GAPS AND HAS NOT BEEN REMOVED SI 125590 1 12 NCE ORIGINAL INSTLN, TORQUE VERIFICATION WILL BE D 125590 1 13 ELETED ON THIS BOLT. CLOSE PR. 125776 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THE V070-198507-004 SEAL HOUSING NOT TRAVELING 125776 1 2 FREELY WAS FOUND TO BE CAUSED BY RTV AND OTHER DEBRIS IN THE RETAINER. 125776 1 3 AFTER DEBRIS AND RTV WAS REMOVED, FREE TRAVEL OF THE SEAL WAS RESTORE 125776 1 4 D. DURING THIS REWORK, THE V070-198552 RETAINERS, V070-198576 ENDCAPS, 125776 1 5 AND V070-198577 SHIMS WERE REWORKED AND A PER PRINT CONFIGURATION HAS 125776 1 6 BEEN RESTORED. (REF ITEM 2 PAGE 1A) UPON INSPECTION BY ENG IT WAS FOU 125776 1 7 ND THAT THE REASON THE LINEAR SEAL DID NOT TRAVEL FREELY WAS BECAUSE T 125776 1 8 HE LINEAR SPRING WAS NOT COMPLETELY IN THE RETAINER. THE END OF THE SP 125776 1 9 RING WAS HANGING OUT OF THE RETAINER. THIS RESTRICTED FULL TRAVEL OF T 125776 1 10 HE SEAL ASSY. WITH THE SPRING IN THE CORRECT CONFIGURATION, THE LINEAR 125776 1 11 SEAL TRAVELED FREELY. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1B) T 125776 1 12 HE BUBBLED KOROPON FOUND ON THE SEAL PANEL WAS REMOVED AND NEW KOROPON 125776 1 13 REAPPLIED. NO STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION WAS NOTED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPE 125776 1 14 RATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 4 ON PAGE 1C) THE IMPROPER FIT OF THE 125776 1 15 V070-198552-001 ANGLE AT THE END OF THE SEAL PANEL WAS CAUSED BY THE A 125776 1 16 TTACH HOLES IN THE RETAINER BEING DRILLED SLIGHTLY OFF CENTERLINE. THE 125776 1 17 RETAINER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW RETAINER INSTALLED. PER PRINT CONDITIO 125776 1 18 N WAS RESTORED. CONCLUDE THAT ITEMS 1 THROUGH 4 HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED AN 125776 1 19 D ALL SUBSEQUENT REWORK COMPLETE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQUIR 125776 1 20 ED ON THIS PR. 125792 1 1 THE S/N /OCN RECORDED IN OMI V5R02 FOR O2 TANK 2 UPPER AFT STRUT (ME 2 125792 1 2 70-0006-0005) DURING OV-103 FLT 7 PROCESSING WAS INCORRECT THIS PR WAS 125792 1 3 DEFERRED TO FLT 8 DUE TO ACCESS RESTRICTION (BAY 3 RHS CLOSE OUT) DUR 125792 1 4 ING FLT 8 PROCESSING ACCESS WAS OBTAINED (REF STEPS 3,4, AND 5) 125814 1 1 THE PITTED AREAS (12 AREAS TOTAL) ON THE ELEVON 125814 1 2 SKIN SURFACE BELOW RUN PNL #12, RH OUTBD ELEVON 125814 1 3 (Yw 362.165 TO Yw 382.808) WERE CLEANED, INSP'd & 125814 1 4 ACCEPTED AS "OK AS IS" BY RI DOWNEY/STRESS. THERE 125814 1 5 WAS (3) LAYERS OF KOROPON APPLIED TO EACH PITTED 125814 1 6 AREA TO INCREASE THE SKIN SURFACES ABILITY TO RE- 125814 1 7 SIST ADDITIONAL CORROSION. THE CORROSION HAD BEEN 125814 1 8 CAUSED BY GALVANIC ACTION BETWEEN THE ALUMINUM 125814 1 9 SKIN & THE INCONEL BLKTS. THE B91B30111-86 SKIN 125814 1 10 BETWEEN THE NOTED COORDINATES HAS BEEN MR ID'd. 125911 1 1 LOOSE HARDWARE IN ELEVON IS A RESULT FO THE MANUFACTUREING PROCESS. AL 125911 1 2 L ACCEPSSIBLE HARDWARE HAS BEEN REMOVED PER TPS VSTR-3-07-241. IN ACCE 125911 1 3 SSIBLE HARDWARE IS ALLOWED TO REMAIN PER PRINT. 126088 1 1 THE DISCREPANT AFT SEPERATION BOLT WILL BE MR REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SER 126088 1 2 VICE CENTER AND THEN RETURNED TO STOCK. A REPLACEMENT AFT SEPERATION B 126088 1 3 OLT WILL BE USED FOR OV-103 FLIGHT 07. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST 126088 1 4 & THIS PR CAN CLOSE. CLOSE THIS PR. 126222 1 1 ALL ORBITER/ET FITTING ATTACH BOLTS THAT WERE FOUND LOW WERE FULLY TOR 126222 1 2 QUED PRIOR TO FLIGHT PER VSTR-03-07-218. THIS PR WAS HELD OPEN PENDING 126222 1 3 THE RESULTS OF A POST-FLIGHT TORQUE INSPECTION WHICH HAS BEEN PERFORM 126222 1 4 ED PER VSTR-3-08-401. OF THE 36 AFFECTED BOLTS, 34 WERE INSPECTED AND 126222 1 5 FOUND TO BE AT OR NEAR THE MAXIMUM DESIGN TORQUE. CONCLUDE THAT THE AB 126222 1 6 SENCE OF FULL TORQUE WAS DUE SOLELY TO IMPROPER FASTENER INSALLATION A 126222 1 7 ND/OR TORQUE SEQUENCING DURING MANUFACTURING AND THAT THERE IS NO REA 126222 1 8 SON TO SUSPECT FLIGHT AS A CAUSE OF TORQUE LOSS. THIS INSTALLATION IS 126222 1 9 NOW ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED FLIGHT AND NO FURTHER ACTION IS WARRAN 126222 1 10 TED. CLOSE THIS PR 126460 1 1 THE GALLING AND ELONGATION ARE MINOR DEFECTS, AND 126460 1 2 ARE ACCEPTABLE AS IS WITH MR DISPOSITION. THE 126460 1 3 PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY THE NUMEROUS INSTALLATION 126460 1 4 AND REMOVAL OF THE HARDWARE, FOR THE ET CURTAIN. 126631 1 1 HATCH "B" UNLOCKING FORCE TEST WAS REPERFORMED USING METHOD SPECIFIED 126631 1 2 BY VENDOR. PROBABLE CAUSE IS FORCE WAS PREVIOUSLY MEASURED FROM END O 126631 1 3 F LOCK LEVER RESULTING IN SLIGHTLY LOWER FORCE READING (DUE TO LONGER 126631 1 4 LEVEL ARM). VENDOR ACCEPTANCE TEST SPECIFIES MEASURING UNLOCKING FORCE 126631 1 5 FROM MIDPOINT OF FINGER GRIP AREA ON LEVER. RETEST PERFORMED PER STEP 126631 1 6 2. V1058 HAS BEEN CORRECTED TO MAKE THE MEASUREMENT AT THE CORRECT PL 126631 1 7 ACE ON THE HANDLE. 126660 1 1 THE DAMAGE DOCUMENTED IN THIS PR IS MINOR DAMAGE TO THE RADIATOR SILVE 126660 1 2 R-TEFLON COATING. THE COATING LAYERS HAVE NOT BEEN PENETRATED. THE DAM 126660 1 3 AGE WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "AS-IS". THE DISCREPANCIES HA 126660 1 4 VE BEEN RECORDED ON THE DAMAGE DOCUMENTATION LOG AND GRID MAP. NO FURT 126660 1 5 HER WORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 126676 1 1 DENTS & DINGS ARE MINOR & OF A SUPERFICIAL NATURE. 126676 1 2 COIN TAP SHOWED NO INDICATION OF ANY DELAMINA- 126676 1 3 TION OF HONEY COMB PANEL UPPER SHEET. STRUCTURAL 126676 1 4 INTEGRITY OF THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE IS NOT SIGNI 126676 1 5 FICANTLY COMPROMISED. 126863 1 1 IT WAS DETERMINED BY ENGINEERING AND MR BOARD THAT THIS PROBLEM WAS IN 126863 1 2 SIGNIFICANT. THE WCS STORAGE COMPARTMENT PANEL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTUR 126863 1 3 E, AND THIS PROBLEM DOES NOT AFFECT THE FORM, FIT OR FUNCTION OF THIS 126863 1 4 PART. THIS PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR (USE). 126945 1 1 LABEL IS OKAY AS IS. 127139 1 1 THIS SUMMARY ADDRESSES ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DISCREPANCY. THE RPO1 OMS POD IS 127139 1 2 INSTALLED ON OV-103. TILE NEEDED A 56-34 DOOR INSTALLED ON RP01 IN OR 127139 1 3 DER TO MAKE A SPLASH FOR A CARRIER PANEL. SINCE RP01'S 56-34 DOOR WAS 127139 1 4 AT MCDONNEL DOUGLAS FOR REWORK, RP03'S 56-34 DOOR WAS BORROWED AND TEM 127139 1 5 PORARILY INSTALLED FOR THE TILE SPLASH. AFTER THE SPLASH WAS MADE AND 127139 1 6 BEFORE THE RP03'S DOOR WAS REMOVED, 2ND SHIFT OBSERVED THAT THE DOOR G 127139 1 7 APS EXCEEDED THE ALLOWABLE TOLERANCE AND WROTE THIS PR. RP03'S DOOR WA 127139 1 8 S REMOVED AND ROUTED BACK TO RP03 AND RP01'S DOOR WAS DELIVERED AND IN 127139 1 9 STALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE, THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION 127139 1 10 AND THERE IS NOT A DISCREPANCY WITH RP01'S DOOR OR INSTALLATION. THE 127139 1 11 CAUSE OF THIS PR IS DUE TO MISCOMMUNICATION BETWEEN 1ST AND 2ND SHIFT. 127165 1 1 THE DENT WAS MR'D OK AS IS. 127260 1 1 ET FWD AND AFT LATCHES WERE REMOVED AND NEW ONES INSTALLED PER THIS PR 127260 1 2 . RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER ET DOR FUNCTIONAL, OMI-V1097. NO FURTHER PR 127260 1 3 OBLEMS ARE ANTICIPATED. ALL STEPS ON THIS PR ARE COMPLETE AND NO FURTH 127260 1 4 ER WOEK IS REQUIRED. RETEST OF THIS PR WILL BE VERIFIED PER PR MEQ-3-0 127260 1 5 7-0268 AFTER VEHICLE POWER HAS BEEN RESTORED. 127290 1 1 FASTENER HAS BEEN REINSTALLED PER STR-3-07-2756 ATTACHMENT "D" THIS PD 127290 1 2 R WAS USED BECAUSE IT WILL GENERATE EO-TO-FOLLOW DISPOSITION ON ALL TH 127290 1 3 E FASTENERS IN THIS AREA. 127584 1 1 THE LH MAIN GEAR SPRING ENGAGE LITE FAILED TO COME ON AFTER RESET OF S 127584 1 2 WITCH "S8". THE C70-0894 UNIT WAS FIRST POWERED UP AND DOWN TO RESET T 127584 1 3 HE BOX. THE C70-0894 BOX WAS THEN REPLACED AFTER RESET FAILED. IT WAS 127584 1 4 THEN FOUND THAT THE PLUNGER OF THE BUNGEE TRIGGER ASSY WAS NOT FULLY E 127584 1 5 XTENDING TO ACTUATE THE SWITCH ASSY. THE PLUNGER WAS BINDING UP IN THE 127584 1 6 TRIGGER ASSY. THIS CONDITION WAS PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED BY PR MEQ-3-11 127584 1 7 -0498. PR MEQ-3-11-0498 WILL ADDRESS AND CORRECT THIS CONDITION, AND P 127584 1 8 ERFORM SYSTEM RETEST. PROPER SWITCH ACTUATIN AND ELECTRICAL VERIFICATI 127584 1 9 ON HAVE BEEN MADE BY THIS IPR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR DUE TO NORMAL USE. 127584 1 10 UPGRADE THIS IPR TO A PR AGAINST V070-510201-045 LMG, NHA V070-100001 127584 1 11 -024. VENDOR 03953 R/I. CLOSE THIS PR AS A DUPLICATE TO PR MEQ-3-11-04 127584 1 12 98. 127713 1 1 THIS WAD WAS INITIATED WHEN THE LEFT HAND ET DOOR FORWARD DOOR DRIVE HOU 127713 1 2 SING ASSEMLBY WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED. THE ENTIRE ASSEMBLY WAS REPLACED 127713 1 3 WITH MODIFIED OV-102 HARDWARE PER PR MEQ-3-12-0554 WHICH ADDRESSED BOTH 127713 1 4 LEFT HAND FORWARD AND AFT ASSEMBLIES. THIS WAD PERFORMED INITIAL BOROSCO 127713 1 5 PE INSPECTIONS ONLY. ALL SUBSEQUENT WORK AND RIGGING OF THE HARDWARE WAS 127713 1 6 PERFORMED ON PR-0554 AND FUNCTIONAL RETEST WAS VERIFIED PER V1097 RUN 3 127713 1 7 . NO WORK OR RETEST REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIE 127713 1 8 NCY. 127858 1 1 ITEMS 1, 3, 5 & 6 DOC PROBLEMS W/ THE SCREW LENGTHS OF THE SCREWS USED 127858 1 2 TO INSTALL THE R/H VENT DOOR #9. THE SCREW LENGTHS WERE INVESTIGATED 127858 1 3 , RESULTING IN EO TO FOLLOW DISPO WHICH CORRECTED THE SCREW LENGTH CAL 127858 1 4 LOUTS. THE CORRECT SCREWS WERE INSTL'D PER FIG 3 PG. 14 & VERIFIED TO 127858 1 5 BE THE SAME SCREW CALLOUTS AS DWG V070-385031 EO E01. DISCREPANCY NO 127858 1 6 LONGER EXISTS. ITEMS 2 & 4 ARE ADDRESSED BY MEQ-3-07-0226 & PVD-3-07 127858 1 7 -0171 RESPECTIVELY & ARE NOT DISPOSITIONED BY THIS PR. 127899 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS ROUTED THRU HDA FOR R 127899 1 2 EPAIRS, IN TURN THE INSULATOR WAS REPLACED WITH A 127899 1 3 NEW INSULATOR WHICH WAS IN STOCK. THE INSULATOR IS 127899 1 4 INSTALLED ONTO THE TEE AND IS "OK" FOR FLIGHT 127987 1 1 THE ORIGINAL DRAG ANGLE INSTALLATION WAS MISLOCATED, CAUSING THE LOCAT 127987 1 2 ION OF THE NEW DRAG ANGLE REWORK TO BE MISLOCATED. ALSO, SEVERAL MOUNT 127987 1 3 ING HOLES WERE FOUND DRILLED AT AN ANGLE, CAUSING ELONGATION OF THE EX 127987 1 4 ISTING HOLES. NEW "MR" DOUBLERS WERE FABRICATED AND LOCATED TO CORRECT 127987 1 5 THE MISLOCATION. HOLES WERE REAMED TO ACCOMMODATE OVERSIZED FASTENERS 127987 1 6 . MR DOUBLERS AND OVERSIZED FASTENERS WERE SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED. NO 127987 1 7 FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. CLOSE THIS PR. 128092 1 1 AREA IS NOT ACCESIBLE TO INSTALL SOLID RIVETS. BLI 128092 1 2 ND PULL RIVETS PROVIDE ADEQUATE RETENTION CAPABILI 128092 1 3 TY FOR NUTPLATES. STR INTEGRITY MAINTAINED. 128109 1 1 THE S/N /OCN RECORDED IN OMI V5R02 FOR H2 TANK 1 INBOARD AFT STRUT (ME 128109 1 2 270-0006-0015) DURING OV-103 FLT 7 PROCESSIG WAS INCORRECT THIS PR WAS 128109 1 3 DEFERRED TO FLT 8 DUE TO ACCESS RESTRICTION (BAY 6 LHS CLOSE OUT) DUR 128109 1 4 ING FLT 8 PROCESSING ACCESS WAS OBTAINED AND TANK STRUT S/N /OCN WAS O 128109 1 5 BTAINED (REF STEPS 3.4 AND 5) CLOSE THIS PR 128110 1 1 THIS IPR WAS PICKED UP DURING REVIEW OF TIRE PRESSURE DATON FROM TPS M 128110 1 2 EQ-3-07-124 FOR RH INBD AND LH OTBD TIRE ON MLG HAVING QUESTIONABLE DE 128110 1 3 COY RATES. THE DATA SHOWED A SPSIG LOSS FOR THE RH INBD AND 4 PSIG FO 128110 1 4 R THE LH OTBD OVER A 12 HOUR PERIOD, WHICH WOULD VIOLATE OMRS V51AGO. 128110 1 5 044 WHICH DOES NOT ALLOW MORE THAN A 25% INCREASE IN DECAY RATE FROM 128110 1 6 THE PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED RATE. THE VALUE LORE ON THE LH OTBD TIRE FA 128110 1 7 ILED A BUBBLE LEAK CHECK AND PR MEQ-3-07-0352 RESEATED THE VALVE AND V 128110 1 8 ERIFIED FLIGHT PRESSURE. FINAL TIRE PRESSURE CHECKS WERE DONE ON THE 128110 1 9 TIRES IN WUESTION PER STEP 5 OF THIS IPR OPPROXIMATELY 24 HRS LATER. 128110 1 10 THE FINAL DATA REVEALS A 24 HOUR DECAY RATE OF. 8 PSIG FOR THE LH-OTB 128110 1 11 D ANDD .7 PSIG FOR THE RH INBD. THIS DECAY RATE VERIFIERS THAT THE HI 128110 1 12 GH 12 HOUR DECAY WAS BAD DATA AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN OMRSP, VIOLAT 128110 1 13 ION. HOWEVER, THE INITIAL DECAY RATES COMPLETED ON MAY 26 WERE EXTREM 128110 1 14 ELY LOW CABOUT/PSIA PER 7 DAYS. PRESSURE CHECKS COMPLETED ON JUNE 20 128110 1 15 FOR OPF ROLLOUT INDICATE THAT THE LH INBD DECAY RATE IS SLIGHTLY GREAT 128110 1 16 ER THAN 25% OVER THE PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED DECAY RATE, BUT STILL WELL 128110 1 17 WITHIN THE SPIG PER 7 DAY KCRITERIA. THEREFORE, THIS DOES VIOLATE TH 128110 1 18 E OMPSD. NOTE: PERFORM THE FILLOWING STEP BECAUSE THE LH INBD TIRE D 128110 1 19 ECAY RATE EXCEEDED 25% OF THE PREVIOUSLY ESTAHBGLISHED DECAY RATE AND 128110 1 20 VIOLATES V51AGO.044 OMRSD. UPGRADE THIS IPR TO A MEQ PR AGAINST THE L 128110 1 21 H INBD W/T ASSY (PART #V070-510001-097, NHA #V070-100001-021) FOR THE 128110 1 22 DECAY RATE EXCEEDING 25% ALLOWABLE INCREASE OVER LAST RATE. THIS WAS 128110 1 23 WAS UPGRADED TO A PR BECAUSE OMRSD V51AGO.044 WAS VIOLATED. THIS OMR 128110 1 24 S REQUIREMENT WAS WAIVED PER WAIVER #WK0644. THE PROBLEM NO LONGER EXI 128110 1 25 ST. CLOSE THIS PR. 128177 1 1 THE CONTACAT BETWEEN THE MD122-0004-3310 CLEVIS PINS AND THE 170D42025 128177 1 2 1-43 DOUBLE (-45 R/H), WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. SIN 128177 1 3 CE NO PARTS ARE MOVEABLE (PINS OR PANELS) AND RELATIVE MOTION BETWEEN 128177 1 4 PARTS DUE TO VIBRATION IS VERY SMALL, NO FURTHER DAMAGE WILL OCCUR TO 128177 1 5 THE -43 (L/H) AND -45 (R/H DOUBLERS. THE CAUSE OF THE CONTACT IS TOLER 128177 1 6 ANCE BUILD-UP DURING ORIGINAL MANUFACTURING. 128184 1 1 ADHESIVE IN THE TOP THREADS APPROXIMATELY 20% OF C 128184 1 2 IRCUMFERENCE OF THE INSERT. ADHESIVE REMOVED GENTL 128184 1 3 Y AND THE AREA RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. DI 128184 1 4 SCREPANT CONDITION PROBABLY DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS 128184 1 5 IN THE AREA. 128337 1 1 SCRATCHES FOUND ON THE SURFACE OF THE R/H ET DOOR. 128337 1 2 MOLD IMPRESSION TEST RESULTS CONCLUDED THAT THE 128337 1 3 SCRATCHES WERE SUPERFICIAL. THE DISCREPANT AREA W 128337 1 4 AS CORROSION PROTECTED & MR APPROVAL WAS RECV'D FO 128337 1 5 R UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE ET DOOR. 128404 1 1 LRU PR INITIATED AGAINST STRUT TO ROUTE BACK TO VENDOR (RI) FOR READJU 128404 1 2 STMENT. 128557 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SPAR INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER 128557 1 2 AND IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 128651 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THE V070-398436-007 GROUND STRAP BETWEEN PAYLOAD 128651 1 2 BAY DOORS #2 AND #3 AT CENTERMOST LOCATION WAS PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED FO 128651 1 3 R IMPROPER CONTACT WITH PLBD #3. BROKEN FINGER WAS MR ACCEPTED UNRESTRIC 128651 1 4 TED AND MR ID'D. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS FLIGHT DAMAGE. 128651 1 5 128719 1 1 SCRATCH REPAIRED BY SMOOTHING OUT WITH SAND PAPER. 128719 1 2 CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 128794 1 1 THE DENTED AND SPLIT INSULATORS WERE REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENT 128794 1 2 ER. THE LOWER INBOARD INSULATOR GAP WAS SHOWN TO BE WITHIN DWG. TOLERA 128794 1 3 NCE UPON REMEASURING (SEE ATTACHMENT "A"). NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS AND T 128794 1 4 HE INSULATORS ARE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. 129947 1 1 THE MISDRILLED HOLE IN THE V070-352287-001 ACCESS DOOR WAS PLUGGED WIT 129947 1 2 H A RIVET PER MR APPROVED DISPO FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE O 129947 1 3 F THIS DISCREPANCY WAS WORKMANSHIP. 130205 1 1 ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL (V070-398564-004) IS PARTIALLY DEBONDED FROM BASE A 130205 1 2 ND ALSO HAS A (1") GAP ON BOTH ENDS OF SEAL THAT IS NOT PER PRINT. ENV 130205 1 3 IRONMENTAL SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REBONDED TO BASE PER DRAWING REQUIREME 130205 1 4 NTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 130242 1 1 RCC ANGLE AT RIB SPLICE #1 HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER 130242 1 2 PRINT BY THE MANUFACTURER. THE ANGLE ASSY WILL BE 130242 1 3 RE-INSTALLED PER RWNG-3-07-0837. 130274 1 1 ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY WAS DETECTED ALONG WITH PR MEQ-3-12-0553 DURING AN IN 130274 1 2 SPECTION PER S0004 SEQ 45 AT PAD 39A. CRACKS WERE FOUND IN HOISINGS AT T 130274 1 3 HE LEFT FWD AND LEFT AFT ET DOOR DEIVE MECHANISM. BOROSCOPE, EDDY CURREN 130274 1 4 T, AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTIONS WRE PERFORMED WHICH VERIFIED CRACKS AT 130274 1 5 THE BASE OF EACH CLEVIS ATTACHING THE V070-565180 BELLCRANK TO THE HOUSI 130274 1 6 NG. THE REPLACMENT OF HOUSINGS AND RETEST OF THE MECHANISM FORCED A ROLL 130274 1 7 BACK TO THE OPF. THE ET DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM WAS DISASSEMBLED AND THE D 130274 1 8 ISCREPANT HOUSING WERE REMOVED. MODIFIED HOUSINGS PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED I 130274 1 9 N OV-102 WERE INSTALLED IN OV-103. TPS MEQ-3-12-186 CVR'S EO G03 AND EO 130274 1 10 G04 TO V070-565000. ITEM 2 WAS DETECTED DURING RE-INSTALLATION OF THE 130274 1 11 DRIVE MECHANISM. THE ME131-0030-0005 BEARINGS ON THE V070-565179-003 130274 1 12 PUSHROD WERE EXCESSIVELY LOOSE. A REPLACMENT PUSHROD WAS OBTAINED FROM 130274 1 13 LOGISTICS AD INSTALLED IN THE VEHICLE. ITEM 3 OCCURRED DURING FINAL 130274 1 14 RIGGING CHECKS. FINGERPRINT INK WAS APPLIED TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL TO 130274 1 15 DETERMINE SEAL COMPRESSION. THIS INK WAS NOT LISTED AS AN APPROVED 130274 1 16 MATERIAL FOR USE ON THE ORBITER. THIS INK DID NOT CAUSE HARN TO THE 130274 1 17 SEALS OR THE ORBITER STRUCTURE. THE USE OF THIS INK WAS DIRECTED BY 130274 1 18 ROCKWELL, AND THE RI/LSS SIGNATURE BELOW APPROVES ITS USE. ITEM 4 WAS 130274 1 19 DETECTED DURING CONNECTION OF TEH V070-565045-001 AND V070-565046-001 LH 130274 1 20 FWD INTERCOASTALS TO THE STRUCTURE. NAS1003-6H BOLTS WERE INSTALLED TO 130274 1 21 OBTAIN PROPER GRIP LENGTH. THIS CONDITION IS NOT PER PRINT, BUT HAS BEEN 130274 1 22 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER THIS WAD (REF P. 145). ITEM 5 WAS 130274 1 23 DETECTED AFTER ADJUSTING/MEASURING STOP BOLT GAPS. (REF PG 144) STOP 130274 1 24 BOLT GAPS 2,3,5,6,8,9,10,11,14, & 15 ALL EXCEED SPEC. (S/B 0.00" TO 130274 1 25 0.02") BUT HAVE BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE (REF PG 148). THE 130274 1 26 LEFT ET DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM HAS BEEN INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. A SUCCESSFUL 130274 1 27 RETEST WAS PERFORMED FOR FLIGHT. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER 130274 1 28 V1097-ORBITER/ET UMBILICAL CLOSEOUT DOOR FUNCTIONAL TEST. NO FURTHER 130274 1 29 DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSES: ITEM 1-DESIGN DEFICIDENCY ITEM 130274 1 30 2-OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION ITEM 3-NO DISCREPANCY ITEM 4-INTERCOASTAL 130274 1 31 MIS-MACHINED, ITEM 4 ADDRESSEDS USE OF LONGER BOTS. INTERCOASTALS 130274 1 32 PREVIOUSLY MR'D AT INITIAL INSTALLATION (PALMDALE) ITEM 5-GAPS LEFT 130274 1 33 OUT-OF-SPEC TO ACCOMODATE RELAXATION OF THERMAL BARRIER. ROUTE PR TO 130274 1 34 PMRB PRIOR TO CLOSURE. CLOSE THIS PR. 130335 1 1 ENVIRONMENTAL BULB SEAL AT LOCATION Xo1190 HAS A DEBONDED AREA OF APPR 130335 1 2 OXIMATELY 3.0 INCHES AND IS MISLOCATED. THE BULB SEAL WAS ALIGNED PER 130335 1 3 DRAWING THE REBONDED PER MR CONCURRENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATION DEG 130335 1 4 RADATION. 130381 1 1 DENTS 1-7 ARE MINOR AND SUPERFICIAL IN NATURE. STR 130381 1 2 UCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE AVIONICS BAY COVER REMAIN 130381 1 3 S AS DESIGN INTENDED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THIS 130381 1 4 SECONDARY STRUCTURE IS NOT COMPROMISED. 130426 1 1 THE CONTAMINATION DESCRIBED ON PAGE 1 WAS CLEANED OFF PER STEP 3.0. NO 130426 1 2 OTHER SIGNS OF CONTAMINATION WAS FOUND AND AREA IS RETURNED PER PRINT 130426 1 3 . PROBABLE CAUSE: TILE TECH WORKMANSHIP. 130479 1 1 ALL DISCREPANT TEE INSULATORS WERE REMOVED BY MATR 130479 1 2 IX & REPAIRED BY VENDOR. IN ADDITION TEE INSULATOR 130479 1 3 S WERE RE-ID'D & ID PLATES WERE SPOT WELDED. 130517 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 130517 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 130517 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE CARRI 130517 1 4 ER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE P 130517 1 5 OSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO PREVENT FURTHER 130517 1 6 DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. CLOSE PR. 130671 1 1 UPON ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT BOTH THE A-11 PAN 130671 1 2 EL AND THE ACCESS PANEL ON THE R-18 PANEL ARE PER DRAWING CONFIGURATIO 130671 1 3 N. THE A-11 PANEL CAN BE OPENED ONCE THE INTERFERING FASTENER FROM THE 130671 1 4 R-18 ACCESS PANEL IS REMOVED. THE ACCESS PANEL ON THE R-18 PANEL IS O 130671 1 5 NE IN WHICH IS CAPABLE OF BEING OPENED WHILE IN FLIGHT. THE A-11 PANEL 130671 1 6 IS NOT OPENED WHILE IN FLIGHT AND IS INFREQUENTLY OPENED WHILE PROCES 130671 1 7 SING THE VEHICLE. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS HERE AND THE PR CAN CLOSE. 130687 1 1 THE PREVIOUS DISPO REMOVED THE C/P THAT WAS INCORRECTLY INSTALLED AND 130687 1 2 INSTALLED THE CORRECT C/P. CLOSE THIS PR. 130705 1 1 TOLERANCE ADDED TO "PART B" CALLOUT IN MA0106-330 130705 1 2 SPECIFICATION. FUTURE MIXES WILL NOT HAVE TO BE SC 130705 1 3 RAPPED DUE TO IMPROPER PART B QUANTITIES. 130793 1 1 DISCREPANT STRUT, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS X-RAYED TO DETERMI 130793 1 2 NE IF NOTED PROJECTIONS WERE DELAMINATIONS OR SEPARATIONS. X-RAY RESUL 130793 1 3 TS DETECTED POSSIBLE DELAMINATION/SEPARATION AND THE STRUT WAS ROUTED 130793 1 4 TO RI DOWNEY FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS. A NEW STRUT WAS DRAWN OUT OF STOCK 130793 1 5 AND REINSTALLED PER OMI. V5R03. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED BY IN 130793 1 6 STALLING A NEW STRUT. PROBABLE CAUSE: NONE STRUT WILL BE EVALUATED BY 130793 1 7 RI DOWNEY FOR DISCREPANCY. 130808 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPAIR THE TORN V070-565416-009 130808 1 2 GASKET BY REBONDING THE REMAINING PIECE OF GASKET AND FILLING THE VOI 130808 1 3 DS LEFT OVER WITH MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE. THIS WAS AN MR REPAIR. 130808 1 4 THE GASKET IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE 130808 1 5 TO THE GASKET WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 130920 1 1 DISCREPANT DIMENSIONS, AS DESCRIBED PER ITEM 1,PAGE 1, WERE MRB ACCEPT 130920 1 2 ED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 130960 1 1 PATCHING THE CRACK IN CLOSE-OUT PANEL V070-335099-019 DOES NOT AFFECT 130960 1 2 THE DESIGN INTENT OF THE PANEL. THE PANEL IS A NON-LOAD BEARING PIECE 130960 1 3 OF SECONDARY STRUCTURE THAT HAS NO AFFECT ON PRIMARY STRUCTURAL INTEGR 130960 1 4 ITY. MR OK FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 131021 1 1 THE AL/BORON TUBE LOCATED IN BAY 3 OF THE MID-BODY 131021 1 2 , HAS A VERY MINOR DENT. THE SMALL DENT WAS CHEM 131021 1 3 FILMED FOR CORROSION PROTECTION, ACCEPTED BY MRB 131021 1 4 UNRESTRICTED. 131024 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN THE LEFT MAIN LANDING GEAR UPLOCK INDICATION 131024 1 2 (V51X0100X1) REMAINED ON WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN OFF. THE SENSOR WAS 131024 1 3 REMOVED, RIGGED, RE-INSTALLED, AND RETESTED. TROUBLESHOOTING DURING IPR 131024 1 4 039V-0055 LED TO SENSOR RIGGING CHECKS. A PAGE QA WAS INITIATED WHEN THE 131024 1 5 DOOR UPLOCK SENSOR TO TARGET AIR GAP WAS FOUND TO BE TOO SMALL AND THE 131024 1 6 OVERLAP TOO LARGE. THE SENSOR WAS ADJUSTED UNTIL BOTH THE AIR GAP AND 131024 1 7 OVERLAP WERE WITHIN TOLERANCE. A PAGE 1B WAS INITIATED WHEN LIMITED 131024 1 8 ACCESS CREATED DIFFICULTY DURING COTTER PIN INSTALLATION ON THE 131024 1 9 CASTELLATED NUTS SECURING THE GEAR UPLOCK SENSOR. EO-TO-FOLLOW RATIONALE 131024 1 10 WAS RELEASED FOR THE USE OF A NON-CASTELLATED SELF LOCKING NUT. THE 131024 1 11 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DOOR AND GEAR UPLOCK SENSORS BEING OUT OF 131024 1 12 TOLERANCE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION CAUSED BY EXTENSIVE LANDING GEAR 131024 1 13 RIGGING AND CYCLING. NO FURTHER RETEST REQUIRED. 131024 1 14 131148 1 1 UNDER L/H ELEVON FLIPPER DOOR 9, A HI-LOK INSTL'D IN A BRKT WAS HITTIN 131148 1 2 G A ELEVON STRUT, DURING ELEVON CYCLE. THE DISCREPANT HI-LOCK WAS FILE 131148 1 3 D DOWN TO 1 THREAD PROTRUSION PAST THE NUT TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE A 131148 1 4 FTER AN ELEVON CYCLE INTERFERENCE STILL EXISTED. (REF PG 1A). PR STR-3 131148 1 5 -07-1385 WAS WRITTEN AGAINST THE STRUT WHICH WAS MAKING CONTACT WITH T 131148 1 6 HE NOTED HI-LOCK. AN EXTRA WASHER WAS ADDED TO THE STRUT CONNECTION AS 131148 1 7 SY, WHICH WOULD SHIFT THE POSITION OF THE STRUT AWAY FROM THE DISCRPAN 131148 1 8 T HI-LOCK. AFTER COMPLETION OF STR-1385, AN ELEVON CYCLE WAS PERFORMED 131148 1 9 & NO STRUT TO HI-LOCK CONTACT WAS NOTED. 131212 1 1 THE PROBLEM WAS MR'D OK AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED US 131212 1 2 E. 131344 1 1 THE FOUR DISCREPANT SPANNER BEAM INSULATORS TO RCC PNL #10 L/H SIDE WE 131344 1 2 RE REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. THE INSULATORS HAVE BEEN INST 131344 1 3 L'D INTO THE RCC PNL & ARE "OK" FOR FLT. THE SERRATED WASHER CALLOUT 131344 1 4 HAS BEEN CONFIRMED PER EOTE. THIS PR MAY BE CLOSED. 131428 1 1 TWO DINGS WERE FOUND ON THE V070-355477-001 KEEL BEAM STABILIZER STRUT 131428 1 2 (Xo 1326.30 AFT FUSELAGE). MOLD IMPRESSIONS FOUND THE DEPTH OF THE DI 131428 1 3 NG IN ITEM 1.0 TO BE 0.0061" AND THE DEPTH OF THE DING IN ITEM 2.0 TO 131428 1 4 BE 0.0044". THE DINGS WERE SANDED AND CORROSION PROTECTED LEAVING NO V 131428 1 5 ISIBLE SIGN OF THE DINGS AFTER REPAIR. THE V070-355477-001 IS A PRIMAR 131428 1 6 Y STRUCTURE. BOTH DISCREPANCIES WERE MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 131428 1 7 NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE 131428 1 8 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 131496 1 1 NUTPLATE ON FWD BOTTOM CORNER OF 45 DOOR FRAME WAS FOUND TO BE DISCREP 131496 1 2 ANT. SCREW FOR THIS LOCATION WAS LOCATED IN PLACE FOR OV-103 FLIGHT 09 131496 1 3 . DISCREPANT NUT PLATE WAS THEN REMOVED AND REPLACED PER STEPS 6.0 THR 131496 1 4 OUGH 11.0. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 131549 1 1 ALL ITEMS ON O/B SECTION OF LH ELEVON FLIPPER DOOR RUB PANELS. REF ITE 131549 1 2 M 1, PG 1, DING ON PANEL #13 FROM I/B ITEM 2, PG 1, (3) DINGS ON PANEL 131549 1 3 #15 FROM I/B. ITEM 3, PG 1, FLAKED COATING ON FWD EDGE OF RUB PANEL, 131549 1 4 MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. NO CRACKING OF THE FACESHEET OR DEBONDING FROM THE 131549 1 5 HONEYCOMB IS DETECTED. ITEM 1 IS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS 131549 1 6 REPAIRED BY COATING WITH HIGH-EMISSITY COATING. ITEMS 2 AND 3 ARE MR A 131549 1 7 PPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. DUE TO THE LOCATIONS OF THE DINGS 131549 1 8 AND FLAKED COATING UNDER THE ENVELOPE OF FLIPPER DOOR SEALING SURFACE, 131549 1 9 ITEMS 2 AND 3 DO NOT PRESENT A LEAK PATH. BECAUSE THE FLIPPER DOOR RU 131549 1 10 B PANELS ARE NOT STRUCTURAL PANELS, THE PRESENCE OF DINGS WILL NOT DEG 131549 1 11 RADE THE INTEGRITY OF THE STRUCTURE. THIS PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE 131549 1 12 : OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 131614 1 1 EQUIVALENT WASHERS WERE MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS AN EQUIVAL 131614 1 2 ENT SUBSTITUTION. 131717 1 1 RELEASED ENGINEERING WILL REVISE DWG V070-346048, 131717 1 2 TO SHOW CORRECT INSTALLATION OF BRACKET (V070-3401 131717 1 3 09-001) ON DWG. 131833 1 1 THE SHEARED RIVET SHANK WAS REMOVED FOR EVALUATION. UPON REMOVAL, IT W 131833 1 2 AS NOTED THAT THE HOLE WAS NOT DRILLED PERPENDICULAR TO THE SURFACE. T 131833 1 3 HIS REQUIRED A LARGER DIAMETER HOLE TO BE DRILLED TO STRAIGHTEN THE HO 131833 1 4 LE. DUE TO ELONGATION, A LARGER DIAMETER FASTENER WAS USED, AND DUE TO 131833 1 5 LACK OF ACCESS, A HI-LOK WAS USED IN PLACE OF THE RIVET. NO FURTHER E 131833 1 6 NGINEERING IS REQUIRED. REWORK WAS WITH MR APPROVAL DUE TO OUT OF PRIN 131833 1 7 T CONDITION. PROB CAUSE: VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. 132053 1 1 THE TIRE IN QUESTION HAS EXCESSIVE FLTS. THIS PR MR'D THE TIRE FOR ROL 132053 1 2 LAROUND USE ONLY AND MARKED THE TIRE AS SUCH ALONG WITH A MR ID. A PR 132053 1 3 CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. CLOSE PR. 132121 1 1 BEND IN CORNER OF CARRIER PANEL WAS MR'D OK AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 132121 1 2 . PROBABLE CAUSE: HANDLING. CLOSE THIS PR 132184 1 1 PERFORMANCE OF PREVIOUS STEPS WILL APPLY FAYING 132184 1 2 SURFACE SEAL UNDER BRACKETS PRIOR TO INSTALLATION. 132444 1 1 MD111-4019-0304 BOLT NOT SEATING PROPERLY WAS CORRECTED BY CHANGING MO 132444 1 2 UNTING HARDWARE TO ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR NAS1587-3 WASHERS WHICH INTE 132444 1 3 RFERED WITH RADIUS OF BOLT. MD111-4020-0303 BOLTS WILL PROVIED THE PRO 132444 1 4 PER GRIP FOR THE C/P WHICH IS ONE GRIP LONGER THAN PRINT DUE TO MR PR 132444 1 5 STR-3-07-2049 WHICH ADDED SHIM AND CHANGED HARDWARE. MR IS NOT REQUIRE 132444 1 6 D THIS IS NOW PER PRINT. 132794 1 1 DURING STRONGBACK INSTALLATION A SCRATCH AND A DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS 132794 1 2 FOUND ON R/H PLBD #3. THE SCRATCH, WHICH IS CONSIDERED COSMETIC, WAS 132794 1 3 SEALED WITH MBO120-037 ADHESIVE AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 132794 1 4 A NEW NUT ELEMENT WAS INSTALLED INTO THE NUTPLATE BY BENDING BACK TABS 132794 1 5 TO RETAIN THE ELEMENT. THIS CONDITION WAS ALSO MR ACCEPTED FOR UNREST 132794 1 6 RICTED USE. MR DISPO ACCEPTED THE USE OF (7) OUT OF (8) STRONGBACK FAS 132794 1 7 TENERS FOR CURRENT OPF PROCESSING. C/P'S WILL BE INSTALLED WITH ALL (8 132794 1 8 ) PRINT CONFICURATION FASTENERS WHEN STRANGBACKS ARE REMOVED. PROBABLE 132794 1 9 CAUSE: SCRATCH - WORKMANSHIP; NUTPLATE - OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 132913 1 1 THE TRIMMED HILOCK WAS SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED 132913 1 2 PER THE DISPOSITION 132916 1 1 MISDRILLED HOLE IN STIFFINER WAS USED. STIFFINER W 132916 1 2 AS MR REPOSITIONED TO PICKUP MISDRILLED HOLE LOCAT 132916 1 3 ION. STIFFINER LOCATION AT Y0 = + .190 PER MR DOES 132916 1 4 NOT EFFECT DESIGN INTENT. SYSTEM RESTORED. 132977 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 132977 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION 891.75 XO 396.50 ZO LH IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORIGINA 132977 1 3 L RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 1" LBS. NUT WAS R 132977 1 4 EPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE TO THE AP 132977 1 5 PROPRIATE 14 TO 100" LBS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO PRINT CONFIGURATI 132977 1 6 ON. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THIS IS A SECOND 132977 1 7 ARY STRUCTURE. 133007 1 1 ITEMS 1 & 3 HOLES REAMED OUT & OVERSIZE HI-LOCS IN 133007 1 2 STL'D. ITEM 2 HOLES (3 EA) HAD NEXT SIZE UP BLIND 133007 1 3 RIVETS INSTL'D, 5 EA HOLES HAD NEXT SIZE SOLID RI 133007 1 4 VETS INSTL'D. ITEM 4 CONICAL WASHER REAMED OUT. 133007 1 5 ITEM 5 CONICAL WASHER REBONDED. THESE PROBLEMS WE 133007 1 6 RE FROM ORIGINAL BUILD-UP & MOD WORK. 133021 1 1 ITEM 1: B91B11185-11 ANGLE WAS FOUND TO BE BENT AND WAVY ON PAGE 1. TH 133021 1 2 E ANGLE WAS DYE PENETRANT INSPECTED PER STEP 2.0 AND NO INDICATIONS WE 133021 1 3 RE FOUND. THE ANGLE WAS INSTALLED WITH HI-LOK'S BY MR TO HELP THE ANGL 133021 1 4 E DRAW DOWN AGAINST THE FITTING. ITEM 2: 2 EACH FASTENER LOCATINS THAT 133021 1 5 ATTACH THE B91B10306-12 OTBD STRAP TO THE B91B10301 BEAM WERE FOUND T 133021 1 6 O BE DRILLED TO .194. A PER PRINT MD121-0003-05 (DIA. 156) RIVET COULD 133021 1 7 NOT BE INSTALLED. A MD121-0003-06XX DIA RIVET WHICH REQUIRES HOL SIZE 133021 1 8 OF .192 TO .196 WAS INSTALLED TO PROVIDE FOR PROPER INSTALLATION. ITE 133021 1 9 M 3: 2 OF 3 HOLES THAT ATTACH B91B10306-13 OTBD STRAP TO B91B10591-1 F 133021 1 10 ITTING WHERE FOUND TO HAVE DIAMETER OF .1966. THE 2 DISCREPANT INBD MO 133021 1 11 ST HOLES SHOULD HAVE .160 TO .164 DIAMETER HOLES FOR MD121-0003-05XX R 133021 1 12 IVET. A MD121-0003-06XX DIA RIVET WHICH REQUIRES HOLES SIZE OF .192 TO 133021 1 13 .196 WAS INSTALLED TO PROVIDE FOR PROPER INSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE 133021 1 14 FOR ALL DISCREPANCIES IN VENDOR. 133174 1 1 STR INTEGRITY NOT AFFECTED. 133398 1 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSPECTION OF THIS CONDITION 133398 1 2 INDICATES THAT THE DAMAGE IS MINOR. THIS CONDITION 133398 1 3 DOES NOT REQUIRE A REPAIR. THE HOLE DID NOT 133398 1 4 PUNCTURE THE ALUM. FACE SHEET. THERE IS ONLY MINOR 133398 1 5 DAMAGE TO THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE AND THIS IS 133398 1 6 ACCEPTABLE PER RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL (REF,SECT. 133398 1 7 3-11B). THIS CONDITION WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT 133398 1 8 THE FIT,FORM OR FUNCTION OF THE RADIATOR PNL THIS 133398 1 9 CONDITION ALSO WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HEAT 133398 1 10 TRANSFER CAPABILITIES OF THE RADIATOR PNL. 133462 1 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSPECTION OF THIS/THESE DAMAG 133462 1 2 ED CONDITIONS INDICATES THAT THE DAMAGE IS MINOR. 133462 1 3 THIS/THESE CONDITIONS ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH 133462 1 4 TO REQUIRE A REPAIR. THE SCRATCHES AND/OR HOLES A 133462 1 5 ND/OR DAMAGE IS TO THE SILVER TEFLON TAPE ONLY. T 133462 1 6 HIS MINOR TAPE DAMAGE IS ALLOWABLE PER VOUGHT RADI 133462 1 7 ATOR REPAIR MANUAL (SECT. 3-11B). THE DINGS, IF A 133462 1 8 NY, ARE MINOR AND DO NOT REQUIRE A REPAIR. THIS/T 133462 1 9 HESE CONDITOINS WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HEAT 133462 1 10 TRANSFER CAPACITY OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CON 133462 1 11 DITION WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HEAT TRANSFER 133462 1 12 CAPACITY OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CONDITION IS 133462 1 13 ACCEPTABLE "AS-IS" FOR UN-RESTRICTED USE. NO MR 133462 1 14 I.D. REQ'D (DING MAP) 133652 1 1 THE LOOSE/SHANKED SCREW DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS A -0306 GRIP 133652 1 2 SCREW INSTEAD OF THE PER PRINT MD112-1002-0304 SCREW. THE INCORRECT SC 133652 1 3 REW WAS REMOVED & REPLACED WITH THE PER PRINT SCREW. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HA 133652 1 4 S BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP 133726 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP WHEN A BRAKE ATTACH BOLT STRIPPED WHILE TORQUING 133726 1 2 . THE ROB BRAKE ASSY, P/N MC621-0051-0030 S/N 034, WAS REMOVED PER ATT 133726 1 3 ACHMENT 'BRAKE REMOVAL'. A BF GOODRICH REP. WAS CALLED IN AND HE DISAS 133726 1 4 SEMBLED THE BRAKE, REPLACED ALL BOLTS AND NUTS AND THE REASSEMBLED THE 133726 1 5 BRAKE, REF ATTACHED VENDOR WORK DOCUMENT. THE BRAKE WAS THEN REINSTAL 133726 1 6 LED PER ATTACHMENT 'BRAKE INSTALL'. DURING INVESTIGATION OF THIS BRAKE 133726 1 7 PROBLEM IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE TORQUE VALUE OF 575 +/-20 FT-LBS I 133726 1 8 S INCORRECT AND THAT THE CORRECT VALUE SHOULD BE 475+/-20 FT-LBS. THIS 133726 1 9 INCORRECT TORQUE DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE BOLT FAILURE SINCE IT FAIL 133726 1 10 ED AT 425 FT-LBS. THE FOUR ATTACH BOLTS ON THE ROB BRAKE WERE TORQUED 133726 1 11 TO 475+/-20 FT-LBS AND A PAGE 1A WAS INITIATED STATING THAT THIS TORQU 133726 1 12 E IS NOT PER SPEC. MLO308-0029. EO-TO-FOLLOW DISPOSITION AND APPROVAL 133726 1 13 TO CHANGE THE TORQUE VALUE AS INDICATED WAS OBTAINED AND AN EO WAS REL 133726 1 14 EASED TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE EFFECTIVE OV-103 FLT 9 ROB BRAKE ONLY AND 133726 1 15 SUBS. THE OTHER BRAKES ON THIS VEHICLE TPRQUED TO 575 FT-LBS IS NOT A 133726 1 16 CONCERN AND WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS EO. THE AFT MOST BOLT ON THE 133726 1 17 ROB WAS TORQUED TO 575 +/-20, BACKED OFF, THEN TORQUED TO 475 +/-20. 133726 1 18 NO CONCERN EXISTS. THE FOUR BOLTS AND NUTS REMOVED WERE ROUTED TO THE 133726 1 19 VENDOR THRU HDA FOR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE BOLT FAILURE W 133726 1 20 AS THAT THE BOLT WAS DAMAGED DURING INSTALLATION. ALL WORK COMPLETE AN 133726 1 21 D NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. CLOSE THIS PR UPON VERIFICATION OF RELEASED E 133726 1 22 O (STEP 12). 133946 1 1 SAMPLES OF SUSPECT CORROSION WERE TAKEN AND ANALYZED. CONDITION WAS MR 133946 1 2 ACCEPTION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAU 133946 1 3 SE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 134007 1 1 STEP 1.1 CONFIRMS THAT DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS V0 134007 1 2 70-190264-002 AND NOT V070-190104-002. THE (V070-1 134007 1 3 90264-002) INBOARD INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKW 134007 1 4 ELL SERVICE CENTER. THE INSULATOR IS INSTALLED INT 134007 1 5 O PANEL (RH) #14 AND PANEL IS INSRALLED FOR FLIGHT 134215 1 1 THE CHANNEL BLOCKS V070-346090-021 AND -022 WERE RELOCATED TO ALLOW IN 134215 1 2 STALLATION OF STRAPS V070-346095-102,-103 AND -104. THE L/H CHANNEL AS 134215 1 3 SY V070-346095-101 AND -102, WERE ASSEMBLED AND INSTALLED AT XO 1152.9 134215 1 4 2. CENTER STRAP V070-346091-085 WAS INSTALLED AT XO 1152.92 THE R/H CH 134215 1 5 ANNEL ASSY V070-346095-103 AND -104 WERE ASSEMBLED AND INSTALLED AT XO 134215 1 6 1153.92. 134550 1 1 SUPPORT FITTING (V070-340492-003) INTERFERENCE IDE 134550 1 2 NTIFIED IN ITEM 1 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION IS BEING REW 134550 1 3 ORKED TO FIT VIA MR APPROVAL IN CONJUNCTION WITH S 134550 1 4 TR-3-07-1572. 134556 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 134556 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 134556 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 134556 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 134556 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 134556 1 6 7-103-C1) THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 134761 1 1 AN ACCESS HOLE WAS CUT IN THE VERT FIN. THE MISSI 134761 1 2 NG H/W WAS INSTL'D PER PRINT. A MR DOUBLER WAS IN 134761 1 3 STL'D OVER THE CUTOUT. 134949 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED WHEN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE ROD END V070-510 134949 1 2 464-001 OF THE LH MLG UPSTOP COMPRESSION LINK V070-510462-001 DOES NOT 134949 1 3 EXTEND FAR ENOUGH INTO THE COMPRESSION LINK TO BE SEEN THROUGH THE IN 134949 1 4 SPECTION HOLE. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE ROD END ENGAGED THE STRUT 10 134949 1 5 THREADS (.5") AND WAS APPROXIMATELY .1" SHORT OF THE INSPECTION HOLE. 134949 1 6 THE ASSY WAS MR'D TO ACCEPT AS IS AND THE STRUT WAS MR ID'D. A PR CON 134949 1 7 DITION NO LONGER EXISTS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE UPSTO 134949 1 8 P ASSY REQUIRED RIGGING WHICH POSITIONED THE ROD END OUTSIDE THE VIEW 134949 1 9 THROUGH THE INSPECTION HOLE. 135015 1 1 THE SPLIT IN R/H RCC PANEL #13'S OUTBOARD INSULTOR, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 135015 1 2 S 1, HAS BEEN REPAIRED BY THE RI SERVICE CENTER. THE REPAIR HAS RETURN 135015 1 3 ED THE INSULATOR TO PRINT CONFIGURATION AND THE DISCREPANCY NO LONGER 135015 1 4 EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 135256 1 1 DURING INSTALLATION OF LESS CARRIER PANELS SHIMS DEBONDED FROM LOWER S 135256 1 2 IDE OF C/PS. SHIMS WERE REINSTALLED AND RETURNED TO DRAWING INSTALLATI 135256 1 3 ON REQUIRMENTS. REF. PAGE 1F, MR RATIONALE: MRB APPROVAL REQUESTED TO 135256 1 4 ACCEPT EXCEEDED AIR DRY TIME. (OF 15 MINUTES), ENGR. INSPECTION TEST 135256 1 5 OF SHIM BOND LINE BY FINGER PUSH/PULL METHOD REVEALED THAT SHIMS ARE A 135256 1 6 CCEPTLY BONDED. SHIMS TOTAL OF (6) DO MEET THE DRAWING INSTALLATION DE 135256 1 7 SIGN INTENT. SHIMS ARE BONDED ON SECONDARY STRUCTURE. ENG NOTE: REFERE 135256 1 8 NCE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE FOR MR APPROVAL SIGNATURES. SURFACE PREPERATIO 135256 1 9 N AIR DRY TIME EXCEED THE (1) HOUR MAX. TIME ALLOWED PRIOR TO THE APPL 135256 1 10 ICATION OF SILICONE PRIMER. SHIMS WERE ENGINEERED INSPECTED/TESTED FOR 135256 1 11 QUALITY OF BOND AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. SHIMS (6) DO MEET THE INST 135256 1 12 ALLATION DESIGN INTENT. 135267 1 1 REF ITEM 1.0, PG 1, GOUGE ON LH ET ATTACH FITTING ON AFT OUTBOARD UPPE 135267 1 2 R FACE. REF DWG V070-350206, ZONE 11C. GOUGE DEPTH IS APPROX 0.00850" 135267 1 3 ON ATTACH FITTING UPPER FACE. FACE THICKNESS AT DISCREPANT AREA IS APP 135267 1 4 ROX 1.4' TITANIUM. DISCREPANT AREA WAS BURNISHED AND MR ACCEPTED FOR U 135267 1 5 NRESTRICTED USE AS REPAIRED. THIS PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMA 135267 1 6 NSHIP. 135360 1 1 DAMAGED SPRING WAS FOUND TO BE BENT OUT OF DWG V070-365371 REQUIREMENT 135360 1 2 S. SPRING WAS REPLACED BY PER PRINT REWORK FOR DAMAGED SPRINGS. PROBAB 135360 1 3 LE CAUSE: DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 135415 1 1 RUBBER SEAL HAS SEVERAL FLAT SPOTS. SEAL IS OK AS IS PER MR. PROBABLE 135415 1 2 CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OR UNEVEN RTV SEALANT. 135589 1 1 THE SEPARATION IN THE KAHROLON SURFACE OF THE LH. E.T. SOCKET SHELL, D 135589 1 2 OCUMENTED BY ITEMS 1 & 2 PAGE 1, HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS PER MR DISPO 135589 1 3 SITION. THE MISSING KAHRLON CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO NORMAL MANUFACTURING 135589 1 4 METHODS. THE KAHROLON THAT IS MISSING IS A RESULT OF NOT "BUTTING" THE 135589 1 5 TWO ENDS OF MATERIAL COMPLETELY AGINST EACH OTHER DURING THE BONDING 135589 1 6 PROCESS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF DEBONDING OR WEAR. THE LO2 AND LH2 IN 135589 1 7 SERTS WHICH HAVE WORN KAHRLON COATINGS, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 4 & 3 PAGE 135589 1 8 2, HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW INSERTS. THE WORN INSERTS H 135589 1 9 AVE BEEN FORWARDED TO THE VENDOR TO BE REFURBISHED. ITEMS 1, 2, 3 & 4 135589 1 10 OF THIS PR HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXIST. CLOSE THIS PR. 135614 1 1 RCC PANEL L/H #9 WAS NOT INSPECTED PER OMRSD REQUIREMENT. THIS INSPECT 135614 1 2 ION IS WAIVED UNTIL FLIGHT 11. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PRO 135614 1 3 BABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL/AUTHORIZATION ERROR. 135647 1 1 AFTER FURTHER ENG INVESTIGATION OF TILE CAVITY AREA V070-399415-117, I 135647 1 2 T HAS BEEN FOUND THAT NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. THE NOTED SCRATCHES & DIN 135647 1 3 GS ARE ONLY SUPEREFICIAL MACHINING MARKS, & DO NOT AFFECT THE STRUCTUR 135647 1 4 AL INTEGRITY OF THE V070-399451 ANGLE. 135743 1 1 PR MEQ-3-07-0238 ON THE R/H FWD RADIATOR LATCH ASSYs ADDRESS THREE ITE 135743 1 2 MS WHICH ARE RCD'D ON PGS. 1, 1A & 1B. ITEM 1 - THE DRY LUBE USED ON 135743 1 3 THE CYCLINDRICAL SURFACE OF THE RADIATOR ROLLERS WAS SITED AS "WEARING 135743 1 4 OFF". AS STATED BY ITEM 3 OF THE MR RATIONAL ON PG. 24 THRU 26, THIS 135743 1 5 CONDITION IS NORM. NO FURTHER ACTION WAS REQ'D ON THIS ITEM. ITEM 2 135743 1 6 - SIX OF THE 12 LATCH ROLLERS ON THE R/H DEPLOYABLE RADIATOR PNLs REQ' 135743 1 7 D MINOR LATHE WORK AS DESCRIBED IN THE MR RATIONAL ON PGS. 24 THRU 26 135743 1 8 & 48.1 THRU 48.3, TO ELIMINATE THE ROLLING INCONSISTANCE FOUND IN THES 135743 1 9 E ROLLERS. THE AMT OF MATERIAL REMOVED FROM EA ROLLER IS AS FOLLOWS: 135743 1 10 OUTBD ROLLERS #1 & #3 (OUTBD ROLLERS ARE CLOSEST TO THE PBD CENTERLIN 135743 1 11 E & ROLLER #1 IS FURTHEST FWD & ROLLER #6 FURTHEST AFT). ROLLER #1 - 135743 1 12 REMOVED .016" OFF OF THE TOTAL LENGTH OF THE ROLLER. ROLLER #3 - REMO 135743 1 13 VED .008" OFF OF THE TOTAL LENGTH OF THE ROLLER. INBD ROLLERS #1, 3, 135743 1 14 4 & 5 (INBD ROLLERS ARE CLOSEST TO THE PBD HINGELINE & ROLLER #1 IS FU 135743 1 15 RTHEST FWD & ROLLER #6 FURTHEST AFT). ROLLER #1 - REMOVED .011" OFF O 135743 1 16 F THE TOTAL LENGTH OF THE ROLLER. ROLLER #3 - REMOVED.019" OFF OF TH 135743 1 17 E TOTAL LENGTH OF THE ROLLER. ROLLER #4 - REMOVED .012" OFF OF THE TO 135743 1 18 TAL LENGTH OF THE ROLLER. ROLLER #5 - REMOVED .012" OFF OF THE TOTAL 135743 1 19 LENGTH OF THE ROLLER. ITEM 3 - THE WIDTH OF THE 224-00139 & 224-00140 135743 1 20 CLEVISES WHICH THE RADIATOR LATCH ROLLERS SECURE INTO ARE NOT PER SPE 135743 1 21 C. THE WIDTH OF THESE FITTINGS ARE SMALLER THAN CALLED OUT IN THEIR R 135743 1 22 ESPECTIVE PRINTS. THIS CONDITION IS CONSIDERED CAUSED BY PAINT OVER-S 135743 1 23 PRAY BEFORE THE CLEVIS ASSY WAS PUT TOGETHER. THIS DISCREPANT CONDITI 135743 1 24 ON IS ADDRESSED IN THE MR RATIONAL ON PGS. 24 THRU 26 & 48.1 THRU 48.3 135743 1 25 . NO FURTHER ACTION WAS REQ'D. 135780 1 1 THE B91B15080 CLIPS CALLED OUT IN BLOCK #7 ARE 135780 1 2 MADE OF STAINLESS STEEL A-286. LESS THAN 1 DEGREE 135780 1 3 FORMING IS WELL WITHIN DESIGN LIMITATIONS. PARTS 135780 1 4 WERE "BENT" TO CONFORM TO THE AREA OF INSTALLA- 135780 1 5 TION, UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER CLIPS WERE BENT 135780 1 6 NOT MORE THAN 1 DEGREE. BASED ON DYE PENETRANT 135780 1 7 INSPECTION PERFORM DURING PR STR3-05-0787 THE 135780 1 8 CLIPS WERE NOT OVERSTRESS ON CRACKED, THEREFORE NO 135780 1 9 STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS EXIST. CLIPS WERE INSTALLED 135780 1 10 WITHOUT PROBLEMS, OR INCIDENT. 136070 1 1 DISCREPANT RADIATOR BEARINGS WERE LIGHTLY SANDED 136070 1 2 ENOUGH TO ALLOW THE HINGE BOLTS TO BE EASILY INSER 136070 1 3 TED INTO BEARINGS. HARDWARE WAS MR'D AND APPROVED 136070 1 4 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRE 136070 1 5 D. 136134 01 1 VOID PR - DUPLICATE. 136254 1 1 FUEL CELL INSTALLED & RETESTED PER OMI V5R01. SYS 136254 1 2 IS RETURNED TO DWG CONFIGURATION. DISCREPANT CELL 136254 1 3 RETURNED TO VENDOR FOR REPAIR/FAILURE ANALYSIS. 136278 1 1 CRACK IN INTERCOASTAL WAS BEYOND REPAIR. THE PART 136278 1 2 WAS R&R BY RI TULSA PERSONNEL. ASSY HAS BEEN RE- 136278 1 3 TURNED TO FLT CONFIG. 136372 1 1 DURING THE FLIPPER DOOR CLOSURE CLOSEOUT INSPECTION. TWO AREAS OF PEEL 136372 1 2 ED/TORN SILICON ON THE SECONDARY SEAL CURTAIN AND SIX FASTENERS WITH I 136372 1 3 MPROPER THREAD PROTRUSION WERE FOUND. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE NOT FOU 136372 1 4 ND DURING THE INITIAL CLOSEOUT INSPECTION. (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 136372 1 5 1) THESE ITEMS WERE REPAIRED PER MR DISPO USING MBO130-119 TYPE III AD 136372 1 6 HESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHI 136372 1 7 P DURING PROCESSING. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1) THESE FASTENERS DID PROTRU 136372 1 8 DE THROUGH THE NUTPLATES BUT NOT A FULL THREAD. THIS CONDITION WAS ACC 136372 1 9 EPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS WO 136372 1 10 RKMANSHIP DURING PREVIOUS INSTALLATION OF SEAL CURTAIN. NO FURTHER SHO 136372 1 11 P OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 136547 1 1 O2 TANK, S/N SXT0014 HAS BEEN ROUTED TO MSC FOR DELIVERY TO THE VENDOR 136547 1 2 (BALL BROS.) FOR THE FOLLOWING: 1. VALIDATION OF THE VAC-ION PUMP FUN 136547 1 3 CTIONAL CHECK TIME REQUIRMENT NOT MET. 2. TANK VENT LINE EXIBITS LEAK 136547 1 4 AT INTERFACE FITTING AND PENETRATION OF THE FOAM BLOCK. BUBBLE LEAK AP 136547 1 5 PEARS TO ORIGINATE FROM THE FOAM BLOCK. (REF. PR FCP-3-07-0163) TANK P 136547 1 6 LUMBING INTERFACE FITTINGS LEAKAGE AT O2 TANK ABOVE ALLOWED LIMITS AS 136547 1 7 INDICATED BY MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK. (REF. PR'S FCP-3-07-0129, -0163 AND 136547 1 8 -0164) PORT FINISHES POLISHED BUT CONTINURED TO LEAK. INDICATED LEAKS 136547 1 9 MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO VENT LINE LEAK WITHIN FOAM BLOCK. 136558 1 1 DUE TO LACK OF AVAILABILITY OF THE MD128-0002-0432 FASTNER. THE V070-1 136558 1 2 98637-001 SPACER WAS TRIMMED .063 INCH TO BE INSTALLED WITH A MD128-00 136558 1 3 02-0431 FASTNER PER VSTR-3-07-241. MRB APPROVAL WAS RECEIVED FOR UNRES 136558 1 4 TRICTED USE OF TRIMMED V070-198637-001 SPACER. CLOSE THIS PR. 136644 1 1 FIVE 70C6638-1 BRACKETS, WHICH WERE DAMAGED FROM NORMAL WEAR, WERE REM 136644 1 2 OVED AND REPLACED. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE FIVE DISCREPENT BRACKETS WAS 136644 1 3 A RETURN TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. 136647 1 1 PER DWG B91B2001 SEC AW-AW ZONE 33C, AND B91B20599 136647 1 2 IT CAN BE SEEN THAT EXISTING GAPS ARE PER PRINT. 136647 1 3 INSTLN DWG B91B2001 OF (2) BOLTS NOTED IN ITEM 1 136647 1 4 DOES NOT SPECIFY THAT GAP MUST BE UNDER NUT OR UN- 136647 1 5 DER BOLT HEAD. THEREFORE BOTH CONDITIONS ARE ACCEP 136647 1 6 TABLE CLOSE PR 136744 1 1 JUMPER ASSEMBLY COULD NOT BE PROPERLY INSTALLED BECAUSE THE INSTALLATI 136744 1 2 ON NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE ORBITER UMBILICAL S 136744 1 3 HROUD PLATE. XO1300, YO100, ZO355. NUT PLATE REMOVED AND INSTALLATION 136744 1 4 RIVET HOLES WERE PLUGGED. A MOUSE-EAR NUT PLATE WAS INSTALLED ON THE O 136744 1 5 UTBOARD SIDE OF THE PLATE PER MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 136784 1 1 THE DISCREPANT V070-198704-004 RING HAS BEEN REMOVED. A NEW RING WILL 136784 1 2 BE INSTALLED WHEN THE TRAILING EDGE SEAL IS INSTALLED. THE NEW RING IS 136784 1 3 WITH THE HARDWARE TO BE INSTALLED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE IS NO 136784 1 4 RMAL WEAR. CLOSE THIS PR. 136890 1 1 FLT STS-14,STS-23,&STS-25 ORBITER TANK PRESSURES 136890 1 2 VALIDATE EACH OTHER TO SHOW NO DECREASE IN H2 TK 136890 1 3 RV CRACK PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH CLOSE TO THE LOWER 136890 1 4 OMRSD LIMIT, THE STS-14 AND STS-25 GSE GAGE READ- 136890 1 5 INGS READINGS WERE OUT OF THE OMRSD V45ARO.020 136890 1 6 TOLERANCE3S OF 302-310PSIG. BASED UPON STS-14, STS 136890 1 7 -25 DATA AND THE VARIABLE OF HUMAN AND GSE ERROR, 136890 1 8 STS-23 GAGE READINGS WILL BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE 136890 1 9 BEEN IN ERROR. THE FINAL STS-25 GAGE READING OF 30 136890 1 10 3PSIG VERIFIES THE TK RV CRK MEETS THE OMRSD RQMT 136962 1 1 SIGNS CORROSION WERE FOUND IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS: ITEM 1.0: (2) N 136962 1 2 AS1581C3T13 BOLTS, (1) MD112-1002-0112 BOLT (REFERENCE DWG V070-198200 136962 1 3 , ZN 80G). ITEM 2.0: (2) MD114-5003-0004 NUTPLATES (REFERENCE DWG V070 136962 1 4 -198200, ZN 59C). ITEM 3.0: (17) MD112-1002-0303 BOLTS, (1) MD112-3002 136962 1 5 -0305 BOLT, (REFERENCE DWG V070-198200, ZN 59C, V070-198001, ZN 12C). 136962 1 6 ITEM 4.0: (2) MD114-5005-0301 NUTPLATES, (6) MD114-5016-0301 NUTPLATES 136962 1 7 , (REFERENCE DWG V070-198100, ZN 11-23C). AN ATTEMPT TO CLEAN UP THE C 136962 1 8 ORROSION WAS MADE BY USING BEHR-TEX DAMPENED WITH IPA. SOME CORROSION 136962 1 9 WA REMOVED BUT SOME WAS DIFFICULT TO REMOVE DUE TO THEIR LOCATION. A Q 136962 1 10 C INSPECTION FOUND NO SIGNS OF CORROSION PENETRATING THE METAL BUT SUR 136962 1 11 FACE CORROSION WAS STILL PRESENT. A SUBSEQUENT ENGINEERING INSPECTION 136962 1 12 FOUND LIGHT SIGNS OF SURFACE CORROSION STILL PRESENT. THE SURFACE CORR 136962 1 13 OSION PRESENT WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. PROBABLE CAU 136962 1 14 SE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 137027 1 1 THE .010" SHIM WAS INSTALLED BETWEEN (2) PREVIOUSL 137027 1 2 Y INSTALLED (MR) SHIMS. INSTALLATION AND CLOSING U 137027 1 3 P OF THE GAP HAS MET THE MR REWORK INTENT. 137149 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 137149 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 137149 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACTI 137149 1 4 ON TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W 137149 1 5 TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 137149 1 6 THE CARRIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. CLOSE PR. 137151 1 1 SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THIS MR MODIFICATION TO T 137151 1 2 HE V070-340138-001 SUPPORT PANEL HAS PROVIDED FOR 137151 1 3 THE CLEAR UNOBSTRUCTED ATTACHMENT OF THE V070-3401 137151 1 4 38-001 TO THE V070-634689-007 MMU PANEL WITHOUT DE 137151 1 5 GRADING THE V070-30138-001 SUPPORT PANEL OR ITS AT 137151 1 6 TACHING V070-634689-007 MMU PANEL INTENDED FUNCTIO 137151 1 7 N NOR ITS STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THIS SECONDARY S 137151 1 8 TRUCTURE MODIFIED. THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF T 137151 1 9 HIS MR MODIFICATION TO THE V070-340492-003 AND -00 137151 1 10 5 SUPPORT BRACKETS AND FABRICATION/INSTALLATION OF 137151 1 11 TAPERED SHIM HAS NOW PROVIDED FOR PROPER HARDWARE 137151 1 12 ALIGNMENT AND INSTALLATION COMPLETION WITHOUT DEG 137151 1 13 RADING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF REF SUPPORT BRACKET 137151 1 14 S (MAINTAINING MINIMUM HOLE EDGE DISTANCE OF 2D) N 137151 1 15 OR ITS ATTACHING V070-634689-007 MMU PANEL FUNCTIO 137151 1 16 NAL FIT TO SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 137398 1 1 THE MPM BEARING/SHAFT (& ASSOCIATED H/W) WAS REMOV 137398 1 2 ED AT Xo 870.80 PER STEP 1 OF THIS PR. THE ASSY O 137398 1 3 CN # WAS VERIFIED TO BE THE SAME # RECORDED IN OMI 137398 1 4 V5046 WHICH ERRONEOUSLY DOC'D REMOVAL OF THIS BEA 137398 1 5 RING. THE H/W REMOVED WAS STORED W/ THE REMAINDER 137398 1 6 OF THE MPM H/W WHICH WAS REMOVED PER THE OMI 1/13 137398 1 7 /87. TOTAL H/W REMOVED ON THIS PR WEIGHED < 2 LBS 137398 1 8 (.5 LBS RECORDED IN STEP 2.) SO NO WEIGHT TRACKI 137398 1 9 NG IS REQ'D. 137443 1 1 THE S/N /OCN RECORDED IN OMI V5R02 FOR O2 TANK 1 OUTBOARD LOWER FWD ST 137443 1 2 RUT (ME270-0006-0001) DURING OV-103 FLT 7 PROCESSING WAS INCORRECT THI 137443 1 3 S PR WAS DEFERRED TO FLT 8 DUE TO ACCESS RESTRICTIONS (BAY 4 LHS CLOSE 137443 1 4 OUT) DURING FLT 8 PROCESSING ACCESS WAS OBTAINED AND TANK STRUT S/N / 137443 1 5 OCN WAS OBTAINED (REF STEPS 3,4,AND 5) CLOSE THIS PR 137546 1 1 PR VOIDED, DUPLICATE OF ECL-3-07-0156. 137555 1 1 FASTENERS FOR THE R/H LOWER LESS CARRIER PANEL #12 WERE OVERTORQUED PR 137555 1 2 IOR TO FLIGHT 10 WITH A DISCREPANT TORQUE WRENCH. LOC-TITE WAS USED AT 137555 1 3 THE FWD FASTENER LOCATION WHICH HAD LOW RUNNING FOR ONE FLIGHT, UNTIL 137555 1 4 THE NUTPLATES COULD BE CHANGED OUT. NUTPLATES FOR R/H LOWER LESS CARR 137555 1 5 IER PANEL #12 WERE REPLACED WITH PER PRINT NUTPLATES USING BLIND RIVET 137555 1 6 S PER MR. BLIND RIVETS WERE USED DUE TO INADEQUATE ACCESS TO INSTALL S 137555 1 7 OLID RIVETS. ITEMS 1, 2, & 3 HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXIST. P 137555 1 8 ROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 137611 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATES FOR ENGINE #3 O/B HEAT SHIELD DOCUMENTED BY ITEMS 137611 1 2 1,3,&4 WERE REMOVED AT PAD B PRIOR TO FLIGHT 10 AND MD114-1001-0006 N 137611 1 3 UTS WERE USED PER MR RESTRICTED ONE FLIGHT. DURING FLIGHT 11 PROCESSIN 137611 1 4 G, SPACER AT LOCATION 8 WAS REMOVED, (ITEM 2, PAGE 1A) AND NEW NUTPLAT 137611 1 5 E SPACERS AND NUTPLATES WERE INSTALLED PER PRINT AT THE THREE DISCREPA 137611 1 6 NT LOCATIONS. ITEMS 1-4 HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED AND RESOLVED. PROBABLE CAU 137611 1 7 SE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 137620 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. THE 137620 1 2 INSULATOR HAS BEEN INSTALLED INTO THE RCC PANEL FOR FLIGHT. 137808 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1.B. EDGE: "A" (.070), "B"(.072) AND "C" 137808 1 2 (.070) STEP DIMENSIONS ARE WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE 137808 1 3 OF .070 +/- .008. "D"(.095) STEP DIMENSION WAS RE 137808 1 4 WORKED BY MR TO REDUCE STEP TO .065 WHICH IS ALSO 137808 1 5 WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE. ITEM 1 PG O.B. EDGE: "A"( 137808 1 6 .055). "B"(.050) AND "C"(.050) STEP DIMENSIONS WER 137808 1 7 E MR APPROVED DUE TO SLIGHT OVERCOMPRESSION OF FIL 137808 1 8 LER BAR WHICH WILL NOT RESULT IN OVERSTRESS OF TIL 137808 1 9 E, SIP, OR STRUCTURE. "D"(.135) STEP DIMENSION WAS 137808 1 10 REWORKED TO REDUCE STEP TO .076 WHICH IS WITHIN 137808 1 11 DESIGN TOLERANCE OF .070 +/- .008. ITEM 2 PG 2 STR 137808 1 12 UCTURE TO PANEL STEPS: STEP .089 WAS REWORKED TO R 137808 1 13 DUCE STEP TO .052 WHICH REQUIRES MR APPROVAL. REWO 137808 1 14 RK STEP OF .052 RESULTS IN SLIGHT OVERCOMPRESSION 137808 1 15 OF FILLER BAR WHICH WILL NOT RESULT IN OVERSTRESS 137808 1 16 OF TILE. SIP OR STRUCTURE. REMAINING STEPS ARE WIT 137808 1 17 HIN DESIGN TOLERANCE OR MR APPROVED. ALL STEP DIME 137808 1 18 NSIONS FROM CARRIER PANEL AS REWORKED OR DOCUMENTE 137808 1 19 D PROVIDE A FILLER BAR TO TILE CONFIGURATION THAT 137808 1 20 WILL PREVENT OVERTEMP OF FILLER BAR. SIP & STRUCT. 137874 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT CORROSION ON THE PAYLOAD BAY DOOR FW 137874 1 2 D BULKHEAD LATCH ROLLERS. SAMPLES OF THE CORROSION WERE TAKEN AND MISP 137874 1 3 LACED. NEW SAMPLES WERE TAKEN SEVERAL WEEKS LATER AND ROUTED TO NASA M 137874 1 4 ICROCHEMICAL ANALYSIS BRANCH FOR CHEMICAL ANALYSIS PER LAB REQUEST NO. 137874 1 5 MCB 793-87. RESULTS FROM THE LAB DATA INDICATED NO IRREGULAR MATERIALS 137874 1 6 WERE FOUND IN THE SAMPLES. CHEMICALS WERE IDENTIFIED TO BE THOSE FOUN 137874 1 7 D IN THE DRY LUBRICANT ALONG WITH MINOR PROCESSING PRODUCTS AND ENVIRO 137874 1 8 NMENTAL DEBRIS. THE ROLLERS HAVE BEEN LIGHTLY CLEANED USING IPA AND LO 137874 1 9 W LINT CLOTH AND NO DEGRADATION TO THE ROLLERS IS IDENTIFIABLE. 137963 1 1 REMOVED & REPLACED. 137963 1 2 DISCREPANT THERMAL BARRIER HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH 137963 1 3 A NEW ONE. THE INSTALLAITON IS NOW PER PRINT. 137983 1 1 THE EXISTING HOLES MEASURES .191" AND CANNOT BE 137983 1 2 REAMED TO .2031-.2061" BECAUSE OF INACCESSABILITY 137983 1 3 BY OMITTING THE ANCHOR SLEEVES & MODIFYING THE 137983 1 4 HARDWARE REQ'MTS AS REQUESTED BY GRUMMAN THE CLIP 137983 1 5 CAN BE INSTALLED 137993 1 1 THE V075-333116-009 FIBERGLASS CLOSEOUT PANEL HAD THREE CRACKS WHICH W 137993 1 2 ERE REPAIRED WITH FIBERGLASS PATCHES. THIS MR REPAIR WILL NOT ADVERSEL 137993 1 3 Y AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE PANEL. THE C/O PANEL IS A SECONDARY STRU 137993 1 4 CTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AND FAULTY WORKMANSHIP. 138122 1 1 THE FASTENERS WERE SUCESSFULLY SHAVED, AND ARE NOW 138122 1 2 WITHIN THE SPEC. TOLERANCE. NO FURTHER ACTION REQ 138122 1 3 UIRED. 138393 1 1 FOREIGN MATERIAL INDENTIFIED WAS TILE OUST/RESIDUE 138393 1 2 WHICH IS APPARENT DURING DRAINAGE ON THE VEHICLE 138393 1 3 BETWEEN THE WING L/E CAVITY. CLOSE THIS PR. 138447 1 1 DISCREPANT STRUT WITH MISSING SAFETY WIRE HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH A REP 138447 1 2 LACEMENT STRUT ORDERED FROM LOGISTICS. DISCREPANT STRUT HAS BEEN ROUTE 138447 1 3 D TO HDA FOR FURTHER DISPOSITION. ITEM 1 PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND 138447 1 4 NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: MISSING SAFETY WIRE. 138517 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES LISTED ONPAGES 1 THROUGH 1K HAVE 138517 1 2 BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS OR RESOLVED BY MR DISPOSTION 138517 1 3 CONSISTING MAINLY OF (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) VENTING 138517 1 4 VOIDS, REMOVING EXCESSIVE RTV, AND REWORKING OF DE 138517 1 5 BONDS. DESIGN INTENT OF THE RTV HEAT SINK INSTALLA 138517 1 6 TION HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. 138550 1 1 SCRATCH AND PINHOLE ON SEAL WERE INSPECTED AND MEASURED. A SEAL LEAK T 138550 1 2 EST WAS PERFORMED PER V1058 AND PASSED WITH 0.2 PSI/MIN LEAKAGE (1.0 P 138550 1 3 SI/MIN MAX ALLOWABLE). SEAL WAS THEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 138550 1 4 AS IS. RETEST PERFORMED PER STEP 6. PROBABLE CASUE IS MOVEMENT AND USE 138550 1 5 OF EQUIPMENT NEAR SEAL. RECURRENCE CONTROL-PROVIDE REUSEABLE PROTECTI 138550 1 6 VE COVERS FOR SEALS TO REPLACE TAPE PRESENTLY USED. 138766 1 1 COMPLETION OF THE HI-LOCK FASTENER INSTALLATION 138766 1 2 MEETS STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER 138766 1 3 ACTION IS REQUIRED 138837 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DUE TO THE MS-20813-1 MLG SCHRADER GAS VLAVE CAP 138837 1 2 S NOT BEING ACCEPTABLE FOR USE AS DESCRIBED IN THE MAINTENANCE ALER IS 138837 1 3 SURED BY "DILL". (REF ATTACHMENT "A") THE DESCREPANT VALVE CAPS WERE C 138837 1 4 HARGED OUT WITH NEW, MAINTENANCE ALERT VERIFIED OK, MS-20813-1 CAPS. T 138837 1 5 HE CAPS WERE VERIFIED INSTALLED BY V1165 SEQ 03-098 AND 03-149. THE DE 138837 1 6 SCREPANT CAPS WILL BE RETURNED TO THE SUPPLIER FOR REPLACEMENT, AS DES 138837 1 7 CRIBED IN THE MAINTENANCE ALERT (ATTACHMENT "A"). 138987 1 1 CLIP WAS TRIMMED SUCCESSFULLY, CLIP INSTL'D W/ SUF 138987 1 2 FICIENT EDGE DISTANCE. 139086 1 1 VISUAL & RECORDED INSPECTION OF THIS CONDITION 139086 1 2 INDICATES THAT THE DAMAGE IS MINOR, AND DOES NOT 139086 1 3 REQUIRE A REPAIR. THE SCUFF DID NOT PUNCTURE THE 139086 1 4 FACE SHEET ALUM & THERE IS ONLY MINOR DAMAGE TO 139086 1 5 THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPT- 139086 1 6 ABLE PER VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL. THIS 139086 1 7 CONDITION WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE FIT, FORM 139086 1 8 OR FUNCTION OF THE RADIATOR PANEL NOR WILL THIS 139086 1 9 CONDITION ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HEAT TRANSFER CAPAB- 139086 1 10 ILITIES OF THE RADIATOR PANEL 139113 1 1 THE SEAL THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN REPLACED ON PR MEQ-3-07-03-05 139113 1 2 WAS LEFT IN AND THE NEW SEAL WAS INSTALLED IN THE WRONG LOCATION. BOT 139113 1 3 H SEALS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW SEALS. SUBSEQUENT SEAL LEAK 139113 1 4 CHECK PASSED. PAGE 1 AND 1A DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. CLOSE 139113 1 5 D THIS PR. 139442 1 1 AFTER THE C70-0894 LC CONTROL BOX CABLES WERE RE- 139442 1 2 MOVED FROM THROUGH THE SIDE ECCS PORT THE PRESSURE 139442 1 3 PORT CAP COULD NOT BE FOUND AND THUS WAS NOT RE- 139442 1 4 INSTALLED. A NEW CAP WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED. 139482 1 1 FITTING INTERFERED WITH SILL LONGERON STIFFENER DUE TO MISLOCATION OF 139482 1 2 6 UPPER HOLES. A NEW FITTING WAS OBTAINED, DRILLED , AND INSTALLED. 139518 1 1 THE RIGHT HAND NOSE LANDING GEAR TIRE WAS SEVERELY WEATHER CHECKED. TH 139518 1 2 E WHEEL AND TIRE WAS REMOVED UPON RECOMMENDATION OF RI AND B.F. GOODRI 139518 1 3 CH. REF ATTACH PAR (#2575) A NEW TIRE WAS INSTALLED ON THE WHEEL ASSEM 139518 1 4 BLY PER PR NWA 038-0003. UPON COMPLETION OF W/T BUILD UP THE WHEEL WAS 139518 1 5 REINSTALLED ON THE VEHICLE FOR FLIGHT. A PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXIST 139518 1 6 S. W/T REMOVAL/REPLACEMENT WAS COMPLETED BY V1165. NO RETEST REQUIRED 139518 1 7 PER THIS PR. 139578 1 1 ITEM 1 OF PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY INSTALLING THE MISSING WASHERS TO PRI 139578 1 2 NT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WASHERS NOT INSTALLED AT ASSY. 139632 1 1 REF ITEM 1 PG 1 SUSPECT BURNED PAINT ON STRUCTURE IN LOCATION ON AFT I 139632 1 2 NBD CORNER OF V070-351992-004 RETAINER SEAL OF LH2 ET DOOR AND SURROUN 139632 1 3 DING STRUCTURE. SUSPECT "BURNED PAINT" CONDITION WAS ACTUALLY OILY FIL 139632 1 4 M ON THE SEAL AND SURROUNDING STRUCTURE. MABLAB DETERMINED SAMPLES OF 139632 1 5 FILM TO BE SILICONE-BASED FLUID. PRESENCE OF FLUID RESIDUE ON DOOR RET 139632 1 6 AINER SEAL AND SURROUNDING STRUCTURE DID NOT DAMAGE KOROPON OR SEAL. R 139632 1 7 ESIDUE WAS REMOVED WITH IPA AND BEAR-TEX. V070-351992-004 RETAINER SEA 139632 1 8 L OF LH2 ET DOOR AND SURROUNDING STRUCTURE WAS RETURNED TO PRINT CONDI 139632 1 9 TION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 139911 1 1 OXYGEN CNTRL PNL (P/N V070-454714-012 S/N 614983) HAS SCRATCHES ON THE 139911 1 2 FOLLOWING DYNATUBE SURFACES: COMMON LINE PORT, TANK 2 SUPPLY PORT, EC 139911 1 3 LSS PRIMARY O2 SUPPLY PORT, RELIEF PORT & HORIZONTAL DRAIN PORT. THES 139911 1 4 E SCRATCHES WERE EXAMINED W/ A 10X PWR MAGNIFICATION & FOUND TO BE VER 139911 1 5 Y SLIGHT. ENG DETERMINED THAT THE SCRATCHES WERE PROBABLY A RESULT OF 139911 1 6 PREVIOUS LINE MATING & DEMATING. THIS PR WAS TO BE CLOSED PENDING A 139911 1 7 SUCCESSFUL MASS SPEC LK CHK & PMRB APPROVAL. DURING PRSD/FCP SYS CHEC 139911 1 8 KOUT THE O2 REACTANT VLV FOR FUEL CELL 3 (REF. DES 40V45LV024) WAS FOU 139911 1 9 ND TO BE LEAKING AT AN EXCESSIVE RATE. THIS VLV IS PART OF THE OXYGEN 139911 1 10 CNTRL PNL DOC'D ON THE FRONG PG. OF THIS PR (V070-454714-012). THIS 139911 1 11 PROBLEM IS DOC'D ON PR FCP-3-07-0184 & HAS CAUSED REMOVAL & REPLACEMEN 139911 1 12 T OF OXYGEN CNTRL PNL P/N V070-454714-012 S/N 614983. SINCE THE CNTRL 139911 1 13 PNL HAS ALREADY BEEN REMOVED A MASS SPEC & PMRB APPROVAL IS NO LONGER 139911 1 14 REQ'D. AN LRU PR HAS BEEN INIT'D DOC'G THE DISCREPANCIES LISTED ON T 139911 1 15 HE FRONT PG. OF THIS PR. THE DISCREPANCY HAS BEEN RTN'D TO DWG CONFIG 139911 1 16 , NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQ'D. 139951 1 1 REF ITEM 1, WRINKLES FOUND ON BULB SEAL. WRINKLES HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED O 139951 1 2 N AN MR BASIS. REF ITEM 2, DISENGAGED JOINTS, THE WIRE MESH SHOULD HAV 139951 1 3 E A .500INCH GAP BETWEEN THE WIRE MESH IN THE JOINT TO THE ADJACENT S 139951 1 4 EAL/WIRE MESH. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE PER DRAWING. REF ITEM 3, D 139951 1 5 EBONDED JOINTS (3) JOINTS HAVE BEEN REBONDED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. 139951 1 6 REF ITEM 4, CRUSHED JOINT FOUND ALONG ENVIRONMENTAL BULB SEAL IS ACCEP 139951 1 7 TABLE ON AN MR BASIS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCIESLISTED ABOVE IS 139951 1 8 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 139978 1 1 AT THIS TIME RADIATORS R3 & R4 HAVE BEEN CLEANED A 139978 1 2 ND COVERED TO PREVENT ANY ADDITIONAL OIL DROPPING 139978 1 3 ON THE RADIATORS. ACCORDING TO LABORATORY REQUEST 139978 1 4 MCB422-87 THE FLUID FOUND ON THE R/H #4 RADIATOR 139978 1 5 WAS A HEAVY COLORLESS OIL. OIL IS ASSUMED TO HAVE 139978 1 6 COME FROM THE OVERHEAD BRIDGES AND GSE PR A70-088 139978 1 7 3-2-0138 IS INSPECTING FOR THE ORIGIN OF THIS OIL. 140025 1 1 THE ANGLE WAS REPOSITIONED TO ALLOW A CORRECT INSTALLATION. THE PREVIO 140025 1 2 US MR RTV WAS TRIMMED AWAY. THIS ALLOWS THE PLOYIMIDE SEAL TO FIT FLUS 140025 1 3 H WITH THE SEAL PANEL. PROBLEM CAUSED BY ORIGINAL ANGLE INSTALLATION B 140025 1 4 EING INCORRECT. 140027 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1-INSPECTION AND EVALUATION REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF CORRO 140027 1 2 SION IN BAY 8 AT THIS TIME. HYDRAULIC FLUID IS PRESENT, MAINLY ON THE 140027 1 3 AFT SPAR, DUE TO THE LOCATION OF THE ACTUATOR IN THE BODY FLAP COVE AR 140027 1 4 EA FORWARD OF THIS BAY. THE PRESENCE OF HYDRAULIC FLUID WILL NOT AFFEC 140027 1 5 T THE BODY FLAP INTERIOR STRUCTURE OR ITS CORROSION PROTECTION. PROBAB 140027 1 6 LE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 140076 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY ON THE LOWER LEFT HAND CORNER OF T 140076 1 2 HE V070-399451-001 ANGLE, HAS BEEN PREVIOULY MR AC 140076 1 3 CEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE ON ROCKWELL PAPER MRD# 140076 1 4 255552 (ATTACHED) MRD# IS STAMPED ON THE -001 ANG 140076 1 5 LE. THIS PR IS NO CONSTRAINT TO INSTALLATION OF TH 140076 1 6 E V070-399451-001 ANGLE. 140139 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO INVESTIGAGE THROUGH NDT METHODS 140139 1 2 WHETHER OR NOT REPAIR OF TWO DENTS IN THE ELEVON FACESHEET WAS NECESS 140139 1 3 ARY. THE DENTS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AFTER EVALU 140139 1 4 ATION. THE ELEVON IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THE DISCREPANCIES WERE CAUSED 140139 1 5 BY MISHANDLING. 140195 1 1 HOLE INCORRECTLY DRILLED. HOLE WAS DETERMINED TO B 140195 1 2 E UNWORKABLE. NEW STIFFENER WAS OBTAINED VIA PMR # 140195 1 3 307909. INSTALLATION OF NEW STIFFENER ACCOMPLISHED 140195 1 4 ON TPS STR-3-07-221 140213 1 1 PRSD POST LOAD G02 SAMPLES FAILED PURITY. OMRS V45DMO. 010-L SPECIFIES 140213 1 2 POST LOAD SAMPLES TO MEET SE-S-0073 TABLE 6.4-13 (NEW 4.4-13). 02 SAMP 140213 1 3 LES FAILED DUE TO HIGH HELIUM CONTENT. RESULTS AS FOLLOWS: PURITY,PRI- 140213 1 4 99.946,B/U-99.837,LIMIT-99.989. TOTAL IMPURITIES,PRI-541,B/U-1627,LIMI 140213 1 5 T-110. GHE,PRI-510,B/U-1600,LIMIT-. HIGH GHE CONTENT IN PRSD L02 LOADS 140213 1 6 WAS OCCURRED IN THE PAST AND CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO NOT FULLY PRESSING 140213 1 7 GHE FROM TANKS AT CONCLUSION OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURIZATION. DURING THIS 140213 1 8 LOAD, GSE 02 VENT LINE AND TANKS EXPERIENCED A RAPID DELAY AT CONCLUSI 140213 1 9 ON OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURIZATION (REF IPR-26RV-0663/PR S70-0817-01-2-030 140213 1 10 1). THIS PREVENTED A NORMAL POST LOAD STABILIZATION PERIOD. IN ADDITIO 140213 1 11 N , SAMPLE BOTTLES ARE NORMALLY PURGED WITH G02 IN PREPS FOR LOAD PRIO 140213 1 12 R TO ACTUAL SAMPLING OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, DUE TO 02 VENT LINE ANOMALLY 140213 1 13 , POST LOAD SAMPLES WERE TAKEN FROM GSE G02 T-0 SYSTEM WITH NEW SAMPLE 140213 1 14 BOTTLES THAT WERE NOT PURGED WITH G02 BUT RATHER PADDED WITH GHE. WAI 140213 1 15 VER (WK0679) HAS BEEN PROCESSED ACCEPTING L02 LOAD FOR FRF OPERATIONS. 140213 1 16 FUEL CELLS HAVE OPERATED FOR APPRX 125 HRS (38 ON INTERNAL REACTANTS) 140213 1 17 WITH NO DEGRADATION IN FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE NOTED. THIS PR SHOULD BE 140213 1 18 CLOSED UPON APPROVAL OF WAIVER WK0679. 140225 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATES DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WERE CLEANED OF 140225 1 2 ANY DEBRIS AND RUNNING TORQUES CHECKED USING NEW SCREWS. RUNNING TORQ 140225 1 3 UE FOR ALL EIGHT NUTPLATES ARE WITHIN THE PER PRINT RANGE OF 2.0-18.0 140225 1 4 IN. LBS. AND SCREW THREADS WERE NOT GALLED. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RE 140225 1 5 SOLVED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 140335 1 1 DISCREPANT SEAL, V070-198712-015,DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1,PAGE1 HAS BEEN R 140335 1 2 EPLACED WITH A NEW SEAL. DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS (NEW SEAL INSTAL 140335 1 3 LED PER JC) CLOSE THIS PR 140572 1 1 VISUAL INSP OF STRUT W/ 10X MAGNIFYING GLASS RE- 140572 1 2 VEALS THERE ARE NO BROKEN FIBERS. THE DEPTH OF 140572 1 3 THE DEFECT IN ITS PRESENT LOC. HAS NOT AFFECTED 140572 1 4 THE ABILITY OF THE STRUT TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN IN 140572 1 5 TENT. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PRIMARY 140572 1 6 STR S/C: SCRATCHED AREA CORROSION PROTECTED. 140572 1 7 SCRATCH HAS NO ADVERSE AFFECT ON STRUTS STRUCTURAL 140572 1 8 INTEGRITY. 140822 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: 2 EACH BULB SEALS AT FWD OUTBOARD CORNER OF RH ET DOOR 140822 1 2 WERE FOUND TO BE CHARRED. V070-351992-001 AND V070-351992-006 SEALS WE 140822 1 3 RE REPALCED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS FLIGHT DAMAGE. ITEM 2 PAGE 1A: THE FILL 140822 1 4 ER TUBE BETWEEN THE DISCREPANT V070-351992-001 SEAL AND V070-351992-00 140822 1 5 6 SEAL AND V070-351992-006 SEAL COULD NOT BE REFUSED DUE TO BEING CHAR 140822 1 6 RED AND SATURATED WITH HYD FLUID. A NEW TUBE WAS FABRICATED) PROBABLE 140822 1 7 CAUSE OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. ITEM 3 PAGE 1B: THE V070-351992-001 SEA 140822 1 8 L WAS FOUND TO BE 3/8" TO SHORT. AMR-001 SEAL WAS FABRICATED OF SAME M 140822 1 9 ATERIAL TO CLOSE UP GAP. PROBABLE CAUSE OPERATIONAL VENDOR INSTALLATIO 140822 1 10 N. CLOSE THIS PR. 140852 1 1 INCORRECT FASTENER GRIP LENGTHS WERE FOUND AT Xo 1256.50 STARBOARD SID 140852 1 2 E. A E.O. TO FOLLOW WAS OBTAINED TO CORRECT GRIP LENGTHS ON BOTH SIDES 140852 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 141180 1 1 A DWG REQUIREMENT EXISTS TO MAINTAIN A GAP BETWEEN AFT LATCH FITTINGS AN 141180 1 2 D LIOH DOOR OF .060 +.000 -.005. THE BEST GAP THAT COULD BE OBTAINED WHI 141180 1 3 LE MAINTAINING UNOBSTRUCTED LATCH PIN MOVEMENTS INTO FITTINGS IS .048 FO 141180 1 4 R LH SIDE AND .080 FOR RH SIDE. THESE WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 141180 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS TOLERANCE BUILD UP. 141180 1 6 141434 1 1 DURING RH WING CLOSEOUT INSPECTION, FLIGHT 8, THE NOTED B91B10147-27 W 141434 1 2 ING STRUT WAS FOUND WITH (2) SMALL DENTS. THE STRUT WAS LOCATED DIAGON 141434 1 3 ALLY AT Yw 254, Xw 1220. A TWO PIECE DOUBLER WAS BONDED OVER THE DENTS 141434 1 4 AND A COMPRESSION LOAD TEST WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY INTEGRITY OF REPA 141434 1 5 IR. POST FLIGHT, THE DENTED STRUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW 141434 1 6 ALUMINUM WING STRUT. THIS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO PRINT CONFIGURA 141434 1 7 TION. DENTS WHERE MOSTLY LIKELY CAUSED DURING INGRESS/EGRESS OF NEAR B 141434 1 8 Y WORKING OPERATIONS. CLOSE THIS PR. 141555 1 1 THE V070-399451 ANGLE WAS FOUND TO BE .160" BELOW THE IML OF THE V070- 141555 1 2 326101 FWD FUSELAGE STR. THIS ANGLE IS SECONDARY STR THAT WAS MISLOC' 141555 1 3 D DUE TO BUILD-UP OF MANUFACTURING TOLERANCES. THIS CONDITION WAS COM 141555 1 4 PENSATED FOR DURING TILE INSTL'N. THIS CONDITION WAS "MR APPROVED FOR 141555 1 5 UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS" AND HAS BEEN MR ID'D. 141782 1 1 NAS-1004-15A BOLT WAS LOOSENED AND SLIGHT ROTATION ALLOWED BOLT HEAD T 141782 1 2 O SEAT AGAINST CLAMP. BOLT AND NUT WERE THEN RETORQUED TO SPEC. NO RAE 141782 1 3 TEST IS REQUIRED AND THERE IS NO FURTHER WORK TO BE PERFORMED ON THIS 141782 1 4 WAD. 141831 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 141831 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION 779.25 XO 396.50 ZO L/H IN THE MIDBODY. THIS ORIGI 141831 1 3 NAL RD114-8005-107 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 0 INCH POUNDS. N 141831 1 4 UT WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE T 141831 1 5 O THE APPROPRIATE 14 TO0100 INCH POUNDS. RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO PR 141831 1 6 INT CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. T 141831 1 7 HIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 141885 1 1 THE SCRATCHES ID'D AS ITEMS 1 & 2 ON THE PR WERE C 141885 1 2 ORROSION PROTECTED W/ KOROPON. SCRATCHES HAVE NO 141885 1 3 EFFECT ON STRUTS STR INTEGRITY. MR APPROVAL PER P 141885 1 4 G. 3 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 141936 1 1 CLOSE OUT PHOTO'S (REF TCS-3-07-095) FOR BAY 4 LHS SHOW THAT TANK PRET 141936 1 2 ECTIVE COVERS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM O2 TK1. WAD JC V34-00007 SHOWS TH 141936 1 3 AT THE COVERS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM O2 TK 3, IN BAY 10 RHS & STEP 3 C 141936 1 4 ONFIRMS THIS. STEP 1 OF THIS PR VERIFIES THAT PROTECTIVE COVERS HAVE B 141936 1 5 EEN REMOVED FROM O2 TK 2, IN BAY 3 RHS. 141957 1 1 MD115-2002-0003 THREADED INSERTS WERE REMOVED & REPLACED AT -YW444.32 141957 1 2 & -YW457.75 AT BOTH -YW LOCATIONS, LAMINATED SHIMS WERE REMOVED, REFAB 141957 1 3 'D, & REBONDED USING MBO 130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE. THE 3 NEW MIL-S-224 141957 1 4 99 COMP 1, TYPE 1, CLASS 1 SHIMS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRISTRICTED USE 142026 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 142026 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 142026 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 142026 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 142026 1 5 3-C1. 142153 1 1 FOR ITEM #1, THE DENT IN THE STR: A STRUCTURAL DOUBLER WAS HOT BONDED 142153 1 2 OVER THE DENT IN THE INBD ELEVON. FOR ITEM #2 WHERE THE LAP SHEARS FA 142153 1 3 ILED: A NEW MIX WAS MADE, THE DOUBLER WAS REBONDED & THE LAP SHEARS ME 142153 1 4 T THE REQ'D SHEAR LOADS, FOR ITEM #3 WHERE A STEP COULDN'T BE WORKED B 142153 1 5 ECAUSE A DEFECT IS O/T PER V9045: THE BONDING WAS ACCOMPLISHED USING A 142153 1 6 DDITIONAL ADHESIVE TO FILL THE VOID. FOR ITEM #4 WHERE THE STR HAS A 142153 1 7 HOLE IN IT: THE FACE SHEET WAS REMOVED, THE CORE WAS FILLED W/ ADHESIV 142153 1 8 E, AND A DOUBLER WAS BONDED OVER THE DAMAGED AREA (SAME DOUBLER AS FOR 142153 1 9 ITEM #1). 142159 1 1 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF V1022,FC1 H2O R/V "B" HEATER APPEARED TO BE 142159 1 2 MALFUNCTIONING. TROUBLESHOOTING INDICATED THAT FC 1 H2O R/V B HEATER T 142159 1 3 HERMOSTAT (REF DES 40V45TS169) WAS FAILED CLOSE. THE THERMOSTAT IN QUE 142159 1 4 STION WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. RETEST OF THE NEW THERMOSTAT FAILED, E 142159 1 5 XHIBITING SIMILAR RESULTS AS THE ORIGINAL DISCREPANCY (RF PG 1A) FURTH 142159 1 6 ER INVESTIGTION HAS REVEALED THAT THE PAYLOAD BAY PURGE IS HAVING AN A 142159 1 7 FFECT ON TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS TAKEN AT THE AFFECTED THERMOSTAT A H 142159 1 8 EAT GUN WAS USED TO PROVE THAT THAT THE THERMOSTAT DOES CYCLE OPEN WHE 142159 1 9 N THE TEMPERATURES HOT ENOUGH. FURTHER RETEST HAS SHOWN THAT THE HEATE 142159 1 10 R WILL GET HOT ENOUGH TO OPEN THE THERMOSTAT, THIS TOOK APPROXIMATELY 142159 1 11 SIX HOURS. THE FL1 H2O R/V "B" HEATER IS FUNCTIONING NORMALLY. PROBABL 142159 1 12 E CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 142319 1 1 THE V070-198373-001 SEAL LOCATED ON THE R/H INBOARD ELEVON ACTUATOR HI 142319 1 2 NGE WAS NOT POSITIONED PER PRINT. DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO REMOVE AND REBO 142319 1 3 ND THE SEAL PER PRINT. UPON REMOVAL IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE SEAL HA 142319 1 4 D BEEN PREVIOUSLY DAMAGED. A NEW V070-198373-001 SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND 142319 1 5 BONDED IN PLACE. SEAL INSTALLATION RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. S 142319 1 6 ECONDARY STRUCTURE. 142556 1 1 O2 TK2 LOWER OUTBOARD AFT BORON STRUT (ME270-0006-0004) WAS FOUND TO H 142556 1 2 AVE SUSTAINED SURFACE DAMAGE. SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION INDICATED NUMEROUS 142556 1 3 SCRATCHES WITH BROKEN FIBERS. O2 TK2 WAS TEMPORARILY REMOVED TO ALLOW 142556 1 4 ME270-0006-0004 STRUT AND ME270-0006-0006 STRUT (REF PR FCP-3-07-0191 142556 1 5 ) REPLACEMENT. DURING O2 TK2 R/R OPERATIONS, O2 TK2 INBOARD TRUNNION N 142556 1 6 UT FAILED RUNNING TORQUE (REF PG 1A). TRUNNION NUT WAS REPLACED AND SU 142556 1 7 BSEQUENT RUNNING TORQUE CHECK PROVED SUCCESSFUL. UPON RE-INSTLN OF O2 142556 1 8 TK2, O2 SUPPLY, VENT AND FILL LINE (REF PR'S FCP-3-07-0129,0163, & 016 142556 1 9 4 RESPECTIVELY) FAILED LOW PRESSURE MASS SPEC CK CKS. FITTINGS WERE DI 142556 1 10 SCONNECTED, CLEANED AND RECONNECTED. SUBSEQUENT LOW PRESSURE MASS SPEC 142556 1 11 CK CKS PROVED SUCCESSFUL. HIGH PRESSURE MASS SPECS WILL BE PERFORMED 142556 1 12 PER OMI V1022 AND TRACKED ON PR'S FCP-3-07-0129, 0163, AND 0164. ALL D 142556 1 13 ISCREPANCIES IDENTIFIED ON THIS PR HAVE BEEN CORRECTED. RECOMMEND CLOS 142556 1 14 URE OF THIS PR. ELECTRICAL RETEST OF O2 TK2 WILL BE TRACKED BY CIG SYS 142556 1 15 TEM. 142594 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO MR ACCEPT AS IS THE ELONGATED H 142594 1 2 OLE ON THE BACKSIDE OF THE V070-390315-005 CARRIER PANEL. THE CAUSE OF 142594 1 3 THE ELONGATED HOLE WAS SLIGHT MISALIGNMENT OF THE BONDED STUD ASSEMBL 142594 1 4 BY WHICH CREATED INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE STUD ASSEMBLY AND THE CARRIE 142594 1 5 R PANEL. THE V070-390315-005 CARRIER PANEL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 142611 1 1 BUSHING WAS FOUND TO BE GALLED. A NEW ONE IS OBTAINED AS A REPLACEMENT 142611 1 2 . PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 142703 1 1 PROBLEM HOLES WERE DRILLED OUT TO NEXT SIZE DIA. N 142703 1 2 EXT SIZE DIA. FASTENERS INSTALLED . POOR WORKMANSH 142703 1 3 IP CAUSED PROBLEM. LARGER DIA. FASTENERS WERE AUTH 142703 1 4 ORIZED ON AN MR UNRESTRICTED BASIS. 142793 1 1 BOLT MEETS OR EXCEEDS STRENGTH OF RIVET. DESIGN IN 142793 1 2 TENT IS MAINTAINED. NO EFFECT ON STR INTEGRITY. 142799 1 1 THE DELAMINATED V070-198423-001 SHIM, IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WA 142799 1 2 S MEASURED BY ENGINEERING AND FOUND TO BE .190" THICK. PER THE V070-19 142799 1 3 8416 DWG. THE SHIM IS TO BE INSTALLED AS REQUIRED TO ALIGN THE INBOARD 142799 1 4 FACE OF THE V070-198418-001 AFT RAMP WITH STA Yw -317.100. THE DAMAGE 142799 1 5 D LAMINATES WERE REMOVED FROM THE SHIM TO OBTAIN A THICKNESS OF .050" 142799 1 6 AND THE SHIM, AFT RAMP AND V070-198498-001 GAP FILLER WERE INSTALLED. 142799 1 7 ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION OF THE INSTALLATION DETERMINED THAT THE SHIM 142799 1 8 WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE ALIGNMENT OF THE AFT RAMP WITH STA. 142799 1 9 Yw -317.100. THEREFORE, THE SHIM WAS REMOVED AND LOCALLY SCRAPPED. THE 142799 1 10 AFT RAMP AND GAP FILLER WERE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON STR-3-10-450. CO 142799 1 11 NCLUDE THAT THE INSTALLATION IS PER DWG. REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER W 142799 1 12 ORK IS REQUIRED. THE SHIM WAS DAMAGED BY HOT GASSING DUE TO IMPROPER A 142799 1 13 LIGNMENT OF THE AFT RAMP AND STA. Yw -317.100. THE V070-198418-001 AFT 142799 1 14 RAMP IS SECONDARY STR. 142808 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES DESCRIBED ON PGS 1 THRU 1F CONSI 142808 1 2 STED MAINLY OF VOIDS. WRINKLES & MINOR DEFECTS IN 142808 1 3 THE RTV HEAT SINK. MR DISPO FOR THE VENTING OF V 142808 1 4 OID & WRINKLES & THE REWORK OF MINOR DEFECTS WAS A 142808 1 5 PPROVED. THE DESIGN INTENT OF THE RTV HEAT SINK H 142808 1 6 AS BEEN MAINTAINED. 142808 2 1 CLOSE PR 142913 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1- INDENTATION IN V070-352281-001 AFT FUSELAGE CAP WAS MR 142913 1 2 ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. C 142913 1 3 LOSE THIS PR. 142962 1 1 INSULATOR WAS FOUND TO BE CRUSHED AND DUE TO INCONEL COVER NOT BEING T 142962 1 2 ORN OR MOUNTING BRACKETS AFFECTED IT IS MR OK FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 142973 1 1 THE GROUNDING FINGERS ON THE V070-351614-001 RH SHELL ASSEMBLY HAVE BE 142973 1 2 EN BENT TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONFIGURATION THIS CONFIGURATION AND THE KAHR 142973 1 3 LON SURFACE HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS FOR THE UNRESTRICTED USE. THE PROB 142973 1 4 ABLE CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCY IS NORMAL USE. 143013 1 1 THE V082-544919-005 MPM CONNECTING SHAFT DID NOT ALIGN PROPERLY WITH T 143013 1 2 HE V082-544918-005 FITTING TO ALLOW INSTALLATION OF THE V082-544915-00 143013 1 3 1 PIN. THE SHAFT WAS REPLACED AND ALIGNMENT WAS ACCEPTABLE. THE OLD SH 143013 1 4 AFT WAS LRU PR'D AND ROUTED TO HDA FOR DISPOSAL. NO FURTHER DISCREPANC 143013 1 5 Y EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: MISDRILLED PART. 143128 1 1 THE NICK AND THE SCRATCH WERE BURNISHED OUT OF THE ALUMINUM TUBE. THE 143128 1 2 TUBE WALL THICKNESS WAS MAINTAINED PER DESIGN TOLERANCE. THE ALUMINUM 143128 1 3 TUBE HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE NICK AND SCRATCH WA 143128 1 4 S CAUSED BY THE TRAFFIC IN THE AREA TO PERFORM ANOTHER WAD. CLOSE THIS 143128 1 5 PR. 143130 1 1 THE RH #3 PAYLOAD BAY DOOR RADIATOR PANEL WAS DAMAGED WHEN AN AIR TOOL 143130 1 2 ADAPTER WAS EJECTED FROM AN AIR WRENCH ON THE OVERHEAD BRIDGE DURING 143130 1 3 PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPENING POST OPERATIONS. THE RESULTING DING PENETRATE 143130 1 4 D AND PUNCTURED THE RADIATOR'S FACE SHEET BUT X-RAY RESULTS SHOWED THA 143130 1 5 T IT DID NOT AFFECT THE COOLING TUBES. TAPE WAS REMOVED AROUND THE DAM 143130 1 6 AGED AREA AND AN ALUMINUM DOUBLER WAS BONDED ON AS AN MR ACCEPTED REPA 143130 1 7 IR. THERMAL PAINT WAS APPLIED TO THE DOUBLER AND SURROUNDING AREA (ABO 143130 1 8 UT 4" X 4") FOR CORROSION PROTECTION. THE REPAIR WAS PERMANENT (UNREST 143130 1 9 RICTED MR) AND NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. 143219 1 1 DURING V5K03, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE BOLTS ON THE FWD & AFT HINGES OF L 143219 1 2 H RADIATORS #3 & #4 WERE GALLED/HAD CLEARANCE PROBLEMS. CONSULTATION W 143219 1 3 ITH VOUGHT AEROSPACE (RADIATOR MANF) VIA ROCKWELL REVEALED THAT IN THE 143219 1 4 WORST CASE SCENARIO, THERE WAS ONLY 0.0001" CLEARANCE BETWEEN THE LAR 143219 1 5 GEST BOLT AND THE SMALLEST BUSHING DIAMETER. A FIT CHECK OF CALIBRATED 143219 1 6 DOWELS WAS USED TO VERIFY BUSHINGS ON RADIATORS AND VEHICLE MATCHED 143219 1 7 DWG CONFIGURATION. NEW BOLTS WERE ORDERED FOR INSTALLATION OF RADIATOR 143219 1 8 S. A MR WAS APPROVED FOR LIGHT SANDING OF RADIATOR HINGE BUSHINGS ON T 143219 1 9 EH VEHICLE SIDE TO REMOVE ANY BURRS OR SCRATCHES. ONLY THE FWD & AFT B 143219 1 10 USHINGS OF RADIATOR LH #4 REQUIRED ANDING. THE MR WAS APPROVED FOR UNR 143219 1 11 ESTRICTED USE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS STRINGENT DESIGN TOLERANCES. WORK 143219 1 12 IS COMPLETED ADN RADIATORS ARE INSTALLED. WITH MEQ ENG CONCURRENCE, C 143219 1 13 LOSE THIS PR. 143290 1 1 DESIGN OF WIRE TRAY SUPPORT, P/N V070-852704-007, 143290 1 2 DID NOT ACCOUNT FOR EXISTING V070-852051-001 FITTI 143290 1 3 NG. MOD 003 OF VSTR-3-07-285 WILL PROVIDE A CLEAR 143290 1 4 ANCE NOTCH AND CORRECT HARDWARE QUANTITY AS AUTHOR 143290 1 5 IZED BY AN ENGINEERING CHANGE PER EO TO FOLLOW. T 143290 1 6 HIS PR IS TO REMAIN OPEN UNTIL CORRECTIVE ACTION P 143290 1 7 ER MOD 003 HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND THE V070-852704- 143290 1 8 007 SUPPORT HAS BEEN INSTALLED PER STEP 17.0 OF TH 143290 1 9 E BASIC TPS. AT THAT TIME, THE INSTALLATION WILL 143290 1 10 MEET DESIGN INTENT. 143307 1 1 THE R/H NLG TIRE OBTAINED A CUT MEASURING APPRX. 2 143307 1 2 3X.75" EXTENDING THRU THE 3RD CORD. REMOVING & REP 143307 1 3 LACING THE TIRE PER OMI V1165 RETURNS THE EQUIPMEN 143307 1 4 T KBACK TO SPECIFICATIONS & IS MADE ACCEPTABLE FOR 143307 1 5 FLIGHT. 143341 1 1 WATER WAS SEEN DRIPPING FROM THE ET DOOR FORWARD CENTERLINE LATCH AFTE 143341 1 2 R A RAINSTORM AT DFRF POST-LANDING. SINCE WATER HAD ENTERED THE AFT CO 143341 1 3 MPARTMENT FROM AFT OF THIS LATCH, IT WOULD HAVE HAD TO TRAVEL PAST THE 143341 1 4 AFT CENTERLINE LATCH TO GET TO THE FORWARD. THEREFORE BOTH LATCH ASSE 143341 1 5 MBLIES WERE SUSPECTED OF POSSIBLE WATER DAMAGE AND WERE REMOVED FOR IN 143341 1 6 SPECTION. BOTH PDU'S WERE DRY AND SHOWED NO SIGNS OF WATER DAMAGE OR O 143341 1 7 THER ANOMALIES. WHILE THE PDU'S WERE OUT OF THE SHIP, A VISUAL INSPECT 143341 1 8 ION OF THE STRUCTURAL CAVITIES WAS PERFORMED. AN ALLEN WRENCH WAS FOUN 143341 1 9 D IN THE FORWARD CAVITY AND WAS DOCUMENTED BY PR LAF 3-11-0225. ALSO I 143341 1 10 N THE FORWARD CAVITY, A WHITE RESIDUE (BELIEVED TO BE CORROSION) WAS V 143341 1 11 ISABLE AROUND THE MOUNTING FASTENERS. PR STR 3-11-3258 WAS INITIATED A 143341 1 12 ND CLEANED THE RESIDUE WHICH HAD NOT PENETRATED THE KORPON FINISH. NO 143341 1 13 OTHER ANOMALIES WERE NOTED AND THE LATCHES WERE REINSTALLED AND FUNCTI 143341 1 14 ONALLY TESTED PER THIS PR. NO FURTHER DISREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE ET D 143341 1 15 OOR CENTERLINE LATCHES. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATI 143341 1 16 ON. 143350 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE RPLCD & WILL BE PEELED 143350 1 2 TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 143350 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE C/P 143350 1 4 IS OK FOR FLT. RC ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE 143350 1 5 CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. 143350 1 6 CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 143392 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 143392 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 143392 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 143392 1 4 ACTION IS INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 143392 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CAAR #5121-8 143392 1 6 7-103-C1) THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 143404 1 1 ITEM 1 WAS REDUNDANT WITH MAP ID #7 IN BLOCK R-1 OF DING LOG/MAP AND R 143404 1 2 EQUIRED NO ACTION. ITEM 2 WAS A MINOR SCUFF/NICK IN THE LH #1 TOP RADI 143404 1 3 ATOR TAPE WHICH WAS MR ACCEPTED OK AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS A SMALL M 143404 1 4 ETEORITE HITTING SIDEWAYS TO THE PANEL. ITEM 3 WAS A SCATTERED DISCOLO 143404 1 5 RATION AREA IN THE LH#1 TOP RADIATOR TAPE WHICH WAS MR ACCEPTED OK AS 143404 1 6 IS. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS TARNISHING OF THE SILVER-TEFLON LAYER OF THE TA 143404 1 7 PE DUE TO MOISTURE OR SOLVENT CLEANER SEEPAGE INTO THE TAPE. 143742 1 1 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF V63-50009 A GAP WAS FOUND BETWEEN THE WASHER 143742 1 2 AND THE STRUT AT THE ATTCH POINT WHERE TOP FWD AND TOP AFT STRUTS FOR 143742 1 3 H2 TANK 2 CONNECT THIS GAP MEASURED 0.012 IN. FURTHER INVESTIGATION A 143742 1 4 LSO FOUND A GAP BETWEEN TLE BOLT HEAD AND THE STRUT. THIS GAP MEASURED 143742 1 5 0.007 IN. SEE FIG 2-1 FOR GAP LOCATIONS. THE LOCATIONS OF THESE GAPS 143742 1 6 INDICATE TLE BOLT WAS NOT TORQUED PROPERLY DURING INSTALLATION THE BOL 143742 1 7 T WAS RETORQUED, MOVEMENT OF TL2 BOLT NOTED, AND O GAP MEASURED AT BOL 143742 1 8 T PLACES AFTER TLE RETORQUE. CLOSE THIS PR 143811 1 1 FUEL CELL 2 COOLANT LINE V070-454500-018 WAS INSPE 143811 1 2 CTED VISUALLY BY PROCESS ENGINEERING AND DESIGN EN 143811 1 3 GINEERING. LINE HAS A VERY SLIGHT DEVIATION TO ST 143811 1 4 RAIGHT LINE PATH, WHICH MAY BE DETECTED WITH SEVER 143811 1 5 E SCRUTINY AND INSPECTION. LINE DEVIATION AND SPA 143811 1 6 N DIMENSIONS WERE TAKEN BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN ST 143811 1 7 EP 5 THIS PR. LINE DEVIATION IS SMALL AND GRADUAL 143811 1 8 , MORE OF A GENTLE BOW THAN A SHARP BEND. ORBITER 143811 1 9 FLOOR MOLD LINE HAS A GENTLE ARC, INCLINING UPWAR 143811 1 10 D FROM CENTERLINE OF SHIP. LINE SUPPORTS MAINTAIN 143811 1 11 AN EQUAL HEIGHT OF LINE FROM FLOOR, THUS CREATING 143811 1 12 A NOMINAL SLIGHT ARC TO LINE PATH IN QUESTION. 143811 1 13 LINE V070-454500-018 MR ID'D WITH THIS PR NO. MR 143811 1 14 RATIONALE COORDINATED WITH DOWNEY ENGINEERING. FU 143811 1 15 EL CELL COOLANT SYSTEM INTEGRITY WAS NOT INVALIDAT 143811 1 16 ED BY THIS PR. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 143898 1 1 REF ITEM 2 PAGE 1A, PIN V070-198420-001 IS INSTALLED 180 DEGREES FROM 143898 1 2 PRINT. PIN WAS PREVIOUS MR ACCEPTED PER MRD223798. REF ITEM 1 PAGE 1 S 143898 1 3 ILVER PLATING MISSING AMOUNT OF SILVER PLATING IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DE 143898 1 4 GRADE FUNCTION. MR ACCEPTED AS IS. 143916 1 1 CARRIER PANEL V070-390329-007 HAD THE WRONG OCN#. THE CORRECT OCN# WA 143916 1 2 S MARKED ON THE CARRIER PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 143998 1 1 ITEM 1.0 PAGE 1 THIS ITEM WAS TRANSFERRED TO PR STR-3-11-3441, PAGE 1A I 143998 1 2 TEM 1 (COPY ATTACHED). ITEM 2.0 PAGE 1,A 0.5 INCH DIAMETER TOOLING HOLE 143998 1 3 WAS FOUND UNCOVERED IN THE SILL LONGERON AT XO900. THIS HOLE IS TO BE CO 143998 1 4 VERED BY A 70C3209 CAP PER DWG 70E3801. THE CAP WAS BONDED WITH MB0120-0 143998 1 5 37 TYPE III ADHESIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN NOT INSTALLED BY VENDOR. ITEM 3 143998 1 6 PAGE 1A THE MB0120-037 TYPE III ADHESIVE USED TO BOND 70C3209 CAP WAS U 143998 1 7 SED WITHOUT PROPER APPROVAL. THIS USE OF THIS ADHESIVE WAS MR ACCEPTED F 143998 1 8 OR UNRESTRICTED USE BASED ON IT BEING A ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE PER RI M&P 143998 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE PROCEDURAL ERROR. 144521 1 1 THE EIGHT TITANIUM HI-LOK PINS WERE REPLACED WITH 144521 1 2 CRES HI-LOK PINS. STANDARD NUTS AND WASHERS WERE U 144521 1 3 SED IN PLACE OF HI-LOK COLLARS. THIS WAS A TOLERAN 144521 1 4 CE BUILD-UP PROBLEM. CLOSE THIS PR. 144523 1 1 ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION HAS FOUND THAT THERE IS ACTUALLY (4) NUT PLA 144523 1 2 TES THAT ARE VACANT IN THIS AREA. THESE NUT PLATES ARE INSTALLED PER P 144523 1 3 RINT. (REF V070-856019, VIEW AZ, ZN104G). THEY WERE INSTALLED PER VSTR 144523 1 4 -3-07-265, VERIFIED STEP 42.0, WHICH ESTABLISHED A -008 CONFIGURATION 144523 1 5 FOR OV-103. THIS MOD WAS IN SUPPORT OF MCR 11771, CENTAUR, WHICH IS NO 144523 1 6 T BEING USED AT THIS TIME. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 144746 1 1 GAP UNDER HI-LOK COLLAR HAS BEEN ACCEPTED OKAY-AS-IS PER MR. ELEVON WI 144746 1 2 LL FUNCTION WITHIN ITS DESIGN INTENT. 144824 1 1 DEFECT 1 - DISCREPANT HEAT SINK REMOVED & NEW HEAT 144824 1 2 SINK APPLIED PER STR-3-07-292. DEFECT 2 - HEAT 144824 1 3 SINK WAS REMOVED IN ERR, STR CLEANED & NEW HEAT 144824 1 4 SINK APPLIED PER STR-3-07-292. THIS RTNS HEAT 144824 1 5 SINK INSTL TO PRINT CONFIG. 145367 1 1 FOAM INSULATION WAS REMOVED FROM LINE IN QUESTION 145367 1 2 LINE WAS INSPECTED. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE 145367 1 3 LINE. THEN THE LINE WAS RE-FOAMED FLOW DIRECTIONAL 145367 1 4 ARROW DIRECTION WAS CORRECTED TO COMPLY W/ DWG 145564 1 1 NAME PLATE WAS COATED USING SUBSTITUTE MATERIAL 21 145564 1 2 1-220. 145608 1 1 LO2 ET MONOBALL INSERT WAS FOUND TO HAVE ROUND INDENTATION AND BASE MA 145608 1 2 TERIAL FLAKING OFF OF LINER. THE DISCREPANT INSERT ASSY. WERE REPLACED 145608 1 3 WITH NEW ONE TO RETURN TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE OPERATI 145608 1 4 ONAL DEGRADATION. 145691 1 1 THE PIN HOLE IN RCC PNL #21 L/H SIDE OF INSULATOR 145691 1 2 WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SRVC CNTR. THE CHIP DISC 145691 1 3 REPANCY WAS XFERRED TO TES-PAPER & REPAIRED LOCALL 145691 1 4 Y. THE PNL IS INSTL'D ON THE VEH & IS "OK" FOR FL 145691 1 5 T. 145779 1 1 DISCREPANT NUT PLATE AND CHANNEL NUT PLATE WERE RE 145779 1 2 MOVED AND REPLACED. MISSING NUT IN CHANNEL NOTED 145779 1 3 ON PAGE 1 WAS RECOVERED AND DISPOSED OF BY SHOP PE 145779 1 4 RSONNEL WHEN PANEL WAS REMOVED. CAUSE WAS WEAR AN 145779 1 5 D TEAR. 146035 1 1 INSULATOR'S HAVE BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUFACTURER'S 146035 1 2 SPECIFICATION. RC ACTION STILL IN WORK. 146329 1 1 FUEL CELL 2 COOLANT LINE V070-454500-026 WAS INSPE 146329 1 2 CTED VISUALLY BY PROCESS ENGINEERING AND DESIGN EN 146329 1 3 GINEERING. LINE HAS A VERY SLIGHT DEVIATION TO ST 146329 1 4 RAIGHT LINE PATH, WHICH MAY BE DETECTED WITH SEVER 146329 1 5 E SCRUTINY AND INSPECTION. LINE DEVIATION AND SPA 146329 1 6 N DIMENSIONS WERE TAKEN BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN ST 146329 1 7 EP 5 THIS PR. LINE DEVIATION IS SMALL AND GRADUAL 146329 1 8 , MORE OF A GENTLE BOW THAN A SHARP BEND. ORBITER 146329 1 9 FLOOR MOLD LINE HAS A GENTLE ARC, INCLINING UPWAR 146329 1 10 D FROM CENTERLINE OF SHIP. LINE SUPPORTS MAINTAIN 146329 1 11 AN EQUAL HEIGHT OF LINE FROM FLOOR, THUS CREATING 146329 1 12 A NOMINAL SLIGHT ARC TO LINE PATH IN QUESTION. 146329 1 13 LINE V070-454500-026 MR ID'D WITH THIS PR NO. MR 146329 1 14 RATIONALE COORDINATED WITH DOWNEY ENGINEERING. FU 146329 1 15 EL CELL COOLANT SYSTEM INTEGRITY WAS NOT INVALIDAT 146329 1 16 ED BY THIS PR. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 146336 1 1 PER MA0101-301 3.2.1 TWO ADDITIONAL APPROVED WASHE 146336 1 2 RS MAY BE ADDED TO PROVIDE PROPER GRIP. TWO ADDITI 146336 1 3 ONAL WASHERS WERE ADDED. (RD153-1002-0005) PROPER 146336 1 4 GRIPS WERE ACHEIVED. NO PROBLEM EXISTS. WASHERS AD 146336 1 5 DED PER MA0101-301 AND INSTALLED BY TPS STR-3-07-1 146336 1 6 74. 146474 1 1 THE ORIGINAL DISCREPANCY IN THIS PR WAS THE 3/8" BOLTS CALLED OUT FOR 146474 1 2 THE INSTALLATION OF THE T-O SUPPORT PLATE WERE TOO SHORT, PAGE 1. THE 146474 1 3 BOLTS WERE CHANGED FROM NAS1006-34A TO NAS1006-40A PER AN EOTF. DURING 146474 1 4 THE CHANGING OF THE 3/8" BOLTS A PAGE 1A WAS GENERATED FOR THE THREAD 146474 1 5 /SCRATCH MARKS IN THE UPPER AND LOWER T-O FITTINGS AND SUPPORT PLATES. 146474 1 6 THE MARKINGS WERE REMOVED BY SANDING PER MR ACTION. FURTHER EVALUATIO 146474 1 7 N SHOWED THAT THE HOLES IN THE CLEVIS PAGE 1C (UPPER FITTING) AND LONG 146474 1 8 ERON PAGE 1D (LOWER FITTING) WERE OVERSIZED AND ELONGATED, PAGE 1C AND 146474 1 9 1D. THE HOLES IN THE CLEVIS WERE ACCEPTED AS IS PER MR ACTION. THE HO 146474 1 10 LES IN THE LONGERON WERE DRILLED UP AND SHOULDER WERE DRILLED/REAMED T 146474 1 11 O THE PRINT DIMENSIONS. A NAS1006-42A WAS INSTALLED IN THE LONGERON IN 146474 1 12 PLACE OF NAS1006-40A TO COMPENSATE FOR THE SHOULDER BUSHINGS, THIS ST 146474 1 13 ILL SATISFIES THE EOTF INTENT. SCORE MARKS WERE FOUND IN THE BUSHINGS 146474 1 14 AFTER FINAL REAMING, PAGE 1F. THE SHARP EDGES OF THE SCORE MARKS WERE 146474 1 15 SANDED DOWN AND THE BUSHINGS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. TH 146474 1 16 E WASHER INSTALLATION FOR THE 3/4" PIN HAD RADIUS WASHERS IN AN INSTAL 146474 1 17 LATION THAT REQUIRED FLAT WASHERS, PAGE 1B PER AN EOTF. THE WASHERS WE 146474 1 18 RE CHANGED, THE EXTRA FLAT WASHER REMOVED AND THE TORQUE CHANGED TO CL 146474 1 19 ASS V (CASTELLATED NUT). DURING THE REMATING OF THE ELECTRICAL BOARD ( 146474 1 20 REMOVED TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO THE SUPPORT PLATE HARDWARE) THE TERMINALS 146474 1 21 WERE NOT PROPERLY CLEANED, PAGE 1G. THE TERMINALS WERE DEMATED, CLEAN 146474 1 22 ED AND REMATED. THE T-O SUPPORT PLATE WAS INSTALLED IMPROPERLY (THE 3/ 146474 1 23 8" BOLT DID NOT PENETRATE THRU THE SUPPORT PLATE) AT THE LOWER LONGERO 146474 1 24 N WHICH WAS DISCOVERED DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THE T-O UMBILICAL FR 146474 1 25 AME, PAGE 1H. THE INSTALLATION WAS CORRECTED. THE L/H T-O SUPPORT LOCA 146474 1 26 TIONS HAVE BEEN REWORKED TO A FLIGHT CONDITION WHICH HAS BEEN ACCEPTED 146474 1 27 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS A DESIGN DEFICIENCY WHICH 146474 1 28 INCLUDED SOME WORKMANSHIP AND OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION PROBLEMS. NO FU 146474 1 29 RTHER ENGINEERINGIS REQUIRED AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 146569 1 1 THE BRACKET-TO-PANEL STEP MEASUREMENT OUT OF TOLER 146569 1 2 ANCE (0.083) HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS AND WILL ASSI 146569 1 3 ST IN PREVENTING THE OVERTEMP OF THE FILLER BAR, S 146569 1 4 IP, AND STRUCTURE. THE STRUCTURE-TO-CARRIER PANEL 146569 1 5 STEP OUT OF TOLERANCE (0.050) HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS 146569 1 6 IS AND WILL ASSIST IS PREVENTING AN OVERSTRESSING 146569 1 7 OF THE TILE. 146629 1 1 THE PROBLEM FOR ITEM #1 WAS THAT THE V070-390392-001 STUD WAS FRACTURE 146629 1 2 D 1/8" OUTBOARD OF THE IML. THIS PROBLEM COULD NOT BE WORKED AS IS, BE 146629 1 3 CAUSE A CARRIER PANEL IS OVER THE STUD. ITEM #2 REMOVED THE CARRIER PA 146629 1 4 NEL, REPLACED THE FRACTURED STUD WITH A NEW ONE, THEN REINSTALLED THE 146629 1 5 CARRIER PANEL. ITEM #3 WAS FOR WHEN THE STUD BECAME DEBONDED DURING CA 146629 1 6 RRIER PANEL INSTALLATION. THE STUD WAS REMOVED AND REBONDED. ITEM #4 W 146629 1 7 AS THAT THE CARRIER PANEL COULD NOT BE INSTALLED BECAUSE THE STUD BECA 146629 1 8 ME MISLOCATED DURING BONDING. THE STUD WAS REMOVED AND REBONDED IN THE 146629 1 9 PROPER LOCATION. THE DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXIST. CAUSE: WORKMANSHI 146629 1 10 P. 146659 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1 I.B. EDGE: "B"(.067) AND "C"(.068) STE 146659 1 2 P DIMENSIONS ARE WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE OF .070 + 146659 1 3 /- .008. "A"(.060) STEP DIMENSION WAS MR APPROVED 146659 1 4 DUE TO SLIGHT OVERCOMPRSSION OF FILLER BAR WHICH W 146659 1 5 ILL NOT RESULT IN OVERSTESSOF TILE. SIP, OR STRUCT 146659 1 6 URE. "D"(.102) STEP DIMENSION WAS REWORKED BY MR T 146659 1 7 O REDUCE STEP TO .047 WHICH REQUIES MR APPROVAL. I 146659 1 8 TEM 1PG 1 O.B. EDGE: "A"(.060) AND "B"(.060) AND " 146659 1 9 D"(.057) STEP DIMENSIONS WERE MR APPROVED DUE TO S 146659 1 10 LIGHT OVERCOMPRESSION OF FILLER BAR WHICH WILL NOT 146659 1 11 RESULT IN OVERSTRESS OF TILE, SIP, OR STRUCTURE. " 146659 1 12 C"(.072) STEP DIMENSION WAS WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANC 146659 1 13 E OF .070 +/- .008. ITEM 2 PG.2 STRUCTURE TO PANEL 146659 1 14 STEPS: STEP .100 WAS REWORKED TO REDUCE STEP TO . 146659 1 15 054 WHICH REQUIRED MR APPROVAL. REWORKED STEP OF . 146659 1 16 054 RESULTS IN SLIGHT OVERCOMPRESSION OF FILLER BA 146659 1 17 R WHICH WILL NOT RESULT IN OVERSTRESS OF TILE, SIP 146659 1 18 , OR STRUCTURE, REMAINING STEPS WERE WITHIN DESIGN 146659 1 19 TOLERANCE OR MR APPROVED. ALL STEP DIMENSIONS FRO 146659 1 20 M CARRIER PANEL AS REWORKED OR DOCUMENTED PROVIDE 146659 1 21 A FILLER BAR TO TILE CONFIGURATION THAT WILL PREVE 146659 1 22 NT OVERTEMP OF FILLER BAR, SIP, & STRUCTURE. 146987 1 1 THE RUB PLATE WAS REWORKED, WITH MR APPROVAL, TO REMOVE THE SCRATCHES. 146987 1 2 THE REWORKED AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE 146987 1 3 DAMAGE WAS DUE TO MISHANDLING OF THE RUB PLATE, BECAUSE NO EVIDENCE OF 146987 1 4 FURTHER DAMAGE WAS NOTICED AFTER HYD OPS. THE RUB PLATE, WITH THE DAM 146987 1 5 MAGED AREA REINFORCED, IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 147123 1 1 DURING PLBD OPERATIONS TO RECONFIGURE THE WEIGHTS 147123 1 2 ON THE LH ZERO-G SYSTEM, THE WEIGHTS BASKETS WERE 147123 1 3 MISALIGNED WITH THE PLBD. THIS LEFT THE LH PLBD H 147123 1 4 IGH (LESS THAN 145 DEGREES) WHICH PROHIBITS THE 13 147123 1 5 PLATFORMS FROM BEING LOWERED. THIS PR CONNECTED 147123 1 6 Z-G SYSTEM, CLOSED THE LH PLBD, RECONFIGURED AND Z 147123 1 7 ERO'D THE WT BASKETS, THEN RE-OPENED THE LH PLBD T 147123 1 8 O 145 DEGREES. AN UNSATISFACTORY CONDITION NO LON 147123 1 9 GER EXISTS AND ICD SPECS MAY BE MET IF 13 PLATFORM 147123 1 10 S ARE LOWERED. CLOSE THIS PR. 147178 1 1 (ITEM 1), THE NICKED SERRATED ROLLER BRACKET WAS REMOVED PER THIS PR. 147178 1 2 AND NOTCHED PER RI DOWNEY PR DJ1371, THEN REINSTALLED PER THIS PR. TH 147178 1 3 E RI DR ALSO CHAMFERRED THE INNER HATCH COVER (ITEM 2) AND REAPPLIED C 147178 1 4 ORROSION PROTECTION TO ALL MODIFIED SURFACES. THE HATCH WAS ? AND INS 147178 1 5 PECTED. NO FURTHER INTERRFERENCE EXIST. (ITEM 3), THE VELCRO STRAP P 147178 1 6 ROBLEM WAS TRANSFERRED TO PR FC5-3-07,0268.(ITEM 4) ASSY V070-332542- 147178 1 7 002 WAS PROPERLY REMARKED PER STEP 29, PG 14. CLOSE THIS PR. 147186 1 1 THE "SCORING/SCRATCHES" IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1 PAGE 1, WERE INSPECTED US 147186 1 2 ING A DEPTH GAUGE WITH .0001 (ONE TEN-THOUSANDTHS) OF AN INCH RESOLUTI 147186 1 3 ON. SINCE NONE OF THE MARKS COULD BE MEASURED, THE MARKS ON THE RUB PA 147186 1 4 NEL ARE ACCEPTABLE AND THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. CONCLUDE THAT THE R 147186 1 5 UB PANEL IS WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON 147186 1 6 THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 147262 1 1 DURING 02 MANIF, INSTALN (REF TPS FCP-3-07-017), SCRATCHES WERE OBSERV 147262 1 2 ED ON V070-454705-024 ECLSS 02 SUPPLY LINE SEALING SURFACE. FTG WAS OB 147262 1 3 SERVED WITH 10X POWER MAGNIFICATION AND GOOD LIGHTING. INSPECTION INDI 147262 1 4 CATED SCRATCHES WERE VERY MINOR AND OF THE TYPE SEEN DUE TO NORMAL CYC 147262 1 5 LING OF THE FITTINGS AND NOT A SERIOUS CONCERN TO LINE/JOINT SEALING. 147262 1 6 MR APPROVAL OBTAINED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. SUBSEQUENT TO LINE INSTLN, 147262 1 7 HIGH PRESSURE MASS SPEC LIC CHECK WAS PERFORMED PER OMI V1022 TEMP DEV 147262 1 8 09/08. CONNECTION INDICATED O LEAKAGE. 147339 1 1 REDUCTION OF TORQUE FROM CLASS 3 TO CLASS 2 OF THR 147339 1 2 EE VERTICAL BOLTS IN A PATTERN OF NINE WILL ALLOW 147339 1 3 TORQUEING TO BE PERFORMED WITHOUT A REDUCTION IN S 147339 1 4 TRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. MAR 147339 1 5 GIN OF SAFETY WILL NOT BE DEGRADED. ADDITIONAL H/W 147339 1 6 REMOVAL, USE OF SPECIALLY FABRICATED TOOLING AND 147339 1 7 A REDUCTION OF TORQUE REQUIREMENT, HAS ALLOWED DIS 147339 1 8 CREPANT BOLTS TO BE REMOVED AND REINSTALLED. INSTA 147339 1 9 LLATION IS NOW RETURNED TO DESIGN CONFIGURATION WI 147339 1 10 TH THE EXCEPTION OF TORQUE REDUCTION. CLOSE THIS P 147339 1 11 R. 147591 1 1 OVERSIZE FASTENERS (.2031) WERE INSTLD WHERE (.163 147591 1 2 5") SIZE FASTENERS WERE CALLED OUT. INSTLN WAS VER 147591 1 3 IFIED TO BE PER SPEC MAO 101-301 AND CORROSION PRO 147591 1 4 TECTED PER MAO608-301. MR ACTION WAS TAKEN ON THE 147591 1 5 OVERSIZE FASTENERS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHE 147591 1 6 R DISPO OR WORK IS REQ'D. CLOSE PR. 147650 1 1 R/H INBD ELEVON, OUTBD BLADE SEAL WHICH BINDS IN THE HOUSING, DOCUMENT 147650 1 2 ED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, HAS BEEN RESOLVED BY MACHING THE OUTBD HOUSING H 147650 1 3 ALF AND BLADE SEAL PER MR DISPO. MACHINING ELIMINATED THE BINDING AND 147650 1 4 NOW THE BLADE MOVES WITHIN THE HOUSING WITHOUT BINDING. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 147650 1 5 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: SLIGHT BOW OF 147650 1 6 BLADE AND HOUSING. 148050 01 1 VOID,WRITTEN ON WRONG TAIR BOOK,STAMP 192 148126 1 1 PN PLBD'S LH 1-5 AND RH 1,2 ARE (145 OF 202) HOLES THAT ARE OUT-OF-TOLER 148126 1 2 ANCE. THESE HOLES ARE USED FOR STRONGBACK INSTALLATION, THE O/T HOLE CON 148126 1 3 DITIONS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATION 148126 1 4 AL DEGRADATION. 148126 1 5 148199 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REMOVE AND REPLACE THE DISCREPA 148199 1 2 NT RECEPTACLE TO ACHIEVE THE CORRECT TORQUE FOR THE CAPTIVE BOLT. THIS 148199 1 3 IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DAMAGED RECEPTACLE W 148199 1 4 AS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 148228 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES ON ROD ASSEMBLY LOCKING DEVICE M 148228 1 2 D162-0002-005 AND NICK ON BELL CRANK V070-595530W 148228 1 3 ERE DISCOVERED WHILE PROCESSING MEQ-3-07-090. THE 148228 1 4 ROD ASSEMBLY WAS DISCONNECTED FROM BELL CRANK. LOC 148228 1 5 KING DEVICE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER DWG-V070- 148228 1 6 595512, AND WAS RETURNED TO ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION 148228 1 7 . NO RERIGGING WAS NECESSARY. NICK WAS REPAIRED PE 148228 1 8 R DWG V070-595501. MR WAS GENERATED AND APPROVED. 148228 1 9 RE-INSTALLATION OF LINKAGE AND RETEST SHALL BE PER 148228 1 10 FORMED PER STEPS 4 AND 5, MOD-001 OF 148228 1 11 MEQ-3-07-090. THEREFORE, NO PERFORMANCE REQUIREMEN 148228 1 12 TS ARE NECESSARY PER THIS PR. 148303 1 1 DISCREPANCY FOUND IN THIS PR HAS BEEN DETERMINED 148303 1 2 TO BE AN AREA MIDDED DURING HEAT SINK INSTALLATION 148303 1 3 OF TPS STR-3-07-281. DISPOSITION HAS BEEN MADE IN 148303 1 4 THIS PR TO APPLY THE HEAT SINK TO MISSED AREA BET 148303 1 5 WEEN STRINGERS 23 AND 24 INL/H BAY 5. ALL WORK STE 148303 1 6 PS AHVE BEEN PERFORMED. ITEMS INVOLVED IN THIS PR 148303 1 7 ARE PRIMARY STRUCTURE. 148603 1 1 NUTPLATE SPACER WHICH WAS INADVERTENTLY DRAWN INTO VACUUM WHEN DRILLIN 148603 1 2 G OUT NUTPLATE, ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS SEARCHED FOR BY SHOP PERSONNEL BU 148603 1 3 T COULD NOT BE RECOVERED. THE NUTPLATE SPACER, NAS463YC516H, WAS INSTA 148603 1 4 LLED PER PREVIOUS RI MR BE9448-000M. NAS463YC516H NUTPLATE SPACERS WER 148603 1 5 E NOT AVAILABLE FROM LOGISTICS, THEREFORE A MR SPACER WAS FABRICATED T 148603 1 6 O THE SAME DIMENSIONS AND USING THE SAME MATERIAL AS THE NAS463YC516H. 148603 1 7 MR REWORK RESTORED THE MR BE9448-000M INSTALLATION AND PROBABLE CAUSE 148603 1 8 : WORKMANSHIP. 148993 1 1 PAGE 1/ ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY REPORTED BEING UNABLE TO INSTALL ML31C PANE 148993 1 2 L DUE TO ROCKWELL REMOVING MOUNTING BRACKETS. THE PREVIOUS DISPO VERIF 148993 1 3 IED THAT THE V070-338764-002 AND V070-338763-002 MOUNTING BRACKETS HAV 148993 1 4 E BEEN REINSTALLED. DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 149084 1 1 RETAINERS REINSTALLED PER PRINT. 149114 1 1 MR WASHER WITH A .62" O.D. HAS BEEN FABRICATED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL B 149114 1 2 EARING SURFACE FOR USE AT CENTER MR ELONGATED HOLE. HOLE WAS ELONGATED 149114 1 3 PER MR STR-3-01-0429. DISCREPANCY DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, HAS B 149114 1 4 EEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 149172 1 1 THE V070-198371-001 SEAL AND THE V070-198373-001,- 149172 1 2 002 SEALS THAT WERE DAMAGED HAVE BEEN REPAIRED TO 149172 1 3 PRINT CONFIGURATION. TILE REWORK OF LOWER ELEVON C 149172 1 4 OVER AREA WILL PREVENT AN OVERHEAT CONDITION IN TH 149172 1 5 IS AREA. CLOSE THIS PR. 149246 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER STEPS 3 & 4, RESP 149246 1 2 ECTIVELY. THIS CORRECTS THE DISCREPANCY NOTED AS ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1. THE 149246 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 149286 1 1 THE HIGH PRE-LOAD IN THE BORON STRUT BOLTS AND THE MISALIGNMENT OF BOL 149286 1 2 T HOLES WERE CAUSED BY AN INTERFERENCE AT THE Xo 807 FRAME FITTING. MR 149286 1 3 DISPOSITION FILED THE INTERFERING MATERIAL OFF OF THE Xo 807 FITTING 149286 1 4 TO ALLOW UNRESTRICTED INSTALLATION OF THE 70B2010-3 STRUT. 149306 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL 149306 1 2 SRVC CNTR. THE INSULATOR HAS BEEN INSTL'D INTO TH 149306 1 3 E RCC PNL & THE PNL IS INSTL'D FOR FLT. 149339 1 1 SCRATCHED AREAS CORROSION PROTECTED. SCRATCHES 149339 1 2 HAVE NO ADVERSE AFFECT ON STRUTS' STRUCTURAL INTE- 149339 1 3 GRITY. 149391 1 1 THE BRACKETS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED WITH HI-LOCS INST 149391 1 2 EAD OF RIVETS, BECAUSE OF LIMITED SPACE IN ELEVON 149391 1 3 COVE WITH MR DISPO. CLOSE THIS PR. 149419 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 149419 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 149419 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 149419 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 149419 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 149419 1 6 7-103-C1). THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 149524 1 1 RTV WAS INJECTED INTO THE SEAL INTERFACE, TO BRING THE GAP BACK TO PRI 149524 1 2 NT TOLERANCE. THIS REPAIR IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 149559 1 1 OBTAIN A NEW CLIP B91B15080-11 149684 1 1 DAMAGED BOLT WAS REPLACED WITH MR APPROVED BOLT AND MISSING COTTER PIN 149684 1 2 WAS RE-INSTALLED. REMAINING STRUT ASSY'S WERE INSPECTED WITH NO FURTH 149684 1 3 ER DISCREPANCIES FOUND. AN LAF PR WAS GENERATED TO DOCUMENT MISSING CO 149684 1 4 TTER PIN. DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXISTS. CLOSE THIS PR. 149689 1 1 BRAKE,PACKAGED AND SENT TO B.F.GOODRICH THRU HDA 149689 1 2 ON 4/20/85 PRR#92178B 149769 1 1 TROUBLESHOOTING SHOWED THAT A SIGNAL BIAS WITHIN FUEL CELL 1 OZ FLOW MET 149769 1 2 ER CIRCUITRY CAUSED A HIGHER THAN NORMAL FLOW READING. A REPAIR COULD NO 149769 1 3 T BE MADE SINCE THE FLOW METER IS INTERNAL THE THE FUEL CELL. FUEL CELL 149769 1 4 1 (S/N 114) HAS BEEN REMOVED PER PR FCP-3-16-0295. ALL DISCREPANCIES HAV 149769 1 5 E BEEN NOTED ON THE LRU PR AND THE FUEL CELL HAS BEEN RETURNED DTO THE V 149769 1 6 ENDOR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF PROBLEM: SIGNAL BIAS. 149896 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-0 149896 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION 665.25 Xo AND 399.75 Zo R/H IN THE MIDBODY. THE OR 149896 1 3 IGINAL RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 0" POUNDS. N 149896 1 4 UT WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE T 149896 1 5 O THE APPROPRIATE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO PR 149896 1 6 INT CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. T 149896 1 7 HIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 149903 1 1 REF DISCREPANCY #1. THE DEPRESSION IN THE BULKHEAD 149903 1 2 WAS FILLED WITH MBO 120-037 TYPE 2 ADHESIVE PER M 149903 1 3 R DISPOSITION STEP 20A. THE ELONGATED HOLE WAS CLE 149903 1 4 ANED UP BY DRILLING TO THE NEXT LARGER SIZE AND IN 149903 1 5 STALLING AN OVERSIZE FASTENER PER MR DISPOSITION S 149903 1 6 TEPS 15.0 AND 22.0. REF DISCREPANCY #2. THE PROTRU 149903 1 7 SION ON THE BULKHEAD WAS PARTIALLY REMOVED PER MR 149903 1 8 DISPOSITION STEP 15. THE REMAINDER OF THE PROTRUSI 149903 1 9 ON WAS ACCEPTED AS IS PER MR RATIONALE AFTER STEP 149903 1 10 24.0. 150013 1 1 2 EA NUT PLATES AT Xo693, -Yo54 & -Yo43 WERE WRITTEN UP ON PAGE 1 AS B 150013 1 2 EING BAD. NUT PLATES WERE CHECKED PER STEP 3.0 AND DETERMINED TO BE GO 150013 1 3 OD. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NO DISCREPANCY. 150231 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS ITEM 1.0 AND 2.0. THE LOC 150231 1 2 ATION IN ITEM 1.0 HAVE BEEN REPAINTED PER V070-362001 E.O. B02. THE LOCA 150231 1 3 TIONS IN ITEM 2.0 WERE REPAINTED PER DR'S REFERENCED ON ATTACHMENT C. TH 150231 1 4 E PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE MISSING CORROSION PROTECTION WAS IMPROPER SURFAC 150231 1 5 E PREPARATION DURING THE ORIGINAL PAINTING PROCESS. 150231 1 6 150325 1 1 THE CORROSION AROUND THE UPPER FORWARD RIB SPLICE #6 ATTACH HOLE IDENT 150325 1 2 IFIED IN ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY ENLARGING THE DIA OF THE HOLE T 150325 1 3 O .500" TO REMOVE THE CORROSION. AFTER ENLARGING THE HOLE AN MR BUSHIN 150325 1 4 G WAS FABRICATED AND PRESS FIT INTO THE FITTING TO BRING THE HOLE SIZE 150325 1 5 BACK TO WITHIN DRAWING REQUIREMENTS OF .375" TO .378" DIA WITH MR APP 150325 1 6 ROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CONCLUDE CORROSION HAS BEEN REMOVED AND HO 150325 1 7 LE HAS BEEN RETURNED TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS R 150325 1 8 EQUIRED. 150423 1 1 REMOVAL OF KOROPON FROM UPPER AREA OF SCRATCH WHICH APPEARED TO RUN UN 150423 1 2 DER FILLER BAR OF ADJACENT TILE, REVEALED NO SCRATCH IN THE BASE METAL 150423 1 3 . WHAT APPEARED TO BE A SCRATCH WAS A BUILD UP SEVERAL KOROPON LAYERS 150423 1 4 . THE REMAINING APPROX 3/4" SCRATCH IS SUPERFICIAL AND NO DEGRADATION 150423 1 5 OF THE BASE METAL EXISTS. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN ADDRESSEDAND RESO 150423 1 6 LVED. 150514 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN PITTING, GOUGING AND SCUFFED FINISHES WERE 150514 1 2 DETECTED ON EACH OF THE FOUR R/H MLG DOOR ROLLER ASSEMBLIES. MOLD IMPR 150514 1 3 ESSIONS THAT WERE DETECTABLE WITH A THUMB NAIL. THE MOLDS WERE ANALYZE 150514 1 4 D ON THE OPTICAL COMPARATOR. THE ANALYSIS INDICATED THAT THE GOUGES WE 150514 1 5 RE SUPERFICIAL IN NATURE. MR CONCURRENCE WAS OBTAINED FOR UNRESTRICTED 150514 1 6 USAGE (AS IS) OF THE MLG DOOR ROLLER ASSEMBLIES. MR ID WAS APPLIED. T 150514 1 7 HE PROBABLE CAUSE IS SLIGHT OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION/WEAR. NO RETEST RE 150514 1 8 QUIRED. 150730 1 1 THE MINOR TEAR IN THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE ON R/H RADIATOR PANEL #2 HAS 150730 1 2 BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "AS-IS". NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIE 150730 1 3 S EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: SPACE DEBRIS DURING FLIGHT. 150736 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AS AN IPR WHEN FIRING ROOM CONSOLE INDICATIONS SHO 150736 1 2 WED THE L/H ET DOOR RTL INDICATOR #2 TO BE ON (S/B OFF). THE L/H AFT RTL 150736 1 3 PADDLE WAS MANUALLY CYCLED AND IN EACH ATTEMPT THE PADDLE STUCK BEFORE 150736 1 4 IT WAS FULLY RELEASED. THE IPR WAS UPGRADED TO AN MEQ PR AND MR DEFERRED 150736 1 5 FOR ONE FLIGHT DUE TO THE COMPLEXITY OF THE REPAIR PROCEDURE. AFTER FLI 150736 1 6 GHT, THE L/H AFT ET DOOR LATCH ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED FROM THE VEHICLE AND 150736 1 7 INSPECTED. PAGE 1A WAS PICKED UP TO DOCUMENT A DISTORTED SPRING/PLUNGER 150736 1 8 BARREL ON THE V070-565173-001 FITTING THAT WAS CAUSING BINDING. A NEW F 150736 1 9 ITTING WAS ORDERED AND MATCH DRILLED TO THE LATCH ASSEMBLY HOUSING (PAGE 150736 1 10 1B, NO HOLES IN FITTING). V070-565147-001 BUSHING WAS REPLACED. V070-565 150736 1 11 47-001 ROLLER ARM WAS FOUND TO BE IN GOOD CONDITION AND WAS REUSED. LATC 150736 1 12 ASSEMBLY WAS REBUILT AND REINSTALLED IN VEHICLE. SUCCESSFUL RETEST WAS P 150736 1 13 RFORMED BY V1097 ET DOOR FUNCTIONAL TEST. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORN V070-5651 150736 1 14 5-001 BUSHING AND POSSBILE BINDING DUE TO A DISTORTED SPRING/PLUNGER BAR 150736 1 15 EL ON THE V070-565173-001 FITTING. NORMAL WEAR ATTRIBUTED TO CHATTERING 150736 1 16 AUSED BY CURRENT ET FERRY FLIGHT DOOR CONFIGURATION. 151071 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AS IPR 33RV-0012 WHEN THE LEFT-HAND ET DOOR RTL 151071 1 2 1 AND 2 INDICATIONS WERE FOUND ON WHILE THE ET DOORS WERE OPEN TO CENT 151071 1 3 ERLINE. THE RTL INDICATIONS SHOULD ONLY COME ON WHEN THE DOOR (LEFT-HA 151071 1 4 ND IN THIS CASE) IS CLOSED. TROUBLESHOOTING DETERMINED THE CAUSE OF TH 151071 1 5 E ERRONEOUS INDICATION WAS A MECHANICALLY BOUND LIMIT SWITCH PADDLE. T 151071 1 6 HIS CONDITION WAS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED AND DOCUMENTED LAST FLIGHT AND 151071 1 7 DEFERRED TO PR MEQ-3-A0026. THIS DEFERRED PR (MEQ-3-A0026) WILL CORRE 151071 1 8 CT THE PROBLEM AND VERIFY RETEST. CLOSE THIS PR AS DUPLICATE TO PR MEQ 151071 1 9 -3-A0026. 151078 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM (S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE 151078 1 2 PEELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD 151078 1 3 BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 151078 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHIN 151078 1 5 G HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121- 151078 1 6 87-103-C1). THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 151083 1 1 SIX (6) NAS 1199-4 RIVETS WERE PULLING THROUGH THE THREE (3) V070-1971 151083 1 2 73-001 BRACKETS WHICH CONNECTS THE V070-1416012-003 FLIPPER DOOR TO TH 151083 1 3 E V070-197129-001 INSULATOR. THE THREE V070-197173-001 BRACKET ALL PAR 151083 1 4 TS TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. 151105 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP AS AN IPR WHEN THE LH PLBD CLOSE INDICATION #2 F 151105 1 2 AILED TO COME ON DURING FLIGHT. TROUBLESHOOTING WAS PERFORMED AND INDI 151105 1 3 CATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH ON THE V070-594222-012 SWITCH ASSY WAS BAD 151105 1 4 OR MIS-RIGGED. THE IPR WAS UPGRADED TO A PR AND THE SEITCH ASSY ROUTED 151105 1 5 TO RI DOWNEY FOR REWORK. UPON RECEIPT OF REWORKED SWITCH THE SWITCH A 151105 1 6 SSY WAS BENCH CHECKED AND OPERATION WAS NOMINAL. DURING INSTALLATION P 151105 1 7 AGE 1A WAS TAKEN WHEN THE SWITCH MODULE COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO 151105 1 8 NUT PLATE PROBLEMS, ITEM 2, AND THAT THE ATTACH BOLTS WERE TOO LONG, I 151105 1 9 TEM 3, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO CLEAN THE THREADS ON THE NUT PLATE PAGE 1B 151105 1 10 WAS TAKEN WHEN THERE WAS NO RUNNING TORQUE, ITEM 4, AND THAT THERE WER 151105 1 11 E NUMEROUS DINGS AROUND THE NUT PLATE, ITEM 5. ITEMS 2 & 4 WERE ADDRES 151105 1 12 SED BY REPLACING THE NUT PLATE PER STEP 53.32. ITEM 3 WAS ADDRESSED PE 151105 1 13 R RO-TO-FOLLOW DISPO PER PAGE 23.2. ITEM 5 WAS ADDRESSED ON PR STR-3-0 151105 1 14 9-2968. THE SWITCH WAS INSTALLED AND UPON ATTEMPTING TO MATE THE CONNE 151105 1 15 CTORS PAGE 1C, ITEM 6, WAS TAKEN. THE CONNECTORS ALREADY MATED WERE DE 151105 1 16 MATED AND THE SWITCH REMOVED. PR STR-3-09-3004 MODIFIED THE SHROUD AND 151105 1 17 THE SWITCH WAS RE-INSTALLED AND THE CONNECTORS MATED. THE SWITCH WAS 151105 1 18 THEN RIGGED AND RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER V5006,PLBD FUNCTIONAL. ALL WO 151105 1 19 RK COMPLETE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCIES: ITEM 1: NORMAL WEAR ITE 151105 1 20 M 2: INCORRECT INSTALLATION ITEM 3: DESIGN DEFICENCY ITEM 4: RUNNING T 151105 1 21 AP IN THREADS ITEM 5: DAMAGED DURING MANUFACTURE ITEM 6: DESIGN DEFICE 151105 1 22 NCY. 151216 1 1 THE V070-510707-006 BOLT WAS UNABLE TO BE INSTALLE 151216 1 2 D IN THE MD137-0005-0704 BUSHING. THE BOLT AND BUS 151216 1 3 HING WERE REMOVED AND CLEANED UP TO PREVENT ANY IN 151216 1 4 TERFERENCE FIT. THE TWO PARTS WERE THEN USED AS A 151216 1 5 TEMPORARY INSTALLATION. UPON OBTAINING FRESH HARDW 151216 1 6 ARE THE TEMPORARY INSTALLATION WAS REMOVED AND SCR 151216 1 7 APPED LOCALLY WITH A NEW BOLT AND BUSHING TAKING I 151216 1 8 TS PLACE. SAME PART NUMBERS APPLY. CONFIGURATION H 151216 1 9 AS BEEN RETURNED TO THE PRINT SPECIFICATIONS. 151242 1 1 STIFFENER WAS TRIMMED AND INTERFERING HI-LOC LOCAT 151242 1 2 IONS PLUGGED WITH DOUBLE FLUSH RIVETS. NEW HI-LOC 151242 1 3 LOCATIONS DO NOT INTERFERE WITH INSTALLATION. 151329 1 1 (REF ITEM 1.0 ON PAGE 1). DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE ATTACH HARDWARE FO 151329 1 2 R THE V070-198315-001 PRIMARY SEAL PANEL, TWO NUTPLATES BROKE. THESE N 151329 1 3 UTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND WITH MR APPROVAL, NUTS AND WASHERS WILL BE U 151329 1 4 SED IN LIEU OF NUTPLATES DURING REINSTALLATION OF THE SEAL PANEL. PROB 151329 1 5 ABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION OF THE NUTPLATE. (REF ITEM 2.0 O 151329 1 6 N PAGE 1A) THE TWO MISSING NUTPLATES WERE PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED FOR U 151329 1 7 NRESTRICTED USE. DISCREPANT LOCATIONS WERE IDENTIFIED WITH THE ORIGINA 151329 1 8 L MR, "MR BJ6980-OOM". NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS DUE TO PREVIOUS MR ACCEPT 151329 1 9 ANCE. 151365 1 1 THE V075-593360-001 SERRATED PLATE (OCN BK0622) AND V075-593322-001 SE 151365 1 2 RRATED CATCH (OCN BK0623) WERE REMOVED FROM OV-103 PER RTOMI V5067 (3- 151365 1 3 102688-9) SEQ 01-051 THEN REINSTALLED PER SEQ01-076. THE OCN'S WERE VI 151365 1 4 SUALLY VERIFIED ON THE PARTS AND CORRESPONG TO THE CORRECT PART NUMBER 151365 1 5 S. CVAS RECORDS HAD PREVIOUSLY INDICATED THE V075-593360-001 PLATE WAS 151365 1 6 OCN F97254. CVAS RECORDS WILL BE UPDATED TO MATCH VEHICLE CONFIGURATI 151365 1 7 AON WITH CLOSURE OF THIS PR. NO HARDWARE DISCREPANCY EXISTS. OUTDATED 151365 1 8 CVAS RECORDS IS THE PROBABLE CAUSE. CLOSE THIS PR. 151408 1 1 THE LO2 ET DOOR GROUND STRAP HAS MINOR FRAYING NEAR THE ATTACH POINT T 151408 1 2 O THE ET DOOR. THE DAMAGE WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AN MR ID W 151408 1 3 AS APPLIED. NO OTHER DISCREPANT EXIST WITH THE GROUND STRAP. PROBABLE 151408 1 4 CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR. 151441 1 1 THE DOUBLERS WERE REBONDED TO THE BULKHEAD. THE 151441 1 2 LAP SHEARS PASSED MINIMUM AND AVERAGE REQUIREMENTS 151469 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM (S) WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PE 151469 1 2 ELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BE 151469 1 3 ARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. A 151469 1 4 CTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 151469 1 5 H/W TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C 151469 1 6 1. THE CARRIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. CLOSE PR. 151656 1 1 EO TO FOLLOW WILL BE OBTAINED PER TPS STR-3-07-221 151656 1 2 MOD 009. 151678 1 1 AFTER A VISUAL INSPECTION OF R/H PSA FITTINGS V070 151678 1 2 -346058 AND V070-346059, MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAK 151678 1 3 EN OF THREE WORST CASE HOLES, WHICH HAD GOUGES OF 151678 1 4 .0036,.0044 AND .0045. AFTER REMOVAL OF ALL ROUGH 151678 1 5 EDGES, THE HOLES WERE CORROSION PROTECTED AND M.R. 151678 1 6 I.D.'ED, FOR USE AS IS. 151752 1 1 INSULATOR WAS FOUND TO BE CRUSHED AND DUE TO INCONEL COVER NOT BEING T 151752 1 2 ORN OR MOUNTING BRACKETS AFFECTED IT IS MR OK FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 151777 1 1 OMRS V56ABO.010 "ET DOOR CONFIGURATION FOR FLIGHT VERIFICATION" WAS 151777 1 2 INVALIDATED WHEN THE RIGHT ET DOOR WAS REMOVED FROM CENTERLINE LATCHES 151777 1 3 FOR FURTHER TILE WORK. AFTER TILE WORK WAS COMPLETE, ET DOORS WERE RE 151777 1 4 POSITIONED ON TO CENTERLINE LATCHES. THE OMRS WAS THEN SATISFIED ON TH 151777 1 5 IS WAD (REF ATTACHED OMRSAD), NO FURTHER WORK OR RETEST IS REQUIRED ON 151777 1 6 THIS WAD. 151785 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1.0 THROUGH 7.0 ON PAGES 1 THROUGH 1F) ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7 DO 151785 1 2 CUMENT DISCREPANT KNUCKLE AND WIPER SEALS ON THE V070-198315-002 PRIMA 151785 1 3 RY SEAL PANEL. THE DISCREPANT ITEMS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW 151785 1 4 HARDWARE WHICH RETURNED THE SEAL PANEL TO A PER PRINT CONFIGURATION W 151785 1 5 ITH THE EXCEPTION OF ITEM 5 ON PAGE 1D WHICH WAS INSTALLED WITH A MR S 151785 1 6 TIFFENER BONDED TO IT TO INCREASE THE SEALING CAPABILITIES OF THE SEAL 151785 1 7 . PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCIES 1 THROUGH 7 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 151785 1 8 ION. (REF ITEMS 8 AND 9 ON PAGE 1G) THESE ITEMS WERE DUPLICATES AND VO 151785 1 9 IDED BY QC. (REF ITEM 10 ON PAGE 1H) THE WIPER SEAL REMOVED WAS ACTUAL 151785 1 10 LY A V070-198063-002 MISIDENTIFIED AS A V070-198063-001 SEAL. THE SEAL 151785 1 11 WAS REIDENTIFIED AS A -002. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANS 151785 1 12 HIP DURING MANUFACTURE. (REF ITEM 11 ON PAGE 1I) ITEM 11.0 DOCUMENTS K 151785 1 13 NUCKLE SEALS THAT WERE UNABLE TO BE INSTALLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE BETW 151785 1 14 EEN THE SEAL AND THE SEAL PANEL. THIS INTERFERENCE WAS CAUSED DUE TO A 151785 1 15 CORNER OF EACH SEAL NOT BEING RADIUSED AS PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. M 151785 1 16 ATERIAL WAS REMOVED SO THAT THE PARTS HAD THE RADIUS AND THE INTERFERE 151785 1 17 NCE WAS ALLEVIATED. PARTS WERE RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION AND INS 151785 1 18 TALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP DURING PART MANUFACTURE. CONCLU 151785 1 19 DE THAT ALL ITEMS ON THIS PR HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED AND NO FURTHER ENG OR 151785 1 20 SHOP ACTION IS REQUIRED. 151932 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO CLEAN THE INTERNAL THREAD OF A 151932 1 2 NUT PLATE AND REPLACE IT IF NECESSARY. WIPING THE THREADS WITH ALCOHOL 151932 1 3 WAS SUFFICIENT TO RETURN THE NUT PLATE TO USE. THIS IS SECONDARY STRU 151932 1 4 CTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 151934 1 1 ITEM 1.0,PG 1.0, THREAD DAMAGE IN DOME HEAT SHIELD ATTACHING BOLT HOLE 151934 1 2 S #39,40,41,45. HOLES WERE CLEANED TO REMOVE RAISED METAL/SHARP EDGES 151934 1 3 BY HAND USING ABRASIVE PAPER/CLOTH. CLEANED CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED 151934 1 4 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 151989 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE 151989 1 2 PEELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD 151989 1 3 BEARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION 151989 1 4 . THE SHIM(S) WERE CENTERED OVER THE BOLT HOLES 151989 1 5 PER MR ACTION TO RESOLVE THE MISALIGNMENT PROBLEM. 151989 1 6 RC ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTA 151989 1 7 CHING HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR # 151989 1 8 5121-87-103-C1) 152007 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATORS WERE REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CNTR. THE 152007 1 2 INSULATORS HAVE BEEN INSTL'D INTO THE RCC PNL & THE PNL IS INSTL'D FO 152007 1 3 R FLT. 152061 1 1 DURING FLIGHT 8 (STS 29) PROCESSING, THREE COLD PLATE INSERTS WERE FOUND 152061 1 2 TO BE STRIPPED (REF. ITEM 1, PAGE 1). THE THREE INSERTS WERE TAPPED TO 152061 1 3 ALLOW FASTENER INSTALLATION WHICH REMOVED THEIR LOCKING FEATURE (REF. 152061 1 4 ITEM 2, PAGE 1A). THIS PR WAS THEN MR ACCEPTED AS-IS RESTRICTED TO 152061 1 5 FUTURE FLIGHT BECAUSE THE COLD PLATE WATER LINES WOULD NEED TO BE 152061 1 6 DESERVICED IN ORDER TO REPLACE THE INSERTS. DURING FLIGHT 15 (STS-53) 152061 1 7 THE WATER LINES WERE DESERVICED TO PERFORM REMOVAL OF WINDOW NUMBER 8 152061 1 8 FOR PYRO MODIFICATION/SERVICE. WHILE THE LINES WERE DESERVICED THE COLD 152061 1 9 PLATE WAS REMOVED AND ALL 17 INSERTS WERE REMOVED AND NEW ONES 152061 1 10 INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DISCREPANT INSERTS IS NORMAL WEAR AND 152061 1 11 TEAR (OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION). CONCLUDE THAT THE INSERTS HAVE BEEN 152061 1 12 RETURNED TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS 152061 1 13 PR. 152199 1 1 ABSENCE OF P/N APPLICATION TO ASSY IS PER PRINT. A 152199 1 2 TTACHMENT OF TEMP ID TAG PER LG-375(7) K MEETS REQ 152199 1 3 MTS FOR ID OF PARTS RETAINED IN WORK AREA. NO DISC 152199 1 4 REPANT CONDITION. 152580 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP DURING TPS MEQ-3-09-154 WHICH PERFORMED A CHECK 152580 1 2 OF THE NO WONG SENSORS. THE LEFT NO WONG SENSOR WAS FOUND TO BE RIGGED 152580 1 3 OUT OF SPEC, SENSOR DEACTIVATES AT 2.041" OF STRUT TRAVEL, S/B BETWEE 152580 1 4 N .87 AND 1.45". THE MOST DESIREABLE DEACTIVATION LOCATION IS BETWEEN 152580 1 5 1.00 AND 1.25" OF STRUT TRAVEL SO BOTH THE LEFT AND RIGHT SENSORS WERE 152580 1 6 CHECKED. THE "A" DIMENSION WAS ADJUSTED ON BOTH LEFT AND RIGHT AND TH 152580 1 7 EN THE FLOOR LIFT WAS USED TO COMPRESS THE STRUT. THE LEFT SENSOR WAS 152580 1 8 ADJUSTED TO DEACTIVATE BETWEEN 1.00 AND 1.25 AND THE RIGHT SENSOR WAS 152580 1 9 FOUND TO BE IN THESE LIMITS. A SECOND CHECK WAS PERFORMED AND THE LEFT 152580 1 10 HAND WAS FOUND TO GO OFF AT 1.036 AND THE RH AT 1.119" OF STRUT TRAVE 152580 1 11 L. THE FLOOR LIFT WAS THEN LOWERED AND THE STRUT WAS PRESSURIZED TO 30 152580 1 12 0 PSI. ALL WORK COMPLETE AND NO OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS RESULTED. PROBABL 152580 1 13 E CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS THAT THE SENSORS WERE NOT RIGGED PROPERLY. 152580 1 14 NO ADDITIONAL RETEST IS REQUIRED. 152788 1 1 INTERFERENCE WAS FOUND TO EXIST BETWEEN THE V070-856179-001 CLOSE-OUT 152788 1 2 SHROUD AND THE J3 CONNECTOR ON THE RIGHT, AFT R-T-L SWITCH MODULE. PER 152788 1 3 MR DISPO, THE SHROUD WAS TRIMMED TO ALLEVIATE THE INTERFERENCE. NOMIN 152788 1 4 AL LAYOUT SHOWS NO INDICATION OF INTERFERENCE BETWEEN SHROUD AND CONNE 152788 1 5 CTOR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS A BUILD UP OF TOLERANCE. NO E. 152788 1 6 O.T.F. OR FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. 152800 1 1 MR WASHER WITH A .67 INCH OUTER DIAMETER HAS BEEN FABRICATED TO PROVID 152800 1 2 E ADDITIONAL BEARING SURFACE FOR USE AT ELONGATED HOLE. DISCREPANCY DO 152800 1 3 CUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PR 152800 1 4 OBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 152894 1 1 MD111-4019-0304 BOLT IS NOT SEATING PROPERLY WAS CORRECTED BY CHANGING 152894 1 2 MOUNTING HARDWARE TO ELIMINATE THE NEED FOJR NAS1587-3 WASHERS WHICH 152894 1 3 INTERFERED WITH RADIUS OF BOLT. MD111-4020-0303 BOLTS WILL PROVIDE THE 152894 1 4 PROPER GRIP FOR THE C/P WHICH IS ONE GRIP LONGER THAN PRINT DUE TO MR 152894 1 5 PR STR-3-07-2048 WHICH ADDED SHIM AND CHANGED HARDWARE. MR ID NOT REQ 152894 1 6 UIRED RETURNED TO PRINT. 152944 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO TEMPORARILY REMOVE THE (4) PNEU 152944 1 2 MATIC ACCUMULATOR (SURGE TANK) INSTALLATION BOLTS. THE INSTALLATION OF 152944 1 3 THESE BOLTS HAD CREATED A MISALIGNMENT WITH THE V070-852313-002 BRACE 152944 1 4 AND THE V07-852324-002 GUSSET WAS INSTALLED. THE DISCREPANCY DOCUMENT 152944 1 5 ED IN ITEM 1.0 PAGE 1.0 HAS BEEN RESOLVED. THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTU 152944 1 6 RE. 153055 1 1 THE TWO ATTACH FASTENERS FOR THE V070-395064-001 ACCOUSTICAL SENSOR HE 153055 1 2 ATSINK WERE FOUND TO NOT HAVE THE MINIMUM REQUIRED THREAD PROTRUSION. 153055 1 3 THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR IDENTIFI 153055 1 4 CATION WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS A BUILD UP OF TO 153055 1 5 LERANCE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED. 153056 1 1 THE FORWARD INBOARD CORNER OF SHELF 33 WHICH WAS LOOSE, DOCUMENTED BY 153056 1 2 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS CAUSED BY THE FWD INBOARD ATTACH PINT BUSHING CATC 153056 1 3 HING ON THE SHELF SUPPORT AS A RESULT OF THE SHELF BEING MISALIGNED. T 153056 1 4 HE SHELF WA PROPERLY ALIGNED BY LOOSENING THE 4 ATTACH PINTS FOR THE S 153056 1 5 HELF ALLOWING THE BUSHING TO BE INSTALLED THROUGH THE SHELF AND THE SH 153056 1 6 ELF SUPPORT. A NEW NAS1587-4 WASHER WAS ORDERED AND INSTALLED, REPLACI 153056 1 7 NG THE MISSING WASHER, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 2, PAGE 1A. PROBABLE CAUSE: 153056 1 8 DUE TO ACCESSIBILITY TO PROPERLY ALIGN SHELF #3. CLOSE THIS PR 153253 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST CHAFFING ON THE RH SIDE OF THE UPPER AND 153253 1 2 LOWER DRAG BRACES ABOUT 1.5" FROM THEIR PINNED ATTACH POINT. THE CHAF 153253 1 3 FING EXPOSED KOROPON ON BOTH BRACES, AND BARE METAL ON THE UPPER BRACE 153253 1 4 (ABOUT 1/16 X 1/16"). VISUAL INSPECTION BY LSOC ENGR REVEALED NO GOUG 153253 1 5 ES OR METAL REMOVAL. BEFORE RI ENGR COULD INSPECT CHAFFED BRACES, THE 153253 1 6 DISCREPANT AREA WAS REPAINTED ON A DR (REF STR DR 3-12-0252). THE PROB 153253 1 7 ABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS SLIGHT CONTACT BETWEEN UPPER AND LOWER DRAG 153253 1 8 BRACES ADJACENT TO THEIR ATTACH PIN. NO RETEST REQUIRED. (NORMAL WEAR) 153436 1 1 DURING FUNCTIONAL TEST OF "B" HATCH ACTUATOR PER V1058, IT WAS NOTED T 153436 1 2 HAT THE FORCE REQUIRED TO UNLOCK THE ACTUATOR (FROM THE PAYLOAD BAY SI 153436 1 3 DE) WAS 5.5 LB, S/B 7-18 LB. TROUBLESHOOTING DETERMINED THAT THE LOWER 153436 1 4 FORCE WAS DUE TO THE LOCKING LEVER ON THE AIRLOCK SIDE N OT FULLY ENG 153436 1 5 AGING IN THE "LOCKED" POSITION WHEN ACTUATED FROM THE PLB SIDE (TEST W 153436 1 6 AS PERFORMED WITH BOTH LEVERS IN FULL LOCKED POSITION, AND ACCEPTABLE 153436 1 7 FORCE READING WAS OBTAINED). A BORESCOPE INSPECTION OF THE ACTUATOR LO 153436 1 8 CKING STEM SHOWED EXCESSIVE WEAR WHICH WAS CAUSING SUFFICIENT FREE PLA 153436 1 9 Y IN THE MECHANISM TO PREVENT COMPLETE TRANSLATION OF MOTION OF THE PL 153436 1 10 B SIDE LEVER TO THE AIRLOCK SIDE LEVER. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED 153436 1 11 FOR ONE FLIGHT. DURING FLIGHT 11 PROCESSING FLOW, THE ACTUATOR (AN LRU 153436 1 12 ) WAS REMOVED AND A REPLACEMENT OBTAINED. THE REPLACEMENT WAS INSPECTE 153436 1 13 D AND FOUND TO HAVE THE PROBLEM OF THE LOCK LEVER ON THE AIRLOCK SIDE 153436 1 14 OF THE ACTUATOR NOT FULLY ACTUATING THE LEVER ON THE PLB SIDE (ITEM 3 153436 1 15 PG 1B). THIS ACTUATOR WAS THEN ROUTED TO THE NASA SHUTTLE LOGISTICS DE 153436 1 16 POT (NSLD) FOR REPAIR. THE ACTUATOR WAS THEN RETURNED AND INSTALLED, W 153436 1 17 ITH NOMINAL FUNCTIONAL RETEST PERFORMED PER STEP 47. PROBABLE CAUSE OF 153436 1 18 ITEM 1 AND 2 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 3 IS 153436 1 19 REPLACEMENT ACTUATOR WAS IMPROPERLY RIGGED. ITEM 4 CAUSE IS IMPROPER W 153436 1 20 ORDING OF WORK PROCEDURE. ITEM 5 CAUSE IS INSUFFICIENT TIME ALLOWED FO 153436 1 21 R CURE PRIOR TO DELIVERY TO KSC, CURE COMPLETED AT KSC. ITEMS 4 AND 5 153436 1 22 REQUIRED NO RETEST. ITEMS 1, 2 AND 3 RETESTED PER STEP 47. RC ACTION F 153436 1 23 OR ITEM 2 IS REDESIGN ACTUATOR LOCKING MECHANISM (REF MCR 11987R3). 153537 1 1 THE BOLTS NOTED IN STEP 4.0 OF STR-3-07317 HAVE BEEN TORQUED. 153595 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: R/H WING TIP DID NOT HAVE RTV AT 23 SPAR FITTING 153595 1 2 INSULATOR INTERFACE. THE INSULATOR WAS REMOVED AND RTV APPLICATION HAS 153595 1 3 BEEN COMPLETED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DISCREPANCY WAS A DESIGN 153595 1 4 DEFICIENCY. ITEM 2 PAGE 1A: R/H RIB SPLICE 23 SPAR FITTING INSULATOR 153595 1 5 V070-190193-002 COULD NOT BE REINSTALLED BECAUSE THE (2) OUTBOARD SPAR 153595 1 6 FITTING BOLTS COULD NOT BE TORQUED TO DRAWING SPECS WHILE THE WING TIP 153595 1 7 INSULATOR, TILE EXTENSION BOX, AND TILE WERE INSTALLED. THE SPAR FITTING 153595 1 8 INSULATOR AND THE SPAR FITTING WERE REWORKED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR 153595 1 9 DISPOSITION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DISCREPANCY WAS A DESIGN 153595 1 10 DEFICIENCY. ITEM 3 PAGE 1B: AREAS OF CORROSION WERE FOUND WHEN SPAR 153595 1 11 FITTING AND INSULATOR AT RIB SPLICE 23 WERE REMOVED. THE CORROSION PITS 153595 1 12 WERE BURNISHED AND CORROSION PROTECTED FOR UNRESTRICTED PER MR 153595 1 13 DISPOSITION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DISCREPANCY WAS OPERATIONAL 153595 1 14 DEGRADATION/ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. ITEM 4 PAGE 1C: CORROSION WAS UNABLE 153595 1 15 TO BE REMOVED FROM UNDER FASTENER HEADS WHEN THE FASTENERS WERE 153595 1 16 INSTALLED. RIVETS WERE REMOVED AND CORROSION WAS REMOVED FROM AROUND THE 153595 1 17 RIVET HEADS AND IN THE COUNTERSINKS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR 153595 1 18 DISPOSITION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DISCREPANCY WAS OPERATIONAL 153595 1 19 DEGRADATION/ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. ITEM 5 PAGE 1D: THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A 153595 1 20 "PROCEDURAL ERROR" WITH RESPECT TO THE DISCREPANCY ON PAGE 1C. BLOCK 30 153595 1 21 REFERRED PAGE 14.2 FOR DISPO; SHOULD HAVE BEEN 14.4. DISPOSITION, AS 153595 1 22 WRITTEN, CORRECTLY ADDRESSES PAGE 1C. ITEM 6, PAGE 1D: THIS ITEM 153595 1 23 DOCUMENTS THAT EXCESSIVE MATERIAL HAD BEEN REMOVED AS A RESULT OF 153595 1 24 BURNISHING AND REQUIRED FURTHER ENGINEERING EVALUATION BEFORE 153595 1 25 PROCEEDING. STR ENG LOOKED AT AREA AND THE OKAY TO PROCEED WAS GIVEN. NO 153595 1 26 DISCREPANCY EXISTS. ITEM 7 PAGE 1E: KOROPON HAD BEEN APPLIED TO RIVET 153595 1 27 HEADS AND CORROSION PITS WITHOUT DOCUMENTATION. STEP 22.0 WAS BOUGHT 153595 1 28 OFF. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DISCREPANCY WAS WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 8 PAGE 153595 1 29 1F: EXCESSIVE MATERIAL WAS REMOVED FROM (3) RIVETS WHILE BURNISHING OUT 153595 1 30 CORROSION, RESULTING IN GROUND DOWN RIVET HEADS. THE RIVETS WERE 153595 1 31 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR DISPOSITION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 153595 1 32 THE DISCREPANCY WAS UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. ITEM 9 PAGE 1G: RIVETS INSTALLED 153595 1 33 BY STEP 25.0 HAD EXCESS AMOUNT OF GAP BETWEEN HEAD OF RIVET AND VEHICLE 153595 1 34 SKIN. THE GAP WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR DISPOSITION. THE 153595 1 35 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DISCREPANCY WAS UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. NO FURTHER 153595 1 36 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 153651 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED WHILE RUNNING V1164 (ELEVON COVE SECONDARY SEAL 153651 1 2 LEAK CHECK TEST) ON THE L/H INBOARD ELEVON WHICH RESULTED IN AN UNSATI 153651 1 3 SFACTORY LEAK RATE. SIX LOCATIONS ON THE INBOARD ELEVON HAD LEAK PATHS 153651 1 4 . THE AREAS WERE SEALED EITHER PER PRINT OR MR ACTION, AND THE LEAK TE 153651 1 5 ST RUN AGAIN. THE REPAIR/LEAK TEST SCENARIO WAS CONTINUED UNTIL A SATI 153651 1 6 SFACTORY LEAK RATE WAS OBTAINED. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED AN 153651 1 7 D THIS PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 153736 1 1 DURING INSPECTION OF ENG #2 DOME HEAT SHIELD NUTPLATES PER V41-10016, 153736 1 2 THE RETAINER OF THE NOTED NUTPLATE WAS BROKEN. THE NUTPLATE WAS ORIGIN 153736 1 3 ALLY INSTALLED PER AN MANUFACTURING MR (MRD-BE9448-000M). THIS PR R&R' 153736 1 4 D THE NUTPLATE RETURNING IT TO THE ORIGINAL MR CONDITION. 153781 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: REMOVED AND REPLACED THE DISCREPANT CENTER HINGE'S CENT 153781 1 2 ER SEAL. VISUAL INSPECTION SHOWED NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF A LEAK PATH (SEE 153781 1 3 PAGE 2). PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN - FRSI MOD TO PROTECT THE SEALS. ITEM 153781 1 4 S 2 AND 3 PAGE 1: MR UNRESTRICTED ACCEPTANCE OF THE (2) ACTUATOR HINGE 153781 1 5 S SIDE SEALS P/N V070-198383-001 AND -002 AS ARE (SEE PAGE 4) PROBABLE 153781 1 6 CAUSE: DESIGN - FRSI MOD TO PROTECT THE SEALS AND PROCESSING/WEAR. 153949 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES LISTED ON PGS. 1 THRU 1E HAVE BE 153949 1 2 EN ACCEPTED AS IS OR RESOLVED BY THE FOLLOWING MR 153949 1 3 DISPOs. DEFECTS 1.1 & 3.3 WERE REBONDED. FOR DEF 153949 1 4 ECTS 5.3 & 7.1, RTV WAS REMOVED FROM HI-LOKS. DEF 153949 1 5 ECT 4.4 WAS A VOID THAT WAS VENTED. AFTER INVESTI 153949 1 6 GATION, DEFECTS 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 & 9.1 WERE FOUND TO 153949 1 7 HAVE NO DEBONDS & ACCEPTED AS IS. FOR DEFECTS 3.1 153949 1 8 , 6.2, 7.2, 10.1, 11.1 & 11.3, DEBONDS WERE < .25" 153949 1 9 & ACCEPTED AS IS. GAP AT DEFECT 4.2 WAS FILLED W 153949 1 10 / RTV & ACCEPTED AS IS. MISSING PIECE AT DEFECT 6 153949 1 11 .1 WAS .25" & FILLED W/ RTV & ACCEPTED AS IS. EDG 153949 1 12 E DISTANCE WAS ACCEPTED AS IS AT DEFECTS 3.2, 4.1, 153949 1 13 4.3, 5.1, 5.2, 7.3, 8.1, 10.2, 11.2 & 12.1. AFTE 153949 1 14 R REINSP, DEFECT 14 WAS ACCEPTED AS IS. DESIGN IN 153949 1 15 TENT OF THE RTV HEAT SINK INSTL'N HAS BEEN MAINTAI 153949 1 16 NED. 153970 1 1 FASTENER HEADS HAD BEEN PROTRUDING BEYOND INSTLN R 153970 1 2 EQ'MTS OF .020" TO STRUCTURE SURFACE. THE CROWN HE 153970 1 3 ADS PORTION OF THESE FASTENERS WERE SHAVED REDUCIN 153970 1 4 G THEM TO WITHIN INSTLN REQ'MTS. FASTENERS NOW MEE 153970 1 5 T THE INSTLN DESIGN INTENT. CLOSE PR. 154082 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: THE V070-565316-001 RETAINER SET WAS FOUND TO NOT BE 154082 1 2 DRILLED FOR BAGGIE RETAINERS. THIS WAS DUE TO V070-565316-001 RETAINERS 154082 1 3 BEING REPLACED THIS FLOW. NUTPLATES WERE INSTALLED PER THIS PR STEPS 1 - 154082 1 4 10. PROBABLE CAUSE IS PROCEDURE ERROR. ITEM 2 PAGE 1A: GAP BETWEEN 154082 1 5 RETAINERS V070-851039-005 AND -006 WAS FOUND TO BE .040 WHEN DWG 154082 1 6 REQUIRES .12 +/-.03. THIS GAP WAS MR ACCEPTED PER PAGE 5. PROBABLE CAUSE 154082 1 7 IS TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. ITEM 3 PAGE 1B: STEP 15 WAS ADDED TO ALLOW A 154082 1 8 BIGGER GAP BETWEEN REMAINING RETAINERS DUE TO SMALLER GAP. THIS WAS NOT 154082 1 9 REQUIRED AND IS DELETED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NO DISCREPANCY. 154082 1 10 154152 1 1 AS DESCRIBED IN THE MR RATIONAL THE CENTERLINE ROL 154152 1 2 LERS THAT THIS PR IS AGAINST ARE MR OK AS IS FOR 154152 1 3 UNRESTRICTED USE. 154536 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1-INSERTS AT FWD INBOARD AND FWD OUTBOARD HOLES WERE CLEA 154536 1 2 NED OUT USING A TAP AND WIRE BRUSH. FWD OUTBOARD INSERT CLEANED UP GOO 154536 1 3 D. FWD INBOARD INSERT REMAINED GALLED, SO PAGE 1A WAS WRITTEN. ITEMS 2 154536 1 4 AND 3, PAGE 1A-INSERTS AT FWD I/B AND AFT I/B HOLES WERE REMOVED AND 154536 1 5 REPLACED. ITEM 4, PAGE 1B-NEW INSERTS AT FWD I/B AND AFT I/B HOLES WER 154536 1 6 E DISCREPANT SO INSERTS WERE AGAIN REMOVED AND REPLACED. ITEM 5, PAGE 154536 1 7 1C-NEW INSERTS AT FWD I/B AND AFT I/B HOLES WERE CLEANED OUT USING A T 154536 1 8 AP AND WIRE BRUSH. BOLTS WERE FIT-CHECKED AND THREADS WERE INSPECTED A 154536 1 9 ND VERIFIED TO BE GOOD. THIS RETURNS THIS INSTALLATION TO PRINT CONFIG 154536 1 10 URATION. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP. 154553 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SPAR INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCK 154553 1 2 WELL SERVICE CENTER AND IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 154580 1 1 THE MIS-ID'D OCN NUMBER ON THE L/H OUTBOARD ELEVON CARRIER PANEL HAS B 154580 1 2 EEN RE-ID'D PER RI/CVAS DIRECTION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS A MIS-ID'D PA 154580 1 3 RT NUMBER OBTAINED FROM THE VENDOR. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED 154580 1 4 AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 154634 1 1 THE SCRATCHES REPORTED ON PAGE 1 WERE LESS THAN 0.0007 IN. IN DEPTH, A 154634 1 2 ND WERE REMOVED BY LIGHTLY SANDING WITH 600 GRIT WET SANDPAPER. THE S 154634 1 3 URFACE WAS THEN CORROSION PROTECTED. THE HATCH COLLAR SEALING SURFACE 154634 1 4 IS NOW RETURNED TO A NOMINAL CONDITION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE SCR 154634 1 5 ATCHES WAS MOVEMENT OF GSE INTO AND/OR OUT OF THE AIRLOCK. THE DISCRE 154634 1 6 PANCY IS RESOLVED, AND NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. REPAIR WAS MR'S FOR UNR 154634 1 7 ESTRICTED USE. 155118 1 1 THE REMOVED ROLLAROUND WHEEL/TIRE ASSEMBLY W/ THE 155118 1 2 CUT IN THE TIRE WILL BE ROUTED TO THE WHEEL/TIRE 155118 1 3 SHOP (PER STEP 26) WHERE IT WILL BE DISASSEMBLED, 155118 1 4 TIRE SCRAPPED AND A NEW ROLLAROUND TIRE INSTALLED 155118 1 5 FOR ROLLAROUND USE. ALL 4 ROLLAROUND WHEEL/TIRE AS 155118 1 6 SEMBLIES PRESNTLY INSTALLED (FOLLOWING COMPLETION 155118 1 7 OF ABOVE STEPS) WILL BE REMOVED AT VLS FOR FLT MLG 155118 1 8 WHEEL/TIRE ASSY INSTALLATION. 155138 1 1 OMRSD V45AJ0.100 REQUIRES A MASS SPEC LK CK OF THE 155138 1 2 FUEL CELL END PLATE INSULATOR AT THE PWR SECTION 155138 1 3 AND ACCESSORY SECTION I/F. THE ALLOWABLE LEAKAGE 155138 1 4 PER OMRDS IS 1.0 X 10 EXP -7 SCCS (INDICATED). TH 155138 1 5 E MASS SPEC OF ABOVE LISTED LOCATION WAS PERFORMED 155138 1 6 PER PR FCP-3-07-0070 ATTACHMENT J STEP 3 ON FUEL 155138 1 7 CELL #2. THE LK RATE WAS 1.17 X 10(-6) SCCS (INDI 155138 1 8 CATED). THE ALLOWABLE LK RATE IS MUCH TOO TIGHT F 155138 1 9 OR THE AREA OF CONCERN. THE VENDOR (IFC) AND ROCK 155138 1 10 WELL HAVE DETERMINED A MORE REALISTIC NUMBER FOR T 155138 1 11 HE ALLOWABLE LEAKAGE AT THE NOTED LOCATION OF 1.0 155138 1 12 X 10 EXP -4 SCCS (INDICATED) PER RCN OV7157. CLOS 155138 1 13 E THIS PR UPON RECEIPT OF RCN OV7157. (ATTACH COP 155138 1 14 Y OF RCN) 155334 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 155334 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 155334 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 155334 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 155334 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 155334 1 6 7-103-C1). THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 155400 1 1 THE V070-194102-002 CARRIER PNL WAS FOUND TO BE LO 155400 1 2 OSE DUE TO A DISCREPANT GUIDE PIN V070-194107-001 155400 1 3 A NEW GUIDE PIN WAS CANNABALIZED BY VSTE-4-03-183 155400 1 4 FOR USE ON OV-103 AND A NEW PIN WAS ORDERED FOR OV 155400 1 5 -104. THE BAD PIN WAS ROUTED FOR SCRAPPING. THIS L 155400 1 6 EAVES THE CARRIER PNL GUIDE PIN COMBINATION AVAILA 155400 1 7 BLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. EXISTING MOVEMENT IS PER 155400 1 8 PRINT. CLOSE PR. 155553 1 1 PRIOR TO INSTALLING THE R/H #6 LOWER LESS CARRIER PANEL, CLOSE OUT INS 155553 1 2 PECTION BEHINE PANEL #6 REVEALED DISCREPANT LOCKWIRE INSTALLATION AT T 155553 1 3 HREE LOCATIONS, THE UPPER FWD, UPPER AFT, AND LOWER AFT ATTACH POINTS. 155553 1 4 THE UPPER LESS C/P AND SPAR INSULATOR WAS REMOVED AND THE LOCKWIRES W 155553 1 5 ERE R&R'D. SPAR INSULATOR AND UPPER CARRIER PANEL WERE THEN REINSTALLE 155553 1 6 D. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 155569 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF AN UPPER AFT TAILCONE FITTING STRUCTURAL BOLT SHANK 155569 1 2 ING OUT, IDENTIFIED AS ITEM 1.0 OF THIS PR, WAS SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED 155569 1 3 AFTER DEVIATIONS WERE WRITTEN TO PROVIDE PROPER GRIP THROUGH USE OF WA 155569 1 4 SHERS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS INCORRECT CALLOUTS ON JOB CARD. 155734 1 1 DISCREPANCIES 1 THRU 4 WERE RESOLVED BY UNRESTRICTED MRB DISPOSITION 155734 1 2 AS FOLLOWS: DISCREPANCY 1: REQ'D DRILLING A HOLE IN THE BRACKET TO MA 155734 1 3 TCH HOLE IN FRAME WEB (STEP 19.0). DISCREPANCY 2: REQ'D FILLING THE 155734 1 4 ORIGINAL LOWER I/B HOLES WITH RIVETS AND PICKING UP AN ADD'L HOLE FROM 155734 1 5 THE WEB (STEPS 11.0 THRU 17.0). DISCREPANCY 3: REQ'D SANDING OFF THE 155734 1 6 HIGH SPOTS AND RE-PAINTING (STEP 10.0). DISCREPANCY 4: REQ'D INSTALL 155734 1 7 ATION OF A FLUSH RIVET IN THE UNUSED HOLE (STEPS 21.2 & 21.3). 155734 1 8 THE ABOVE DISCREPANCIES RESULTED FROM RI ENGINEERING TO PICK UP EXISTI 155734 1 9 NG HOLES WHEN THOSE HOLES WERE MISLOCATED. (REF DWG V070-346048 Z 134 155734 1 10 F). 155807 1 1 THE SEALS ON THE 50-2 ACCESS DOOR HAVE BEEN REBONDED OR POTTED PER THI 155807 1 2 S MR DISPOSITION USING MB0130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE. USE OF THESE SEALS 155807 1 3 WILL NOT HINDER THE DESIGN INTENT OF THE SEAL INSTALLATION. THE PROBA 155807 1 4 BLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE IS THE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF THE DOOR ON A R 155807 1 5 EGULAR BASIS. 156049 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN ON THE SHANK LENTH OF THE MD112-3003-0544 & -0550 156049 1 2 BOLTS USED TO INSTALL THE LESS CARRIER PANELS. THE -0544 & -0550 BOLTS 156049 1 3 ARE 2.750 & 3.125 LONG RESPECTIVELY. THIS PR WAS GENERATED WHEN IT WA 156049 1 4 S NOTICED THAT NOT ONLY DID THESE FULLY THREADED BOLTS ( AS NOTED IN T 156049 1 5 HE TITLE OF THESE BOLTS IN THE STANDARD PART SPEC) HAVE SHANKS BUT THE 156049 1 6 SHANKS WERE NOT UNIFORM THROUGHOUT THE BOLTS. IF FURTHER RESEARCH INT 156049 1 7 O THE APPARENT BOLT SHANK PROBLEM HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED ONE WOULD HAVE 156049 1 8 NOTICED NOTE 2 ON THE 2ND PAGE OF THE 2 PAGE SPEC THAT STATES: "FOR S 156049 1 9 CREWS 2 INCHES LONG OR SHORTER, COMPLETE THREADS SHALL EXTEND TO WITHI 156049 1 10 N 2 THREDS OF BEARING SURFACE HEAD. SCREWS OF LONGER LENGTH (OUR PARTI 156049 1 11 CULAR CASE) SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM COMPLETE THREAD LENGTH OF 1.750 INCHE 156049 1 12 S" AND THIS PR WOULD HAVE NEVER BEEN GENERATED. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS 156049 1 13 HERE AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 156197 1 1 LOCKING COLLAR WAS FOUND TO HAVE DISTORTED METAL. THE DISCREPANT LOCKI 156197 1 2 NG COLLAR WAS REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 156627 1 1 H2 TANK 1 RELIEF VLV TEST WAS PERFORMED 4 TIMES TO 156627 1 2 FIND POSSIBLE FAULT WITH GSE TEST GAGE,THE RESULTS 156627 1 3 INDICATE GSE TEST GAGE READING CORRECTLY. 156627 1 4 H2 TANK 2 RV IS CRACKING AT 298 PSIG. S/B 302-310 156627 1 5 PSIG PER OMRSD V45AR.020 156627 1 6 H2 TANK 2 RV TEST WILL BE REPERFORMED PER V1022 156627 1 7 STS-25(PRIOR TO FLT25) 156770 1 1 H2 TANK 2 JUNCTION BOX PROTECTIVE FAIRING CRACK RE 156770 1 2 PAIREDUSING FIBERGLASS & RESIN REAPIR. PART MR ID 156770 1 3 'D & REINSTALLED PER DWG. PART RESTORED TO DESIGN 156770 1 4 INTENT. SYS RESTORED. 156845 1 1 THE THREAD PROTRUSION DISCREPANCIES WERE ALLEVIATED BY REMOVING THE WA 156845 1 2 SHERS UNDER THE GUIDE PIN NUTS, PER MR ACTION. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIE 156845 1 3 S EXIST. ROUTE TO PMRB FOR APPROVAL. 156945 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WHICH DOCUMENTED WASHER RIDINGIN RADIUS AND NOT FLUSH 156945 1 2 TO FRAME WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE WASHER AND ADDING AN MR RADIUS 156945 1 3 BLOCK. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A, WHICH DOCUMENTED INDENTATION IN STRUCTURE WHER 156945 1 4 E WASHER WAS IN RADIUS WAS MINOR (0.005" DEEP MAX) AND WAS SMOOTHED IN 156945 1 5 TO ADJACENT STRUCTURE PER MR DISPO. ITEMS 1 & 2 HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AND 156945 1 6 NO LONGER EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: IMPROPER INSTALLATION DURING MANUFAC 156945 1 7 TURING. 156971 1 1 CABLES WERE FABRICATED PER DRAWING #SK-CS-001 156971 1 2 SHEETS 1 THRE 23. CONNECTOR MS3116P-12-IOP WITH 156971 1 3 PORTABLE BACKSHELL SP06SP-12-IOP REPLACED WITH 156971 1 4 LIKE CONNECTOR AND NON-PORTABLE BACKSHELL 156971 1 5 MS312OF-12-IOP AND CONNECTOR MS3116P-4-35 WITH 156971 1 6 PORTABLE BACKSHELL SP06P-4-35 REPLACED WITH LIKE 156971 1 7 CONNECTOR AND PORTABLE BACKSHELL MS312OF-4-35 157211 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 157211 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 157211 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 157211 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 157211 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 157211 1 6 7-103-C1) 157275 1 1 THE OUTBOARD ELEVON ACTUATOR ACCESS PANEL WAS INSTALLED WITH WASHERS B 157275 1 2 ENEATH THE FASTENERS HEADS (NOT PER PRINT). UPON REMOVA; OF THE WASHER 157275 1 3 S AND INCEASING THE BOLT LENGTHS ONE GRIP ( PER PRINT & SPE MAO101-301 157275 1 4 ) THE PROPER THREAD PROTRUSION WAS ACHEIVED. NO MR REQUIRED ALL OF THE 157275 1 5 FASTENERS ARE INSTALLED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST & T 157275 1 6 HE PR CAN CLOSE. CLOSE THIS PR. 157324 1 1 THE V070-198535-001 BLOCK SEAL WAS FOUND TO HAVE AN INCISION IN THE SI 157324 1 2 LICONE RUB SURFACE. THE SEAL WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW SEAL AND THE OLD 157324 1 3 SEAL WAS ROUTED TO HDA FOR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY 157324 1 4 IS POOR MANUFACTURING WORKMANSHIP. RECEIVED FROM VENDOR IN THIS CONDI 157324 1 5 TION. PART NEVER INSTALLED. 157359 1 1 PG. 1A WAS DISPO'D FIRST TO CNTR THE CNTR STRAP BE 157359 1 2 FORE RE-DRILLING THE ELONGATED HOLE, ITEM 1 PG. 1. 157359 1 3 THE ELONGATED HOLE WAS REAMED TO 5/16" (.3125) I 157359 1 4 N THE INTERCOSTAL & CHNL, WHILE THE V070-346091-04 157359 1 5 4 SPLICE WAS REPLACED. ME112-0013-1005 SCREW & MD 157359 1 6 114-1001-0006 NUT WAS INSTL'D IN THE OVERSIZED HOL 157359 1 7 E WHICH WILL ALLOW THE CONNECTION OF THE CHNL , (S 157359 1 8 TRAP) SPLICE & INTERCOSTAL. 157392 1 1 ITEM 1: SEAL IS DEBONDED AT SPLICE AND SPLICE IS NOT CENTERED. Xo1198 157392 1 2 LH SEAL WAS REBONDED PER STEP 2 PER PRINT. ITEM 2: SEAL IS CRUSHED AND 157392 1 3 DEBONDED Xo1090 LH SEAL WAS REBONDED PER STEP 2. CRUSHED PORTION MR A 157392 1 4 CCEPTED. ITEM 3: SEAL IS DEBONDED AND SCREEN IS NOT ALOGN THE ENTIRE L 157392 1 5 ENGTH OF SPLICE. Xo693 LH INSPECTION PER STEP 1 OF THIS PR REVEALS THA 157392 1 6 T NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS AT THIS LOCATION. ITEM 4: FWD END OF AFT SEAL 157392 1 7 IS DEBONDED Xo790 LH SEAL WAS REBONDED PER STEP 2. ITEM 5: THE V070-39 157392 1 8 8558-040 SEAL IS 3.41" LONG AND SHOULD BE 3.61" LONG. MR ACCEPTED AS I 157392 1 9 S. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE DISCREPANCIES WERE PROBABLY CAUSED BY NORMAL WE 157392 1 10 AR AND TEAR. 157443 1 1 DISCREPANT INSULATOR HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUF- 157443 1 2 ACTURER SPECIFICATION. CLOSE PR 157506 1 1 THE INTERFERRING SHIM WAS REMOVED AND REBONDED IN A NEW POSITION ALLEV 157506 1 2 IATING THE INTERFERENCE PROBLEM PER AN E.O.T.F. THE SHIM HAS BEEN BOND 157506 1 3 ED IN ITS NEW POSITION PER THE E.O. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST & T 157506 1 4 HIS PR CAN CLOSE. CLOSE THIS PR. 157511 1 1 DISCREPANT CLOSEOUTS IN ITEM 182 WERE REMOVED. NEW CLOSEOUTS WERE BOND 157511 1 2 ED AT THIS LH Xo1264.20 LOCATION ON LONGERON SILL RETURNING AREA TO PR 157511 1 3 INT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE WORKMANSHIP. 157582 1 1 DURING INSTL'N OF L.E.S.S. C/Ps SHIMS DEBONDED FROM LWR SIDE OF C/Ps. 157582 1 2 SHIMS WERE REINSTL'D & RTN'D TO DWG INSTL'N RQMTS. 157729 1 1 THE TWO DISCREPANT FASTENERS WERE REPLACED WITH FASTENERS WHICH PROVID 157729 1 2 E PROPER THREAD PROTRUSION. THE V070-198200 DRAWING WAS CHANGED BY E.O 157729 1 3 . TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE IN HARDWARE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY I 157729 1 4 S IMPROPER HARDWARE CALLOUT ON DRAWING. 157842 1 1 THE LH ET DOOR AFT READY TO LATCH PADDLE WAS FOUND SLIGHTLY JAMMED IN 157842 1 2 THE ACTUATED (DEPRESSED) POSITION DURING STS29R ET DOOR FUNCTIONAL. TH 157842 1 3 IS PROBLEM IS FAIRLY COMMON AND IS ATTRIBUTED TO ET FERRY DOOR VIBRATI 157842 1 4 ON DURING FERRY FLIGHT WHICH DEFORMS ROTATING BEARING SURFACES. THE PR 157842 1 5 OBLEM WAS DEFERRED TO THIS FLIGHT (STS33) AND THE LH AFT UPLOCK LATCH 157842 1 6 WAS REMOVED FROM THE SHIP AND REBUILT WITH A NEW PADDLE ARM, BRASS BUS 157842 1 7 HNG AND LAMINATED WASHERS. DURING REASSEMBLY, THE NEW PADDLE ARM SHAFT 157842 1 8 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A DAMAGED THREAD (PAGE 1A) SO THE PADDLE ASSEMBLY A 157842 1 9 ND NUT WERE REPLACED WITH NEW PARTS AND THE LATCH ASSEMBLY WAS REINSTA 157842 1 10 LLED IN THE SHIP. 2 MOUNTING SCREWS WERE SLIGHTLY ROUNDED AND WERE REP 157842 1 11 LACED (PAGE 1B ITEM 3). PAGE 1B, ITEM 4 RESULTED FROM A MISUNDERSTANDI 157842 1 12 NG ABOUT WHERE TO APPLY A FILLET SEAL AND WAS RESOLVED THROUGH A VERBA 157842 1 13 L EXPLANATION OF A DRAWING CALLOUT. THE LATCH ASSEMBLY WAS SUCCESSFULL 157842 1 14 Y RETESTED PER TPS MEQ-3-09-156 (LATCH PULL TEST) AND V1097 (ET DOOR F 157842 1 15 UNCTIONAL). NO FURTHER PROBLEM EXISTS WITH THE LH AFT LATCH ASSY. PROB 157842 1 16 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION ACCELLERATED BY LAMINATED SHIM DES 157842 1 17 IGN AND FERRY FLIGTH DAMAGE. 158164 1 1 THE CRACK IN THE SKIN OF PAYLOAD BAY DOOR #5 WAS PATCHED/SEALED USING 158164 1 2 STRUCTURAL ADHESIVE PER MR APPROVAL. THE DOOR'S STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY W 158164 1 3 AS RETAINED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING 158164 1 4 IS REQUIRED AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 158325 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE 158325 1 2 PEELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD 158325 1 3 BEARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION 158325 1 4 . THE SHIM(S) WERE CENTERED OVER THE BOLT HOLES P 158325 1 5 ER MR ACTION TO RESOLVE THE MISALIGNMENT PROBLEM. 158325 1 6 R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATT 158325 1 7 ACHING HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR 158325 1 8 #5121-87-103-C1). 158385 1 1 ITEM 1.0 OF THIS PR HAS BEEN TRANSFERREDTO PR STR-3-11-3347 PAGE 1B AL 158385 1 2 ONG WITH OTHER DISCREPANT STRUTS IN THE RIGHT WING (REF ATTACHED COPY 158385 1 3 OF STR-3-11-3347). THIS TRANSFER WILL KEEP THE DISCREPANT STRUTS IN TH 158385 1 4 E RIGHT WING TOGETHER WHICH WILL MAKE THEM EASIER TO ADDRESS SINCE THE 158385 1 5 Y ALL HAVE SIMILAR PROBLEMS. 158389 1 1 THE 2 HI-LOKS ARE MADE OF A-286 CORROSION & HEAT RESISTANT STEEL & THE 158389 1 2 REFORE WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO CORROSION. THE APPARENT RESIDUE APPEARS 158389 1 3 AS MERELY A STAIN ON THE SURFACE WHICH IS A NRL COND FOR SURFACE EXPO 158389 1 4 SED TO SUCH ELEVATED TEMPS. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS SO THE PR CAN BE CLO 158389 1 5 SED. 158703 1 1 THE AREAS REFERENCED IN ATTACHEMENT A (KAPTON TAPE APPLIED OVER PAINT 158703 1 2 PEELED AN BLISTERED IN MIDBODY AROUND SILL AREA) HAVE BEEN REPAINTED P 158703 1 3 ER V070-362001 E.O. B02. CERTAIN LOCATIONS, PER PAGE 7.1, HAD ONE COAT 158703 1 4 OF PAINT UNDERNEATH THE PEELED PAINT. NO REPAINTING WAS NECESSARY IN 158703 1 5 THESE LOCATIONS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE PEELED AND BLISTERED PAINT 158703 1 6 WAS IMPROPER SURFACE PREPARATION DURING THE ORIGINAL PAINTING PROCESS. 158794 1 1 THE RAISED AREA OF THE FLIPPER DOOR RUB PANEL, V070-198801-056, IDENTI 158794 1 2 FIED IN ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE RAISED AREA AND COA 158794 1 3 TING THE EXPOSED INCONEL WITH MB0125-063 HIGH TEMPERATURE COATING AND 158794 1 4 MR ACCEPTING THE RUB PANEL AS REWORKED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE PROBA 158794 1 5 BLE CAUSE OF THE DING IS WORKMANSHIP. CONCLUDE THAT THE RUB PANEL IS A 158794 1 6 CCEPTABLE AS REPAIRED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 159297 1 1 SCRATCH WAS MR'D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CORROSION P 159297 1 2 ROTECTION OF BARED METAL HAS BEEN CORROSION PROTEC 159297 1 3 TED AS PART OF TILE CAVITY PROPS ON PR LWNG-3-07-1 159297 1 4 121 MR ACCEPTS SCRATCH AS NOT VIOLATING DESIGN INT 159297 1 5 ENT OF VEHICLE SKID. CAUSE: TILE REMOVAL WORKMANSH 159297 1 6 IP. 159317 1 1 ITEMS 1.0, 2.0, AND 3.0: TWO MD111-4024-0506 AND ONE MD111-4024-0606 B 159317 1 2 OLTS WERE FOUND WITH GAPS UNDER THE HEAD. THESE GAPS WERE 0.012" MAX A 159317 1 3 T ONE END AND 0.000 AT THE OPPOSITE END INDICATING THAT THE BOLTS WERE 159317 1 4 COCKED TO ONE SIDE. ENG CALCULATIONS SHOWED A MAX MISALIGNMENT OF LES 159317 1 5 S THAN 1.5 DEG. THE ONE EACH MD153-0014-000X SELF-ALIGNING WASHERS ISN 159317 1 6 TALLED UNDER THE BOLT HEADS WILL CORRECT SUCH MISALIGNMENT. THESE WASH 159317 1 7 ERS ARE DESIGNED TO CORRECT ANGULAR MISALIGNMENT UP TO 8 DEG AND WITHS 159317 1 8 TAND UP TO 180 KSI OF TENSILE STRENGTH WHICH IS MORE THAN THE 120 KSI 159317 1 9 THAT THE BOLTS ARE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND. LONGER GRIP BOLTS WERE INSTA 159317 1 10 LLED IN PLACE OF THE PER PRINTBOLTS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE THICKER SELF-A 159317 1 11 LIGNING WASHERS. THE MD153-5004-0005 AND MD153-5006-0006 COUNTERSUNK W 159317 1 12 ASHERS THAT ARE INSTALLED UNDER THE BOLT HEADS PER PRINT WERE REMOVED. 159317 1 13 THE INSTALLED MD153-0014-0005 AND -0006 SELF ALIGHING WASHERS ARE COU 159317 1 14 NTERSUNK AND THUS PRESERVING THE DESIGN INTENT OF THE ORIGINAL WASHERS 159317 1 15 . THESE MR REPAIRS HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. REF ATTACH 159317 1 16 MENT "B" FOR MR LOCATIONS AND HARDWARE SUBSTITUTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: 159317 1 17 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 159382 1 1 THREAD DAMAGE IN HOLES 1 AND 2 OF LH FRAME 1140 WA 159382 1 2 S RESOLVED BY MR DISPO. THE HOLES WERE REAMED TO A 159382 1 3 MAX DIA OF 0.2188. VISUAL & EDDY CURRENT INSPECTI 159382 1 4 ONS CONFIRMED. NO CRACK PRESENT. CLOSE PR. 159392 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT DEGRADING RTV SEALANT AROUND THE LH ML 159392 1 2 G INBOARD TRUNION FITTING/BUSHING (REF ITEM #1). REPLACEMENT RTV (DCQ-28 159392 1 3 17) COULD NOT BE OBTAINED PRIOR TO GEAR RETRACT FOR FLIGHT THEREFORE, TH 159392 1 4 E PR WAS DEFERRED UNTIL FLIGHT 13 (REF MR DEFERRAL RATIONALE, PG 2). THE 159392 1 5 DISCREPANT RTV WAS REMOVED AND A NEW RTV SEAL WAS TOOLED INTO PLACE AROU 159392 1 6 ND THE TRUNION FITTING/BUSHING, THE PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. NO RE 159392 1 7 EST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 159392 1 8 159616 1 1 FUEL CELL #2 O2 SPLY LINE CONNECTION PORT F3 HAS AN INDICATED LEAK RAT 159616 1 2 E OF 2.28 X 10 -7 PWRS SCCS, MAX ALLOWABLE IS 1.0 X 10 -7 PWRS SCCS. T 159616 1 3 HE LINE WAS DEMATED, INTERFACES CLEANED, AND REMATED TWICE. EACH TIME 159616 1 4 THE INDICATED LEAK RATE INCREASED TO 1.4 X 10 -6 PWRS SCCS. THE END FI 159616 1 5 TTING ON THE O2 SPLY LINE V070-454865-126 WAS DEBRAZED AND A NEW END F 159616 1 6 ITTING BRAZED ON THE LINE END. X-RAY RESULTS WERE GOOD. INITIAL MASS S 159616 1 7 PEC LEAK CHECK FAILED WITH AN INDICATED LEAK RATE OF 7.8 X 10 -7 PWRS 159616 1 8 SCCS. THE LINE WAS DEMATED, INSPECTED(NO DAMAGE),CLEANED FACES, AND RE 159616 1 9 MATED, TORQUED AND SAFETY WIRE. SUBSEQUENT MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK WAS SU 159616 1 10 CESSFUL WITH AN INDICATED LEAK OF 4.0 X 10 -9 PWRS SCCSM AT SYSTEM PRE 159616 1 11 SSURE OF 931 PSIA. DISCREPANCY ON PG 1 HAS BEEN CORRECTED AND SYSTEM I 159616 1 12 S FLIGHT WORTHY. R.C.ACTION: EVALUATE AND CO-ORDINATE POTENTIAL CORREC 159616 1 13 TIVE ACTION WITH COGNIZANT DESIGN AGENCY. PMRB REVIEWED THIS PR ON 4-1 159616 1 14 -88 AND DELEGATED CLOSURE APPROVAL TO PMRB CHAIRMAN. "OK TO CLOSE", RO 159616 1 15 N PEEK, SPC PMRB CHAIRMAN. 159815 1 1 ITEM 1; V070-333743-001 STUD BROKEN OFF FROM BRACKET. WINDOW #4 MR STU 159815 1 2 D PLATE ASSEMBLY BONDED TO BRACKET TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM. ITEM 2; V07 159815 1 3 0-333743-001 STUD ASSY IS TOO LONG IN THE V070-339390-004 BRACKET. WIN 159815 1 4 DOW #3 STR-3-07-1266 FABRICATED AN MR STUD ASSY AND INSTALLED IT. COND 159815 1 5 ITION HAS ALREADY BEEN OKAY'D AS IS. ITEM 3; NUT ON STUD (WINDOW #3, I 159815 1 6 TEM 2) BOTTOMS OUT ON SHANK APPROX 1/16" PRIOR TO INTERFACING WITH BRA 159815 1 7 CKET. THE BRACKET ASSY WAS INSTALLED WITH (1) NAS620C10L WASHER UNDER 159815 1 8 THE NUT TO TAKE UP THE EXTRA SPACE PER MR. ITEM 4; UNABLE TO REMOVE BR 159815 1 9 ACKET, WINDOW #4 DUE TO BOTH FASTENER HEADS BEING ROUNDED OUT. ITEM 1 159815 1 10 WAS ORIGINALLY DISPO'D TO REMOVE THE BRACKET AND REPLACE THE STUD BUT 159815 1 11 THIS COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED AND AN MR STUD ASSY WAS BONDED INSTEAD. 159815 1 12 ITEMS 4 WAS PICKED UP WHILE WORKING STEP 1. STEPS 1 - 5 WERE DELETED. 159815 1 13 ITEM 5; PROCESS RTOMI V-9045 ORIGINAL WAS LOST. BEFORE IT WAS FOUND T 159815 1 14 HE SURFACE PREP EXPIRED, AND A NEW RTOMI WAS ISSUED. 159952 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS HOLE IN MONEL SCREEN IS NOT A PR CONDIT 159952 1 2 ION. LSOC/STR AND LSS/RI ENGINEERING EVALUATED THE HOLES IN THE MONEL 159952 1 3 SCREEN AND ALL ARE SMALLER THAN 3/4" DIA. WHICH IS ALLOWED PER PRINT. 159952 1 4 TWISTED CORRUGATED STRIPS, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 2, PAGE 1, ARE NOT DISCR 159952 1 5 EPANT. THE CORRUGATED STRIPS ARE DESIGNED TO BE FLEXIBLE FOR WHEN THE 159952 1 6 CURTAIN MOVES WITH THE ET PLATE. THERE IS NO DAMAGE TO THE MONEL MESH 159952 1 7 WHICH IS GREATER THAN 3/4" DIA. AND THERE ARE NO HOLES UNDER THE SPRIN 159952 1 8 GS WHICH ARE GREATER THAN 1/2". PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. CLOSE 159952 1 9 THIS PR. 160059 1 1 THREE OF THE FOUR DENTS WERE ACCEPTED AS ID PER MR ACTION AFTER APPLYI 160059 1 2 NG HIGH TEMP PAINT. THE FOURTH DENT WAS TRIMMED OUT OF THE RUB PANELS 160059 1 3 FACE SHEET PER MR ACTION. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST ON THIS PR. T 160059 1 4 HE PANEL HAS ALREADY BEEN INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. 160271 1 1 THE V070-396424-001 CARRIER PANEL, OCN#BB8545, WAS CANIBILIZED TO SUPP 160271 1 2 ORT OV-099. SINCE THE C/P WAS NEVER RE-ORDERED A NEW V070-396424-001 C 160271 1 3 /P WAS ORDERED ON THIS PR, THE FASTENER HOLES WERE MATCH DRILLED TO TH 160271 1 4 E VEHICLE CONFIGURATION. (4) OF THE (14) HOLES WERE MISLOCATED. THESE 160271 1 5 HOLES WERE SLOTTED AND MR ACCEPTED UNRESTRICTED. FIVE NEW TILE TRP03-0 160271 1 6 22, AND THE C/P WILL BE INSTALLED PER V80-95962. CLOSE THIS PR. 160345 1 1 PROBLEM DESCRIBED ON PAGE 1 TO PANEL V070-337424-0 160345 1 2 02 OCN J17021. WAS REPAIRED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE F 160345 1 3 OR MR ACTION. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. 160345 1 4 FOR FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 160345 1 5 ENGINEERING NOTE: PANEL HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO RI 160345 1 6 -DWG BY DD1149 FOR CREW ESCAPE SYSTEM MODIFICATION 160345 1 7 S Y MCR 12134. 160378 1 1 DISCREPANCY 1 WAS RESOLVED BY MR DISPOSITION. LH H 160378 1 2 OLES 1,2 & 8 AND RH HOLES 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 & 8 WERE R 160378 1 3 EAMED TO A MAX DIA OF 0.2188. VISUAL AND EDDY CURR 160378 1 4 ENT INSPECTIONS CONFIRMED NO CRACKS WERE PRESENT. 160388 1 1 DURING FLIGHT 10 PROCESSING, THE V070-198313-001 POLYIMIDE SEAL WAS FO 160388 1 2 UND TO BE CHARRED ALONG THE FORWARD EDGE OF THE SEAL. THE DISCREPANT C 160388 1 3 ONDITIION WAS DEFERRED PENDING INBOARD ELEVON PRIMARY SEAL REWORK. DUR 160388 1 4 ING THE FLIGHT 12 REWORK, THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND A NEW SEAL WAS INST 160388 1 5 ALLED PER STR-3-A0144. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 160455 1 1 THE REMOVAL OF THE PREVIOUSLY EXISTING DRAG-ANGLE, REVEALED ALL THE HO 160455 1 2 LES DRILLED THROUGH THE AFT FUSELAGE WERE DRILLED AT AN ANGLE, CAUSING 160455 1 3 THE EXISTING HOLES TO BE ELONGATED. TO CLEAN OUT THE ELONGATIONS, THE 160455 1 4 HOLES HAD TO BE REAMED OVERSIZED, AND OVERSIZED FASTENERS WERE INSTAL 160455 1 5 LED. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED, FASTENERS WERE INSTALLED, ON PR STR-3-07-1 160455 1 6 348 (MR) WHICH INSTALLED THE DOUBLERS, DRAG-ANGLE, WITH NO FURTHER ACT 160455 1 7 ION REQUIRED 160543 1 1 THE PROBLEM OF FAIRING PNL BEING CRACKED BY WASTE 160543 1 2 MGMT COMPARTMENT PARTITION HAS BEEN SOLVED BY ADDI 160543 1 3 NG A SHIM BEHIND THE FAIRING PNL SPT. THIS WILL E 160543 1 4 NABLE PNL TO CLEAR PARTITION. THE CRACK WAS FIXED 160543 1 5 BY STR-3-07-1708. THIS IS SECONDARY STR. 160560 1 1 THE BROWN SPOT ON RCC PANEL #8 RIGHT HAND SIDE MR' 160560 1 2 D OK "AS IS". THE PANEL DOES NOT REQUIRE MR ID. TH 160560 1 3 E PANEL WILL BE INSTLD FOR FLT. PER STR-3-07-1745. 160560 1 4 CLOSE PR. 160739 1 1 A .017 GAP WAS FOUND BETWEEN CARRIER PANEL AND SUBSTRUCTURE AT 2 LOCAT 160739 1 2 IONS. V070-396283-025 SPACERS WERE REPLACED WITH V070-396283-021 SPACE 160739 1 3 RS TO ELIMINATE GAP. A DEV TO V80-95964 J/C WAS WRITTEN TO REFLECT CHA 160739 1 4 NGE BASED ON AUTHORITY OF THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE TOLERANCE BUILDUP. 160933 1 1 REWORK PER PREDEEDING STEPS RETURNS CURTAIN SEAL 160933 1 2 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION 160986 1 1 THE DISCREPACY NOTED ON PAGE 1 HAS BEEN ANNOTATED ON STR-3-07-2502 WIT 160986 1 2 H SIMILAR DISCREPANCES ON OTHER RUB PANELS. THE DISCREPANCY WILL NOT B 160986 1 3 E WORKED ON THIS PR. NO OTHER DISCREPANCY EXIST IN THIS PR. 161111 1 1 PAGE 1 WAS PICKED UP ON L/H AND R/H VENT DOOR 4 AFT HINGES HAVING GAPS 161111 1 2 BETWEEN BUSHINGS AND HINGE. ATTCHMENTS 1 AND 2 WERE WRITTEN TO REMOVE 161111 1 3 AND INSPECT THE HARDWARE. THE V070-384312-001 AND V070-384318-001 BUS 161111 1 4 HINGS WERE FOUND TO BE BINDING IN THE CLEVIS AND IT WAS DECIDED TO REP 161111 1 5 LACE THEM. ATTACHMENTS 3 AND 4 WERE WRITTEN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS AND -00 161111 1 6 1 BUSHINGS WERE ORDERED FROM RI. PAGES 1A AND 1B WERE PICKED UP WHEN T 161111 1 7 HE -001 BUSHINGS RECEIVED FROM RI WERE BINDING AND SEVERAL WOULD NOT F 161111 1 8 IT INTO THE VEHICLE CLEVISES. ATTACHMENT "VEHICLE CLEVIS BUSHING CHECK 161111 1 9 " WAS WRITTEN WHICH INSPECTED AND MEASURED THE CLEVISES AND NONE WERE 161111 1 10 FOUND TO BE UNDERSIZED. A FIT CHECK AGAIN SHOWED THAT THE BUSHINGS WER 161111 1 11 E BINDING AND PAGES 1C AND 1D WERE PICKED UP IDENTICAL TO PAGES 1A AND 161111 1 12 1B. FURTHER INSPECTION OF THE -001 BUSHINGS SHOWED THAT MANY WERE ACT 161111 1 13 UALLY OVERSIZED. AN MR WAS WRITTEN TO ALLOW US TO POLISH THE DRY LUBE. 161111 1 14 LSOC, RI, AND NASA ENGINEERING DECIDED THAT AN EO WAS NEEDED TO BOTH 161111 1 15 V070-384312 AND V070-384318 BUSHINGS TO CHANGE THE OD FROM .3727 (+0.0 161111 1 16 /-0.0005") AND ALSO TO V070-384304 TO ALLOW THE -003 BUSHINGS TO BE IN 161111 1 17 STALLED. EO TO FOLLOW RATIONALE WAS WRITTEN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS AND ALL 161111 1 18 AVAILABLE -001 BUSHINGS WERE SENT TO RI SERVICE CENTER ON PR MEQ-3-07 161111 1 19 -0227 FOR REWORK TO -003 DIMENSIONS. THE NEW -003 BUSHINGS WERE RETURN 161111 1 20 ED TO KSC AND ALL WERE WITHIN SPEC. A FIT CHECK OF THE -003 BUSHINGS I 161111 1 21 N THE VEHICLE SHOWED AND EXCELLANT FIT WITH FREE ROTATION. DOOR INSTAL 161111 1 22 LATION RESUMED IN ATTACHMENTS 3 AND 4 USING THE -003 BUSHINGS AND DOOR 161111 1 23 SET UP WAS PERFORMED. PAGES 1E AND 1F WERE PICKED UP IN STEP 18 OF AT 161111 1 24 TACHMENTS 3 AND 4 RESPECTIVELY BECAUSE THE AFT HINGE GAPS C AND D WERE 161111 1 25 NOT EQUAL WITHIN +/- .005" PER THE INSALLATION AND RIGGING INSTRUCTIO 161111 1 26 NS. THE AFT HINGE GAPS WERE MEASURED AND FOUND TO BE .043"/.072" AND . 161111 1 27 055"/.064" RESPECTIVELY. THIS DIMENSION IS NOT ADJUSTABLE AFTER MANUFA 161111 1 28 CTURE. THESE GAPS ARE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW FOR MOVEMENT AND EXPANSION/C 161111 1 29 ONTRACTION IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. THEREFORE, THIS CONDITION WAS MR'D "ACC 161111 1 30 EPTABLE AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE". PAGE 1G WAS PICKED UP BECAUSE THE 161111 1 31 ELCETRICAL BOND TEST OF THE BOND STRAP ON R/H VENT DOOR 4 WAS OUT OF 161111 1 32 SPEC. ATTACHMENT "ELECTRICAL BOND TEST" WAS WRITTEN TO CORRECT THIS DI 161111 1 33 SCREPANCY AND A RESISTANCE OF 2.38 MILLIOHMS WAS OBTAINED ON RETEST. T 161111 1 34 HE VENT DOOR FUNCTIONAL RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER V1016. THESE DISCREPA 161111 1 35 NCIES NO LONGER EXIST. 161167 1 1 DOUBLER, V070-351902-009 WHICH WAS FOUND MISSING FROM ENGINE #3 R/H DO 161167 1 2 ME HEAT SHIELD DURING FLIGHT 10 PROCESSING AT PAD B, ITEM 1, WAS BONDE 161167 1 3 D IN PLACE USING A MR DOUBLER FOR FLIGHT 10. DOUBLER BOND FAILED LAP S 161167 1 4 HEARS AND WAS DEFERRED RESTRICTED 1 FLIGHT, ITEM 2. DURING FLIGHT 11 P 161167 1 5 ROCESSING, THE DISCREPANT DOUBLER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW PER PRINT DOUB 161167 1 6 LER WAS BONDED IN PLACE. ITEMS 1 & 2 HAVEBEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER 161167 1 7 EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 161355 1 1 26 HOLES ARE ACCEPTABLE AS-IS, ONE HOLE IS ENLARGE 161355 1 2 D TO NEXT LARGER SIZE AND RIVETS INSTALLED IN ALL 161355 1 3 HOLES, MR APPROVED. CLOSE THIS PR. 161424 1 1 BEARING SLEEVE WAS DELIVERED WITH NO PART NUMBER MARKED ON THE COMPONE 161424 1 2 NT. PART NUMBER WAS DETERMINED FROM ATTACHED PAPERWORK AND COMPARISION 161424 1 3 WITHOTHER SLEEVES TO BE USED ON THE SAME INSTALLATION. PART NUMBER WAS 161424 1 4 MARKED ON SLEEVEPER MAO-101-301. 161511 1 1 3 EACH NUTS AT LOCATIONS SHOWN ON PG 1 WERE FOUND TO HAVE LOW RUNNING 161511 1 2 TORQUE. DISCREPANT NUTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER DWG. PROBABLE CA 161511 1 3 USE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 161556 1 1 DISCREPANCY NOTED ON THIS PR HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED PREVIOUSLY IN V5001, 161556 1 2 POST OP 3. INDENTED AREA IS WELL WITHIN SPEC (DEPTH S/B LESS THAN 0.05 161556 1 3 0) PER V56AA0.130, THEREFORE, NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. NO RETEST REQUIR 161556 1 4 ED. 161646 1 1 THE HOLE IN THE INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL 161646 1 2 SERVICE CENTER AND IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 161717 1 1 WHILE WORKING STRUCTURAL INSPECTION F/C V31-15115, THE VISUAL VERIFICA 161717 1 2 TION OF THE AFT CORNER DRAIN HOLES BEING OBSTRUCTED, COULD NOT BE PERF 161717 1 3 ORMED DUE TO TILE INSTALLATION. THE DRAIN HOLE AREAS WERE X-RAYED PER 161717 1 4 V070-3-09-116. NO EVIDENCE OF WATER ACCUMULATION OR OBSTRUCTION WAS FO 161717 1 5 UND. THIS INSPECTION PROVIDED SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE TO EXCEPT DRAIN HO 161717 1 6 LE INSPECTIONS FOR OV-103, FLIGHT 09 (STS-33R) REF EXCEPTION EK1329R1. 161717 1 7 THIS DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 161751 1 1 A FLUSH HEAD HI-LOK, WAS INSTLLAED, WITH EO TO FOLLOW APPROVAL, TO ELI 161751 1 2 MINATE INTERFERANCE WITH THE BRACKET INSTALLED ON TOP OF THE PART. THE 161751 1 3 SUPPORT BRACKET IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT IN THIS CONFIGURATION. UPON 161751 1 4 RECIEPT AND VERIFICATION OF EO TO FOLLOW. 161818 1 1 THIS PR REQUIRES NO DISPOSITION. THE DISCREPANT 161818 1 2 HEAT SINK IN L/H BAY 5, STRINGERS 24/25 (FWD Xo-85 161818 1 3 1, AFT Xo863) WAS REMOVED PER PR STR-3-07-1680. T 161818 1 4 HERE IS NO HEAT SINK REQUIRED IN THIS AREA. 161854 1 1 THE VOID ON THE BORON/ALUMINUM STRUT IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS 161854 1 2 RESOLVED BY BONDING A 2" BY 8" ALIUMINUM DOUBLER OVER THE VOID WITH MR 161854 1 3 APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS DUE 161854 1 4 TO WORKMAN SNAGGING THE ALUM LAYER ON HIS GLOVE DURNG ROUTINE INSPECTI 161854 1 5 ON. CONCLUDE THAT THE STRUT TUBE IS ACCEPTABLE AS REPAIRED AND NO FURT 161854 1 6 HER WORK IS REQUIRED. 161945 1 1 DURING TPS EPD-3-07-149 THE INSTALLATION OF TERMIN 161945 1 2 AL MODULE 40V77TB142 (REF EO V070-794361-C27) WAS 161945 1 3 HALTED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SUPPORT STRUCTURE TO M 161945 1 4 OUNT THE MODULE ON. A REQUEST TO R1/DOWNEY FOR ENG 161945 1 5 INEERING TO INSTALL SUPPORTS WAS PROCESSED WITH TH 161945 1 6 E INITIATION OF THIS PR. THE ENGINEERING TO INSTAL 161945 1 7 L THE SUPPORTS HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND THE ACTUAL WO 161945 1 8 RK TO INSTALL SUPPORTS WILL BE PERFORMED ON TPS ST 161945 1 9 R-3-07-305. (REF. V070-346048 EO #E05. 162118 1 1 THE 70B2010-3 BORON TUBE INSTALLED IN L/H BAY 5 HAS A SMALL DENT. THE 162118 1 2 DENT IS APPROXIMATELY 1" LONG BY 1/2" WIDE BY 1/16" DEEP. THIS CONDITI 162118 1 3 ON HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED OK AS IS (REF DB3645-000M)> PROBABL 162118 1 4 E CAUSE: OVERSIGHT DURING HARDWARE INSPECTION. 162124 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY WAS DISCOVERED DURING STEP 01-009 OF V31-13102. HYDRAU 162124 1 2 LIC FLUID WAS DETECTED ON THE HYD FILLER VALVE UNDER THE VALVE CAP. A 162124 1 3 LEAK WAS SUSPECTED IN THE FILLER VALVE. DAILY INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED 162124 1 4 FOR 15 DAYS PER THIS WAD. NO FLUID WAS DETECTED DURING THIS PERIOD. T 162124 1 5 HE HYD FLUID WAS MOST LIKELY EXCESS FLUID FROM THE LAST HYDRAULIC TOP 162124 1 6 OFF THAT HAD NOT BEEN CLEANED. THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN CORRECTED AND NO F 162124 1 7 URTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. RETEST PER V1165 WILL VERIFY CORRECT FLUID 162124 1 8 LEVEL. PROBABLE CAUSE: EXCESS FLUID FROM PREVIOUS TOPPING OPERATION. 162193 1 1 UPPER & LOWER INSULATORS AT R/S #17 TEE HAVE BEEN 162193 1 2 REMOVED, REPAIRED, RE-INSTALLED & GAPPED PER PRINT 162193 1 3 . FINAL INSTALLATION OF TEE WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED P 162193 1 4 ER TPS STR-3-07-155. WORK ON THIS PR IS COMPLETE. 162289 1 1 TORQUE WAS VERIFIED FOR THE 17 NOTED SCREWS AND ALL WERE FOUND FLUSH T 162289 1 2 O THEIR NUT PLATES. THIS CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE P 162289 1 3 ER MR AND MR ID WAS APPLIED. 162316 1 1 A HOLE WAS DRILLED IN (59-10) DOOR AND CAPTIVE FASTENER WAS INSTALLED 162316 1 2 ONTO CARRIER PANEL TO RETURN THIS AREA TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. CAUSE: 162316 1 3 NORMAL WEAR. 162322 1 1 ONE DENT IS VISIBLE ON FUEL CELL 1 COOLANT FILTER HOUSING. VISUAL INSP 162322 1 2 ECTION, DENTAL MOLD IMPRESSION ANALYSIS AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION R 162322 1 3 EVEALED SHALLOW INDENTATION WITH NO REMOVED METAL OR CRACKS AT DENT LO 162322 1 4 CATION. SINCE THIS IS LOW PRESSURE SYSTEM (OPERATING PRESSURE IS 65 +/ 162322 1 5 - 10 PSIA AND FILTER BODY BURST PRESSURE IS RATED AT 500 PSI) THE LENG 162322 1 6 TH, WIDTH AND DEPTH OF INDENTATION IS ACCEPTABLE. NOTED DENT DOES NOT 162322 1 7 COMPROMISE THE INTEGRITY OF THE SYSTEM. FILTER WAS MR MARKED AND IS AC 162322 1 8 CEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 162385 1 1 DISCREPANT WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL, V070-198753-006, DOCUMENTED BY ITE 162385 1 2 M 1, PAGE 1, HAS BEEN REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW SEAL. ITEM 1, PA 162385 1 3 GE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: SEAL DESI 162385 1 4 GN DEFICIENCY OF WHICH RI IS AWARE OF. NEW SEAL DESIGN IS BEING RESEAR 162385 1 5 CHED. CLOSE THIS PR 162748 1 1 ELEC WIRE SUPPORT BRKT V070-34047-001 WAS INSTALLE 162748 1 2 D PICKING UP EXISTING HOLES IN STR LOCATED X01040, 162748 1 3 Z0355.5, Y0-90 162825 1 1 TWO SPACERS DEBONDED FROM ISOLATOR WHEN THE HYDRAULIC ACCUMULATOR WAS 162825 1 2 REMOVED. SPACERS WERE BONDED BACK ON THE ISOLATOR AND ITEMS RETURNED T 162825 1 3 O PRINT CONFIGURATION. SECONDARYSTRUCTURE. 162833 1 1 THE FOUR DOCUMENTED FASTENERS WERE REPLACED PER PR 162833 1 2 INT CONFIGURATION. DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 162833 1 3 STR-3-07-1552 COUNTERSUNK FASTENER HOLE TO PRINT 162833 1 4 CONFIGURATION THAT WAS NOT DONE BY PALMDALE. 162853 1 1 STR REPAIR METHOD A RETURNS PART TO CONFIGURATION. 162864 1 1 (REF ITEM 1) THIS PR CORRECTED 6 EA. HOLES .164 IN 162864 1 2 . THAT WERE ELONGATED BY DRILLING HOLES TO .10 IN 162864 1 3 SIZE, AND INSTALLING LARGER SIZE FASTENERS. 162864 1 4 (REF ITEM 2) RADIUS INTERFERENCE CAUSING A .100 GA 162864 1 5 P BETWEEN SUPPORT AND FRAME WAS CORRECTED BY INSTA 162864 1 6 LLING A .120 +/- SHIM BETWEEN SUPPORT AND FRAME. 162864 1 7 (REF ITEM 3) ONE OF 6 EA. HOLES WAS NEAR THE EDGE 162864 1 8 OF BRACKET I.E. REDUCING THE EDGE DISTANCE. THE HO 162864 1 9 LD WAS PLUGGED AND A NEW FASTENER WAS INSTALLED .3 162864 1 10 75" INBD TO CORRECT E.D. PROBLEM. 162864 1 11 (REF ITEM 1) REMOVAL OF A BRACKET CAUSED HOLE ELON 162864 1 12 GATION. 162864 1 13 (REF ITEM 2) INCORRECT RADIUS SIZES CAUSED INTERFE 162864 1 14 RENCE. 162864 1 15 (REF ITEM 3) EXISTING HOLE WAS .130 INBD THAN DRAW 162864 1 16 ING CALLOUT CAUSING E.D. PROBLEM. NO FURTHER DISPO 162864 1 17 SITION OR WORK IS REQUIRED. 163031 1 1 THE BRKT/CARRIER PNL INTERFERENCE WAS RESOLVED BY TRIMMING THE C/P. T 163031 1 2 HE DISCREPANT STEP COND WAS CORRECTED BY THE INSTL'N OF AN MRB APPROVE 163031 1 3 D SUPT & SHIM (BONDED). THE ORIGINAL SHIM SLIPPED DURING BONDING & WA 163031 1 4 S REMOVED & RPLCD BY ANOTHER BONDED SHIM. OMITTED NASA INSP POINT WAS 163031 1 5 RESOLVED IN ACCORDANCE W/ THE QPRD. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST; 163031 1 6 NO FURTHER REMEDIAL ACTION REQ'D PER THIS PR. 163091 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE RPLCD & WILL BE PEELED 163091 1 2 TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE EDGE DISTANC 163091 1 3 E WAS CORRECTED BY CENTERING THE SHIM(S) OVER THE 163091 1 4 BOLT HOLES PER MR ACTION. THE THREAD BEARING MARK 163091 1 5 S WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. RC ACTION 163091 1 6 TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO 163091 1 7 PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87-103-C1) 163239 1 1 AN EO-TO-FOLLOW WAS OBTAINED TO ALLOW SUBSTITUTION OF HI-LOKS FOR HUCK 163239 1 2 BOLTS IN THE MID-BODY. THE INTERFERING HUCK BOLTS WERE REMOVED AND HI 163239 1 3 -LOKS WERE INSTALLED IN THEIR PLACE. MISALIGNED HOLE WAS MR'D OK-AS-IS 163239 1 4 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 163351 1 1 V075-333116-009 FAIRING HAD A SMALL CRACK (APPROX 1"). CRACK WAS STOP 163351 1 2 DRILLED ON BOTH SIDES AND GLASS FABRIC PATCHES WERE BONDED ON BOTH SID 163351 1 3 ES OF THE RACK. CRACK PROBABLY CAUSED DUE TO TRAFFIC IN THE AREA. 163510 1 1 THE UPPER RIGHT TRUSS SUPT TUBE ME621-0068-0001 WAS NOTED AS HAVING A 163510 1 2 SURFACE ABNORMALITY RUNNING FROM LWR PART OF TUBE UPWARDS APPROX. 24". 163510 1 3 AFTER ENG INSP, THE DISCREPANCY WAS ID'D AS A MANUFACTURING SPLICE J 163510 1 4 OINT, WHICH IS AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. THE SUPT TUBE'S OUTER SURFACE 163510 1 5 SPLICE JOINT & SCRATCHED AREA, APPROX. 24" FROM TOP ATTACHMENT POINT 163510 1 6 WAS CORROSION PROTECTED. THE ME621-0068-0001 UPPER RIGHT TRUSS SUPT T 163510 1 7 UBE, UNDER PRESENT CONDITION WAS DETERMINED TO BE UNDER LOAD. A WAIVE 163510 1 8 R TO OMRSD V30ACO.010 DELETED THE RQMT TO REMOVE THE ATTACH BOLTS. TH 163510 1 9 E UPPER & LWR TUBE ATTACH BOLTS WERE FASTENED TO DWG RQMTS OF .005 +/- 163510 1 10 .004" GAP, BETWEEN THE WASHER (NUT SIDE) & SUPT TUBE. 163746 1 1 THE SHARP ENDS OF THE SAFETY WIRE WERE PUSHED BACK INSIDE THE ROLLERS 163746 1 2 TO ELIMINATE THE DISCREPANCY OF SHARP ENDS BEING EXPOSED. CLOSE THIS P 163746 1 3 R. 163901 1 1 REMOVED & REPLACED. 164027 1 1 WORK ON THIS PR IS COMPLETE AND HAS BEEN DONE 164027 1 2 SATISFACTORILY NO FURTHER DISPOSITION IS REQUIRED 164054 1 1 H2 TANK #3, S/N SHT 0013 WAS SCRATCHED IN (4) AREA 164054 1 2 S IN THE LOWER OUTBOARD AREA AND (2) AREAS ON THE 164054 1 3 TANK GIRTH RING AND ALSO ON THE OUTBOARD TRUNNION 164054 1 4 PLATE. DEFECTS WERE MINOR AND MR ACTION WAS TAKEN 164054 1 5 AND SCRATCHES/DINGS WERE COVERED WITH SUPER KOROPO 164054 1 6 N AND ID'D. TANK IS FLIGHT WORTHY. 164055 1 1 ON THE LEFT HAND WIRE TRAY AT THE X0 863 FRAME HOL 164055 1 2 E 9 WAS REAMED TO 0.196", HOLE 11 TO 0.2146. THIS 164055 1 3 WAS DONE TO REMOVE ANY DAMAGE CAUSED BY THREADS IN 164055 1 4 BEARING. NDE WAS PERFORMED AND NO ANOMOLIES WERE 164055 1 5 FOUND (REPORT #30394). THIS REPAIR LEAVES THE HOLE 164055 1 6 S ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CLOSE PR. 164224 1 1 VENDOR FAILED TO INSTALL 2 HI-LOCKS AS SPECIFIED O 164224 1 2 N V070-855313, Z68, VIEW L. FASTENERS WERE INSTAL 164224 1 3 LED BY PR DISPO. 164245 1 1 INSTL'N OF TOP BOLT WAS VERIFIED AS CORRECT BOLT P 164245 1 2 ER PRINT. CNTR & BOTTOM BOLTS WERE VERIFIED AS 12 164245 1 3 PT SHEAR BOLTS W/ THE CORRECT INSTL'N & MR ACCEPT 164245 1 4 ED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. DESIGN INTENT OF T 164245 1 5 HIS INSTL'N HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. 164248 1 1 HOLE DID NOT PENETRATE SURFACE AND DING WAS OF AC 164248 1 2 CEPTABLE DIMEMSIONS, THESE DAMAGES ARE MINOR AND 164248 1 3 ACCEPTABLE. 164278 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PG 1: THE V070-198507-003 LINEAR WIPER SEAL HOUSING WAS 164278 1 2 NOT TRAVELING FREELY DUE TO INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE FLANGES OF THE HO 164278 1 3 USING AND THE INSIDE WALLS OF THE V070-198541 RETAINER CHANNEL. A MINI 164278 1 4 MUM AMOUNT OF MATERIAL WAS REMOVED FROM THE FLANGES OF THE V070-198507 164278 1 5 -003 HOUSING WITHOUT EXCEEDING PRINT REQUIREMENTS TO FACILITATE FREE T 164278 1 6 RAVEL OF THE HOUSING. FREE TRAVEL OF THE HOUSING WAS NOT RESTORED. PER 164278 1 7 MR DISPO, ADDITIONAL MATERIAL WAS REMOVED FROM THE V070-198507-003 HO 164278 1 8 USING TO RELIEVE INTERFERENCE DUE TO CURVATURE OF THE V070-198541 PANE 164278 1 9 L. FREE TRAVEL OF THE HOUSING WAS RESTORED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR INTERFE 164278 1 10 RENCE WAS A BUILD UP OF TOLERANCE. REF ITEM 2 ON PG 1A: THE V070-19886 164278 1 11 2-006 WIPER SEAL AT THE I/B END OF THE V070-198525 WAS FOUND TO BE DEG 164278 1 12 RADED. THE O/B END FLANGE MATERIAL WAS TORN CAUSING A POSSIBLE LEAK PA 164278 1 13 TH. THE DISCREPANT SEAL WAS REMOVED AND ROUTED TO THE HDA FOR REWORK. 164278 1 14 A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR T 164278 1 15 HIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. REF ITEM 4 & 5 ON PG 1B, 6 164278 1 16 .0 ON PG 1C, 8 & 9 ON PG 1E: THE V070-198860-015 KNUCKLE SEALS AT Yw-3 164278 1 17 18 WERE FOUN TO BE SPLIT AND PREFORMED ALLOWING POSSIBLE LEAK PATHS. T 164278 1 18 HE DISCREPANT SEALS WERE REMOVED AND ROUTED TO THE HDA FOR REWORK. NEW 164278 1 19 SEALS WERE OBTAINED AND COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE WI 164278 1 20 TH THE RADII ON THE FLANGES OF THE V070-198541 PANEL. FURTHER INVESTIG 164278 1 21 ATION REVEALED AN EO THAT RADIUSES THE INSIDE CORNERS OF THE SEALS TO 164278 1 22 ALLEVIATE THE INTERFERENCE. DUE TO UNAVAILABLITY OF V070-198860-031 AN 164278 1 23 D V070-198860-033 SEALS, ROCKWELL LOGISTICS DELIVERED THE -015 AND -02 164278 1 24 5 SEALS. PER TPS STR-3-11-475, THE SEALS WERE REWORKED TO INCORPORATE 164278 1 25 THE EO THE SEALS WERE THEN INSTALLED ON THE V070-198541 PANEL FOR FLIG 164278 1 26 HT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCIES WERE OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION DUE 164278 1 27 TO MISALIGNMENT OF HARDWARE WHEN ORIGINALLY INSTALLED. REF ITEM 7 ON P 164278 1 28 G 1D: THE CRACK ON THE O/B END OF THE V070-198541 SEAL PANEL WAS 0.13" 164278 1 29 L AND LOCATED IN A NON LOAD BEARING WEB. THE CRACK WAS STOP DRILLED W 164278 1 30 ITH AN 0.098" DIA DRILL AND THE DEFORMED AREA WAS FILLED FLUSH WITH MB 164278 1 31 O120-008 ADHESIVE TO MAINTAIN A PROPER SEALING SURFACE FOR THE POLYMID 164278 1 32 E SEAL. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. REF ITEM 10.0 P 164278 1 33 G 1F: THE GAP BETWEEN THE V070-198576 END CAP AND V070-198552 ANGLE E 164278 1 34 XCEEDING PRINT REQUIREMENT OF LESS THAN 0.001" AT EACH END WAS ADDRESS 164278 1 35 ED BY RETURN TO PRINT DISPO. THE END CAPS WERE REMOVED AND THE V070-19 164278 1 36 8577 LAMINATE SHIMS WERE REPLACED TO OBTAIN THE MAX 0.001 GAP AT EACH 164278 1 37 END. THE END CAPS WERE REINSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCR 164278 1 38 EPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP DURING ORIGINAL INSTALLATION OF HARDWARE. REF IT 164278 1 39 EM 11.0 ON PG 1G: AFTER THE DISCREPANT SEALS DOCUMENTED PER ITEMS 4.0 164278 1 40 THRU 6.0, 8.0, 9.0 WERE REINSTALLED, THE EXCESS RTV ADHESIVE WAS REMOV 164278 1 41 ED FROM THE SEAL PER SPECIFICATION. NEXT SHIFT, ANOTHER TECHNICIAN INC 164278 1 42 ORRECTLY TRIMMED THE RTV FROM THE EDGES OF THE KNUCKLE SEALS CREATING 164278 1 43 A POTENTIAL LEAK PATH. PER MR DISPOSITION, THE RTV WAS REAPPLIED AND A 164278 1 44 PROPER SEALING SURFACE WAS RE-ESTABLISHED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DI 164278 1 45 SCREPANCY IS POOR WORKMANSHIP. REF ITEM 3 ON PG 1A: THE V070-198865-00 164278 1 46 1 WIPER WEAL AT THE I/B END OF THE V070-198525 WAS FOUND TO BE DEGRADE 164278 1 47 D. THE O/B END FLANGE MATERIAL WAS TORN CAUSING A POSSIBLE LEAK PATH. 164278 1 48 THE DISCREPANT SEAL WAS REMOVED AND ROUTED TO THE HDA FOR REWORK. A NE 164278 1 49 W SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 164278 1 50 DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 164346 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM WAS REMOVED & RPLCD. THE SHIM 164346 1 2 WILL BE PEELED TO FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE DISC 164346 1 3 REPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS & THE PR MAY BE CLOSED. 164354 1 1 THE V070-190310-001 SPAR INSULATOR FOR L/H #10 RCC PANEL HAD A HOLE AN 164354 1 2 D A SMALL CRACK IN THE FOIL. THE UNSULATOR WAS SENT TO RSC FOR REPAIR. 164354 1 3 THE REPAIR HAS RETURNED THE INSULATOR TO PRINT CONFIGURATION.INSULAT 164354 1 4 OR WILL BE INSTALLED PER JCV80-96902. PROBABLE CAUSE: MATERIAL DEGRADA 164354 1 5 TION. 164398 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN OMRSD'S V51 AGO, 010-A/B/C & D - IR COULD N 164398 1 2 OT BE SATISFIED FOR THE NEW CARBON BRAKES. THESE REQUIREMENTS CURRENTL 164398 1 3 Y CALL TO VERIFY ACTUATION SLEEVE FREE PLAY AND GAP DISTANCE BETWEEN Q 164398 1 4 .D. HAWES AFTER Q.D. MATE. THE NEW CARBON BRAKES HAVE A DIFFERENT HYDR 164398 1 5 AULIC HOSE Q.C. AND PROPER CONNECTION IS VERIFIED BY THE ENGAGEMENT OF 164398 1 6 LOCK PINS. THE OMRSD FILE HAS NOT BEEN UPDATED TO ACCOUNT FOR THIS NE 164398 1 7 W BRAKE CONFIGURATION. AN RCN IS IN WORK BY R.I. BUT WILL NOT BE PROCE 164398 1 8 SSED PRIOR TO OPF ROLLOUT. EXCEPTION EK 1657 WAS APPROVED TO ACCEPT TH 164398 1 9 IS CONDITION FOR FLIGHT 10, (COPY ATTACHED). NO HARDWARE DISCREPANCY E 164398 1 10 XISTS. REQUIREMENT NOT UPDATED TO NEW HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. 164415 1 1 THE RH OMS DECK ATTACH POINT #5 FITTING WAS FOUND CRACKED DURING A NEW 164415 1 2 STRUCTURAL INSPECTION OMRSD. THIS REQUIREMENT WAS CONDUCTED ON TPS ST 164415 1 3 R-3-09-422, SINCE THEN ITS BEEN IMPLEMENTED TO V30-15436 & V30-15437 J 164415 1 4 OB CARDS. THE NOTED CRACK WAS LOCATED ON THE AFT EDGE OF THE OUTBD FIT 164415 1 5 TING FLANGE. AN UNRESTRICTED MR REWORK WAS IMPLEMENTED TO BEEF UP THE 164415 1 6 FITTING. THE REWORK CONSISTED OF ROUTING OUT THE 1.6" LONG CRACKED ARE 164415 1 7 A COMPLETELY AND INSTALLING A U-SHAPED CHANNEL INSIDE THE FITTING (REF 164415 1 8 ATTACHMENTS 4 & 6). IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE CRACK OCCURRED DURNG OMS 164415 1 9 POD REMOVAL. GS IS MOUNTED TO THE FITTING DURING POD REMOVAL. IT IS BE 164415 1 10 LIEVED THAT THE GSE WAS INSTALLED INCORRECTLY, CAUSING IMPROPER LOADIN 164415 1 11 G OF THE FITTING FLANGES. (RE ACTION: PROPER GSE INSTALLATION VERIFICA 164415 1 12 TION STEPS HAVE BEENADDED TO THE OMI (V5011) TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPE 164415 1 13 NING IN THE FUTURE). ALL ANALYSES AND REWORK IS COMPLETE, THEREFORE TH 164415 1 14 IS PR CAN CLOSE. 164461 1 1 DISCREPANCY WILL NOT EXIST AFTER REMOVAL OF THE WI 164461 1 2 RE HARNESS BRKTs V070-855006-013. 164473 1 1 ITEMS #1 AND #2 DESCRIBE DISCREPANCIES ON THE SEALS ON THE LEFT HAND E 164473 1 2 .T. DOOR FRAME. THE SEALS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW ONES. 164654 1 1 DURING WORK IN LH BAY #2, A706401 ELECTRICAL SUPPO 164654 1 2 RT BRACKET WAS BROKEN BY A SHOP TECHNICIAN. THE OL 164654 1 3 D HARDWARE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. THERE WERE HI 164654 1 4 -LOCS USED INSTEAD OF THE RIVETS CALLED OUT ON THE 164654 1 5 INSTALLATION DRAWING AND THIS MR CONDITION HAS BE 164654 1 6 EN PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED ON STRUCTURES PR STR-3-07 164654 1 7 -1983. 164715 1 1 THE MD121-0002-05 RIVET WAS REPLACED BY A MD121-00 164715 1 2 05-05 BLIND RIVET TO ALLOW INSTALLATION. REF VSTR- 164715 1 3 3-07-272 STEP 5B. EO-TO FOLLOW AGIANST DRAWING V07 164715 1 4 0-339606. 164870 1 1 THE9 AREAS OF CORROSION ON THE ELEVON SKIN WERE MANUALLY AND CHEMICAL 164870 1 2 LY CLEANED. AN OPTICAL INSPECTION OF EACH PIT DEPTH WAS PERFORMED AND 164870 1 3 ANALYZED BY RI/DOWNEY STRESS AND RE/DOWNEY DESIGN. EIGHT OF THE CORROS 164870 1 4 ION AREAS WERE VERIFIED OXIDE FREE AND ONE AREA REQUIRED A DOUBLER. TH 164870 1 5 E MR-001 DOUBLER HAS BEEN BONDED AND THE PROCESS VERIFICATION PANELS H 164870 1 6 AVE BEEN VERIFIED TO MEET THE SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. STRUCTURAL I 164870 1 7 NTEGRITY OF THE ELEVON SKIN HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. NO DISCREPANCIES EXIS 164870 1 8 T. 165072 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE (1) DISCREPANT NUTPLATE 165072 1 2 ON THE LO2 UMBILICAL STRUCTURE CLOSEOUT. THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTUR 165072 1 3 E. THE DISCREPANCY DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1.0, PAGE 1.0 IS RESOLVED. THE P 165072 1 4 ROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE TO THE NUTPLATE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 165428 1 1 INSULATOR WAS FOUND TO BE CRUSHED, AND DUE TO INCONEL COVER NOT BEING 165428 1 2 ORN OR MOUNTING BRACKETS AFFECTED, IT IS MR OK FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. C 165428 1 3 LOSE THIS PR. 165480 1 1 THE TOP AFT END OF THE L/H UPPER THRUST STRUT WAS GOUGED .005" DEEP. T 165480 1 2 HE GOUGE WAS FILLED WITH MB0120-037, TYPE II ADHESIVE. THIS REPAIR WAS 165480 1 3 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR ID APPLIED. THRUST STRUT WAS DAM 165480 1 4 AGED WHILE CAUSE WORKING TORQUE VERIFICATION OF ATTACH BOLTS (STR-3-A0 165480 1 5 077). CLOSE THIS PR. 165827 1 1 THE RCC PANELS' STEP AND GAP WERE REMEASURED BY RI/DOWNEY UPON THE RET 165827 1 2 URN OF OV-103 FROM FLIGHT 07 (26R). THE MEASUREMENTS OBTAINED BY RI/DO 165827 1 3 WNEY POST FLIGHT 07 ARE DIFFERENT THAN THOSE OBTAINED PREFLIGHT 07, TH 165827 1 4 EREFORE, THE MEASUREMENTS OF THE RCC PANELS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED EITHE 165827 1 5 R BY A TYPE 'B' TPS (PER A CHIT) OR BY RI/DOWNEY. IF A CONCERN EXISTS 165827 1 6 AS A RESULT OF THE MEASUREMENTS, AT THAT TIME, A PR WILL BE GENERATED 165827 1 7 AND ADDRESSED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE VARIANCE IN MEASUREMENTS IS 165827 1 8 IN FLIGHT MOVEMENT (SELF-ADJUSTMENT) OF THE RCC PANELS. NO FURTHER ENG 165827 1 9 INEERING ACTION IS REQUIRED AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. FLIGHT 8 DATA TO BE 165827 1 10 ADDRESSED ON STR-3-08-2884. 165913 1 1 THE CONVENTIONAL RIVET WAS REMOVED & A BLIND RIVET 165913 1 2 WAS INSTL'D. THIS BRINGS THE INSTL BACK TO DWG C 165913 1 3 ONFIG. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQ'D. 166036 1 1 OUTBOARD MOST HOLE THAT ATTACHES B91B10306-13 OUTBOARD STRAP TO B91B10 166036 1 2 591-1 FITTING WAS FOUND TO HAVE INSIDE DIAMETER OF .1973/.2047 AND HAV 166036 1 3 E THREAD MARKS IN HOLE. THE HOLE IN FITTING AND STRAP WAS ENLARGED TO 166036 1 4 .218 DIAMETER AND A DOUBLE OVERSIZED HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED. THE HOLE WA 166036 1 5 S INSPECTED PER STEP 2.0 AFTER REAMING AND NO SIGNS OF DAMAGE WAS PRES 166036 1 6 ENT. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 166071 1 1 FLIPPER DOOR #2 RETURNED TO DWG CONFIGURATION. 166159 1 1 OXYGEN TANK 2 WAS REMOVED AFTER THIS PR WAS TAKEN. 166159 1 2 ANY MATERIAL THAT MAY HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN CONNEC 166159 1 3 TOR THREAD WAS REMOVED AT TIME OF TANK REMOVAL. SU 166159 1 4 BSEQUENT VISUAL INSP FOUND NO PLASTIC MATERIAL IN 166159 1 5 ANY OF TANK ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR THREADS. PG. 1A W 166159 1 6 AS TAKEN DURING VISUAL INSP. NON-CONFORMANCE BEING 166159 1 7 A SUSPECT ROLLED STARTING THREAD ON SAME J1 CONNE 166159 1 8 CTOR. PRSD OXYGEN TANK 2 ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR J1 T 166159 1 9 HREADED BARREL HAD INDICATIONS OF A ROLLED THREAD 166159 1 10 AT THE STARTING THREAD. SOFT MATE WAS PERFORMED 166159 1 11 WITH NO APPRECIABLE RESISTANCE TO THREADING. THERE 166159 1 12 WAS NO INDICATION OF FURTHER DEGRADATION OF THREA 166159 1 13 DS ON TANK SIDE OR CABLE SIDE OF CONNECTOR. CONNEC 166159 1 14 TOR J1 HAS BEEN MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 166159 1 15 CONNECTOR J1 WAS HARD MATED PER OMI V5R02 AND IS C 166159 1 16 IG TRACKED. FUNCTIONAL RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED PE 166159 1 17 R OMI V1022. REF. PR'S EPD-3-07-0494 AND EPD-3-07- 166159 1 18 0771. CLOSE PR. 166259 1 1 BRACKET WAS REMOVED TO ALLOW ACCESS FOR BRAZING OF 166259 1 2 ECL TUBE. BRACKET REINSTALLED. CLOSE PR. 166260 1 1 DISCREPANT BRACKETS HAVE BEEN DELETED OR RELOCATED 166260 1 2 WITH E.O. TO FOLLOW. ITEM 1: E.O.-TO-FOLLOW TO DE- 166260 1 3 LETE SECTION BV-BV. ITEMS 2, 3, &4: E.O.-TO-FOLLOW 166260 1 4 TO RELOCATE AND DELETE BRACKETS. 166269 1 1 THE RH ET DOOR STALLED DURING DUAL MOTOR OPENING. INSPECTION IN THE AF 166269 1 2 T COMPARTMENT REVEALED A GSE PYRO SIMULATOR WAS JAMMED BETWEEN THE ACT 166269 1 3 UATOR BELLCRANK AND THE DRIVE ASSEMBLY HOUSING. ONLY MINOR PAINT DAMAG 166269 1 4 E WAS FOUND ON THE ACTUATOR HOUSING. THE ET DOOR WAS RETESTED AND CHEC 166269 1 5 KED FOR CORRECT RIGGING. THE PAINT DAMAGE WAS TOUCHED UP SO THAT NO FU 166269 1 6 RTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. ET DOOR RETESTED BY V1097 WITH NO ANOMALIES 166269 1 7 . 166333 1 1 THE BOLTS WITH SURFACE CORROSION WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS. CORROSION DUE 166333 1 2 TO BOLTS BEING EXPOSED TO ENVIRONMENT (NORMAL). 166374 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 166374 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 166374 1 3 EARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. 166374 1 4 THE SHIM (S) WERE CENTERED OVER THE BOLT HOLES PER 166374 1 5 MR ACTION TO RESOLVE THE MISALIGNMENT PROBLEM. R. 166374 1 6 C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACH 166374 1 7 ING HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #512 166374 1 8 1-87-103-C1). 166642 1 1 THE AFT RUBBER SEAL, V070-326883-001, WAS PARTIALLY DEBONDED AND CAUSI 166642 1 2 NG INTERFERANCE WITH BOTH LH AND RH ENVIRONMENTAL SEALS. AFTER THE NLG 166642 1 3 D'S WERE CONFIGURED FOR FLIGHT, THE SEAL WAS TRIMMED AND RELOCATED. TH 166642 1 4 E SEAL BONDING PROCESS WAS PERFORMED PER PRINT. THIS WAS MR ACCEPTED F 166642 1 5 OR UNRESTRICTED USE. 167372 1 1 A FLOW PATH WAS DETECTED BETWEEN THE RU TUBE AND HOUSING AT THE OUTBOA 167372 1 2 RD END OF THE L/H INBOARD ELEVON. THE INSTALLATION WAS INSPECTED TO VE 167372 1 3 RIFY CORRECT SHIM INSTALLATION AND RTV WAS APPLIED TO SEAL THE LEAK PA 167372 1 4 TH. THIS REWORK HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CONCLUDE THAT 167372 1 5 NO ADDITIONAL REWORK IS REQUIRED. 168124 1 1 THE PULSE PURGE REMOVED ANY PARTICULANT MATTER 168124 1 2 THAT WOULD CAUSE A POSSIBLE IMPROPER SEATING OF 168124 1 3 THE POPPET,ALLOWING THE POPPET TO CLOSE. THE 168124 1 4 POPPET HAS SHOWN SIMILAR CHARACTERISTICS IN THE 168124 1 5 PAST,WITH POSITIVE RESULTS AFTER POD CYCLING.UPGRD 168124 1 6 TO PR HISTORICAL VALUE 168247 1 1 DISCREPANT INSERTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW INSERTS RETURNIN 168247 1 2 G INSTALLATION TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXISTS. 168440 1 1 FCP CATHODE ACTIVATION OMRS V45CG0.020, "INTERNAL HEATERS WILL PROVIDE 168440 1 2 LOAD TO FUEL CELL TO DISSIPATE O2 FROM THE O2 ELECTRODE, THE LOAD SHA 168440 1 3 LL BE APPLIED FOR 90 +30/-0 SECONDS" WAS VIOLATED BY 19 SECONDS DURING 168440 1 4 STS 26R S0024,V2 PROCESSING. FUEL CELL #3 OPEN CIRCUIT VOLTAGE DISSIP 168440 1 5 ATIONWAS MAINTAINED FOR 139 SECONDS. THE TIME SPECIFIED FOR OPEN CIRC 168440 1 6 UIT VOLTAGE DISSIPATION (V45CG0.020) PROVIDES A MINIMUM TIME TO ENSURE 168440 1 7 ADEQUATE O2 DISSIPATION FROM O2 ELECTRODE AND PROVIDE A MAXIMUM FOR O 168440 1 8 PERATIONAL CONSTRAINT TO MINIMIZE FUEL CELL HTR "ON " TIME. THIS EXTRA 168440 1 9 19 SECONDS OF SPECIFIED OPEN CIRCUIT VOLTAGE DISSIPATION TIME HAS NO 168440 1 10 ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE FUEL CELL AND WILL NOT AFFECT FUEL CELL PERFORMA 168440 1 11 NCE. ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF FCP 3 CATHODE ACTIVATION WERE SATISFIED. 168512 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE PEE 168512 1 2 LED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEA 168512 1 3 RING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE CAR 168512 1 4 RIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE 168512 1 5 POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO PREVENT FURTH 168512 1 6 ER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. CLOSE PR. 168957 1 1 HI-LOKS REPLACED AND STRUCTURE SPOTFACED TO PROV- 168957 1 2 IDE ADEQUATE BEARING SURFACE. INTERFERING HI-LOKS 168957 1 3 REMOVED AND REPLACED AS REQUIRED. ACTUAL REQUIRED 168957 1 4 GRIP LENGTH OF DISCREPANT HI-LOKS RECORDED AND IN- 168957 1 5 STALLED AS ALLOWED PER MAO 101-301. 168969 1 1 STOP BOLT GAPS WERE MEASURED ALONG WITH LATCH PRELOAD AND PRESSURE SEA 168969 1 2 L CONTACT PROFILE PER PR MEQ-3-07-0251. DATA EVALUATION INDICATED THAT 168969 1 3 LATCH PRELOAD AND PRESSURE SEAL CONTACT WERE ABOVE THEIR ACCEPTABLE M 168969 1 4 INIMUM, HOWEVER, STOP BOLTS WERE NOT MAKING CONTACT WITH DOOR WHEN FUL 168969 1 5 LY LATCHED. THE STOP BOLTS WERE SHIMMED DOWN TO CONTACT THE DOOR AND M 168969 1 6 R'D ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ALL STOP BOLT NUT PLATES WERE CHE 168969 1 7 CKED FOR SELF LOCKING CAPABILITY BY MEASURING RUNNING TORQUE ON THE ST 168969 1 8 OP BOLTS DURING INSTALLATION. L/H #2 STOP BOLT WAS FOUND TO HAVE NO RU 168969 1 9 NNING TORQUE AND WAS INSTALLED WITH LOCK-TITE. R/H #12 STOP BOLT ALSO 168969 1 10 HAD NO RUNNING TORQUE AND BOLT EXAMINATION INDICATED THAT STOP BOLT HA 168969 1 11 D WORN THREADS. THIS STOP WAS REPLACED AND INSTALLED WITH LOCK-TITE. B 168969 1 12 OTH STOP BOLT INSTALLATIONS WERE MR'D ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 168969 1 13 ALL STOP BOLT ADJUSTMENT IS COMPLETE AND WAS VERIFIED BY THIS WAD. NO 168969 1 14 RETEST IS REQUIRED AND ALL WORK IS COMPLETE. 169308 1 1 ROUTE DISCREPANT LOWER TEE INSULATOR PART #V070- 169308 1 2 190247-001 TO HDA FOR SHIPMENT TO VENDOR FOR 169308 1 3 REPAIR HI-TEMP, LOS ANGELES, CA. SHIP DISCREPANT 169308 1 4 INSULATOR TO RI DOWNEY FOR REPAIR. CLOSE THIS PR 169331 1 1 UPON COMPLETION OF MAIN WHEEL ASSEMBLY JOB CARDS 169331 1 2 TIRE WILL HAVE BEEN ROUTED TO HDA FOR SCRAP OR TO 169331 1 3 STORAGE FOR REUSE DEPENDING ON CONDITION 169409 1 1 BOLTS FOR THE UPPER TAILCONE ATTACH POINT LOCATIONS HAVE BEEN INSTALLE 169409 1 2 D PER J/C V35-50001. NO MISALIGNMENT OF STRUCTURE EXISTED AND BOLTS WE 169409 1 3 RE INSTALLED WITH NO DIFFICULTY. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND 169409 1 4 NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL ERROR DEV HAS BEEN ADDED 169409 1 5 TO JACK TRANSFER OMI V5069 TO ENSURE BOLTS ARE INSTALLED DURING FUTURE 169409 1 6 OPERATIONS AND ENGINE REMOVAL & INSTALLATION OMI'S 169433 1 1 INSPECTION OF THE RIGHT-HAND RADIATOR PANEL #2 REVEALED A SMALL AREA O 169433 1 2 F MINOR DAMAGE IN THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE. THIS TYPE OF MINOR TAPE DAMA 169433 1 3 GE IS ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT REPAIR PER THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL 169433 1 4 AND HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIE 169433 1 5 S EXIST. 169572 1 1 TRIMMING WILL BE E.O. TO FOLLOW AND WILL ALLOW 169572 1 2 ISOLATOR TO BE INSTALLED CORRECTLY. 169585 1 1 2 V070-336586-007 BARRIERS AND 1 V070-336586-006 BARRIER WERE FOUND TO I 169585 1 2 NTERFER WITH NEW LIOH DOOR LATCH FITTINGS FROM LIOH MOD ON STR-3-12-486. 169585 1 3 THE BARRIERS WERE TRIMMED TO ACCOMODATE NEW LATCH FITTINGS BY E-O-T-F. 169585 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. UPON VERIFICATION THAT RELEASED EO 169585 1 5 REFLECTS ENGINEERING DISPOSITION. CLOSE THIS PR. 169585 1 6 169637 1 1 DAMAGED INTERCOSTAL WAS REPLACED. HOLES NOT MATCH 169637 1 2 DRILLED TO CLIPS DUE TO OVER SIZED HOLES (1 EA) O 169637 1 3 N CLIPS. CLIPS WERE MR'D PER DR STR-3-07-1908. 169779 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DUE TO A HELICOIL INSERT BEING LOOSE AND PREVENTIN 169779 1 2 G CAP SCREW EXTRACTION. THIS DISCREPANCY CAUSED THE INSERT TO ROTATE WHE 169779 1 3 N ITS CAP SCREW WAS ROTATED FOR REMOVAL. A TEMP DEV WAS WRITTEN TO V1165 169779 1 4 TO INCREASE THE TORQUE ON THE INSERT'S CAP SCREW TO ENSURE A GOOD FIT. 169779 1 5 MR DEFERRAL RATIONALE WAS ACCEPTED FOR ONE FLIGHT. ITEM 1A WAS INITIATED 169779 1 6 DUE TO A CARBON BRAKE CAP SCREW HEAD OUT OF SPEC, THE SCREW HEAD MEASUR 169779 1 7 ED 0.413 IN. S/B 0.419-0.437 IN. THE DISCREPANCY SCREW SIZE WAS MR DEFER 169779 1 8 RED TO ACCEPT THE OUT OF SPEC SCREW FOR ONE FLIGHT. AN LRU-PR WAS INITIA 169779 1 9 TED AND ROUTED TO B.F. GOODRICH ALONG WITH THE DISCREPANCY BRAKE ASSY 169779 1 10 STATING THE HELICOIL INSERT WAS LOOSE AND CAP SCREW WAS OUT OF SPEC. THE 169779 1 11 DISCREPANT ITEMS WILL BE REPAIRED DURING POST FLIGHT BRAKE 169779 1 12 REFURBISHEMENT BY VENDOR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR ON BRAKE ASSY. 169817 1 1 THE SUPPORTS WERE INSTALLED AT THE PROPER LOCATION, WITH MR APPROVAL T 169817 1 2 O CHANGE FASTENERS AND FASTENER LOCATIONS TO FACILITATE INSTALLATION. 169817 1 3 THE PROBLEM WAS DUE TO THE LAYOUT OF THE FASTENERS, IN THE ORBITER, DI 169817 1 4 D NOT MATCH THE LAYOUT SHOWN ON THE SUPPORT INSTALLATION PRINT. THE SU 169817 1 5 PPORT INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 169935 1 1 ITEM #1 THE CARRIER PANEL COULD NOT BE REMOVED WIT 169935 1 2 H A JO-BOLT INSTALLED: THE JO-BOLT WAS DRILLED OUT 169935 1 3 . ITEM #2 UNABLE TO REMOVE THE JO-BOLT WITH A SPEC 169935 1 4 IAL TOOL WITHOUT DAMAGING TILE: THE REQUIREMENT FO 169935 1 5 R USING THE SPECIAL TOOL WAS DELETED ALLOWING THE 169935 1 6 JO-BOLT TO BE DRILLED OUT. ITEM #3 & ITEM #5 PERTA 169935 1 7 IN TO LOSING PART OF THE JO-BOLT IN THE ORBITER: P 169935 1 8 ART WAS LOST AND LOST AND FOUND PR LAF-3-07-0016 W 169935 1 9 AS INITIATED. ITEM #4 PANEL WILL NOT COME OFF: 169935 1 10 PANEL WAS REMOVED AFTER ADDITIONAL ATTEMPTS. ITEM 169935 1 11 #6 ELONGATED HOLES NOT MR APPORVED: HOLES MR APPRO 169935 1 12 VED OK AS IS. ITEM #7 BOTTOM LEFT ATTACH HOLE GALL 169935 1 13 ED: THE HOLE WAS REAMED TO 0.250 + 0.004 -0.000 TO 169935 1 14 REMOVE GALLING. THE C/P WILL BE INSTALLED BY RSI- 169935 1 15 3-07-091 WITH A JO-BOLT 169949 1 1 CHARRED EDGE-FILL MATERIAL WAS REMOVED AND THE VOID FILLED WITH MBO120 169949 1 2 -008 ADHESIVE. REPAIR WAS MR'D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MAXIMUM DEPTH OF 169949 1 3 MATERIAL REMOVAL WAS 1/16 OF AN INCH. NO FACE SHEET DELAMINATION WAS E 169949 1 4 VIDENT IN MATERIAL REMOVAL AREA. 169992 1 1 THE MOUNTING PROVISIONS NEEDED WILL BE PROVIDED BY TPS VSTR-3-07-335. 169992 1 2 THIS TPS INCORPORATES V070-346048 EO E-07. VERIFY WORK COMPLETED PER V 169992 1 3 STR 3-07-335, STEPS 1.0 & 2.0 GT 1/08/88. 170150 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: MR UNRESTRICTED USE TO ACCEPT THE DINGED/ROLLED OVER RU 170150 1 2 B PANEL FACESHEET AT THE FWD OUTBOARD MOST EDGE AS REPAIRED WITH MB012 170150 1 3 5-063 COATING CURED BY LAUNCH. (SEE PAGE 2). PROBABLE CAUSE: AN IMPACT 170150 1 4 THAT CAUSED THE FACESHEET TO DIMPLING. ITEM 2 PAGE 1A: MR UNRESTRICTE 170150 1 5 D USE TO ACCEPT THE COUNTER SUNK HOLE IN THE RUB PANEL RETAINER STRIP 170150 1 6 WHICH IS DEEPER THAN REQUIRED FOR A NAS1581C3T4 SCREW. (SEE PAGE 5). P 170150 1 7 ROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP AT FABRICATION. ITEM 3 PAGE 1A: DENT HAD BE 170150 1 8 EN PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED. DISPO'D TO MR ID THE RUB PANEL. (SEE PAGE 7 170150 1 9 ). PROBABLE CAUSE: AN IMPACT THAT CAUSED THE FACESHEET TO DENT. 170156 1 1 THE DISCREPANT STEP CONDITIONS FOUND FOR THE CARRIER PANEL-TO-FILLER B 170156 1 2 AR SUPPORT AND CARRIER PANEL-TO-WING TRAILING EDGE STEPS WERE REPAIRED 170156 1 3 TO MEET AN ACCEPTABLE STEP CONDITION OF .070" +/-.015"/-.030". ITEM 170156 1 4 1.0, PAGE 1 (CARRIER PANEL-TO-FILLER BAR SUPPORT STEPS): A SHIM WAS B 170156 1 5 ONDED TO THE ADJACENT FILLER BAR SUPPORT TO BRING DISCREPANT STEP COND 170156 1 6 ITION BACK WITHIN ACCEPTABLE MR TOLERANCE (.040" - .085"). THE FINAL 170156 1 7 MEASUREMENTS FOR THE CARRIER PANEL-TO-FILLER BAR SUPPORT STEPS WERE AS 170156 1 8 FOLLOWS: INBOARD OUTBOARD 170156 1 9 "A": .0782" (PAGE 1) "A": .0578" (PAGE 1) 170156 1 10 "B": .072" (PAGE 1) "B": .0469" (PAGE 9) 170156 1 11 "C": .076" (PAGE 1) "C": .0579" (STEP 18) 170156 1 12 "D": .084" (PAGE 1) "D": .080" (PAGE 1) 170156 1 13 ITEM 2.0, PAGE 1A (CARRIER PANEL-TO-WING TRAILING EDGE STRUCTURE): A 170156 1 14 SHIM WAS BONDED ON THE WING TRAILING EDGE STRUCTURE TO BRING DISCREPAN 170156 1 15 T STEP CONDITIONS BACK WITHIN THE MR TOLERANCE (.040" - .085"). THE F 170156 1 16 INAL MEASUREMENTS WERE AS FOLLOWS: I/B .0713 .0703 .0509 .0522 .0 170156 1 17 718 .0713 .0787 .0732 .0733 O/B. 170156 1 18 ITEM 3, PAGE 1B (SHIM TOO WIDE): THE SHIM BEING BONDED ON THE WING TR 170156 1 19 AILING EDGE LOCATION NEEDED TO BE .40" WIDE. INSTEAD OF .75" WIDE. T 170156 1 20 HIS SHIM WAS TRIMMED ACCORDINGLY. 170156 1 21 ITEM 4, PAGE 1C (VOID IN BONDLINE): DURING THE BONDING OF THE SHIM TO 170156 1 22 THE FILLER BAR SUPPORT A SMALL COSMETIC VOID WAS FOUND. THE VOID WAS 170156 1 23 FILLED WITH RTV AND MR APPROVED. 170156 1 24 ITEM 5, PAGE 1D: DURING INSTALLATION OF THE V070-191067-002 CARRIER 170156 1 25 PANEL ABOVE INTERFERED WITH THE TOP SIDE OF THE CARRIER PANEL. TWO MR 170156 1 26 HOLES WERE DRILLED IN THE TOP SIDE OF CARRIER PANEL TO TAKE CARE OF T 170156 1 27 HE INTERFERENCE WITH THE SCREWS. 170214 1 1 DISCREPANCY IS WITHIN SPEC TOLERANCE FOR INSULATOR 170214 1 2 S. 170288 1 1 THIS PR ADDRESSED A DENTED ALUMINUM WING STRUT FOUND IN THE LH WING AT 170288 1 2 YW -147.5, BETWEEN XW 1220 AND XW 1249. THERE WERE THREE DENTS FOUND 170288 1 3 WITH THE WORST CASE BEING .0446" DEEP. THE STRUT WAS REMOVED AND A NEW 170288 1 4 B91B10133-23 STRUT WAS BUILT UP AND INSTALLED. INSTALLATION OF NEW ST 170288 1 5 RUT REQUIRED THE HEATING OF THE ADJACENT VERTICAL STRUT AND COOLING OF 170288 1 6 THE NEW DIAGONAL STRUT. THE THERMAL EXPANSION/CONTRACTION OF THE STRU 170288 1 7 TS ALLOWED THE STRUT AND VEHICLE ATTACH POINTS TO LINE UP. PROBABLE CA 170288 1 8 USE OF DAMAGE TO STRUT WAS WORKMANSHIP. 170292 1 1 TRIMMING THE SUPPORT DOUBLERS EDGE WILL ALLOW THE 170292 1 2 INSTALLATION OF STIFFENER TO THE DWG LOCATION AND 170292 1 3 WILL NOT EFFECT THE FORM FIT OR FUNCTION OF THE SU 170292 1 4 PPORT DOUBLER. THEREFORE IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTR 170292 1 5 ICTED USAGE. 170332 1 1 THE WIRE TRAY HAS BEEN DYE PENETRANT INSPECTED AND FOUND TO HAVE NO CR 170332 1 2 ACKS. THE TRAY IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICT 170332 1 3 ED USE AS IS. 170422 1 1 SCREWS ARE REMOVED/PART ACCEPTABLE. 170430 1 1 RADIATOR DAMAGE WAS DETERMINED TO BE MINIMAL WITH NO FACE SHEET DAMAGE 170430 1 2 . TAP DAMAGE WAS RECORDED ON DING MAP AND A MR RATIONALE WAS WRITTEN T 170430 1 3 O ACCEPT DAMAGE. 170589 1 1 MINOR DAMAGE TO THE FLIPPER DOOR STRUT WAS A RESULT OF INTERFERENCE BE 170589 1 2 TWEEN IT AND THE WASHER TAB ON THE ADJACENT ELEVON STRUT. THE DISCREPA 170589 1 3 NT AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND THE WASHER TAB WAS TRIMMED TO PREV 170589 1 4 ENT FURTHER DAMAGE. DISCREPANCY WAS DUE TO A DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 170652 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST FLT 11 AND DEFERRED UNTIL OPF PROCESSING F 170652 1 2 LT 12. THE COTTER PINS HAD SHARP EDGES AROUND THE DEPLOYABLE RADIATOR PA 170652 1 3 NELS AND HINGES ON THE RADIATOR HINGELINES ON BOTH THE PORT AND STBD SID 170652 1 4 ES. ITEM 2 WAS INSPECTED BY VITT AND NO SHARP EDGES WERE PRESENT. ITEM 1 170652 1 5 WAS DEFERRED PER MR RATIONALE OF RESTRICTED FOR ONE FLIGHT (FLT 11). TH 170652 1 6 E PREVIOUS DISPO HAS CORRECTED THIS PROBLEM BY APPLYING SILICONE RUBBER 170652 1 7 ADHJESIVE MBO130-144 PER V070-634530 EO D07 AND MAO106-373. PROBABLE CAU 170652 1 8 SE OF PROBLEM DUE TO PROCEDURAL ERROR. DID NOT INCLUDE EO IN LRU OMI. NO 170652 1 9 FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. TPS MEQ-3-12-180 CVR'D EO D07 VERIFYING 170652 1 10 APPLICATION OF ADHESIVE PER V070-634530. 170756 1 1 ITEM 1 DISCRIBED MINOR SURFACE OXIDATION ON SOME LH INBD OUTBD PRIMARY 170756 1 2 SEAL PANEL HOLES. THE OXIDATION WAS REMOVED WITHOUT ANY MATERIAL, AND 170756 1 3 NEW CORROSION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED TO RETURN TO PRINT. THE PROBABLE 170756 1 4 CAUSE OF THE OXIDATION WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 170941 1 1 TECHNICIAN ERROR CAUSED ONE OF FORTY HOLES 170941 1 2 TO BE MISDRILLED. HOLE WAS SLOTTED TO ACHIEVE 170941 1 3 ALIGNMENT WITH MR APPROVAL & IS ACCEPTABLE FOR 170941 1 4 UNRESTRICTED USE. CLOSE PR. 171061 1 1 DEBOND TAPE ON THE L/H RADIATOR PANEL #4 HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER MR DISP 171061 1 2 OSITION IN AGREEMENT WITH THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL. THE MINOR 171061 1 3 TEAR IN THE L/H RADIATOR PANEL #4 HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED "OK AS IS". NO 171061 1 4 FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE IS HANDLING DEGRADATION A 171061 1 5 ND FLIGHT DAMAGE. 171164 1 1 INTERFERENCE PROBLEM CORRECTED BY REDIRECTING PLUM 171164 1 2 BING RUN UP & AFT WITH A 45 DEG ELBOW IN UE4 OF A 171164 1 3 STRAIGHT FITTING. ENGINEERING DRAWINGS CHANGED VIA 171164 1 4 EO-TO-MOCKUP EFFORT COMPLETED. 171299 1 1 DURING STRUCTURAL INSPECTION V30-14424 A DEFECT WA 171299 1 2 S FOUND IN #4 LH PLBD HINGE PIN. A NEW HINGE PIN W 171299 1 3 AS ORDERED AND INSPECTED FOR DEFECTS. THE OLD PIN 171299 1 4 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED BY THE NEW HARDWARE. ANOT 171299 1 5 HER INSPECTION OF THE HINGE ASSEMBLY REVEALED NO D 171299 1 6 EFECTS. THE REMOVED DEFECTIVE HINGE PIN WAS THEN I 171299 1 7 NSPECTED(ULTRASONIC TEST) AND WAS FOUND NOT TO HAV 171299 1 8 E ANY RESULTS OF THE ORGINAL INSPECTION WERE DISCO 171299 1 9 VERED DURING OTHER REAL TIME PROBLEMS. THE REMOVED 171299 1 10 (NON-DEFECTIVE) HINGE PIN WAS THEN ROUTED TO 171299 1 11 LOGISTICS FOR STOCK/FUTURE USE. THE HINGE ASSEMBLY 171299 1 12 WAS TOUCHED UP WITH PAINT AND AN EO-TO-FOLLOW WAS 171299 1 13 GENERATED FOR THE TOUCH-UP PROCEDURES. RECURRENCE 171299 1 14 CONTROL ACTION IS ALSO SATISFIED BY THE EO WHICH 171299 1 15 ALLOSW TOUCH-UP CAPABILITY. 171311 1 1 ITEM 1 ON C/P UPPER AND MIDDLE BOLTS WERE RESOLVED BY RUNNING BOLTS IN 171311 1 2 TO NUTPLATES AND AN ACCEPTABLE RUNNING TORQUE WAS RECORDED ITEM 2 ON N 171311 1 3 AS 1578C3T12 BOLT BEING INSTALLED INSTEAD OF T10 PER PRINT WAS RESOLVE 171311 1 4 D BY MEASURING GRIP LENGTH IN STEP 7.0 AND NAS 1578C3T12 IS PROPER GRI 171311 1 5 P FOR FASTENER LOCATION AND MR APPROVED ON PAGE 5.0. PROBABLE CAUSE TO 171311 1 6 LERANCE BUILD UP. CLOSE THIS PR. 171341 1 1 CARRIER PANEL WAS (2) SMALL DENTS. MR OKAY AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE T 171341 1 2 O CARRIER PANEL BEING DROPPED. BURR SANDED AND CORROSION PROTECTED. CL 171341 1 3 OSE THIS PR 171399 1 1 ON THE LH/OB ELEVON THE OB AND IB SEAL RETAINERS AND THE OB KNUCKLE SE 171399 1 2 AL WERE DISCOLORED AND DEGRADED (ITEMS 1,2, AND 3). THE SEALS WERE REM 171399 1 3 OVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW SEALS AND THE DISCOLORED KOROPON UNDER THE 171399 1 4 SEALS WAS CLEANED UP. THE SEAL INSTL'S HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT CON 171399 1 5 FIGURATION. THE SPANWISE WIPER SEAL HOUSING WOULD NOT MOVE FREELY IN T 171399 1 6 HE OB SEAL RETAINER (ITEM 4). THE WIPER SEAL ASSEMBLY WAS DISASSEMBLED 171399 1 7 AND CLEANED TO REMOVE CONTAMINATION. THE SEAL WAS THEN REASSEMBLED AN 171399 1 8 D VERIFIED TO MOVE FREELY WITHIN THE RETAINER. THE WIPER SEAL OVERHANG 171399 1 9 WAS GREATER THAN PRINT TOLERANCE (ITEM 5). THE ATTACH HOLES IN THE V0 171399 1 10 70-198864-005 WIPER SEAL WERE SLOTTED BY MR DISPO TO ALLOW SEAL TO BE 171399 1 11 INSTALLED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRAD 171399 1 12 ATION (ITEMS 1-4). BUILD UP OF TOLERANCES (ITEM 5). 171478 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 171478 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 171478 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 171478 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 171478 1 5 3-C1. 171537 1 1 LH2 ET MONOBALL INSERT WAS FOUND TO HAVE ROUND INDENTATION AND BASE MA 171537 1 2 TERIAL FLAKING OFF OF LINER. THE DISCREPANT INSERT ASSY. WERE REPLACE 171537 1 3 WITH NEW ONES TO RETURN TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE OPERATI 171537 1 4 ONAL DEGRADATION. 171608 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REMOVE AND REPLACE TWO KEEN-SER 171608 1 2 TS THAT HAD LOST THEIR LOCKING FEATURES (ITEM 2, PAGE 1B). THESE DISCR 171608 1 3 EPANT KEEN-SERTS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LOOSE CONDITION OF THE BASE 171608 1 4 PLATE (ITEM 1, PAGE 1). THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS OPERATIONAL 171608 1 5 DEGRADATION. ITEM 3.0, PAGE 1A, WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED FLIGH 171608 1 6 T AFTER BEING BURNISHED TO REMOVE THE VISIBLE INDICATION. THE CAUSE OF 171608 1 7 THIS DISCREPANCY WAS HANDLING. ITEM 4.0, PAGE IB, WAS SANDED AND BURN 171608 1 8 ISHED FOR UNRESTRICTED MR USE. THE CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCY WAS WORKMA 171608 1 9 NSHIP. THE BASE PLATE IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 171664 1 1 THE IMPROPER SEATING OF THE V070-198063-004 SEAL, IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1 171664 1 2 , PAGE 1, WAS RESOLVED BY INSTALLING A NEW SEAL AND, WITH UNRESTRICTED 171664 1 3 MR APROVAL, BONDING AN RTV SUPPORT UNDER THE EDGE OF THE NEW SEAL. TH 171664 1 4 E MR SUPPORT WAS REQUIRED TO FACILITATE THE DEGRADED V070-198072-019 S 171664 1 5 EAL SUPPORT. THE CAUSE OF THE DEGRADED SEAL SUPPORT AND SEAL WAS PROBA 171664 1 6 BLY DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THE SEAL AND SEAL SUPPORT AR 171664 1 7 E ACCEPTABLE AS REWORKED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 171805 1 1 M.R. RATIONALE: VISUAL AND RECORDED INSPECTION OF 171805 1 2 THIS CONDITION INDICATES THAT THE DAMAGE IS MINOR. 171805 1 3 THIS CONDITION IS NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO RE- 171805 1 4 QUIRE A REPAIR. THE DAMAGE/HOLE(S) DID NOT PUNC- 171805 1 5 TURE THE ALUM. FACE SHEET. THERE IS ONLY MINOR 171805 1 6 DAMAGE TO THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE AND THIS IS AC- 171805 1 7 CEPTABLE PER VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL (REF: 171805 1 8 SECT. 3-11b). THIS CONDITION WILL NOT ADVERSLY AF 171805 1 9 FECT THE HEAT TRANSFER CAPABILITIES OF THE RADIA- 171805 1 10 TOR PANEL. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE AS-IS FOR 171805 1 11 UN-RESTRICTED USE. NO M.R. I.D. REQUIRED. 172032 1 1 E.O. WILL CHANGE THE DWG TO REFLECT THE AS BUILT 172032 1 2 CONFIGURATION. 172324 1 1 ALLOWING 1.20 " DIA. HOLE TO BE DRILLED AT A MATCH 172324 1 2 ED LOCATION WILL ELIMINATE MIS-ALIGNMENT WITH V070 172324 1 3 -613088 DUCT. MILLING OUT 0.060 INCH THICK WAS REQ 172324 1 4 UIRED IN SMALL AREAS TO PROVIDE FOR A FLAT SURFACE 172324 1 5 WHERE V070-333346 SCREEN AND V070-339617 RETAINER 172324 1 6 SEAT AGAINST PNL. R 18. THIS MILLING WILL NOT SIG 172324 1 7 NIFICANTLY AFFECT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF PNL. R17 172324 1 8 SINCE SCREEN AND RETAINER WILL BE RIVITED TO PNL. 172324 1 9 R17 IN THIS MILLED AREA WILL PROVIDE INCREASED ST 172324 1 10 IFFNESS. V070-339613-004 PNL. IS A SECONDARY STR. 172350 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 - A NEW V070-198704-009 TRAILING EDGE RING WAS OBTAINED 172350 1 2 TO REPLACE THE DISCREPANT RING. A LRU PR WAS GENERATED FOR THE DISCRE 172350 1 3 PANT V070-198704-009 RING WHICH WAS ROUTED TO HDA. PROBABLE CAUSE WA O 172350 1 4 PERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 172442 1 1 REWORK PER PRECEEDING STEPS RETURNS CURTAIN SEAL 172442 1 2 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION 172722 1 1 2 MINOR DEFECTS IN THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE WERE DETECTED DURING THE R/H 172722 1 2 RADIATOR PANEL #1 POST FLIGHT INSPECTION. ONE DEFECT WAS PREVIOUSLY M 172722 1 3 R ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN-UP AS 172722 1 4 A NEW DISCREPANCY. THE SECOND DEFECT, MICRO METEORITE IMPACT, WAS MR 172722 1 5 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND DOCUMENTED IN THE DAMAGE DOCUMENTATI 172722 1 6 ON LOG/GRID MAP. CAUSE OF DAMAGE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION 172722 1 7 . 172826 1 1 SPACERS BONDED TO THE V539-853509-001 SUPPORT WERE TOO BIG. SPACERS TR 172826 1 2 IMMED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO MISREADING DRAWING DURING FABRICATION. 172958 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 - PER PRINT THERE IS NO RETAINING RING REQUIRED AT ONE 172958 1 2 END OF V070-198702-023 SEAL. SINCE SCREEEN HAS RECEEDED APPROX 3/4", A 172958 1 3 NEW V070-198702-023 SEAL WAS OBTAINED TO REPLACE THE DISCREPANT SEAL. 172958 1 4 A LRU PR WAS GENERATED FOR THE DISCREPANT V070-198702-023 SEAL WHICH 172958 1 5 WAS ROUTED TO HDA. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 173092 1 1 CURTAIN WHICH DID NOT ALIGN AS A RESULT OF THE CURTAIN NOT BEING PER P 173092 1 2 RINT, ITEM 1, PAGE 1, HAS BEEN ROUTED TO HDA FOR FURTHER DISPOSITION T 173092 1 3 O SEND TO RI SERVICE CENTE FOR REPAIR OR SCRAP AS REQUIRED. NEW CURTAI 173092 1 4 N WAS ORDERED AND INSTALLED PER V35-90006. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RES 173092 1 5 OLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: PART NOT BUILT PER PRINT. 173132 1 1 DURING STR-3-11-456, THE V070-198546-002 POLYMIDE SEAL SET WAS FOUND T 173132 1 2 O BE CHIPPED ALONG ITS FORWARD EDGE. THE SEAL WAS REPLACED WITH NEW HA 173132 1 3 RDWARE AND WILL BE REINSTALLED PER STR-3-11-456. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DI 173132 1 4 SCREPANCY WAS FLIGHT DAMAGE. 173170 1 1 THE ELECTRICAL GROUND STRAP ON THE L/H ET DOOR WAS FRAYED AND BROKEN. 173170 1 2 THE EQUIVALENT STRAP WAS REMOVED FROM OV-104 PER CANNIBALIZATION TPS M 173170 1 3 EQ-4-07-106. THE STRAP WAS INSTALLED, BONDED AND TESTED PER THIS PR AN 173170 1 4 D NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR. 173289 1 1 SUMMARY - A NEW V070-198821-001 THERMAL BARRIER SEAL WAS TORN BEYOND R 173289 1 2 EPAIR DURING INSTALLATION. A PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED -001 THERMAL BARRIE 173289 1 3 R SEAL (OCN NO. C52393) WAS OBTAINED, AND THIS ORIGINAL SEAL WAS IN GO 173289 1 4 OD CONDITION EXCEPT FOR A 3/8" FRAY AT THE AFT END. THE ORIGNAL SEAL 173289 1 5 WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. 173422 1 1 MOLD IMPRESSIONS RESULTS OF SCRATCH IN BOND STRUT 173422 1 2 SURFACE SHOWS DEPTH OF SCRATCH (.014") IS > ALLOWA 173422 1 3 BLE DESIGN CRITERIA (< .003"). THERE IS NO EVIDEN 173422 1 4 CE OF CUT OR DISPLACED BORON FIBERS. BORON STRUT 173422 1 5 WILL UNDERGO FUNCTIONAL INTEGRITY TEST AT VENDOR S 173422 1 6 ITE FOR EVALUATION DUE TO DEPTH OF SCRATCH. LRU P 173422 1 7 R WRITTEN TO ROUTE DISCREPANT STRUT TO VENDOR FOR 173422 1 8 EVALUATION. REPLACEMENT STRUT WILL BE INSTL'D PER 173422 1 9 OMI V5R02. 173427 1 1 THE MISSING/TORN AREA OF THE LH PURGE CURTAIN WAS REPAIRED WITH APPROV 173427 1 2 ED MAT'L AND PER AN APPROVED METHOD. A REPLACEMENT -009 PART WAS OBTAI 173427 1 3 NED TO COMPLETE THE -011 INSTALLATION. 173469 1 1 ONE ME128-0034-0803 FASTENER WAS REMOVED & RPLCD O 173469 1 2 NTO LADDER SUPT FITTING V070-334421-002. THE RIVE 173469 1 3 T HOLES OF THE LADDER SUPT FITTING WERE FOUND TO B 173469 1 4 E SLIGHTLY OVERSIZED & MR ACCEPTED TO USE "AS IS". 173469 1 5 THE FASTENER NEEDED TO BE RPLCD DUE TO OPERATION 173469 1 6 AL DEGRADATION. 173725 1 1 SPACER FOR FLUID LINE SUPPORT BRACKET COULD NOT BE INSTALLED AT Xo1090 173725 1 2 .33 Yo-54.06 DUE TO CUTOUT IN V070-367454-003 RETAINER NOT BEING CENTE 173725 1 3 RED ON FLUID LINE HOLE IN MIDBODY FRAME. THE RETAINER CUTOUT WAS ENLAR 173725 1 4 GED TO ALLOW SPACER TO BE INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE TOLERANCE BUILD-UP 174255 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP AS A RESULT OF DAMAGE OBTAIN 174255 1 2 ED TO HINGE BOLTS DURING RADIATOR REMOVAL. THIS P 174255 1 3 R HAS ORDERED NEW HINGE BOLTS TO BE USED FOR RADIA 174255 1 4 TOR INSTALLATION. INSPECTIONS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED 174255 1 5 ON ALL HINGE LOCATIONS ON THE R/H RADIATOR #3 AND 174255 1 6 #4 AND THE VEHICLE SIDE HINGE LOCATIONS. A PR CO 174255 1 7 NDITION ON BOLTS NO LONGER EXISTS. PR'S MEQ-3-07- 174255 1 8 0262, 0263, 0264, 0265 WERE PICKED UP ON R/H #3 AN 174255 1 9 D #4'S HINGE POINTS (ON VEHICLE AND RADIATOR SIDES 174255 1 10 ) AND MEQ-3-07-100 HAS REINSTALLED THE RADIATORS. 174577 1 1 MOUNT HOLES WILL NOT ALIGN W/ THE VEHICLE HOLES. 174577 1 2 THE VEHICLE HOLES WERE ENLARGED TO ALLOW ENOUGH 174577 1 3 TOLERANCE FOR THE H/W TO BE INSTL'D. THE PROBLEM 174577 1 4 WAS DUE TO A DESIGN OVERSIGHT & WAS RECTIFIED BY 174577 1 5 E.O. 174806 1 1 FUEL CELL NO 2 COOLANT LOOP INDICATED A COOLANT LO 174806 1 2 SS OF APPROX 16.77 CUBIC INCHES IN FOUR MONTHS. 174806 1 3 A FREON DETECTOR WAS USED TO PROBE FUEL CELL NO 2 174806 1 4 COOLANT LINES IN SEARCH OF A LEAK. NO LEAKS WERE 174806 1 5 FOUND. THE FUEL CELL WAS REMOVED PER TPS FCP-3-07 174806 1 6 -016 ON 7/2/86. THE REMOVED FUEL CELL (S/N 113) 174806 1 7 WAS ROUTED TO THE VENDOR (INTERNATIONAL FUEL CELLS 174806 1 8 ) WITH LRU PR FCP-3-07-0081 ATTACHED. THE LRU PR 174806 1 9 INDICATED THE NOTED COOLANT LOSS. THE VENDOR PERF 174806 1 10 ORMED A COOLANT LEAK CHECK ON THE FUEL CELL AND CO 174806 1 11 NFIRMED THE FUEL CELL DID LEAK. THE INDICATED COO 174806 1 12 LANT LOSS WAS INTERNAL TO THE FUEL CELL. THE FUEL 174806 1 13 CELL WAS REMOVED. FUEL CELL NO 2 COOLANT LINES A 174806 1 14 RE FLIGHT WORTHY. 174850 1 1 DEFECT ON SEAL WAS MEASURED AND A SEAL LEAK TEST WAS PERFORMED PER STE 174850 1 2 P 2 AND PASSED WITH 0 PSI/MIN LEAKAGE (1.0 PSI/MIN MAX ALLOWABLE). SEA 174850 1 3 L WAS THEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. RETEST PERFORMED PE 174850 1 4 R STEP 2. PROBABLE CAUSE IS MOVEMENT AND USE OF EQUIPMENT NEAR SEAL. R 174850 1 5 ECURRENCE CONTROL-PROVIDE REUSABLE PROTECTIVE COVERS FOR SEALS TO REPL 174850 1 6 ACE TAPE PRESENTLY USED. 174894 1 1 DISCREPANT BOLT HAS BEEN RESTORED TO ACCEPTALBE 174894 1 2 CONDITION WITHIN DIAMETER TOLERANCE AND HOLE REAM- 174894 1 3 ED TO ELIMINATE ANY BURRS. INSTALLATION RETURNED 174894 1 4 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. 174937 1 1 THE CRACK IN INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SE 174937 1 2 RVICE CENTER. THE INSULATOR WAS REINSTALLED AND GA 174937 1 3 PPED ONTO TEE #8. TEE WILL BE INSTALLED PER STR-3- 174937 1 4 07-155. TEE #8 IS OK FOR FLIGHT, DISCREPANT INSULA 174937 1 5 TOR REPAIRED. 175070 1 1 CORRECT BOLT GRIP LENGTH HAS BEEN VERIFIED AND 175070 1 2 BOLTS PROPERLY TORQUED. 175265 1 1 AN MR DOUBLER WAS INSTALLED TO CORRECT THE MISALIG 175265 1 2 NMENT AND THE OVERSIZED HOLES DRILLED OUT TO MATCH 175265 1 3 . EXTRA LENGTH FASTENERS WERE INSTALLED PER THIS P 175265 1 4 R INSTEAD OF TPS STR-3-07-184 DUE TO ADDITIONAL MA 175265 1 5 TERIAL THICKNESS. 175388 1 1 THE RADIOMETER SUPPORT BRACKET WAS TRIMMED PER MR ACTION TO ALLEVIATE 175388 1 2 THE FASTENER/BRACKET INTERFERENCE. THE BRACKET IS OK FOR FLIGHT NO FUR 175388 1 3 THER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 175417 1 1 WORST DAMAGE TO DOUBLER WAS A 0.073 DIA HOLE SEE 175417 1 2 ATTACH A THE LOC OF THIS HOLE IS SUCH THAT IT WILL 175417 1 3 NOT INFRINGE ON ANY EDGE DISTANCE OR HOLE SPACING 175417 1 4 CRITERIA DOUBLER WILL BE BONDED TO STRUCTURE AND 175417 1 5 EXCESS ADHESIVE WILL FILL 0.073 DIA HOLE.STRUCTUR- 175417 1 6 AL INTEGRITY OF THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE WILL NOT 175417 1 7 BE GREATLY COMPROMISED CLOSE PR 175668 1 1 UPON COMPLETION OF MAIN WHEEL ASSEMBLY JOB CARDS 175668 1 2 TIRE WILL HAVE BEEN ROUTED TO HDA FOR SCRAP OR TO 175668 1 3 STORAGE FOR RE-USE DEPENDING ON CONDITION 175736 1 1 DISCREPANCY 1 WAS CAUSED BY A DESIGN DEFICIENCY AN 175736 1 2 D HAS BEEN RESOLVED BY MR DISPOSITION TO REAM THE 175736 1 3 HOLES UNTIL AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION IS OBTAINED. D 175736 1 4 ISCREPANCY 2 WAS CAUSED BY WORKMANSHIP AND THE HOL 175736 1 5 ES HAVE BEEN EITHER MR'D "OK AS IS" OR REAMED TO A 175736 1 6 LARGER SIZE AND THEN ACCEPTED. DISCREPANCY 3 WAS 175736 1 7 CAUSED BY TEMP INSTALLING CLECO CLAMP IN HOLE AND 175736 1 8 MR DISPO ACCEPTED THE HOLE "OK AS IS". 175799 1 1 SHOP AIDS SA26-003 WERE REMOVED AND SCRAPPED. THESE COVERS ARE NOT REQ 175799 1 2 UIRED. COVERS GAVE A FALSE IMPRESSION OF STRENGTH, RESULTING IN MORE D 175799 1 3 AMAGE THAN THEY PREVENTED (PERSONNEL STEPPED ON COVERS). NOT PER SPI Q 175799 1 4 A-001 B-14. 175812 1 1 TORQUE TUBES ARE DESIGNED TO BE FLEXABLE IN TWO DI 175812 1 2 RECTIONS (Z & Y). FAIRLEADS ARE INSTALLED IN PLBD 175812 1 3 RIBS TO PREVENT TUBE FROM CONTACTING/DAMAGING PLB 175812 1 4 D RIB. THEREFORE POTENTIAL CONTACT OF TORQUE TUBE 175812 1 5 AND FAIRLEAD IS NOMINAL. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDIT 175812 1 6 ION. 175856 1 1 SPHERICAL BEARING WAS CHECKED USING THE G070-510082 TOOL AND BOTH ENDS 175856 1 2 OF THE TOOL (.6225 AND .6235" DIA) WERE INSERTED COMPLETELY THRU THE 175856 1 3 BEARING. THE BEARING ID WAS CHECKED FOR BURR'S AND/OR RAISED METAL AND 175856 1 4 NONE WAS FOUND. BEARING ID WAS CLEANED AND GSE COVER PLATE REINSTALLE 175856 1 5 D. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 176368 1 1 WHEELS THAT HAD BEEN MODIFIED BY THE VENDOR FOR THE STRAIN GAGE MOD WE 176368 1 2 RE BEING PREPARED FOR PROCESSING FOR USE ON OV-104 WHEN IT WAS NOTED T 176368 1 3 HAT THE OVER INFLATION PLUG ON EACH WHEEL WAS LOOSE INDICATING THAT TH 176368 1 4 EY HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY TORQUED. THE QC ALSO REPORTED VERBALLY THAT T 176368 1 5 HERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF LOCTITE APPLICATION OR LUBRICATION OF THE PACK 176368 1 6 ING. THE VENDOR REPORTS THAT THEY HAVE VERIFIED PAPER WORK THAT INDICA 176368 1 7 TES THAT VALVES WERE INSTALLED PER THE SPECIFICATION (MLO308-0142) WHI 176368 1 8 CH INCLUDES APPLICATION OF LUBRICATION AND LOCTITE. NUMEROUS TESTS WER 176368 1 9 E RUN ON WHEELS ON OV-103 AS WELL AS WHEELS ALREADY BUILT UP FOR OV-10 176368 1 10 4 AND A WHEEL NOT PRESENTLY DESIGNATED TO A PARTICULAR VEHICLE TO 176368 1 11 ASSURE THAT THE SAME PROBLEM DID NOT EXIST ON ANY OTHER WHEELS. THE VE 176368 1 12 NDOR ALSO PERFORMED TESTS ON A TEST FIXTURE RESEMBLING THE WHEEL ASSEM 176368 1 13 BLIE'S OVER INFLATION PLUG INTERFACE. THE WORK THAT WAS PERFORMEDON T 176368 1 14 HIS PR INCLUDED TWO BORESCOPE INSPECTIONS (ONE WITH VIDEO) OF VALVES/P 176368 1 15 LUGS INSTALLED ON THE MAIN AND NOSE WHEELS ON THE VEHICLE AND TORQUEIN 176368 1 16 G OF EACH OVER INFLATION VALVE TO 25% OF ITS MAXIMUM TORQUE TO SEE IF 176368 1 17 MOVEMENT OCCURS. THE SAME TYPE OF WORK WAS DONE ON THE TWO NOSE WHEELS 176368 1 18 AND 2 MAINS DESIGNATED FOR OV-104 (THE OTHER TWO MAINS WERE ALREADY RE 176368 1 19 WORKED PER SPEC AFTER DISCOVERY OF LOOSE VALVES). ALL BORESCOPE INSPEC 176368 1 20 TIONS INDICATED THAT THE OVER INFLATION VALVES WERE FLUSH. THE 176368 1 21 TORQUEING TO 25% RESULTED IN NO MOVEMENT ON ANY OTHER OVER INFLATION V 176368 1 22 ALVES.THE TESTS PERFORMED BY THE VENDOR INDICATED THAT WHEN A VALVE W 176368 1 23 AS INSTALLED AND TORQUED HAND TIGHT THERE WAS NO GAP BETWEEN THE VALVE 176368 1 24 AND THE WHEEL. THEY ALSO REPORTED THERE WAS NO LEAKAGE WHEN A VALVE WA 176368 1 25 S INSTALLED WITH NO GAP BETWEEN THE VALVE AND THE WHEEL (FLUSH). THE T 176368 1 26 ESTS DONE ON THE NON-VEHICLE DESIGNATED WHEEL (MWA SERIAL NUMBER 020) 176368 1 27 INDICATED THAT WHEN USING A NEW PACKING IT TOOK BETWEEN 10 TO 25 INCH 176368 1 28 LBS TO TORQUE THE VALVE FLUSH. AFTER APPLICATION OF 50 INCH LBS NO TUR 176368 1 29 NING OF THE VALVE OCCURS WHEN ADDITIONAL TORQUE IS APPLIED. SAFETY WIR 176368 1 30 E WAS INSTALLED ON THE OIV (OVER INFLATION VALVE) AND IT WAS 176368 1 31 DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD TAKE A HIGH TORQUE TO LOOSEN ANY OTHER OVER I 176368 1 32 NFLATION VALVES THAT WERE SAFTEY WIRED. IN SUMMARY, THE BORESCOPE INDI 176368 1 33 CATES THAT ALL WHEELS' OVER INFLATION VALVES ARE FLUSH. THE OVER INFLA 176368 1 34 TION VALVES ARE TORQUED TO AT LEAST 25% OF THE MAXIMUM TORQUE. TESTS I 176368 1 35 NDICATE THAT NO LEAKAGE WOULD OCCUR UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. THERE IS N 176368 1 36 O EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE POSTULATION THAT THE OVER INFLATION VALVES O 176368 1 37 N OV-103 ARE NOT PROPERLY TORQUED. EXTENSIVE TESTING INDICATES THAT NO 176368 1 38 PROBLEM EXISTS. ROUTE TO PMRB FOR APPROVAL. PER PRIME BOARD REQUEST, T 176368 1 39 HIS PR WAS DEFERRED TO FLT 08 RATHER THAN CLOSED DURING FLT 07 AS ORIG 176368 1 40 INALLY DISPOSITIONED. THE POST FLIGHT WHEELS HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND 176368 1 41 BROKEN DOWN IN THE WHEEL AND TIRE SHOP. THE OVER INFLATION VALVES WILL 176368 1 42 BE REMOVED, CLEANED AND REINSTALLED WITH LOCTITE. AFTER FINAL TORQUEIN 176368 1 43 G, THE VALVES WILL BE TORQUE STRIPED TO PROVIDE A MEANS OF VERIFYING N 176368 1 44 O VALVE MOVEMENT DURING WHEEL PROCESSING, INSTALLATION AND TESTING. VA 176368 1 45 LVE REMOVAL AND REINSTALLATION WILL BE PERFORMED PER THE FOLLOWING TPS 176368 1 46 'S: MWA-022-008, MWA-059-007, MWA-070-006 AND MWA-071-006 (REF EO MLO3 176368 1 47 08-0142 CO4 FOR MWA TORQUE STRIPING). CURRENTLY, ALL WHEELS PROVIDED B 176368 1 48 Y THE VENDOR WILL BE TORQUE STRIPED AT THE VENDOR'S FACILITY. UNDER TO 176368 1 49 RQUE OF OVER INFLATION PLUGS ON FLIGHT WHEELS IS NO LONGER A CONCERN. 176368 1 50 PRIME BOARD APPROVAL IS NO LONGER REQUIRED TO CLOSE PR. CLOSE THIS PR. 176391 1 1 REF ITEM 1 & 2 - BOTH MISSING DIMENSIONS HAVE BEEN 176391 1 2 ADDED PER EO-TO-FOLLOW TO SUPPORT BOTH ANGLE IN- 176391 1 3 STALLATIONS. REF. V070-856001 INSTL'N DWG. BOTH 176391 1 4 ANGLES WERE INSTL'D PER STR-3-07-221. 176449 1 1 ALL DISCREPANT SCRATCHES LISTED IN ITEM 1.0, PG 1.0 RANGE FROM .0007' 176449 1 2 TO .0051" IN DEPTH. A DYE PENETRANT INSP REVEALED NO CRACKS, & ALL SCR 176449 1 3 ATCHES TO BE SUPERFICIAL IN NATURE. THE SCRATCHES WERE SANDED SMOOTH & 176449 1 4 CORROSION PROTECTED. THE RIPPLE DISCRIBED IN ITEM 2 PG 2 IS COSMETIC 176449 1 5 IN NATURE & REQUIRED NO DISPO. BOTH THE SCRATCHES & THE RIPPLE WERE MR 176449 1 6 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 176459 1 1 INSTALLATION OF MAS561$2-9 PIN IN THE LATCH, 176459 1 2 MD124-0001-0002, ASSY RESTORES THE DOOR TO 176459 1 3 DRAWING CONFIGURATION. 176616 1 1 ITEM 1 THROUGH 14 ON PAGES 1 THROUGH 1L ARE ALL ON DISCREPANT RUNNING 176616 1 2 TORQUE FOR ROSAN INSERTS AROUND WINDOWS 1 THROUGH 8. INSERTS WITH BAD 176616 1 3 OR TOO LOW RUNNING TORQUE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER MA010-304. PROB 176616 1 4 ABLE CAUSE NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CLOSE THIS PR. 176639 1 1 REPLACING WASHER CORRECTS THIS DESCRAPANCY. 176639 1 2 WASHER VERIFICATION ADN TORQUE IS ACCOMPLISHED IN 176639 1 3 S0004. 176702 1 1 DURING INSPECTIONS FOR THE CLOSEOUT OF MIDBODY BAY 2 LHS IT WAS NOTED 176702 1 2 THAT THE H2 SUPPLY LINE FOR FC1 WAS NOT RESTING IN ONE OF ITS TUBE SUP 176702 1 3 PORTS. (DISCREPANCY #1) THE LINE COULD NOT BE PUSHED DOWN INTO THE SUP 176702 1 4 PORT WITHOUT CREATING A PRELOAD AT THE FUEL CELL CONNECTION (DISCREPAN 176702 1 5 CY #2). A SPACER WAS FABRICATED OUT OF THE SAME INSULATION MATERIAL AS 176702 1 6 ON THE LINE. THE SPACER WAS INSERTED BETWEEN THE LINE AND THE TUBE SU 176702 1 7 PPORT AND SECURED USING L-T 80 FIRE BARRIER TAPE. THE TUBE WAS THEN TY 176702 1 8 -WRAPPED DOWN PER THE INSTALLATION DRAWING. MR RATIONALE FOR UNRESTRIC 176702 1 9 TED USE WAS WRITTEN AND APPROVED TO DOCUMENT THIS FIX. PROBABLE CAUSE: 176702 1 10 WORKMANSHIP. 177076 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 177076 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 177076 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACTI 177076 1 4 ON TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W 177076 1 5 TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 177076 1 6 THE CARRIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. CLOSE PR. 177099 1 1 THE INTERFERENCE PROBLEM NOTED IN ITEM #1 WAS ELIMINATED BY TRIMMING T 177099 1 2 HE V070-856311-001 CLIP AND V070-856309-002 BRACKET. THE BRACKET WAS T 177099 1 3 HEN INSTALLED USING OVERSIZED FASTENERS AND, BY COUNTERSINKING THE INT 177099 1 4 ERCOSTAL AND USING CSK HI-LOKS, THE EDGE DISTANCE PROBLEMS WERE ELIMIN 177099 1 5 ATED (REF ITEMS 2 & 3). WORK WAS PERFORMED THROUGHMR ACCEPTANCE. ITEM 177099 1 6 S 4, 5, AND 6 WERE RESOLVED BY ROTATING THE ISOLATOR 180 DEG, USING NE 177099 1 7 XT SIZE HOLES/FASTENERS TO CORRECT FOR MISALIGNMENT AFTER ROTATING, AN 177099 1 8 D ACCEPTING THE SLIGHTLY OUT-OF-ROUND HOLES AS IS. WORK WAS DONE ON AN 177099 1 9 MR AND E.O. TO FOLLOW BASIS. THE CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCIES WAS DESIG 177099 1 10 N DEFICIENCY. NO FORTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 177106 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: T01P31170-037 INTERCOSTAL WAS CRACKED ON RH PLBD #3 4TH 177106 1 2 INTERCOSTAL FROM CENTERLINE. THE INTERCOSTAL WAS REPLACED WITH T01P31 177106 1 3 170-039 INTERCOSTAL BY E-O-T-F. PROBABLE CAUSE WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 2 PAG 177106 1 4 E 1A: REPLACEMENT INTERCOSTAL DELAMINATED WHEN TECH WAS DRILLING PILOT 177106 1 5 HOLE AT AFT TOP EDGE. A NEW INTERCOSTAL WAS OBTAINED AND DAMAGED ONE 177106 1 6 RETURNED TO VENDOR. PROBABLE CAUSE WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 3 AND 4 PAGE 1B: 177106 1 7 PER DRAWING DIMENSIONS COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED DUE TO LOCATION OF HOLE 177106 1 8 S IN PLBD STRUCTURE. THE INTERCOSTAL WAS THEN LOCATED BY MR TO MAINTAI 177106 1 9 N .41 EDGE DISTANCE FOR HI-LOKS ON BOTH ENDS. PROBABLE CAUSE VENDOR MI 177106 1 10 SLOCATION OF HOLES. ITEM 5 PAGE 1C: CORROSION PROTECTION WAS FOUND TO 177106 1 11 NOT BE APPLIED PER SPEC. BY NOT ALLOWING FOR PROPER CURE TIMES. THIS C 177106 1 12 ONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE ON PAGE 8. PROBABLE CAUS 177106 1 13 E WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 6 PAGE 1D: THE MB0130-085 ADHESIVE USED TO BOND ST 177106 1 14 UDS FOR TCS BLANKETS DID NOT CURE PROPERLY. THE STUDS WERE REBONDED PE 177106 1 15 R STEP 13.9.4. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. UPON VERIFICATION THAT R 177106 1 16 ELEASED EO REFLECTS ENGINEERING DISPOSITION, CLOSE THIS PR. 177182 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY DOCUMENTED ON PAGE 1 OF THIS PR IS NOT A HOLE AS SUCH. 177182 1 2 A 1/2" DIA. SECTION OF SILVER-TEFLON TAPE HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY REMOVED 177182 1 3 FROM THE L/H RADIATOR PANEL #1 AT LOCATION 21" FROM CENTERLINE AND 27 177182 1 4 3/4" FROM THE AFT EDGE. WHITE THERMAL PROTECTIVE PAINT WAS APPLIED AS 177182 1 5 SILVER-TEFLON TAPE CANNOT BE BONDED TO THE PANEL ONCE THE ORIGINAL TA 177182 1 6 PE IS REMOVED. AT THE INTERFACE OF THE WHITE THERMAL PAINT AND THE SIL 177182 1 7 VER-TEFLON TAPE EDGE, THE INCONEL LAYER OF THE TAPE SYSTEM IS VISIBLE. 177182 1 8 THIS IS NOT BURNED TAPE BUT PART OF THE SEVERAL TAPE LAYERS THAT COMP 177182 1 9 RISE THE THERMAL CONTROL COATING. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS NOT ON THE RADI 177182 1 10 ATOR DAMAGE LOG. BECAUSE LOCKHEED DOES NOT HAVE DOCUMENTATION OF THE R 177182 1 11 EPAIR,QIT IS ASSUMED THAT THE MR REPAIR WAS PERFORMED PRIOR TO MAINTAI 177182 1 12 NING THE RADIATOR DAMAGE DOCUMENTATION LOGS. AT THIS LOCATION OF THE R 177182 1 13 ADIATOR PANEL, THERE IS NO DISCREPANCY. THE REPAIR WILL BE DOCUMENTED 177182 1 14 ON THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG TO PREVENT FURTHER REDUNDENT PR'S. 177353 1 1 REF. PAGE 1. PIN (V070-198482-001) WAS MISSING FROM RUB PANEL AND FOUN 177353 1 2 D UNDER FLIPPER DOOR #8. PIN WAS INSTALLED (WELDED) TO RUB PANEL (AT R 177353 1 3 OKWELL SERVICE CENTER) PER DRAWING. EXCEPT: SILVER PLATING WHICH WAS T 177353 1 4 O COVER THE HEAD OF PIN COULD NOT BE PERFORMED HERE AT KSC. RI MR ACCE 177353 1 5 PTED THE DELETION OF THE SILVER PLATING PER DOCUMENT MRD 223757. A COP 177353 1 6 Y OF THIS DOCUMENT IS ATTACHED. 177422 1 1 V070-193023-002 C/P FWD ATTACH LOCs SHIMMED TO ACHIEVE ACCEPTABLE C/P 177422 1 2 TO C/P STEP CONDITIONS. DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 177425 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE RPLCD & WILL BE PEELED 177425 1 2 TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 177425 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE C/P 177425 1 4 IS OK FOR FLT. RC ACTION TO INVESTIGAGE POSSIBLE 177425 1 5 CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. 177425 1 6 CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 177487 1 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSPECTION OF THIS/THESE DMG 177487 1 2 CONDITIONS INDICATES THAT THE DMG IS MINOR. THIS/ 177487 1 3 THESE CONDITIONS ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO REQ 177487 1 4 A REPAIR. THE SCRATCHES AND/OR ONLY. THIS MINOR 177487 1 5 TAPE DMG IS ALLOWABLE PER VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR M 177487 1 6 ANUAL (SECT. 3-11B). THE DINGS, IF ANY, ARE MINOR 177487 1 7 AND DO NOT REQ A REPAIR. THIS/THESE CONDITIONS WIL 177487 1 8 L NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE FIT, FORM, AND/OR FUNCTI 177487 1 9 ON OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CONDITION WILL NOT 177487 1 10 ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HEAT TRANSFER CAPACITY OF THE 177487 1 11 RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CONDITION IS ACCABLE AS-IS 177487 1 12 FOR UN-RESTRICTED USE. NO MR I.D. REQ'D (DING MAP) 177491 1 1 THE NOTED CARRIER PANELS ARE BEING REWORKED AND TH 177491 1 2 EN REINSTALLED PER RW 3-07-1106. CLOSE PR. 177543 1 1 MISSING NUTPLATE INSTALLED. 177706 1 1 S/C TEST SPECIMENS FAILED LAP SHEAR. INSTALLATION 177706 1 2 WAS ACCEPTED BASED ON FASTENER STRENGTH & ACCEPTAB 177706 1 3 LE LAP SHEARS OF REMAINING SAMPLES. CLOSE THIS PR. 177840 1 1 MISSING FASTENERS (DUE TO DWG ERR) WERE INSTL'D PE 177840 1 2 R EO TF. GAP DUE TO MISLOC'D BRKT WAS CORRECTED B 177840 1 3 Y ADDING AN MR TAPERED SHIM. DYE PENETRANT INSP H 177840 1 4 AS VERIFIED NO DAMAGE DUE TO FLT W/ MISSING FASTEN 177840 1 5 ERS. CORRECTIVE EO HAS BEEN RELEASED & INSTL IS N 177840 1 6 OW ACCEPTABLE FOR FLT. 177894 1 1 SEE MR RATIONALE ON PAGE 2. FLEXHOSE TOUCHING CONDITION IS ACCEPTED PE 177894 1 2 R MR RATIONALE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP ON INSTALLATION. 177968 1 1 INSTALLATION MEETS DWG INTENT. CLOSE PR. 178016 1 1 FASTENER HEADS ARE PROTRUDING FROM STR .002 - .004 178016 1 2 " > .020". FASTENER HEADS WERE SHAVED DOWN TO B/P 178016 1 3 RQMTS. 178492 1 1 THIS PR IS A DUPLICATE OF PR STR-3-07-1135 (REF AT 178492 1 2 TACHED COPY FOR DISPO.) THIS PR IS NOT REQUIRED. 178790 1 1 FCP 3 FILL COOLANT QD DUST CAP LANYAD WAS REMOVED & REPLACED WITH VEND 178790 1 2 OR (SETON-WILSON) PARTS. COOLANT Q.D. LANYARD IS RETURNED TO DWG. & IS 178790 1 3 FLIGHT WORTHY. CLOSE THIS PR. 178907 1 1 REDUCTION IN LIGHNING PROT CAUSED BY THE LOSS OF T 178907 1 2 HE GROUNDING SPRINGS IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT 178907 1 3 REWORK OF SPRINGS. THE REMAINING SPRINGS & RADIATO 178907 1 4 R SHIELDING IS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE AN 178907 1 5 ADEQUATE GROUND DATA. 179043 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: MR UNRESTRICTED REMOVED THE BURR AND A LITTLE ADDITIION 179043 1 2 AL MATERIAL (NOT EXCEEDING .05") TO PROVIDE FOR CLEARANCE OF PAYLOAD S 179043 1 3 HIM V725-334012-007. (SEE PAGE 2). PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN/WORKMANSHIP. 179063 1 1 THIS PR REPORTED FOUR INTERRELATED DISCREPANCIES. THE FOLLOWING LISTS 179063 1 2 A SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEMS AND WHAT WAS DONE TO CORRECT THEM. THE FIR 179063 1 3 ST PROBLEM DESCRIBED IN THIS PR WAS O/T CARRIER PANEL TO FILLER BAR SU 179063 1 4 PPORT STEPS (ALLOWABLE STEP RANGE IS 0.040 TO 0.085). THE O/T STEPS 179063 1 5 WERE PUT BACK IN TOLERANCE BY BONDING SHIMS IN DISCREPANT AREAS. THE 179063 1 6 SECOND DISCREPANCY, PAGE 1A ITEM 2, DESCRIBED O/T CARRIER PANEL TO WIN 179063 1 7 G TRAILING EDGE STEPS (ALLOWABLE STEP RANGE IS 0.040 TO 0.085). SHIMS 179063 1 8 WERE USED HERE ALSO TO PUT DISCREPANT STEPS IN TOLERANCE. THE THIRD 179063 1 9 DISCREPANCY AROSE WHEN A SHIM COULD NOT BE INSTALLED ON THE WING TRAIL 179063 1 10 ING EDGE DUE TO FILLER BAR INTERFERENCE. THIS PROBLEM WAS SOLVED BY 179063 1 11 TRIMMING THE WIDTH DIMENSION OF THE SHIM SO IT COULD BE INSTALLED WITH 179063 1 12 OUT FILLER BAR INTERFERENCE. THE FOURTH DISCREPANCY REPORTED BY THIS 179063 1 13 PR, PAGE 1C ITEM 4, DESCRIBED A CONDITION OF AN MR -002 SHIM NOT BEING 179063 1 14 PROPERLY ALIGNED AND EXTENDING PAST THE EDGE OF THE FILLER BAR SUPPOR 179063 1 15 T WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FLUSH TO -.03 INCH. THIS PROBLEM WAS CORRE 179063 1 16 CTED BY TRIMMING THE SHIM FLUSH WITH THE FILLER BAR SUPPORT AND CORROS 179063 1 17 ION PROTECTING THE EXPOSED AREA WITH KOROPON. 179196 1 1 E.O. TO FOLLOW DISPO REPLACED V070-156856-004 BACK 179196 1 2 PLATE WITH V070-156856-005 WHICH HAS SMALLER CON- 179196 1 3 NECTOR HOLE. 179218 1 1 AS EXPLAINED IN UPGRADE SUMMARY ON PAGE 2 FUEL CELL 2 WAS REMOVED AND 179218 1 2 REPLACED PER OMI V5R01. RETEST WAS SUCCESSFULL. PROBABLE CAUSE: MATERI 179218 1 3 AL DEGRADATION/DEFICIENCY 179230 1 1 THE PITTED AREAS (19 AREAS TOTAL) ON THE ELEVON 179230 1 2 SKIN SURFACE BELOW RUB PNL #13, L/H OUTBD ELEVON 179230 1 3 (Yw-382.808 TO Yw-401.748) WERE CLEANED, INSP'd & 179230 1 4 ACCEPTED AS "OK AS IS" BY RI DOWNEY/STRESS. THERE 179230 1 5 WERE (3) LAYERS OF KOROPON APPLIED TO EACH PITTED 179230 1 6 AREA TO INCREASE THE SKIN SURFACES ABILITY TO RE- 179230 1 7 SIST ADDITIONAL CORROSION. THE CORROSION HAD BEEN 179230 1 8 CAUSED BY GALVANIC ACTION BETWEEN THE ALUMINUM 179230 1 9 SKIN & THE INCONEL BLKTS. THE B91B30111-85 SKIN 179230 1 10 BETWEEN THE NOTED COORDINATES HAS BEEN MR ID'd. 179267 1 1 THE UNDERSIDE OF THE L.H. #2 RADIATOR WAS ACCIDENTLY NICKED WITH NEEDL 179267 1 2 E NOSE PLIERS. THE DAMAGE WAS RECORDED ON THE RADIATOR DING MAP AND DE 179267 1 3 NTAL MOLDS WERE TAKEN AND ANALYZED. THE M.R. RATIONAL ABOVE ACCEPTS TH 179267 1 4 IS CONDITION. (TAPE DAMAGE ONLY). 179383 1 1 (REF.ITEM 1) HOLES IN STRUCTURE WERE .3 LOWER THAN 179383 1 2 DRAWING; AN MR ADAPTER PLATE WAS BUILT TO USE EXI 179383 1 3 STING HOLES IN STRUCTURE RATHER THAN DRILL NEW HOL 179383 1 4 ES. (REF.ITEM 2) EDGE DISTANCE WAS MARGINAL BECAUS 179383 1 5 E OF NISLOCATED HOLES; HOLE LOCATION WAS ADEQUATE 179383 1 6 TO USE AS IS. (REF.ITEM 3) A286 CSK. HILOKS WERE N 179383 1 7 OT AVAILABLE; USED TITANIUM ESK. HILOKS INTEAD. (R 179383 1 8 EF.ITEM 4) HOLES WERE MISDRILLED DURING FABRICATIO 179383 1 9 N OF MR ADAPTER PLATE; USED ASSEMBLY AS IS. A COMB 179383 1 10 INATION OF DESIGN, AND WORKMANSHIP DEFICIENCY CREA 179383 1 11 TED FIT PROBLEMS. NO FURTHER DISPO DR WORK IS REQU 179383 1 12 IRED. DISCREPANCIES NOTED WILL NOT AFFECT FIT, FOR 179383 1 13 M, OR FUNCTION OF INSTALLATION. 179401 1 1 THE INTENT OF OMRS V45CE0.050-A REQUIREMENT OF 10 PCT MAXIMUM DISSOLVE 179401 1 2 D GAS CONTENT IS THAT ONLY NEWLY SERVICED FUEL CELL AND ORBITER COOLAN 179401 1 3 T LOOP WHICH HAS BEEN VACUUM AND FILLED WITH S14-140-1 COOLANT CANISTE 179401 1 4 R IS TO MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. IN THIS CASE FUEL CELL ONLY WAS NEWLY S 179401 1 5 ERVICED WITH COOLANT. ORBITER COOLANT LOOP HAS NOT BEEN SERVICED WITH 179401 1 6 NEW COOLANT SINCE LAST FLIGHT. OMRS WILL BE CLARIFIED WITH RCN SO THAT 179401 1 7 COOLANT LOOP DISSOLVED GAS CONTENT CAN BE 15 PCT MAXIMUM. OMI V5R01 W 179401 1 8 ILL BE UPDATED PER ICR UPON RECEIPT OF APPROVED RCN COMPLETION OF OMI 179401 1 9 V5R01 WILL SATISFY OMRS V45CE0.050-A EXCEPT FOR THE ABOVE REQM'T. UPON 179401 1 10 RECEIPT OF APPROVED RCN OMRS V450E0.050-A WILL BE FULLY SATISFIED. CL 179401 1 11 OSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT OF APPROVED RCN OU8592 AND UPON COMPLETION OF 179401 1 12 OMI V5R01 RUN 1 SEQ 12. OMRSD V45CE0.050-A. 179404 1 1 THE (2) 73A310305 WASHERS WERE REBONDED PER PRINT. PR CONDITION NO LON 179404 1 2 GER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 179454 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUT PLATES WERE REPLACED W/ NEW ONE 179454 1 2 S. A FIT CHK W/ PDA WAS PERFORMED PER INS-3-07-13 179454 1 3 0. NO FASTENER MISALIGNMENT WAS FOUND BETWEEN PDA 179454 1 4 & PLATE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THREAD DAMAGE WA IMPR 179454 1 5 OPER FIT OF PDA TO ADAPTER PLATE PRIOR TO TORQUING 179454 1 6 OF FASTENERS ON A PREVIOUS INSTL. NO FURTHER WOR 179454 1 7 K OR DISPO IS REQ'D. 179593 1 1 DAMAGED RECEPTACLE (3) WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW PARTS. DISCR 179593 1 2 EPANCY WAS VERIFIED TO NO LONGER EXISTS. CAUSE: NORMAL PART DEGRADATIO 179593 1 3 N. CLOSE THIS PR. 179635 1 1 THERE IS A SAMLL GAP UNDER 1 SIDE (INBOARD SIDE) OF ONE OF FOUR ATTACH 179635 1 2 HOLES FOR CONIC SEAL. HOLE AND INSTALLATION IS PER SPECIFICATIONS. TH 179635 1 3 IS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: GAP LOOKED EXCESSIVE IN LIMI 179635 1 4 TED ACCESS AREA. 179702 1 1 FUEL CELL #2 "READY" INDICATION WAS NOT ACHIEVED UNTIL START + 22 1/2 179702 1 2 MINUTES. OMRSD V45CG0.060-B REQUIRES FUEL CELL 2 "READY" INDICATION BE 179702 1 3 ACHIEVED IN NOT LESS THAN 6 MINUTES OR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES AFTER 179702 1 4 FC START INITIATION. FUEL CELL #2 MODIFICATIONS (END CELL HEATER REMOV 179702 1 5 AL AND REDUCED START UP HEATER POWER) RESULTS IN A LONGER START TIME. 179702 1 6 RCN # 0V8136M HAS UPDATED OMRS V45CG0.060-B TO REFLECT NEW FUEL CELL # 179702 1 7 2 START TIME. REVISED OMRS READS "READY" INDICATION SHALL OCCUR IN NOT 179702 1 8 LESS THAN 6 MINUTES FOR FCP'S 2 & 3, AND NOT LONGER THAN 35 MINUTES F 179702 1 9 OR FCP 2 OR 25 MINUTES FOR FCP 3 AFTER FCP START INDICATION. WAIVER WK 179702 1 10 682 WAS WRITTEN TO COVER FC2 START FOR WCDDT & FRF. 180063 PRSD 1 O2 T-O GROUND SUPPLY TUBE WAS CONTACTING SHIPS STRUCTURE IN AFT COMPAR 180063 PRSD 2 TMENT. LINE V070-455110-043 WAS LOOSENED FROM ITS CLAMPED POSITION AND 180063 PRSD 3 INSPECTION OF POINTS OF CONTACT (2) SHOWED NO SIGN OF DAMAGE. LINE WA 180063 PRSD 4 S MR'D IN PLACE AND WRAPPED WITH TEFLON TAPE AS A CHAFE GUARD, THEN RE 180063 PRSD 5 -CLAMPED INTO PLACE. LINE IS RETURNED TO ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION WITH A 180063 PRSD 6 DDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS INSTALLED TO PROTECT IT FROM DAMAGE THAT MIGHT OC 180063 PRSD 7 CUR DUE TO THE TWO POINTS OF CONTACT AND IS MR MARKED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 180063 PRSD 8 FABRICATION. 180201 1 1 THIS PR CONDITION IS THE CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCY RECORDED ON PR STR-3 180201 1 2 -12-3464. THIS PR WILL BE CLOSED AND WRITTEN AS A PAGE 1A TO STR-3464. 180282 1 1 SPEC CORRECTED TO APPORTION SEGMENTS OF HTR FOR DESIGNED WRAP OF H2O T 180282 1 2 UBING. 180349 1 1 TUBE ASSY V070-454866-104 HAD LT-80 TAPE REMOVED A 180349 1 2 ND LINE WAS SEALED CORRECTLY PER SPEC. SEE STEP 2 180349 1 3 & ATTACHED IPD SHEET. THIS PR IS NOT LONGER A CONS 180349 1 4 TRAINT TO COMPLETION OF PR FCP-3-07-0126. TUBE ASS 180349 1 5 Y TY-WRAPS WILL BE INSTALLED PER FCP-3-07-0126. CL 180349 1 6 OSE PR. 180605 1 1 CORROSION FOUND ON THE L/H WING LEADING EDGE UNDER L/H RCC PANEL #19, 180605 1 2 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS CLENAED AND MEASURED. THE TWO PITS ARE .008 AND .0 180605 1 3 03 IN. DEEP IN THE B91B11735 FITTING WHICH IS .100 THICK. THE CORROSIO 180605 1 4 N DOES NOT EXTEND UNDER ANY FASTENER HEADS AND WAS LIGHTLY ABRADED TO 180605 1 5 BLEND WITH THE ADJACENT SURFACE. THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND 180605 1 6 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADTI 180605 1 7 ON. 180675 1 1 THE V070-190225-001 RIB SPLICE #22 UPPER INSULATOR HAD A SMALL CRACK W 180675 1 2 ITH INSULATION VISIBLE. THE INSULATOR WAS SENT TO HDA WITH A RECOMMEND 180675 1 3 ED FIX TO ROUTE TO THE RI SERVICE CENTER FOR REPAIR. THE REPAIRED INSU 180675 1 4 LATOR WAS OBTAINED AND ISNTALLED TO RCC #22. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE DAMAG 180675 1 5 E WAS PROBABLY CAUSED DUE TO ROUGH HANDLING OF THE INSULATOR. 180711 1 1 THE PROBLEM WAS THAT NO HOLES WERE IN THE 70W3821-5 SUPPORT TO ALLOW F 180711 1 2 OR THE INSTALLATION OF THE V073-794012-001 CABLE CLAMP BRACKET. AN ENG 180711 1 3 INEERING EVALUATION WAS DONE AND IT WAS DETERMINED AN ENGINEERING CHAN 180711 1 4 GE WAS REQUIRED FOR THE INSTALLATION. HOLES WERE DRILLED AS INDICATED 180711 1 5 IN THE ATTACHMENT AND THIS WILL BE JUSTIFIED BY EO TO FOLLOW. UPON THE 180711 1 6 RELEASE OF THE EO PER STEP 3.0 ABOVE, CLOSE THIS PR. 180852 1 1 2" LOC IS CORRECT BASED ON DIMENSIONAL RQMTS AS SH 180852 1 2 OWN ON EO V070-340008-B-12. LOC'G DIMENSION WAS F 180852 1 3 URTHER CLARIFIED ON AN EO-TO-FOLLOW (SEE V070-3400 180852 1 4 08-B-14 PG. 4 ATTACHED) TO REFLECT ACTUAL VEH CONF 180852 1 5 IG. REF. STR-3-07-281 MOD 002. NO DISCREPANT CON 180852 1 6 DITION. 180980 1 1 THE V070-851014-001 AND -002 ET BAGGIE BRACKETS WERE FOUND NOT INSTALL 180980 1 2 ED ON THE LO2 CURTAIN ATTACH PLATE AND NO DOCUMENTATION EXPLAINED THEI 180980 1 3 R REMOVAL. THE BRACKETS WERE REINSTALLED PER THIS PR. THE INSTALLATION 180980 1 4 DRAWING V070-851042 HAD A TYPO ERROR IN REFERENCEING THE DASH #'S OF 180980 1 5 THE TWO BRACKETS (-001 S/B -002 AND -002 S/B -001) STEP 2 VERIFIES ENG 180980 1 6 INEERING WAS CORRECTED PER E.O. TO FOLLOW. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EX 180980 1 7 IST. UPON APPROVAL OF E.O. TO FOLLOW IN STEP 2, CLOSE THIS PR. 181000 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN HYDRAULIC FLUID WAS SEEN AROUND THE NOSE LA 181000 1 2 NDING GEAR HYDRAULIC FILL VALVE. THE SPILLED FLUID WAS CLEANED FROM TH 181000 1 3 E STRUT AND THE HYDRAULICFILL VALVE CAP TORQUED TO THE HIGH END OF IT 181000 1 4 S ALLOWABLE RANGE (85-90 IN LBS). THE FILL VALVE WAS INSPECTED 24 HOUR 181000 1 5 S AFTER VALVE WAS RE-TORQUED AND NO LEAKAGE WAS DETECTED. THE PROBABLE 181000 1 6 CAUSE FOR THE LEAKAGE WAS AN UNDERTORQUED FILL VALVE. NO RETEST IS RE 181000 1 7 QUIRED. 181173 1 1 THE DEFECT IN THE FITTING HAD THE SHARP EDGES REMO 181173 1 2 VED, AND MR ACTION OK AS IS. THE DING WAS CAUSED B 181173 1 3 Y CARELESSNESS IN THE AREA. THE BOLT WAS CHANGED O 181173 1 4 UT WITH A BOLT WITH THE NEXT LONGER DASH NUMBER. T 181173 1 5 HE WRONG LENGTH BOLT WAS INSTALLED AT PALMDALE. TH 181173 1 6 E FITTING WITH THE MR ACTION WORKED AND THE BOLT C 181173 1 7 HANGED OUT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 181267 1 1 LSOC AND NASA ENGINEERING HAVE PERFORMED A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE AF 181267 1 2 FECTED SEAL AND THE ADJACENT SEAL. UPON RELEASE OF THE FLIPPER DOOR FR 181267 1 3 OM ITS SECURED POSITION, THE SEALS RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION 181267 1 4 WITH NO INDICATION OF A PERMANENT SET. THERE IS NO VISUAL EVIDENCE OF 181267 1 5 GOUGES, CRACKS, CREASES, OR OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEFECT. THERE ARE MINOR 181267 1 6 MARKINGS ON THE SEAL SURFACE AT THE CONTACT AREA WHICH DO NOT PENETRA 181267 1 7 TE THE THEMAL-PROTECTIVE COATING. PREVIOUSLY EXISTING EXPOSED AREAS HA 181267 1 8 VE BEEN TOUCHED UP WITH HIGH-TEMP COATING. ALTHOUGH NO PERMANENT DAMAG 181267 1 9 E WAS CAUSED BY THIS INCIDENT, IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED BY SYSTEMS E 181267 1 10 NGINEERING THAT THE FLIPPER DOOR POSITIONING NOT BE ALTERED WITHOUT FI 181267 1 11 RST NOTIFYING THE MIDBODY SHOP SUPERVISOR, AND THAT FLIPPER DOORS NEVE 181267 1 12 R BE RAISED HIGH ENOUGH TO CONTACT THE WING TRAILING EDGE SEALS. CONCL 181267 1 13 UDE THAT THIS DISCREPANCY WAS CAUSED BY HUMAN ERROR. A PRELIMINARY EVA 181267 1 14 LUATION REPORT HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO LSOC SAFETY FOR CONSIDERATION OF 181267 1 15 POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTION. 181306 1 1 COLUMBIUM SEAL WAS RETURNED TO IT'S CORRECT POSITION AND REMEASURED AN 181306 1 2 D FOUND TO BE WITHIN DRAWING TOLERANCE OF 0.010 MAXIMUM GAP. PROBABLE 181306 1 3 CAUSE OF PR IS HANDLING OF PART BEYOND NORMAL TRAVEL PATH COMBINED WIT 181306 1 4 H IMPROPER MEASUREMENT METHOD. SEAL HAS FREE MOTION & RETURNS TO SEALE 181306 1 5 D POSITION UNDER EXISTING SPRING PRESSURE. 181348 1 1 UPPER AND LOWER INSULATORS AT R/S #20 LH TEE HAVE 181348 1 2 BEEN REMOVED, REPAIRED, RE-INSTALLED AND GAPPED PE 181348 1 3 R PRINT. FINAL INSTALLATION OF TEE WILL BE ACCOMPL 181348 1 4 ISHED PER TPS VSTR-3-07-155. WORK ON THIS PR IS CO 181348 1 5 MPLETE. 181489 1 1 THE INTERFERENCE DISCREPANCY WAS RESOLVED BY MOVING THE UPPER INBD INS 181489 1 2 ULATOR OUTBD SLIGHTLY. THE PLUG & SPACER ARE INSTL'D FOR FLT. 181640 1 1 USING DRILL (PILOTED, COUNTERSUNK 100 DEGREE 181640 1 2 DRILL), AND FILE ELONGATE ATTACH HOLE (4 EA.) AP- 181640 1 3 PROX. 060 IN, ENOUGH TO ALLOW CONNECTOR HOLES 181640 1 4 ENOUGH TO ALLOW CONNECTOR HOLES TO MATCH BRACKET 181640 1 5 HOLES. COUNTERSINK INBOARD SIDE OF BRACKET. 181640 1 6 NOTE: SET UP DEBRIS CATCHER PRIOR TO ANY DRILLING 181640 1 7 TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION. TOUCH UP BRACKET PER 181640 1 8 SSR 0012. 181667 1 1 THE DING IN THE FLIPPER DOOR RUB PANEL, V070-198002-091, IDENTIFIED IN 181667 1 2 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS RESOLVED BY COATING THE EXPOSED INCONEL WITH MB01 181667 1 3 25-063 HIGH TEMPERATURE COATING AND MR ACCEPTING THE DING AS IS FOR UN 181667 1 4 RESTRICTED USE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DING IS WORKMANSHIP. CONCLUD 181667 1 5 E THAT THE RUB PANEL IS ACCEPTABLE AS REPAIRED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS 181667 1 6 REQUIRED. 181685 1 1 LH HINGE CARRIER PANELS 1,4 & 6 WERE FOUND TO NOT HAVE THE PROPER THRE 181685 1 2 AD PROTRUSION. THE HINGE CARRIER PANEL FASTENERS WERE REPLACED WITH TH 181685 1 3 E PROPER GRIP FROM STRUCTURES PR'S STR-3-07-2355 AND 2356 WHICH MEASUR 181685 1 4 ED ALL HINGE CARRIER PANEL GRIPS AND INSTALLED THE PROPER FASTENERS. 3 181685 1 5 HINGE CARRIER PANELS NOW HAVE THE PROPER GRIP. PROBABLE CAUSE IS JOB 181685 1 6 CARDS FOR HINGE CARRIER PANELS NOT BEING UPDATED PROPERLY. JOB CARD UP 181685 1 7 DATE IS IN WORK TO REFLECT PROPER FASTENER GRIP FOR CARRIER PANELS. 181840 1 1 DENTED AREA WAS REINFORCED BY DOUBLER (MR) INSTAL- 181840 1 2 LATION. CLOSE PR. 181864 1 1 DURING VEHICLE TESTING IN OMI V1022, THE O2 TANK 1 VENT POPPET HAD A L 181864 1 2 EAK RATE OF 1400 SCCMS AT A TANK PRESSURE OF 330 PSIA. THE TEST WAS RE 181864 1 3 PERFORMED AT TANK PRESSURES OF 355 AND 825 PSIA WITH LEAK RATES IN EXC 181864 1 4 ESS OF 1400 SCCMS IN BOTH CASES. A NEW POPPET WAS ORDERED AND INSTALLE 181864 1 5 D. A MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK WAS PERFORMED ON THE NEWLY INSTALLED POPPET 181864 1 6 AT THE ORBITER LIVE I/F AND A LEAK RATE OF 7.1 X 10 ª-7 WAS OBTAINED. 181864 1 7 MAX ALLOWABLE IS 1 X 10 ª-7 AND A PG 1A TO THIS PR WAS TAKEN. THE LINE 181864 1 8 I/F WAS DEMATED, CLEANED, INSPECTED, AND RETORQUED TWICE RESULTING IN 181864 1 9 1.96 X 10 ª-6 AND 1.8 X 1- ª-6 LEAK RATES. A CLOSER INSPECTION ON THE 181864 1 10 THIRD DEMATE SLOWED SOME MINOR SCRATCHES ON THE POPPET DYNATUBE FACE. 181864 1 11 MR DISPOSITION WAS WRITTEN AND APPROVED TO POLISH THE POPPET DYNATUBE 181864 1 12 SURFACE AND ALSO TO REMOVE FOAM ON THE CONNECTING LINE TO HELP RELIEV 181864 1 13 E A SLIGHT MISALIGNMENT. THESE STEPS WERE PERFORMED AND THE POPPET RE- 181864 1 14 INSTALLED. A LOW PRESSURE MASS SPEC OF THE POPPET SHOWED 0 LEAKAGE. TH 181864 1 15 E SYSTEM WAS THEN SECURED FOR THE FES R & R POWER DOWN PERIOD. (THE TA 181864 1 16 NK WAS APPROX 300 PSIA). WHEN THE ORBITER WAS POWERED UP AFTER THE FES 181864 1 17 R & R O2 TANK 1 INDICATED AMBIENT AND IPR 29RV-0083 WAS GENERATED. T 181864 1 18 ROUBLESHOOTING FOUND A LEAK IN THE TANK 1 VENT FLIGHT CAP. THIS WAS CO 181864 1 19 RRECTED ON IPR 29RV-0083. A TANK MOISTURE CHECK WAS PERFORMED ON THIS 181864 1 20 PR AND THE MOISTURE CONTENT WAS LESS THAN 2 PPM MAX ALLOWABLE IS 20 PP 181864 1 21 M. A RETEST OF THE NEW POPPET WAS THEN PERFORMED AT A TANK PRESSURE OF 181864 1 22 341 PSIA WITH A LEAK RATE OF 1151 SCCMS. THE TANK WAS PRESSURIZED TO 181864 1 23 917 PSIA AND THE TEST RE-PERFORMED WITH A LEAK RATE OF LESS THAN 57.7 181864 1 24 SCCMS. (METER WAS READING OFF SCALE LOW). MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK AT HIGH 181864 1 25 PRESSURE ALSO SHOWED 0 LEAK RATE. THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN O2 POPPET IS 181864 1 26 900 SCCMS AT A TANK PRESSURE OF 115-350 PSIA. AN RCN HAS BEEN GENERAT 181864 1 27 ED TO THE OMRSD TO CHANGE THE TANK PRESSURE RANGE TO 115-975 PSIA. PRO 181864 1 28 BABLE CAUSE: POPPET FAILURE. CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT OF APPROVED RC 181864 1 29 N OV8672. 182448 1 1 BRACKET (V070-784144-001) CAN NOW BE INSTALLED BEC 182448 1 2 AUSE THE LOCATION HAS BEEN MOVED, AFT OF ORIGINAL 182448 1 3 LOCATION, TO ELIMINATE ANY INTERFERENCE WITH THE B 182448 1 4 ELLY BAND. THE PROBLEM WAS A DESIGN OVERSIGHT AND 182448 1 5 WAS RECTIFIED WITH RELEASED ENGINEERING. THE MIS 182448 1 6 DRILLED HOLE WAS PLUGGED, WITH A RIVET, TO MAINTAI 182448 1 7 N THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE STRINGER. THE M 182448 1 8 ISDRILLED HOLE WAS A WORKMANSHIP ERROR AND IS COVE 182448 1 9 RED BY AN MRB APPROVED REPAIR. THE V070-784144-00 182448 1 10 1 TRJ BRKT HAS BEEN INSTALLED ON INS-3-07-025. 182555 1 1 V070-393316-001 CARRIER PANEL HAD A MINOR DENT OR BEND IN THE LOWER CO 182555 1 2 RNER. THE BEND/DENT WAS STRAIGHTENED AND A DYE PEN INSPECTION WAS PERF 182555 1 3 ORMED. THE DYE PEN INSPECTION REVEALED NO DEFECTS WITH THE -001 CARRIE 182555 1 4 R PANEL. A FEW VERY MINOR SCRATCHES WERE ALSO NOTED AROUND THE DENT, A 182555 1 5 ND WERE CORROSION PROTECTED. THE PANEL WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTE 182555 1 6 D USE, AND MR ID'D. 182662 1 1 A WAIVER TO OMRS V00H00.020 TABLE TO HAVE AV BAY #3 ACCESS PANEL V070- 182662 1 2 660512-027 INSTALLED HAS BEEN WAIVED. REFERENCE ATTACHED COPY OF WAIVE 182662 1 3 R (WK0643). CLOSE THIS PR. 182824 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REMOVED FROM PANEL #4 182824 1 2 RH. REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER, AND REIN 182824 1 3 STALLED. THE INSULATOR IS OK FOR FLIGHT AND THE PR 182824 1 4 CAN BE CLOSED. 182865 1 1 DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE 2 EA V070-346141-001 SUPPORT BRACKETS, THE B 182865 1 2 RACKETS BECAME DELAMINATED. AN LRU PR WAS INITITATED TO ROUTE THE PART 182865 1 3 S TO THE HDA FOR SCRAP. NEW HARDWARE NOT REQUIRED T BE OBTAINED SINCE 182865 1 4 REMOVED BRACKETS WRE TO BE ROUTED TO LOGISTICS FOR STORAGE. PROBABLE C 182865 1 5 AUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS ADHESIVE WAS TOO STRONG FOR NON DESTRUCTIVE BR 182865 1 6 ACKET REMOVAL. ADHESIVE REMOVAL NOT REQUIRED FOR SCRAP HARDWARE. NO FU 182865 1 7 RTHER ENGINEERING OR SHOP ACTION REQUIRED.REF S/C ABOVE: FOR CLARIFICA 182865 1 8 TION PURPOSES, THE (2) BRACKETS REMOVED WAS RETURNING THE AREA ON 70W2 182865 1 9 101 FRAME TO B/P CONFIGURATION THEREFORE NEW PARTS WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 182865 1 10 BE OBTAINED EVEN THOUGH THE ORIGINAL (2) BRACKETS ARE TO BE SCRAPPED 182865 1 11 LOCALLY. 182959 1 1 ANALYSIS OF UNKNOWN SUBSTANCE IN THE FWD FUSE BY T 182959 1 2 HE NASA CHEMICAL ANALYSIS LAB REVEALED NO ALUMINUM 182959 1 3 OXIDE WAS PRESENT. THE PRESENCE OF THE SUBSTANCE 182959 1 4 WAS MR'D OK AS IS. CAUSE WAS VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. 183068 1 1 WAVINESS OF DOOR IS CAUSED BY THE RIVETING OF TWO 183068 1 2 DEBONDED FACE SHEETS. THIS REPAIR HAS BEEN MR'D OK 183068 1 3 AS IS AND CANNOT BE FIXED. NO FURTHER STRUCTURAL 183068 1 4 ACTION WILL BE TAKEN. REF. PR STR-3-07-1354 LH, 13 183068 1 5 58 RH. CLOSE PR. 183090 1 1 VISUAL INSPECTION OF INNER CONE BEARING RACES RE- 183090 1 2 VEALED NO UNACCEPTABLE PITS, SCRATCHES, OR OTHER 183090 1 3 DAMAGE. THE 0.015 BALL POINT SCRIBE USED TO MORE 183090 1 4 ACCURATELY MEASURE PITS/SCRATCHES (PER AIR FORCE 183090 1 5 TECHNICAL ORDER T.O. 44B-1-3 WHEEL ASSEMBLY INSTAL 183090 1 6 LATION. THIS WHEEL ASSEMBLY HAS FLOWN ON PREVIOUS 183090 1 7 MISSIONS WITH NO PROBLEMS. THE PIT AND 2 SMALL 183090 1 8 SCRATCHES NOTED ARE INSIGNIFICANT AND WILL BE NO 183090 1 9 PROBLEM/NO CONSTRAINT TO THE LAUNCH/LANDING OF FU- 183090 1 10 TURE FLIGHTS. THESE BEARING RACES ARE ACCEPTABLE 183090 1 11 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 183231 1 1 THE MINOR SCRATCHES ON THE V070-198502-002 FITTING IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 183231 1 2 1, PAGE 1 WAS INSPECTED BY ENGINEERING AND MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRES 183231 1 3 TRICTED USE. AS THE FITTING IS A RUB SURFACE, MR MARKING WAS NOT REQUI 183231 1 4 RED. THE SCRATCHES ARE A RESULT OF NORMAL FLIGHT DEGRADATION. CONCLUDE 183231 1 5 THE SCRATCHES ARE ACCEPTABLE AS IS AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 183245 1 1 RAISED METAL/SHARP EDGES IN SCORED GIMBLE BOLT HOLES HAVE BEEN REMOVED 183245 1 2 BY HAND USING ABRASIVE PAPER/CLOTH AND MR ACCEPTED. ITEMS 1 AND 2 HAV 183245 1 3 E BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRA 183245 1 4 DATION. ADDITIONAL INFO FROM BLK #20-STEPS 10-011, 01-010, 01-008, 012 183245 1 5 -022, 01-021. 183251 1 1 THE DEFECTS IN HOLES 5 & 11 WERE A RESULT OF A DES 183251 1 2 IGN DEFICIENCY. MR DISPO REAMED THE HOLES TO A MAX 183251 1 3 DIA OF 0.2188. FURTHER MR DISPO ACCEPTED HOLE 11 183251 1 4 "OK AS IS" DESPITE THE HOLE HAVING A LIGHT REAM MA 183251 1 5 RK. EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION CONFIRMED NO CRACKS WE 183251 1 6 RE PRESENT. 183277 1 1 ON PAGES 1 AND 1A, BOLTS COULD NOT BE RETURNED DUE TO INTERFERENCE FRO 183277 1 2 M OTHER BOLTS. DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO ALLOW THE REMOVAL OF INTERFING BOL 183277 1 3 TS FOR ACCESS. THIS ALLOWED BOLTS TO BE RETORQUED PER VSTR-3-07-317 ST 183277 1 4 EP 11.0 STEP 11.0 IN THE TPS IS COMPLETE. 183435 1 1 DISCREPANCY PART WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW PART TO BE INSTALLED DURING P 183435 1 2 OD INSTALLATION. CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 183843 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES LISTED ON PAGES 1 THRU 1E HAVE B 183843 1 2 EEN ACCEPTED AS IS OR RESOLVED BY THE FOLLOWING MR 183843 1 3 DISPOSITIONS: ITEM 2, SUB TEM 22 WAS A DISCREPANT 183843 1 4 AREA THAT WAS POTTED. THE FOLLOWING DISCREPANCIES 183843 1 5 WERE VOIDS THAT WERE VENTED: ITEM 1 SUB ITEMS 1,2 183843 1 6 ,3,6,8,9,10,11,12,14,18,19,20, ITEM 2 SUB ITEM 21, 183843 1 7 AND SUB ITEMS 23,24,25,26,29,31,33,35,36,37. THE 183843 1 8 FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE DEBONDED HEAT SHRINK THAT WAS 183843 1 9 TRIMMED OFF: ITEM 2 SUB ITEMS 15,16,17, ITEM 3 SU 183843 1 10 B ITEM 15, AND SUB ITEMS 25 AND 27. 183843 1 11 SUB ITEM 28 WAS RE-KOROPONED. SUB ITEM 32 WAS FOAM 183843 1 12 THAT WAS REMOVED. THE FOLLOWING WERE ACCEPTED AS 183843 1 13 IS: ITEM 1 SUB ITEMS 15,16,22, ITEM 2 SUB ITEMS 4 183843 1 14 AND 13, ITEM 3 SUB ITEMS 5 AND 7, AND SUB ITEMS 30 183843 1 15 ,34,AND 38. DESIGN INTENT OF THE RTV-HEAT SINK INS 183843 1 16 TALLATION HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. 183888 1 1 THE MR PART THAT WAS WORKED ON MEQ-3-07-0359 WAS NOT DRILLED IN THE CO 183888 1 2 RRECT PLACES CAUSING AN INTERFERENCE FIT THAT ALSO CAUSED THE SCREWS T 183888 1 3 O CROSS THREAD WHEN ISTALLED. A PER PRINT PART WAS FIT CHECKED AND COU 183888 1 4 LD BE INSTALLED SO WILL BE USED IN PLACE OF THE MR PART. 184142 1 1 V070-335083 AND V070-339521 REAR WINDOW CLOSEOUTS WERE FOUND TO BE MIS 184142 1 2 SING BLACK TOP COAT. TOP COAT WAS APPLIED PER DRAWING. PROBABLE CAUSE 184142 1 3 WAS THAT TOP COAT WAS NOT REQUIRED FOR LAST FLOW. 184164 1 1 AN ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION REVEALS THAT THE THREE COSMETIC SCRATCHES 184164 1 2 DO NOT GO THRU THE MBO125-063 SURFACE COATING. THE TITANIUM FACESHEET 184164 1 3 HAS NOT BEEN PENETRATED. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE SCRATCHES ARE DUE TO NOR 184164 1 4 MAL WEAR AND TEAR DURING ORBITER PROCESSING. 184354 1 1 THE B91B15075-20 STIFFENER WAS SUCCESSFULLY INSTAL 184354 1 2 LED PER THE PR/MR DISPOSITION. THE INTENT OF THE 184354 1 3 B91B15010-Z WING SPAR MOD WAS COMPLETED. 184382 1 1 ITEM 1: WHEN INSTALLING BOLT, NUTPLATE BROKE LOOSE AT LOCATION #25 ENG 184382 1 2 #3 R/H DOME H/S. THE H/S WAS FLOWN FOR STS-33 WITH A BOLT AND NUT HEL 184382 1 3 D IN PLACE WHILE TORQUING. THE NUTPLATE HAS BEEN REPLACED POST FLIGHT 184382 1 4 STS-33. ITEM 2,3,4: SEVERAL NUTPLATES AROUND ENG 1,2,3 ARE DAMAGED. TH 184382 1 5 ESE NUTPLATES WERE REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEA 184382 1 6 R. 184590 1 1 ABOVE DISCREPANCY SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN AGAINST 184590 1 2 PR STR-3-07-1702 WHICH ALREADY DOCUMENTS HEAT SIN 184590 1 3 K PROBLEMS IN L/H BAY 5. A PAGE 1B HAS NOW BEEN W 184590 1 4 RITTEN CORRECTING THIS ERROR. THIS PR IS NO LONGE 184590 1 5 R REQUIRED. 184653 1 1 THE FOLLOWING STRUTS WERE FOUND TO BE UNDERSIZED BY .001 TO .002 INCHE 184653 1 2 S IN DIAMETER: ITEM # PART # LOCATION 184653 1 3 Xw, Yw 184653 1 4 1.0 B91B60080-33 868.0, GLOVE BOX 184653 1 5 2.0 B91B60081-27 979.5, GLOVE BOX 184653 1 6 3.0 B91B60081-29 1009.75, GLOVE BOX 184653 1 7 4.0 B91B60082-41 1009.75, GLOVE BOX 184653 1 8 5.0 B91B60082-49 949.25, GLOVE BOX 184653 1 9 6.0 B91B10137-31 1307.0, 167.0 184653 1 10 7.0 B91B10138-27 1191.0, 226.0 184653 1 11 8.0 B91B10357-43 1307.0, 254.0 184653 1 12 9.0 B91B10147-29 1249.9, 282.0 184653 1 13 10.0 B91B10143-31 1307.0, 372.5 184653 1 14 A DETAILED STRESS ANALYSIS PERFORMED BY ROCKWELL DOWNEY ON THE DISCREP 184653 1 15 ANT CONDITION OF THE STRUTS REVEALED THAT A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY 184653 1 16 EXISTS FOR EACH STRUT INSTALLATION. THESE STRUTS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR 184653 1 17 FLIGHT. AFTER RETURN FROM FLIGHT 11 (STS-41), THE STRUTS WERE MR ID'ED 184653 1 18 AND NO NEW DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. 184659 1 1 FRSD TANK SUPPORT STRUT ME270-0006-0002 SURFACE SC 184659 1 2 RATCHES HAD MOLD IMPRESSIONS TAKEN AND VISUAL INSP 184659 1 3 ECTION WAS PERFORMED. VISUAL INSPECTION FOUND THAT 184659 1 4 NO BORON THREADS WERE CUT OR VISIBLE. SCRATCH DEP 184659 1 5 TH DID NOT EXTEND BEYOND 0.003 INCHES MAX ALLOWED. 184659 1 6 THESE TWO CONDITIONS MEET DESIGN REQUIREMENTS EST 184659 1 7 ABLISHED BY ROCKWELL ENGINEERING. BORON STRUT STRU 184659 1 8 CTURAL INTEGRITY HAS NOT BEEN COMPROMISED. STRUT M 184659 1 9 .R. APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, MARKED AT SCRAT 184659 1 10 CH LOCATIONS, AND PAINT SURFACE RESTORED RETURNED 184659 1 11 TO SPARES. REPLACEMENT STRUT WILL BE INSTALLED PER 184659 1 12 OMI V5R02. 184662 1 1 ALL DISCREPANT SEALS HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND REPLAC 184662 1 2 ED. ALL SORK STEPS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND VEHICLE 184662 1 3 RETURNED TO PRINT 184781 1 1 CARRIER PANEL, P/N V070-194101-006, ROLLED BURR DISCREPANCY WAS RESOLV 184781 1 2 ED IN STEP 1.0 BY SANDING DOWN BURR TO OBTAIN A SMOOTH SURFACE PER MR 184781 1 3 REPAIR. CORROSION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED AND MR ID ACCOMPLISHED PER ST 184781 1 4 EPS 2.0 AND 3.0. 184859 1 1 02 RELIEF PORT FLIGHT FITTING V070-454721-002 HAS BEEN ASSIGNED AN OCN 184859 1 2 #. NO MARKING OF PART IS REQUIRED. 184998 1 1 THE V070-194118-002 SUPPORT TAB THAT DEBONDED FROM THE V070-198541 SEA 184998 1 2 L PANEL AT Yw 367 WAS REBONDED PER V9045. THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN RETURNE 184998 1 3 D TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PART DEBONDING IS POOR SU 184998 1 4 RFACE PREPARATION PRIOR TO BOND. 185131 1 1 IT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY ULTRASONIC TESTING THA 185131 1 2 T THE PLBD HINGE PINS ARE NOT DEFECTIVE(REPORT #27 185131 1 3 606B). HOWEVER, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE V070-37 185131 1 4 0003 DRAWING DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR HINGE PIN COMPON 185131 1 5 ENT TOUCH-UP AFTER INSTALLATION. THIS PR AUTHORIZE 185131 1 6 D THE RELEASE OF AN EO-TO-FOLLOW TO CLARIFY DWG V0 185131 1 7 70-370003, FOR ALL VEHICLES, FOR PAINT TOUCH-UP AF 185131 1 8 TER INSTALLATION. RECURRENCE CONTROL ACTION IS ALS 185131 1 9 O SATISFIED BY THE EO WHICH ALLOWS TOUCH-UP CAPABI 185131 1 10 LITY 185274 1 1 CONICAL WASHERS (FILLERS) WERE BONDED IN PER PRINT. APPARENT CAUSE: PO 185274 1 2 OR ORIGINAL BONDS. CLOSE THIS PR. 185364 1 1 PG 1 ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED A V070-399114-001 WAFER MISSING FROM 185364 1 2 THE TOP LINK OF THE RH BODY FLAP CHAIN SEAL. THIS PROBLEM WAS CORRECT 185364 1 3 ED BY ORDERING A NEW WAFER & INSTL'G IT IN THE CHAIN LINE. DISCREPANCY 185364 1 4 NO LONGER EXISTS. CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT OF EO FOR STEP 7. 185668 1 1 THIS PR WAS TRANSFERED TO AN EXISTING PR AT THE SA 185668 1 2 ME LOCATION. THIS PR IS NO LONGER REQUIRED. 185670 1 1 THE MR PATCH WAS SANDED DOWN TO .016" IN THE AREA 185670 1 2 OF INTERFERENCE. THE STIFFENER WAS SHIMMED UP AROU 185670 1 3 ND THE PATCH. THIS INTERFERENCE WAS FORSEEN BY GRU 185670 1 4 MMAN BUT THE PATCH WAS THICKER THAN ANTICIPATED. C 185670 1 5 LOSE THIS PR. 185674 1 1 FOR ITEM #1 ON PAGE 1- THE CLIPS WERE UNABLE TO BE 185674 1 2 INSTALLED PER PRINT DUE TO A MISALIGNMENT OF PILO 185674 1 3 T HOLES-MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN FOR A DIMENSIO 185674 1 4 NSAL ANALYSIS (KSC FAILURE ANALYSIS REQUEST ATTACE 185674 1 5 D). SHIM WAS MANUFACTURED THICK ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN 185674 1 6 THE PILOT HOLE CENTERLINE AND THE CLIP WAS INSTAL 185674 1 7 LED WITH THE SHIM INSTALLED. FOR ITEMS #2 AND #3 O 185674 1 8 N PAGE 1A- THE CLIPS INSTALLED WERE NOT PER PRINT- 185674 1 9 AN E.O. WAS ISSUDED WHICH RELEASED A NEW REVISION 185674 1 10 OF THE DRAWING. THE USE OF THE CLIPS IS REFLECTED 185674 1 11 AS A CHANGE ON THIS NEW REVISION AND THEY ARE TO B 185674 1 12 E INSTALLED. THE CLIP WAS INSTALLED AS PART OF THE 185674 1 13 SOLUTION TO ITEM #1. 185749 1 1 THE INBOARD JOBOLT THAT FASTENS THE V070-198812-001 BLOCK ASSY (RUB PA 185749 1 2 NEL HOLDOWN) TO THE UPPER ELEVON SURFACE WAS FOUND TO HAVE A LOW PIN B 185749 1 3 REAKOFF. THE SUSPECT JOBOLT FASTENS THE BLOCK DOWN SUFFICIENTLY WITH N 185749 1 4 O LOSS OF STRUCTUAL INTEGRITY OR FUNCTION. TO PREVENT LOSS OF DEBRIS I 185749 1 5 NSIDE ELEVON AND DAMAGE TO THE HONEY COMB FACE SHEET STRUCTURE OF THE 185749 1 6 ELEVON SKIN, ENGINEERING HAS DECIDED TO MR DISPO "UNRESTRICTED AS IS" 185749 1 7 AND IDENTIFY WITH MR MARKINGS. FASTENER WILL NOT BE REPLACED. CLOSE TH 185749 1 8 IS PR. 185898 1 1 ENGINEERING INSPECTION OF THE ET FITTING LUG THRUS 185898 1 2 T STRUCTURE SHOWS SIGNS OF HEAT FLOW AND A MATERIA 185898 1 3 L DEPOSIT. THE HEAT FLOW WAS DETERMINED TO BE A NO 185898 1 4 RMAL FLIGHT CONDITION. THE RESIDUE FROM THE ET FIT 185898 1 5 TING, NEAR THE LH2 DISCONNECT, WAS ANALYZED USING 185898 1 6 INFRARED SPECTROPHOTOMETRIC TECHNIQUES AND DETERMI 185898 1 7 NED TO BE OUTGASSING OF TPS RTV MATERIAL. THERE IS 185898 1 8 NO EVIDENCE OF WHITE CORROSION PRODUCTS. S/C HEAT 185898 1 9 FLOW IS AN ACCEPTED CONDITION IN THIS AREA. NO DI 185898 1 10 SCREPANCY EXISTS. 186087 1 1 INCORRECT HARDWARE WAS REMOVED (COUNTERSINK SCREWS). FILLERS (CONICAL 186087 1 2 WASHERS) WERE BONDED IN PLACE. CORRECT HARDWARE (PROTRUDING HEAD SCRE 186087 1 3 WS WILL BE INSTALLED BY CARRIER PANEL INSTALLATION JOB CARD, V80-95947 186087 1 4 . CLOSE THIS PR. 186179 1 1 THIS PR IS A DUPLICATE OF STR-3-09-2925. THE MD114-5003-0004 NUTPLATES 186179 1 2 HAVE BEEN MR ACCEPTED BY STR-3-09-2925. 186191 1 1 MOLD IMPRESSION RESULTS OF SCRATCHES IN THE BORON 186191 1 2 STRUT SURFACE SHOW THE DEPTH OF SCRATCH #2 GREATE 186191 1 3 R THAN THE ALLOWABLE DESIGN CRITERIA OF .003 IN. ( 186191 1 4 SCRATCH #2 MEASURED .0033 IN.). ALSO CUT BORON FIB 186191 1 5 ERS WERE NOTED DURING AN INSPECTION WITH A 10X GLA 186191 1 6 SS WHICH IS ALSO A VIOLATION OF DESIGN CENTER CRIT 186191 1 7 ERIA. AN LRU PR HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO ROUTE THE STRU 186191 1 8 T BACK TO THE VENDOR WHERE IT WILL UNDERGO FUNCTIO 186191 1 9 NAL INTEGRITY TESTS AND EVALUATION DUE TO THE ABOV 186191 1 10 E MENTIONED DISCREPANCY. A REPLACEMENT STRUT WAS 186191 1 11 OBTAINED FROM SPARES. R.C. ACTION-DEVELOP BETTER M 186191 1 12 ETHODS AND CRITERIA FOR THE HANDLING, UNCRATING, A 186191 1 13 ND THE STORAGE OF THE BORON STRUTS BY ALL PARTIES 186191 1 14 INVOLVED. (I.E. SHOP, LOGISTICS, ETC.) 186271 1 1 THE SCRATCH AND DENTS WERE MINOR AND APPROVED BY M 186271 1 2 R FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE SCRATCH WAS BLENDED A 186271 1 3 ND RE-CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR I.D. ALONG WITH T 186271 1 4 HE DENT. CAUSE OF SCRATCHES & DENTS DUE TO CARELE 186271 1 5 SSNESS. CLOSE THIS PR. 186357 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF PR MEQ-3-A0039. PR MEQ 186357 1 2 -3-A0039 WAS DEFERRED FROM FLIGHT 11 (OV-103) IN ORDER TO ACCEPT THE V 186357 1 3 070-510120-001 GUIDE FOR RESTRICTED USE OF ONE FLIGHT WITH THE UNDERST 186357 1 4 ANDING THAT THE GUIDE WOULD BE REPLACED BEFORE FLIGHT 12 (REF. PAGE 1D 186357 1 5 & 55 FOR MRB APPROVAL). THE V070-510120-001 GUIDE WAS REMOVED AND REP 186357 1 6 LACED PER WORKSTEPS 166,173,181, & 192 IN PR MEQ-3-A0039 (REF. PAGES 5 186357 1 7 8-66). AN LRU PR WAS INITIATED TO ROUTE THE DISCREPANT V070-510120-001 186357 1 8 GUIDE (OCN AU7854) TO HDA/RECOMMEND SCRAP (REF. STEP 185.4). THE PR C 186357 1 9 ONDITIONS NO LONGER EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL DEGRADATION. NO RETE 186357 1 10 ST REQ'D. 186855 1 1 REPLACING MISSING SEAL RETURNS FLIPPER DOOR #6 TO 186855 1 2 PRINT CONFIGURATION. 186855 1 3 MSG-ID NOT KNOWN. 186948 1 1 NO FURTHER DISPOSITION OR WORK IS REQ'D. 186953 1 1 AS STATED IN THE INITIAL DISCREPANCY FLIGHT CAPS AT THE FOLLOWING LOCA 186953 1 2 TIONS WERE REMOVED & REPLACED W/O RECORDING OCN NO'S: 40V45PD0030 (H2 186953 1 3 TK 1 FILL), 40V45P0040 (H2 TK 2 FILL),40V45PD450 (H2 TK 3 FILL), 40V4 186953 1 4 5PD550 (H2 TK 4 FILL). PRSD FLIGHT CAPS ARE REMOVED & REPLACED SEVERAL 186953 1 5 TIMES THRUOUT THE FLOW TO SUPPORT ROUTINE TESTING. THE FINAL FLIGHT C 186953 1 6 AP INSTL'N (PRIOR TO FLIGHT) IS PERFORMED IN OMI V3538. THE OCN'S ARE 186953 1 7 RECORDED AT THAT TIME. A COPY OF OMI V3538 (STEP 04-028) IS ATTACHED ( 186953 1 8 ATTACH 1). 186956 1 1 AFT SCREW AND NUTPLATE ON LESS LOWER #8 C/P WAS STRIPPED OUT. THE SCRE 186956 1 2 W HEAD WAS DRILLED OFF AND NUTPLATE REPLACED PER DRAWING. PROBABLE CAU 186956 1 3 SE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 187022 1 1 BLANKET REPAIR & SEAL & BLANKET TRIMMING ELIMINATE 187022 1 2 D PROBLEM. 187288 1 1 ENG INSPECTION INDICATE THAT PIN HOLES ARE MINOR 187288 1 2 AND DO NOT REQUIRE REPAIR. THESE CONDITIONS ARE 187288 1 3 ACCEPTABLE AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THESE 187288 1 4 CONDITIONS WILL NOT ADVERSLEY EFFECT THE FIT, FORM 187288 1 5 FUNCTION OR HEAT TRANSFER CAPABILITIES OF RAD 187288 1 6 PNL R2. MR ID REQUIRED. 187344 1 1 ITEM 1: THE LOWER OUTBOARD EDGE OF THE TRAILING EDGE SEAL WAS SLIGHTLY 187344 1 2 DAMAGED. THE DAMAGED MATERIAL WAS REMOVED PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE 187344 1 3 TO ROUGH HANDLING. 187356 1 1 THE TWO MPM SHOULDER BOLTS WHICH WERE LOOSE WERE FOUND TO SHOW SIGNS T 187356 1 2 HEY "BOTTOMED OUT". NO SIGNS OF GAULLING EXISTED AND 2 REPLACEMENT BOL 187356 1 3 TS (1 DASH # SHORTER) WERE INSTALLED AND TORQUED PER DRAWING. NO FURTH 187356 1 4 ER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ORIGINAL BOLTS TOO LONG. 187436 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 187436 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 187436 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 187436 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 187436 1 5 3-C1. 187492 1 1 NUTPLATE THREADS SLIGHTLY BURRED. NUTPLATE DEBURRED AND CLEANED UP. PR 187492 1 2 OBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 187504 1 1 FOR O2 TANK 2 S/N SHT0020 THE INBD TRUNNION PLATE RUNNING TORQUE WAS 4 187504 1 2 " LBS, S/B 32-300 "LBS. THE TRUNNION PLATE WAS REMOVED AND THE TRUNNIO 187504 1 3 N PLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. THEN THE TRUNNION PLATE WAS RE-INSTA 187504 1 4 LLED. RUNNING TORQUE WAS THEN CHECKED 51" LBS. ALLOWABLE IS 32-300" LB 187504 1 5 S. 187621 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN HYDRAULIC FLUID WAS OBSERVED ON THE TOP SUR 187621 1 2 FACE OF THE NLG STRUT AROUND THE METERING PIN RETAINING RING (P/N 1170 187621 1 3 645-1). THE FLUID WAS CLEANED OFF THE STRUT, AND THE STRUT WAS MONITOR 187621 1 4 ED FOR ADDITIONAL LEAKAGE. DURING AN INITIAL 8 HR 19 MIN. MONITORING P 187621 1 5 ERIOD NO LEAKAGE WAS DETECTED. A PAGE 1A WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE NOS 187621 1 6 E GEAR BEING DOWN DURING LEAKAGE MONITORING PERIOD. (NOTE: IF A LEAK E 187621 1 7 XISTED AT THE O-RING BENEATH THE METERING PIN RETAINING RING, THE LEAK 187621 1 8 WOULD OCCUR WITH THE GEAR EITHER UP OR DOWN SINCE THE FLUID PRESSURE 187621 1 9 IN THE O-RING IS THE SAME.) FOUR ADDITIONAL LEAK INSPECTIONS WERE PERF 187621 1 10 ORMED OVER A 12 DAY PERIOD. ONE OF THE FOUR CHECKS REVEALED ONE DROP O 187621 1 11 F FLUID ON THE TOP OF THE STRUT "...AROUND THE BLEEDER PORT..." ENGINE 187621 1 12 ERING INSPECTION FOUND RESIDUAL FLUID BENEATH THE METERING PIN RETAINI 187621 1 13 NG RING. THE RETAINING RING WAS REMOVED FROM THE TOP OF THE STRUT AND 187621 1 14 RESIDUAL FLUID WAS FOUND ALONG INNER AND OUTER EDGES OF THE RING, AND 187621 1 15 IN THE ADJACENT MATING SURFACE ON THE TOP OF THE STRUT. THE TOP SURFAC 187621 1 16 E OF THE O-RING WAS INSPECTED AND NO DEFECTS WERE FOUND. THE RESIDUAL 187621 1 17 FLUID WAS CLEANED OFF THE STRUT AND THE RING, AND A FLUID CONTAIMENT S 187621 1 18 YSTEM WAS PLACED ON THE TOP OF THE STRUT. THE NOSE GEAR WAS CYCLED UP 187621 1 19 FOR 29 HRS 165 MIN. AFTER THE NOSE GEAR WAS CYCLED BACK DOWN, THE CONT 187621 1 20 AINMENT DEVICE AND TOP OF STRUT WAS INSPECTED FOR LEAKAGE AND NO FLUID 187621 1 21 WAS DETECTED. THE RETAINING RING AND FASTENING HARDWARE WAS RE-INSTAL 187621 1 22 LED. A NEW LEAK WAS DETECTED AROUND THE GLAND NUT WHERE THE LOWER PIST 187621 1 23 ON ASSY INTERFACES WITH THE UPPER STRUT HOUSING. THE FLUID WAS REMOVED 187621 1 24 AND AFTER AT LEAST 3 DAYS 16 HOURS HAD ELAPSED, THE FLUID CLEANUP CLO 187621 1 25 TH WEIGHT WAS MEASURED BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER FLUID CLEANUP. KNOWING TH 187621 1 26 AT 3.6 DROPS (0.08 GRAMS) OF FLUID HAD LEAKED, A LEAK RATE OF LESS THA 187621 1 27 N 0.05 DROPS PER HOUR WAS ESTABLISHED. SINCE THE FLUID LEAK PATH WAS T 187621 1 28 HROUGH A DYNAMIC SEAL, A LEAK RATE OF 1.5 DROPS PER HOUR IS THE MAXIMU 187621 1 29 M ALLOWABLE (REF OMRS V51ACO. 020). THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS 187621 1 30 FLUID SPILLAGE DURING STRUT SERVICING FROM BLEEDER VALVE CONNECTION/DI 187621 1 31 SCONNECTION WITH S70-0645 SERVICING UNIT, AND HYDRAULIC LEAK WITH AN A 187621 1 32 CCEPTABLE LEAK RATE FROM A NOSE STRUT DYNAMIC SEAL. NO RETEST REQUIRED 187630 1 1 THE MONIEL RIVETS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH H 187630 1 2 UCK LOCK RIVETS PER THE DRAWING. NO FURTHER ACTION 187630 1 3 IS REQUIRED. 187644 1 1 DEFECT IS DUPLICATE OF STR-3-07-1786. DEFECT 1.2 187644 1 2 THIS DEFECT WILL BE ADDRESSED ON STR-3-07-1786. 187679 1 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSPECTION OF THIS DAMAGE CON- 187679 1 2 DITIONS INDICATES THAT THE DAMAGE IS MINOR. THESE 187679 1 3 CONDITIONS ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO REQUIRE A 187679 1 4 REPAIR. THE SCRATCH AND HOLE AND DAMAGE IS TO THE 187679 1 5 SILVER TEFLON TAPE ONLY. THIS MINOR TAPE DAMAGE IS 187679 1 6 ALLOWABLE PER VOUGHT RADIATOR REAPIR MANUAL. THE 187679 1 7 DING IF ANY ARE MINOR AND DO NOT REQUIRE A REPAIR. 187679 1 8 THESE CONDITIONS WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT FIT FORM 187679 1 9 AND FUNCTION OF THE RAIDATOR PANEL. 187814 1 1 REMOVE WATERPROOF SOLUTION RESIDUAL WITH CLEAN 187814 1 2 CLOTHES DAMPENED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL (TT-1-735) 187814 1 3 FROM THE HATCH SEALS & SURFACES. DRY WITH CLEAN 187814 1 4 LINT FREE CLOTHES & VISUALLY VERIFY THAT RESIDUAL 187814 1 5 HAS BEEN REMOVED. 187893 1 1 THE (2) MD114-5004-0005 NUTPLATES UNDER THE V070-146070-001 AND V070-1 187893 1 2 46070-002 LINKS WERE NOT PROPERLY CENTERED WHEN RIVET HOLES WERE DRILL 187893 1 3 ED ON THE LINKS. THIS CONDITION WAS FOUND WHEN WORKING PR STR-3-11-320 187893 1 4 3 (REFERENCE ATTAHCMENT "A" OF SUCH PR). THE ABOVE DISCREPANCY WAS CA 187893 1 5 USING THE V070-146068-002 BOLT THREADS TO COME INTO CONTACT WITH THE N 187893 1 6 UTPLATE METAL AND THUS BECOMING FLAT. THESE ARE THE KEYSTONE BOLTS THA 187893 1 7 T CLOSE OUT RIGHT HAND FLIPPER DOOR #12. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO S 187893 1 8 LOT (1) RIVET HOLE IN EACH OF THE (2) MD114-5004-0005 NUTPLATES PROVID 187893 1 9 ING MORE FLEXIBILITY DURING NUTPLATE INSTALLATION. THIS ALLOWS THE COR 187893 1 10 RECT ALIGNMENT OF THE LINK AND NUTPLATE HOLES. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMAN 187893 1 11 SHIP . WHEN THE V070-146070-001 AND -002 LINKS WERE OBTAINED THE RIVET 187893 1 12 HOLES WERE NOT DRILLED IN THE PROPER LOCATION FOR ALIGNMENT OF THE LI 187893 1 13 NK AND NUTPLATE HOLES. 187983 1 1 DURING RSI-3-12-169, TWO VOIDS WERE FOUND IN THE EPOXY FILLER USED ON 187983 1 2 BLIND FASTENER HEADS ON THE ELEVON HINGE TUBE. THE VOIDS WERE ACCEPTED 187983 1 3 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP DURING ORIGINAL I 187983 1 4 NSTALLATION. 188011 1 1 TORQUE REQUIRED TO LATCH THE SIDE HATCH FROM OUTSIDE WAS 375 IN-LBS, 188011 1 2 SHOULD BE 350 IN-LBS MAX PER OMRSD V33AA0.040-A. WAIVER VK2102 HAS BEEN 188011 1 3 APPROVED TO ACCEPT THE HIGHER LATCHING TORQUE FOR ONE FLIGHT ONLY. RCN 188011 1 4 KV10112 IS BEING PROCESSED TO INCREASE MAX ALLOWABLE TORUQE TO 400 188011 1 5 IN-LBS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS COMBINED RESISTANCE OF THE (18) LATCHES AND 188011 1 6 THE HIGHER INTERNAL RESISTANCE OF THE NEW ACTUATOR. 188011 1 7 188074 1 1 ELONGATION IS IN BULKHEAD ONLY. THESE HOLSE ARE DO 188074 1 2 CUMENTED ON ROCKWELL EO M-956335 SHT 4, AND ARE MA 188074 1 3 RKED. REFER TO LOCATION ON EO MARKED WITH SYMBOL F 188074 1 4 OR SUPPORTING NOTES. HOLES ARE PER PRINT. 188088 1 1 DUE TO VERY LOW CURRENT DRAW, INSUFFICIENT H2O WAS 188088 1 2 PRODUCED TO FLOOD FC1. THE H20 GENERATED IS NOT D 188088 1 3 ETRIMENTAL TO FUEL CELL 1 PERFORMANCE KSC OMI'S AR 188088 1 4 E BEING CORRECTED TO REFLECT THE OMRSD REQUIREMENT 188088 1 5 & JSC HAS REPORTED THE CREW EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 188088 1 6 WILL ADD THE SWITCH POSITION CHK. A WAIVER HAS BEE 188088 1 7 N REQUESTED. THE KSC OMI'S THAT REQUIRE CORRECTION 188088 1 8 S PER THE WAIVER WK0131 IS S0026 EAFB ORB LANDING, 188088 1 9 & V9001 ORB PWR UP & DOWN. CLOSE THIS PR UPON REC 188088 1 10 EIPT OF WAIVER & THE CHANGES TO OMI'S S0026&V9001. 188169 1 1 SURFACE CORROSION WAS FOUND ON THE MOUNTING RIVETS OF ALL FOUR BODY FL 188169 1 2 AP ROTARY ACTUATOR SUPPORT STRUCTURES. SAMPLES WERE TAKEN TO THE MICRO 188169 1 3 CHEMICAL ANALYSIS LAB AND CONFIRMED THE PRESENCE OF CORROSION (REFEREN 188169 1 4 CE ATTACHED LAB ANALYSIS). THE RIVET HEADS AND SURROUNDING STRUCTURE W 188169 1 5 ERE CLEANED USING BEHR-TEX DAMPENED WITH IPA AND LATTER INSPECTED FOR 188169 1 6 ANY ADDITIONAL SIGNS OF CORROSION; NO CORROSION WAS FOUND. ALL RIVET H 188169 1 7 EADS AND SURROUNDING STRUCTURE WERE CORROSION PROTECTED IN ALL LOCATIO 188169 1 8 NS (REFERENCE ATTACHMENT "B") PER MA0608-301 CODE 00-AA-28-XX. NO CARR 188169 1 9 IER PANELS OR DOORS HAD TO BE REMOVED PER THIS PR SINCE V80-05859 JOB 188169 1 10 CARD WAS OPENED FOR TILE WORK. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION 188291 1 1 WIRE SCREEN MESH WAS TORN AROUND A CORNER OF THE V070-340375-010 GAP F 188291 1 2 ILLER. THE DISCREPANT MESH WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED USING MBO130-144 A 188291 1 3 DHESIVE. THIS RETURNED THE PART TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. 188326 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE LATCH PULL TEST ON THE LH ET DOO 188326 1 2 R NOT BEING PERFORMED IN THE DISIRED TEST RANGE. THE LATCH PULL TEST F 188326 1 3 IXTURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN POSITIONED 1.37 +/- 0.100 INCHES VERTICAL TRAV 188326 1 4 EL DISTANCE FROM THE FULLY-LATCHED POSITION. INSTEAD, THE TEST FIXTURE 188326 1 5 WAS POSITIONED AT APPROXIMATELY 0.150 - 0.200" FROM BEING FULLY-LATCH 188326 1 6 ED. THIS ERROR WAS CAUSED BY A MISITERPRETATION OF THE DIAL INDICATOR 188326 1 7 MEASUREMENT SCALE. THE 0.100" SCALE WAS MISINTERPRETED TO READ 1.00". 188326 1 8 THE ERROR WAS IDETIFIED AFTER A COMPLETE MOTOR 1 TEST CYCLE AND A MOT 188326 1 9 OR 2 LATCH CYCLE UNDER LOAD WAS PERFORMED. A TEST CYCLE CONSISTS OF RA 188326 1 10 ISING A SUSPENDED LOAD APPROX 0.500" TO VERIFY NO MOTOR STALLING OR TO 188326 1 11 RQUE LIMITER SLIPPAGE AND THEN LOWERING BACK TO THE STARTING POSITION. 188326 1 12 ALSO DUE TO THE ERROR IN READING THE DIAL INDICATOR, THE TEST FIXTURE 188326 1 13 ONLY TRAVELED 0.050" WHICH DID NOT RAISE THE TEST FIXTURE OFF OF THE 188326 1 14 DERRICK SUPPORT STAND BUT ONLY PARTIALLY RELIEVED THE PRELOAD DEFORMA 188326 1 15 TION FROM THE SUSPENDED LOAD OF 1150 LBS, AS A RESULT, THE UPLOCK LATC 188326 1 16 CHES DID NOT SEE THE FULL WEIGHT OF THE LOAD. IN ADDITION, DURING THE 188326 1 17 LATCH TEST CYCLES (BEFORE THE READING ERROR WAS IDENTIFIED), NO ANOMAL 188326 1 18 IES WITH THE HARDWARE WERE OBSERVED. BASED ON THIS INFORMATION, THE FU 188326 1 19 NCTIONAL TEST WAS RESTARTED AT THE CORRECT TEST RANGE POSITION AND NO 188326 1 20 MOTOR STALLING OR TORQUE LIMITER SLIPPAGE WAS OBSERVED FOR EITHER MOTO 188326 1 21 R 1 OR 2. THE INTEGRITY OF THE LH ET DOOR UPLOCK LATCHES AND DRIVE LIN 188326 1 22 KAGES WERE RETESTED WITH NO ANOMALIES. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATOR ERROR. 188326 1 23 THIS CONDITION WAS EVALUATED BY RI STRESS AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT 188326 1 24 LOADING IN THE LATCH DRIVE SYSTEM WAS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. 188350 1 1 DISCREPANT FASTENER WAS REPLACED FROM PROTRUDING 188350 1 2 HEAD RIVET WHICH INTERFERED W/ SUPPORT INSTL TO FL 188350 1 3 USH SHEAR RIVET. MR WAS REQ'D ON STIFFENER & SUPP 188350 1 4 ORT TO OK REPLACEMENT OF RIVET. FASTENER LOC NOT 188350 1 5 REQ'D PER PRINT FOR SUPPORT BUT ONLY FOR STIFFENER 188350 1 6 . THIS ACTION ALLOWS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF STIF 188350 1 7 FENER & SUPPORT. 188555 1 1 TPS VSTR-3-07-282 REMOVED THE BOLT RETAINER ASSY THAT HOLDS THE MISSIN 188555 1 2 G V070-352878-001 WRENCH FITTING IN PLACE. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE BOLT R 188555 1 3 ETAINER ASSY, THE WRENCH FITTING WAS TAPED IN PLACE. UPON REINSTALLATI 188555 1 4 ON OF THE BOLT RETAINER ASSY IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE WRENCH FITTING 188555 1 5 WAS NO LONGER TAPED IN PLACE. AFTER AN EXTENSIVE SEARCH WAS MADE IN T 188555 1 6 HE AFT IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE WRENCH FITTING WAS NOT THERE. THE W 188555 1 7 AY THE WRENCH FITTING SITS OVER THE GIMBALL BOLTS AND THEN TAPED IN PL 188555 1 8 ACE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR IT TO FALL OFF. IN ORDER FOR THE WRENCH FIT 188555 1 9 TING TO BE MISSING, IT MUST HAVE BEEN REMOVED BY UNAUTHORIZED WORK AND 188555 1 10 THEN MISPLACED. VSTR-2-08-253 CANNIBALIZED A WRENCH FITTING FROM OV- 188555 1 11 102 AND VSTR-3-07-282 INSTALLED THE WRENCH FITTING IN OV-103. STEP 2. 188555 1 12 0 DELETES THE ORDERING STEP SINCE THE CANNIBALIZATION TPS INSTALLS THE 188555 1 13 NEW WRENCH FITTING, IT WILL ALSO ORDER IT. DESCREPANT CONDITION NO L 188555 1 14 ONGER EXISTS. QC NOTE: LAR WRITTEN. 188960 1 1 UPON COMPLETION OF REWORK, REPLACEMENT WILL SATISF 188960 1 2 Y THE DWG INTENT. 189089 1 1 THE EO V070-156850 B06 SHT. 1 REFLECTS THE WORK AC 189089 1 2 COMPLISHED ON THIS PR. CAUSE: ENG DWG. 189136 1 1 REF ITEM 1, PAGE 1, EXPOSED METAL ADJACENT TO AFT FASTENER ON FLIPPER 189136 1 2 DOOR RUB PANEL #5, RH INBOARD ELEVON, WITH NO APPARENT DENT OR DAMAGE 189136 1 3 TO SURFACE. DISCREPANCY WAS MR REPAIRED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BY APPLYI 189136 1 4 NG HIGH TEMPERATURE COATING TO THE EXPOSED INCONEL FACESHEET. FLIPPER 189136 1 5 DOOR RUB PANEL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THIS PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE C 189136 1 6 AUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 189349 1 1 GAP ON FLIPPER DOOR INSPECTED & FOUND TO BE OK. AS 189349 1 2 IS, AND APPROVED BY MRG. OVERTORQUED BOLTS INSPEC 189349 1 3 TED AND ALSO FOUND TO BE MRB-OK AS IS. UNDERTORQUE 189349 1 4 D BOLTS INCREASED TO PROPER TORQUE. CLOSE PR. 189439 1 1 WHEN ALL ABOVE WORK IS ACCOMPLISHED, INSTL OF NEW 189439 1 2 ITEM RETORES THE STRUCTURAL SYSTEM TO PRINT EQUIVA 189439 1 3 LENT CONDITION 189465 1 1 ANY BENT/DAMAGED BRIDGE SPRINGS HAVE BEEN REPLACED 189465 1 2 PER PRINT. 189580 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM (S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE 189580 1 2 PEELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD 189580 1 3 BEARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. 189580 1 4 THE SHIM (S) WERE CENTERED OVER BOLT HOLES PER MR 189580 1 5 ACTION TO RESOLVE THE MISALIGNMENT PROBLEM. R.C. 189580 1 6 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 189580 1 7 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 189580 1 8 7-103-C1) 189615 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF PR A70-883-2-0135 SEVERAL PA 189615 1 2 RTS FELL DOWN ON L/H 4 RAD PANEL W/COVERS INSTL'D. 189615 1 3 THE COVERS WERE REMOVED & THE PANEL SHOWED NO DAM 189615 1 4 AGE AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT. THEREFORE NO PRO 189615 1 5 BLEM EXISTS. 189779 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 189779 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION 1010.50Xo AND 396.50Zo R/H IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORI 189779 1 3 GINAL RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 10 INCH POUND 189779 1 4 S. NUT WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQ 189779 1 5 UE TO THE APPROPRIATE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE T 189779 1 6 O PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEA 189779 1 7 R. THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 189801 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP BY LSOC MEQ ENGINEERING DURING A VISUAL INSPECTI 189801 1 2 ON OF THE LH MAIN LANDING GEAR. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE LINKAGE CONFIGUR 189801 1 3 ATIONS INDICATED THAT RIGGING DISCREPANCIES EXISTED. THE FOLLOWING SIX 189801 1 4 DISCREPANCIES WERE NOTED DURING THE LH MLG RIGGING CHECK AND SUBSEQUEN 189801 1 5 T RIGGING. ITEM #1, PAGE 1: A SERIES OF ADJUSTMENTS WERE MADE TO THE E 189801 1 6 NTIRE MLG THROUGHOUT THIS ENTIRE PR BY MEANS OF A SERIES OF LH MLG RET 189801 1 7 RACTIONS, MEASUREMENTS AND SUBSEQUENT ADJUSTMENTS, INCLUDING: THE DOOR 189801 1 8 RETRACT ASSEMBLIES AND UPLOCK MECHANISM. UPON THE COMPLETION OF THIS 189801 1 9 SERIES OF MEASUREMENTS/ADJUSTMENTS, ALL THE LH MLG DOOR STOPS, HOOK ST 189801 1 10 OPS, HOOK GAPS, AND OVER-CENTER MEASUREMENTS WERE RETURNED/VERIFIED 189801 1 11 TO BE WITHIN SPECIFIED TOLERANCE PER ML0308-0029, WITH THE EXCEPTION O 189801 1 12 F THE FOLLOWING THREE: A) LH MLG FWD/INBD DOOR STOP GAP (REF. MR PAGE 189801 1 13 197) MEASURES 0.030" SHOULD BE 0.0" . PROPER BULB SEAL CONTACT ACHIEVE 189801 1 14 D AND THERMAL BARRIERS WITHIN SPECIFICATION. MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRIC 189801 1 15 TED USE. B) STRUCTURAL MOLD LINE MEASURED TO BE FROM 1.027" TO 0.170" 189801 1 16 AND SHOULD BE 0 +/- 0.031" (REF PAGE 198). THIS CONDITION HAS NO AFFEC 189801 1 17 T ON THE OPERATION OF THE LANDING GEAR OR IT'S ASSOCIATED HARDWARE. MR 189801 1 18 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE.C) INBD/MID HOOK-ROLLER GAP MEASURED TO 189801 1 19 BE 0.282" (REF. PAGE 199). THE 0.003" DIFFERENCE DOES NOT AFFECT THE F 189801 1 20 IT, FORM OR FUNCTION OF THE MLG DOOR HOOK/ROLLER OR ASSOCIATED THERMAL 189801 1 21 BARRIERS. SUFFICIENT ENGAGEMENT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED BETWEEN THE INBD/MID 189801 1 22 DOOR HOOK AND THE ROLLER. MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE 189801 1 23 CAUSE: INITIAL IMPROPER RIGGING. ITEM #2, PAGE 1A: A 0.188" DIAMETER D 189801 1 24 RILL BIT USED AS A RIGGING PIN COULD NOT BE INTIALLY INSTALLED IN THE 189801 1 25 LH MLG INBD/AFT DOOR HOOK RIGGING HOLE. A SLIGHT FORCE APPLIED TO THE 189801 1 26 HOOK LINK ASSEMBLY IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO TAKE UP THE SLACK IN THE LI 189801 1 27 NKS AND THUS ALIGN THE RIGGING HOLE AND ALLOW THE RIGGING PIN TO BE IN 189801 1 28 SERTED. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: SLACK NOT TAKEN OU 189801 1 29 T OF LINK ASSEMBLIES. ITEM 3, PG 1B: WHILE RETRACTING THE LH MLG, THE 189801 1 30 LH DOOR UPLOCK INDICATION WAS NOT RECEIVED. THE TWO SENSOR/TARGET GAP 189801 1 31 MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN AND FOUND TO BE WITHIN SPECIFICATION. THE UPL 189801 1 32 OCK WAS THEN MANUALLY CYCLED AND THE INDICATIONS WERE VERIFIED TO BE O 189801 1 33 PERATIVE. THIS DISCREPANCY OCCURED DURING A MLG CYCLE IN WHICH THE 189801 1 34 V070-510462-001 MLG DOOR RETRACT LINK WAS PREVIOUSLY ADJUSTED "IN" TO 189801 1 35 INCREASE THE DOOR PRE-LOAD WITHOUT ADJUSTING THE ME162-0009-0011 ROD A 189801 1 36 SSEMBLY TO COMPENSATE WITH REGARDS TO THE DOOR HOOKS, (REF. PAGE 29, S 189801 1 37 TEP 93 - DOOR HOOK MEASUREMENTS) THIS RESULTED IN THE DOOR HOOKS NOT F 189801 1 38 ULLY ENGAGING THE ROLLERS AND THUS, THE UPLOCK SENSOR AND TARGET DID N 189801 1 39 OT ALIGN IN ORDER TO GENERATE THE UPLOCK INDICATION. THE ME162-0009-00 189801 1 40 11 ROD ASSEMBLY WAS ADJUSTED BACK TO SPECIFICATION AND THE LANDING GEA 189801 1 41 R RETRACTED AND THE UPLOCK INDICATION OBTAINED. (REF PAGE 39, STEP 119 189801 1 42 - RETRACT AND STEP 120 - CLAY MEASUREMENTS) THIS PR CONDITION NO LONGE 189801 1 43 R EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: LH MLG DOOR HOOK ASSEMBLY NOT RECONFIGURED D 189801 1 44 URING ASSOCIATED HARDWARE ADJUSTMENT. ITEMS 4, 5, & 6 PAGE 1C: THESE T 189801 1 45 HREE DISCREPANCIES WERE PICKED UP WHEN IT WAS OBSERVED THAT THE V070-5 189801 1 46 10101 LH MLG DOOR BUNGEE WAS BEING ADJUSTED INCORRECTLY. (ITEM 4, REF. 189801 1 47 PAGE 153, STEPS 356-358) THE V070-510141 TUBE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADJUST 189801 1 48 ED AS THE DISPOSITION INDICATED. ITEM 5: ADDRESS THE CONDITION OF V070 189801 1 49 -510138 RING NUT'S TORQUE DUE TO ITEM #4 OF THIS PR. THE RING NUT'S TO 189801 1 50 RQUE WAS VERIFIED ON PAGE 167.1, STEP 387.1.PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKAMNSHI 189801 1 51 P SUSPECT CONDITION. ITEM 6: AFTER VERIFYING THE RING NUT'S TORQUE, TH 189801 1 52 E V070-510145-002 WASHER'S TABS WERE RE-ENGAGED AND ONE OF TWO TABS BR 189801 1 53 OKE OFF. THE V070-510145-002 WASHER WAS THEN REMOVED AND REPLACED. (RE 189801 1 54 F. PAGE 167.2, STEPS 387.3-387-7) THE V070-510101 LH MLG DOOR BUNGEE W 189801 1 55 AS THEN CORRECTLY ADJUSTED PER STEPS 388 THROUGH 390 ON PAGE 168 AND S 189801 1 56 EVERAL MORE GEAR CYCLES/MEASUREMENTS TAKEN FOR CONTINUED RIGGING. PROB 189801 1 57 ABLE CAUSE: FATIGUE FROM REPEATED INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL. PR CONDITI 189801 1 58 ONS 4, 5, AND 6 NO LONGER EXIST. THE V070-510101 LH MLG DOOR BUNGEE WI 189801 1 59 LL BE ADJUSTED TO SPECIFICATION PER PR MEQ 3-11-0498. ALL SIX DISCREPA 189801 1 60 NCIES NOTED IN THIS PR HAVE BEEN CORRECTED AND RETESTED AND OR MR ACCE 189801 1 61 TED. 189954 1 1 DURING FLIGHT 10 PROCESSING, A GAP WAS FOUND TO EXIST BETWEEN THE V070-1 189954 1 2 98313-001 SEAL AND THE PRIMARY SEAL PANEL. THIS GAP WAS CAUSED BY THE SE 189954 1 3 CONDARY SEAL CURTAIN PUSHING THE SEAL AWAY FROM THE PANEL ALLOWING A LEA 189954 1 4 K PATH. RTV WAS APPLIED AND THIS PR WAS DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 11. THIS PR W 189954 1 5 AS THEN DEFERRED AGAIN TO FLIGHT 12. DURING FLIGHT 12 PROCESSING, THE SE 189954 1 6 CONDARY SEAL SYSTEM WAS REWORKED PER STR-3-12-484. UPON COMPLETION OF TH 189954 1 7 E REWORK, THE SEAL CURTAIN WAS REINSTALLED CORRECTLY AND THE GAP BETWEEN 189954 1 8 THE SEAL PANEL AND THE POLYIMIDE SEAL WAS REDUCED TO LESS THAN 0.010" W 189954 1 9 HICH IS ACCEPTABLE PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. CONCLUDE ALL ENG AND SHOP 189954 1 10 ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR IS COMPLETE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 189954 1 11 DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP DURING PREVIOUS INSTALLATION OF CURTAIN SEAL. 189980 1 1 CLIP V070-156854-001 WILL BE DELETED FROM DWG (OV- 189980 1 2 103). CLOSE THIS PR. 190001 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 190001 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 190001 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACTI 190001 1 4 ON TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W 190001 1 5 TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 190001 1 6 THE CARRIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. CLOSE PR. 190095 1 1 THIS PR CONDITION IS DOCUMENTED ON AND WILL BE ADD 190095 1 2 RESSED BY PR STR-3-07-1649. SEE ATTACHED PR. 190145 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGES 1 AND 1A) THE DISCREPANT SPL-192L-SU-11 THRE 190145 1 2 ADED INSERT WAS REMOVED AND A NEW INSERT WAS INSTALLED. THIS INSERT FAIL 190145 1 3 ED TORQUE-OUT TEST AND ITEM 2 WAS PICKED UP. PER SPECIFICATION MAI101-30 190145 1 4 4, THE TORQUE-OUT TEST IS ONLY REQUIRD FOR PROCESS QUALIFICATION. UPON R 190145 1 5 EMOVAL OF TORQUED-OUT INSERT, A NEW INSERT WAS INSTALLED AND THE STRUCTU 190145 1 6 RE HAS BEEN RETURNED TO A PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCRE 190145 1 7 PANCY IN OPERATIONAL WEAR OUT OF THREADED INSERT. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG 190145 1 8 INEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 190184 1 1 THE TWO UPPER RECEPTABLES FOR THE MF43E STRUTURAL AVIONICS PANEL WERE 190184 1 2 BROKEN DURING FASTENER REMOVAL/INSTALLATION OPERATIONS. THE TWO RECEPT 190184 1 3 ACLES WRE R&R,WHICH RETURNED THEM TO PRINT CONFIGURATIONS. THE REPLACE 190184 1 4 MENT OF THE INBD RECEPTACLE REQUIRED REMOVAL OF MANUFACTURING MR SHIM 190184 1 5 (REF MR-BL-3403-000M-006). A NEW SHIM WAS BONDED IN PLACE, RETURNING T 190184 1 6 HE INSTALLATION TO ITS ORIGINAL MR CONDITION. 190416 1 1 TRIM 73A310248-1047 DOOR SO THAT A GAP OF .030, 190416 1 2 +.030,+.030-.000 EXISTS WITH SURROUNDING 190416 1 3 STRUCTURE PER DWG 190490 1 1 THE THREE EXISTING HOLES IN THE BLKHD ARE 250", 190490 1 2 BUT SHOULD HAVE BEEN .187-193 MAX. THE USE OF THE 190490 1 3 .250 HOLES AND FASTERNERS WILL NOT EFFECT THE FORM 190490 1 4 FIT OR FUNCTION OF THE INSTALLATION, THE DRAWING 190490 1 5 INTENT WILL BE MAINTAINED. THERE WILL BE SUFFI- 190490 1 6 CIENT EDGE DISTANCE ON THE DOUBLER AND MATING 190490 1 7 BLKHD STRUCTURES. THE REWORK IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UN- 190490 1 8 RESTRICTED USAGE. 190528 1 1 28 HOLES IN THE Xo1307 BULKHEAD WERE INSPECTED AND 13 WERE FOUND TO BE 190528 1 2 OVERSIZED. THESE HOLES WERE REAMED TO 0.250 WITH MR APPROVAL. ONE ADD 190528 1 3 ITIONAL HOLE WAS INADVERTANTLY REAMED TO 0.250 AND WAS MR ACCEPTED. TW 190528 1 4 O DESIGN NUTPLATE CHANNELS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH ONE MR NUTPL 190528 1 5 ATE CHANNEL TO ACCOMODATE THE LARGER SIZE NUTPLATES. THE HOLES WERE OV 190528 1 6 ERSIZED DURING INITIAL MANUFACTURE. THIS INSTALLATION IS STRUCTURALLY 190528 1 7 ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CLOSE THIS PR. 190625 1 1 THE 20 AREAS OF CORROSION ON THE ELEVON SKIN WERE MANUALLY AND CHEMICA 190625 1 2 LLY CLEANED. AN OPTICAL INSPECTION OF EACH PIT DEPTH WAS PERFORMED AND 190625 1 3 ANALYZED BY RI/DOWNEY STRESS AND RI/DOWNEY DESIGN. SEVENTEEN OF THE C 190625 1 4 ORROSION AREAS WERE VERIFIED OXIDE FREE AND THREE AREAS REQUIRED DOUBL 190625 1 5 ERS. TWO DOUBLERS HAVE BEEN BONDED TO COVER THE THREE PITS AND TWO FLU 190625 1 6 SH HEAD HI-LOKS REPLACED TWO PROTRUDING HED HI-LOKS TO ALLOW FOR INSTA 190625 1 7 LLATION OF THE MR-001 DOUBLER. THE PROCESS VERIFICATION PANELS HAVE BE 190625 1 8 EN VERIFIED ABOVE SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF 190625 1 9 THE ELEVON SKIN HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. NO DISCREPANCIES EXIST. 190928 1 1 GAULD SCREW DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1 FOR R/H FLIPPER DOOR #12 WAS 190928 1 2 REPLACEDWITH (1) NAS1580C3T4 SCREW FOR FERRY FLIGHT BECAUSE OF UNAVAI 190928 1 3 LIBILITY OF PER PRINT SCREW. SCREW HAS BEEN REMOVED AFTER FERRY FLIGHT 190928 1 4 AND THE PER PRINT SCREW WAS ORDERED AND WILL BE INSTALLED PER J/C V80 190928 1 5 -96111. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 190946 1 1 INTERFERENCE WAS ELIMINATED BY RE-LOCATING THE V07 190946 1 2 0-321229-003 CLIP AT Xo582, Yo-105, Zo385 FROM ABO 190946 1 3 VE TO BELOW THE FRAME MEMBER. THIS NEW LOCATION I 190946 1 4 S PRINT CONFIGURATION. REF DWG V070-320301, ZONES 190946 1 5 214E & 263E. STR-3-07-237 CAN NOW PROCEED. 191099 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 191099 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 191099 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACTI 191099 1 4 ON TO INVESTIGAGE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W 191099 1 5 TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 191099 1 6 THE CARRIER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. CLOSE PR. 191140 1 1 THE V070-339524-001 PANEL HAD THE CRACK STOP-DRILL 191140 1 2 ED AREAS SANDED, PATCHES BONDED, AND PAINT TOUCHED 191140 1 3 UP ALL OVER THE PANEL TO CONFIGURE IT FOR UNRESTR 191140 1 4 ICTED USE PER MR. CLOSE PR. 191230 1 1 SCRATCHES WERE MINOR DEFECTS IN THE SKIN PANEL AND 191230 1 2 WERE BURNISHED OUT WITH AN MR DISPOSITION. CORRO 191230 1 3 SION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED. NO MR ID WAS REQUIRE 191230 1 4 D BECAUSE OF TILE BEING BONDED TO THE AREA. 191374 1 1 OVERTRIM OF 0.060 IN. WAS ACCEPTED OK PER MR APPRO 191374 1 2 VAL. CAUSE OF THIS PROBLEM WAS WORKMANSHIP. CLOS 191374 1 3 E THIS PR. 191382 1 1 WIRE HARNESSES WERE FOUND TO CHAFE (INTERFERE) AGAINST L/H LOWER BAY 6 191382 1 2 WIRE TRAY COVER AT FWD END. DISCREPANT ANGLE SECTION WHERE WIRES CROS 191382 1 3 S LOWER ANGLE WAS TRIMMED PER ATTACHMENT "Y" BY EO-TO-FOLLOW TO ELIMIN 191382 1 4 ATE THE INTERFERENCE. UPON VERIFICATION THAT RELEASED EO'S REFLECTS EN 191382 1 5 GINEERING DISPOSITION, CLOSE THIS PR. 191398 1 1 THE V070-398438 FITTING IS ATTACHED TO THE LOWER 191398 1 2 END OF THE V070-398582 EXPANSION JOINT ("DOGBONE") 191398 1 3 AND PROVIDES A CLOSEOUT SEALING SURFACE BETWEEN 191398 1 4 THE TWO DOOR PANELS. DURING ORIGINAL INSTALLATION 191398 1 5 THE V070-398438 FITTING IS ATTACHED TO THE "DOG- 191398 1 6 BONE" TO PROVIDE A .010 MAX GAP BETWEEN THE FIT- 191398 1 7 TING AND EDGE OF THE DOOR STRUCTURE (REF: V070- 191398 1 8 398520 ZN 162D VIEW CP). SINCE THE EXPANSION 191398 1 9 JOINT IS FREE TO SEEK IT'S OWN POSITION DURING 191398 1 10 MOVEMENT OF THE PLBD'S DURING FLT THE ORIGINAL .01 191398 1 11 MAX GAP IS CONSIDERED A "FIRST BUILD" REQUIREMENT 191398 1 12 ONLY. THE GAP AS NOTED ON THIS PR IS NOT CONSID- 191398 1 13 ERED A DISCREPANT. 191430 1 1 PAGE 1 ITEM 1 DESCRIBED A STRUT THAT REQUIRED A 6.7 LB. LOAD TO ALIGN 191430 1 2 HOLES. THE DOCUMENT THAT INSTALLED THE STRUT, CM3-07-130, ALLOWED THE 191430 1 3 USE OF UP TO A 5 LB. LOAD. A PROBLEM REPORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN W 191430 1 4 HEN THE 5 LB. LIMIT WAS EXCEEDED, PRIOR TO STRUT INSTALLATION. THIS PR 191430 1 5 WAS WRITTEN AFTER THE STRUT WAS INSTALLED USING UNAUTHORIZED METHODS. 191430 1 6 THE STRUT INSTALLATION WAS MR ACCEPTED BECAUSE THE USE OF UP TO 5 LB. 191430 1 7 LOAD TO INSTALL THE STRUT WAS A PREDICTED LOAD, NOT THE MAXIMUM. USIN 191430 1 8 G THE 6.7 LB. LOAD FOR INSTALLATION OF THE STRUT DOES NOT ALTER THE IN 191430 1 9 TEGRITY NOR CHANGE THE INTENT OF THE STRUT. 191558 1 1 DURING STRUCTURAL INSPECTION, A PARTIALLY DELAMINATED SHIM WAS FOUND O 191558 1 2 N FLIPPER DOOR #8. THE DAMAGE WAS MINOR AND THE SMALL DISCREPANT PORTI 191558 1 3 ON OF THE SHIM WAS REMOVED WITH MR APPROVAL. DISCREPANCY WAS A RESULT 191558 1 4 OF OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 191621 1 1 TRIMMING RADIUS OF THE FLIPPER DOOR SEAL SUCCESSFU 191621 1 2 LLY COMPLETED AS MRB APPROVED. ALL WORK ON THIS PR 191621 1 3 IS COMPLETE. 191727 1 1 V070-351993-002 SEAL WAS FOUND TO HAVE PIECE MISSING AT INBOARD AFT CO 191727 1 2 RNER. SEAL AND SPLICES WITH ADJACENT SEALS WERE REPLACED PER DRAWING. 191727 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. CLOSE THIS PR. 191792 1 1 THE 3 HOLES DRILLED THRU THE SKIN, AND THE 12 HOLE 191792 1 2 S DRILLED IN STRINGERS WERE PLUGGED. THIS PROBLEM 191792 1 3 WAS DUE TO MISINTERPRETING COORDINATES. PROBLEM 191792 1 4 ITEM 3 MR'D OK AS IS. 191915 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES DOCUMENTED ON THIS PR HAVE BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRE 191915 1 2 STRICTED USE. THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE WAS REMOVED TO INSPECT THE ALUMIN 191915 1 3 UM FACESHEET FOR DAMAGE, DISCREPANCY ITEM #1. THERMAL CONTROL COATING 191915 1 4 WAS APPLIED IN PLACE OF THE REMOVED TAPE. DEFECT #3 WAS MINOR AND NO R 191915 1 5 EWORK WAS REQUIRED. ITEM #2 WAS PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTE 191915 1 6 D USE (1985). 192052 1 1 UPON REMOVAL, THE V070-356180-012 PANEL WAS FOUND TO HAVE ALL (28) FAS 192052 1 2 TENER HOLES OVERSIZED (IS .203+, S/B .190+.0017/.0005) THIS PANEL IS N 192052 1 3 OT ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT, THEREFORE WAS SCRAPPED SINCE THIS PANEL IS B 192052 1 4 EING REPLACED WITH A V539-856876-001 PANEL A NEW V070-356180-012 PANEL 192052 1 5 WILL NOT BE REQUIED THIS FLIGHT. WHEN THE NEW PANEL IS RECEIVED, IT W 192052 1 6 ILL BE PLACED IN LOGISTIC STORAGE. HOLES IN DISCREPANT PANEL WERE OVER 192052 1 7 SIZED DURING INITIAL MANUFACTURING. PART DELIVERY TO KSC IS NOT A CONS 192052 1 8 TRAINT TO CLOSING THIS PR. 192248 1 1 DISCREPANT PARTS WERE REPLACED WITH NEW PARTS TO BE USED DURING PID IN 192248 1 2 STALLATION. CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 192690 1 1 ELONGATED HOLES IDENTIFIED ON ITEM 1 PROBLEM DESCR 192690 1 2 IPTION HAS BEEN OPENED UP BY MATCH DRILLING THE V0 192690 1 3 70-338340-001 &-002 BEAMS AND V070-337603-001 AND 192690 1 4 -002 SUPPORT TO OVERSIZE HOLES (.200 DIA) AND INST 192690 1 5 ALLED OVER SIZE FASTENERS TO FIT HOLE AND SUPPORT 192690 1 6 (MD121-0003 BLIND FASTENERS, 2 PLACES). STRUCTURAL 192690 1 7 INTEGRITY HAS BEEN MAINTAINED WITH REQUIRED CORRI 192690 1 8 SION PROTECTION APPLIED TO AFFECTED METAL SURFACES 192690 1 9 AND MR I.D. MARKINGS INSTALLED. 192760 1 1 THE SEAL I/F BTWN THE V070-198772-001 SEAL & THE SEAL PNL HAD AN EXCES 192760 1 2 SIVE GAP OVER THE MAX ALLOWABLE GAP OF .010. MBO130-119 TYPE III RTV 192760 1 3 ADHESIVE WAS INJECTED BTWN THE WING TIP COLUMBIAN SEAL (V070-198772-00 192760 1 4 1) & THE V070-198515 SEAL PNL, TO REDUCE THE EXCESSIVE GAP. THE FIRST 192760 1 5 ATTEMPT OF THIS PROCESS WAS UNSUCCESSFUL (REF. PG. 1A ITEM 2), BUT TH 192760 1 6 E SECOND ATTEMPT PRODUCED AN ACCEPTABLE GAP OF < .010. THE USE OF THE 192760 1 7 MBO130-119 RTV TO FILL THE EXCESSIVE GAP WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRI 192760 1 8 CTED USE. 192992 1 1 PER V35-50002 STEP 07 (ATTACHMENT A) THE SPRING CLIP REFERENCED IN ITE 192992 1 2 M 1.0, PAGE 1.0 WAS REPAIRED BY MANUALLY BENDING THE SPRING SLIGHTLY T 192992 1 3 O CONFORM TO OMRSD REQUIREMENTS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND 192992 1 4 TEAR. 193107 1 1 . 193107 1 2 ORIGINAL PR LOST IN CLOSURE LOOP ITEM 1 WAS WORKED ON ORIGINAL PR AND CL 193107 1 3 OSED (REF ATTACHED TAIR INDEX). 193196 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. THE 193196 1 2 INSULATOR HAS BEEN INSTALLED INTO THE RCC PANEL AND THE PANEL IS INSTA 193196 1 3 LLED FOR FLIGHT. 193582 1 1 THIS PR CORRECTS ALL DISCREPANCIES WITH FASTENERS NOT PROTRUDING THROU 193582 1 2 GH THE NUTPLATES ON PLBD HINGE COVER INSTALLATIONS. DISPO TO CORRECT 193582 1 3 DRAWING WILL RESOLVE ANY/ALL FUTURE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THREAD PROTUSI 193582 1 4 ON IN THIS AREA. CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT AND VERIFICATION OF EO. 193603 1 1 DISCREPANT RADIATOR BEARINGS WERE LIGHTLY SANDED E 193603 1 2 NOUGH TO ALLOW THE HINGE BOLTS TO BE EASILY INSERT 193603 1 3 ED INTO BEARINGS. THE DING ON RADIATOR WAS LIGHTL 193603 1 4 Y SANDED AND CORROSION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED. HA 193603 1 5 RDWARE WAS MR'D AND APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 193603 1 6 NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 193742 1 1 H2 RELIEF PRT #1 FLIGHT FITTING V070-454721-001 HAS BEEN ASSIGNED AN O 193742 1 2 CN #. NO MARKING OF PART IS REQUIRED. 193748 1 1 THE SMALL CUT IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL OF THE RH MLG DOOR WAS SEALED 193748 1 2 WITH WHITE RTV (MB0130-119, TYPE III) PER MR REPAIR TO PREVENT ANY FUT 193748 1 3 URE TEARING. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE CUT WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION 193944 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY WAS THAT THE SCHADER VALVE ON THE LEFT MAIN LANDING GE 193944 1 2 AR STRUT FAILED A LEAK CHECK. THE LEAKAGE WAS 2.5 CC/5 MINUTES WHEN IT 193944 1 3 SHOULD HAVE BEEN 0.0. THE MS28889-2 SCHRADER VALVE WAS R&R'D, THE STR 193944 1 4 UT WAS PRESSURIZED TO 482 PSIG +/- 10 PSIG AT 72 DEG F +/- 2 DEG F FOR 193944 1 5 FLIGHT WITH ZERO LEAKAGE. THE SYSTEM HAS BEEN RETURNED TO FLIGHT CONF 193944 1 6 IGURATION AND NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL O 193944 1 7 PERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 194241 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO ALLOW MEQ TO CONTROL THE MEASURING OF THE NOSE 194241 1 2 LANDING GEAR DOOR STOP GAPS DURING THE REWORKING OF THE TPS THERMAL BARR 194241 1 3 IER. THE DOOR STOPS 3,4,9,& 12 WERE FOUND TO BE OUT OF SPEC. PR MEQ-3-07 194241 1 4 -0269 HAD PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED THE STOPS 3 AND 9. THIS PR (0544) GENER 194241 1 5 ATED A MR AGAINST STOPS 4 AND 12. ALL DOOR STOP GAP MEASUREMENTS ARE WIT 194241 1 6 HIN SPEC OR MR'D FOR UNRESTRICATED USE. OMRSD V51AAO.018 WAS SATISFIED P 194241 1 7 ER RETEST ON THIS PR TO VALIDATE NLG UP FD'S. THE SYSTEM IS FULLY OPERTO 194241 1 8 NAL AND MEETS DRAWING CONFIGURATION OR IS MR'D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE 194241 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE GAP VARIANCE IS THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF THE TPS 194241 1 10 THERMAL BARRIER'S DIMENSIONAL CHARACTERISTICS. WITH MEQ ENGINEERING 194241 1 11 CONCURRENCE, CLOSE THIS PR. 194702 1 1 SLIGHTLY COMPRESSED V070-197140-001 INSULATOR (UNDER FLIPPER DOOR #4), 194702 1 2 HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED OK AS IS. 194720 1 1 PG 1, I.B. EDGE: "A" (.070), "B" (.075) AND "D" (.080) WERE WITHIN 194720 1 2 ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085. "C" (.088) STEP WAS REWORKED WH 194720 1 3 EN SHIM BONDED FOR PR STR-3-07-1953 ALSO CORRECTED THIS STEP DIM. REW 194720 1 4 ORKED DIM WAS MEASURED IN STEP 15 PG 7 AND FOUND TO BE "C" (.067) WHIC 194720 1 5 H IS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085. 194720 1 6 PG 1 O.B. EDGE: "A" (.060), "B" (.060), "C" (.060) AND "D" (.060) ARE 194720 1 7 WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085 SO NO REWORK WAS REQUIRED 194720 1 8 . 194720 2 1 PG 1A: MR SHIMS -002, -003 AND -004 WERE BONDED TO CORRECT O/T STEPS 194720 2 2 FROM C/P TO WING T/E STRUCTURE. MR -004 SHIM BONDED TO C/P LOWER EDGE 194720 2 3 WAS ORIGINALLY FABRICATED AND LOCATED PER ATTACHMENT "U", BUT THEN CH 194720 2 4 ANGED TO ACCOUNT FOR IML MISMATCH TO BE CORRECTED AND WAS TRIMMED AND 194720 2 5 LOCATED PER ATTACHMENT "C". STEP DIMENSIONS WERE MEASURED IN STEP 14. 194720 2 6 0 WITH OUTBOARD REMEASURED PER STEP 32 PG 17 AFTER MR -004 SHIM WAS TR 194720 2 7 IMMED AND IML MISMATCH CORRECTED. ALL STEPS AS REWORKED ARE WITHIN AC 194720 2 8 CEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085. 194720 3 1 PG 1B: O/T .108 STEP TAKEN 6" FROM O/B EDGE WAS REWORKED BY TRIMMING 194720 3 2 LENGTH OF MR -004 SHIM AND ALLOWING FOR IML MISMATCH TO BE CORRECTED. 194720 3 3 AS STATED IN ITEM 2 PG 1A SUMMARY, STEP DIMS WERE REMEASURED AFTER IM 194720 3 4 L MISMATCH WAS CORRECTED AND DISCREPANT REWORKED STEPS WERE REMEASURED 194720 3 5 PER STEP 32. ALL STEPS AS REMEASURED FELL WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANC 194720 3 6 E OF .040 TO .085. 194720 4 1 PG 1B: STEP 15 REMEASURES DISCREPANT I/B EDGE "C" STEP DIM AFTER SHIM 194720 4 2 BONDED ON STR-3-07-1953 CORRECTED O/T STEP. CLARIFICATION WAS STATED 194720 4 3 ON PG 1B. 194720 5 1 PG 1C: PAGE 1C WRITTEN ADDRESSING INSUFFICIENT FILLER BAR CONTACT SUR 194720 5 2 FACE WAS DETERMINED TO BE A THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM (TPS) CONCERN ON 194720 5 3 LY. NO STRUCTURAL WORK IS REQUIRED. PR LWNG-3-07-1741 WAS INITIATED 194720 5 4 PER STEP 29 AND WILL ADDRESS IMPROPER F/B SEAL ZONE. 194720 6 1 PG 1D: O/T MEASUREMENTS TAKEN FROM O/B EDGE TO I/B EDGE WAS DETERMINE 194720 6 2 D TO BE THE RESULT OF CARRIER PANEL TO BLANKET INTERFERENCE. BLANKET 194720 6 3 WAS REMOVED TO CORRECT INTERFERENCE AND MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN AGAIN 194720 6 4 PER STEP 32 WHICH WERE WRITTEN WITHIN MR TOLERANCE REQUIREMENTS OF .04 194720 6 5 0 TO .085. ALL STEP DIMENSIONS FROM CARRIER PANEL AS REWORKED OR DOCU 194720 6 6 MENTED PROVIDE A FILLER BAR TO TILE CONFIGURATION THAT WILL PREVENT OV 194720 6 7 ERTEMP OF FILLER BAR, SIP OR STRUCTURE. 194799 1 1 UNABLE TO INSTALL THE OMS HIGH POINT BLEED FUEL LINE SUPPORT TO THE RI 194799 1 2 GHT HAND UMBILICAL SHROUD. FOUR 3/16" HOLES WERE DRILLED AND TWO MD114 194799 1 3 -5003-0004 NUT PLATES WERE INSTALLED ON THE SHROUD PER V070-340527, VI 194799 1 4 EW T, ZN 62A. IT WAS NOTED THAT 2 HARD LINES WERE CHAFFING ON THE V070 194799 1 5 -340561-003 SUPPORT. IT WAS VERIFIED UPON FURTHER EVALUATION THAT NO C 194799 1 6 HAFFING EXISTS. THE LINES REFERENCED PER ITEM 2 PROBABLY WERE MOVED BY 194799 1 7 UNAUTHORIZED WORK. THE SCOPE OF THE UNAUTORIZED WORK IS UNKNOWN. IT W 194799 1 8 AS VERIFIED THAT THE HARDLINES ARE INSTL'D PER PRINT & NO OBVIOUS DAMA 194799 1 9 GE EXISTS. 194806 1 1 SCORED BUSHINGS AND NICKS IN FITTING CAUSED BY WOR 194806 1 2 KMANSHIP ERRORS. NICKS IN FITTING FILED SMOOTH TO 194806 1 3 PREVENT CRACK PROPAGATION & THE SCORED BUSHINGS RE 194806 1 4 PLACED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY REMAINS POSITIVE. CLO 194806 1 5 SE PR. 194842 1 1 RAISED METAL/SHARP EDGES IN SCORED GIMBLE BOLT HOLES HAVE BEEN REMOVED 194842 1 2 BY HAND USING ABRASIVE PAPER/CLOTH AND MR ACCEPTED. ITEMS 1 & 2 HAVE 194842 1 3 BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADA 194842 1 4 TION. 195016 1 1 DOUBLER INSTL'N REINFORCES THE DENTED AREA. 195036 1 1 THE (V070-190292-002) OUTBOARD INSULATOR FOR RH RC 195036 1 2 C PNL #17 WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. 195036 1 3 THE INSULATOR IS INSTALLED AND OK FOR FLIGHT. 195103 1 1 THE DISCREPANT HEAT SINKS NOTED ON PAGE 1 WERE REM 195103 1 2 OVED AND THE ADHESIVE CLEANED. TPS VSTR-3-07-281 195103 1 3 REAPPLIED THE CORRECT HEAT SINK BETWEEN HEAT SINKS 195103 1 4 23 AND 24. NO HEAT SINK IS REQUIRED BETWEEN STRI 195103 1 5 NGERS 24 AND 25. THAT HEATSINK HAD BEEN INSTALLED 195103 1 6 INCORRECTLY. NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. 195295 1 1 ITEMS #1 AND #2 ARE THE SAME DISCREPANCY. AN MR SHIM WAS FABRICATED AN 195295 1 2 D BONDED TO THE CARRIER PANEL TO REMOVE THE OUT OF TOLERANCE STEPS. IT 195295 1 3 EM #3 HAD AN OUT OF TOLERANCE STEPS AT ANOTHER LOCATION ON THE CARRIER 195295 1 4 PANEL. AN MR SHIM WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED TO THE CARRIER PANEL TO R 195295 1 5 EMOVE THE OUT OF TOLERANCE STEPS. ITEM #4 WAS UNABLE TO INSTALL A SHIM 195295 1 6 DUE TO AN INTERFERENCE. THE SHIM WAS TRIMMED AND THE INTERFERENCE WAS 195295 1 7 ELIMINATED. ITEM #5 WAS FOR A SHIM THAT WASN'T INSTALLED FLUSH. THIS 195295 1 8 WAS ACCEPTED OKAY AS IS. AND FOR ITEM #6, ONE BOLT COULD NOT BE INSTAL 195295 1 9 LED DUE TO AN INTERFERENCE WITH ANOTHER BOLT HEAD. THE WASHER UNDER TH 195295 1 10 E SECONDARY BOLT WAS REMOVED PER MR TO ALLOW INSTALLATION OF THE PRIMA 195295 1 11 RY BOLT. ALL MR ACTION WAS APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 195556 1 1 DURING WHEEL INSTALLATION IT WAS NOTICED THE WHEEL DID NOT APPEAR TO B 195556 1 2 E INSTALLED CORRECTLY (REF IPR TROUBLESHOOTING SUMMARY). WHEN MEASUREM 195556 1 3 ENTS WERE TAKEN IT WAS FOUND THAT THE AXLE WAS APPROXIMATELY .035 INCH 195556 1 4 ES SHORT. THE SHORTNESS OF THE AXLE WAS MR'D AND MARKED AS SUCH ON THE 195556 1 5 AXLE. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 195566 1 1 THE LMLG UPLOCK ROLLER IS GOUGED. UPON INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS OF D 195566 1 2 ENTAL MOLDS, PHOTOGRAPHS, AND VISUAL APPEARANCE OF THE 1170186-1 MLG U 195566 1 3 PLOCK ROLLER, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT ROLLER SHOULD BE REPLACED. THIS P 195566 1 4 R REMOVED AND REPLACED THE 1170186-1 ROLLER ON THE LEFT MLG. AN LRU PR 195566 1 5 # LRU-MEQ-3-12-0518 WAS INITIATED TO HANDLE DISPOSAL OF THE REMOVED R 195566 1 6 OLLER. A MLG CYCLE WAS PERFORMED PER THIS PR AND THE CLAY MEASUREMENT 195566 1 7 WAS UNDER SPEC. THIS CYCLE HAD WHAT APPEARED TO BE TOO LITTLE CLAY IN 195566 1 8 THE UPLOCK HOOK TO BE A RELIABLE READING AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AD 195566 1 9 DITIONAL DATA WOULD BE REQUIRED TO VERIFY THE NEW ROLLER. THE NEXT GEA 195566 1 10 R CYCLE WAS PERFORMED PER MEQ-3-12-0515 ON 1/17/91 AND THE UPLOCK MEAS 195566 1 11 UREMENTS WERE: LMLG UPLOCK HOOK (A) 0.120 (S/B .110-.260); (B) 0.00 (S 195566 1 12 /B 0.00); (C) 0.150. THE MEASUREMENTS ARE WITHIN SPEC AND THE ROLLER 195566 1 13 HAS BEEN REPLACED. THIS PROBLEM HAS BENN RESTORED TO DRAWING SPECIFICA 195566 1 14 TIONS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE GOUGING OF THE ROLLER IS VIBRATION O 195566 1 15 F FAYING SURFACES (HOOK ON ROLLER) DURING ASCENT AND RE-ENTRY. NO ADDI 195566 1 16 TIONAL RETEST REQUIRED. 195571 1 1 THE REDUCTION IN LIGHTNING PROTECTION CAUSED BY TH 195571 1 2 E LOSS OF THE GROUNDING SPRING IS NOT SUFFICIENT T 195571 1 3 O WARRANT THE REWORK OF THE SPRING. THE REMAINING 195571 1 4 SPRINGS AND THE RADIATOR SHIELDING IS MORE THAN SU 195571 1 5 FFICIENT TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE GROUND PATH. 195872 1 1 MR ACTION WAS TAKEN TO MODIFY TUBE SUPPORT PLATE V 195872 1 2 070-454708-001 BY REMOVAL OF SUPPORT PLATE MATERIA 195872 1 3 L AT AREA OF INTERFERENCE WITH LINE V070-454866-10 195872 1 4 4. (REF STEPS 6&7 PG 5 AND PHOTOS) FOAM INSULATION 195872 1 5 ON LINE V070-454866-104 WAS REMOVED AND RE-INSTAL 195872 1 6 LED IN AREA OF INTERFERENCE TO RETURN LINE INSULAT 195872 1 7 ION TO SPEC REQUIREMENTS. TUBE SUPPORT PLATE V070- 195872 1 8 454708-001 WAS RE-INSTALLED PER DRAWING AND PREVIO 195872 1 9 US INTERFERENCE BETWEEN LINE AND TUBE SUPPORT PLAT 195872 1 10 E NO LONGER EXISTS. LINE INTERFERENCE HAS BEEN COR 195872 1 11 RECTED, MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, AND RETU 195872 1 12 RNED TO FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. 195913 1 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSPECTION OF THIS/THESE DAMAG 195913 1 2 E CONDITIONS INDICATES THAT THE DAMAGE IS MINOR. 195913 1 3 THIS/THESE CONDITIONS ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH T 195913 1 4 O REQUIRE A REPAIR. THE SCRATCHES AND/OR HOLES AN 195913 1 5 D/OR DAMAGE IS TO THE SILVER TEFLON TAPE ONLY. TH 195913 1 6 IS MINOR TAPE DAMAGE IS ALLOWABLE PER VOUGHT RADIA 195913 1 7 TOR REPAIR MANUAL (SECT. 3-11B). THE DINGS, IF AN 195913 1 8 Y, ARE MINOR AND DO NOT REQUIRE A REPAIR. THIS/TH 195913 1 9 ESE CONDITIONS WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE FIT, F 195913 1 10 ORM, AND/OR FUNCTION OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS 195913 1 11 CONDITION WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HEAT TRANSF 195913 1 12 ER CAPACITY OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CONDITION 195913 1 13 IS ACCEPTABLE "AS-IS" FOR UN-RESTRICTED USE. NO 195913 1 14 MR I.D. REQ-D (DING MAP) 195917 1 1 TWO SMALL DINGS WERE FOUND ON THE R/H PLBD #4. THESE DISCREPANCIES WER 195917 1 2 E SEALED WITH MBO120-037 ADHESIVE AND WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNESTRICTED 195917 1 3 USE. THESE DINGS ARE CONDISERED COSMETIC & DO NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCTU 195917 1 4 RAL INTEGRITY OF THE DOOR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 195936 1 1 REF ITEM 1, PG 1, BROKEN MD114-5003-0004 NUTPLATE ON OB SIDE OF UPPER 195936 1 2 INNER SPLICE PLATE ON ENG #3 DOME HEAT SHIELD. CAPTIVE PART OF NUTPLAT 195936 1 3 E RETRIEVED. TEMPORARY REPAIR WAS PERFORMED FOR FLT 11 WITH RETURN TO 195936 1 4 PRINT CONDITION DEFERRED TO FLT 12. TEMPORARY REPAIR FOR FLT 11 INVOLV 195936 1 5 ED REPLACING NUT ELEMENT WITH NUT. REPAIR FOR FLT 12 INVOLVED R&R OF N 195936 1 6 UTPLATE. NUTPLATE REPAIR RETURNED UPPER INNER SPLICE PLATE ASSY TO PRI 195936 1 7 NT CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 195983 1 1 AN EO WAS RELEASED TO CHANGE THE NAS1004-12A BOLT CALLOUT TO MD111-402 195983 1 2 0-0412 IN DWG V070-399252 ZONE 8C. THE MD111 BOLT HAS A REDUCED WRENCH 195983 1 3 ING DIAMETER WHICH ALLOWS REQUIRED TOOLING CLEARANCE. PROBLEM CAUSED B 195983 1 4 Y DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 196121 1 1 THIS PR CORRECTS ALL DISCREPANCIES WITH FASTENERS NOT PROTRUDING THROU 196121 1 2 GH THE NUTPLATES ON PLBD HINGE COVER INSTALLATIONS. DISPO TO CORRECT D 196121 1 3 RAWING WILL RESOLVE ANY/ALL FUTURE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THREAD PROTUSIO 196121 1 4 N IN THIS AREA. CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT AND VERIFICATION OF EO. 196157 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 196157 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION RH XO950.00 ZO396.50 IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORIGINAL 196157 1 3 RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 0.0 INCH POUNDS. NU 196157 1 4 T WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE TO 196157 1 5 THE APPROPRIATE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO PRI 196157 1 6 NT CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. TH 196157 1 7 IS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 196306 1 1 THE FIRST DISCREPANCY WAS THAT A READY-TO-LATCH INDICATOR FAILED DURIN 196306 1 2 G FLIGHT 07. A TROUBLESHOOTING PLAN WAS ACTIVATED WHICH LED TO THE R & 196306 1 3 R OF THE RIGHT HAND FORWARD PLBD SWITCH MODULE. CAUSE: FAULTY SWITCH 196306 1 4 MODULE. THE SECOND DISCREPANCY WAS (WERE) SUSPECTED BENT AND PARTIALLY 196306 1 5 RECESSED PINS IN THE NEW SWITCH MODULES. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT DURING 196306 1 6 BENCH CHECKING, A WRONG NUMBER WAS RECORDED LEADING TO PICKING UP THE 196306 1 7 PAGE 1A (10% INSTEAD OF 1%). UPON A SECOND BENCH CHECK ALL THE NUMBERS 196306 1 8 CAME OUT TO BE CORRECT AND THE SWITCH MODULE WAS DEEMED ACCEPTABLE AN 196306 1 9 D LATER INSTALLED. CAUSE: HUMAN ERROR. THE MODULE PASSED THE CHECKOUT 196306 1 10 DURING THE V5006 PLBD FUNCTIONAL. 196312 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE A NUT PLATE ON THE LH2 196312 1 2 ET UMBILICAL CURTAIN ATTACH PLATE. THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. APPR 196312 1 3 OVAL WAS GIVEN FOR RESTRICTED USE (1 FLIGHT) OF THE LH2 ET UMBILICAL C 196312 1 4 LOSEOUT CURTAIN INSTALLED WITH A NUT AND WASHER IN PLACE OF THE DAMAGE 196312 1 5 D NUTPLATE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THE NUTPLATE WAS REPLACED RETURNI 196312 1 6 NG IT TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. 196358 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 196358 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 196358 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 196358 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 196358 1 5 3-C1. 196451 1 1 PR TRANSFERRED TO EXISTING PR AT SAME LOC. THIS 196451 1 2 PR NO LONGER REQ'D. 196580 1 1 CLEARANCE FOR THE CONTROL RODS WAS INCREASED BY OPENING THE CUTOUT DIM 196580 1 2 ENSION IN THE NET SUPPORT ASSY'S. DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. CAUSE: 196580 1 3 DESIGN DEFICENCY. UPON VERIFICATION OF E.O. IN STEP 4.0, CLOSE THIS P 196580 1 4 R. 196983 1 1 THE MUSHROOMED RIVET (ITEM 1 PAGE 1) WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE RIVE 196983 1 2 T AND INSTALLING A HI-LOC. THE HI-LOC WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED 196983 1 3 USE. THE NICK IN THE STIFFENER WAS BLENDED OUT AND CORROSION PROTECTE 196983 1 4 D PER THE DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE STIFFENER WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRE 196983 1 5 STRICTED USE AS REWORKED. ITEMS 1 AND 2 PAGE 1 WERE PROBABLY DUE TO WO 196983 1 6 RKMANSHIP. CONCLUDE THAT THE STIFFENER IS INSTALLED PER DESIGN INTENT 196983 1 7 AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 197026 1 1 DUE TO THE REDESIGN OF THE V070-337435-017 SIDEWALL PANEL, THE ELECTRI 197026 1 2 CAL CONNECTOR FOR THE HYGIENE LIGHT COULD NOT BE MATED. NO FURTHER WOR 197026 1 3 K ON THE PANEL IS TO BE PERFORMED. A FCS TAIR CATEGORY PR WAS GENERATE 197026 1 4 D (REF. FCS-3-07-0246) TO REWORK THE HYGIENE LIGHT 197075 1 1 THE LOX T-O UMBILICAL COLLECT RECEPTACLES WERE SHIMMED TO CORRECT A MI 197075 1 2 SALIGNMENT ON AN MR RESTRICTED BASIS IN SUPPORT OF OV-103 FLIGHT 1. TH 197075 1 3 IS FIX HAS PROVEN TO BE SATISFACTORY FOR OV-103 FLIGHTS 1 THROUGH 8. T 197075 1 4 HE PR WAS DEFERRED EACH FLIGHT WHILE RI-DOWNEY DETERMINED A RESOLUTION 197075 1 5 . MCR 11240 WAS APPROVED IN SEPTEMBER, 1987 AND ENGINEERING IS IN WORK 197075 1 6 TO IMPLEMENT THE NECESSARY MODIFICATIONS. MCR 11240 HAS BEEN RELEASED 197075 1 7 BY DOWNEY BUT HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED TO LOCKHEED YET. THE MODIFICATION 197075 1 8 WILL PROVIDE NEW COLLECT RECEPTACLES AS WELL AS REMACHINING OF THE CO 197075 1 9 UNTER-BORE SURFACES. THE EXISTING MR-APPROVED TAPERED SHIM INSTALLATIO 197075 1 10 N IS SATISFACTORY AND WILL SUPPORT OV-103'S FLIGHT 9; ON AN MR-UNRESTR 197075 1 11 ICTED BASIS. FUTURE WORK WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF M 197075 1 12 CR 11240. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPA 197075 1 13 NCY IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 197196 1 1 THE V070-198112-006 SEAL HAS A CREASE IN THE METAL ON THE FWD END (HIN 197196 1 2 GE SIDE). THE DISCREPANT SEAL WAS SENT TO HDA WITH THE RECOMMENDATION 197196 1 3 TO SEND IT TO THE CENDOR FOR REPAIR AND RETURN TO STOCK. A NEW SEAL WA 197196 1 4 S OBTAINED AND STORED IN THE MIDBODY SHOP. PROBABLE CAUSE: DISCREPANCY 197196 1 5 CAUSED DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 197203 01 1 CANCELLED PR. 197303 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN THE LH ET DOOR GOUNDP STRAP WAS DISCOVERED TO 197303 1 2 BE FRAYED. THE DAMAGED STRAP WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED, BUT IT WAS INSTA 197303 1 3 LLED IMPROPERLY AND WAS DAMAGED. THE STRAP WAS ROUTED PROPERLY BUT WAS N 197303 1 4 OT REPLACED BECAUSE A NEW ONE WAS NOT AVAILABLE. THE PROBLEM CONDITION W 197303 1 5 AS MR'D AND DEFERED TO BE REPAIRD WHEN A NEW STRAP COULD BE PROCURED AND 197303 1 6 THE PART WAS INSTALLED PROPERLY. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE WAS NORMA 197303 1 7 L WEAR AND TEAR AND IMPROPER ROUTING. 197303 1 8 197360 1 1 NUT PLATE ON DOOR FRAME FOR ATTACH POINT #8 WAS FOUND TO BE BROKEN. NU 197360 1 2 T PLATE WAS REPLACED PER DWG. PROBABLE CAUSE OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 197360 1 3 CLOSE THIS PR 197900 1 1 DURING ORBITER AFT SHAKE DOWN INSPECTION, THE FWD AND AFT ATTACHING HARD 197900 1 2 WARE FOR THE RH V070-355718-007 SUPPORT STRUT WAS FOUND WITH LOOSE HARDW 197900 1 3 ARE. AN ADDITIONAL WASHER WAS ADDED UNDER THE NUT WHICH PROVIDES THE NUT 197900 1 4 FROM BOTTIOMING OUT ON THE BOLT SHANK. THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT 197900 1 5 MR APPROVAL PER THE THREADED FASTENER INSTALLATION SPEC, MAO101-301. PR 197900 1 6 OBABLE CAUSE: ORIGINAL INSTALLATION WAS NOT PER SPEC. 197900 1 7 198069 1 1 SUBSTITUTING ALUMINUM FOR TITANIUM WILL NOT SIGNIF 198069 1 2 ICANTLY AFFECT STR INTEGRITY. 198085 1 1 DUE TO STRUCTURE'S PR STR-3-07-1483 ON THE R/H FORWARD PBD BULKHEAD SW 198085 1 2 ITCH MODULE STRIKER PLATE BEING BENT, THE RIGGING INTEGRITY OF THE PBD 198085 1 3 SWITCH MODULE WAS QUESTIONED. STRUCTURES MR REPAIRED THE STRIKER PLATE 198085 1 4 PER 1483 AND THE ABOVE STEPS WERE WORKED TO CHECK AND RE-RIG, IF REQU 198085 1 5 IRED, THE R/H FORWARD PBD BULKHEAD SWITCH MODULE. THE RIGGING INTEGRIT 198085 1 6 Y OF THE R/H FORWARD PBD BULKGEAD SWITCH MODULE WAS CHECKED AND VERIFI 198085 1 7 ED WITHIN SPECIFICATION BY STEPS 3 AND 8 OF THIS PR. NO RE-RIGGING WAS 198085 1 8 REQUIRED. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR OR STR-3-07-1483. 198292 1 1 DENTS & DINGS ARE MINOR AND OF A SUPERFICIAL NA- 198292 1 2 TURE. COIN TAP SHOWED NO INDICATION OF ANY DELAMI 198292 1 3 NATION OF HONEY COMB PANEL UPPER SHT. STRUCTURAL 198292 1 4 INTEGRITY OF THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE IS NOT SIGNI 198292 1 5 FICANTLY COMPROMISED. 198385 1 1 DURING EXTERNAL SURVEILLANCE INSPECTION OF THE VERTICAL TAIL CONICAL S 198385 1 2 EAL, DISCOLORATION WAS NOTICED ON THE LEADING EDGE OF THE RIGHT HAND C 198385 1 3 ONICAL SEAL (LOWER END OF #4R CONICAL SEAL). THE DISCOLORATION ("RAINB 198385 1 4 OW" EFFECT) IS ONLY A SURFACE EFFECT AND THE RUDDER SPEED BRAKE CONICA 198385 1 5 L SEAL WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE CAUSE OF THE DISCOLORATION IS UPON A 198385 1 6 SCENT MATERIAL ADHERING TO THE CONICAL SEAL ARE SUBJECTED TO HEATING E 198385 1 7 FFECTS WHICH PRODUCE THE "RAINBOW" EFFECT. 198416 1 1 THE CRACK IN CLOSE OUT PANEL NOTED ON PAGE 1 OF THIS PR WAS REPAIRED B 198416 1 2 Y PATCHING THE PANEL ON BOTH SIDES OF THE PANEL WITH GLASS FABRIC AND 198416 1 3 EPOXY RESIN. THE CRACK NO LONGER EXISTS. REPAIR WAS MR ID'D "STR-3-079 198416 1 4 -2229" 198487 1 1 FUEL CELL NO. 1 WAS INADVERTENTLY SHUTDOWN OUT OF 198487 1 2 SEQUENCE WHICH RESULTED IN FUEL CELL NO. 1 BEING 198487 1 3 LEFT ON MAIN A FOR A PERIOD OF APPROX. 2 MINUTES 198487 1 4 27 SECONDS. WITH FUEL CELL OF APPROX. 0.132 LBS. 198487 1 5 OF H2O WAS GENERATED WHICH REMAINED IN CELL. THIS 198487 1 6 REDUCES "FALSE START", TIME DURING NEXT START-UP 198487 1 7 BY HALF (PER OMRSD ALLOWABLE FALSE START TIME IS 5 198487 1 8 MINUTES). FUEL CELL TEMPERATURE REMAINED IN SPECI 198487 1 9 FICATION. THEREFORE, FUEL CELL IS STILL CAPABLE 198487 1 10 OF "FALSE START" TIME. THIS PR IS TO BE CLOSED U- 198487 1 11 PON RECEIPT OF WAIVER WKO190 AND TEMP DEV TO V1040 198487 1 12 VOL. 2 STS-27. 198489 1 1 MIS-DRILLED HOLE WILL NOT AFFECT BRACKET INSTALLAT 198489 1 2 ION. 198513 1 1 THE DISCREPANT C/P (C070-399432-001) HAD (2) MISLOCATED, OUT-OF-ROUND 198513 1 2 HOLES & WAS SCRAPPED. A NEW C/P WAS OBTAINED, FITTED & DRILLED UNDER 198513 1 3 TPS& STR ENG SUPERVISION. THIS C/P WILL BE INSTL'D ON THE ORBITER BY 198513 1 4 WAD FWD-3-07-086 AFTER TPS IS BONDED TO IT. THIS PR RESTORES H/W TO PR 198513 1 5 INT CONFIG'N ITEM (2) PG 1. 198647 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: NEW V070-198423-001 SHIM IS FABRICATED PER DWG AND NO B 198647 1 2 OW EXISTS AS STATED IN ITEM 1. THERE IS NO DWG REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIM T 198647 1 3 O MEET FLUSH AGAINST UPPER OR LOWER SIDE OF V070-198418-002 AFT RAMP A 198647 1 4 SSY. NEW SHIM CAN BE DRILLED PER DWG AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NO DISCR 198647 1 5 EPANCY. ITEM 2 PAGE 1A: DISCREPANT V070-198423-001 SHIM DESCRIBED IN I 198647 1 6 TEM 2 WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW SHIM WHICH WAS MATCH DRILLED TO AFT RAMP 198647 1 7 ASSY. NEW SHIM WILL BE INSTALLED ON VSTR-3-09-434. PROBABLE CAUSE IS 198647 1 8 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 198657 1 1 DAMAGED STRUT REPLACED WITH CANNABALIZED PART FROM 198657 1 2 103. 198795 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO CLEAN THE INTERNAL THREAD OF A 198795 1 2 NUT PLATE AND REPLACE IT IF NECESSARY. WIPING THE THREADS WITH ALCOHOL 198795 1 3 WAS SUFFICIENT TO RETURN THE NUT PLATE TO USE THIS IS SECONDARY STRUC 198795 1 4 TURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 198948 1 1 X 198986 1 1 THROUGH INSP OF DENT SIIN V070-356735-012 ACCESS P 198986 1 2 NL, IT WAS FOUND THAT THERE ARE NO DEFECTS, I.E., 198986 1 3 NO DEBOND & NO CRACKS. DENTS "AS-IS" WILL NOT AFFE 198986 1 4 CT STR INSTEGRITY OF THIS SECONDARY STR. FUNCTION 198986 1 5 & FIT OF ACCESS PNL WILL REMIAN AS DESIGN INTENDED 199120 1 1 DEFECT #1 - INSTL OF HEAT SINK W THICKNESS OF .225 199120 1 2 HAS BEEN MRB APPROVED. DEFECT #2 - WIDTH OF HEAT 199120 1 3 SINK WAS VERIFIED AS 3.3 AND RECORDED IN PCR. 199136 STAT 1 VERIFIED HOLDING PER OISR 12-10-92. 199136 1 1 TROUBLESHOOTING SHOWED THAT A SIGNAL BIAS EXISTS WITHIN FC1 H2 FLOWMETER 199136 1 2 CIRCUITRY. A REPAIR COULD NOT BE MADE SINCE THE FLOW METER IS INTERNAL 199136 1 3 TO THE FUEL CELL. FUEL CELL 1 (S/N 114) HAS BEEN REMOVED PER PR FCP-3-16 199136 1 4 -0295. ALL DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN NOTED ON THE LRU PR AND THE FUEL CELL 199136 1 5 HAS BEEN RETURNED TO THE VENDOR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM IS A SIG 199136 1 6 NAL BIAS. 199193 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO MR REPAIR GOUGES, NICKS, AND CU 199193 1 2 TS IN THE DOOR FRAME GASKET FOR DOOR 75-01. THE GASKET WAS REPAIRED WI 199193 1 3 TH WHITE RTV, MB0130-119 TYPE III. THIS REPAIR WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNR 199193 1 4 ESTRICTED USE. THIS DOOR AND FRAME ARE PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF 199193 1 5 THIS DISCREPANCY WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 199362 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATORS WERE REPAIRED AT ROCKWEL 199362 1 2 L SERVICE CENTER. THE INSULATORS HAVE BEEN INSTALL 199362 1 3 ED INTO THE RCC PANEL AND THE PANEL IS INSTALLED F 199362 1 4 OR FLIGHT. 199440 1 1 THREE MINOR DISCREPANCIES WERE DETECTED DURING THE RADIATOR PANEL POST F 199440 1 2 LIGHT INSPECTION. TWO OF THE DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEP 199440 1 3 TED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REWRITTEN. ITEM #3 IS 199440 1 4 A MINOR TEAR IN THE TAPE THAT IS ACCEPTABLE AS-IS DUE TO IT'S LOCATION A 199440 1 5 ND LACK OF SEVERITY. DAMAGE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 199440 1 6 199563 1 1 ABOVE DISCREPANCY SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN AGAINST 199563 1 2 PR STR-3-07-1704 WHICH ALREADY DOCUMENTS HEAT SIN 199563 1 3 K PROBLEMS IN R/H BAY 5. A PAGE 1B HAS NOW BEEN WR 199563 1 4 ITTEN CORRECTING THIS ERROR. THIS PR NO LONGER REQ 199563 1 5 'D CLOSE. 199647 1 1 WORK ACCOMPLISHED PER DISPOSITION. MISDRILLED 199647 1 2 HOLE PLUGGED 199806 1 1 MBO130-173 RTV STOPS AT Xo 934.25 WERE BONDED .015 199806 1 2 " OFF STGR 25 (L/H & DELAMINATED ON STGR 25 (R/H). 199806 1 3 THE DELAMINATED STOP (STR 25 R/H) WAS REMOVED & 199806 1 4 REBONDED. THE RTV STOP AT STGR 25 (L/H) WAS TRIMM 199806 1 5 ED TO REMOVE THE .015" OVERLAP, & MR ID'D. 199860 1 1 MASS SPEC LEAK CHK ON FUEL CELL #1 O2 SUPPLY PORT (F3) PERFORMED PER V 199860 1 2 5R01 EXCEEDED ALLOWABLE LEAK RATE IND'D (GHe) OF 1 X 10 -7 SCCS (MAX). 199860 1 3 LEAK RATE WAS 3.92 X 10 -6 SCCS IND'D. O2 SUPPLY LINE V070-454865-1 199860 1 4 12 WAS DISCONN'D FROM FC #1 O2 SUPPLY PORT (F3). BOTH DYNATUBE FACES 199860 1 5 WERE CLEANED & INSP SHOWED NO MARKS ON EITHER FACE. LINE WAS RECONN'D 199860 1 6 , TORQUED & SAFETY WIRED PER DWG. MASS SPEC LEAK CHK WAS THEN PERFORM 199860 1 7 ED AT FLT PRESS & IND'D LEAK RATE WAS ZERO. 199948 1 1 ITEMS 1 THROUGH 6 DESCRIBED VARIOUS SCREWS AND WASHERS REMOVED FROM THE 199948 1 2 H INBD ELEVON COVE WHICH WERE NOT PER PRINT. THE CORRECT HARDWARE WAS OR 199948 1 3 ERED AND PUT WITH THE STR-3-12-485 KIT FOR PRINT INSTALLATIONS. THE NOTE 199948 1 4 ON PAGE 2 WHICH HAD A MARKED-OUT REFERENCE TO ITEM 6 WAS PEN & INKED IN 199948 1 5 ERROR. THE DISPOSITON STEPS 1,2, AND 3 DID ADDRESS ITEM 6. THE PROBABLE 199948 1 6 CASUE OF THESE DISCREPANCIES WAS MANUFACTURING INSTALLATION DEVIATION. 199948 1 7 ITEM 7 DESCRIBED (2) RETAINERS REMOVED FROM THE LH SIDE WHICH HAD DASH # 199948 1 8 'S FOR THE RH SIDE. A PARELLEL PR WAS WRITTEN FOR THE RH SIDE DURING RET 199948 1 9 AINER REMOVALS. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE RETAINERS WERE PER PRINT, BUT 199948 1 10 THE INSTALLATION HOLES WERE DRILLED INCORRECTLY DURING MANUFACTURING. AN 199948 1 11 MR WAS WRITTEN TO ACCEPT THESE WRONG HOLES AND THE WRONG LH/RH RETAINER 199948 1 12 INSTALLATIONS SINCE THE RETAINERS ARE NOT INERCHANGEABLE. THE PROBABLE 199948 1 13 CAUSE WAS MANUFACTURING ERROR. 199965 1 1 PD ITEM #1 INTERFERENCE WAS RECV'D & PAYLOAD RCDR 199965 1 2 HAS SUCCESSFULLY BEEN REMOVED (REF ATTACHED WORKED 199965 1 3 COPY OF TPS INS-3-07-044 MOD SHT 002) PD ITEM #2 199965 1 4 HAS BEEN RECTIFIED BY INSTL'G P/N & OCN ON SHELF 199965 1 5 2A IN AVIONICS BAY 1 (REF STEP 2 COMPLETION OF THI 199965 1 6 S PR) 199989 1 1 THE S/N /OCN RECORDED IN OMI V5R02 FOR O2 TANK 1 INBOARD LOWER AFT STR 199989 1 2 UT (ME270-0006-0003) DURING OV-103 FLT 7 PROCESSING WAS INCORRECT. THI 199989 1 3 S PR WAS DEFERRED TO FLT 8 DUE TO ACCESS RESTRICTION (BAY 4 LHS CLOSE 199989 1 4 OUT). DURING FLT 8 PROCESSING, ACCESS WAS OBTAINED AND TANK STRUT S/N 199989 1 5 /OCN WAS OBTAINED. (REF STEPS 3,4, AND 5). ITEM 2 (PAGE 1A) TANK ST 199989 1 6 RUT SERIAL NO.'S IN THE ALPHANUMERIC SERIES ARE NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE 199989 1 7 SAME MANNER AS STRUT SERIAL NO.S IN THE NUMBERICAL SERIES. THIS LED T 199989 1 8 O SOME CONFUSION AS TO RECORDING A SERIAL NO. CONSISTANT WITH THE CVA 199989 1 9 S TRACKING SYSTEM. THIS WAS RESOLVED WITH AN ENGINEERING NOTE (REF PG 199989 1 10 3) AND S/N /OCN WAS OBTAINED AND VERIFIED. ALL DISCREPANCIES ON THIS 199989 1 11 PR HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. 200028 1 1 NUT AND WASHERS AT DISCREPANT LOCATION, ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WERE REMOVED F 200028 1 2 OR EVALUATION OF INSTALLATION. THE PEELABLE WASHER WAS FOUND TO BE WRI 200028 1 3 NKLED CAUSING AN EXCESSIVE GAP UNDER THE WASHER. A NEW WASHER AND NUT 200028 1 4 WERE ORDERED AND INSTALLED AND PER PRINT GAP WAS OBTAINED. ITEM 1, PAG 200028 1 5 E 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: WRINKLED LA 200028 1 6 MINATED WASHER. 200295 1 1 H2 TANK 2 GROUND STRAP HAS BEEN CONFORMALY COATED PER THIS DOCUMENT. S 200295 1 2 YSTEM HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT NO RETEST REQUIRED. CLOSE THIS PR. 200333 1 1 DURING DOUBLER INSTALLATION OF 10 RIVETS, ONE RIVE 200333 1 2 T AT ANOTHER NEARBY LOCATION WAS DISCOVERED TO HAV 200333 1 3 E BEEN R/R'D WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION. THE SUSPECT 200333 1 4 RIVET WAS REMOVED. THE HOLE MEASURED, AND RIVET 200333 1 5 REPLACED, THEREBY RETURNING THE RIVET TO PAINT CON 200333 1 6 FIGURATION. 200672 1 1 THE GALLING AND ELONGATION ARE MINOR DEFECTS, AND 200672 1 2 ARE ACCEPTABLE AS IS WITH MR DISPOSITION. THE 200672 1 3 PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY THE NUMEROUS INSTALLATION 200672 1 4 AND REMOVAL OF THE HARDWARE, FOR THE ET CURTAIN. 200734 1 1 BRKTS INSTL'D ON STR-3-07-265. UNABLE TO INSTALL BRKTS DUE TO "BAND-AI 200734 1 2 D" INTERFERENCE. "BAND-AID" REMOVED & BRKTS INSTL'D. "BAND-AID" REINST 200734 1 3 L'D. (MRB APPROVED BAND-AID-TRIMMED TO PROVIDE CLEARANCE). 200863 1 1 DENTS & DINGS ARE MINOR AND OF A SUPERFICIAL NA- 200863 1 2 TURE. COIN TAP SHOWED NO INDICATION OF ANY DELAMI 200863 1 3 NATION OF HONEY COMB PANEL UPPER SHT. STRUCTURAL 200863 1 4 INTEGRITY OF THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE IS NOT SIGNI 200863 1 5 FICANTLY COMPROMISED. 201084 1 1 THE MINOR IDENTATION IN THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE ON THE R/H RADIATOR PAN 201084 1 2 EL #4 HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "AS-IS". NO FURTHER DI 201084 1 3 SCREPANCIES EXIST. 201228 01 1 CANCELLED THIS PR. 201249 1 1 DISCREPANT SCREW WAS REMOVED & RPLCD W/ A NEW ONE. 201320 1 1 THE TOP SPLICE LINE EDGE ON ENGINE #1 R/H DOME HEAT SHIELD WHICH IS BE 201320 1 2 NT AND DELAMINATED AT TWO PLACES, ITEM 1, PAGE 1, HAS BEEN MR REPAIRED 201320 1 3 BY STRAIGHTENING THE DELAMINATED PLIES AND INJECTING ADHESIVE BETWEEN 201320 1 4 THE PLIES. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE: O 201320 1 5 PERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 201805 1 1 DURING SURV INSP IT WAS NOTED THAT THE VALVE CAP ON THE L/H WHEEL ASSY 201805 1 2 WAS A SUSPECT DILL CAP. REF MAINT ALERT ATTACHED. THE CAP WAS RETURNE 201805 1 3 D TO VENDOR & AN ADDITIONAL CAP WAS ORDERED TO REPLACE THE SUSPECT CAP 201805 1 4 . NO RETEST REQ'D FOR THIS PR. 201869 1 1 THIS WAD WAS INITIATED WHEN THE RIGHT HAND ET DOOR FORWARD DOOR DRIVE HO 201869 1 2 USING ASSENMBLY WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED. THE ENTIRE ASSEMBLY WAS REPLACE 201869 1 3 D WITH MODIFIED OV-102 HARDWARE PER PR MEQ-3-12-0553 WHICH ADDRESSED BOT 201869 1 4 H RIGHT HAND FORWARD AND AFT ASSEMBLIES. THIS WAD PERFORMED INITIAL BORO 201869 1 5 SCOPE INSPECTIONS ONLY. ALL SUBSEQUENT WORK AND RIGGING OF THE HARDWARE 201869 1 6 WAS PERFORMED ON PR-0553 AND FUNCTIONAL RETEST WAS VERIFIED PER V1097 RU 201869 1 7 N 3. WORK PER STEP 3 WAS ALSO PERFORMED ON PR-0553. NO WORK OR RETEST RE 201869 1 8 QUIRED ON THIS WAD. PROBABLE CAUSE-DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 201908 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WERE REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL 201908 1 2 SERVICE CENTER. THE INSULATOR HAVE BEEN INSTALLED 201908 1 3 INTO THE RCC PANEL AND THE PANEL IS INSTALLED FOR 201908 1 4 FLIGHT. 201949 1 1 THE DEBONDED AND SPLIT SEALS INDENTIFIED IN PAGES 1, 1A, 1B, 1C AND 1E W 201949 1 2 ERE RESTRICTED MR APPROVED AS IS. POST FLIGHT A MICRO INSPECTION WAS PER 201949 1 3 ORMED ON STR-3-13-507. AS A RESULT OF THAT INSPECTION ALL OF THE SEALS W 201949 1 4 ERE RE-EVALUATED AND EITHER RETURNED TO PRINT, UNRESTRICTED MR REPAIRED 201949 1 5 OR UNRESTRICTED MR REPAIRED OR UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED ON OTHER DOCUMEN 201949 1 6 TS. (REF. INTERIM SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS ON PAGES 13, 14, 15, 16 AND 18.) C 201949 1 7 ONCLUDE NO FURTHER WORK OR INSPECTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 201949 1 8 202060 1 1 SEVEN FASTENER NUTS & SHIMS BECAME DISLODGED FROM 202060 1 2 THE REAR OF THE V070-335096-001 PNL. TWO NUTS & A 202060 1 3 LL SEVEN SHIMS ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR. A LOST & FOUN 202060 1 4 D PR (LAF-3-07-0119) WAS INIT'D TO LOCATE THE MISS 202060 1 5 ING H/W. REPLACEMENT H/W WAS ORDERED IN THE FORM 202060 1 6 OF ME115-0015-0002 INSERTS. THE SHIMS & NUTS WERE 202060 1 7 REMOVED FROM EA INSERT & INSTL'D INTO THE EXISTIN 202060 1 8 G INSERTS IN THE PNL WHICH HAD THE MISSING NUTS & 202060 1 9 SHIMS. CONFIG RTN'D TO PRINT. 202129 1 1 BY TRIMMING THE CLOSEOUT PANEL ALLOWED CLEARANCE 202129 1 2 DURING INSTALLATION. THE TRIMMING DID NOT CHANGE 202129 1 3 THE DRAWING INTENT 202240 1 1 ENLARGING THE ONE DISCREPANT HOLE TO L50-253 WILL 202240 1 2 CLEAN UP THE ELONGATION AND ALLOW USE OF THE DOUBL 202240 1 3 ER AS THE DRAWING INTENDED. THIS REWORK WILL NOT 202240 1 4 EFFECT THE FORM, FIT, OR FUNCTION OF TH EINSTALLAT 202240 1 5 ION, AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. NO 202240 1 6 MR REQUIRED. 202469 1 1 V070-731875-048 LUMINOUS MID-DECID CEILING PANEL WAS MAKING HARD CONTA 202469 1 2 CT WITH THE ATTACH POINT FOR THE EMERGENCY ESCAPE POLE, BRACKET V070-3 202469 1 3 38870-001. THE -001 BRACKETWAS PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED, DH3256-00M FOR 202469 1 4 BEING INSTALLED TOO FAR FORWARD. THIS CONDITION RESULTED IN INTERFERE 202469 1 5 NCE BETWEEN THE -048 CEILING PANEL AND THE -001 BRACKET. THE -048 CEIL 202469 1 6 ING PANEL WAS SLIGHTLY TRIMMED (.25") TO ALLOW FOR CLEAREANCE BETWEEN 202469 1 7 THE V070-731875-048 CEILING PANEL AND THE V070-338870-001 BRACKET. ROU 202469 1 8 TE TO PMRB FOR APPROVAL. 202487 1 1 THR PURPOSE OF THIS PR IS TO DOCUMENT THE MODIFICATION OF THE V070-390 202487 1 2 201-001 CARRIER PANEL BY TFRC3-A0001. THIS MODIFICATION WAS MR APPROVE 202487 1 3 D ON PAGE 60 OF THE TFRC DOCUMENT. A COPY OF THE MODIFICATION REQUIREM 202487 1 4 ENTS FROM THE TFRC DOCUMENT IS APPENDED TO THIS PR AS ATTACHMENTS "A", 202487 1 5 "B" AND "C". STEP 156 OF TFRC3-A0001 REQUIRED THAT A STRUCTURES PR BE 202487 1 6 GENERATED WITH THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN BLOCK 17 OF PAGE 1. CARRI 202487 1 7 ER PANEL IS MR ID'D TFRC3-A0001. THIS CARRIER PANEL IS SECONDARY STRUC 202487 1 8 TURE. NO STRUCTURAL DISCREPANCY EXISTED AT THE TIME OF INITIATION OF T 202487 1 9 HIS PR. 202489 1 1 THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED. CORRECTED AND BROUGHT BACK 202489 1 2 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION IN THIS PR. PROBLEM 1 & 2 STEPS 6,7,&8 HAVE RE 202489 1 3 POSITIONED LOOSE FITTINGS IN THE V070-399451 ANGLE AND TORQUED THEM IN 202489 1 4 TO POSITION. PROBLEM 3 NEW NUT PLATES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN STEP 1 AND 202489 1 5 HAVE REPLACED DISCREPANT NUTPLATES IN STEPS 2,3,4,&5. PROBLEM 4 - NE 202489 1 6 W BOLTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN STEP 1 TO REPLACE GALLED BOLTS. THESE N 202489 1 7 EW BOLTS ARE RETAINED WITH THE V070-399451 ANGLE FOR PERMANENT INSTALL 202489 1 8 ATION DURING TPS VSTR-3-07-314 MOD -005 STEP 4.0. PROBLEM 5 - NEW HAR 202489 1 9 DWARE WAS RECIEVED IN STEP 1 TO REPLACE NON-INSTALLED HARDWARE DISCOVE 202489 1 10 RED DURING REMOVAL. THIS HARDWARE WILL BE RETAINED WITH THE V070-3994 202489 1 11 51 ANGLE FOR PERMANENT INSTALLATION DURING TPS VSTR-3-07-314 MOD -005 202489 1 12 STEP 4.0. PROBLEM 6 - A NEW NUTPLATE WAS RECEIVED AND REPLACED A DISC 202489 1 13 REPANT NUTPLATE IN STEPS 10 THRU 15. UPON COMPLETION OF THESE TASKS A 202489 1 14 LL PROBLEMS WILL BE RESOLVED. 202516 1 1 THERE WERE TWO WHITE SPOTS LOCATED APPROX 4" AFT OF THE FWD SPAR (ZONE 202516 1 2 2 OF THE BODYFLAP) A SAMPLE OF THE POWDER WAS OBTAINED AND THE RESULT 202516 1 3 S FROM THE ANALYSIS LAB INDICATES THAT THEPOWDER WAS RTV RESIDUE AND 202516 1 4 NOT CORROSION. THE POWDER WAS CLEANED UP. PROBABLE CAUSE: DURING AN RT 202516 1 5 V BOND SOME RTV THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLEANED UP WAS MISSED. 202733 1 1 A BROWNISH FOAM INSULATION WHICH WAS USED NEAR THE LOCATION NOTED IN I 202733 1 2 TEM 1 WAS MISTAKEN FOR CORROSION. THE AREA WAS CLEANED UP TO PREVENT F 202733 1 3 URTHER CONFUSION. THIS WAS A WORKMANSHIP DISCREPANCY. 203045 1 1 FUEL CELL 02 AND H2 PURGE LINE FIBROUS INSULATION 203045 1 2 WA FOUND TO BE CRUSHED. LINE INSULATION WAS REMOVE 203045 1 3 D FROM NOTED LINES AT AREAS DEFINED Y ATTACHED FIG 203045 1 4 URES FOR LINE ACCESS AN INSPECTION. ENGINEERING IN 203045 1 5 SPECTION AND EVALUATION PERFROMED. BOTH LINES HAVE 203045 1 6 BEEN INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE ALONG SPAN AND UNDER LI 203045 1 7 NE SUPPORT POINTS WITH NO DAMAGE FOUND AT SUPPORT 203045 1 8 POINTS. SLIGHT BOW DETECTED AND MEASURED BY QUALIT 203045 1 9 Y ASSURANCE AT LINE SPAN BETWEEN LINE SUPPORTS (SE 203045 1 10 E DIMENSIONS STEPS 2 & 9). ORBITER FLOOR MOLD LINE 203045 1 11 CONTAINS A GENTLE ARC, RISING FROM CENTERLINE TOOU 203045 1 12 TBOARD. LINES IN QUESTION HAVE SOME ARC DUE TO PAR 203045 1 13 ALLEL TRACKING OF LINE WITH FLOOR LINE. CRUSHED FI 203045 1 14 BROUS LINE INSULATION HAD BEEN REMOVED FOR LINE AC 203045 1 15 CESS AND EVALUATION. NEW INSULATION INSTALLED TO A 203045 1 16 FFECTED SECTIONS OF LINES PER PRINT, RETURNING FIB 203045 1 17 ROUS INSULATION TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. LINES V0 203045 1 18 70-454210-016 AND V070-454211-020 MR I.D.'D WITH T 203045 1 19 HIS PR NO. FUEL CELL PURGE SYSTEM WAS NOT INVALIDA 203045 1 20 TED. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 203093 1 1 THE MISSING HARDWARE ON LINK ASSY 170D432130-5 HAS 203093 1 2 BEEN INSTLD W/O INCIDENT. THE THERMAL CONICAL SEA 203093 1 3 L & RUDDER SPEEDBRAKE AREA WERE INSPECTED & NO DAM 203093 1 4 AGE WAS DETECTED. RC PERFORMED PER STEP 6.0 AND A 203093 1 5 COPY OF THE REPORT IS ATTACHED. CLOSE PR. 203136 1 1 THE (4) ME114-0032-0012 BARRELL NUTS WERE NOTED AS HAVING THE SILVER P 203136 1 2 LATING WORN FROM THE THREADS. THESE NUTS ARE TIME/CYCLE ITEMS. THE NUT 203136 1 3 S HAVE BEEN SENT TO RI/DOWNEY FOR ENG EXAMINATION, AND NEW BARRELL NUT 203136 1 4 S WERE INSTALLED. THIS ELIMINATES DISCREPANCY ITEMS 1 & 2. THE TIME/CY 203136 1 5 CLE FOR THESE NUTS SHOULD BE RESET TO 0. 203153 1 1 THE MISDRILLED HOLE WAS DRILLED OUT TO 0.256-0.261 203153 1 2 DIA. & A MD121-0004-0803 RIVET WAS INSTLD. NO MR 203153 1 3 MARKING IS REQ'D DUE TO THE FACT THIS AREA WILL BE 203153 1 4 COVERED BY THERMAL PROTECTION BLANKETS. CLOSE PR. 203547 1 1 WIRE TRAY MOUNTING HOLES 1 THOUGH 12 IN THE RIGHT 203547 1 2 HAND FRAME AT X0 1140. ALL SHOWED SIGNS OF TREAD D 203547 1 3 AMAGE. HOLES 1,3, AND 6 WERE REAMED TO 0.2188 INCH 203547 1 4 ES. HOLES 2,4,5,7,8,9,10,11,AND 12 WERE REAMED TO 203547 1 5 0.234 INCHES. NDE WAS DONE AND ALL THE HOLES WERE 203547 1 6 FOUND ACCEPTABLE (REPORTS 30.394 AND 30.396). THES 203547 1 7 E REPAIRS WERE DONE TO REMOVE ANY DAMAGE BY THREAD 203547 1 8 S IN BEARING AND CLEARS THE HOLES FOR UNRESTRICTED 203547 1 9 USE. 203695 1 1 MAO101-301 ALLOWS LENGTHS OTHER THAN THAT CALLED O 203695 1 2 UT ON PRINT. NO PROBLEM EXISTS. 203727 1 1 PRIOR TO INSTALLATION OF THE R/H #6 INSULATOR A CRACK AND A LIFTED EXI 203727 1 2 STING PATCH WAS FOUND. THE CRACK DOES NOT MEET THE MLO601-0002 CRITERI 203727 1 3 A. THE INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED PER MLO311-0022. PROBABLE CAUSE OF CRACK 203727 1 4 IS NORMAL WEAR. 204048 1 1 NOT REAMING 1 HOLE OF 3 WILL NOT AFFECT 204048 1 2 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY NOR CHANGE DWG INTENT OF 204048 1 3 INSTALLATION. BY OMITTING THE ANCHOR SLEEVE AND 204048 1 4 MODIFYING HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS AS REQUESTED BY 204048 1 5 GRUMMAN THE CLIPS CAN BE INSTALLED 204349 1 1 BY REPAIRING THE SPANNER BEAM INSULATOR RETURNS IT 204349 1 2 TO ITS' INTENDED THERMAL INTEGRITY. 204372 1 1 RCC TEE AT RIB SPLICE #9 HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER PRI 204372 1 2 NT BY THE MANUFACTURER. THE TEE ASSY WILL BE RE-I 204372 1 3 NSTALLED PER VSTR-3-07-155. 204500 1 1 HOT BONDING OFDOUBLER OVER DENTED AREA IN PANEL REF_RPT_NO TEXT_ SEQ_NO DISPOSITION ---------- ----- ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 204500 1 2 FACE SHEET RESTORES THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF 204500 1 3 THEAVIONICS BAY COVER DESIGN INTENT OF THIS SECON- 204500 1 4 DARY STRUCTURE IS MAINTAINED. DENTS 1-4 ARE MINOR 204500 1 5 AND SUPERFICIAL IN NATURE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS 204500 1 6 NOT COMPROMISED. 204509 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 204509 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 204509 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 204509 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 204509 1 5 3-C1. 204552 1 1 RUB TUBE WAS FOUND TO BE CHIPPED AT APPROX Xw371 ON RH OUTBOARD ELEVON 204552 1 2 . CHIPPED AREA CAN ONLY BE SEEN WHEN ELEVON IS FULL UP. AREA IS MR ACC 204552 1 3 EPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 204707 1 1 AFT HOLES FOR 2 V070-332942-001 TEE FITTINGS WERE LOCATED .040 FROM TE 204707 1 2 E AND IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN LOCATED .040 FROM EDGE OF BACKUP FITTING. 5 204707 1 3 OF 6 HOLES WERE PILOTED AND THE SIXTH WAS AT FULL SIZE. 5 PILOT HOLES 204707 1 4 AT AFT END WERE PLUGGED AND DRILLED AT PROPER LOCATION PER TPS. THE SI 204707 1 5 XTH HOLE WAS ALSO PLUGGED AND NEW HOLE DRILLED .150 FWD OF PLUGGED HOL 204707 1 6 E. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 204789 1 1 DISCREPANCY FOUND IN THIS PR HAS BEEN DETERMINED 204789 1 2 TO BE A MINOR COSMETIC SCRATCH OF THE KOROPON ONLY 204789 1 3 W/ NO DEGRADATION OR CONTACT W/ THE STRUT. DISPO 204789 1 4 HAS BEEN MADE IN THIS PR TO APPLY CORROSION PRO- 204789 1 5 TECTION OVER SCRATCHED AREA & ALL WORK STEPS HAVE 204789 1 6 BEEN PERFORMED. ITEMS INVOLVED IN THIS PR ARE PRI 204789 1 7 MARY STR. ENG NOTE: STR ENG TO VERIFY MOLD RE- 204789 1 8 SULTS ARE STILL WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. 205003 1 1 A WAIVER WILL BE GENERATED DUE TO RATIONALE THAT L 205003 1 2 H2 SAMPLE FAILURE WILL NOT REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENES 205003 1 3 S OF THE FUEL CELLS TO PERFORM THEIR FUNCTION, MEC 205003 1 4 HANICALLY OR STRUCTURALLY. 205010 1 1 THIS PROBLEM IS WITH GSE ONLY. NO VEHICLE DISCREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE 205010 1 2 I/E HATCH LATCH LOCKING MECHANISM. THIS CONDITION WAS PREVIOUSLY DOCU 205010 1 3 MENTED BY GSE PR A70-0788-005-0004. THIS PR WILL BE CLOSED AS A DUPLIC 205010 1 4 ATE. CLOSE THIS PR AS A DUPLICATE TO GSE PR A70-0788-005-0004. 205329 1 1 REF PROBLEM ITEM 1, A NEW STIFFENER WAS OBTAINED. 205329 1 2 REF PROBLEM ITEM 2, THE STIFFENERS WERE TRIMMED 205329 1 3 PER FIG 1 TO CLEAR THE INTERFERING STRUCTURE. PRO 205329 1 4 BLEM 1 WAS VENDOR, PROBLEM 2 WAS DESIGN. 205527 1 1 HEAT SINK HAS BEEN REWORKED TO ELIMINATE INTERFERE 205527 1 2 NCE WITH ADJACENT STRINGERS. TRIMMING WILL NOT SI 205527 1 3 GNIFICANTLY DECREASE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OR HEAT 205527 1 4 SINK CAPABILITIES. SECONDARY STRUCTURE. CLOSE TH 205527 1 5 IS PR. 205549 1 1 THE SPAR INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT RSC BY INSERTING EXTRA INSULATION. 205549 1 2 THE DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS AND THE PR CAN CLOSE. 205656 1 1 THE L.H. PLB DOOR WAS CYCLED CLOSED WITH AN OBSERVER MONITORING THE DE 205656 1 2 SCREPANT PUSH ROD. THE OBSERVER VERFIED THAT THE PUSH ROD DID NOT COME 205656 1 3 NEAR ANY VEHICLE STRUCTURE. THIS INDICATES THE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY P 205656 1 4 ERSONNEL WORKING IN THE ARA OR GSE (A LADDER OR WORKSTAND) ON THE SILL 205656 1 5 LONGERON. FCS DISPOSITIONED STEPS 2-6 TO R&R THE DECALS ON THE PUSH R 205656 1 6 OD. WHILE REMOVING THE DECALS, PAGE 1A WAS PICKED UP TO DOCUMENT FINDI 205656 1 7 NG 3 P/N'S ON THE PUSH ROD. QC EXPECTED TO FWD ONLY ONE P/N BUT THE NO 205656 1 8 TE ON PAGE 5 EXPLAINED THAT 2 P/N'S ARE CALLED OUT PER THE DWG AND THE 205656 1 9 THIRD IS DUE TO AN EO. THE DECALS WERE REPLACED AND NO FURTHER DISCRE 205656 1 10 PANCIES EXIST. THE PUSH ROD ASSY WAS VISUALLY INSPECTED AND NO DAMAGE 205656 1 11 OR DISPLACED METAL WAS FOUND. ONLY THE DECALS WERE CHAFFED. 205766 1 1 ENGINEERING INSPECTION OF DISCREPANCY NOTED IN ITEM 1 REVEALED AN INCO 205766 1 2 RRECT WASHER INSTALLED UNDER THE FASTENER NUT. THE DISCREPANT WASHER W 205766 1 3 AS REMOVED AND REPLACED BY THE CORRECT WASHER PER DRAWING V070-510301, 205766 1 4 ZN 34C. THE NUT WAS TORQUED AND COTTER PIN WAS INSTALLED. THIS PR CON 205766 1 5 DITION NO LONGER EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: CORRECT HARDWARE NOT VERIFIED 205766 1 6 PRIOR TO INSTALLATION. 206428 1 1 DISCREPANCY 1 WAS RESOLVED BY EO-TO-FOLLOWDISPOSITION TO INCORPORATE 206428 1 2 MODIFICATION TO BRACKET TO SUPPORT FUEL BLEED LINE INSTALLATION. DISCR 206428 1 3 EPANCIES 2 & 3 WERE RESOLVED BY MR DISPOSITION. A LINER RETAINER HOLE 206428 1 4 WAS RELOCATED AND A MR SHIM WAS MADE TO MAINTAIN PROPER LINER ALIGNMEN 206428 1 5 T MR DISPOSITION ALSO PLUGGED UNUSED HOLES WITH RIVETS AND INCREASED S 206428 1 6 CREW LENGTHS TO ACCOMODATE SHIM THICKNESS. 206675 1 1 A WAIVER TO OMRS V00H00.020 TABLE TO HAVE AV BAY #2 ACCESS PANEL V070- 206675 1 2 660509-004 INSTALLED HAS BEEN WAIVED. REFERENCE ATTACHED COPY OF WAIVE 206675 1 3 R (WK0643). CLOSE THIS PR. 206683 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, IT WAS NOTICED THAT THE COTTER PINS INSTALLED AT 206683 1 2 R/H #3 RADIATOR HINGELINE CONNECTIONS DID NOT HAVE THE PROPER ADHESIVE 206683 1 3 COATING INSTALLED, AS CALLED OUT PER EO D07 OF DWG V070-634530. ADHES 206683 1 4 IVE REQ'D TO ELIMINATE POSSIBLE SHARP OBJECTS DURING EVA OPS OMI V5K03 206683 1 5 , WHICH INSTALLED THE RADIATOR, FAILED TO CALL OUT THE ADHESIVE APPLIC 206683 1 6 ATION DURING COTTER PIN INSTALLATION. A DEV TO V5K03 WAS WRITTEN TO IN 206683 1 7 CORPORATE THE ADHESIVE APPLICATION AND THE WORK WAS VERIFIED COMPLETE. 206683 1 8 NO FURTHER WORK REQ'D AND THIS PR CAN BE CLOSED. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROC 206683 1 9 EDURAL ERROR. 206794 1 1 THE BUSHINGS DESCRIBED IN ITEM 1 FOR HOLES 108,134 206794 1 2 ,144, AND 185 WERE BROUGHT FLUSH WITH THE OML USIN 206794 1 3 G A MICRO-SHAVER AND HAVE BEEN APPROVED AS ACCEPTA 206794 1 4 BLE AS IS. THE HOLES WITH BUSHINGS DESCRIBED IN IT 206794 1 5 EM 2(112,135,195, AND 203) WERE REAMED BETWEEN 0.2 206794 1 6 663 AND 0.2668 TO ALLOW DOUBLER INSTALLATION TO CO 206794 1 7 NTINUE. THIS REWORK HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRI 206794 1 8 CTED USAGE. STRUCTURAL INTERGRITY IS MAINTAINED. F 206794 1 9 OR ITEM #2, OVERSIZED FASTENERS WERE USED PER MR A 206794 1 10 PPROVAL. 206827 1 1 FOUR MLG TRUNNION BOLT HOLES WERE FOUND TO HAVE VARIOUS SCRATCHES & DA 206827 1 2 MAGE. ONE HOLE WAS CLEANED UP TO PER PRINT CONDBY REMOVING BURRS IN 206827 1 3 THE HOLE. THE THREE OTHER HOLES WERE MR'D OK AS IS AFTER SMOOTHING OU 206827 1 4 T EDGES OF DAMAGE. REPAIRS ARE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PRIMARY STRUCTU 206827 1 5 RE 206985 1 1 INITIATE PMR TO OBTAIN (16) MD111-4020-0403 BOLTS. 206985 1 2 (REF. M072-544502 E.O. A03) RECORD PMR NO. 145316. 206985 1 3 NOTE: UPON RECEIPT OF PARTS, PERFORM FOLLOWING 206985 1 4 STEP. 207058 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF FUEL CELL #2 DIAGNOSTIC TEST. BREATHING OXYGEN ( 207058 1 2 PER SE-5-0073 TABLE 6.3-24) WAS INADVERTANTLY USED INSTEAD OF REQUIRED 207058 1 3 GRADE F GASEOUS OXYGEN (PER SE-5-0073 TABLE 6.3.-4). THIS IS A VIOLAT 207058 1 4 ION OF OMRSD FILE VI G53FF0000.004 AND GEN REQMT 1.4.2. FILE III V45. 207058 1 5 THE REDUCES PURITY GO2 IS NOT DETRIMENTAL TO FUEL CELL DIAGNOSTIC TEST 207058 1 6 ING NOR FUTURE FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR 207058 1 7 . CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT OF WAIVER WKG013 (FILE VI) AND (FILE III 207058 1 8 V45) 207338 1 1 INTEFERING FASTENERS REWORKED TO ALLOW PARTS INSTL 207475 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0, P 207475 1 2 AGE 1.0. THE SHANK OF THE LOWER (2) MD112-1002-0307 SCREWS BOTTOMED OU 207475 1 3 T PRIOR TO HEAD PROPERLY SEATING ON THE CARRIER PANEL WHEN FLIGHT TORQ 207475 1 4 UE WAS REACHED. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE ENGINEERING REQUIREMENT OF 207475 1 5 MD112-1002-0308 SCREWS BEING USED IN THE BOTTOM TWO HOLES WOULD BE CHA 207475 1 6 NGED TO MD112-1002-0306 SCREWS PER E.O. TO FOLLOW. THIS CHANGE OF GRIP 207475 1 7 LENGTH IS NEEDED TO ALLOW FOR THE PROPER SEATING OF THE (2) SCREWS. T 207475 1 8 HE CARRIER PANEL INSTALLATION IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. IMPROPER DESIG 207475 1 9 N OF THIS INSTALLATION LED TO THIS DISCREPANCY. 207568 I 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSP. OF THIS/THESE CONDITIONS 207568 I 2 ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO REQUIRE A REPAIR. 207568 I 3 THE SCRATCH AND/OR HOLE AND /OR DAMG. IS ALLOWABLE 207568 I 4 PER VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL IF ANY, ARE 207568 I 5 MINOR AND DO NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE FIT, FORM, 207568 I 6 AND/OR FUNCTION OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CONDI- 207568 I 7 TION WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HEAT TRANSFER 207568 I 8 CAPACITY OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CONDITION IS 207568 I 9 ACCEPTABLE AS-IS FOR UN-0RESTRICTED USE. 207602 1 1 V070-199815-002R/H R/S 16 TEE MOVEMENT IS WITHIN DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. 207602 1 2 NOT A DISCREPANY CONDITION. 207770 1 1 ITEM 1 WAS A MINOR INDENTATION IN THE LH #2 TOP RADIATOR TAPE WHICH WA 207770 1 2 S MR ACCEPTED OK AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 207821 1 1 THE OVER-TORQUED HUBCAP FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW H 207821 1 2 ARDWARE PER THIS PR. A DEV WAS WRITTEN TO V1165 TO CORRECT WRONG TORQU 207821 1 3 E CALLOUT (COPY ATTACHED). THE OCN RECORDED DURING REINSTALLATION OF T 207821 1 4 HE HUBCAP WAS NOT THE SAME AS THE ONE RECORDED FROM THE REMOVAL. THE H 207821 1 5 UBCAP WAS REMOVED AND INSPECTED, THE OCN NUMBER WAS RECORDED AND THE H 207821 1 6 UBCAP WAS REINSTALLED. THE AN0783 HUBCAP ORIGINALLY REMOVED FROM THE L 207821 1 7 HOB WHEEL PER PR MIQ-3-08-0387 WAS REINSTALLED ON THE LHIB WHEEL PER P 207821 1 8 R MEQ-3-08-0388 WHICH REMOVED THE AN0784 HUBCAP FROM THE LHIB WHEEL. A 207821 1 9 N0784 WAS REINSTALLED ON THE LHOB WHEEL PER PR MEQ-3-08-0387. THE AN07 207821 1 10 83 AND AN0784 HUBCAPS ARE INTERCHANGEABLE. THE MAIN LANDING GEAR WHEEL 207821 1 11 HAS BEEN RETURNED TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. CAUSE: HUMAN ERROR. 207838 1 1 INSULATED OXYGEN LINE V070-454705-026 WAS FOUND TO BE IN CONTACT WITH 207838 1 2 NEW SRB RATE GYRO SUPPORT. CONTACT IS LIGHT WITH LINE SECURELY IN PLAC 207838 1 3 E. LINE AND SUPPORT SECURING ATTITUDES WILL NOT PRESENT ADVERSE MOTION 207838 1 4 TO CAUSE LINE INSULATION DEGRADATION. LINE HAS TEFLON TAPE COVERING A 207838 1 5 T AREA OF CONTACT, PROVIDING A NATURAL CHAFFE GUARD. THIS CONDITION HA 207838 1 6 S BEEN MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND IS MR MARKED. 208092 1 1 REMOVED AS COMPLETLY AS POSSIBLE FORM L/H MLG STRU 208092 1 2 T WITH MEK SOLVENT. EFFECTIVE IN REMOVING MOST OF 208092 1 3 KORPON BUT ALSO REMV'D PART OF THE TOP COAT OF WHI 208092 1 4 TE PAINT. THE PAINTED SURFACES WERE REPAINTED PER 208092 1 5 RI SPEC & INSPECTED TO VERIFY A SATISFACTORY TOP C 208092 1 6 OAT WAS APPLIED. RETURNED TO IT'S NORMAL STATE. 208256 1 1 THE WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL IS CURLED UNDER AT FLIPPER DOORS #11,12 & 208256 1 2 13. THE SEAL HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE 208256 1 3 : DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 208334 1 1 THE FOLLOWING TORSION RESTRAINT STRAPS WERE INSTALLEDAT THE FOLLOWING 208334 1 2 LOCATIONS. STRAP V070-346095-105/106. V070-346091-086/087. V070-34609 208334 1 3 5-107/108. INNER CHANNEL BLKS V070-346090-022 WERE RELOCATED APPROX 1" 208334 1 4 INBOARD ON CHANNEL STRAPS V070-346095-106-108 ON BOTH STRAPS -106 AND 208334 1 5 108. 1" OF THE OUTBOARD EDGE WAS CUT OFF. THE FIRST THREE MOST INBOAR 208334 1 6 D V070-346090-021. BLKS OR STRAP V070-346095-107 AND TWO -021 BLKS FRO 208334 1 7 M STRAP V070-346091-087. STRAP WERE REPLACED WITH BLKS V070-346090-001 208334 1 8 WHICH PROVIDED CORRECT BLK TO STRINGER DISTANCE. A .020 LAMINATED SHI 208334 1 9 M WAS INSTALLED UNDER THE FIRST AND 2ND BLKS OF STRAP V070-346095-105. 208334 1 10 WHICH ALLOWED THE CHANNEL STRAP BLKS TO COME WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE 208334 1 11 UPON RECEIPT AND VERIFICATION OF EO TO FOLLOW STEPS 1.26,1.30,1.32,1.3 208334 1 12 4,1.40 CLOSE PR. 208476 1 1 ITEM 1: THE SAMPLES TAKEN FROM THE POLYIMIDE PANELS WERE SENT TO THE 208476 1 2 MAB LAB AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE RESIDUE WAS OUTGASSING FROM THE 208476 1 3 TPS COMPONENTS INSIDE THE NOSECAP. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE 208476 1 4 CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 2: THE DELAMINATION ON THE 208476 1 5 V070-399486-002 POLYIMIDE PANEL WAS MR REPAIRED BY INJECTING MBO120-037 208476 1 6 ADHESIVE INTO THE DELAMINATION. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE 208476 1 7 CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 3-6: THE OTHER DELAMINATION ON THE 208476 1 8 V070-399486-001 AND -002 PANELS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTEICTED USE AS 208476 1 9 IS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 208476 1 10 208588 1 1 ITEMS 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 AND 4.0: STEP 2.0 CALLS OUT TO OBTAIN THE REPAIRED 208588 1 2 V070-198702-024 TUBE SEAL FROM HDA; A NEW V070-198702-024 TUBE SEAL W 208588 1 3 AS OBTAINED FROM LOGISTICS INSTEAD AND STORED WITH THE RIGHT HAND FLIP 208588 1 4 PER DOOR #2 HAREWARE IN MIDBODY SHOP BAY 1. THE NEW V070-198702-024 TU 208588 1 5 BE SEAL WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE VEHICLE PER THE RESPECTIVE JOB CARD. 208588 1 6 THE REPAIRED V070-198702-024 TUBE SEAL WILL BE SEND BACK TO LOGISTICS 208588 1 7 FOR RESTOCK. THE V070-198702-024 TUBE SEAL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. P 208588 1 8 ROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 208679 1 1 SHAVED BOLT WAS PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED PER MR CONCURR 208679 1 2 ENCE. BOLT INSTALLED ON STR-3-07-1203. CLOSE THI 208679 1 3 S PR. 208697 1 1 SCRATCHES ON IML OF ACCESS CVR WAS SANDED OUT BY A 208697 1 2 DISPOSITION. FIX IS APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED 208697 1 3 USE & PART IS RETURNED TO DESIGN INTENT. 208754 1 1 THE BOLT/BUSHING PROBLEM WAS SUCCESSFULLY ELIMINAT 208754 1 2 ED PER THE PR/MR DISPOSITION. THE PROBLEM ARE 208754 1 3 SOLVED 208778 1 1 FOR ITEMS #1 AND #2, THE BROKEN BRACKETS WERE REMOVED FROM STRINGER #1 208778 1 2 1 AND THE FASTENERS REMOVED. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE BRACKETS HAVE 208778 1 3 NO FUNCTION AND NEW ONES WILL NOT BE INSTALLED, WITH THE HOLES TO BE P 208778 1 4 LUGGED BY RIVETS AND TO BE DOCUMENTED BE EO TO FOLLOW. BECAUSE NO NEW 208778 1 5 BRACKETS WILL BE INSTALLED, ITEMS #3 AND #4 ARE TAKEN CARE OF AND WILL 208778 1 6 GO AWAY. 208901 1 1 ITEM 1: NUTPLATE AT 12:00 O'CLOCK POSITION SHEARED OFF DURING INSTALLA 208901 1 2 TION OF THE BOLT. THE BOLT AND NUTPLATE WERE REMOVED. THE HEATSHEILD W 208901 1 3 AS FLOWN WITH A NUT AND BOLT FOR OV-103 FLIGHT 09. THE NUTPLATE HAS BE 208901 1 4 EN REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 209224 1 1 THE TEAR IN UPPER TEE #20 INSULATOR IS MR'D OIL AS 209224 1 2 IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BECAUSE THE TEAR DOES NOT 209224 1 3 EXPOSE ANY INSULATION & RIB SPLICE #21 IS IN A LO 209224 1 4 W THERMAL GRADIENT. MR ID IS NOT REQ'D ON RCC INS 209224 1 5 ULATORS. TEE #20 WILL BE INSTL'D INTO RIB SPLICE 209224 1 6 #21 PER STR-3-07-1736. 209289 1 1 PROBLEM CORRECTED BY INSTALLING HI-LOK FASTENERS I 209289 1 2 N PLACE OF THE BLIND RIVETS PER EO-TO-FOLLOW. EO B 209289 1 3 14 AGAINST "MAKE WORK" DWG V070-100008 AUTHORIZES 209289 1 4 THE CHANGE. CAUSE OF THIS PROBLEM WAS A DESIGN DEF 209289 1 5 ICIENCY. CLOSE THIS PR. 209456 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHENTHE COLLAR SEAL ON THE CREW MODULE SIDE HAT 209456 1 2 CH WAS FOUND UNPROTECTED. PG 1A AND 1B NOTE MINOR DISCREPANCIES WITH T 209456 1 3 HAT SEAL. THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. THAT SEAL FAILED A PRESSU 209456 1 4 RE LEAK CHECK (PG 1C) AND WAS INSPECTED, CLEANED AND RETESTED. THE 2ND 209456 1 5 LEAK CHECK FAILED DUE TO A GSE LEAK AND PR C70-0749-1-0017 WAS INITIA 209456 1 6 TED. THE LEAK CHECK WAS REPERFORMED WITH A DIFFERENT GSE UNIT AND THE 209456 1 7 SEAL LEAKED AGAIN; PAGE 1D WAS ADDED. THE SEAL WAS AGAIN REPLACED (3R 209456 1 8 D SEAL) AND FAILED A LEAK CHECK DUE TO ANOTHER GSE LEAK ( PG 1E). A 2N 209456 1 9 D LEAK CHECK PASSED WITH DIFFERENT GSE. THE SEAL CURRENTLY INSTALLED ( 209456 1 10 FOR FLIGHT) HAS NO NOTED DEFECTS AND SATISFACTORILY PASSED SEAL PRESSU 209456 1 11 RE LEAK CHECK. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXIST. 209456 1 12 CLOSE THIS PR. 209496 1 1 TEE #2 LH WAS REMOVED FROM RIB SPLICE #3 BY STR-3-07-155 FOR STRUCTURA 209496 1 2 L INSPECTION. THE TEE WAS TEMPORARILY INSTALLED BY STR-3-07-319 TO SU 209496 1 3 PPORT TILE LESS CARRIER FIT CHECK. UPON INSTALLATION THIS PR WAS GENE 209496 1 4 RATED ON A DISCREPANT LOWER INSULATOR GAP. THE TEE WAS REMOVED. THE 209496 1 5 INSULATOR ADJUSTED TO CORRECT THE GAP PROBLEM AND THEN REINSTALLED TEM 209496 1 6 PORARILY. WHEN THE TILE WORK IS COMPLETE THE TEE WILL BE REMOVED PER 209496 1 7 STR-3-07-319. THE FINAL INSTALLATION FOR FLIGHT OF THE TEE WILL BE PE 209496 1 8 R STR-3-07-155. THE DISCREPANCY IN THIS PR NO LONGER EXISTS SO THE PR 209496 1 9 CAN BE CLOSED. 209583 1 1 THE OUTBD INSULATORS OF PANEL $4 LH WERE ADJUSTED INBD TO OVERCOME THE 209583 1 2 TEE INTERFERENCE DISCREPANCY. THE INTERFERENCE PROBLEM NO LONGER EXIS 209583 1 3 TS AND THE PR CAN BE CLOSED. 209583 1 4 CLOSE THIS PR. 209590 1 1 THE WIRE TRAY AT THE R/H XO 636 FRAME HAS DAMAGE I 209590 1 2 N HOLES 1,6,7 AND 12 REF PG. 4 SKETCH FOR HOLE LOC 209590 1 3 ATIONS. DUE TO PREVIOUS THREADS IN BEARING. HOLE 1 209590 1 4 WAS REAMED TO 0.2304 DIA. HOLES 6 AND 12 TO 0.218 209590 1 5 5 DIS. AND HOLE 7 TO 0.2186 DIA. NDE WAS PERFORMED 209590 1 6 AND NO EVIDENCE OF CRACKES WERE FOUND (REPORT AT 209590 1 7 TACHED) THIS MR REWORK CLEARS THE MOUNTING HOLES F 209590 1 8 OR UNRESTRICTED USE. 209755 1 1 RCC PANEL R/H #10 WAS NOT INSPECTED PER OMRSD REQUIREMENT. THIS INSPEC 209755 1 2 TION IS WAIVED UNTIL FLIGHT 11. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PR 209755 1 3 OBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL/AUTHORIZATION ERROR. 209925 1 1 DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION REVEALS NO CRACKS ARE 209925 1 2 PRESENT. THE CLIP IS ACCEPTABLE FOR USAGE AS IS 210030 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2 PG 2, LUMINOUS CEILING PANEL COVER ASSYS, NOT FINISHED PER 210030 1 2 PRINT. BOTH ITEMS WERE RESOLVED BY OBTAINING NEW COVER ASSYS AND ROUTIN 210030 1 3 G THE DISCREPANT ASSYS FOR REWORK. THIS PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WO 210030 1 4 RKMANSHIP. 210030 1 5 210092 1 1 RH MLG DOOR SEAL WAS DETERMINED TO BE DEBONDED FROM RH MLG DOOR AND NO 210092 1 2 T TORN. THE SEAL WAS REBONDED PER DWG 91B50050 SPEC. MA0106-322. PROBA 210092 1 3 LE CAUSE IS OPERATIONALE DEGRADATION. 210108 1 1 DURING STR-3-11-454,ST35.0, INSTALLATION OF THE LHOBOBOB PRIMARY SEAL 210108 1 2 PANEL, AND INCORRECT FASTENER WAS FOUND INSTALLED AT A WIPER SEAL ATTA 210108 1 3 CH POINT. THE FASTENER WAS NOT INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT, AND WAS USED AS A 210108 1 4 CLAMPING FORCE WHILE APPLYING RTV. WHEN THE RTV CAME OUT OF CURE, THE 210108 1 5 FASTENER SHOULD HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND WAS NOT PER THIS DISPOSITION. T 210108 1 6 HE FASTENER WAS REMOVED. PER PRINT HARDWARE WILL BE INSTALLED PER STR- 210108 1 7 3-11-454,ST-35.0. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING OR SHOP ACTION REQUIRED. PROB 210108 1 8 ABLE CAUSE: OVERSIGHT-WORKMANSHIP. 210204 1 1 RIGHT HAND RADIATOR #3 HINGE FITTINGS 3 AND 4 WERE 210204 1 2 LIGHTLY SANDED TO REMOVE GALLING AND ALLOW INSERT 210204 1 3 ION OF RAD HINGE BOLTS. FITTINGS WERE MR'D AND APP 210204 1 4 ROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ 210204 1 5 UIRED. 210207 1 1 DRILL OUT OLD RIVETS R&R DISCREPANT NUT PLATES 210207 1 2 USING GOOD SHOP PRACTICE. (REF. DWG 170D410540). 210286 1 1 THE DD1149 THAT DELIVERED THE STRUT TO THE ROCKWEL 210286 1 2 L RSC REFERRED TO THE 70B2000-104 STRUT AS A LH ST 210286 1 3 RUT. THIS WAS AN ERROR THE STRUT WAS ACTUALLY REMO 210286 1 4 VED FROM THE RH LOCATION. THIS ERROR ON THE DD1149 210286 1 5 WAS CORRECTED ON 1-5-88. ALL REMAINING PAPERWORK 210286 1 6 HAS BEEN CHANGED TO SHOW THAT OCN 6Z760S30246 BELO 210286 1 7 NGS TO THE VR70-341156-008 STRUT. ALL PAPERWORK IS 210286 1 8 IN ORDER THIS PR CAN BE CLOSED. 210332 1 1 REF. DISC #1 (3) EXISTING OVERSIZE HOLES WERE ADDR 210332 1 2 ESSED BY INSTALLING NEXT SIZE UP FASTENERS FOR BRA 210332 1 3 CKET INSTLN HOLE DESCRIBED IN DISCREPANCY IS COVER 210332 1 4 ED BY A PER PRINT-011 SHIM. MR APPROVED FASTENER I 210332 1 5 NSTLN. REF. DISC #2, PG 1A, V070-856606-001 BRACKE 210332 1 6 T WAS MR TRIMMED TO PROVIDE INSTLN AT PRINT LOCATI 210332 1 7 ON. ALL MR'S ARE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR'S RETURN 210332 1 8 INSTLNS WITHIN DESIGN INTENT. CLOSE PR. 210334 1 1 THE SCRATCHES WERE MEASURED & DYE-PEN CHECKED. 210334 1 2 THEY WERE MR'd OK AS IS. 210379 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY WAS THAT THE VR70-341148-005 HINGE SUPPORT MADE CONTAC 210379 1 2 T WITH THE SILL LONGERON. THE INTERFERENCE WAS FILED/MILLED OUT TO ALL 210379 1 3 EVIATED THE DISCREPANCY. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE SUPPORT IS MAINTI 210379 1 4 ANED. MR BOARD APPOVAL GRANTED 210425 1 1 DISCREPENT HOLES WERE ADDRESSED BY MR INSTALLING O 210425 1 2 F OVERSIZED FASTENERS ( REWORK FASTENERS) 1) HOLE 210425 1 3 LOCATION REQUIRED NEXT DIAMETER SIZE UP TO FILL HO 210425 1 4 LE. NO CRACKS OR ANOMILIES NOTED BY NDT. BARED ARE 210425 1 5 AS WERE RE-KORPONED. DINGE MR'D ANAYASIS. REWORK P 210425 1 6 ER MR RETURNS DISCREPANT CONDITION TO DESIGN INTEN 210425 1 7 T. 210695 1 1 THE ELONGATED HOLE WAS REAMED OUT TO .250". A .25 210695 1 2 0" DIA HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED. THIS WAS A WORKMANSH 210695 1 3 IP PROBLEM. 210745 1 1 THE PANEL WAS RECEIVED AT PALMDALE WITH A PIECE BR 210745 1 2 OKEN OFF. THE BROKEN OFF PIECE WAS BONDED IN PLACE 210745 1 3 , AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR AC2685- 210745 1 4 000M. THE PNL WAS MR IDENTIFIED WITH THE MARKING D 210745 1 5 R AC2685-000M. NO ENGR DISPO REQ'D. CLOSE PR. 210746 1 1 CHANNEL INTERFERENCE WILL BE ELIMINATED. BOLTS TO 210746 1 2 CARRIER PANEL V070-191074-002 WILL BE TORQUED TO D 210746 1 3 RAWING SPECIFICATIONS. 210767 1 1 THE INSULATION BLANKET HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION (REF: 210767 1 2 DRAWING 170D432400 ZN 3-5 SHEETS) PER VENDOR REPRESENTATIVE ACTION PER 210767 1 3 HIS PROCEDURE (SEE ATTACHED). THIS RETURNS THE HARDWARE TO PRINT CONF 210767 1 4 IGURATION. 210886 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY FROM THIS PR (1699) WAS TRANSFERRE 210886 1 2 D TO PR STR-3-07-1760 TO CONSOLIDATE THE REPAIR EF 210886 1 3 FORT. 210910 1 1 THE VLV STEM CORE WAS CYCLED TO DISLODGE ANY CONTA 210910 1 2 MINATION. THE RESULTS PER STEP 3 INDICATES NO VISI 210910 1 3 BLE LEAKAGE. THE VLV STEM IS NOW NO LONGER LEAKING 210910 1 4 & THE CAP IS REINSTALLED. 210947 1 1 ITEM #1 ON PG 1. SPOTS APPEARED WHERE PRIMER WAS APPLIED. PRIMER WAS R 210947 1 2 EMOVED, THINNED, AND REAPPLIED TO COVER PER SPEC. REQUIREMENTS. ITEM # 210947 1 3 2 ON PG 1A. KORPON WAS REMOVED DURING PRIMER REMOVAL. KORPON WAS REAPP 210947 1 4 LIED OVER ENTIRE COVER SURFACE PER ITEM 1A ON PG. 2. PER SPEC. REQ. IT 210947 1 5 EM #3 ON PG. 1B. WIRE TRAY COVER SURFACE WAS NOT WATER BREAK FREE TEST 210947 1 6 ED FOR CONTAMINANTS. COVER WAS PAINTED TO SPECIFICATIONS/ENGINEERING R 210947 1 7 EQUIREMENTS. WIRE TRAY COVER DOES MEET THE SURFACE PREPARATION/APPLICA 210947 1 8 TION DESIGN INTENT. 210976 1 1 THE ORIGINAL PILOT HOLE WAS PLUGGED. THE MISDRILL 210976 1 2 ED HOLE WAS USED FOR THE FASTENER LOCATION. THIS 210976 1 3 WAS A WORKMANSHIP ERROR. 211041 1 1 INDICATION SHOWS FLT STS-14,STS-23 & STS-25 ORBITE 211041 1 2 R TANK PRESSURE VALIDATE EACH OTHER TO SHOW NO DEC 211041 1 3 REASE IN H2 TK RV CRACK PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH CLOS 211041 1 4 E TO THE LWR OMRSD LIMIT, THE STS-14 & STS-25 GSE 211041 1 5 GAGE READINGS WERE WITHIN LIMITS BUT STS-23 GAGE R 211041 1 6 EADINGS WERE OUT/OF THE OMRSD V45ARO.020 TOLERANCE 211041 1 7 S OF 302-310 PSIG. BASED UPON STS-14,25 DATA & THE 211041 1 8 VARIABLE OF HUMAN & GSE ERROR, STS-23 GAGE RDGS W 211041 1 9 ILL BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN IN ERROR. THE FINAL 211041 1 10 STS-25 RDGS VERIFY CRACK MEETS OMRSD REQRMNT'S. 211314 1 1 CARRIER PANEL TO FILLER BAR BRACKET AND WING STRUC 211314 1 2 TURE STEP MEASUREMENTS BROUGHT WITHIN MR ACCEPTABL 211314 1 3 E TOLERANCE (0.040 - .085) THRU THE INSTALLATION O 211314 1 4 F BRACKET DOUBLER AND SHIMS. ALL INTERIM DISCREPA 211314 1 5 NCIES CORRECTED TO ACHIEVE FINAL STEP REQUIREMENTS 211314 1 6 . TILE OVERLAP PROBLEM TRANSFERRED TO TPS. ALL D 211314 1 7 ISCREPANCIES CORRECTED, NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED 211578 1 1 THE AN316C6R JAM NUTS WERE TORQUED BY A MOD TO VST 211578 1 2 R-3-07-279. PRINT CONFIGURATION WAS ATTAINED. 211735 1 1 THE V070-351928-003 RING WAS MR REWORKED IN ORDER TO REPAIR THE CRACK 211735 1 2 AS DOCUMENTED ON PAGE 1. THE CRACK WAS STOPPED DRILLED AND A DOUBLER W 211735 1 3 AS INSTALLED IN ORDER TO BEEF UP THE AREA. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. 211735 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE WAS NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 211963 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1 I.B. AND O.B. EDGE: SHIMS BONDED TO CARRIER PANEL STIFFENE 211963 1 2 R FEET PER RATIONAL PG. 11 ITEM 1 THROUGH 24 AFFECTED STEPS LISTED IN 211963 1 3 ITEM 1. STEP DIMENSIONS WERE REMEASURED AFTER COMPLETION OF ITMES AND 211963 1 4 ARE SHOWN IN ATTACHMENT "G". I.B. "A" (.072), "B" (.052), "C" (.049 AN 211963 1 5 D O.B. "A" (.075), "B" (.075), "C" (.073), "D" (.076) ARE WITHIN DESIG 211963 1 6 N TOLERANCE OF .070 +/- .008 OR ACCEPTABLE MR TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .08 211963 1 7 5. I.B. "D" DIM WAS REWORKED BY BONDING MR -010 SHIM ON CARRIER PANEL 211963 1 8 PER ITMES 33. TO 37. PAGES 15 AND 16. STEP WAS REWORKED TO FROM .033 T 211963 1 9 O .047 WHICH IS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085. ITEM 2 PG 211963 1 10 1A C/P TO WING STRUCTURE STEP: MR SHIM -009 BONDED TO WING TRAILING 211963 1 11 EDGE STRUCTURE REDUCES OUT OF TOLERANCE STEPS TO ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE 211963 1 12 OF .040 TO .085 PER RATIONALE PG 11. REMEASURED STEPS AFTER BONDING OF 211963 1 13 SHIM ARE SHOWN IN ATTACHMENT "G". ALL STEPS ARE WITHIN DESIGN TOLERNA 211963 1 14 CE OF .070 +/- .008 OR ACCEPTABLE MR TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085 PER RAT 211963 1 15 IONALE PG. 11. ITEM 3 PG. 1B: MR SHIM LISTED IN ITEM 3 WAS TRIMMED ON 211963 1 16 ITEM 31 PG. 13 SO MR -009 SHIM COULD BE BONDED. ALL STEP DIMENSIONS FR 211963 1 17 OM CARRIER PANEL AS REWORKED AND DOCUMENTED PROVIDE A FILLER BAR TO TI 211963 1 18 LE CONFIGURATION THAT WILL PREVENT OVERTEMP OF FILLER BAR, SIP & STRUC 211963 1 19 TURE. TIEM 4 PAGE 1C: PR WRITTEN ADDRESSING INSUFFICIENT FILLER BAR CO 211963 1 20 NTACT SURFACE WAS DETERMINED TO BE A TPS CONCERN ONLY. NO STRUCTURAL 211963 1 21 WORK IS REQUIRED. PR LWNG-3-07-1689 WILL BE ADDRESS IMPROPERLY F/B SEA 211963 1 22 L ZONE. REF PGS 17.0 AND 18.0 FOR S/C ITEMS 1 THROUGH 3. 212283 1 1 LINE RETAINER SCREWS PREVENTED PROPER INSTALLATION OF THE KEEL BRIDGE 212283 1 2 AT Xo 1040 FRAME, Yo 0.0. APPROXIMATELY 1/16" OF MATERIAL WAS REMOVED 212283 1 3 FROM THE HEAD OF EACH SCREW. EACH SCREW WAS THEN CORROSION PROTECTED A 212283 1 4 ND MR ID'D PER MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBLEM DUE TO A BUILDUP OF TO 212283 1 5 LERANCES.CLOSE THIS PR. 212295 1 1 THE JO BOLTS WERE SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED AND THE 212295 1 2 STIFFENER WAS COMPLETED 212569 1 1 THE V070-333118-003 FAIRING HAS A CRACK APPROX. 1 INCH IN LENGTH. THE 212569 1 2 FAIRING WAS REPAIRED WITH A FIBRERGLASS PATCH PER MR DISPO. PROBABLE C 212569 1 3 AUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 212678 1 1 DURING 02 MANIF 1 INSTLN (REF TPS FCP-3-07-017), SCRATCHES WER OBSERVE 212678 1 2 D ON FOLLOWING PORT DYNATUBE FACES: 1. T-0 PORT, 2. FUEL CELL 1 SUPPLY 212678 1 3 PORT, 3. COMMON LINE PORT, 4. MANIFOLD RELIEF PORT 5. ECLSS PRIMARY S 212678 1 4 UPPLY PORT, DISCREPANT FTGS WERE INSPECTED UISNG 10X POWER MAGNIFICATI 212678 1 5 ON AND GOOD LIGHTING. ALL BLEMISHES (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF T-0 PORT) W 212678 1 6 ERE VERY MINOR AND OF THE TYPE SEEN DUE TO NORMAL CYCLING OF THE PNL I 212678 1 7 NTERFACE LINES. THE T-O PORT SCRATCH WAS RADIAL AND COMPLETELY ACROSS 212678 1 8 THE FACE MR APPROVAL OBTAINED TO POLISH FTG. SUSEQUENT TO POLISHING, A 212678 1 9 LL FTG'S WERE RECONNECTED AND HIGH PRSSURE MASS SPEC LIC CHECKED PER O 212678 1 10 MI V1022 TEMP DEV 09/08. ALL FIVE CONNECTIONS INDICATED O LEAKAGE. 212705 1 1 THE MINOR TEAR IN THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE ON RIGHT HAND RADIATOR #2 HAS 212705 1 2 BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO REPAIR REQUIRED. TAPE DAMAG 212705 1 3 E CAUSED BY SPACE DEBRIS. CLOSE THIS PR. 212719 1 1 THE END OF THE SCREW THREAD ON A FASTENER WAS FOUN 212719 1 2 D TO BE IN CONTACT WITH A FITTING. CONDITION IS A 212719 1 3 CCEPTABLE AND STRUCTURE CAN BE USED AS-IS. CONCLU 212719 1 4 SION: DESIGN OF STRUCTURE CAUSE CONTACT BETWEEN 212719 1 5 FASTENER AND FITTING. NO FURTHER DISPOSITION OR 212719 1 6 WORK IS REQUIRED. 213242 1 1 THE INITIAL DESCREPANCY-"FUEL CELL 1 H2 REACTANT VLV INDICATED OPEN (V 213242 1 2 45X2150E1) WHEN 02 REACT VLV INDICATED CLOSE". T/SING REVEALED THAT TH 213242 1 3 E VLV CAME OPEN DUE TO A REVERSE DELTA PRESS ACROSS THE VLV CAUSED BY 213242 1 4 A LEAKY VLV. THE DISCREPANT VLV IS PART OF THE H2 MANIFOLD 1 LRU (MANF 213242 1 5 PNL). THE MANIFOLD PANEL WAS REMOVED & REPLACED PER STEPS 47-67. AFTE 213242 1 6 R THE MANIFOLD PNL WAS INSTL'D IT WAS NOTED THAT THE SUPPLY LINE I/F P 213242 1 7 ORT ON THE PNL DID NOT HAVE PROVISIONS FOR SAFETY WIRE. MR APPROVAL FO 213242 1 8 R THIS DISCRPANCY WAS GIVEN ON PG 66 & THE PNL WAS MR ID PER STEP 141. 213242 1 9 HOWEVER THIS SUPPLY LINE WAS SAFETY WIRED TO AN ADJACENT PORT APPROX 213242 1 10 3" AWAY PER STEP 143. THIS IS ALLOWABLE PER THE MAO 102-306 SPEC. AFTE 213242 1 11 R THE PNL WAS INSTL'D HIGH PRESS MASS SPECS WERE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE 213242 1 12 D ON 3 OF THE 5 LINE I/F'S PER STEP 82 OF THIS PR. THE H2 COMMON (OR C 213242 1 13 ROSSOVER) LINE FAILED MASS SPEC (REF PG 1B). THE COMMON LINE WAS POLIS 213242 1 14 HED PER STEP 162 (WITH MR APPROVAL) & MASS SPEC LEAK CK'D AT HIGH PRES 213242 1 15 S PER STEP 174. THE REMAINING LINE (H2 TANK 1 SUPPLY LINE) WAS SUCCESS 213242 1 16 FULLY MASS SPEC LEAK CK'D AT HIGH PRESS PER STEP 148 (FOLLOWING THE SA 213242 1 17 FETY WIRE INSTL'D). THE HIGH PRESS MASS SPEC ON THE RELIEF LINE I/F WA 213242 1 18 S ALSO REPEATED PER STEP 148 BECAUSE THE LINE MAY HAVE BEEN DISTURBED 213242 1 19 WHEN THE SAFETY WIRE WAS INSTL'D FROM THE SUPPLY LINE TO THE RELIEF PO 213242 1 20 RT ON THE PANEL. THE MANIFOLD PNL RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER STEPS 180- 213242 1 21 180.15 EXCEPT FOR THE CK VLV FLOW TEST WHICH WAS PERFORMED PER STEP 26 213242 1 22 -119 OF V1022 ON 4-11-88. THE FOAM INSTL'N WAS COMPLETED PER STEP 181. 213242 1 23 THE SYS IS RESTORED TO FLIGHT STATUS. 213366 1 1 FIVE VR70-354241-002 SPACERS WERE FOUND DEBONDED FORM THE 50-01 DOOR P 213366 1 2 ERIMETER (REFERENCE ATTACHMENT "A' FOR LOCATIONS). THESE SPACERS DEBON 213366 1 3 DED WHEN THE CARRIER PANEL FASTENERS WERE REMOVED POST FLIGHT. FIVE NE 213366 1 4 W VR70-354241-002 SPACERS WERE BONDED PER PRINT TO THE ORIGINAL CONFIG 213366 1 5 URATION AROUND THE 50-01 DOOR PERIMETER. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL D 213366 1 6 EGRADATION. 213447 1 1 ITEM 1 OF PAGE 1 WAS WRITTEN AS THE R/H BOTTOM SCREW (MD112-3002-0424) 213447 1 2 WOULD NOT TORQUE TO REQUIRED TORQUE. AFTER REMOVING THE V070-293000-02 213447 1 3 5 PANEL, THE -0424 SCREWS WERE FOUND TO BE TOO SHORT, AND MD1120399209 213447 1 4 426 SCREWS WERE INSTALLED PER EO TO FOLLOW (REF. STEP 21.0). DURING RE 213447 1 5 MOVAL OF THE V070-293000-025 PANEL, ONE (1) MD112-3002-0424 SCREW REQU 213447 1 6 IRED TO BE DRILLED OUT DUE TO BINDING. (REF. PAGE 1A). A .250 INCH HAN 213447 1 7 D REAMER WAS USED TO CLEAN OUT THE BOTTOM TWO (2) FWD-025 PANEL HOLES. 213447 1 8 AFTER REAMING OF HOLES, SEVERAL MEASUREMENTS PER HOLE WERE TAKEN AND R 213447 1 9 ECORDED AS VARING FROM .314 TO .251 INCH. (REF. 1B). THE HOLES WERE MR 213447 1 10 ID'D AND ACCEPTED "AS IS" FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE TWO MD114-5003-000 213447 1 11 5 NUTPLATES FOR THE -0426 SCREWS ALSO WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. 213447 1 12 CLOSE THIS PR UPON E.O. VERIFICATION. 213526 1 1 MR REPAIR REAMED ELONGATED HOLE IN STIFFENER AND 213526 1 2 INSTALLED THE NEXT LARGER SIZE RIVET. REPAIR IS 213526 1 3 APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND RETURNS ASSEMBLY 213526 1 4 TO DESIGN INTENT. 213751 1 1 DISCOLORED (RUSTED STEEL) WASHER WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW P 213751 1 2 ER PRINT WASHER. SURROUNDING AREA WAS INSPECTED FOR ANY OTHER DAMAGE/C 213751 1 3 ORROSION AND NO DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND. INSTALLATION WAS RETURNED TO 213751 1 4 PRINT CONFIGURATION, NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INST 213751 1 5 ALLATION OF NON-FLIGHT HARDWARE AT ASSY. 213870 1 1 THE DAMAGE WAS FOUND TO BE INSIGNIFICANT & WAS MR'D ACCEPTABLE AS IS. 213953 1 1 RESULTS OF LK CK OF H2 TANK 3 VENT WAS BLOWING 213953 1 2 LEAK (LARGE BUBBLES) THE H2 TK 3 VENT FLT CAP 213953 1 3 SEAL WAS FOUND DAMAGED & REPLACED. THE FLT CAP 213953 1 4 WAS REINSTALLED & VERIFIED NO LEAKAGE AFTER 30 MIN 213953 1 5 ATTACHED H2 TK 3 PRESS LPS DATA SHOWED NO PRESSURE 213953 1 6 DECREASE FOR 3 DAYS. THE NEW FLT CAP SEAL IS GOOD 213996 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS HIGH RUNNING TORQUE ON NUT FOR L/H ET FW 213996 1 2 D STRUT WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE EXISTING NUT AND SCREW AND REPLAC 213996 1 3 ING THEM WITH NEW HARDWARE. INSTALLATION WAS PERFORMED PER THIS PR AND 213996 1 4 S0004,S26-006 TORQUED THE NUT FOR FLIGHT. PROBABLE CAUSE: GALLED NUT 213996 1 5 OR SCREW. 214027 1 1 THE V070-856558-003 STIFFNER WAS GOUGED BY A DREME 214027 1 2 L CUTTER WHILE TRYING TO INSTALL AN MR DOUBLER. MO 214027 1 3 LD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN AND ANALYZED, AND A VISU 214027 1 4 AL INSPECTION DONE WHICH FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF CRAC 214027 1 5 KS. THE SHARP EDGES AND CORNERS OF THE GOUGE WERE 214027 1 6 ABRADED AWAY. A DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED TO RESTORE 214027 1 7 ANY LOSS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY, AND WAS INSTALLE 214027 1 8 D. BOTH THE DOUBLER AND THE DEFECT AREA WERE CORRO 214027 1 9 SION PROTECTED AND THE DOUBLER WAS GIVEN AN MR ID. 214062 1 1 SCRATCHES ID'd IN ITEM 1 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION ON 214062 1 2 SHELF 3 OF AVIONICS BAY 1 V070-703102-015 TRY LWR 214062 1 3 FACE SHT RECV'D DENTAL MOLD IMPRESSIONS OVER (9) 214062 1 4 DESCREPANT AREAS. SCRATCHES WERE ANALYZED IN MOLD 214062 1 5 IMPRESSIONS & DIMENSIONALLY VERIFIED. ENG DETER- 214062 1 6 MINED SCRATCHES TO BE MINOR, NOT DEGRADING STRUC- 214062 1 7 TURAL DESIGN INTEGRITY. STRESS RISES WERE SUCCESS 214062 1 8 FULLY REMOVED FROM SURFACE, CORROSION CNTRL RESTOR 214062 1 9 ED & DECREPANT AREA PROPERLY MR ID W/ PR NO. 214100 1 1 A 30 LB PUSH TEST WAS PERFORMED ON THE R/H INBD ELEVON GUIDE PIN/RUB P 214100 1 2 LATE, FOLLOWED BY DYE PEN INSPECTION. THE DYE PEN INSPECTION REVEALED 214100 1 3 A .031" FLAW IN THE WELD. THE FLAW FELL WITHIN SPEC CRITERIA. THE FLAW 214100 1 4 WAS APPROVED FOR ONE FLIGHT. POST FLIGHT DYE PEN INSPECTION SHOWED NO 214100 1 5 EVIDENCE OF PROPAGATION. THEREFORE THIS PR CAN BE CLOSED. A NEW OMRSD 214100 1 6 REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO INSPECT EACH PIN WELD AFTER EACH F 214100 1 7 LIGHT. (REF V30-1448, V30NA0-070). CLOSE THIS PR. 214185 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1- AREA DESCRIBED IN ITEM 1 WAS INSPECTED WITH A BOROSCOP 214185 1 2 E AND VISUALLY INSPECTED FRO BODY FLAP COVE AREA. INSPECTION REVEALED 214185 1 3 NO EVIDENCE OF A BURN THRU IN THIS BAY. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS THAT AFT AF 214185 1 4 EA OF BAY HAS ACCUMULATED SOME DUST WHICH MAY HAVE APPEARED TO RESEMBL 214185 1 5 E A BURN THRU. 214335 1 1 PD #1: SEAL INTERFERENCE WAS CORRECTED BY TRIMMING SEALS AT I/B & O/B 214335 1 2 EDGE PER ATTACHMENT CORRECTED BY MR TRIM PER ATTACHMENT C. PD #2: DEB 214335 1 3 OND ALONG O/B EDGE WAS REBONDED W/ NO SURFACE PREPARATION DUE TO SML W 214335 1 4 IDTH. PD #3 & #4": DEBONDED AREA & RAISED LIP WERE REBONDED ALSO W/ N 214335 1 5 O SURFACE PREPARATION DUE TO SML WIDTH. SEAL INTEGRITY HAS BEEN MAINT 214335 1 6 AINED & IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 214474 1 1 ITEM 1.0 PAGE 1. FWD AND AFT LOWER HOLES FOR V070-332714-002 TEE WAS F 214474 1 2 OUND TO NOT HAVE THE PROPER EDGE DISTANCE. THE EDGE DISTANCE IS .280 A 214474 1 3 ND IT SHOULD BE .38 PER DWG. THE EDGE DISTANCE WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNR 214474 1 4 ESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. ITEM 2 PAGE 1 DIF 214474 1 5 FERENT TOOLING WAS OBTAINED AND HOLES WERE DRILLED PER MOD 03 SO DISCR 214474 1 6 EPANCE NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE NO DISCREPANCY. 214491 1 1 AREAS WHERE WHITE COATING WAS PEELING HAVE BEEN 214491 1 2 RE-FINISHED PER PRINT CONFIGURATION. DISCOLORATION 214491 1 3 ON WHITE COATING IS DUE TO OUTGASING FROM ADJACENT 214491 1 4 THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS, THIS DISCOLORATION DO- 214491 1 5 ES NOT DEGRADE WHITE COATING THAT IT IS PRESENT 214491 1 6 ON. DISCOLORATION IS NOT A DISCREPANT CONDITION. 214491 1 7 IT IS NORMAL AFTER FLIGHT. 214521 1 1 SEAL V070-198708-002 WHICH HAS A CRUSHED ROLLED EDGE (APPROX .20") IDE 214521 1 2 NTIFIED BY ITEM 1 PAGE 1, HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS PER MR APPROVAL. THE 214521 1 3 DISCREPANCY DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1 PAGE 1 HAS BEEN ADDRESSED AND RESOLV 214521 1 4 ED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO MANHANDLING OF THE SEAL. 214540 1 1 REMOVAL OF THE INCONEL PLATE ON THE MOST INBOARD END OF THE RH OUTBOAR 214540 1 2 D ELEVON REVEALED SEVERAL MINOR SCRATCHES OR GOUGES. THE AREAS WERE SA 214540 1 3 NDED TO REMOVE ANY RAISED METAL. THIS WAS A WORKMANSHIP DISCREPANCY. 214563 1 1 LOOSE HARDWARE IN ELEVON IS A RESULT OF THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS. ALL 214563 1 2 ACCESSIBLE HARDWARE HAS BEEN REMOVED PER TPS VSTR-3-07-241. INACCESSI 214563 1 3 BLE HARDWARE IS ALLOWED TO REMAIN PER PRINT. 214631 1 1 THE TWO DENTS NOTED WERE SMALL AND MINOR IN NATURE. THE SHARP EDGES WE 214631 1 2 RE BLENDED INTO THE ADJACENT STRUCTURE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED U 214631 1 3 SE WITH MR APPROVAL. DISCREPANCY WAS A RESULT OF OPERATIONAL DEGRADATI 214631 1 4 ON. VERIFY MR REPAIRS PERFORMED BY STEP 1.0 ARE COMPLETE. 214695 1 1 RECORD RCN #KS7680 WHICH REVISED OMRSD THEN CLOSE 214695 1 2 THIS PR. 214736 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL 214736 1 2 SERVICE CENTER. THE INSULATOR HAVE BEEN INSTALLED 214736 1 3 INTO THE RCC PANEL AND THE PANEL IS INSTALLED FOR 214736 1 4 FLIGHT. 214772 1 1 SCRATCHED AREA CORROSION PROTECTED. SCRATCH HAS 214772 1 2 NO ADVERSE AFFECT ON STRUTS' STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. 214791 1 1 HOLE IN DOUBLER AND STRUCTURE WAS ENLARGED, SO THA 214791 1 2 T THE COUNTERSINK COULD BE REWORKED. COUNTERSINK 214791 1 3 IN DOUBLER IS NOW ACCEPTABLE. CLOSE THIS PR. 214820 1 1 TRIMMING OF BRACKET WAS PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED BY MR 214820 1 2 CONCURRENCE. BRACKET INTERFERENCE WITH 1307 SPAR 214820 1 3 WAS ELIMINATED WITH THE TRIMMING OF BRACKET. 215074 1 1 REPLACED TWO FANS SYSTEM CHECKS OUT PROPELY. 215280 1 1 BOLT WAS REMOVED VERIFIED TO BE MD111-4001-0304 (S 215280 1 2 TEP 1) INSTALLED (WITH WASHER) AND LOCKING FEATURE 215280 1 3 OF NUT VERIFIED (STEP 2). REMAINING 13 BOLTS WERE 215280 1 4 CHECKED/TORQUED (STEP 3) PER ENGR REQUEST (PG 1A) 215280 1 5 INSTALLATION IS PER DWG. CLOSE PR. 215580 1 1 ITEM 1, PG 1-DISCREPANT CHAMFER WAS MR ACCEPTED AS 215580 1 2 IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. DESIGN INTENT OF THIS IN 215580 1 3 STL'N HAS BEEN MAINT. 215590 1 1 THE CENTER, UPPER O/B HOLE ON WINDOW NO 8'S FRAME 215590 1 2 HAD THREAD DAMAGE. THE HOLE WAS TAPPED, CLEANED 215590 1 3 AND A NEW THREADED INSERT WAS INSTALLED. 215594 1 1 MRB APPROVAL OBTAINED TO INSTALL GROUND STRAP EX- 215594 1 2 TENSION. INSTALLATION & TEST COMPLETED SATISFAC- 215594 1 3 TORILY. 215678 1 1 THE LOOSE SCREWS (REF. PAGE 1) AND THE SHORT SCREWS (REF. PAGE 1A) FOR 215678 1 2 THE PLBD HINGE CARRIER PANEL HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH FAST 215678 1 3 ENERS WHO'S GRIP LENGTHS WERE DETERMINED BY STR-3-07-2355 AND STR-3-07 215678 1 4 -2356. (EXCEPT Xo1100) PROPER GRIP LENGTH FASTENERS HAVE BEEN INSTALLE 215678 1 5 D AND TORQUED AT ALL DISCREPANT LOCATIONS, PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXIT 215678 1 6 S. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 215691 1 1 THE V070-198436-001 CAP SEAL WAS TOO LARGE TO FIT ON THE ELEVON STRUCT 215691 1 2 URE. THE AMOUNT OF INTERFERENCE WAS CALCULATED AND TRIMMED OFF THE CAP 215691 1 3 SEAL. THE CAP WAS ALSO NICKED AND MISSING PAINT. THESE DISCREPANCIES 215691 1 4 WERE ELIMINATED BY SMOOTHING OUT ALL THE ROUGH EDGES AND CORROSION PRO 215691 1 5 TECTING ALL EXPOSED AREAS. THE CAP WAS THEN INSTALLED ON STR-3-09-424 215691 1 6 WITH NO FURTHER INTERFERENCE. WORK WAS PERFORMED WITH MR APPROVAL. DIS 215691 1 7 CREPANCIES WERE A RESULT OF TOLERANCE BUILD UP AND OPERATIONAL DEGRADA 215691 1 8 TION. 215803 1 1 BRACKET V070-156483-006 INSTL'N WILL BE ACCOMPLISH 215803 1 2 ED DURING DOUBLER INSTL'N ON PR STR-3-07-1349 WILL 215803 1 3 AN EO TO FOLLOW FOR INSTL'N DWG. V070-156850. 215817 1 1 THE INNER MOLD LINE OF THE V070-194124-001 CARRIER 215817 1 2 PANEL WAS DISCOVERED TO HAVE CHARRED AND POWERED 215817 1 3 KOROPON AS WELL AS EXPOSED BARE METAL. SAMPLES WER 215817 1 4 E TAKEN AND ANALYZED BY BRANCH (REQUEST #MCB368-87 215817 1 5 ) AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE YELLOW POWDER IN 215817 1 6 THE SAMPLES HAD THE SAME CHEMISTRY AS KOROPON WAS 215817 1 7 REMOVED, THE PANEL CORROSION PROTECTED, AND REPAIN 215817 1 8 TING TRASFERREDTO WAD #LWING-3-07-1382. THE IML A 215817 1 9 LSO HAD INDENTIONS AS A RESULT OF THE HARDNESS TES 215817 1 10 TING. THE INDENTATIONS HAVE BEEN MR'D FOR 215817 1 11 UNRESTRICTED USE TO AVOID BEING WRITTEN UP AS A DE 215817 1 12 SCREPANCY IN THE FUTURE. THE OUTER MOLD LINE OF TH 215817 1 13 E CARRIER PANEL HAD SCRATCHES AND BURRS DETECTED. 215817 1 14 THESE WERE SANDED OUT AND CORROSION PROTECTION WAS 215817 1 15 APPLIED. THIS SERIES OF DISCREPANCIES WILL NOT OC 215817 1 16 CUR AGAIN DUE TO MODIFICATIONS DONE IN THE ELEVON 215817 1 17 COVE AREA. THESE REPAIRS ALLOW THE CARRIER PANEL T 215817 1 18 O BE AVAILABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. HARDNESS TEST 215817 1 19 SHOWED C/P TO BE WITHIN PRINT HEAT TREAT REQUIREM 215817 1 20 ENTS. SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 215881 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED DUE TO A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN CIG/SCAN RECORDS AN 215881 1 2 D THE ACTUAL STATE OF THE MPM PEDESTAL LATCH PDU CONNECTORS. THE QC WA 215881 1 3 S UNABLE TO OBTAIN A SCAN LOG NUMBER FOR MATING THESE CONNECTORS SINCE 215881 1 4 SCAN INDICATED THEY ARE ALREADY MATED. AN ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION R 215881 1 5 EVEALED THE SUBJECT CONNECTORS WERE NOT DEMATED AT KSC BUT WERE DEMATE 215881 1 6 D BY P1-DOWNY DURING A LATCH MODIFICATION. A PR CONDITION NO LONGER EX 215881 1 7 ISTS AS THIS PR DOCUMENTS THIS UNTRACKED DEMATE. 215977 1 1 DISCREPANT FASTENERS AT X0 1249 AREA HAVE BEEN 215977 1 2 TRIMMED, AND/OR REVERSED. MISSING FASTENERS HAVE 215977 1 3 BEEN REPLACED. THIS ALLOWS INSTALLATION OF BAY 215977 1 4 12 KEEL BRIDGE FITTING WITH NO INTERFERENCE. 216047 1 1 THE V070-352244-001 LEFT HAND T-O CLEVIS FITTING WAS FOUND WITH THE LOWE 216047 1 2 R HOLE (3/8 INCH HOLE) EXCEEDING ITS PER PRINT DIMENSION. THIS ELONGATED 216047 1 3 AND OVERSIZED CONDITION OF THE HOLE WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED US 216047 1 4 E AS IS PER PR STR-3-12-3298 (STEP 9.2, PAGE 6.2). THE NEW MEASUREMENTS 216047 1 5 OF THE HOLE, EXCEEDED THE PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED DIMENSION BY 0.002 INCH 216047 1 6 ES. THIS CONDITION HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED PER THIS PR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 216047 1 7 AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 216047 1 8 216099 1 1 O2 TK 2 SPLY LINE ELBOW FTG, P/N ME273-0144-0004 HAD A MINOR GOUGE ON 216099 1 2 THE SEALING SURFACE. SUBSEQUENT MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK OF THE LINE AND T 216099 1 3 ANK FAILED. 02 TK 2 WAS REMOVED FROM THE SHIP PER FCP-3-07-0163. THE T 216099 1 4 ANK SPLY PORT WAS POLISHED PER SRP AS WELL AS THE FILL AND VENT PORTS 216099 1 5 PER FCP-3-07-0164 AND -0163 RESPECTIVELY. DURING SUBSEQUENT LEAK CHECK 216099 1 6 THE 02 TK VENT LINE WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BUBBLE LEAK IN THE VENT LINE 216099 1 7 SOMEWHERE WITHIN THE FOAM BLOCK. 02 TANK 2 WAS REPLACED WITH A SPARE 0 216099 1 8 2 TANK PER FCP-3-07-0163. WHILE THE 02 TANK 2 WAS REMOVED FROM SHIP TH 216099 1 9 E ELBOW FTG WAS DEBRAZED FROM THE 02 TK 2 SPLY LINE, V070-454705-067. 216099 1 10 DURING DEBRAZE OPERATION, IT WAS NOTED THE 02 TK 2 SPLY LINE ELBOW FTG 216099 1 11 DID NOT PROPERLY LINE UP WITH THE 02 TK SIMULATOR INSTALLED INPLACE O 216099 1 12 F TANK TO SUPPORT O2 TANK 2 VENT LINE FABRICATION PER FCP-3-07-0163. ( 216099 1 13 REF, PG 1-A) 02 TK 2 (SPARE) WAS REINSTALLED IN SHIP PER BRAZE AND FIT 216099 1 14 WAS ACCEPTABLE. ELBOW FTG ME273-0144-0004 WAS BRAZED TO 02 TK 2 SPLY 216099 1 15 LINE, AND INITIAL MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK FAILED (REF. PG1-B) THE ELBOW T 216099 1 16 O LINE BRAZE WAS REHEATED, AND SUBSEQUENT MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK WAS GOO 216099 1 17 D. V1022, SEQ 18-181 PERFORMED SUCCESSFULL HIGH PRESS MASS SPEC LEAK C 216099 1 18 HECK. DISCREPANCIES 1, 2, AND 3 ON PGS 1, 1A AND 1B HAVE BEEN CORRECTE 216099 1 19 D. 216110 1 1 PART REWORKED TO USEABLE CONDITION PART TO BE INST 216110 1 2 ALL PR STR-3-05-0262 STEP 141. 216142 1 1 CONTROL ROD ON FLIPPER DOOR NO. 10 WAS SUSPECTED OF CHAFING ON HILOCK 216142 1 2 IN FWD END OF ELEVON STRUT V0700596070-007. THE DISCREPANT CHAFING ARE 216142 1 3 A WAS EVALUATED AS BEING COSMETIC IN NATURE ONLY, & WAS RE-CORROSION P 216142 1 4 ROTECTED. THE ELEVON WAS CYCLED TO FULL UP & DOWN POSITION DURING TEST 216142 1 5 ING, & THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF CONTACT BETWEEN V070-596610-015 CONTRO 216142 1 6 L ROD & SUSPECT HILOCK. 216224 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 216224 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 216224 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 216224 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 216224 1 5 3-C1. 216287 1 1 DURING V1165 HYD STRUT SERVICING & STRUT PRESSURIZATION THE L/H STRUT 216287 1 2 SHOWED A 1 PSIG CK IS TO VERIFY NO LEAK THRU THE SCHRADER VALVE & THE 216287 1 3 SCHRADER VALVE CONNECTION INTO THE STRUT. A LEAK DISPLACEMENT METER WA 216287 1 4 S USED TO VERIFY NO LEAK THRU THE SCHRADER VALVE FOR A 1/2 HR PERIOD 216287 1 5 & NO LEAK WAS DETECTED. LEAK TECH SOLUTION WAS USED AROUND THE SCHRADE 216287 1 6 R VALVE CONNECTION INTO THE STRUT & NO LEAK WAS DETECTED. A 2 HR CK IS 216287 1 7 PERFORMED PRIOR TO THE 1 HR CK WHICH CK'S FOR LEAKS AROUND THE SCHRAD 216287 1 8 ER CONNECTION INTO THE STRUT. THIS CK ALSO SHOWED NO SIGNS OF LEAKAGE. 216287 1 9 AN EXTENDED CK WAS THEN PERFORMED 24 HRS LATER. AT THE END OF 24 HRS 216287 1 10 NO LEAK WAS DETECTED, ANOTHER 1 HR CK WAS PERFORMED & AGAIN NO LEAK 216287 1 11 WAS DETECTED. IT WAS LEARNED FROM CONVERSATION WITH THE TECH & THE QUA 216287 1 12 LITY THAT 2 DIFFERENT PEOPLE HAD READ THE INITIAL & END PRESSURES. THI 216287 1 13 S WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN PRESSURE READINGS. ANOTHER VARIA 216287 1 14 BLE WHICH WOULD CHANGE PRESS READINGS IS TEMP VARIATIONS. THIS CAN'T B 216287 1 15 E VERIFIED BECAUSE A TEMP CK IS ONLY DONE BEFORE THE 2 HR CK & JUST PR 216287 1 16 IOR TO FLIGHT PRESSURIZATION. A DEV (ATTACHED) HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO THE 216287 1 17 PROCEDURE TO CLARIFY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRESS READINGS & THE ACCUR 216287 1 18 ACY WHICH MUST BE OBTAINED. A DEV (ATTACHED) WAS ALSO WRITTEN TO RECOR 216287 1 19 D TEMPS AT EVERY STEP WHICH RECORDS PRESS. THESE 2 CHANGES SHOULD ALLE 216287 1 20 VIATE THESE PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE. THE STRUT HAS SUCCESSFULLY BEEN 216287 1 21 RETESTED & NO LEAKS HAVE BEEN FOUND. 216394 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1: REMOVED AND REPLACED THE CHARRED CENTER HINGE'S CENTER SE 216394 1 2 AL. SEAL WALL WAS THINNED DOWN BUT THERE WERE NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF A LE 216394 1 3 AK PATH (SEE PG 2). PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN - FRSI MOD TO PROTECT THE S 216394 1 4 EALS. ITEMS 2 AND 3 PAGE 1: MR UNRESTRICTED ACCEPTANCE OF THE (2) ACTU 216394 1 5 ATOR HINGES SIDE SEALS, P/N V070-198383-001 AND -002 AS ARE (SEE PAGE 216394 1 6 4). PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN - FRSI MOD TO PROTECT THE SEALS AND PROCESS 216394 1 7 ING/WEAR. 216410 1 1 SCUFF MARKS WERE FOUND ON THE LH FWD INBD MLG DOOR 216410 1 2 LATCH ROLLER. DENTAL MOLDS AND POLARIOD PICTURES 216410 1 3 WERE TAKEN OF THE DISCREPANT LATCH ROLLER. THE INV 216410 1 4 ESTIGATION AND VISUAL INSPECTION BY LSOC, ROCKWELL 216410 1 5 AND NASA ENGINEERING REVEALED THAT THE SCUFF MARK 216410 1 6 S ARE NORMAL WEAR. THE HARDWARE WAS MR ID'D AND AP 216410 1 7 PORVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER THIS PR. A PR COND 216410 1 8 ITION NO LONGER EXISTS. NOTE: PHOTO'S NO LONGER RE 216410 1 9 AD TO REMAIN WITH PR. 216497 1 1 PRINT HAS NO RQMTS FOR MAX/MIN HEAT SINK TO STRIN- 216497 1 2 GER CLEARANCE. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. 216616 1 1 PILOT HOLE IN RETAINER IS ACCEPTED PER MR OK AS IS. HOLE WILL BE SEALE 216616 1 2 D WITH RETAINER SEALING PER STR-3-07-220 216647 1 1 REPLACEMENT OF SCREW WITH NEXT HIGHER GRIP LENGTH 216647 1 2 RETURNS INSTALLATION TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. 216699 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT BEARING CONE (S/N 11 216699 1 2 -87-0111) WAS RECORDED IN OMI V1165 AS BEING INSTALLED ON THE LOB MLG; 216699 1 3 BUT AFTER AN INVENTORY OF THE REMAINING BEARINGS, S/N 11-87-0111 WAS O 216699 1 4 NE OF THE BEARINGS THAT HAD YET TO BE INSTALLED. THIS ERROR IN RECORDI 216699 1 5 NG THE CORRECT S/N OF THE BEARING WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF RESP 216699 1 6 ONSIBLE QC WHO THEN CORRECTED THE ENTRY IN THE OMI. BEARING CONE (S/N 216699 1 7 11-87-0149) WAS DETERMINED TO BE INSTALLED ON THE LOB MLG. (REF. COPY 216699 1 8 OF DISCREPANT STEP 1-030). THE PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE 216699 1 9 CAUSE: PAPER PROBLEMS, MISTAKE IN MAKING DATA ENTRY. 216820 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE A DAMAGED V070-305003-0 216820 1 2 02 BOLT AND ITS NUT AND NUT RETAINER AT ATTACH POINT 3 ON RP01. IN ADD 216820 1 3 ITION, A BUSHING AT THIS LOCATION WAS RETURNED TO PRINT POSITION. THIS 216820 1 4 IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCYWAS OPERATIONAL D 216820 1 5 EGRADATION. 217083 1 1 THE DAMAGE APPEARS TO HAVE RESULTED FROM A "MICRO- 217083 1 2 METEOROID" STRIKE. THE CONDITION HAS BEEN NOTED 217083 1 3 BEFORE AND IT IS CHARACTERIZED BY A SMALL "CRATER 217083 1 4 LIKE" MARK ON THE RADIATOR PANEL. I.E. A HOT OR 217083 1 5 HIGH ENERGY PARTICLE CAUSING THE RADIATOR TAPE SUR 217083 1 6 FACE TO MELT & CURL BACK FROM THE CENTER IMPACT 217083 1 7 AREA. A SMALL HOLE WITH EXTREMELY SMOOTH SIDES 217083 1 8 THRU THE ALUMINUM FACE SHEET. THE CONDITION CAN 217083 1 9 NOT BE AVOIDED. THE REPAIR METHOD "VOID FILLER" 217083 1 10 SEEMS TO WORK VERY WELL. THE VOID (INTERNAL 217083 1 11 HONEYCOMB) SHOULD ONLY BE FILLED INTERNALLY AND 217083 1 12 THE EXTERNAL CRATER SHOULD BE LEFT ALONE ON FUTURE 217083 1 13 REPAIRS SINCE THE VOID FILLER CANNOT BOND TO THE 217083 1 14 TEFLON TAPE. THIS REPAIR IS A GOOD, QUICK, & EASY 217083 1 15 REPAIR. IT DOES MINIMAL SIDE EFFECT (HEAT TRANS- 217083 1 16 FER, TAPE REMOVAL, THERMAL CONTROL COATING) IMPACT 217083 1 17 AS COMPARED WITH OTHER STANDARD REPAIRS (DOUBLER) 217083 1 18 THIS CONDITION/REPAIR WILL BE ADDED TO OUR AR- 217083 1 19 SENAL OF "STD REPAIRS" FOR FUTURE USE AS REQUIRED 217083 1 20 & REVISED ABOVE. 217194 1 1 THE GROUNDING FINGERS ON THE V070-351614-001 LH SHELL ASSEMBLY HAVE BE 217194 1 2 EN BENT TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONFIGURATION. THIS CONFIGURATION AND THE CRA 217194 1 3 CK HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE O 217194 1 4 F THE DISCREPANCY IS NORMAL WEAR. 217231 1 1 TO DETERMINE THE GAP WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN THE INSTALLED V070-354010-00 217231 1 2 2 & -004 FITTINGS AND THE INSIDE OF COVER V070-353589-009, THE MOUNTIN 217231 1 3 G FACE TO FACE DIMENSIONS OF THE FITTINGS WERE MEASURED AND COMPARED T 217231 1 4 O THE INSIDE MOUTING FACE MEASUREMENT OF THE COVER. BOTH DIMENSIONS TA 217231 1 5 KEN WERE FOUND TO BE WITHIN DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. PER DRAWING REQUIREM 217231 1 6 ENTS A MAX GAP OF .124 IN AND A MAX INTERFERENCE OF .076 IN IS POSSIBL 217231 1 7 E. THE ABOVE MEASUREMENTS REVEALED A .046 IN MAX INTERFERENCE, WHICH I 217231 1 8 S WITHIN DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. A FIT CHECK OF THE COVER OVER THE INSTA 217231 1 9 LLED FITTINGS WAS CONDUCTED AND A TIGHT FIT EXISTED WITH NO SIDE TO SI 217231 1 10 DE MOVEMENT OF THE COVER. THE COVER WAS INSTALLED WITH THE REQUIRED 217231 1 11 HARDWARE, TORQUED AND REMOVED TO INSPECT FOR DEFORMATION OF THE COVER. 217231 1 12 THE INSPECTION REVEALED NO DEFORMATION. RI WAS CONTACTED AND CONFIRME 217231 1 13 D AN INTERFERENCE FIT CAN EXIST AND NO SHIMS WOULD BE REQUIRED. NO SHI 217231 1 14 MS ARE REQUIRED AND NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 217276 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. THE 217276 1 2 INSULATOR HAS BEEN INSTL'D INTO THE RCCC PANEL & THE PANEL IS INSTL'D 217276 1 3 FOR FLIGHT. 217292 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 217292 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 217292 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 217292 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 217292 1 5 3-01. 217882 1 1 THE R/H ET DOOR PUSHRODS (FWD & AFT) WERE SHORTEN- 217882 1 2 ED 1 FULL TURN, PER STEP 7. THE LCH ENGAGEMENT 217882 1 3 MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN, PER STEP 15, WITH AN UP- 217882 1 4 PER GAP OF .008 ON L/H FWD & ENGAGEMENT. A TOTAL 217882 1 5 OF .070 SHIMS ADDED UNDER L/H FWD ENGAGEMENT PORT 217882 1 6 IN ORDER TO GET THE DESIRED 0 GAP UNDER UPPER SUR- 217882 1 7 FACE WHILE MAINTAINING THE .004 MINIMUM GAP UPPER 217882 1 8 LOWER SURFACE, AS INDICATED ON STEP 20. DURING 217882 1 9 FINAL TORQUE PER STEP 22 THE JAM NUT AND BEARING 217882 1 10 ROD THREADS WERE NOTED STRIPPED. STEP 27 ORDERED 217882 1 11 NEW BEARING ROD AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INSTALLED AND 217882 1 12 FINAL TORQUE PER STEP 30, SATISFYING PG. 1A. RE- 217882 1 13 FERENCE NOTE ON PAGE 12. THE ME131-0032-0005 BEAR 217882 1 14 ING ROD WAS NOT FOUND AT KSC SO THE PROPER ME131- 217882 1 15 0074-0005 BEARING ROD WAS INSTALLED. THIS IS NOT 217882 1 16 A MR PR. STEP 29 WAS CHANGED TO REFLECT THIS. 217931 1 1 STR RESTORED PER DWG CONFIGURATION. 217947 1 1 MR DISPO TO STOP DRILL CRACK AND BOND LIGHTING 217947 1 2 SHIELD V070-855474-001TO V070-855301 ASSY RETURNS 217947 1 3 SHIELD TO DESIGN INTENT. 218359 1 1 DURING ORIGINAL TANK INSTALLATION THE STRUT OCN S/N'S FOR H2 TANK 3 WERE 218359 1 2 RECORDED INCORRECTLY. THIS PR WAS DEFERRED UNTIL ACCESS TO H2 TANK 3 WA 218359 1 3 S GOOD ENOUGH TO REINSPECT OCN S/N'S FOR TANK 3 STRUTS. DURING THE OMDP 218359 1 4 STRUCTURAL INSPECTIONS ACCESS WAS ADEQUATE ENOUGH TO REINSPECT THE TANK 218359 1 5 STRUT OCN S/N'S. THE NEW OCN S/N'S RECORDED WERE VERIFIED CORRECT THROUG 218359 1 6 H CVAS. 218377 1 1 BY NOT REAMING THE 2 HOLES ON THE UPR CLIP WILL 218377 1 2 NOT AFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY,NOR CHANGE 218377 1 3 THE DWG INTENT. BY OMITTING THE ANCHOR SLEEVES 218377 1 4 AND MODIFYING THE HARDWARE REQ'MTS AS REQUESTED 218377 1 5 BY GRUMMAN THE CLIP CAN BE INSTALLED 218432 1 1 DISCREPANCY 1-(3) INTERFERING HI-LOKS IN FRAME ASSY AT PDU #1 ON LH FW 218432 1 2 D PLBD WERE INSTALLED WITH WASHERS AND LOCK NUTSINSTEAD OF HI-LOK COL 218432 1 3 LARS AND (2) PINS WERE GROUND DOWN TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. THIS INS 218432 1 4 TALLATION WAS PMRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 218675 1 1 NICK ON SEAL WAS INSPECTED AND A SEAL LEAK TEST WAS PERFORMED PER V105 218675 1 2 8 AND PASSED WITH 0 PSI/MIN LEAKAGE (1.0 PSI/MIN MAX ALLOWABLE). SEAL 218675 1 3 WAS THEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. RETEST PERFORMED PER 218675 1 4 STEP 12. PROBABLE CAUSE IS MOVEMENT AND USE OF EQUIPMENT NEAR SEAL. RE 218675 1 5 CURRENCE CONTROL-PROVIDE REUSABLE PROTECTIVE COVERS FOR SEALS TO REPLA 218675 1 6 CE TAPE PRESENTLY USED. 218720 1 1 THE (4) V070-146068-002 KEYSTONE BOLTS FOR RIGHT HAND FLIPPER DOORS #4 218720 1 2 AND #12 WERE REMOVED IN CALIFORNIA AFTER STS-31. THE BOLTS HAD FLATTE 218720 1 3 NED THREADS. NEW BOLTS WERE OBTAINED AND INSTALLED. WHEN THE NEW V070- 218720 1 4 146068-002 BOLTS WERE REMOVED AT THE OPF AFTER THE RETURN FLIGHT FROM 218720 1 5 EDWARDS THE THREADS WERE AGAIN FOUND TO BE DAMAGED. THE ROD AND LINK A 218720 1 6 SSEMBLIES WERE REMOVED TO REPLACE THE NUTPLATES FOR THE BOLTS. NEW NUT 218720 1 7 PLATES WERE INSTALLED; THE LINK AND ROD ASSEMBLIES WERE ALSO INSTALLED 218720 1 8 . THE DAMAGED BOLTS WERE RUN THRU A DIE THAT CLEANED THE THREADS. THES 218720 1 9 E BOLTS WERE USED FOR A FIT CHECK OF THE NEW NUTPLATES. ALL FOUR V070- 218720 1 10 146068-002 BOLTS SHOWED FLAT THREADS AGAIN AFTER THE FIT CHECK WAS COM 218720 1 11 PLETED. THE LINK AND ROD ASSEMBLIES WERE REMOVED A SECOND TIME TO GAIN 218720 1 12 ACCESS TO THE NUTPLATES. THE NUT ELEMENT WAS REMOVED FROM EACH OF THE 218720 1 13 FOUR NUTPLATES AND MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN OF THE ALIGNMENTD BETW 218720 1 14 EEN THE HOLE IN THE LINKS AND NUTPLATES BASKET HOLES. MISALIGNMENT WAS 218720 1 15 FOUND IN ALL FOUR CASES (REF ATTACHMENT A). AN INSPECTION OF THE POSI 218720 1 16 TIONS OF THE NUTPLATES SHOWED THAT THEY WERE NOT CENTERED WHEN THEIR R 218720 1 17 IVET HOLES WERE DRILLED IN THE LINKS. THIS CAUSED THE LINK AND NUTPLAT 218720 1 18 E HOLES TO BE MISALIGNED. TWO NEW PR'S WERE GENERATED TO CORRECT THESE 218720 1 19 DISCREPANCIES (REF STR-3-11-3370, FLIPPER DOOR #12 LINKS). ONE RIVET 218720 1 20 HOLE IN EACH OF FOUR NEW NUTPLATES WAS SLOTTED TO ALLOW MORE FLEXIBILI 218720 1 21 TY DURING INSTALLATION. THE LINK AND THE NUTPLATE HOLES WERE CENTERED 218720 1 22 AND THE RIVETS WERE SQUEEZED IN POSITION. THE FOUR V070-146070 LINKS W 218720 1 23 ERE INSPECTED TO DETERMINE IF THEY WERE BENT WHEN THE FLIPPER DOORS WE 218720 1 24 RE OPENED AND POSSIBLY OVEREXTENDED. NO SIGN OF BENDING WAS FOUND ON A 218720 1 25 NY LINKS. THE HOLES IN THE LINKS FOR THE V070-146068 BOLTS WERE REAMED 218720 1 26 TO THEIR MAXIMUM TOLERANCE OF .250" (REF DWG V070-146100, ZONE 21B). 218720 1 27 THIS REAMING WILL REDUCE MISALIGNMENT (IF ANY) BETWEEN THE HOLE IN THE 218720 1 28 LINK AND THE HOLE IN THE FLIPPER DOOR PANEL. THE LINK AND ROD ASSEMBL 218720 1 29 IES WERE REINSTALLEDAND FIT CHECKS WERE PERFORMED USING THE PREVIOUSL 218720 1 30 Y DAMAGED BOLTS. THE OLD BOLTS WERE RUN THRU A DIE TO CLEAN THEIR THRE 218720 1 31 ADS BEFORE THE FIT CHECK. THE INBOARD FLIPPER DOOR #4 BOLT SHOWED VERY 218720 1 32 SLIGHT SIGNS OF THREAD FLATTENING WHILE THE OUTBOARD SHOWED NO SIGNS 218720 1 33 OF THREAD FLATTENING. BOTH INBOARD AND OUTBOARD BOLTS OF FLIPPER DOOR 218720 1 34 #12 SHOWED SLIGHT SIGNS OF THREAD FLATTENING. THE NUTPLATES AL ALL LOC 218720 1 35 ATIONS SHOWED NO SIGNS OF DAMAGE. IT WAS OBSERVED DURING THE WORK OF T 218720 1 36 HIS PR THAT THE BOLTS AND THE NUTPLATES MAY NOT BE PERPENDICULAR TO EA 218720 1 37 CH OTHER DURING INSTALLATION AND TORQUING DUE TO TIGHT TOLERANCES. IT 218720 1 38 WAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT DURING BOLT INSTALLATION THE LINK ASSEMBLY HAS 218720 1 39 A LOT OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WHICH MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO ALIGN THE BOL 218720 1 40 T AND NUTPLATE IN THE LINK. THIS RECURRING DAMAGE IS COMMON TO ALL VEH 218720 1 41 ICLES. NEW BOLTS ARE REQUIRED EACH FLIGHT. NEW BOLTS WERE ORDERED BY T 218720 1 42 HIS PR AND WILL BE INSTALLED PER V80-96012 AND V80-96111. THE V070-146 218720 1 43 068 BOLTS ARE INSPECTED EVERY TIME THEY ARE REMOVED (PER APPLICABLE JO 218720 1 44 B CARD) FOR POSSIBLE DAMAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. OUT OF TOLERANCE 218720 1 45 MISALIGNMENT OF HOLES IN THE V070-146070 LINK AND THE NUTPLATE HOLE DU 218720 1 46 RING MANUFACTURING. 219027 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. THE 219027 1 2 INSULATORS HAVE BEEN INSTL'D INTO THE RCC PANEL & THE PANEL IS INSTL'D 219027 1 3 FOR FLIGHT. 219235 1 1 THIS PR IS A DUPLICATE AT PR STR-3-11-3249. 219238 1 1 M.R. RATIONALE: VISUAL & RECORDED INSPECTION OF 219238 1 2 THESE CONDITIONS INDICATE THAT THE DAMAGE IS MINOR 219238 1 3 THESE CONDITIONS ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO RE- 219238 1 4 QUIRE A REPAIR. THE DENT & HOLE DID NOT PUNCTURE 219238 1 5 THE ALUM. FACE SHEET. THERE IS ONLY MINOR DAMAGE 219238 1 6 TO THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE AND THIS IS ACCEPTABLE 219238 1 7 PER VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL. (REF.: SECT. 219238 1 8 3-11b) THESE CONDITIONS WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT 219238 1 9 THE HEAT TRANSFER CAPABILITIES OF THE RADIATOR PNL 219238 1 10 THESE CONDITIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE 'AS-IS' FOR UN- 219238 1 11 RESTRICTED USE. NO M.R. I.D. REQUIRED. 219442 1 1 THE V070-339467-001 FIBERGLASS CLOSEOUT PANEL HAS A SMALL CRACK. THE P 219442 1 2 ANEL HAS BEEN REPAIRED WITH A FIBERGLASS PATCH BY MR DISPO. PROBABLE C 219442 1 3 AUSE OF DAMAGE IS WORKMANSHIP. 219547 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ROUTE THE DISCREPANT V070-35161 219547 1 2 4-001 SHELL ASSEMBLY TO THE HARDWARE DISPOSITIONING AREA FOR REPAIR AN 219547 1 3 D REPLACE IT WITH A NEW SHELL ASSEMBLY. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DAMA 219547 1 4 GED KAHRLON SURFACE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THE SHELL ASSEMBLY IS 219547 1 5 A PRIMARY STRUCTURE. 219862 1 1 THE BUSHINGS DESCRIBED IN ITEM 1 FOR HOLES 108,134 219862 1 2 ,144 AND 185 WERE BROUGHT FLUSH WITH THE OML USING 219862 1 3 A MICRO-SHAVER AND HAVE BEEN APPROVED AS ACCEPTAB 219862 1 4 LE AS IS. THE HOLES WITH BUSHINGS DESCRIBED IN ITE 219862 1 5 M 2 (112,135,195, AND 203) WERE REAMED BETWEEN 0.2 219862 1 6 663 AND 0.2668 TO ALLOW DOUBLER INSTLN TO CONTINUE 219862 1 7 . THIS REWORK HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED U 219862 1 8 SAGE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED FOR ITEM 219862 1 9 #2,OVERSIZED FASTENERS WERE USED PER MR APPROVAL. 219862 1 10 CLOSE PR. 220143 1 1 THE MR WASHER CALLOUT FOR THE V070-396255-009 C/P WAS TOO SMALL. THE W 220143 1 2 ASHER HAS BEEN CHANGED TO A LARGER DIAMETER WASHER PER MR DISPO. PROBA 220143 1 3 BLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP/VENDOR. 220433 1 1 INSTALLING BRACKET AT A SLIGHT INCLINE WILL NOT 220433 1 2 AFFECT WIRE ROUTING IN THIS AREA BRKT WILL BE INS- 220433 1 3 TLD USING EXISTING FASTENERS AS CALLED OUT FOR BY 220433 1 4 PRINT CONFIG STRUTURAL INTEGRITY OF THIS SECONDARY 220433 1 5 STRUCTURE REMAINS THE SAME AND FUNCTION REMAINS AS 220433 1 6 DESIGN INTENDED CLOSE PR 220563 1 1 THE V070-395217-003 & -004 C/Ps INTEFERRED W/ THE INSTL'N OF THEIR F/B 220563 1 2 s AS A RESULT OF THE RELOC OF THE F/Bs. THIS PR TEMPORARILY INSTL'D T 220563 1 3 HE C/P FOR A FIT CHK. IT THEN VERIFIED THAT VSTR-3-07-333 HAD WORDS T 220563 1 4 O TRIM THE -004 C/P & STR-3-07-2263 HAD WORDS TO TRIM THE -003 C/P, AN 220563 1 5 D THE INTERFERENCES NO LONGER EXIST. 220771 1 1 A SPARE FLT CAP WILL BE USED TO FILL THE OV-103 RE 220771 1 2 QUIREMENT. THIS CAP WAS OBTAINED PER STEP 3 OF THI 220771 1 3 S PR. THE SUSPECT FLT CAP WILL BE ROUTED TO THE OP 220771 1 4 F & IT WILL BE EVALUATED PER THE OV-104 PR INITIAT 220771 1 5 ED IN STEP 9. 220816 1 1 ATTACH PT #5 BOLTS WERE SENT TO ROCKWELL DOWNEY FO 220816 1 2 R FURTHER EVALUATION ON LRU PR 3-07-2062. NEW BOLT 220816 1 3 S WERE OBTAINED, AND ARE IN V5011 MERL. NO FURTHER 220816 1 4 DISPOSITION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 220853 1 1 ITEM 1 PG. 1 I.B EDGE MEASUREMENTS TAKEN ON ITEM 1 220853 1 2 WERE BEFORE TRIM OF SEALS V070-198592 AND V070-19 220853 1 3 8593 ON PR STR-3-07-1926. SEALS INTERFERED WITH CO 220853 1 4 NTACT BETWEEN CARRIER PANEL AND TRAILING EDGE BEAM 220853 1 5 . PANEL STEPS WERE REMEASURED PER STEP 2.0 AND MR- 220853 1 6 001 SHIM WAS REVISED ON PG. 8.1. MR-001 SHIM WAS T 220853 1 7 HEN BONDED AND STEPS WERE MEASURED FOR I.B EDGE ON 220853 1 8 ITEM 12 PG 7. STEP "A"(.071), "B"(.073) AND "D"(. 220853 1 9 072) ARE WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE OF .070 +/-.008. 220853 1 10 "C"(.059) STEP DIMENSION IS WITHIN MR APPROVED 220853 1 11 ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .404 TO .085 PER PG. 5. IT 220853 1 12 EM 1 PG. 1 O.B. EDGE: FILLER BAR BRACKET TO CARRIE 220853 1 13 R PANEL STEPS MEASURED AGAIN ON ITEM 2.0 PG 2 FOR 220853 1 14 O.B EDGE WERE SUSPECT DUE TO INTERFERENCE BETWEEN 220853 1 15 O.B. STIFFENER AND TRAILING EDGE BEAM. STEPS WERE 220853 1 16 MEASUERD AGAIN WITH I.B. FINAL MEASUREMENTS ON ITE 220853 1 17 M 1.2.1 PG 7.1. STEPS "A"(.064), "B"(.071), AND "C 220853 1 18 "(.078) ARE WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE OF .070 +/- .0 220853 1 19 08. "D"(.056) STEP DIMENSION IS WITHIN MR APPROVED 220853 1 20 ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085 PER PG. 5. 220853 1 21 ITEM 2 PG. 1A STRUCTURE TO PANEL STEPS: OUT OF TOL 220853 1 22 ERANCE CARRIER PANEL TO STRUCTURE STEPS WERE REWOR 220853 1 23 KED TO BRING STEPS TO ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE(.040 TO 220853 1 24 .085). MR-002 SHIM WAS BONDED AND STEPS WERE REME 220853 1 25 ASURED AND ARE LISTED IN ITEM 11.1 PG. 7.1. STEPS 220853 1 26 ARE ALL WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .08 220853 1 27 5 PER MR RATIONALE ON PG. 8. ITEM 3 PG. 1B: MR -00 220853 1 28 1 SHIM WAS TRIMMED TO CORRECT EXCESSIVE LENGTH LIS 220853 1 29 TED IN ITEM 3 ON STEP 19. PAGE 8.1. ITEM 4 PG 1C A 220853 1 30 ND ITEM 5 PG. 1D: MR-001 SHIM AND MR -002 SHIM 220853 1 31 BONDED OUT OF TOLERANCE WAS CORRECTED BY TRIMMING/ 220853 1 32 FILING AWAY OUT OF TOLERANCE EDGE (REF. ITEM 20. P 220853 1 33 G 9.1 AND ITEM 22 PG 11) DUE TO BEING MINOR IN NAT 220853 1 34 URE. ALL STEP DIMENSIONS FROM CARRIER PANEL AS REW 220853 1 35 ORKED AND DOCUMENTED PROBIDE A FILLER BAR TO TILE 220853 1 36 CONFIGURATION THAT WILL PREVENT OVERTEMP OF FILLER 220853 1 37 BAR, SIP & STRUCTURE. 220964 1 1 BRACKET WAS MODIFIED TO FIT INTO INSTALLATION POSI 220964 1 2 TION. BRACKET DOES FIT INTO INSTALLATION LOCATION 220964 1 3 AND WAS ACCEPTED ON AN MR BASIS. CAUSE: ENGINEE 220964 1 4 RING DRAWING. 221046 1 1 SETSCREW ADJUSTMENT FOR LATCH 1 AND LATCH 18 MICROSWITCHES WAS PERFORM 221046 1 2 ED. LATCH 1 (UPPER LATCH) MICROSWITCH SETSCREW WAS FOUND TO HAVE BEEN 221046 1 3 CORRECTLY ADJUSTED. LATCH 18 MICROSWITCH SETSCREW WAS READJUSTED TO A 221046 1 4 POSITION 1/4 OF A TURN BACK FROM ITS ORIGINAL. THIS IS EQUIVALENT TO . 221046 1 5 008 OF AN INCH OF SETSCREW MOTION AND INDICATES THAT THE SETSCREW WOUL 221046 1 6 D HAVE ACTIVATED MICROSWITCH CLOSURE IN ITS ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION. FO 221046 1 7 LLOWING SETSCREW ADJUSTMENT, THE HATCH WAS CLOSED AND LATCHED, AND THE 221046 1 8 RESISTANCE OF EACH MICROSWITCH WAS DETERMINED TO BE LESS THAN 2.0 OHM 221046 1 9 S. THIS VERIFIED THAT THE HATCH LATCHES WERE IN THE FULLY LATCHED POSI 221046 1 10 TION. A PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. 221136 1 1 CLOSE INSPECTION REVEALS THAT THE AUDIO PANEL LATC 221136 1 2 H HANDLES WERE UNABLE TO LOCK BECAUSE OF DEFECTIVE 221136 1 3 CLIPS. THESE CLIPS WERE DEFORMED AND DO NOT CONFO 221136 1 4 RM TO PRINT SPECIFICATIONS. THE DEFECTIVE CLIPS WE 221136 1 5 RE REPLACED WITH NEW ITEMS AND POSITIVE LOCKING OF 221136 1 6 THE LATCH HANDLES WAS ACHIEVED. THE LATCH HANDLE 221136 1 7 ASSEMBLIES HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATI 221136 1 8 ON WITH NO MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED. 221234 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF TPS STR-3-08-395 WAS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS ANY 221234 1 2 DEBOND OF THE ALUMINUM FACESHEET. THE MEANS USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER 221234 1 3 ANY DEBOND EXISTED WAS A "COIN TAP" TEST PERFORMED BY ENGINEERING. IT 221234 1 4 IS QUALITY ENGINEERING DECISION WHETHER A NASA/QC IS REQUIRED ON A GIV 221234 1 5 EN TASK. THIS PARTICULAR TASK WAS WORKED BY LSOC, NASA AND RI/LSS ENGI 221234 1 6 NEERING NOT SHOP, THEREFORE, QE DEEMED A MIP WAS NOT REQUIRED. IRREGAR 221234 1 7 DLESS, THIS IS NOT A STRUCTURAL PR CONDITION AND PR SHOULD NEVER HAVE 221234 1 8 BEEN GENERATED. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED AND THIS PR CAN CLO 221234 1 9 SE. PROBABLE CAUSE A MISINTERPETATION OF QPRD BY QE. CLOSE THIS PR. 221387 1 1 EVALUATION OF C/P LOADS SHOWS THAT REDUCED HARDNES 221387 1 2 S OF C/P WILL NOT DEGRADE STR INTEGRITY OF PANEL B 221387 1 3 ELOW AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL. A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAF 221387 1 4 ETY IS MAINTAINED. NO MR ID REQ'D. 221550 1 1 THE V070-198559-001 NUT DESCRIBED IN ITEM 1 OF THIS PR AND ALL OF THE 221550 1 2 ASSOCIATED HINGE HARDWARE HAS BEEN TORQUED TO PRINT SPECIFICATIONS. TH 221550 1 3 E DISCREPANT INSTALLATION NO LONGER EXISTS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE 221550 1 4 DISCREPANT INSTALLATION IS A POOR ORIGINAL INSTALLATION. THIS PR REQUI 221550 1 5 RES NO FURTHER ENGINEERING. 221561 01 1 VOID THIS PR. 221614 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO SATISFY A BUILDING 45 REQUEST, 221614 1 2 CONTROL NUMBER J3174R1, TO BRING THE REMAINING TWO UNDERSIZED HOLES TO 221614 1 3 PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE HOLE LOCATED AT THE SIX O'CLOCK POSITION WAS 221614 1 4 BROUGHT TO PRINT SIZE BY STR-3-09-3031. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 221614 1 5 THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS WORKMANSHIP. 221615 1 1 LOCKING COLLAR WAS FOUND TO HAVE DISTORTED METAL. THE DISCREPANT LOCKI 221615 1 2 NG COLLAR WAS REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 221641 1 1 REAMING AND DE-BURRING HOLES TO MAXIMUM DIA. WITH- 221641 1 2 IN PRINT TOLERANCE WILL ALLOW INSTALLATION OF 221641 1 3 BOLT SLEEVE PER PRINT. 221855 1 1 DURING AN EVAULATION OF THE DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED IN ITEM 1 OF THIS PR 221855 1 2 SEVERAL ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO ACHIEVE A PROPER INSTALLATION OF THE BE 221855 1 3 AM. A PROPER INSTALLATION WAS ACHIEVED. THE IMPROPER FIT WAS PROBABLY 221855 1 4 CAUSED BY A MISALIGNMENT OF THE HARDWARE DURING THE INITIAL INSTALLATI 221855 1 5 ON. THIS PR REQUIRES NO FURTHER ENGINEERING EVALUATION. 221965 1 1 AN MR FABRICATED SHIM WAS SHAVED TO MATCH ANGLE OF HOLE IN SILL LONGER 221965 1 2 ON AND RADIUS BLOCK WAS COUNTER BORED IN LINE WITH THE FASTENER HOLE. 221965 1 3 THIS HARDWARE. REPAIR WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND SILL LO 221965 1 4 NGERON WAS MR APPROVED AS-IS. 222070 1 1 THE PROBLEM WAS THAT SCRATCHES OCCURRED DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE HIGH 222070 1 2 PRESSURE FUEL TURBO PUMP LRU RAIL. MOLD IMPRESSIONS AND DEFECT MEASUR 222070 1 3 EMENTS WERE TAKEN, AND A DYE PEN INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED. RAISED META 222070 1 4 L WAS REMOVED FROM THE DEFECTS, ALL INDENTATIONS & SCRATCHES WERE POLI 222070 1 5 SHED AND BLENDED INTO THE SURROUNDING AREA. THE REPAIR WAS APPROVED FO 222070 1 6 R UNRESTRICTED USE. POLAROID PHOTO KEPT FOR ENGINEERING EVALUATION, PH 222070 1 7 OTOCOPY ATTACHED. CLOSE THIS PR. 222097 1 1 FC3 COOLANT PRESSURE INCREASED WITH REACTANT VLV'S CLOSED AND FUEL CEL 222097 1 2 L DEPRESSURIZED. TROUBLESHOOTING REVEALED ABOVE DISCREPANCY WAS DUE TO 222097 1 3 FC3 O2 SUPPLY VLV (40V45LV024) LEAKING THRU APPROX 90 SCCM (MAX ALL 222097 1 4 OWABLE IS 18 SCCM). IPR 26RV-0339 DOCUMENTED FC3 COOL PRESS INCREASE T 222097 1 5 O 30 PSIA (EXPLAINED CONDITION). O2 MANIFOLD 2 PANEL (40V45LV024 VLV I 222097 1 6 S LOCATED IN PANEL ASSY) WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. SUBSEQUENT TO NEW O 222097 1 7 2 MANIFOLD 2 PANEL INSTALLATION, HIGH PRESSURE MASS SPEC LK CKS INDICA 222097 1 8 TED EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE ECLSS O2 SUPPLY PORT (1.7 X 10 -ª7 SCCS). REF 222097 1 9 PG 1A ECLSS O2 SUPPLY WAS DISCONNECTED, CLEANED AND RECONNECTED. SUBSE 222097 1 10 QUENT HIGH PRESSURE MASS SPEC INDICATED LEAKAGE ECL O2 SUPPLY PORT W 222097 1 11 ITHIN ALLOWABLE LIMITS (8.2 X 10 -ª8 SCCS). O2 MANIFOLD VLV PNL ASSY F 222097 1 12 LOW TESTS (REF STEPS 57, 58, & 59) AND EM CHECKS (REF STEPS 45 THRU 48 222097 1 13 ) WERE SUCCESSFUL. 222111 1 1 THE ATTEMPT TO RIG THE RIGHT AFT ROTART ACTUATOR 222111 1 2 (MOTOR 2, 88 AND 175 OPEN POSITION INDICATORS) WAS 222111 1 3 UNSUCCESSFUL AT THE 175 POSITION BECAUSE OF THE 222111 1 4 SLOP IN THE ZERO-G SYS. ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO MOVE 222111 1 5 THE AFT ACTUATOR TOWARDS THE CLOSE DIRECTION 1 222111 1 6 SPLINE IN ORDER TO HAVE THE #2 INDICATION ACTUATE 222111 1 7 AT THE SAME TIME AS THE #1 INDICATION WAS ALSO 222111 1 8 UNSUCCESSFUL. AT THIS POINT IT WAS DECIDED TO 222111 1 9 ATTEMPT TO RIG THE AFT ACTUATOR AT THE 88 POSITION 222111 1 10 BECAUSE THE ZERO-G SYS WOULD HAVE THE LEAST AMOUNT 222111 1 11 OF AFFECT ON RIGGING AT THIS POSITION. THIS ADJ. 222111 1 12 WORKED WELL IN THAT THE 88 OPEN POSITION IND. 222111 1 13 1 AND 2 CAME ON AT THE SAME TIME AND THE DOOR 222111 1 14 INCLONOMETER READING WERE WITHIN SPEC. THE SAME 222111 1 15 HOLDS TRUE FOR THE FULL OPEN 175 POSITION. FINAL 222111 1 16 VERIFICATION OF PROPER RIGGING WAS PERFORMED PER 222111 1 17 STEP 18 WITH THE ALLOWABLE TOLERANCE BEING FROM 222111 1 18 174-15' TO 175-45'. ALL READINGS WITHIN SPEC. 222145 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF LO2 TANK POST LOAD TO 30 MINUTE STABILIZATION PE 222145 1 2 RIOD, A FAILURE (LEAK) IN GSE LO2 H.P. VENT SYSTEM ALLOWD O2 TANKS TO 222145 1 3 DROP BELOW PRESSURE LIMITATION STATED IN OMRSD (V45DM0.010) FOR STABIL 222145 1 4 IZATION PERIOD. A GSE PR S70-0817-01-002-0376 WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMEN 222145 1 5 T/TRACK GSE LEAK WITH THIS PR DOCUMENTING OMRSD TK PRESSURE VIOLATION. 222145 1 6 STATED PRESSURE RANGE (PER OMRSD) IS 800-930 PSIA. A DATA RETRIEVAL O 222145 1 7 F O2 TK PRESSURES (DURING STABILIZATION PERIOD) RANGED AS FOLLOWS: O2 222145 1 8 TK1 LOW-645 PSIA, HIGH-847 PSIA/O2 TK2 LOW-545 PSIA, HIGH-843 PSIA/O2 222145 1 9 TK3 LOW-641 PSIA, HIGH-889 PSIA. THE MINIMUM PRESSURE (800 PSIA) STATE 222145 1 10 D IN OMRSD REPRESSENTS A MINIMUM EXPECTED PRESSURE FOR A NOMINAL LOAD 222145 1 11 AND DOES NO REPRESENT A "HARDWARE" OR "AUALITY OF LOAD" CONSTRAINT. IN 222145 1 12 ADDITION, O2 VENT LINE SAMPLES HAVE PASSED AND TANKS ARE STARILIZED A 222145 1 13 T NOMINAL POST LOAD PRESSURES. CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT OF APPROVED 222145 1 14 WAIVER WK1039. 222146 1 1 EACH OF THE (3) DISCREPANT LOCATIONS CONTAINED MISLAIGNMENT BETWEEN THE 222146 1 2 NUTPLATE AND SCREW HOLE. THE FIRST RESTRICTED MR WAS A TEMPORARY FIX WHI 222146 1 3 CH REMOVED THE NUTPLATE AND INSTALLED A STANDARD NUT AND WASHER WITH THE 222146 1 4 SCREW. THESE WERE REMOVED, AND A SPECIAL 14650HA-02 (SPS) CORNER NUTPLA 222146 1 5 TE WAS INSTALLED. THIS INVOLVED DRILLING A NEW RIVET HOLE AND PLUGGING O 222146 1 6 NE OF THE OLD ONES. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS MANUFACTURING (VEND 222146 1 7 OR) WORKMANSHIP ERROR. 222146 1 8 222267 1 1 GOUGE IN FITTING REQD UNRESTRICTED MR TO SMOOTH AN 222267 1 2 D APPLY NEW COAT OF CORROSION PROTECTION. REWORK 222267 1 3 DOES NOT AFFECT ABILITY OF FITTING TO PERFORM ITS 222267 1 4 FUNCTION. CAUSE OF PROBLEM WAS WORKMANSHIP. 222334 1 1 THE NOTED SCRATCHES WERE LOCATED ON THE AFT SIDE OF THE V070-320505-00 222334 1 2 7 ATTACH FITTING. THE SCRATCHES WERE MINOR IN SIZE. ADDITIONAL CORROSI 222334 1 3 ON PROTECTION PRIMER WAS APPLIED. THIS WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED U 222334 1 4 SE. ROUTE TO PMRB FOR CONCURRANCE. 222669 1 1 THE V070-731874-037 LUMINOUS CEILING PANEL WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTR 222669 1 2 ICTED USE, AFTER SLIGHT TRIMMING OF A LOWER PLASTIC SUPPORT THE TRIMMI 222669 1 3 NG OF THE PLASTIC SUPPORT ALLOWED FOR PROPER INSTALLATION OF THE -037 222669 1 4 PANEL. A DISCREPANT ME128-0047-0107 FASTENER WAS ALSO REMOVED AND REPL 222669 1 5 ACED. 222685 1 1 THE BENT & DISTORTED INSULATOR WAS MR'D "OK AS IS". THE INSULATOR IS I 222685 1 2 NSTL'D FOR FLIGHT. 222747 1 1 THE FLOOR PANEL WEB WAS TRIMMED TO ELIMINATE THE INTERFERENCE WITH THR 222747 1 2 EE SCREWS. THE TRIMMING WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FUR 222747 1 3 THER ENGINEERING WILL BE REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: BUILD UP OF TOLER 222747 1 4 ANCES. 222764 1 1 V070-331555-001 WINDOW SEAL WAS NOTED AS HAVING SURFACE CONTAMINATION 222764 1 2 DURING FLIGHT 8 PROCESSING. RESTRICTED USE FOR FLIGHT 8 WAS APPROVED 222764 1 3 AND PR WAS TRANSFERRED TO OV-103 FLIGHT 9 CATEGORY. REINSPECTION DURIN 222764 1 4 G FLIGHT 9 PROCESSING WAS GRANTED AND THE PR WAS TRANSFERRED TO OV-103 222764 1 5 FLIGHT 10 CATEGORY. INSPECTION OF SEAL DURING FLIGHT 10 PROCESSING, A 222764 1 6 GAIN SHOWED NO SPREAD OF CONTAMINATION. DISCREPANCY WAS THEN ACCEPTED 222764 1 7 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 222820 1 1 DISCREPANT INSULATOR HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUFA- 222820 1 2 CTURER SPECIFICATION. 222852 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1 DENT ON OUTBOARD FACESHEET OF B91B11302-4 RH WING DOOR PAN 222852 1 2 EL. THE DENT WAS 0.21" DEEP, 0.500" LONG AND 0.110" WIDE ON THE 0.016" 222852 1 3 THICK ALUMINUM HONEYCOMB FACESHEET. THE DISCREPANT AREA WAS MR REPAIR 222852 1 4 ED BY FILLNG THE DENT WITH MBO120-008 EPOXY ADHESIVE. A 0.020" THICK D 222852 1 5 OUBLER WAS BONDED OVER THE MBO120-008 FILL POT REPAIR USING MBO120-048 222852 1 6 TYPE III ADHESIVE PER PROCESS 620 BRISKHEAT. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DE 222852 1 7 NT IN THE FACESHEET WAS WORKMANSHIP. THE B91B11302-4 DOOR PANEL IS A P 222852 1 8 RIMARY STRUCTURE. 222903 1 1 ENGINEERING INSPECTION OF TILE CAVITIES REVEALED T 222903 1 2 HAT THE DISCREPANCIES MIGHT EXIST ONLY IN THE KORO 222903 1 3 PON. REMOVAL OF THE KOROPON CONFIRMED THAT THERE W 222903 1 4 AS NO DAMAGE TO THE ALUMINUM STRUCTURE. THE TILE C 222903 1 5 AVITIES WERE CORROSION PROTECTED PER AFT-3-07-040. 223422 1 1 CARRIER PANELS 1 THROUGH 8 ON JOB CARD V80-05859 WERE WRITTEN UP ON (I 223422 1 2 TEM 1) COUNTERBORE NOT BEING PRESENT AND (ITEM 2) RETAINING RINGS BEIN 223422 1 3 G INCOMPLETE. ENGINEERING REVIEWED DRAWINGS AND DETERMINED COUNTERBOR 223422 1 4 E AND RETAINING RINGS ARE NOT REQUIRED. RETAINING RINGS WERE REMOVED 223422 1 5 PER STEP 1 AND J/C DEV'S WERE WRITTEN TO REMOVE RETAINING RING CALLOUT 223422 1 6 FROM REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION JOB CARDS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS ERROR IN 223422 1 7 DRAWINGS. 223443 1 1 THE ORIGINAL DISCREPANCY WAS THE LENGTHS OF THE 3/8" BOLTS IN THE R/H 223443 1 2 T-O SUPPORTS. THE BOLTS WERE CHANGED FROM NAS1006-34A TO NAS1006-40A P 223443 1 3 ER AN EOTF. UPON REMOVAL OF THE 3/8" BOLTS ADDITIONAL DISCREPANCIES WE 223443 1 4 RE FOUND. THE LONGERON ATTACH POINTS (LOWER T-O SUPPORT) SHOWED INDICA 223443 1 5 TIONS OF A STRESS CRACK WHICH WAS FOUND TO BE A PLUG INSTALLED DURING 223443 1 6 MANUFACTURING FOR A MISDRILLED HOLE (REF DR BD8117-000M). IT WAS DISCO 223443 1 7 VERED THAT THE WASHER INSTALLATION ON THE 3/4" PINS WERE INCORRECT, A 223443 1 8 RADIUS WASHER WAS BEING USED IN AN INSTALLATION WHICH CALLED FOR A FLA 223443 1 9 T WASHER. DURING THE R&R OF THE WASHERS THE NUT ON THE UPPER 3/4" PIN 223443 1 10 BOUND UP. THE NUT WAS GROUND OFF AND SCRAPPED WITH THE DAMAGED PIN. NE 223443 1 11 W HARDWARE WAS OBTAINED/INSTALLED AT THE UPPER SUPPORT LOCATION. WITH 223443 1 12 THE T-O SUPPORT PLATES REMOVED ALL THE INSTALLATION HOLES WERE INSPECT 223443 1 13 ED AND MEASURED. THE UPPER 3/8" HOLE IN THE CLEVIS (UPPER T-O SUPPORT) 223443 1 14 WAS SLIGHTLY ELONGATED AND THREAD MARKS WERE VISIBLE. THE SHARP EDGES 223443 1 15 WERE REMOVED AND THE HOLE WAS ACCEPTED AS IS PER MR ACTION. THE LOWER 223443 1 16 3/8" IN THE CLEVIS WHICH WAS UNDER SIZED, WAS REAMED UP TO THE PRINT 223443 1 17 SPECIFICATIONS. THE 3/8" HOLES IN THE LONGERON WERE ELONGATED WITH THR 223443 1 18 EAD MARKS IN THE LOWER HOLE. THE HOLES WERE DRILLED/REAMED UP AND SHOU 223443 1 19 LDER BUSHINGS WERE INSTALLED MAINTAINING THE DESIGNED HOLE DIAMETERS. 223443 1 20 THE 3/4" HOLES IN THE CLEVIS HAD GALL MARKS WHICH WERE CLEANED OUT PER 223443 1 21 MR ACTION. AN NAS1006-42A BOLT WAS INSTALLED IN THE LOWER FTG TO COMPE 223443 1 22 NSATE FOR THE SHOULDERS ON THE NEW MR BUSHINGS. THIS MR INSTALLATION S 223443 1 23 ATISFIED THE INTENT OF EO C01, V070-854330. THE DISCREPANT V070-353297 223443 1 24 -004 SUPPORT PLATE (UPPER LOCATION) WAS SCRAPPED AND A NEW SUPPORT PLA 223443 1 25 TE WAS INSTALLED. THE R/H T-O SUPPORT LOCATIONS HAVE BEEN REWORKED TO 223443 1 26 A FLIGHT CONDITION WHICH HAS BEEN REWORKED AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTR 223443 1 27 ICTED USE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS A DESIGN DEFICIENCY AND OPERATIONAL D 223443 1 28 EGRADATION. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 223555 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. THE 223555 1 2 INSULATOR HAS BEEN INSTALLED INTO THE RCC PANEL AND THE PANEL IS INSTA 223555 1 3 LLED FOR FLIGHT. 223646 1 1 BRACKET INSTALLATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITH HI-LO 223646 1 2 C'S INSTEAD OF RIVETS, BECAUSE OF LIMITED SPACE IN 223646 1 3 ELEVONCOVE. RELIEF HOLE IN BRACKET HAS BEEN ENLA 223646 1 4 RGED TO CLEAR BOLT HEAD OF BOLT ALREADY INSTALLED 223646 1 5 IN STRUCTURE WITH MR DISPOSITION. CLOSE THIS PR. 223832 1 1 CONDITION ACCEPTABLE AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 223967 1 1 L/H INBOARD BRAKE, WAS PACKAGED AND SENT TO B.F. 223967 1 2 GOODRICH THRU HDA ON 4-20-85. PRR #92181B. 224101 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP INITIALLY BECAUSE AN RD153 WASHER WAS INSTALLED 224101 1 2 UNDER THE BOLT HEAD ON THE FWD HINGE OF LH VENT DOOR 9, WHICH IS NOT P 224101 1 3 ER PRINT. ATTACHMENT 1 WAS WRITTEN TO CORRECT THE INSTALLATION. IN S 224101 1 4 TEP 6 OF ATT. 1, A V070-384318-001 BUSHING WAS FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOL 224101 1 5 ERANCE AND PAGE 1A WAS WRITTEN. PER R.I. ENGINEERING, V070-384312-001 224101 1 6 AND V070-384318-001 BUSHINGS ARE INACTIVE FOR FUTURE DESIGN, THEREFOR 224101 1 7 E E.O. TO FOLLOW RATIONAL WAS WRITTEN FOR DWG. V070-385031 TO ALLOW I 224101 1 8 NSTALLATION OF THE UPDATED -003 BUSHINGS. THE -003 HINGE BUSHINGS WER 224101 1 9 E INSTALLED AND OPERATED SMOOTHLY AND DOOR SET UP WAS COMPLETED. LRU 224101 1 10 PR'S WERE WRITTEN TO SEND THE OLD V070-384312-001 AND V070-384318-001 224101 1 11 BUSHINGS TO RI SERVICE CENTER FOR REWORK TO -003 DEMENSIONS. ALSO, THE 224101 1 12 FWD HINGE BOLT WAS CHANGED FROM A NAS1004-18 TO A -17 TO ACHIEVE THE 224101 1 13 PROPER CHIP LENGTH TO CORRECT THE 1B DISCREPANCY. V1016 RETESTED THE 224101 1 14 DOOR OPERATION. UPON VERIFICATION IN STEP 2 THAT RELEASED E.O. REFLEC 224101 1 15 TS ENGINEERING DISPOSITION, CLOSE THIS PR. 224177 1 1 THIS IPR WAS PICKED UP DURING S0004 FINAL GEAR RETRACTION. THE SWITCH 224177 1 2 WAS RIGGED TO ASSURE PROPER ACTUATION AND CYCLED MANUALLY WITH THE C7 224177 1 3 0-0894 UNIT MONITORING TO OBTAIN THE PROPER LITE INDICATIONS. THE PIN 224177 1 4 FELL IN THE HOLE EACH TIME ASSURING A BUNGEE FIRING AND THE PROPER LI 224177 1 5 TE INDICATIONS WERE RECIEVED. THE GEAR WAS RETRACTED FOR FLIGHT PER T 224177 1 6 HIS WAS AND ALL RESULTS WERE NORMINAL. S0004 CONTINUED FROM THAT POIN 224177 1 7 T. PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. RETEST WAS COMPLETED BY THE RETRAC 224177 1 8 TION FOR FLIGHT. SEVERAL FLIGHT OMRSD'S WERE SATISFIED. CLOSE THIS P 224177 1 9 R. 224184 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 224184 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION L/G Xo1116.25 Zo396.88 IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORIGIN 224184 1 3 AL RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 0.0 INCH POUNDS. 224184 1 4 NUT WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE 224184 1 5 TO THE APPROPRIATE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS. RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO 224184 1 6 PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 224184 1 7 THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 224195 1 1 REF ITEM 1: DINGED AREA WAS FOUND TO HAVE SCRATCHES AND CRACKS CRACKS 224195 1 2 WERE REMOVED BY DRILLING OUT CRCKED AREAS AND BURNISHING OUT SCRATCHES 224195 1 3 ON REMAINING STRUCTURE. STRUCTURE INTEGRITY MAINTAINED BY INSTALLATIO 224195 1 4 N OF AN MR DOUBLER. REF ITEM 2: OVERSIZED HOLES PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED P 224195 1 5 ER MR ON MR BH 1266. REF ITEM 3: LINEAR INDICATIONS WERE BURNISHED OUT 224195 1 6 AND ACCEPTED PER MR. ALL REWORK HAS BEEN RE-CORROSIONED PROTECTED. R 224195 1 7 EF ITEM 4: DISREPANCY RESOLVED BY INSTALLATION OF AN MR BRACKET ACCEPT 224195 1 8 ED BY MR DISPOSITION BRACKET Xo INTERFACE AREA RETAINED AT PER PRINT ; 224195 1 9 OCATION. CLOSE THISPR 224348 1 1 PRSD LO2 TANK RELIEF PORT (OR) HAD CONTAMINATION ON INNER SURFACE OF T 224348 1 2 UBE. PARTICULATE SAMPLE WAS TAKEN WITH RESULTS INDICATING MATERIAL BEI 224348 1 3 NG 300 SERIES STAINLESS STEEL CORROSION PRODUCT WITH TRACES OF COPPER 224348 1 4 AND SILICATE. ANALYSIS ALSO INDICATEDHIGH CLORIDE. (NOTE: PORT IS OPEN 224348 1 5 AT ATMOSPHERE). CORROSION APPEARED MINOR IN NATURE AND WAS CLEANED TO 224348 1 6 VISUAL CLEAN (VC) USING ISPROPYL ALCOHOL AND COTTON SWABS. PREVENTIVE 224348 1 7 MAINTENANCE STEPS (ALCOHOL SWAB) ARE BEING INCORPORATED INTO RELIEF A 224348 1 8 PORT FITTING INSTLN JOB CARD. THIS SHOULD MINIMIZE CORROSION/CONTAMINA 224348 1 9 TION CONCERNS. 224417 1 1 DURING FUEL CELL #3 INSTALLATIN THE FWD MOUNTING BRACKET COULD NOT BE 224417 1 2 INSTALLED ONTO THE FUEL CELL TRUNION DUE TO A SMALL BURR. THIS BURR WA 224417 1 3 S SUPERFICIAL AND WAS REMOVED WITH EMORY CLOTH. THE MOUNTING BRACKET W 224417 1 4 AS THEN INSTALLED WITH NO ANOMALIES. 224464 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ADHESIVE FRACTURE ON GRAPHITE/EPOXY AT THE RADIUS OF THE SE 224464 1 2 AL SUPPORT. ADHESIVE FRACTURE IS NO MORE THAN AN AREA WHERE NOT ENOUGH 224464 1 3 RESIN WAS APPLIED DURING INSTALLATION. AREA WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. RE 224464 1 4 F. ITEM 2 SEVERAL NICKS ARE PRESENT ON RETAINER EDGE. THE NICKS ARE "C 224464 1 5 OSMETIC" AND WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE CAUSE OF THE PAINT CHIPPING W 224464 1 6 S OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. REF ITEM 3 GROUNGING CLIP AT #2 SHEAR PIN H 224464 1 7 AS A BROKEN FINGER. CLIP WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAG 224464 1 8 ED CLIPS WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. REF ITEM 4 GROUNDING CLIP AT #3 224464 1 9 SHEAR PIN DOES NOT GO UNDER RETAINER AND (1) FINGER IS BENT. CLIP WAS 224464 1 10 MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE CAUSE OF THE FINGER DISCREPANCIES ARE OPERATION 224464 1 11 AL DEGRADATION. REF. ITEM 5 CRACK APPEARS BETWEEN THE ANGLE AND FRAME. 224464 1 12 THERE WAS NO CRACK, IT IS PAINT THAT DID NOT FILL COMPLETELY LEAVING 224464 1 13 VOID BETWEEN ANGLE AND FRAME. THERE IS NO DISCREPANCY. 224468 1 1 SHIMS HAVE BEEN ADDED PER EO-TO-FOLLOW DISPOSITION 224468 1 2 SO THAT 4H AND R/H B91B11488-11 BRIDGE WILL FIT S 224468 1 3 QUARCELY ON THE SPAR. CAUSE OF PROBLEM WAS DESIGN 224468 1 4 ERRORS. CLOSR PR. 224663 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP BECAUSE OF THE INABILITY TO 224663 1 2 INSTL THREE MD121-0002-05 RIVETS DUE TO ACCESS RES 224663 1 3 TRICTIONS. THREE ME112-0014-0503 HI-LOKS & THREE 224663 1 4 ME114-0022-0105 NUTS WERE USED AS A SUBSTITUTE. P 224663 1 5 RIME BD CONCURRENCE WAS OBTAINED PRIOR TO FASTENER 224663 1 6 INSTL'N. THE STIFFENER WAS THEN INSTL'D W/ THE N 224663 1 7 EW FASTENER CONFIG W/ NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE ST 224663 1 8 RUCTURAL INTEGRITY. 224811 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN PITTING, GOUGING AND SCUFFED FINISHES WERE 224811 1 2 DETECTED ON EACH OF THE FOUR L/H MLG DOOR ROLLER ASSEMBLIES. MOLD IMPR 224811 1 3 ESSIONS WERE TAKEN ON THE DEPRESSIONS THAT WERE DETECTABLE WITH A THUM 224811 1 4 B NAIL. THE MOLDS WERE ANALYZED INDICATED THAT THE GOUGES WERE SUPERFI 224811 1 5 CIAL IN NATURE. MR CONCURRENCE WAS OBTAINED FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE (AS 224811 1 6 IS) OF THE MLG DOOR ROLLER ASSEMBLIES. MR ID WAS APPLIED. THE PROBABL 224811 1 7 E CAUSE IS SLIGHT OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION/WEAR. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 224922 1 1 CRACKED INSULATOR, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS REPAIRED BY RI SE 224922 1 2 RVICE CENTER AND RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. ITEM 1 HAS BEEN RESO 224922 1 3 LVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 225135 1 1 THE "RIVETS" DESCRIBED IN ITEM 1 OF THIS PR ARE ACTUALLY THREADED PORT 225135 1 2 ION OF BOLTS. THIS PROTRUSION IS A PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE PROTRUSION 225135 1 3 HAS ALREADY BEEN ADDRESSED PER EO TO DWG V070-191035 (EO B13). THE PR 225135 1 4 OTRUSION WAS RESOLVED ON RSI-3-11-0155. THE PR ALLOWS THE SIP AND IML 225135 1 5 TO BE CUT OUT AT THE BOLT LOCATIONS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 225194 1 1 THE GOUGES/CUTS IN THE L/H OUTBOARD ELEVON SEAL WERE PATCHED USING WHI 225194 1 2 TE RTV TO PREVENT FURTHER DEGRADATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSH 225194 1 3 IP. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 225387 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE RPLCD & WILL BE PEELED 225387 1 2 TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 225387 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACT 225387 1 4 ION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/ 225387 1 5 W TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87-103-C 225387 1 6 1) THE C/P IS OK FOR FLT. 225553 1 1 FLUSH HEAD RIVETS REPLACE BUTTON HEAD RIVETS. V70 225553 1 2 2-703001-003 BRKT CAN BE INSTL'D OVER FLUSH HEAD 225553 1 3 RIVETS. 225651 1 1 THE INSTALLATION OF THE V070-346091-038 SPLICE BET 225651 1 2 WEEN THE CENTER STRAP AND THE R/H CHANNEL ASSY (V0 225651 1 3 70-346095) AT Xo1026.37 WAS DELETED DUE TO INTERFE 225651 1 4 RENCE WITH THE INTERCOSTAL INSTALLED BETWEEN R/H 225651 1 5 STRINGERS 8&9. THIS WAS A MR ACCEPTED CONDITION. 225651 1 6 THE V070-346095-099 CHANNEL WAS SECURED TO THE IN 225651 1 7 TERCOSTAL, AND THE -099 AND V070-346095-100 CHANNE 225651 1 8 L ASSY WAS SECURED TOGETHER PER EO TO FOLLOW ENGIN 225651 1 9 EERING. 225719 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 225719 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 225719 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE CARRI 225719 1 4 ER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE P 225719 1 5 OSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO PREVENT FURTHER 225719 1 6 DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. CLOSE PR. 225773 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 225773 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 225773 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 225773 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 225773 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 225773 1 6 7-103-C) THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 225927 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS MISSING FASTENER FROM "T" FITTING HAS B 225927 1 2 EEN RESOLVED BY ISNTALLING THE PER PRINT ME112-0013-0603 HI-LOK. LOCAT 225927 1 3 ION OF THE MISSING FASTENER WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO SEE IN THE 225927 1 4 HORIZONTAL AND HAS PROBABLY BEEN MISSING FOR SOME TIME. IN THE VERTIC 225927 1 5 AL THE FASTENER LOCATION IS MORE ACCESSIBLE AND COULD BE SEEN WITH A M 225927 1 6 IRROR. THERE ARE 3 OTHER HI-LOKS INSTALLED IN THE AREA AND NO APPARENT 225927 1 7 DAMAGE WAS SEEN AS A RESULT OF THE (1) HI-LOK BEING MISSING. ITEM 1, 225927 1 8 PAGE 1, HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: FASTEN 225927 1 9 ER WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED. 225928 1 1 ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF THE DISCREPANCY DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1 225928 1 2 , FOUND NO CRACKS OR HOLES IN THE INSULATOR WHICH DEVIATE FROM SPEC. 225928 1 3 ML0601-0002. ITEM ITEM 1, PAGE 1 IS NOT A DISCREPANT CONDITION. PROB 225928 1 4 ABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 225975 1 1 AFTER VISUAL INSPECTION OF L/H P.S.A. FITTINGS V07 225975 1 2 0-346058 & V070-346059. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKE 225975 1 3 N OF TWO WORST CASE HOLES, WHICH HAD GOUGES OF .00 225975 1 4 45 AND .0054. AFTER REMOVAL OF ALL ROUGH EDGES, TH 225975 1 5 E HOLES WERE CORROSION PROTECTED AND M.R. I.D'ED, 225975 1 6 FOR USE "AS IS" 226085 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1.0 THROUGH 6.0 ON PAGES 1 THROUGH 1E) ITEMS 1 THROUGH 6 DOCU 226085 1 2 MENT DISCRPEANT KNUCKLE AND WIPER SEALS ON THE V070-198320-001 PRIMARY S 226085 1 3 EAL PANEL. THE DISCREPANT ITEMS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW HARD 226085 1 4 WARE WHICH RETURNED THE SEAL PANEL TO A PER PRINT CONFIGURATION WITH THE 226085 1 5 EXCEPTION OF ITEM 5 ON PAGE 1E WHICH WAS INSTALLED WITH A MR STIFFENER 226085 1 6 BONDED TO IT TO INCREASE THE SEALING CAPABILITIES OF THE SEAL. PROBABLE 226085 1 7 CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCIES 1 THROUGH 6 IS OPERAITONAL DEGRADATION OF HARDW 226085 1 8 ARE. (REF ITEM 7 ON PAGE 1F) ITEM 7 DOCUMENTS KNUCKLE SEALS THAT WERE UN 226085 1 9 ABLE TO BE INSTALLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE SEAL AND THE SEAL 226085 1 10 PANEL. THIS INTERFERENCE WAS CAUSED DUE TO A CORNER OF THE SEAL NOT BEIN 226085 1 11 RADIUSED AS PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. MATERIAL WAS REMOVED SO THAT THE 226085 1 12 PARTS HAD THE RADIUS AND THE INTERFERENCE WAS ALLEVIATED. PARTS WERE 226085 1 13 RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGUATION. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP DURING 226085 1 14 PART MANUFACTURE. 226091 1 1 TRIMMING BACK UPPER SURFACE OF STRINGER #29 FLUSH 226091 1 2 WITH SUPPORT, ALLOWS CLEARANCE FOR ET BOLT REMOVAL 226091 1 3 THIS TRIMMING WILL NOT REDUCE STRINGER DIMENSION 226091 1 4 BELOW DESIGN INTENT. ADEQUATE FASTENER EDGE DIST- 226091 1 5 ANCE IS MAINTAINED AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS NOT 226091 1 6 REDUCED. 226102 1 1 THE S/N /OCN RECORDED IN OMI V5R02 FOR O2TANK 2 INBOARD AFT STRUT (ME 226102 1 2 270-0006-0006) DURING OV-103 FLT 7 PROCESSING WAS INCORRECT. THIS PR 226102 1 3 WAS DEFERRED TO FLT 8 DUE TO ACCESS RESTRICTION (BAY 3 RHS CLOSE OUT) 226102 1 4 . DURING FLT 8 PROCESSING, ACCESS WAS OBTAINED AND TANK STRUT S/N /OCN 226102 1 5 WAS OBTAINED. (REF STEPS 3,4, AND 5). 226130 1 1 FWD LOWER HOLE FOR V070-332714-001 TEE WAS FOUND TO NOT HAVE THE PROPE 226130 1 2 R EDGE DISTANCE. THE EDGE DISTANCE IS .290 AND IT SHOULD BE .38 PER DW 226130 1 3 G. THE EDGE DISTANCE WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CA 226130 1 4 USE IS TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 226218 1 1 THE DENT WAS APPROVED BY MR TO BE WITHIN ACCEPTABL 226218 1 2 E LIMITS AT PLB 7 R/H XO963 YO42 P/N 70B2010-4 CAU 226218 1 3 SE OF DENT DUE TO CARELESSNESS/WORKMANSHIP. 226232 1 1 THE HARD CONTACT BETWEEN THE 170D432776-45 ROLLER ATTACH FITTING ASSEM 226232 1 2 BLY AND THE 170D420251-43 DOUBLER WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICT 226232 1 3 ED USE. SINCE NO PARTS ARE MOVABLE (FITTING OR DOUBLER) AND RELATIVE M 226232 1 4 OTION BETWEEN PARTS DUE TO VIBRATION IS VERY SMALL, NO FURTHER DAMAGE 226232 1 5 WILL OCCUR TO THE -43 DOUBLER. THE CAUSE OF THE HARD CONTACT IS TOLERA 226232 1 6 NCE BUILD-UPS. THE CAUSE OF THE HARD CONTACT IS TOLERANCE BUILD-UPS DU 226232 1 7 RING ORIGINAL MANUFACTURING. 226367 1 1 EVALUATION OF STRUCTURE PANEL AFTER KORPON WAS 226367 1 2 SANDED FROM SURFACE REVEALS NO EVIDENCE OF PENETRA 226367 1 3 TION TO THE STRUCTURE PANEL #V070-310612. 227048 1 1 THE CORROSION DESCRIBED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 OF THIS PR HAS BEEN PREVIOUS 227048 1 2 LY ADDRESSED. THE DOCUMENT STR-3-10-3081 ADDRESSED THE CORROSION AND A 227048 1 3 CCEPTED THE CORROSION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ENG EVALUATION HAS NOT REV 227048 1 4 EALED ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE CONDITION (I.E. OXIDATION IS STILL 227048 1 5 SUPERFICIAL SURFACE CORROSION ONLY, NO PITTING EXISTS). PROBABLE CAUS 227048 1 6 E: THIS IS A NORMAL SURFACE CONDITION ASSOCIATED WITH PASSIVATED A-28 227048 1 7 6 CRES FASTENERS. 227274 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY WAS DETECTED DURING LANDING GEAR INSPECTION JC V31-14174 227274 1 2 . APPROXIMATELY 30-50 NICKS AND GOUGES WERE FOUND ON THE FWD/INBD LMG DO 227274 1 3 OR ROLLER. THE CAUSE OF THIS WAS DUE TO INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE HOOK AN 227274 1 4 D ROLLER. DURING GEAR RETRACTION, THE DOOR HOOK WAS COMING FORWARD TOO E 227274 1 5 ARLY CAUSING THE TIP OF THE HOOK TO STRIKE THE ROLLER. THIS WAS VERIIFED 227274 1 6 DURING RETRACTION BY INSTALLING CLAY ON THE FWD/INBD DOOR HOOK. THE FOL 227274 1 7 LOWING LINKAGES WERE MEASURED AND FOUND TO BE PER SPEC: V070-510317,ME16 227274 1 8 2-009-0001, ME162-009-0011. THE V070-510317 ABD NE162-009-0001 WERE THEN 227274 1 9 ADJUSTED TO THE LOW END OF THEIR TOLERANCES. A CLAY CYCLE WAS 227274 1 10 PERFORMED, WHICH STILL INDICATED HOOK/ROLLER INTERFERENCE. THE 227274 1 11 ME162-009-0001 LINK WAS THEN ADJUSTED TO 11.160 IN. (0.040 IN. UNDER 227274 1 12 SPEC), AND THE PRE-LOAD RE-ADJUSTED IN THE ME162-009-0011 LINK. AN 227274 1 13 EO-TO-FOLLOW RATIONALE WAS WRITTEN FOR THE OUT OF SPEC ME162-009-0001 227274 1 14 LINK (SEE STEP 169). A CLAY CYCLE CONFIRMED NO HOOK/ROLLER INTERFERENCE. 227274 1 15 THE FWD/INBD B91B50511-3 ROLLER ASSEMBLY WAS REPLACED, AND THE FWD AND 227274 1 16 FWD/INBD ROLLERS AND DOOR STOP SHIM STACKS WERE ADJUSTED TO SPEC. ALL 227274 1 17 LINKS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. ALL INSTALLATIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS 227274 1 18 HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED PER V1098, LANDING GEAR FUNCTIONAL. 227274 1 19 PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN ERROR, THE FWD DOOR HOOK TO ROLLER GAP HAS BEEN 227274 1 20 MR'D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. SEE PAGE 75. PAGES 1,1A,1B,& 1C ALL HAVE BEEN 227274 1 21 ADDRESSED. CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT OF EO-TO-FOLLOW. 227695 1 1 THE NAS1578C3T11 SCREWS AND WASHERS WERE REPLACED WITH NAS-1003-12A HE 227695 1 2 X HEAD BOLTS AT TWO LOCATIONS ON EACH BRACKET. THIS WILL ALLOW FASTEN 227695 1 3 ERS TO BE MORE READILY REMOVED DURING POST LANDING BRAKE REMOVAL. NO 227695 1 4 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAS CLOSE THIS PR. 227762 1 1 THE CRACKED T01P31170-039 INTERCOASTAL IDENTIFIED IN TIEM 1, PAGE 1 WA 227762 1 2 S RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE CRACKED INTERCOASTAL AND REPLACING IT WITH 227762 1 3 A NEW ONE, THEREBY RETURNING THE ASSEMBLY TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE 227762 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE CRACKED INTERCOASTAL IS DUE TO THE INTERCOASTAL 227762 1 5 BEING INSTALLED ABOVE THE ADJACENT FRAMES SO THAT, WHEN A PICKBOARD OR 227762 1 6 SIMILAR DEVICE IS PLACED ON THE FRAMES IT WOULD REST ON THE INTERCOAS 227762 1 7 TAL, THEREBY, BREAKING THE TOP FLANGE. CONCLUDE THE INTERCOASTAL HAS B 227762 1 8 EEN RETURNED TO PRINT AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. CLOSE THIS PR. 227837 1 1 THE V070-855475-002 RH ET CAMERA DOOR WAS INSTALLED DURING FLIGHT 8 OP 227837 1 2 ERATIONS WITH INCORRECT HARDWARE. THE DOOR WAS REMOVED AND THE CAPTIVE 227837 1 3 FASTENER WAS REPLACED WITH PER-PRINT GRIP. DOOR REINSTALLED, BUT STILL 227837 1 4 ONE FASTENER TO SHORT. THIS DISCREPANCY DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 9. FASTENER 227837 1 5 AND MATING RECEPTABLE CHANGED OUT RETURNING DOOR INSTALLATION TO PRINT 227837 1 6 CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 227849 1 1 THE PROBLEMS NOTED ON PAGES 1 THROUGH 1F HAVE BEEN 227849 1 2 RESOLVED BY MR DISPOSITION CONSISTING MAINLY OF B 227849 1 3 UT NOT LIMITED TO VENTING OF VOIDS AND REWORKING O 227849 1 4 F DEBONDS ALONG HEATSINK PERIMETER. DESIGN INTENT 227849 1 5 OF THE RTV HEAT SINK INSTALLATION HAS BEEN MAINTAI 227849 1 6 NED. 227929 1 1 LIOH DOOR WAS FOUND TO RIDE HARD AGAINST ADJACENT PANELS ON LEFT SIDE 227929 1 2 AND RIGHT SIDE NEAR HINGE. DOOR WAS TRIMMED TO ALLOW PROPER FIT. PROBA 227929 1 3 BLE CAUSE IS TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 228016 1 1 THE V070-194118-002 SUPPORT TAB THAT DEBONDED FORM THE V070-198541 SEA 228016 1 2 L PANEL AT Yw-367 WAS REBONDD PER V9045. THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN RETURNED 228016 1 3 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PART DEBONDING IS POOR SUR 228016 1 4 FACE PREPARATION PRIOR TO BOND. REF PG 1A, TAB REBONDED PER V9045. PRO 228016 1 5 BABLE CAUSE FOR DEBOND IS POOR SURFACE PREP. 228041 1 1 DISCREPANCIES 1,2,&5 WERE RESOLVED BY MR DISPOSITI 228041 1 2 ON TO EITHER FILE SLOTS TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION 228041 1 3 OR TO ACCEPT "OK AS IS". DISCREPANCIES 3&4 WERE R 228041 1 4 ESOLVED BY DISPO TO TPS VSTR 3-07-135. THE GAULLED 228041 1 5 HOLES WERE REAMED AND INSPECTED BY VSTR-135. VSTR 228041 1 6 -135 ALSO TEMP REPLACED SCREWS WITH CLECO CLAMPS T 228041 1 7 O RESOLVE MOVEMENT PROBLEMS. QC NOTE: VERIFY THAT 228041 1 8 CLECO'S ARE INSTALLED AN STR-135. ALSO, WORK STEPS 228041 1 9 TO INSTALL HARDWARE. 228057 1 1 (1) BLOCK SEAL WAS CHARRED. IT WAS ROUTED TO HDA WITH A RECOMMENDATION 228057 1 2 TO SCRAP. A NEW BLOCK SEAL WAS ORDERED AND PUT IN WITH THE ELEVON COV 228057 1 3 E. REWORK TPS FOR REPLACEMENT INSTALLATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THES 228057 1 4 E DISCREPANCY WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION FROM AIR FLOW PATHS WHICH SH 228057 1 5 OULD BE FIXED BY THE FLIGHT 12 REWORK OF THE ELEVON COVE. 228109 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY CONSISTED OF ELONGATED HOLES IN THE V070-856901-001 BR 228109 1 2 KT. THE HOLES WERE ROUNDED TO .190 & THE BRKT WAS FASTENED USING HI-L 228109 1 3 OKS. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. 228244 1 1 THE MR CLIP WAS SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED USING A 228244 1 2 JO BOLT AND Z B/P FASTENERS PER THE DISPOSITION 228398 1 1 WITH THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW NUTPLATE & RIVETS 228398 1 2 , THIS EQUIPMENT IS RETR'D TO DWG CONFIGURATION. 228432 1 1 PR MEQ-3-07-0234 ON THE L/H FWD RADIATOR LATCH ASSYs ADDRESSED THREE ( 228432 1 2 3) ITEMS WHICH ARE RECORDED ON PGS. 1 & 1A. ITEM 1 - THE DRY LUBE USE 228432 1 3 D ON THE CYLINDRICAL SURFACE OF THE RADIATOR ROLLERS WAS SITED AS "WEA 228432 1 4 RING OFF". AS STATED BY ITEM 3 OF THE MR RATIONAL ON PG. 24 THRU 26, 228432 1 5 THIS CONDITION IS NORM. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQ'D ON THIS ITEM. ITE 228432 1 6 M 2 - THREE OF THE 12 LATCH ROLLERS ON THE L/H DEPLOYABLE RADIATOR PNL 228432 1 7 s REQ'D MINOR LATHE WORK AS DESCRIBED IN THE MR RATIONAL ON PGS. 24 TH 228432 1 8 RU 26 & 46.1 THRU 46.3, TO ELIMINATE THE ROLLING INCONSISTANCE FOUND I 228432 1 9 N THESE ROLLERS. THE AMT OF MATERIAL REMOVED FROM EA ROLLER IS AS FOL 228432 1 10 LOWS: INBD ROLLERS #4 & #6 (INBD ROLLERS ARE CLOSEST TO THE HINGELINE 228432 1 11 & ROLLER #1 IS FURTHEST FWD & ROLLER #6 FURTHEST AFT) ROLLER #4 - REMO 228432 1 12 VED .011" OFF OF THE TOTAL LENGTH OF THE ROLLER. ROLLER #6 - REMOVED 228432 1 13 .010" OFF OF THE TOTAL LENGTH OF THE ROLLER. OUTBD ROLLER #6 (OUTBD R 228432 1 14 OLLRS ARE CLOSEST TO THE PBD CENTERLINE & ROLLER #1 IS FURTHEST FWD & 228432 1 15 ROLLER #6 FURTHEST AFT). ROLLER #6 - REMOVED .014" OFF OF THE TOTAL L 228432 1 16 ENGTH OF THE ROLLER. ITEM 3 - THE WIDTH OF THE 224-00139 & 224-00140 228432 1 17 CLEVISES INTO WHICH THE RADIATOR LATCH ROLLERS SECURE INTO ARE NOT PER 228432 1 18 SPEC. THE WIDTH OF THESE FITTINGS ARE SMALLER THAN CALLED OUT IN THE 228432 1 19 IR RESPECTIVE PRINTS. THIS CONDITION IS CONSIDERED CAUSED BY PAINT OV 228432 1 20 ER-SPRAY BEFORE THE CLEVIS ASSY WAS PUT TOGETHER. THIS DISCREPANT CON 228432 1 21 DITION IS ADDRESSED IN THE MR RATIONAL ON PGS. 24 THRU 26 & 46.1 THRU 228432 1 22 46.3. NO FURTHER ACTION WAS REQ'D. 228575 1 1 THIS WAD WAS INITIATED AS AN IPR WHEN THE NLG BUNGEE SPRING ENGAGE ARM 228575 1 2 LIGHT FAILED TO GO OFF DURING FINAL LANDING GEAR RETRACTION. IT WAS A 228575 1 3 LSO NOTED (ITEM 2) THAT THE GSE UNIT (C70-0894, S/N 004) HAD AN INTERM 228575 1 4 ITTENT VOLTAGE DROP OUT ON METER M3. THE GSE WAS REPLACED WITH A BACKU 228575 1 5 P ON IT AND A GSE PR WAS INITIATED FROM THIS PR. THE LANDING GEAR WAS 228575 1 6 EXTENDED FOR INSPECTION AND THE NLG BUNGEE LIGHT SWITCH WAS FOUND TO H 228575 1 7 AVE A BENT ACTUATION TANG. THE MICROSWITCH WAS REPLACED AND RERIGGED P 228575 1 8 ER PRINT. THE LANDING GEAR WAS THEN RETRACTED FOR FLIGHT AND ALL INDIC 228575 1 9 ATIONS WERE NOMINAL, SATISFYING RETEST. SINCE THE BUNGEE MECHANISM WAS 228575 1 10 NOT ADJUSTED, NO BUNGEE FIRING WAS REQUIRED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF TH 228575 1 11 E SWITCH FAILURE IS A DESIGN DEFICIENCY COMPLICATED BY HUMAN ERROR; TH 228575 1 12 E BUNGEE SWITCH IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN DAMAGED WHEN THE BUNGEE ARNIN 228575 1 13 G PLUNGER WAS LAST DISENGAGED FROM THE TELESCOPING LINK. IMPROVEMENTS 228575 1 14 TO THE SWITCH DESIGN ARE IN REVIEW DUE TO THE REPETATIVE NATURE OF THI 228575 1 15 S TYPE OF FAILURE. THE ENHANCED DESIGN SHOULD PROVIDE A MORE POSITIVE 228575 1 16 INDICATION AND BE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO DAMAGE. CLOSE THIS PR. 228690 1 1 PR MEQ-3-10-0439 WAS INITIATED WHEN METAL SHAVINGS WERE FOUND VISIBLE 228690 1 2 IN THE R/H INBD BRAKE ASSY (S/N 0028) THROUGH THE BRAKE BLEED PORT. TH 228690 1 3 E REMAINING 3 BRAKES WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED THROUGH THE BLEED PORTS A 228690 1 4 ND NO EVIDENCE OF METAL SHAVING WAS ID'D. THE R/H INBD BRAKE WAS REMOV 228690 1 5 ED AND REPLACED WITH S/N 0027. SUBSEQUENT TEAR DOWN AND INSPECTIN OF S 228690 1 6 /N 0028 FOUND SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF METAL CONTAMINATION THROUGHOUT TH 228690 1 7 E BRAKE'S HYDRAULIC HOUSING WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VISIBLE THROUGH 228690 1 8 THE BLEED PORT. THIS MADE ALL 4 BRAKES WHICH WERE INSTALLED SUSPECT OF 228690 1 9 POSSIBLY HAVING CONTAMINATION SO THIS PR WAS INITIATED. THE BRAKE ASS 228690 1 10 EMBLIES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH 4 NEW CARBON BRAKES WHICH HAD R 228690 1 11 ECENTLY BEEN DISASSEMBLED AND INSPECTED. THE REMAINDER OF THE HYDRAULI 228690 1 12 C FLUID SYSTEM WAS NOT SUSPECT OF CONTAMINATION AS WAS EXPLAINED IN HY 228690 1 13 D INTERIM SUMMARY. THE BRAKES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY ACTUATED PER V106 228690 1 14 5 (GNC ANTISKID TEST) AND NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS WITH THE MLG B 228690 1 15 RAKES. 228731 1 1 HOLES IN L/H #19 SPAR FITTING INSULATOR, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, 228731 1 2 HAVE BEEN REPAIRED BY ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER. REWORK HAS RETURNED TH 228731 1 3 E INSULATOR TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND THE INSULATOR WILL BE INSTALLED 228731 1 4 PER JOB CARD V30-14360. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 228837 1 1 DISCREPANT SEALS WERE REMOVED & RPLCD W/ NEW SEALS RTN'G INSTL'N TO PR 228837 1 2 INT CONFIG. PR STR-3-07-2546 WAS GENERATED TO DOC PG. 1A. DISCREPANC 228837 1 3 IES NO LONGER EXISTS. 228839 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SPAR INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCK 228839 1 2 WELL SERVICE CENTER AND IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 229119 1 1 RECORD RCN #K57680 WHICH REVISED OMRSD THIS CLOSE 229119 1 2 THIS PR. 229366 1 1 THIS PR HAS DOCUMENTED NUMBEROUS DENTS AND IMPRESS 229366 1 2 IONS IN AVIONICS BAY 6 PANELS. THE DENTS AND IMPRE 229366 1 3 SSIONS HAVE BEEN MAPPED AND MOLD IMPRESSIONS TAKEN 229366 1 4 AND RECORDED. DOUBLERS THEN WERE FABRICATED THEN 229366 1 5 INSTALLED PER TPS STR-3-07-236(AVIONICS BAY 6 PANE 229366 1 6 L PROTECTION MODIFICATION) THIS DOCUMENT REQUIRES 229366 1 7 NO FURTHER WORK STEPS. 229412 1 1 BRKT TAB V070-194118-003 IS DEBONDED FROM STR. PR 229412 1 2 STR-3-07-1689 WILL REINSTALL BRKT & RTN IT TO B/P 229412 1 3 RQMTS. 229434 1 1 OMRSD V45AJ0.100 REQUIRES A MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK 229434 1 2 OF THE FUEL CELL END PLATE INSULATOR AT THE POWER 229434 1 3 SECTION AND ACCESSORY SECTION INTERFACE. THE ALL- 229434 1 4 OWABLE LEAKAGE PER OMRDS IS 1.0X 10 EXP -7 SCCS 229434 1 5 (INDICATED). THE MASS SPEC OF ABOVE LISTED LOCA- 229434 1 6 TION WAS PERFORMED PER: TPS FCP-3-07-009 ATTACH- 229434 1 7 MENT G STEP 3 ON FUEL CELL #1. THE LEAK RATE WAS: 229434 1 8 4.8 X 10-7 SCCS (INDICATED). THE ALLOWABLE LEAK 229434 1 9 RATE IS MUCH TOO TIGHT FOR THE AREA OF CONCERN. 229434 1 10 THE VENDOR (IFC) AND ROCKWELL HAVE DETERMINED A 229434 1 11 MORE REALISTIC NUMBER FOR THE ALLOWABLE LEAKAGE AT 229434 1 12 THE NOTED LOCATION OF 1.0 X 10EXP -4 SCCS (INDICA- 229434 1 13 TED) PER RCN OV7157. 229752 1 1 MR DISPO TRIMMED LOOSE HEATSINK AND POTTD EXPOSED 229752 1 2 SUBSTATE. INSTALLATION MEETS DESIGN INTENT. 229810 1 1 A MOD 002 TO TPS STR-208 WAS I/W WHEN THIS PR WAS 229810 1 2 GENERATED. THE MOD ADDRESSES THE PROBLEM. THE MOD 229810 1 3 SUBSTITUTES RECEPTACLES THAT FIT THE INSTALLATION 229810 1 4 . REF: ATTACHED MOD COPY. THIS WAS A DESIGN PROB 229810 1 5 LEM. 229907 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 THE MISALIGNMENT RESTRICTING INSTALLATION OF THE 229907 1 2 R17 PANEL IS DUE TO FLEXURE OF THE SUPPORT FRAME DUE TO THE VERTICAL O 229907 1 3 RIENTATION OF THE VEHICLE. THE PANEL WAS INSTALLED BY TORQUING FASTENE 229907 1 4 RS AS THEY WERE INSTALLED. THIS PROCEDURE ALLEVIATES THE MISALIGNMENT 229907 1 5 SO THAT ALL FASTENERS MAY BE INSTALLED. THE PANEL WAS REINSTALLED PER 229907 1 6 V1053. CONCLUDE THAT NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1 THE D 229907 1 7 ISCREPANT NUTPLATE NOTED WAS FOUND NOT TO BE DEFECTIVE PER STEPS 1.0 A 229907 1 8 ND 2.0 OF THE ABOVE DISPO. THE FASTENER COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO 229907 1 9 THE MISALIGNMENT OF HOLES NOTED PER ITEM 1 NOT A DISCREPANT NUTPLATE. 229907 1 10 CORRECT INSTALLATION OF R17 PANEL ELIMINATED HOLE MISALIGNMENT AND ALL 229907 1 11 FASTENERS WERE INSTALLED. CONCLUDE THAT NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 230013 1 1 SURFACE CORROSION HAS BEEN REMOVED BUT SOME PIT- 230013 1 2 TING STILL EXISTS, THIS PITTING IS MINOR AND WILL 230013 1 3 NOT AFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE BODY 230013 1 4 FLAP ACTUATOR SYSTEM. NO MR ID REQUIRED. PRIMARY 230013 1 5 STRUCTURE. COATING ON ACTUATOR SURFACE (NICKEL 230013 1 6 COATING) IS APPROX. .0002" THICK AND HAS A TENDEN- 230013 1 7 CY TO BE DISCONTINUOUS ALLOWING CORROSION/PITTING 230013 1 8 TO APPEAR. 230033 1 1 THE PANELWAS TRIMMED, TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS, TO MAINTAIN PROPER GAPS 230033 1 2 BETWEEN OTHER CLOSEOUT PANELS AND SURROUNDING STRUCTURE. THIS ENABLED 230033 1 3 THE COVER PANEL, TO BE ADJUSTED, TO LINE UP WITH THE MOUNTING HOLES. T 230033 1 4 HE PANEL INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. THE PANEL DEBONDED DUR 230033 1 5 ING THE FIT CHECK AND WAS REPAIRED PER PRINT. 230363 1 1 JC V80-00123 RECORDS THE INSTALLATION & REMOVAL OF 230363 1 2 AVIONICS BAY DOORS OF BAY 1,2, 3A & 38. JCV80-001 230363 1 3 23 REVC WAS ISSUED TO SUPPORT OV 103 FLT 7 PR INS- 230363 1 4 3-07-021 ON 3-25-86 JC V80-00123 REV F WAS ISSUED 230363 1 5 TO SUPPORT OV103 FLT 7 V5112 ON 3-23-86. TPS VSTR- 230363 1 6 3-07-231 SUPPORTED V5112 AND TEMPORARILLY INSTALLE 230363 1 7 D THE AVIONICS BAY DOORS TO SUPPORT VAB ORBITER RO 230363 1 8 LLOUT AND ROLLOVER TO THE OPF. THE FINAL CONFIGURA 230363 1 9 TION IS FOR THE DOORS TO BE REMOVED. NO UNAUTHORIZ 230363 1 10 ED WORK OCCURRED. MULTIPLE ISSUES OF JC80-00123 TO 230363 1 11 SUPPORT UNRELATED WORK MAY INDICATE AN OUT OF CON 230605 1 1 THE V070-337423-004 FIBERGLASS CLOSEOUT PANEL HAD (2) CRACKS WHICH WER 230605 1 2 E REPAIRED WITH FIBERGLASS PATCHES. THIS MR REPAIR WILL NOT ADVERSELY 230605 1 3 AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE PANEL. THE CLOSEOUT PANEL IS A SECONDARY S 230605 1 4 TRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AND FAULTY WORKMANSHIP. 230648 1 1 MID FUSELAGE STRAP V070-346091-086 WAS DRILLED PER PRINT W/ EIGHT HOLE 230648 1 2 S. TWO ADDITIONAL HOLES WERE DRILLED WHICH ALLOWED THE -086 STRAP TO 230648 1 3 BE INSTL'D PER V070-346092. THE -086 STRAP WAS REPAIRED PER EO-TO-FOL 230648 1 4 LOW TO CORRECT THE EIGHT HOLE DESIGN ERR. 230650 1 1 MR RATIONALE: THE OUTGASSING PROPERTY OF THE HEAT SINK MATERIAL IS ACC 230650 1 2 EPTABLE BASED ON RESULTS OF MUA138 (ATTACHED). THE COMBINATION OF VEHI 230650 1 3 CLE CONFIGURATION, FAVORABLE WSTF TEST DATA, PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS AND F 230650 1 4 LIGHT DATA PROVIDES CONFIDENCE IN THE USE OF THE RTS WITHOUT ANY COMPR 230650 1 5 OMISE TO THE HARDWARE, VEHICLE, PAYLOAD OR MISSION. SECONDARY STRUCTUR 230650 1 6 E. 230755 1 1 ITEM 1, PG 1.0 SCREW ON LEFT-HAND PAYLOAD BAY DOOR HINGE #6 COVER ASSE 230755 1 2 MBLY FOUND TO HAVE DAMAGED HEAD. DAMAGE RESULTED FOR OVERUSE OF THREAD 230755 1 3 ED FASTENER. SCREW HEAD WAS DRILLED OUT AND SHANK WAS REMOVED FROM NUT 230755 1 4 PLATE. RUNNING TORQUE ON NUTPLATE WAS 9 IN-LBS. NUTPLATE REMAINS IN OP 230755 1 5 ERATIONAL CONDITION. SCREW WAS R&R'D AND HINGE COVER ASSEMBLY WAS RETU 230755 1 6 RNED TO PRINT CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 230943 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING V5012 WHEN CLAMPS WERE DISCOVERED MISSING 230943 1 2 FROM VARIOUS WIRES ON THE FWD, MID, AND AFT MPM BASES. BEFORE THE PR 230943 1 3 DISPO WAS WORKED, SEVERAL OF THE MISSING CLAMPS WERE REPLACED PER V501 230943 1 4 2,V2 TEMP DEV 12/01. ALL MISSING CLAMPS WERE EITHER INSTALLED OR VERIF 230943 1 5 IED INSTALLED BY THIS PR. A PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CA 230943 1 6 USE- CLAMPS WERE REMOVED BY A WAD WHICH FAILED TO REINSTALL THEM. 231228 1 1 THE L.H. MLG INBD WHEEL AXLE BEARING SLEEVE HAD WEAR DAMAGE TO THE KEY 231228 1 2 WAYS. THE SLEEVE WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW ONE AND THE OLD SLEEVE WAS R 231228 1 3 ETURNED TO LOGISTIES FOR REFURBISHMENT OR SCRAP. NO FURTHER DISCREPAN 231228 1 4 CY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR 231265 1 1 THE V070-199838-005 ICONEL INSULATOR LOCATED ON L/H R/S #9 RCC TEE HAD 231265 1 2 A SMALL CRACK IN THE FOIL. THE INSULATOR WAS REMOVED FROM THE TEE AND 231265 1 3 SENT TO RSC FOR REPAIR. THE REPAIR HAS RETURNED TO INSULATOR TO PRINT 231265 1 4 CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: MATERIAL DEGRADATION. 231429 1 1 THE INSTALLATION OF THE MISSING MD121-0001-05 RIVET RESTORES THE INSTA 231429 1 2 LLATION TO THE DRAWING CONFIGURATION. TPS VSTR-3-09-416 WILL REINSTALL 231429 1 3 THE DOOR. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURER ERROR. 231689 1 1 DWG OBTAINED AT TIME OF PR INITIATION DID NOT HAVE 231689 1 2 SUBJECT EO ATTACHED. EO WAS OBTAINED DOCUMENTING 231689 1 3 REQUIRED SPEC CHANGE. 231920 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO BLEND NICKS ON THE BASE PLATE'S 231920 1 2 INSIDE DIA., BOTTOM FACE. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED AS AN UNRESTRICTED US 231920 1 3 E MR. THE BASE PLATE IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREP 231920 1 4 ANCY WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 231965 1 1 REBOND OF THE FASTENER/RECEPTACLE WILL RESTORE THE 231965 1 2 INSTALLATION PER DWG. 231969 1 1 BRACKET TO CARRIER PANELS STEPS DID NOT MEET THE D 231969 1 2 ESIGN INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS. BRACKET AND CARRI 231969 1 3 ER PANELS (STEPS) DO MEET THE INSTALLATION DESIGN 231969 1 4 INTENT. 232168 1 1 THE APPLICATION OF THE CORROSION PROTECTION FINISH, YELLOW POYURETHANE 232168 1 2 COATING, RETURNS THE LOOP PIN TO THE DESIGN ENGINEERING DRAWING REQUIR 232168 1 3 EMENTS, CORRECTING THE ITEM 1.0 DISCREPANCY. PIN WAS NEVER REMOVED. PR 232168 1 4 OBABLE CAUSE: WRONG PART NUMBER. THIS IS A CREW SQUAWK. 232360 1 1 DISCREPANT STEPS BETWEEN FILLER BAR BRACKET AND AD 232360 1 2 JACENT C/P'S WAS CORRECTED BY THE INSTALLATION OF 232360 1 3 MR SUPPORT. STEPS MEET DESIGN OR MR CRITERIA. DISC 232360 1 4 REPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 232440 1 1 DISCREPANT RECEPTACLE DOCUMENTED BY ITEMS 1 AND 2 PAGES 1 AND 1A, WAS 232440 1 2 REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW RECEPTACLE. ITEMS 1 AND 2 HAVE BEEN RESO 232440 1 3 LVED AND NO LONGER EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE WEAR AND TEAR. 232614 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE 232614 1 2 PEELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD 232614 1 3 BEARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. 232614 1 4 THE DEBONDED SHIM(S) WERE REBONDED IN PLACE. R.C. 232614 1 5 ACTION WO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHIN 232614 1 6 G HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121- 232614 1 7 87-103-C1). 232823 1 1 VOID THIS PR. WRITTEN IN ERROR 232893 1 1 THE WRONG LOCATION WAS SURFACED PREPPED FOR BONDING THE RH V070-346141 232893 1 2 -001 TEE BRACKET DUE TO MISINTERPRETATION OF EO F03 TO DWG. V070-34604 232893 1 3 8. TPS STR-3-09-426 HAS BEEN MODIFIED PER THE TPS. THE AREA REFERENCED 232893 1 4 IN ITEM WILL BE CORROSION PROTECTED PER V9045 WHICH CORROSION PROTECTS 232893 1 5 ANY BARE METAL AFTER BONDING IS COMPLETE. DISCREPANCY WAS DUE TO PROC 232893 1 6 EDURAL ERROR. 233088 1 1 THE DING IN THE FLIPPER DOOR RUB PANEL, V070-198801-060, IDENTIFIED IN 233088 1 2 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS RESOLVED BY COATING THE EXPOSED INCONEL WITH MB01 233088 1 3 25-063HIGH TEMPERATURE COATING AND MR ACCEPTING THE DING AS IS FOR UN 233088 1 4 RESTRICTED USE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DING IS WORKMANSHIP. CONCLUD 233088 1 5 E THAT THE RUB PANEL IS ACCEPTABLE AS REPAIRED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS 233088 1 6 REQUIRED. 233141 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: REMOVED AND REPLACED THE BAD FWD TOP NUTPLATE. (SEE PAG 233141 1 2 E 2) THE BAD AFT BOTTOM NUTPLATE WAS DEFERRED MR RESTRICTED TO FLT 12 233141 1 3 AND THEN WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. (SEE PAGES 4 233141 1 4 & 6) ITEM 2 PAGE 1A: THE BAD FWD BOTTOM NUTPLATE WAS DEFERRED MR REST 233141 1 5 RICTED TO FLT 12 AND THEN WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED TO PRINT CONFIGURAT 233141 1 6 IONS. (SEE PAGES 4 & 8) PROBABLE CASUE: NORMAL WEAR. ITEM 3 PAGE 1B: R 233141 1 7 EMOVED AND REINSTALLED THE FASTENER HARDWARE. (SEE PAGE 3.1) PROBABLE 233141 1 8 CAUSE: MULTIPLE DOCUMENTS-JC & PR. ITEM 4 PAGE 1B: FASTENERS ARE PER P 233141 1 9 RINT. THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN ADDRESSED BY RI BEFORE AND IS ACCEPTABLE. 233141 1 10 (SEE PAGE 3.1) ITEM 5 PAGE 1C: FASTENERS ARE PER PRINT. SCREW LENGTH D 233141 1 11 OES NOT CAUSE ANY INTERFERENCE. (SEE PAGE 3.1) ITEMS 6 PAGE 1D: MR UNR 233141 1 12 ESTRICTED ACCEPTANCE OF THE RING FRAME HOLES AS ARE. MARKS ARE COSMETI 233141 1 13 C IN NATURE. (SEE PAGE 5) PROBABLE CAUSE:OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 233301 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1.0 THROUGH 5.0 ON PAGES 1 THROUGH 1D) ITEMS 1 THROUGH 5 DO 233301 1 2 CUMENT DISCREPANT KNUCKLE AND WIPER SEALS ON THE V070-198320-002 PRIMA 233301 1 3 RY SEAL PANEL. THE DISCREPANT ITEMS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW 233301 1 4 ADHESIVE WHICH RETURNED THE SEAL PANEL TO A PER PRINT CONFIGURATION W 233301 1 5 ITH THE EXCEPTION OF ITEM 5 ON PAGE 1D WHICH WAS INSTALLED WITH A MR S 233301 1 6 TIFFENER BONDED TO IT TO INCREASE THE SEALING CAPABILITIES OF THE SEAL 233301 1 7 . PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCIES 1 THROUGH 5 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 233301 1 8 ION OF HARDWARE. (REF ITEM 6 ON PAGE 1E) ITEM 6 DOCUMENTS KNUCKLE SEAL 233301 1 9 S THAT WERE UNABLE TO BE INSTALLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE SEA 233301 1 10 LS AND THE SEAL PANEL. THIS INTERFERENCE WAS CAUSED DUE TO A CORNER OF 233301 1 11 EACH SEAL NOT BEING RADIUSED AS PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. MATERIAL WAS 233301 1 12 REMOVED SO THAT THE PARTS HAD THE RADIUS AND THE INTERFERENCE WAS ALL 233301 1 13 EVIATED. PARTS WERE RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION AND INSTALLED. PRO 233301 1 14 BABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP DURING PART MANUFACTURE. (REF ITEM 7 OF PA 233301 1 15 GE 1F) DURING THE BOND VERIFICATION OF THE KNUCKLE SEAL INSTALLATIONS 233301 1 16 ON THE PRIMARY SEAL PANEL, THE LAP SHEAR COUPONS FAILED TO MEET THE MI 233301 1 17 NIMUM REQUIREMENTS IN STRENGTH. THE KNUCKLE SEAL INSTALLATIONS WERE AC 233301 1 18 CEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP DURING 233301 1 19 BOND PROCESS. (REF ITEM 8.0 ON PAGE 1G) DURING CURTAIN REINSTALLATION 233301 1 20 PER STR-3-12-484, A GAP WAS FOUND TO EXIST BETWEEN THE V070-198313 SE 233301 1 21 A; AN THE PRIMARY SEAL PANEL. THIS GAP WAS CAUSED BY THE SECONDARY SEA 233301 1 22 L CURTAIN PUSHING THE SEAL AWAY FROM THE PANEL ALLOWING A LEAK PATH. T 233301 1 23 HE SECONDARY SEAL CURTAIN WAS REMOVED AND SHIFTED OUTBOARD TO ALLEVIAT 233301 1 24 E THE INTERFERENCE WITH THE POLYMIDE SEAL. THE GAP BETWEEN THE SEAL PA 233301 1 25 NEL AND THE POLYMIDE SEAL WAS REDUCED TO LESS THAN 0.010" WHICH IS ACC 233301 1 26 EPTABLE PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS IMPROPER INSTALLATIO 233301 1 27 N OF CURTAIN SEAL. CONCLUDE THAT ALL ITEMS ON THIS PR HAVE BEEN ADDRES 233301 1 28 SED AND NO FURTHER ENG OR SHOP ACTION IS REQUIRED. 233357 1 1 PRSD MANIFOLDS ARE MAINTAINED ABOVE 100 PSIA TO PREVENT A PRESSURE IMB 233357 1 2 ALANCE IN THE FUEL CELLS. A PRESSURE IMBALANCE COULD CAUSE AN ELECTROL 233357 1 3 YTE SHIFT WITHIN THE CELL, WHICH COULD AFFECT THE FUEL CELL'S PERFORMA 233357 1 4 NCE. THE FUEL CELLS COUPLED REACTANT REG REDUCES THE SUPPLY PRESSURE D 233357 1 5 OWN TO 65 PSIA FOR DELIVERY TO THE POWER SECTION, H2 PRESSURE IS REAG 233357 1 6 5 SPI LOWER THAN O2. AS LONG AS SUPPLY PRESSURES ARE ABOVE 65 PSIA, TH 233357 1 7 E REG WILL ACT NORMALLY AND NO FUEL CELL DAMAGE OCCUR. SINCE O2 MANIFO 233357 1 8 LD 1 DROPPED TO 86 PSIA AND O2 MANF 2 AND H2 MANF 1 AND 2 WERE ABOVE 1 233357 1 9 00 PSIA, NO FUEL CELL DAMAGE OCCURRED. CLOSE PR UPON RECEIPT OF WAIVER 233357 1 10 . (VIOLATED GENERAL RQMT 3.2.7 CAUTION-DURING ANY FCP PRESSURIZATION 233357 1 11 WITH REACTANTS OR INERT GAGES, MAINTAIN SUPPLY PRESSURE TO THE FCP OF 233357 1 12 NOT LESS THAN 100 PSIA. 233495 1 1 .0045 SCRATCH IN .120 PANEL DOES NOT AFFECT 233495 1 2 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AFTER CORROSION PROTECTION. 233499 1 1 REPLACED. 233581 1 1 TESTING OF STR SHOWS NO DAMAGE DUE TO HEATING 233681 1 1 ITEM 2.0: THE BOOTSTRAP ACCUMULATOR INSTALLATION WITH GAPS UNDER THE 233681 1 2 HEADS OF THE (32) HI-LOKS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE 233681 1 3 CAUSE OF THE GAPS IS DUE TO MISALIGNMENT OF THE HOLES DURING ORIGINAL 233681 1 4 MANUFACTURING BY VENDOR. THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE INSTALLATION. 233681 1 5 ITEM 3.0: THE BOOTSTRAP ACCUMULATOR INSTALLATION WITH ABSENCE OF HI-LOKS 233681 1 6 AT LOCATIONS# 17 AND #26 WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE CAUSE 233681 1 7 OF THE MISSING HI-LOCKS IS DUE TO ORIGINAL MANUFACTURING BY VENDOR. THE 233681 1 8 VENDOR DID NOT DRILL HOLES AT THE TWO LOCATIONS. THIS IS A SECONDARY 233681 1 9 STRUCTURE INSTALLATION. 233681 1 10 233684 1 1 DISCREPANCY 1 WAS RESOLVED BY MR DISPO. REAMING HO 233684 1 2 LES 4 AND 10 IN LH FRAME X0 1191 TO 0.2188 MAX DIA 233684 1 3 . REMOVED THREAD DAMAGE. VISUAL AND EDDY CURRENT I 233684 1 4 NSPECTIONS CONFIRMED NO CRACKS PRESENT. CLOSE PR. 233740 1 1 ITEM #1 WAS THAT THE V070-346009-003 FITTING SET WAS IN THE RADIUS OF 233740 1 2 THE VR70-341152-007 STRUT, THESE FITTINGS WERE TO HAVE THE EXCESS MATE 233740 1 3 RIAL TRIMMED OFF TO PROVIDE CLEARANCE FROM THE STRUT RADIUS. THE FIRST 233740 1 4 ATTEMPT AT TRIMMING DID NOT MATCH THE E.O. (PICKING UP ITEM #3) AND T 233740 1 5 HE FITTINGS HAD TO BE TRIMMED AGAIN. THIS WAS PERFORMED AND THE FITTIN 233740 1 6 GS TRIMMED TO AGREE WITH THE E.O. AFTER TRIMMING, THE FITTINGS WERE NO 233740 1 7 T IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE E.O., SO MR ACTION WAS REQUIRED AND ACCEPTED 233740 1 8 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM #2 WAS THAT THE V070-346009-003 FITTING SET 233740 1 9 . THE GAP WAS FOUND TO BE A COMMON PROBLEM AND WILL BE SHIMMED PER MOD 233740 1 10 -009 OF VSTR-3-07-332. 233743 1 1 CRACK IN THE MID DECK FIBER GLASS CLOSEOUT PANEL V 233743 1 2 070-337420-004 WAS SUPERFICIAL AND PROBABLY CAUSED 233743 1 3 BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THE PANEL WAS PATCHED PE 233743 1 4 R MR REPAIR BY APPLYING GLASS CLOTH AND EPOXY OVER 233743 1 5 THE DAMAGED AREA FOLLOWED BY SMOOTHING REPAIR AND 233743 1 6 PAINTING TO MATCH. PANEL IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 233743 1 7 CLOSE PR. 233860 1 1 ITEM 1-5, PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS DISCREPANCIES IN R/H TEE #14 (R/S 15) 233860 1 2 V070-190242-002 INSULATOR WAS RESOLVED BY ROUTING THE INSULATOR TO RI 233860 1 3 SERVICE CENTER FOR REPAIR. INSULATOR WAS RETURNED AND REINSTALLED FOR 233860 1 4 FLIGHT. REWORK RETURNED THE INSULATOR TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABL 233860 1 5 E CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 233947 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM WAS REMOVED & RPLCD. THE SHIM 233947 1 2 WILL BE PEELED TO FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE DISC 233947 1 3 REPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS & THE PR MAY BE CLOSED. 233949 1 1 RTV HEAT SINK STRIPS ARE CURLED AT ENDS. RTV 233949 1 2 STRIPS THAT WERE SEVERELY CURLED WERE TRIMMED OUT. 233949 1 3 OTHER RTV STRIPS WERE ACCEPTED & IF ANY DISCRE- 233949 1 4 PANT CONDITION EXISTS DURING INSTL/REMOVAL OF PRES 233949 1 5 SURE WILL BE DOCUMENTED. 234128 STAT 1 TAIR INDEX IS CLOSED. THIS PR IS BEING DUPLICATED FOR DATABASE CLOSURE 3 234128 STAT 2 /30/93. 234128 1 1 ORIGINAL LOST IN CLOSURE LOOP. ITEM 1 WAS WORKED ON ORIGINAL PR AND CLOS 234128 1 2 ED (REF ATTACH TAI INDEX). 234176 1 1 DURING ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION OF THE V070-339552-002 RTG COOLING CO 234176 1 2 NNECTOR BRACKET, THE BRACKET WAS OBSERVED TO BE INSTALLED PER PRINT (R 234176 1 3 EF DRAWINGS V070-333801 ZN 22B AND V070-339552). THE BRACKET'S RECEPTA 234176 1 4 CLE CUTOUT MARKINGS ARE ALSO PER PRINT (REF DRAWING V070-339552 ZN 7H 234176 1 5 AND EO AO1). ITEM 1.0 AND 2.0 ON PAGE 1.0 ARE NO DISCREPANCIES. PROBAB 234176 1 6 LE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP OVERSIGHT. 234499 1 1 THE V070-198067-001 SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE NOT SEATING AGAINST THE PRIMA 234499 1 2 RY SEAL TUBE. THIS WAS CORECTED BY APPLYING A RTV DAM AND BONDING A PI 234499 1 3 ECE OF RTV TO WIPER. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 234557 1 1 NUTPLATE CONFIGURATION IS ACCEPTED AS BUILT WITH MR APPROVAL. PROBLEM 234557 1 2 CASUE IS AN UNNECESSARY DESIGN CHANGE AFTER VEHICLE COMPLETION. CLOSE 234557 1 3 THIS PR. 234607 1 1 REF ITEM ONE: DEFECTIVE SEAL WAS REPLACED. REF ITEMS TWO AND THREE: MR 234607 1 2 APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO FLY WITHOUT SPRINGS (AS RECEIVED) BASED ON NO 234607 1 3 IMPACT TO THERMAL INTEGRITY.REF ITEM FOUR: A REPLACEMENT FOR THE MISS 234607 1 4 ING SEAL WAS OBTAINED. INSTALLATION NOW FULLY COMPLIES WITH DRAWING RE 234607 1 5 QUIREMENT. DEFECT CAUSE FOR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 3 APPEARS TO BE MANUFACTUR 234607 1 6 ING DEFECT. CLOSE THIS PR. 234619 1 1 ITEM 1 OF PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY INSTALLING (2) HI-LOKS ONE HIGHER GRI 234619 1 2 P LENGTH. PROBABLE CAUSE: HI-LOK NUT WAS HIGHER THAN HARDWARE BOOK CAL 234619 1 3 LED OUT. 234760 1 1 THE RH #19 RCC UPPER ATTACH BOLT WAS FOUND TO HAVE EXCESSIVE RUNNING T 234760 1 2 ORQUE. THE DISCREPANT BOLT & NUTPLATE WERE REPLACED AND RETURNED TO PR 234760 1 3 INT CONFIGURATION. A SMALL AMOUNT OF CORROSION PREVENTIVE SCREEN WAS R 234760 1 4 EMOVED TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE NUTPLATE RIVETS. THIS CONDITION WAS MR AC 234760 1 5 CEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADA 234760 1 6 TION 234803 1 1 THE NOTED SCRATCHES WERE MINOR AND AFFECTED ONLY THE PRIMER TOP COAT O 234803 1 2 F THE CENTERLINE LATCH TORQUE TUBE (R/H PLBD). THE PAINT WAS TOUCHED U 234803 1 3 P TO MAINTAIN CORROSION PROTECTION. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS WITH 234803 1 4 THE TORQUE TUBE. CLOSE THIS PR. 234829 1 1 RIGHT HAND TEE #14 (R/S#15), TEE #9 (R/S#10) UPPER & LOWER GAPS, TEE # 234829 1 2 18 (R/S #19) LOWER GAP AND TEE #17 (R/S #18) UPPER GAP WITHIN DRAWING 234829 1 3 TOLERANCE BY ADJUSTING SHIM LOCATIONS. TEE #17 LOWER GAP MR'D OK "AS I 234829 1 4 S" FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. TEE #19 UPPER GAP REQUIRED REWORK OF THE INSU 234829 1 5 LATOR SUFFICIENT CLEARANCE TO ADJUST THE GAP WITHIN DRAWING TOLERANCE 234829 1 6 BY CHANGING SHIM LOCATION. TEE #20 (R/S #21) UPPER GAP WITHIN DRAWING 234829 1 7 TOLERANCE BY ADJUSTING CLEVIS PLATE SHIMS PER MR ACTION. ALL THE ABOVE 234829 1 8 TEE GAPS ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 235370 1 1 ITEM 1 PG. 1 I/B EDGE: "A"(.065), "B"(.066) AND "C"(.064) STEP DIMENSI 235370 1 2 ONS ARE WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE OF .070 +/- .008,"D"(.088) STEP DIMENS 235370 1 3 ION WAS REWORKED BY MR TO REDUCE STEP TO .071 WHICH IS ALSO WITHIN DES 235370 1 4 IGN TOLERANCE. ITEM 1 PG 1 O/B EDGE: "A"(.064), "B"(.063) AND "C"(.068 235370 1 5 ) ARE WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE OF .0710 +/- .008. "D"(.057) STEP DIMENS 235370 1 6 ION WAS MR APPROVED DUE TO SLIGHT OVERCOMPRESSION OF FILLER BAR WILL N 235370 1 7 OT RESULT IN OVERSTRESS OF TILE, SIP, OR STRUCTURE. ITEM 2 PG. 1A STRU 235370 1 8 CTURE TO PANEL STEPS: STEPS .090,.108,.100,.100 WERE REWORKED TO REDUC 235370 1 9 E STEP TO .065, .072,.071,.059 WHICH IS ALL WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANC 235370 1 10 E OF .040 TO .085. ALL REMAINING STEPS ARE WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE OF 235370 1 11 .070 +/- .010. ITEMS 3 PG 1B, 4 PG 1C AND 5 PG 1D: ALL ITEMS REFLECT P 235370 1 12 ROBLEMS WITH BOND OF THE MR -002 SHIM. SHIM WAS REMOVED AND REBONDED A 235370 1 13 FTER EACH PROBLEM WAS DISCOVERED. FINAL REBOND WAS DONE ON ITEM 41 PG 235370 1 14 21 WHICH PRODUCED A GOOD BOND AND MEASUREMENT WERE TAKEN WHICH REDUCED 235370 1 15 STEPS FROM ITEM 2 PG. 1A. ALL STEP DIMENSIONS FROM CARRIER PANEL AS R 235370 1 16 EWORKED OR DOCUMENTED PROVIDE A FILLER BAR TO TILE CONFIGURATION THAT 235370 1 17 WILL PREVENT OVERTEMP OF FILLER BAR, SIP & STRUCTURE. 235430 1 1 DISCREPANCY #1: AT TWO DISCREPANT LOCATIONS HOLES 235430 1 2 WERE PLUGGED PER MR APPROVED REPAIR. TWO NEW HOL 235430 1 3 ES WILL BE MATCHED DRILLED IN V070-340524-039 SHRO 235430 1 4 UD UPON INSTALLATION OF V070-340561-003 SUPPORT PE 235430 1 5 R VSTR-3-07-247, STEP 3.0. CAUSE OF THIS PROBLEM 235430 1 6 WAS A TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. DISCREPANCY #2: INBOAR 235430 1 7 D LINE SLOT IN V070-340561-003 SUPPORT WAS MODIFIE 235430 1 8 D PER MR APPROVED REPAIR TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE 235430 1 9 WITH LINE. THIS MR WAS APPROVED BASED ON PREVIOU 235430 1 10 S MR (PALMDALE/BJ6859-000M) TO THE -002 SUPPORT. 235430 1 11 CAUSE OF THIS PROBLEM WAS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 235446 1 1 HI-LOCKS WERE INSTALLED IN THE BRACKET WHERE RIVET 235446 1 2 S WERE CALLED FOR IN THE DRAWING. NO RECORD OF A P 235446 1 3 ARTS SUBSTITUTION COULD BE FOUND SO ENGINEERING RE 235446 1 4 QUESTED THE CONTINUED USE OF HI-LOCKS FOR BRACKET 235446 1 5 INSTALLATION WITH PRIME BOARD APPORVAL. THE BRACKE 235446 1 6 T INSTALLED AND THE WIRE HARNESS CLAMPS ATTACHED. 235446 1 7 MR ACTION IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND STRUCTURAL I 235446 1 8 NTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. SECONDARY STRUCTURE. NO EO 235446 1 9 TO FOLLOW AS THE PROBLEM IS UNIQUE TO OV-103. 235553 1 1 ITEM 1: SMALL CRESCENT SHAPED TEAR IN V070-190316-002 SPAR INSULATOR. 235553 1 2 TORN MATERIAL REMOVED AND A PATCH WELDED IN ITS PLACE. PROBABLE CAU 235553 1 3 SE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 2: SMALL GAP IN LOWER FWD ATTAC 235553 1 4 H POINT. A PATCH WAS WELDED OVER THE GAP. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORM 235553 1 5 AL WEAR AND TEAR. 235732 1 1 PR MEQ-3-08-0390 WAS PICKED UP DURING V9002.7 WHEN IT WAS DISCOVERED T 235732 1 2 HAT THE BUSHING ON NLG STRUT CLEVIS WAS SCORED. THE ACTUATOR WAS DEPIN 235732 1 3 NED, THE BUSHING EVALUATED AND DETERMINED TO BE AN MR CONDITION, AND T 235732 1 4 HEN RE-PINNED TO SUPPORT TILE GEAR CYCLES. THE ACTUATOR WAS DE-PINNED 235732 1 5 AGAIN, AND THE ROLLED EDGE ON THE TANG OF THE BUSHING SANDED. THE ACTU 235732 1 6 ATOR WAS THEN RE-PINNED AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE DAMA 235732 1 7 GE TO THE BUSHING WAS PROBABLY DUE TO MULTIPLE PINNING AND DE-PINNING 235732 1 8 OF THE ACTUATOR FROM NLG STRUT. THIS PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. ME 235732 1 9 Q ENGINEER VERIFY SUCCESSFULRETEST PER V1098. CLOSE THIS PR. 235818 1 1 DISCOLORATION OF THE PNL WAS RESIDUE FROM THERMAL 235818 1 2 PROTECTION ELEMENTS, NOT FROM BEING SCORCHED. THE 235818 1 3 DISCOLORATION WAS CLEANED OFF AND A TEMPERILABLE 235818 1 4 WAS APPLIED TO THE SURFACE TO RECORD AIR TEMP FLOW 235818 1 5 . TO AVOID REDUNDANT PROCEDURES BETWEEN DEPT. 235818 1 6 WADS, THE KOROPON APPLICATION WAS PERFORMED IN WAD 235818 1 7 RWNG-3-07-1074 & VERIFIED BY QC. 235947 1 1 NOTE: THIS PR IS A DUPLICATE OF PR MEQ-3-06-0182. 235947 1 2 HOLE WAS DOCUMENTED AS A Q.C. NOTE. ALREADY ACCE 235947 1 3 PTED AS IS. COPY ATTACHED. 235961 1 1 TO RELIEVE THE SHEAR STRESS & PREVENT THE BUCKLING 235961 1 2 OF (2) UPPER WING DOUBLERS, GROOVES HAVE BEEN CUT 235961 1 3 IN THE DOUBLERS AT AREAS WHERE FAULTY ADHESIVE BO 235961 1 4 NDS ARE SUSPECTED. A TEAM OF (2) ENGs & (2) TECHs 235961 1 5 FROM GTSI HAVE IMPLEMENTED THE REPAIR PROCs IN TH 235961 1 6 IS PR & CUT A TOTAL OF (7) GROOVES IN THESE (2) DO 235961 1 7 UBLERS. THIS WILL PREVENT BUCKLING ALONG THE ADHE 235961 1 8 SIVE BOND LINES & ALLOW THE DOUBLERS TO SHEAR ALON 235961 1 9 G THE GROOVES AS NECESSARY. THE COMPLETION OF THE 235961 1 10 PREVIOUS MENTIONED TASKS WILL RESOLVE ALL THE PRO 235961 1 11 BLEMS OUTLINED ON PG. 1. 236040 1 1 ITEMS 1.0 AND 2.0: STEP 2.0 CALLS OUT TO OBTAIN THE REPAIRED V070-1987 236040 1 2 02-022 TUBE SEAL FROM HDA; A NEW V070-198702-022 TUBE SEAL WAS OBTAINE 236040 1 3 D FROM LOGISTICS INSTEAD AND STORED WITH THE LEFTHAND FLIPPER DOOR #4 236040 1 4 HARDWARE IN MIDBODY SHOP BAY 1. THE NEW V070-198702-022 TUBE SEAL WILL 236040 1 5 BE INSTALLED IN THE VEHICLE PER THE RESPECTIVE JOB CARD. THE REPAIRED 236040 1 6 V070-198702-022 TUBE SEAL WILL BE SENT BACK TO LOGISTICS FOR RESTOCK. 236040 1 7 THE V070-198702-022 TUBE SEAL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUS 236040 1 8 E OF DAMAGE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 236130 1 1 ITEM 1: UNABLE TO INSTALL V070-367588-003 RETAINER DUE TO INTERFERENCE 236130 1 2 W/ THE V070-856898-008 WEB ASSY. THE -003 RETAINER WAS RPLCD W/ A -0 236130 1 3 07 RETAINER WHICH REMOVED ALL WEB INTERFERENCE, PER TPS TCS-3-07-076. 236130 1 4 ITEM 2: -007 RETAINER HAS SEVERAL DIFFERENT NOS MARKED ON IT. THE MA 236130 1 5 RKINGS WERE REMOVED & THE -007 RETAINER WAS REMARKED CORRECTLY. 236232 1 1 DURING TPS EPD-3-07-149 THE INSTALLATION OF TERMIN 236232 1 2 AL MODULE 40TB143 (REF EO V070-794321-B40) WAS HAL 236232 1 3 TED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SUPPORT STRUCTURE TO MOUN 236232 1 4 T THE MODULE ON. A REQUEST TO RI/DOWNEY FOR ENGINE 236232 1 5 ERING TO INSTALL SUPPORTS WAS PROCESSED WITH THE I 236232 1 6 NITION OF THIS PR. THE ENGINEERING TO INSTALL THE 236232 1 7 SUPPORTS HAS BEEN RECIEVED AND THE ACTUAL WORK TO 236232 1 8 INSTALL SUPPORTS WILL BE PERFORMED ON TPS STR-3-07 236232 1 9 305. (REF V070-346048 EC #E05) 236336 1 1 DAMAGED SCREW WAS REMOVED & THIS DR WAS UPGRADED 236336 1 2 TO A PR. WHEN THE PARTIALLY INSTALLED CARRIER 236336 1 3 PANEL WAS REMOVED A DAMAGED FASTENER ASSY WAS DIS- 236336 1 4 COVERED AND A SEPARATE PR, STR-3-04-0742, WAS 236336 1 5 WRITTEN. REPAIR ACCOMPLISHED PER THE STR-3-04- 236336 1 6 0742 AND THE CARRIER PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED PER 236336 1 7 THAT PR. 236664 1 1 THIS PR AGAINST THE L/H FORWARD PBD BULKHEAD LATCH ASSEMBLY CONSISTED 236664 1 2 OF FOUR DISCREPANCIES ON THREE PAGE 1A'S. (PAGE 1 THRU 1B). BELOW IS A 236664 1 3 LIST OFEACH PAGES PR DISCRIPTION AND THE PROBLEM RESOLUTION: 1) THE V 236664 1 4 EHOCLE PDU CONNECTOR, WHICH WAS DEMATED FOR EXTERNALLY POWERED PBD OPE 236664 1 5 RATIONS, JAMMED ITSELF BETWEEN THE V070-594220-017 BORON-ALUMINUM ROD 236664 1 6 AND THE MC287-0039-0001 PDU DURING A LATCH CYCLE. DAMAGE TO THE L/H FO 236664 1 7 RWARD PBD BHD LATCH ASSEMBLY INCLUDED A SCRATCHED BORON-ALUMINUM V070- 236664 1 8 594220-017 ROD AND A SCRATCHED MC287-0039-0001 PDU HOUSING. DISPO WAS 236664 1 9 WRITTEN TO TAKE DENTAL MOLDOF THE RUBBED AREA OF ROD AND TO INSPECT D 236664 1 10 AMAGED AREA FOR BORON FIBERS. DENTAL MOLDS REVEALED A MAX DEPTH OF THE 236664 1 11 ABRASION AS BEING .002" AND NO BORON FIBERS WERE VISIBLE WHEN INSPECTI 236664 1 12 NG THE ROD WITH A MAGNIFYING GLASS. ENGINEERING THEN USED SPEC UD-006 236664 1 13 TO DETERMINE THAT WITH THE DENTAL MOLD AND VISUAL RESULTS, THE ROD WAS 236664 1 14 WITHIN SPEC. AS IS AND REQUIRED NO REWORK JUST SOME KORPON TOUCH UP OF 236664 1 15 THE DAMAGED AREA. AS FOR THE PDU, ROCKWELL DOWNEY DIRECTED LSOC TO REM 236664 1 16 OVE THE L/H FORWARD PBD BULKHEAD LATCH PDU THROUGH A RESPONCE MADE TO 236664 1 17 SEPAR SPC-2209 AND SHIP THE PDU TO DOWNEY FOR INSPECTION. THE PDU WAS 236664 1 18 INSPECTED BY ROCKWELL AND THEN RETURNED FOR RE-INSTALLATION INTO THE S 236664 1 19 HIP. THE RIGGING OF THE L/H FORWARD PBD BHD LATCH ASSEMBLE WAS THEN CH 236664 1 20 ECKED TO VERIFY ITS INTEGRITY. THE PLBD HAS BEEN CLOSED AND LATCHED 236664 1 21 WITH NO ANOMALIES INVOLVING THE PDU AND LATCHING MECHANISM. PAGE 1A) W 236664 1 22 HILE ATTEMPTING TO RE-INSTALL THE MC287-0039-001 L/H FORWARD BULKHEAD 236664 1 23 LATCH PDU, QUALITY NOTICED THAT THE PDU INTERFERED WITH THE HIGH LOCKS 236664 1 24 USED TO SECURE THE PDU ATTACHMENT BRACKET TO THE SHIP. MINOR SCRATCHES 236664 1 25 CAUSED BY THESE HIGH LOCKS WERE FOUND ON THE GEAR REDUCTION CASE OF TH 236664 1 26 E PDU. STRUCTURES PR 2227 WAS PICKED UP AGAINST THE HIGH LOCK WHILE DI 236664 1 27 SPO TO PAGE 1A OF THIS PR WAS WRITTEN TO TAKE DENTAL MOLDS OF THE SCRA 236664 1 28 TCHES. RESULTS FROM THE DENTAL MOLDS AND INSPECTION OF THE PDU BY ENGI 236664 1 29 NEERING REVEALED THE DAMAGE MINOR. AN MR WAS WRITTEN AGAINST THE PDUS 236664 1 30 O THAT IT CAN BE USED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PAGE 1B) PAGE 1B OF THIS 236664 1 31 PR WAS PICKED UP BY QUALITY WHEN THEY FOUND A SCRATCH LOCATED HALF-WAY 236664 1 32 DOWN THE LENGTH OF THE ROD. QC TOOK A DENTAL MOLD OF THE SCRATCH AND R 236664 1 33 ECORDED THE RESULTS ON PAGE 1B. ENGINEERING REVIEWED THESE DENTAL MOLD 236664 1 34 RESULTSAND INSPECTED THE SCRATCH. DISPO WAS THEN WRITTEN FOR QUALITY 236664 1 35 TO INSPECT THE SCRATCH FOR BORON FIBERS. THIS INSPECTION REVEALED NO B 236664 1 36 ORON FIBERS, WHICH AGREED WITH ENGINEERINGS' INSPECTION. FROM THESE RE 236664 1 37 SULTS AND USING SPECIFICATION UD-006, THE ROD WAS DETERMINED TO BE WIT 236664 1 38 HIN SPEC AND NO REWORK EXCEPT TO TOUCH UP THE SCRATCHED KORPON WAS REQ 236664 1 39 UIRED.OTHER DISPO WRITTEN TO THIS PAPER WAS REQUIRED TO SATISFY CHIT K 236664 1 40 2417. SEE COPY OF THIS CHIT ATTACHED WITH PR FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION. 236721 1 1 BOTH UPPER & LWR INSULATORS FOR R/H TEE #1 (RIB SP 236721 1 2 LICE #2) HAVE BOTH BEEN REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SRVC 236721 1 3 CNTR PER MLO311-0022 PARA. 3.1. INSULATIONS HAVE 236721 1 4 BEEN INSTL'D & ARE OK FOR FLT. 236734 1 1 TO ACCOMMODATE ROUTING OF THE NEW GOX LINES, THE NOTED ANGLE AND COVER 236734 1 2 FROM THE AFT WIRE TRAY ASSEMBLY WERE TRIMMED. PROPER GOX LINE CLEARAN 236734 1 3 CE REQUIRMENTS WERE MET. THE ANGLE AND COVER WERE THEN RE-ID PER V070- 236734 1 4 852704 EO A03 AND V070-852708 EO A01. THE ANGLE AND COVER ARE SECONDAR 236734 1 5 Y STRUCTURAL PARTS. IT WAS NOTED THAT AN INSTALLATION STEP WAS NOT FLI 236734 1 6 GHT INSTALLATION WILL STAND AS THE CONFIGURATION OF THE HARDWARE. 236744 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1: THE TEAR ON THE V070-198707-006 ELEVON SEAL WAS REMOVE 236744 1 2 D PER MR DISPO BY USING A MINI-GRINDER TO REMOVE ALL SHARP EDGES. THE 236744 1 3 SLIGHT BEND IN THE V070-198707-006 SEAL WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 236744 1 4 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS POOR HANDLING. 236752 1 1 THE IDMRD FILE 13 45V016.S10 AND OMRSD FILE 3 V45Y00.020 WHICH STATE T 236752 1 2 HE VAC-ION PUMP IS TO BE POWERED UP AT LEAST EVERY 6 MONTHS (180 DAYS) 236752 1 3 AND SATISFY THE SPEC OF NLT 87 MV IN LESS THAN 48 HOURS WAS NOT ACCOM 236752 1 4 PLISHED ON O2 TANK 1 (S/N SXT0015). O2 TANK 1 VAC-ION PUMP WERE TESTED 236752 1 5 ON THIS PR AND ACHIEVED THE SPEC OF NLT 87 MV IN 48 HRS. O2 TANK 1 WI 236752 1 6 LL BE MONITORED WITH EACH ORBITER POWER UP. UPON RECEIPT OF THE WAIVER 236752 1 7 CLOSE THIS PR. 236848 1 1 PART HAS BEEN RE ID'D AND THE TEARS WERE PATCHED AND SEALED PER MR. MR 236848 1 2 ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOOT REPAIR IS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR RE 236848 1 3 PAIR RETURNS BOOT TO DESIGN INTENT PER UNRESTRICTED MR USE. 236871 1 1 FORCE TO UNLOCK "A" HATCH ACTUATOR WAS REMEASURED (3) TIMES AND FOUND 236871 1 2 TO BE WITHIN ALLOWABLE RANGE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS PROCEDURAL ERROR. NO R 236871 1 3 ETEST REQUIRED. 236911 1 1 THE MINOR SCRATCH IN TH SILVER-TEFLON TAPE ON L/H RADIATOR PANEL #3 HA 236911 1 2 VE BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "AS-IS". NO FURTHER DISCREPAN 236911 1 3 CIES EXIST. 237041 1 1 ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1 IS A NOTE ONLY. ITEMS 1 & 2 DOCUMENT THE SAME DISCREP 237041 1 2 ANT CONDITION. 1 EA. MD111-4001-0410 BOLT HAS HEAD O/B SIDE OF STRUT F 237041 1 3 ITTING. J/C V54-50003 AND V070-340008 EO B07 REQUIRES BOTH BOLT HEADS 237041 1 4 ON I/B SIDE. EXISTING CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 237114 1 1 DISCREPANCY WAS THAT A NEW V070-332504-005 SEAL WAS RECEIVED WITH A DE 237114 1 2 FECT GREATER THAN ALLOWABLE LIMITS. AN LRU PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST TH 237114 1 3 E SEAL AND A NEW ONE WAS ORDERED. THE NEW SEAL ARRIVED AND FOUND TO BE 237114 1 4 ACCEPTABLE AND WAS INSTALLED ON MEQ-3-A0020, STEPS 12-17. THE DISCREP 237114 1 5 ANCT SEAL WAS ROUTED TO THE MSC FOR PSSSIBLE MR USE. CAUSE: POOR HANDL 237114 1 6 ING. CLOSE THIS PR. 237209 1 1 LOCATION FOR INSTL OF 2 70A2806-13 SUPPORT ASSY'S 237209 1 2 WAS CHANGED DUE TO AN INTERFERENCE WITH AN EXISTIN 237209 1 3 G BRKT BRKT (P/N 70C6401-1) LOCATED X0 1034.40 STR 237209 1 4 INGER #1 PORT SIDE. 237458 1 1 THROUGH INSPECTIONS OF DENTS IN V070-356735-012 237458 1 2 ACCESS PNL, IT HAS BEEN FOUND THAT THERE ARE NO 237458 1 3 STRUCTURAL DEFECTS, i.e., NO DEBOND AND NO CRACKS. 237458 1 4 DENTS "AS-IS" WILL NOT AFFECT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 237458 1 5 OF THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. FUNCTION AND FIT OF 237458 1 6 ACCESS PNL WILL REMAIN AS DESIGN INTENDED. 237623 1 1 ALL 36 WORN SCREWS WERE REPLACED PER PRINT, THESE 237623 1 2 SCREWS WERE INSTALLED (REF STEP 2) & RECORDED RUNN 237623 1 3 ING TORQUES RAISED NO SUSPICION OF WORN NUTPLATES. 237706 1 1 THE V070-336554-009 SUPPORT WAS FOUND TO INTERFERE WITH THE INSTALLATION 237706 1 2 OF THE LIOH BOX DUE TO THE LIOH MOD THIS FLOW WHICH TRIMMED SUPPORT AND 237706 1 3 HAD DOUBLER BONDED TO FWD SIDE OF BEAM. THE RH SIDE FASTENERS FIT PROPE 237706 1 4 RLY BUT THE LH SIDE WAS FOUND TO BE TOO FAR FORWARD CAUSING LIOH BOX TO 237706 1 5 BE DIFFICULT TO INSTALL. THE SUPPORT WAS TRIMMED BY MR AND AS VERIFIED P 237706 1 6 ER STEP 4.0 THE LIOH CONTAINER FITS WITH NO PROBLEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS 237706 1 7 TOLERANCE BUILDUP. 237706 1 8 237792 1 1 THE UPPER LEFT TRUSS SUPT TUBE ME621-0068-0001 WAS NOTED AS HAVING A S 237792 1 2 URFACE ABNORMALITY RUNNING FROM TOP OF TUBE DOWNWARD APPROX. 24". AFT 237792 1 3 ER ENGRG INSP THE DISCREPANCY WAS ID'D AS A MANUFACTURING SPLICE JOINT 237792 1 4 , WHICH IS AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. THE SUPT TUBE'S OUTER SURFACE SPL 237792 1 5 ICE JOINT WAS CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301. THE ME621-0068-0001 237792 1 6 UPPER LEFT TRUSS SUPT TUBE, UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITION WAS DETERMINE 237792 1 7 D TO BE UNDER LOAD. THE UPPER & LWR TUBE ATTACH BOLTS WERE FASTENED T 237792 1 8 O DWG RQMTS OF .005 +/- .004" GAP, BETWEEN THE WASHER (NUT SIPE) & SUP 237792 1 9 T TUBE. WAIVER WK0515 TO V30ACO.010 DELETES THE BOLT REMOVAL RQMT. 237799 1 1 PR MEQ-3-11-0485 WAS DETECTED DURING MWA INSTALLATION IN V1165 WHEN IT 237799 1 2 WAS SUSPECTED THAT 13 LOCKRINGS AND 13 WASHERS WERE MISSING FROM THE 237799 1 3 OTBD STATOR END SUPPORT PLATE OF THE RH INBD BRAKE ASSEMBLY. BF GOODRI 237799 1 4 CH RELEASED AN ECN (EO) #46826 ON 12-15-88 IN WHICH THE RETAINING RING 237799 1 5 S (LOCKRINGS) AND ASSOCIATED HAREWARE WERE REMOVED FROM THE BRAKE ASSE 237799 1 6 MBLY, REFERENCE ATTACHED COPY. THIS PR CONDITION DOES NOT EXIST. PROBA 237799 1 7 BLE CAUSE: DRAWING REV CHANGE. 237859 1 1 ALLOWING 1.20" DIA. HOLE TO BE DRILLED AT A MATCH- 237859 1 2 ED LOCATION WILL ELIMINATE MISALIGNMENT WITH V070- 237859 1 3 613099 DUCT. MILLING OUT 0.060" THICK WAS REQ'D IN 237859 1 4 SMALL AREAS TO PROVIDE FOR A FLAT SURFACE WHERE V0 237859 1 5 70-333346 SCREEN & V070-339617 RETAINER SEAT AGAIN 237859 1 6 ST PNL RI8. THIS MILLING WILL NOT SIGNIFICANTLY A- 237859 1 7 FFECT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF PNL. R-18 SINCE SCR- 237859 1 8 EEN AND RETAINER WILL BE RIVETED TO PNL. R18 IN T- 237859 1 9 HIS MILLED AREA & WILL PROVIDE INCREASED STIFFNESS 237859 1 10 V070-339614 PNL IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. CLOSE PR. 237865 1 1 HOLES REQUIRED TO INSTALL GROUND STUDS LOCATED AT 237865 1 2 XO 1214-25 AND XO 725.60, YO-104-50, ZO 415.50 MIS 237865 1 3 SING. TWO #11(.191) HOLES WERE DRILLED. AN E.O. TO 237865 1 4 DRAWING V070-340008 BRINGS CONFIGURATION TO PRINT 237887 1 1 MOLD IMPRESSION RESULTS SHOW SCRATCHES ARE .0005 DEEP. THIS IS THE THI 237887 1 2 CKNESS OF KORPON INSTALLED. THE EXPOSED METAL IS COSMETIC IN NATURE. K 237887 1 3 ORPON WILL BE TOUCHED UP DURING NORMAL TILE PROCESSING. PROBABLE CAUSE 237887 1 4 DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CLOSE THIS PR 238005 1 1 THE PROBLEM IS THAT SAFETY WIRE WITH SHARP ENDS EXPOSED WAS DETECTED. 238005 1 2 DURING V6034. THE PROBLEM WAS ELIMINATED BY BENDING THE SAFETY WIRE WI 238005 1 3 TH NEEDLE NOSE PLIERS. THE DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 238072 1 1 THE DESCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 238072 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 238072 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 238072 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 238072 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 238072 1 6 7-103-01) 238153 1 1 REMOVED & REPLACED. 238303 1 1 DISCREPANCY 1 WAS RESOLVED BY REAMING HOLES 1 THRU 238303 1 2 12 IN L/H X0 1040 FRAME TO THE MAX PRINT DIA TO R 238303 1 3 EMOVE SUPERFICIAL THREAD DAMGE. VISUAL & EDDY CURR 238303 1 4 ENT INSPECTIONS CONFIRMED NO CRACKS WERE PRESENT. 238303 1 5 QC NOTE: REMOVED HARDWARE TO BE REINSTALLED PER TP 238303 1 6 S STE-3-07-135. 238471 1 1 THREE DINGS WERE FOUND IN THE R/H LOWER SURFACE OF 238471 1 2 THE WING X01240, Y0330. MR ACTION WAS TAKEN TO SM 238471 1 3 OOTH AND BLEND THE EDGES AND CORROSION PROTECT THE 238471 1 4 AREA. THIS ACTION ALLOWS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF 238471 1 5 DISCREPANT AREA. CLOSE PR. 238483 1 1 MINOR TAPE DAMAGE WAS FOUND AND NO DAMAGE TO THE 238483 1 2 FACE SHEET WAS DISCOVERED. OK FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 238646 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP WHEN THE ONE HOUR DECAY CHECK FAILED. BELIEVED T 238646 1 2 O BE OPERATOR ERROR, PAPER WAS WRITTEN TO REPERFORM THE ONE HOUR DECAY 238646 1 3 CHECK. UPON START OF PR, PAGE 1A WAS WRITTEN STATING THAT THE FILLER 238646 1 4 VALVE BODY WAS NOT TORQUED TO STRUT. THE VALVE WAS TORQUED TO SPEC AND 238646 1 5 THE STRUT WAS DECAY CHECKED AND A PRESSURE OF 416 PSIG WAS OBTAINED B 238646 1 6 EFORE AND AFTER THE ONE HOUR PERIOD. ALL WORK COMPLETE. PROBABLE CAUSE 238646 1 7 : GAGE MISREAD BY OPERATOR. DISCREPANCY WAS SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED PER 238646 1 8 DECAY CHECK, THIS PR. 238820 1 1 ITEM 1 DESCRIBED MINOR SURFACE OXIDATION ON SOME RH INBD-OUTBD PRIMARY 238820 1 2 SEAL PANEL HOLES. THE OXIDATION WAS REMOVED WITHOUT REMOVING ANY MATE 238820 1 3 RIAL, AND NEW CORROSION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED TO RETURN TO PRINT. THE 238820 1 4 PROABABLE CASUE OF THE OXIDATION WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 238910 1 1 REF. ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1: DURING INSPECTION OF #5 PLBD, NUMEROUS AMOUNT O 238910 1 2 F CHIPPING WAS DETECTED AROUND STRONGBACK ATTACH PT HOLES. THE DISCREP 238910 1 3 ANCIES WERE MEASURED AND RECORDED. THE OVERSIZED HOLES WERE REPAIRED F 238910 1 4 OR UNRESTRICTED USE BY MR ACTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR 238910 1 5 REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A: DURING INSPECTION OF #5 PLBD, THE AREA WHERE TH 238910 1 6 E STRONGBACK ARE ATTACHED EXIBITS WEAR (SCRATCHES) THROUGH THE KOROPON 238910 1 7 . THE WEAR WAS REPAIRED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BY MR AVTION. PROBABLE CA 238910 1 8 USE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. REF ITEM 3 PG 1B: DURING INSPECTION OF #5 P 238910 1 9 LBD, DELAMINATION WAS FOUND AROUND (1) ATTACH POINT HOLE. THE DELAMINA 238910 1 10 TION WAS ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BY MR ACTION. PROBABLE CA 238910 1 11 CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. REF PAGES 1C,1D: PAINT WAS FOUND PEELING 238910 1 12 ON PLBD #5 FRAME. FRAME WAS CLEANED AND KORPONED BUT WAS NOT WHITE WAS 238910 1 13 HED AND POLYURETHANE COATED. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRE 238910 1 14 STRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP 239462 1 1 NUTPLATE HAS BEEN REPLACED PER PRINT 239472 1 1 WHILE CLOSING OUT RH FLIPPER DOOR #4, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE V070-146068- 239472 1 2 002 BOLT HOLES IN THE FLIPPER DOOR DID NOT LINE UP WITH THE MATING HOLES 239472 1 3 IN THE LINK ASSEMBLIES. THE AREA WAS REOPENED, AND THE INBD AND OUTBD L 239472 1 4 INK/ROD ASSY'S WERE FOUND INSTALLED IN THE REVERSED LOCATIONS. THE LINK/ 239472 1 5 ROD ASSY'S UNITS WERE REMOVED AND REINSTALLED CORRECTLY. THE AREA WAS CL 239472 1 6 OSED AND THE BOLTS WERE INSTALLED PER THE CLOSE OUT JOB CARD. THESE PART 239472 1 7 S WERE R&R'D THIS FLOW PER STR-3-12-3477. THE PR CALLS OUT THE CORRECT I 239472 1 8 NSTALLATION LOCATIONS, BUT THE PARTS WERE FOUND IN THE OPPOSITE LOCATION 239472 1 9 S DURING CLOSEOUT. PROBABLE CAUSE: PARTS WERE INSTALLED INCORRECTLY DURI 239472 1 10 G THE PREVIOUS INSTALLATION. 239696 1 1 INSTL'N OF BOTTOM BOLT WAS VERIFIED AS CORRECT BOL 239696 1 2 T PER PRINT. CNTR & TOP BOLTS WERE VERIFIED AS 12 239696 1 3 PT SHEAR BOLTS W/ THE CORRECT INSTL'N & MR ACCEPT 239696 1 4 ED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. DESIGN INTENT OF T 239696 1 5 HIS INSTL'N HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. 239888 1 1 WHILE PERFORMING OMI V1098-LANDING GEAR FUNCTIONAL TEST, IPR-41V-0138 239888 1 2 WAS PICKED UP TO DOCUMENT THE LMG BUNGEE SPRING ENGAGE LIGHT (DS3) ON 239888 1 3 THE C70-0894 BOX BEING "OFF" WHEN IT SHOULD BE "ON" (REF. ITEM 239888 1 4 1). AS PART OF THE TROUBLE SHOOTING PLAN, THE V070-510117-003 TRIGGER. 239888 1 5 ASSEMBLY WAS DISASSEMBLED AND VISUALLY INSPECTED. CONTAMINATION WAS 239888 1 6 FOUND INSIDE THE ASSEMBLY HOUSING ALONG WITH A LACK OF DRY LUBE ON THE 239888 1 7 V070-510119 PLUNGER. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THESE TWO CONDITIONS DID NOT 239888 1 8 ALLOW THE PLUNGER TO FULLY EXTEND AND THIS DID NOT ACTIVATE THE 239888 1 9 MICRO-SWITCH WHICH TURNS THE DS3 LIGHT "ON". THE HOUSING WAS CLEANED AND 239888 1 10 A NEW PLUNGER WAS INSTALLED. IPR-41V-0138 WAS THEN UPGRADED TO PR MEQ 239888 1 11 3-11-0498 (REF. PG9). DURING A SWITCH RETEST, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE 239888 1 12 MICRO-SWITCH WAS BROKEN SINCE THERE WAS NO AUDIBLE CLICKING NOISE DURING 239888 1 13 SWITCH ACTUATION. THE V070-510395 INDICATOR ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED AND 239888 1 14 SENT TO RI SERVICE CENTER FOR MICRO-SWITCH R & R. DURING REMOVAL OF THE 239888 1 15 (-395) INDICATOR ASSY, PAGE 1A (ITEM2) 2) WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT THAT 239888 1 16 THERE WAS NO ACCESS TO REMOVE THE NAS1578C4T8 RETAINING SCREW WITHOUT 239888 1 17 FIRST HAVING TO REMOVE THE BUNGEE BOOSTER ASSY. E.O. E02 OF DWG. V070-51 239888 1 18 0201 WASRELEASED AUTHORIZING THE USE OF A NAS1004-8A HEX BOLT DURING THE 239888 1 19 NEXT INSTALLATION OF THE (-395) INDICATOR ASSY TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM ( 239888 1 20 REF. PAGES 18.1 & 22). THE INDICATOR ASSY WAS RE-INSTALLED AND THE MICRO 239888 1 21 -SWITCH WAS SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED (REF. PAGES 26-27). DURING THE PERFORM 239888 1 22 ANCE OF JOB CARD V51-50002 (ELEC. CHECKOUT OF C70-0894 BOX), THE LMG MIC 239888 1 23 RO-SWITCH WAS MANUALLY ACTIVATED AND RELEASED WITHOUT THE DS3 LIGHT GOIN 239888 1 24 G "OFF". THIS CONDITION OF THE MICRO-SWITCH BEING STUCK "ON" IS DOCUMENT 239888 1 25 ED PER PAGE 1B (REF. ITEM 3)/ ADDITIONAL MANUAL CYCLES OF THE SWITCH RES 239888 1 26 TORED ITS OPERATION AND THE SWITCH WAS SUCCESSFULLY CHECKED OUT (REF. PA 239888 1 27 GE 41). PAGE 1C (REF. ITEM 4) WAS INITIATED WHEN IT WAS NOTICED THAT THE 239888 1 28 V070-510117 TRIGGER ASSENBLY WAS ONCE AGAIN BINDING DURING PLUNGER EXTE 239888 1 29 NSION, POTENTIALLY CAUSING THE MICRO-SWITCH TO NOT ACTIVATE WITHIN SPEC 239888 1 30 (REF. PAGE 1C, ITEM 4). THE TRIGGER ASSY WAS DISASSEMBLED, CLEANED, AND 239888 1 31 INSPECTED. A NEW TRIGGER ASSY WAS OBTAINED IN ORDER TO R & R THE INNER S 239888 1 32 PRING LOADED PLUNGER HARDWARE ("GUTS") OF THE BINDING TRIGGER ASSEMBLY. 239888 1 33 THE NEW INNER HARDWARE ("GUTS") WAS INSTALLED AND BINDING STILL EXISTED 239888 1 34 (REF. PAGE 1D, ITEM 5). THE INNER HARDWARE WAS REMOVED AGAIN AND AN INSP 239888 1 35 ECTING OF THE V070-510120 GUIDE ("HOUSING") REVEALED THAT ITS INNER DIAM 239888 1 36 ETER WAS NOT PER PRINT (REF. PG 46). MRB APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO ACCEPT 239888 1 37 SANDING THE INSIDE OF THE HOUSING USING 400-600 GRIT SANDPAPER UNTIL SM 239888 1 38 OOTH (REF. PG 55). IN ADDITION, THE V070-510146 PIN GROOVE LOCATED INSID 239888 1 39 E THE TRIGGER ASSY HOUSING WAS MEASURED USING DENTAL MOLDS AND IT WAS A 239888 1 40 LSO FOUND TO NOT BE PER PRINT (REF PAGE 1E, ITEM 6). MRB APPROVAL WAS OB 239888 1 41 TAINED TO ACCEPT THIS CONDITION(DUE TO MANUFACTURING OR MEASURING TECHNI 239888 1 42 QUES) FOR UNRESTRICTED USE (REF. PAGES 47.02 & 47.03). THE TRIGGER ASSY 239888 1 43 WAS THEN REASSEMBLED AND NO BINDING WAS EVIDENT.THE LMG MICRO-SWITCH WAS 239888 1 44 RESTESTED AND ALL INDICATORS WERE NOMINAL. PRIME BOARD APPROVED THE DIS 239888 1 45 REPANT V070-510120 GUIDE ("HOUSING") FOR RESTRICTED USE OF ONE FLIGHT DU 239888 1 46 E TO ITS INNER DIAMETER DIMENSIONS NOT BEING PER PRINT (REF. PAGE 55). P 239888 1 47 R MEQ 3-11-0498 WAS DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 12 (PR MEQ 3-A0039) WITH THE UNDE 239888 1 48 RSTANDING THAT THE HOUSING WOULD BE REPLACED. ONCE THE ORBITER RETURNED 239888 1 49 FROM FLIGHT 11,THE V070-510117-003 TRIGGER ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED FROM THE 239888 1 50 VEHICLE. THE ONCE FLOWN INNER HARDWARE ("GUTS") WAS REMOVED FROM THE HO 239888 1 51 USING AND INSPECTED; NO VISUAL ANOMALIES WERE NOTED. A NEW V070-510120 G 239888 1 52 UIDE ("HOUSING") WAS OBTAINED AND THE ONCE FLOWN INNER HARDWARE ("GUTS") 239888 1 53 WAS INSTALLED INTO THE NEW HOUSING. AN LRUPR WAS WRITTEN TO SEND THE OL 239888 1 54 D HOUSING AND ITS ORIGINAL INNER HARDWARE ("GUTS")TO HAD (REF. STEP 239888 1 55 185.4). THE TRIGGER ASSEMBLY WAS REINSTALLED INTO THE VEHICLEAND RIGGED 239888 1 56 PER SPEC MLO308-0029. THE OVER-CENTER LINK DIMENSION OF THE BOOSTER 239888 1 57 BUNGEE ASSY WAS ADJUSTED AND VERIFIED TO BE WITHIN SPEC. LSCO OPTICS 239888 1 58 CONFIRMED THE OVER-CENTER ANGEL PER TPS OPT 3-12-020.WHEN PERFORMING A 239888 1 59 RETEST OF THE LMG BUMGEE MICROSWITCH, THE DS3 LIGHT FAILED "OFF", S/B 239888 1 60 "ON" (REF. PAGE 1F, ITEMS 7&8). THE RIGGING OF THE SWITCH WAS SUSPECT 239888 1 61 AND PAGE 1G (REF. ITEM 9) DOCUMENTS THE REQUIRED VERICAL TRAVEL DISTANCE 239888 1 62 (OF THE V070-510392 BALL) TO ACTIVATE THE MICRO-SWITCH IS NOT WITHIN SP 239888 1 63 EC. DURING RE-RIGGING, THE MICRO-SWITCH ONCE AGIAN BECAME BENT AND NEEDE 239888 1 64 D TO BE REPLACED. THE MICRO-SWITCH WAS REMOVED AND SENT TO RI SERVICE CE 239888 1 65 NTER FOR R & R. THE NEW SWITCH WAS OBTAINED, REINSTALLED, AND RIGGED. WH 239888 1 66 EN A RESTEST WAS PERFORMED. THE LMG BUNGEE LIGHT DS3 WAS "ON", S/B "OFF" 239888 1 67 (REF. PAGE 1H, ITEM 10. UPON INSPECTION OFTHE MICRO-SWITCH, IT WAS FOUND 239888 1 68 THAT THE SWITCH WAS STUCK "ON" IN THE ACTIVATED POSITION (REF. PAGE 1I, 239888 1 69 ITEM 11). THE SWITCH WAS MANUALLY CYCLED AND AUDIBLE CLICKS WERE HEARD 239888 1 70 VERIFYING NOMINAL SWITCH OPERATION. THE SWITCH ACTIVATION TOLERACES WERE 239888 1 71 PERFORMED AND FINAL RETEST CYCLES PASSED WITH NOMINAL RESULTS (REF PAGES 239888 1 72 116-117). ALL PR CONDITIONS NO LONGER EXIST. OMI V1098 (FLIGHT 12) WAS 239888 1 73 PERFORMED WITH NO ANOMALIES AND SUCCESSFULLY RESTESTED THE LMG 239888 1 74 V070-5110117-003 TRIGGER ASSEMBLY DURING A LG EXTENSION WITH BOOSTER 239888 1 75 BUNGEE FIRING.PROBABLE CAUSES: (ITEM 1)-CONTAMINATION IN TRIGGER ASSY/LA 239888 1 76 CK OF DRY LUBE ON PLUNGER. (ITEM 2)-DESIGN DISCREPANCY (ITEM 239888 1 77 3, 10, 11)-OVER-ACTUATION OF MICRO-SWITCH CAUSED IT TO STICK "ON". 239888 1 78 (ITEMS 4 & 5)-INNER DIAMETER OF V070-510120 HOUSINGIS BELOW PRINT 239888 1 79 TOLERANCE.(ITEMS 7, 8, 9)- RIGGING NOT WITHOUT TOLERANCE. 239888 1 80 RE-RIGGING. 240009 1 1 UNIT HAS BEEN RETURNED TO SERVICE PER DRWN'G. 240012 1 1 THE FILLER BAR SUPPORT, V070-194111-003, INTERFERE 240012 1 2 S WITH A BOLT INSTL'N. THE FILLER BAR SUPP0RT HAD 240012 1 3 A SECTION TRIMMED AWAY BY MR ACTION TO ALLOW FOR 240012 1 4 THE BOLT INSTL'N W/OUT ANY PROBLEMS. THE ADJOINING 240012 1 5 V070-194104-001 & V070-194105-001 C/P'S WERE CK'D 240012 1 6 TO VERIFY THAT THEY DIDN'T INTERFERE WITH THE FIL 240012 1 7 LER BAR BRACKET. RESULTS WERE POSITIVE, NO INTERFE 240012 1 8 RENCE. THE FILLER BAR BRACKET WAS INSTL'D. 240046 1 1 V073-340114-009 BOLT INSTALLED INTO BARREL NUT AT Xo582.00 Zo401.75 ON 240046 1 2 RH FRAME WAS FOUND TO BE TOO SHORT. THE LOCKING FEATURE FOR BARREL NU 240046 1 3 T IS AT THE END OF NUT SO LOW RUNING TORQUE WAS DUE TO BOLT NOT ENGAGI 240046 1 4 NG LOCKING FEATURE. THIS CONDITION IS DOCUMENTED ON PR CM3-10-0167 SO 240046 1 5 NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS WITH BARREL NUT. A EO-TO-FOLLOW WAS INITIATED TO 240046 1 6 CROSS REFERENCE VENDOR PART NUMBER OF BARREL NUT. TO ROCKWELL PART UM 240046 1 7 BER. PROBABLE CAUSE IS CARGO BOLT BEING TOO SHORT. 240257 1 1 (ITEM 1 & 2) THE SCRATCHES ON THE COLD SURFACE AND 240257 1 2 TRAY AREA OF SHELF #5 WERE BUFFED OUT AND THEN CO 240257 1 3 RROSION PROTECTED. THE PARTS WERE MR ID'D. 240274 1 1 PILOT HOLES WERE REQUIRED TO BE REPOSITIONED BECAU 240274 1 2 SE OF SPAR RADIUS. THE RELEASED ENG NOTED IN ITEM 240274 1 3 6 ON PAGE 4 REFLECTS THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED IN THIS 240274 1 4 PR TO REPOSITION HOLES/TRIM BRACKET. CAUSE: ENG D 240274 1 5 WG. CLOSE THIS PR. 240426 1 1 RELOCATION OF DOOR HOLE ALLOWS PROPER INSTALLATION 240426 1 2 OF RETENTION STRAP. NO EFFECT TO STRUCTURAL INTEG- 240426 1 3 RITY, NO MR ID ALLOWED. 240540 1 1 TORN THERMAL BARRIER, DOCUMENTED PER ITEM 1, PAGE 1, HAS BEEN REMOVED 240540 1 2 AND REPLACED WITH A NEW THERMAL BARRIER. DISCREPANCY DOCUMENTED BY ITE 240540 1 3 M 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OP 240540 1 4 ERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 240581 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 240581 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 240581 1 3 EARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. 240581 1 4 THE SHIM (S) WERE CENTERED OVER THE BOLT HOLES PER 240581 1 5 MR ACTION TO RESOLVE THE MISALIGNMENT PROBLEM. R. 240581 1 6 C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACH 240581 1 7 INGHARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #512 240581 1 8 1-87-103-C1). 241258 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 241258 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION 1278.75 XO 396.50 ZO R/H IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORIGI 241258 1 3 NAL RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 1.5 INCH POUNDS 241258 1 4 . NUT WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQU 241258 1 5 E TO THE APPROPRIATE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO 241258 1 6 PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR 241258 1 7 . THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 241350 1 1 WIRE BUNDLE SUPPORT CLIP WAS BROKEN DURING FLIGHT *. WIRE BUNDLE WAS M 241350 1 2 OUNTED TO BLKD USING WIRE CLAMP ONLY FOR RESTRICTED USE FOR ONE FLIGHT 241350 1 3 . POST FLIGHT WORK, OBTAINED NEW CLIP ASSY, AND RETURNED WIRE BUNDLE R 241350 1 4 OUTING TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. CLIP DAMAGE FROM HIGH AMOUNT OF PRESSUR 241350 1 5 E MOVEMENT. 241455 1 1 THE BINDING OF THE READY-TO-LATCH PADDLE WAS ISOLA 241455 1 2 TED TO A 'BURRED" LAMINATED WASHER. ONCE THE WASHE 241455 1 3 R WAS REPLACED. THE R-T-L PADDLE FUNCTIONED NOMINA 241455 1 4 LLY. THE LATCH MECHANISM WAS FUNCTIONALLY TESTED P 241455 1 5 ER V1097. 241519 1 1 REAM HOLE FROM OPPOSITE DIRECTION. INSTALL PER B C 241519 1 2 HANGE DWG B91B15010. 241742 1 1 BRACKETS RETURN TO PRINT CONFIG. 241801 1 1 DISCREPANCY HAS BEEN ADDRESSED PER EOTF STR-3-07- 241801 1 2 208 MOD 001. 241982 1 1 DISCREPANCIES NO. 1 & 2 BOOT TEARS AND PART #'S MISSING, RESOLVED BY R 241982 1 2 ETURN TO PRINT DISPO. DISCEPANCY #3 WAS RESOLVED BY RETURN TO PRINT RE 241982 1 3 BOND OF TORN/DEBONDED DETAIL. BOOT REPAIRED ACCEPTABLELY BY RETURNING 241982 1 4 TO PRINT BOND PROCEDURES, CLOSE THIS PR. 242056 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING FLIGHT 9 OF OV103, WHEN IT WAS NOTICED THAT 242056 1 2 CDR PEDAL ASSY WOULD NOT RETURN COMPLETELY. CLEANING THE ADJUSTMENT ROD 242056 1 3 WITH IPA HELPED ASSY RETURN COMPLETELY, BUT IT WAS SLOW COMPARED TO PLT 242056 1 4 SIDE. TROUBLESHOOTING DETERMINED THERE WAS RESISTANCE FROM LOWER PIVOT 242056 1 5 POINT. THE CONDITION WAS MR'D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. NO RETEST REQU 242056 1 6 IRED. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 242441 1 1 ITEM 1, THERE IS INTERFERENCE BETWEEN TWO NAS1003-XA BOLTS. PER MR ONE O 242441 1 2 F THE BOLTS WAS REVERSED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS DUE TO A BUILD UP OF TOL 242441 1 3 ERANCES. ITEM 2, THERE IS TWO NUTS ON ONE BOLT. ONE NUT WAS REMOVED. PRO 242441 1 4 BABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 242441 1 5 242481 1 1 DISCREPANT INSERTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW INSERTS RETURNIN 242481 1 2 G INSTALLATION TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXISTS. 242500 1 1 THE NON STRUCTURAL, V070-339533-001 MASK HAS HAD T 242500 1 2 HE CRACKS STOP-DRILLED, SIDES SANDED, PATCHES BOND 242500 1 3 ED, & PAINT TOUCHED UP TO CONFIG IT FOR UNRESTRICT 242500 1 4 ED USE. 242614 1 PV-6-010545 242671 1 1 R/H #4 STOP BOLT WAS FOUND TO BE LOOSE, MD114-1001-0005 SELF LOCKING N 242671 1 2 UT WAS REPLACED, AND STOP BOLT REINSTALLED. DURING WORK ON STOP BOLT I 242671 1 3 T WAS NOTED THAT DWG V070-855301 HAD IMPROPER CALL OUT FOR MD114-1001- 242671 1 4 0005 NUT. EO TO FOLLOW WORDS WERE INITIATED, EO B06 WAS RELEASED AND V 242671 1 5 ERIFIED ON THIS WAD. DENTAL MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE MADE TO VERIFY STOP 242671 1 6 BOLT CONTACT WITH DOOR. DENTAL MOLD MEASUREMENTS INDICATED THAT SOME S 242671 1 7 TOP BOLTS WERE NOT CONTRACTING THE ET DOOR. SEVERAL MORE DENTAL MOLD C 242671 1 8 YCLES WERE PERFORMED ON BOTH THE R/H AND L/H DOORS TO DETERMINE THE DE 242671 1 9 GREE OF STOP BOLT CONTACT AND LATCH PRELOAD. DATA EVALUATION FROM THES 242671 1 10 E CYCLES REVEALED THAT STOP BOLT CONTACT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT AND WAS DO 242671 1 11 CUMENTED ON PR MEQ-3-07-0301. ALL HARDWARE WAS RETURNED TO ITS INITIAL 242671 1 12 CONFIGURATION ON THIS WAD AND SUBSEQUENT STOP BOLT ADJUSTMENT WAS PER 242671 1 13 FORMED ON PR-301. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. NO RETEST R 242671 1 14 EQUIRED FOR THIS PR. SEE PR MEQ-3-07-0301. 242773 1 1 PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTING TPS VSTR-3-07-291 (REPLACING (10) MD111-4020-050 242773 1 2 6 BOLTS WITH MD111-4020-0505 BOLTS) IT WAS NOTICED THAT -04 GRIP LG. B 242773 1 3 OLTS WERE ORIGINALLY INSTALLED INSTEAD OF -06 GRIP LG. BOLTS. MEASUREM 242773 1 4 ENTS WERE TAKEN TO FIND OUT IF THE -05 LG. BOLTS WOULD BOTTOM. RESULTS 242773 1 5 OF THESE MEASUREMENTS SHOW THE -05 BOLT LENGTH TO BE ON THE BORDERLIN 242773 1 6 E OF BOTTOMING AND MISALIGNMENT WAS FOUND BETWEEN THE FWD FITTING AND 242773 1 7 THREADED INSERTS. UPON REMOVAL OF THE BOLTS, (1) PRESS FIT BUSHING IN 242773 1 8 THE FITTING BEGAN TO ROTATE AND BACK OUT CAUSING FURTHER MISALIGNMENT. 242773 1 9 (1) -05 LG. BOLT WAS INSTALLED SUCESSFULLY AND (2) -04 LG. BOLTS WERE 242773 1 10 REINSTALLED DUE TO SEATING PROBLEMS AND GAPS UNDER THE -05 LG. BOLTS 242773 1 11 HEADS. THE REMAINING (7) -04 LG. BOLTS HAVE NOT BEEN REMOVED AND WILL 242773 1 12 BE USED FOR FLIGHT. ACTUAL DIMENSIONS SHOW THAT THE -04 LG. BOLT THREA 242773 1 13 DS FULLY ENGAGE IN THE THREADED INSERT WITH LESS THAT (2) THREADS IN B 242773 1 14 EARING IN THE FWD FITTING. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE PER DESIGN STA 242773 1 15 NDARD 111-0001MP. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND DESIGN INTENT HAS BEEN MAIN 242773 1 16 TAINED WITH A POSITIVE MARGINE OF SAFETY. PMRB APPROVAL HAS BEEN GRANT 242773 1 17 ED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE ON THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. 242774 1 1 ISOLATOR PLATE P/N V749-340102-001 RE-ID'D AS P/N 242774 1 2 V749-340102-003 TO CONFORM WITH EO M072-634544.A07 242774 1 3 RETURNS ISOLATOR PLATE TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. 242973 1 1 THE CRACKED INSULATOR (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE IN 242973 1 2 SULATOR FROM THE RCC TEE AND SENDING IT TO THE RI SERVICE CENTER FOR R 242973 1 3 EPAIR. AFTER REPAIR, THE INSULATOR WAS RETURNED AND REINSTALLED PER TH 242973 1 4 E PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE CRACK IN THE INSULATOR IS 242973 1 5 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. CONCLUDE THAT THE INSULATOR IS ACCEPTABLE AS 242973 1 6 REPAIRED BY THE RI SERVICE CENTER AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 243039 1 1 THE STIFFENER IS BEING MODIFIED PER RELEASED ENG ( 243039 1 2 V070-100008 B13), TO ELIMINATE THE INTERFERENCE PR 243039 1 3 OBLEM WITH THE BONDED ON STUDS. PROBLEM WAS CAUSED 243039 1 4 BY A DESIGN DEFICIENCY. CLOSE THIS PR. 243114 1 1 SHEAR BOLT ASSY SHALL BE USED W/O SET SCREWS. ORIG 243114 1 2 INAL ASSY OF SHEAR BOLT USED LOCK-TIGHT OF THE BOD 243114 1 3 Y THREADS & SET SCREWS. SUSBSEQUENTLY THE LOCKTIGH 243114 1 4 T HAS SET, LOCKING THE BODY THREADS SO NO MOVEMENT 243114 1 5 CAN OCCUR. THE ABSENCE OF MOVEMENT HAS BEEN VERIF 243114 1 6 IED BY OBSERVING THE SET SCREW MARKS ON THE INNER 243114 1 7 BODY PART THRU THE SET SCREW BODY HOLES IN OUTER B 243114 1 8 ODY. 243114 2 1 CUTS IN FRCS SEAL WERE DISCOVERED AFTER MODULE WAS 243114 2 2 REMOVED FROM THE ORBITER. CAUSE OF DAMAGE TO SEA 243114 2 3 L UNKNOWN TO STR ENG. AT THIS TIME. CLOSE THIS PR. 243664 1 1 COUNTERSINKS WERE OUT OF PRINT CONFIGURATION. 243664 1 2 BONDING CONICAL WASHERS INTO CSK'S WILL ALLOW 243664 1 3 ATTACHING HARDWARE TO REMAIN THE SAME. THE FORM, 243664 1 4 FIT, AND FUNCTION OF CONTAINER IS NOT AFFECTED. 243722 1 1 SPILL CONTAINED PRIMARILY H2O WITH LESS THAN 1.0 P 243722 1 2 PM ETHYENE-GLYCOL AND HAD A PH OF 7.2. SPILL WAS " 243722 1 3 MOPED" UP IMMEDIATLY. NO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE WOULD R 243722 1 4 ESULT FROM THIS MIXTURE ON KORPONED A1. 243777 1 1 TRIMMING WILL BE EO TO FOLLOW & WILL ALLOW ISOLATO 243777 1 2 R TO BE INSTALLED CORRECTLY. 243786 1 1 THE V070-198702-038 BULB SEAL OF RIGHT HAND FLIPPER DOOR #8 (TRAILING 243786 1 2 EDGE) OUTER INCONEL SCREEN HAS AN AREA APPROXIMATELY .012 INCHES IN DI 243786 1 3 AMETER THAT IS CRUSHED. THIS CRUSHED AREA IS ABOUT 2.0 INCHES FROM THE 243786 1 4 RING END OF THE BULB SEAL. THE INCONEL SCREEN IS BROKEN (LESS THAN .0 243786 1 5 10 INCHES IN DIAMETER) IN THE CRUSHED AREA AND IT REVEALS THE INCONEL 243786 1 6 SLEEVE. THE INCONEL SLEEVE IS NOT DAMAGED. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS CAUSED 243786 1 7 DUE TO CONTACT OF THE BULB SEAL WITH THE MD112-1003-0406 SCREW AND MD 243786 1 8 114-5003-0104 NUTPLATE USED TO ATTACH THE V070-198720 RETAINER TO THE 243786 1 9 V070-198101 SEAL. REFERENCE DRAWING V070-198100, VIEW J, ZONE 45B, FOR 243786 1 10 LOCATION AND HARDWARE CALL-OUT. THIS DISCREPANCY HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED 243786 1 11 AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPE 243786 1 12 RATIONAL DEGRADATION. 244137 1 1 DURING OV-103 FLT 8 (STS-29R) FC1, H2O RV HTR TEMP REACHED 130 DEG F ( 244137 1 2 IN "B" POSITION) BEFORE CYCLING OFF (REEF 1FA NO. 16). NOMINAL RV HTR 244137 1 3 TEMP AT HTR CUTOFF POINT IS APPROX 100-115 DEG F WITH A NOMINAL THERMO 244137 1 4 STAT OPERATING RANGE OF 70-90 DEG F. INITIAL INSPECTION REVELAED THAT 244137 1 5 FC1 B HTR THERMOSTAT WAS LOCATED APPROX 1/16" BELOW (AWAY FROM HTR STR 244137 1 6 IP) CORRESPONDING FC1 AND FC3 B THERMOSTATS. REMAINDER OF FC1 H2O PNL 244137 1 7 COMPONENTS (HTR STRIP, TEMP SENSOR, RELIEF VLV, AND ASSOCIATED PLUMBIN 244137 1 8 G) ALL APPEARED NORMAL. DURING FC1 B THERMOSTAT MECHANICAL REMOVAL FRO 244137 1 9 M ORB LINE, THE TECHNICIAN REPORTED THE INSTALLATION AS "LOOSE". THIS 244137 1 10 WOULD CAUSE POOR CONTACT BETWEEN THERMOSTAT SENSING SURFACE AND ORB RE 244137 1 11 LIEF LINE CONTRIBUTING TO PROBLEM. SUBSEQUENT CHECKOUT OF FC1 B THERMO 244137 1 12 STAT CIRCUITRY WAS VERIFIED BY SWAPPING FC1 AND FC2 B THERMOSTAT POSIT 244137 1 13 IONS AND CYCLING FC1 RV HTR. ADDITIONAL TEMPERATURE READINGS WERE OBTA 244137 1 14 INED AT FC1 B THERMOSTAT POSITION INDICATING SUFFICIENT HEAT (94 DEG F 244137 1 15 ) TO CAUSE THERMOSTAT CUTOFF. IN ADDITION A REVIEW OF FC1 B THERMOSTAT 244137 1 16 (S/N 418) DATA RACK INDICATED A CUTOFF POINT OF 87.2 DEG F AS COMPARE 244137 1 17 D TO 84.9 DEG F AND 81.9 DEG F FOR FC2 AND FC3 B THERMOSTATS RESPECTIV 244137 1 18 ELY. FC1 RV B THERMOSTAT WAS REINSTALLED TO ITS NORMAL POSITION (CORRE 244137 1 19 SPONDING TO FC2 AND FC3 B THERMOSTATS) AND VERIFYING PROPER TORQUE ON 244137 1 20 SUPPORT BRACKET. RETEST OF THERMOSTAT PROVED SUCCESSFUL WITH A HTR CYC 244137 1 21 LE OCCURRING IN 44 MINUTES AT A RV TEMP OF 115 DEG F. IN CONCLUSION, T 244137 1 22 WO FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO FC1 H2O RV HTR TEMP OVERSHOOT IN FLIGHT: (1) 244137 1 23 LOOSE THERMOSTAT-CAUSING POOR SENSING SURFACE TO LINE CONTACT. (2) TH 244137 1 24 ERMOSTAT CUTOFF POINT-ALTHOUGH WITHIN SPEC THE OPEN SETPOINT IS 2.3 DE 244137 1 25 G F AND 5.3 DEG F ABOVE FC2 AND FC3 THERMOSTATS RESPECTIVELY. SYSTEM H 244137 1 26 AS BEEN RETURNED TO DWG CONFIGURATION NOTE: THIS SYSTEM WILL BE RE-VER 244137 1 27 IFIED DURING OMI V1022 PRIOR TO OPF ROLLOUT. THIS PR ALSO SATISFIES JS 244137 1 28 C REQUEST J2948. CLOSE THIS PR. 244215 1 1 THE TRIMMED HILOK WAS SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED 244215 1 2 FOR THE DISPOSITION 244281 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AS A RESULT OF RIGGING CHECKS PERFORMED BY TPS M 244281 1 2 EQ-3-07-103. MISMATCH MEASUREMENTS BETWEEN THE DOOR RETRACT LINKAGES A 244281 1 3 ND THEIR BEAM ASSEMBLIES (ITEM 2 AND 3) WERE NOT WITHIN SPEC. THE ROD 244281 1 4 ENDS WERE ADJUSTED THEN MR'D APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. RI DOWNEY 244281 1 5 ANALYZED THE LINKS COMPRESSION AND TENSION LOADS AND DETERMINED THAT N 244281 1 6 O MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS BEEN COMPROMISED. ITEM 1 GAP MEASUREMENTS BETWE 244281 1 7 EN STOP BOLT AND DOOR PADS WERE IMPROVED BY THE LINKAGE ADJUSTMENT AND 244281 1 8 AGAIN MR'D APPROVED WITH THE AGREEMENT OF RI DOWNEY DESIGN CENTER AS 244281 1 9 A "RIGGED CONDITION". DURING THE ADJUSTMENTS OF THE LINKAGES IT WAS FO 244281 1 10 UND THAT SAFETY WIRING WAS NOT CALLED OUT ON THE ROD END JAM NUTS 244281 1 11 THEREFORE THIS PR HAS AN EO TO FOLLOW TO RELEASE ENGINEERING. MR ID HA 244281 1 12 S BEEN MARKED ON THE NLG DOORS TO IDENTIFY THIS APPROVED RIGGING CONDI 244281 1 13 TION. A PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. TPS MEQ-3-07-103 WILL REMAIN OP 244281 1 14 EN UNTIL ALL NLG DOOR WORK IS OMPLETE AND ALSO SATISFY THE RETEST FOR 244281 1 15 THIS PR. AFTER A SUCCESSFUL GEAR CYCLE THE GAPS WERE MEASURED ON THE N 244281 1 16 OSE LANDING GEAR DOOR STOPS AND THE NOSE LANDING GEAR BOSTER BUNGEE RO 244281 1 17 LLERS PER TPS MEQ-3-02-103 AND 113 RESPECTIVELY. FOUR DOOR STOPS WERE 244281 1 18 EXCESSIVE AND MR'D PER THIS PR. THE DOOR BUNGEE ROLLER GAP WAS ALSO EX 244281 1 19 CESSIVE AND MR'D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. SUCCESSFUL RETEST HAS BEEN COMP 244281 1 20 LETED PER V1098. 244291 1 1 ITEMS 1, PAGE 1 WHICH IDENTIFY FLAKING ON L/H RCC PANEL #12 IS NOT A P 244291 1 2 R CONDITION. THE CHIPS ARE FLAKING OF THE "A" COATING AND NO CARBON SU 244291 1 3 BSTRATE FIBERS ARE EXPOSED. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE PER MLO601-00 244291 1 4 02 4.12.1.1. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO PR CONDITION. 244510 1 1 THE AREAS OF LOOSE OR DELAMINATING TAPE DOCUMENTED IN ITEMS 1 AND 2 OF 244510 1 2 THIS PR WERE INSPECTED AND NO RADIATOR FACE SHEET DAMAGE WAS FOUND. T 244510 1 3 HE LOOSE TAPE WAS TRIMMED BACK & THE EXPOSED RADIATOR SURFACE WAS PAIN 244510 1 4 TED AS SPECIFIED IN THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL. THE REPAIR WAS 244510 1 5 MR'D OK FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND THE REPAIR WAS LOGGED ON THE OV103 RA 244510 1 6 DIATOR DING MAP. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D ON THIS WAD. CLOSE PR. 244893 1 1 THE CHAFF/SCRATCH MARK ON THE STRUT WAS MONOR (REF. ITEM 1). THE AREA 244893 1 2 WAS COATED TO PREVENT CORROSION AND ACCEPTED WITH MR APPROVAL. THE MIS 244893 1 3 INSTALLED BOLT IN ITEM 2 WAS REMOVED AND REINSTALLED PER PRINT. DISCRE 244893 1 4 PANCIES WERE CAUSED BY OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION AND WORKMANSHIP. 245188 1 1 PROB 1, INCORRECT RESISTANCE VALUES, CORRECTED BY EO CHANGE TO SPEC. 245188 1 2 PROB 2 & 3, INCORRECT HTR SEGMENT LENGTHS, CORRECTED BY EO CHANGE TO S 245188 1 3 PEC. LIP ON COMPLETION OF: SS1 STEP 1, SS2 STEP 8 THEN CLOSE THIS PR. 245249 1 1 OUTGASSING RESIDUE (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING IT USING 245249 1 2 IPA DAMPENED WIPES. RESIDUE WAS A RESULT OF ACCEPTABLE OUT GASSING ARO 245249 1 3 UND THE ACTUATOR WHICH IS A KNOWN NORMAL FLIGHT CONDITION - NO DISCREP 245249 1 4 ANCY. CONCLUDE DISCREPANCY IS RESOLVED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED 245249 1 5 ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 245251 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: ATTACH POINT NO. 1,4,6 & 10 WERE FOUND TO HAVE THREAD I 245251 1 2 MPRESSION IN BUSHING RESULTING IN RAISED METAL. HOLES WERE MR ACCEPTED 245251 1 3 AFTER RAISED METAL WAS BURNISHED OUT. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR A 245251 1 4 ND TEAR. ITEM 1 PAGE 1: ATTACH POINT BOLT HOLE NO.1 WAS FOUND TO HAVE 245251 1 5 KOROPON IN HOLE. KOROPON WAS REMOVED PER STEP 21. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WO 245251 1 6 RKMANSHIP. ITEM 3 PAGE 1: GROUND NUTPLATE ABOVE ATTACH POINT BOLT HOLE 245251 1 7 NO. 10 WAS FOUND TO BE BAD. DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO EVALUATE HOW NUTPLAT 245251 1 8 E WAS BAD. ITEM 5 PAGE 1B WAS GENERATED TO DOCUMENT ACTUAL PROBLEM. PR 245251 1 9 OBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 4 PAGE 1A: BUSHING IN ATTACH POINT # 245251 1 10 2 WAS FOUND TO HAVE SCORE MARKS. HOLE WAS MR ACCEPTED AFTER RAISED MET 245251 1 11 AL WAS BURNISHED OUT. PROBABLE CAUSE NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 5 PAGE 245251 1 12 1B GROUND NUTPLATE ABOVE ATTACH POINT BOLT HOLE NO. 10 WAS NOT FOUND 245251 1 13 TO HAVE LOOSE RIVETS. DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO REMOVE AND REPLACE NUTPLATE 245251 1 14 THEN ITEM 6 PAGE 1AB WAS WRITTENON NUTPLATE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMA 245251 1 15 NSHIP. ITEM 6 PAGE 1C PER PRINT MD114-5003-0006 GROUND NUTPLATE WAS FO 245251 1 16 UND TO INTERFERE WITH LONGERON CAUSING NUTPLATE TO NOT ALIGN WITH DRIL 245251 1 17 LED HOLES FOR NUTPLATE. A MD114-5017-0005 NUTPLATE WAS USED IN PLACE O 245251 1 18 F PER PRINT NUTPLATE WHICH ELIMINATED INTERFERENCE. (MR) PROBABLE CAUS 245251 1 19 E VENDOR. 245477 1 1 S/C HOLES WERE SLOTTED IN THE V070-198153-004 SEAL TO ALLOW PROPER ALI 245477 1 2 GNMENT WITH STRUCTURE. SEAL CAN BE INSTALLED WITHOUT ADVERSELY EFFECTI 245477 1 3 NG INSTALLATION INTEGRITY. 245506 1 1 AS INSTALLED CONFIGURATION WILL BE ADDED TO CORREC 245506 1 2 T DWG. 245506 2 1 EO ORDER TO FOLLOW #B08 DWG CORRECTED. NO FURTHER 245506 2 2 RECURRENCE CONTROL. JAIMIE POSEY 12-20-85 245555 1 1 THE DISCREPANT V070-198702-022 BULB SEAL, IDENTIFIED IN ITEMS 1 AND 2, 245555 1 2 PAGE 1, WAS RESOLVED BY SENDING THE BULB SEAL TO ROCKWELL SERVICE CEN 245555 1 3 TER FOR REPAIR. THE REWORKED BULB SEAL WILL BE REINSTALLED ON JOB CARD 245555 1 4 V80-96111. THE DAMAGED SEAL (ITEMS 1 AND 2) WAS PROBABLY DUE TO NORMA 245555 1 5 L WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THAT THE BULB ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN RETURNED TO 245555 1 6 PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO 245555 1 7 RMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 245719 1 1 ON THE L/H OB ELEVON, THE INBOARD SEAL PANEL HAD A WORN AND DETERIORAT 245719 1 2 YED WIPER SEAL (V070-198863-001) AND KNUCKLE SEAL (V070-198860-017) (I 245719 1 3 TEMS 1 & 2). BOTH SEALS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW SEALS. THE 245719 1 4 NEW WIPER SEAL ARRIVED WITHOUT TWO PER PRINT FASTENER HOLES (ITEM 6). 245719 1 5 THE HOLES WERE MATCH DRILLED TO THE V070-198520 PANEL. THE V070-198508 245719 1 6 -002 LINEAR PANEL WAS THOUGHT TO BE FLAKING (ITEM 3) BUT FURTHER INVES 245719 1 7 TIGATION DETERMINED THE MATERIAL TO BE DEBRIS. THE PANEL WAS CLEANED U 245719 1 8 P WITH MEK. THE V070-198552-001 CLOSEOUT ANGLE APPEARED TO BE WORN ON 245719 1 9 BOTH THE OB & IB ENDS OF THE SEAL RETAINER (ITEM 4). FURTHER INVESTIGA 245719 1 10 TION DETERMINED THE CONDITION IS ACTUALLY DUE TO POLISHING CAUSED BY C 245719 1 11 OLUMBIUM AND POLYIMIDE SEALS. ENGINEERING HAS DETERMINED THE ANGLES TO 245719 1 12 BE PER DESIGN. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. THE SPANWISE WIPER SEAL HOUSIN 245719 1 13 G (V070-198507-002) BINDS IN THE RETAINER (ITEM 5). THE WIPER SEAL ASS 245719 1 14 EMBLY WAS DISASSEMBLED TO REMOVE CONTAMINATION PREVENTING TRAVEL OF SE 245719 1 15 AL. UPON RE-ASSEMBLY, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT INTERFERENCE EXISTS BETWE 245719 1 16 EN THE V070-198507-002 SEAL AND THE V070-198539 SEAL PANEL. A MINIMUM 245719 1 17 AMOUNT OF MATERIAL (NOT TO EXCEED PRINT TOLERANCE) WAS REMOVED FROM TH 245719 1 18 E LINEAR SEAL FLANGES TO ALLEVIATE THE INTERFERENCE. PROBABLE CAUSES: 245719 1 19 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION (ITEMS 1, 2, 3, 4); MANUFACTURE (ITEMS 5, 6). 245844 1 1 THE RH FWD AND AFT ET DOOR UPLOCK LATCH ASSEBLIES WER ECORRECTED PER P 245844 1 2 R MEQ-3-07-0201. THIS PR MERELY VERIFIES FUNCTIONAL RETEST. THE LATCH 245844 1 3 ASSEMBLIES WERE RETESTED PER OMI V1097 RUN ON 4-1-88. NO FURTHER DISCR 245844 1 4 EPANCIES EXIST WITH THE RH ET DOOR LATCH ASSEMBILES. 245865 1 1 THE CRACKED SPRING TAB RETAINER IS THE SAME ITEM ADDRESSED ON PR STR-3 245865 1 2 -09-2915 ITEM 2.0. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED PER PR STR-3-09-29 245865 1 3 15 PAGE 3.0. (REFERENCE ATTACHED COPY) PROBABLE CAUSE NO NEW DISCREPAN 245865 1 4 CY. 245952 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE TWO KEENSERTS THAT HAD 245952 1 2 LOST THEIR LOCKING FEATURES. THESE DISCREPANT KEENSERTS WERE RESPONSIB 245952 1 3 LE FOR THE LOOSE CONDITION OF THE BASE PLATE (ITEM 1, PAGE 1). THIS IS 245952 1 4 SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS OPERATIONAL DE 245952 1 5 GRADATION. 245956 1 1 REPLACED. 246168 1 1 QE TO VERIFY THIS CONDITION & LOCATION HAS BEEN 246168 1 2 ADDED TO OV103 DING MAP. 246220 1 1 THE RH ET DOOR FLOW RESTICTOR (FINGER) V070-398938-009 HAS AN OUT OF T 246220 1 2 OLERANCE STEP CONDITION TO THE ADJ LATCH SUPPORT. THE FINGER (V070-398 246220 1 3 938-009) WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW FINGER. PAGE 1A: UNABLE TO OBTAIN GAP 246220 1 4 OF .060 +/- .010 BETWEEN FINGERS PER DRAWING, GAP OF .028" WAS OBTAIN 246220 1 5 ED AND MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP (VENDOR) BUILD UP OF T 246220 1 6 OLERANCES. 246403 1 1 THE TPS STR-3-05-0762-017 MR RADIUS BLOCK THAT WAS NOT INSTALLED (ITEM 246403 1 2 1, PAGE 1), WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR ONE FLIGHT (FLIGHT 11). AFTER F 246403 1 3 LIGHT, DURING PROCESSING FOR FLIGHT 12, THE STR-3-05-0762-017 MR RADIU 246403 1 4 S BLOCK WAS INSTALLED PER ORIGINAL MR DESIGN. CAUSE OF THE BLOCK NOT B 246403 1 5 EING INSTALLED: WORKMANSHIP BY NOT FOLLOWING DISPOSITION FOR INSTALLAT 246403 1 6 ION OF PRIMARY SEAL PANEL. REF STR-3-11-454, STEP 35.0 AND MOD -004, S 246403 1 7 TEP 2.0 (ATTACHED). CONCLUDE THAT THE STR-3-05-0762-017 BLOCK HAS BEEN 246403 1 8 INSTALLED PER ORIGINAL MR INTENT AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 246439 1 1 V070-454935-001 BOSS UNION WAS MANUFACTURED INCORR 246439 1 2 ECTLY (REF DWG. V070-454935 ZONE 5C). LRU PR WAS I 246439 1 3 NITIATED & DISCREPANT PART WAS ROUTED TO HDA. PMR 246439 1 4 106875 ORDERED THE NEW BOSS UNION. PMR HAS BEEN SA 246439 1 5 TISFIED & THE NEW BOSS UNION IS PER DWG. CLOSE PR. 246439 1 6 UNION WILL BE INSTALLED PER TPS FCP-3-07-020. 246589 1 1 THE RE-INSTALLATION OF BOLT TO PROPER CONFIGURATIO 246589 1 2 N HAS SUCCEDED IN CONFIRURING BAY 12 KEEL LATCH 246589 1 3 AND HRDW PROPERLY. 246643 1 1 THE L/H AND R/H SIDE NICKS WERE BURNISHED OUT LEAV 246643 1 2 ING CONCAVE IMPRESSIONS IN THE STRUCTURE. NICKS CA 246643 1 3 USED BY POOR WORKMANSHIP IN AN ATTEMPT TO REMOVE T 246643 1 4 HE CADILLAC CP. CLOSE PR. 246727 1 1 BOTH PANELS (FROM RP03 & RPO4) HAVE BEEN REMOVED 246727 1 2 FOR OMS POD REMOVAL. BOTH PODS WILL HAVE BEEN IN- 246727 1 3 STALLED ON ORBITERS (RPOS ON OV-099 AND RP04 ON OU 246727 1 4 -102) CARRIER PANELS HAVE BEEN RE-ISSUED FOR IN- 246727 1 5 STALLATION PER PRINT PER APPLICABLE JOB CARDS. 246908 1 1 ITEM 1 PG. 1 I.B. EDGE BRKT V070-191092-001 WAS RELOC'D TO BRING "B" ( 246908 1 2 .070) IN DESIGN TOLERANCE OF .070 +/- .008 & "C" (.060) WITHIN ACCEPTA 246908 1 3 BLE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085 AS SHOWN IN STEP 34. SHIMS WERE BONDED 246908 1 4 TO BRING "A" (.062) & "D" (.078) INTO DESIGN TOLERANCE OF .070 +/- .00 246908 1 5 8 AS SHOWN IS STEP 47. ITEM 1 PG. 1 O.B. EDGE "A" (.085), "B" (.085) 246908 1 6 & "D" (.040) IS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085 AS SHOWN I 246908 1 7 N STEP 35.1. A SHIM WAS BONDED TO BRING "C" DIM TO .061 WHICH IS ALSO 246908 1 8 WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE & REMEAS'D IN STEP 47.0. ITEM 2 PG. 1A C 246908 1 9 /P TO WING STR STEP: A SHIM WAS BONDED TO C/P & ALL STEPS WERE REMEAS 246908 1 10 'D IN STEP 21 & ARE ALL ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085. ITEM 3 246908 1 11 PG. 1B: HOLES DRILLED THROUGH DOUBLER & BRKT ARE NOT PER ATTACH A. BR 246908 1 12 KT WAS RELOC'D BY RPLC'G DOUBLER & LOC'G HOLES PER ATTACH B. ITEM 4 & 246908 1 13 5 PGS. 1C & 1D: O/T CONDITIONS W/ BRKT V070-191092-001 WAS DUE TO MIS 246908 1 14 LOC. BRKT WAS RELOC'D BY RPLC'G DOUBLER & LOC'G HOLES PER ATTACH C. 246908 1 15 ITEM 6 PG. 1E: LOOSE PLUGS (2 EA) IN V070-191092-001 BRKT WERE REMOVED 246908 1 16 & FILLED W/ ADHESIVE PER STEP 36. ITEM 7 PG. 1F: MD112-1002-0308 FAS 246908 1 17 TENERS FOUND TO BE TOO SHORT & WERE CORRECTED BY INCREASING GRIP LENGT 246908 1 18 H OF FASTENERS TO MD112-1002-0309 PER STEP 31.2. ITEM 8 PG. 1G: O/T B 246908 1 19 RKT TO LWR SURFACE OF WING STEP OF +.013 WAS APPROVED BY MR PER PG. 20 246908 1 20 . ITEM 9 PG. 1H: PG. 1H WRITTEN ADDRESSING INSUFFICIENT F/B CONTACT S 246908 1 21 RFACE WAS DETERMINED TO BE A THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM (TPS) CONCERN O 246908 1 22 NLY. NO STRUCTURAL WORK IS REQ'D. PR LWNG-3-07-1730 WAS INIT'D PER S 246908 1 23 TEP 49 & WILL ADDRESS IMPROPER F/B SEAL ZONE. ALL STEP DIMENSIONS FRO 246908 1 24 M C/P AS REWORKED OR DOC'D PROVIDE A F/B TO TILE CONFIG THAT WILL PREV 246908 1 25 ENT OVERTEMP OF F/B, SIP & STR. 247043 1 1 CHANNEL V070-346095-099 WAS BENT APPROX. 10 DEG UP 247043 1 2 ,2.5" FROM END. THE -099 CHANNEL WAS STRAIGHTENED 247043 1 3 AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTED. A SLIGHT CREASE WAS B 247043 1 4 URNISHED OUT, AND THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED 247043 1 5 . CLOSE PR. 247051 1 1 THE 56-38 OMS/RCS RIGHT HAND ATTACH POINT DOOR HAS A SMALL CHIP ADJACE 247051 1 2 NT TO A CARRIER PANEL ATTACH HOLE. THE CHIP IS SUPERFICIAL SINCE IT IS 247051 1 3 ONLY IN THE TOP LAYER OF LAMINATION. THIS DISCREPANT CONDITION WAS MR 247051 1 4 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR ID 247051 1 5 'ED FOR FUTURE REFERENCE. NO SIGNS OF POSSIBLE FURTHER DELAMINATION WE 247051 1 6 RE FOUND. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 247114 1 1 OMRS REQUIREMENT S00E00.690 SPECIFIES FUEL CELL SHUT-DOWN IS REQUIRED 247114 1 2 IF ESTIMATED HOLD PERIOD IS GREATER THAN 48 HOURS FUEL CELLS WERE NOT 247114 1 3 SHUT-DOWN FOR WCDDT 72 HOUR SCRUB TURN-AROUND. PURPOSE OF REQUIREMENT 247114 1 4 IS TO MINIMIZE FUEL CELL RUN TIME (LIMITED LIFE ITEM). DUE TO ET LH2 T 247114 1 5 -O REPAIR WORK (DURING 72 HOUR SCRUB TURN-AROUND, FUEL CELL SHUT-DOWN 247114 1 6 WOULD HAVE COMPLICATED GH2 T-O SAFING REQUIRED TO SUPPORT LH2 REPAIRS 247114 1 7 RESULTING IN ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL IMPACTS/IMPLICATIONS. AVOIDANCE OF 247114 1 8 THESE OPERATIONAL IMPACTS WAS DEEMED BY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT TO BE MORE 247114 1 9 IMPORTANT THAN MINIMIZING FUEL CELL RUN TIME. (REFERENCE WAIVER WK068 247114 1 10 6). FUEL CELL PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT SCRUB TURN-AROUD PERIOD WAS NOMIN 247114 1 11 AL. CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT/APPROVAL O WAIVER WK0686. 247366 1 1 DURING MANUAL DOOR CLOSURE OF THE RH DOOR IT WAS N 247366 1 2 OTICED THAT STOP #7 DID NOT MEET THE DOOR FLUSH. S 247366 1 3 PEC. REQUIREMNTS (MLO-308-0028) SPECIFY THAT DOOR 247366 1 4 STOPS SHALL BE INCONTACT WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE DOO 247366 1 5 R PADS. NO REQUIREMENT EXIST FOR DOOR STOPS TO MEE 247366 1 6 T FLUSH TO THE DOOR. A STOP BOLT/DOOR GAP OF 0 INC 247366 1 7 H WAS RECORDED PER TPS MEQ-3-07-103 WITH BOTH DOOR 247366 1 8 S AND GEAR RETRACTED. THIS MEASURMENT IS WELL WITH 247366 1 9 IN SPEC. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE DOOR STOP IS TO CONT 247366 1 10 ROL THE DOORS POSITION WHEN CLOSED AFTER CONNECT 247366 1 11 RIGGING. THIS OBJECTIVE IS BEING MET AS PROVED BY 247366 1 12 EXTENSIVE RIGGING CHECKS AND MINOR ADJUSTMENTS (RE 247366 1 13 F. TPS MEQ-3-07-103 AND PR MEW-3-07-0269). ITEM TW 247366 1 14 O P/N'S NOT MARKED CLEARLY HAVE BEEN CORRECTED BY 247366 1 15 THIS PR BY MARKING THE P/N AND OCN ON THE BRACKET. 247366 1 16 A PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. NO RETEST REQUIR 247366 1 17 ED. 247384 1 1 DISCOLORATION OF THE PNL WAS RESIDUE FROM THERMAL 247384 1 2 PROTECTION ELEMENTS. NOT FROM BEING SCORCHED. 247384 1 3 THE DISCOLORATION WAS CLEANED OFF & A TEMPERILABLE 247384 1 4 WAS APPLIED TO THE SURFACE TO RECORD AIR TEMP 247384 1 5 FLOW. TO AVOID REDUNDANT PROCEDURES BETWEEN DEPT. 247384 1 6 WADS, THE KOROPON APPLICATION WAS PERFORMED IN 247384 1 7 WAD RWNG-3-07-1075 & VERIFIED BY QC. 247456 1 1 DRILLING A HOLE BEYOND THE CHAMFERED EDGE OF THE RADIUS BLOCK IS NOT A 247456 1 2 DISCREPANT CONDITION. THE LOCATION OF THE HOLE IS PER DESIGN. THE CHA 247456 1 3 NGE IN THE THICNESS OF THE FITTING REQUIRES HOLE TO BE DRILLED CLOSE T 247456 1 4 O THE EDGE. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. 247473 1 1 NOT REAMING 1 HOLE OUT OF 3 AND NOT INSTALLING 247473 1 2 9 ANCHOR SLEEVES WILL NOT AFFECT STRUCTURAL 247473 1 3 INTEGRITY NOR CHANGE DWG INTENT. BY OMITTING THE 247473 1 4 ANCHOR SLEEVE AND MODIFYING THE HARDWARE REQ'MT 247473 1 5 AS REQUESTED BY GRUMMAN, THE CLIPS CAN BE INSTL'D 247562 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1.0 THRU 5.0 ON PAGES 1 THRU 1D. ITEMS 1 THRU 5 DOCUMENT DI 247562 1 2 SPCREPANT KNUCKLE AND WIPER SEALS ON THE V070-19815-002 PRIMARY SEAL P 247562 1 3 ANE. THE DISCREPANT ITEMS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW HARDWARE 247562 1 4 WHICH RETURNED THE SEAL PANEL TO A PER PRINT CONFIGURATION WITH THE EX 247562 1 5 CEPTION OF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A WHICH WAS INSTALLED WITH A MR STIFFENER B 247562 1 6 ONDED TO IT TO INCREASE THE SEALING CAPABILITIES OF THE SEAL. PROBABLE 247562 1 7 CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCIES 1 THRU 5 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION OF HARDWA 247562 1 8 RE. (REF ITEM 6 ON PAGE 1E). THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A 5/16" AREA ON THE V 247562 1 9 070-198868-004 RETAINER WHERE METAL WAS WORN OFF. THE ROUGH EDGES ON T 247562 1 10 HE PART WERE SMOOTHED OUT AND CORROSION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED. THE PA 247562 1 11 RT WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS A BUI 247562 1 12 LD UP OF TOLERANCE LEADING TO METAL TO METAL CONTACT. (REF ITEM 7 ON P 247562 1 13 AGE 1F). ITEM 7 DOCUMENTS KNUCKLE SEALS THAT WERE UNABLE TO BE INSTALL 247562 1 14 ED DUE TO INTEFERENCE BETWEEN THE SEAL AND THE SEAL PANEL. THIS INTERF 247562 1 15 ERENCE WAS CAUSE DUE TO A CORNER OF THE SEAL NOT BEING RADIUSED AS PER 247562 1 16 DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. MATERIAL WAS REMOVED SO THAT THE PARTS HAD THE 247562 1 17 RADIUS AND THE INTERFERENCE WAS ALLEVIATED. PARTS WERE RETURNED TO PRI 247562 1 18 NT CONFIGURATION AND INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP DURING 247562 1 19 PART MANUFACTURE. (REF ITEM 8 ON PAGE 1G). THE WIPER SEAL REMOVED WAS 247562 1 20 ACTUALLY A V070-198063-001 MISIDENTIFIED AS A V070-198063-002 SEAL. TH 247562 1 21 E SEAL WAS REIDENTIFIED AS A -001. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS W 247562 1 22 ORKMANSHIP DURING MANUFACTURE. CONCLUDE THAT ALL ITEMS ON THIS PR HAVE 247562 1 23 BEEN ADDRESSED AND NO FURTHER ENGINEERING OR SHOP ACTION IS REQUIRED. 247756 1 1 RADIATOR PANEL #1 HAS AN AREA ON ITS LEADING EDGE WERE SILVER-TEFLON T 247756 1 2 APE HAS BEEN REMOVED AND KOROPON APPLIED. THIS APPEARS TO BE THE RESUL 247756 1 3 T OF A REPAIR, AND NOT FLIGHT OR OPERATIONAL DAMAGE. THE NONCONFORMANC 247756 1 4 E WILL BE ADDED TO THE DAMAGE LOG FOR FUTURE REFERENCE OF THE MR ACTIO 247756 1 5 N TAKEN. APPROVAL IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 247780 1 1 ITEM 1: 2 EA. V070-198348-008 SEALS WERE FOUND TO BE BONDED WITH MBO13 247780 1 2 0-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND 50% DEBONDED FROM STRUCTURE. SEALS WERE RE 247780 1 3 BONDED WITH MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE PER STEPS 1 THROUGH 25. ITEM 2 247780 1 4 :SCREED FOUND BEHIND 2 EA, SEALS HAD VOIDS AND WAS ACCEPTED AFTER INTE 247780 1 5 RFERENCE WITH SEAL BOND WAS ELIMINATED DUE TO SCREED NOT BEING REQUIRE 247780 1 6 D PER PRINT. ITEM 3: .25" LONG TEAR/CUT IN SEAL IS PER PRINT V070-1983 247780 1 7 48. ITEM 4: SEALS HAVING SLIPPED DURING BONDING WERE REBONDED PER STEP 247780 1 8 S 33 THROUGH 57. CLOSE THIS PR. 247810 1 1 V070-156852-001 BRACKET CAN NOW BE INSTL'D W/ PRO- 247810 1 2 PER EDGE DISTANCE. EDGE DISTANCE HAS BEEN CHANGED 247810 1 3 FROM .38 TO .30 PER EO TO FOLLOW. 247866 1 1 DELAMINATION OF THE SPAR WEB OCCURED WHEN TWO STUD 247866 1 2 S DEBONDED DURING REMOVAL OF NUTS. THE DELAMINATIO 247866 1 3 N WAS REPAIRED BY GRUMMAN PERSONNEL PER ATTACHMENT 247866 1 4 A. THE REPAIR IS MRB APPROVED (REF. STR-3-07-1496 247866 1 5 ) FOR REBONDING OF DEBONDED STUDS.CLOSE PR. 247868 1 1 AS STATED IN THE SUMMARY ON PAGE 60 FUEL CELL #3 247868 1 2 COOLANT FILTER WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED AFTER SIX 247868 1 3 FLIGHTS. A SECTION OF THE COOLANT LINES ON THE UP 247868 1 4 STREAM SIDE OF THE FILTER WAS FLUSHED AND SUCCESSF 247868 1 5 ULLY SAMPLED. THE SYSTEM CLEANLINESS HAS BEEN RES 247868 1 6 TORED. INITIALLY, THE PLAN WAS TO KEEP THE PR OPE 247868 1 7 N PENDING THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYZED FILTER. THE 247868 1 8 FILTER ANALYSIS RESULTS DO NOT CONSTRAIN THE CLOS 247868 1 9 URE OF THIS PR. AS STATED THE SYSTEM HAS BEEN RES 247868 1 10 TORED TO FLIGHT STATUS. THE REMOVED FILTER WILL B 247868 1 11 E INSPECTED BY LSS TO EVALUATE FILTER PERFORMANCE 247868 1 12 AFTER EXPERIENCING SIX FLIGHTS. FUEL CELL #3 COOL 247868 1 13 ANT LINES ARE RESTORED AND ARE FLIGHT WORTHY. 247883 1 1 DURING INSTALLATION OF PLBD STRONGBACK, A DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS FOUN 247883 1 2 D AT Xo-895, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1. TO EVALUATE THE NUTPLATE CO 247883 1 3 NDITION THE RADIATOR WAS DEPLOYED AND TCS BLANKETS WERE REMOVED. THE N 247883 1 4 UT ELEMENT WAS PUSHED OUT OF THE NUTPLATE AND HELD BEHIND THE TCS BLAN 247883 1 5 KET. THE NUT ELEMENT WAS RECOVERED AND ATTACHED TO THE PR. A NEW NUT E 247883 1 6 LEMENT WAS INSTALLED INTO THE NUTPLATE AND THE TABS WERE BENT BACK IN 247883 1 7 PLACE TO RETAIN THE NUT PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPO. MR DISPO ACCEPTED T 247883 1 8 HE CONDITION TO USE (7) OF (8) STRONGBACK FASTENERS FOR CURRENT OPF PR 247883 1 9 OCESSING UNTIL THE STRONGBACKS ARE REMOVED. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RE 247883 1 10 SOLVED AND NO LONGER EXITS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 247929 1 1 THE CHIP IN THE EDGE OF THE #5 RCC TEE IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, W 247929 1 2 AS RESOLVED, WITH MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, BY REPAIRING THE M 247929 1 3 ISSING TYPE "A" COATING PER STANDARD REPAIR ML0601-9026. THE PROBABLE 247929 1 4 CAUSE OF THE TEE BEING CHIPPED IS DUE TO MISHANDLING DURING RCC TEE RE 247929 1 5 MOVAL. CONCLUDE THAT THE RCC TEE IS ACCEPTABLE AS REPAIRED AND NO FURT 247929 1 6 HER WORK IS REQUIRED. 248037 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE ON THE SUPPORT ASSY IN THE L/H MLG WHEEL WELL 248037 1 2 WAS REMOVED AND A NEW NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS OP 248037 1 3 ERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED AND THIS PR 248037 1 4 CAN CLOSE. 248039 1 1 3 LOCATIONS DESCRIBED IN ITEMS 1 THROUGH 3 WERE FOUND TO HAVE A GAP BE 248039 1 2 TWEEN PARTS TO BE INSTALLED. THE GAPS WERE SHIMMED BY MR TO MAINTAIN I 248039 1 3 NTEGRITY OF THE INSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE IS TOLERNACE BUILD UP OF 248039 1 4 PARTS. 248045 1 1 LSOC AND R.I. ENGINEERING HAVE INSPECTED THE N.L.G 248045 1 2 . DOOR AND HAVE FOUND NO ANOMALIES TO DOOR STRUCTU 248045 1 3 RE OR RIGGING. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS AT THIS TIME 248045 1 4 . MOLDS WERE TEMP/NON FLIGHT AND ARE NOW REMOVED. 248045 1 5 TEMP BACKUP TO COUNTERSEAL BONDING PRESSURE. 248134 1 1 AN MR ANGLE WAS FAB'D, BONDED TO THE CREW MODULE, AND HI LOC'D TO THE 248134 1 2 FITTING. INSTL'N OF THE MR ANGLE RTN'D THE BONDLINE, OF THE FITTING, 248134 1 3 TO A POSTIVE MARGINE OF SAFETY. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DEBOND WAS 248134 1 4 VIBRATION DURING LAUNCH. THE INSTL'N OF THE MR ANGLE TO CREW MODULE & 248134 1 5 THE FITTING IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLT. 248549 1 1 ITEMS 1.0 AND 2.0: THE SAFETY WIRE IN THE PUSH-PULL RODS UNDER SOME OF 248549 1 2 THE FLIPPER DOORS WERE FOUND NOT TO BE PER PRINT: JAM NUT WAS NOT SAF 248549 1 3 ETY WIRED AND .032" DIAMETER SAFETY WIRE WAS BEING USED INSTEAD OF .04 248549 1 4 0" DIAMETER AS CALLED PER PRINT. THE PUSH-PULL RODS UNDER ALL OF THE F 248549 1 5 LIPPER DOORS (RIGHT AND LEFT HAND) WERE INSPECTED AND CHANGED AS REQUI 248549 1 6 RED TO PER PRINT CONFIGURATION (REF ATTACHMENTS "C" THRU "F"). AN EO T 248549 1 7 O DRAWINGS V070-596070, V070-596077, AND V070-596087 WAS NEEDED TO SHO 248549 1 8 W THE CORRECT SIZE OF LOCKWIRE AND ITS METHOD OF INSTALLATION TO THE R 248549 1 9 ESPECTIVE RODS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 248598 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES LISTED ON PAGES 1 THROUGH 1M HAV 248598 1 2 E BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS OR RESOLVED BY THE FOLLOWING 248598 1 3 MR DISPOSITIONS. DEFECTS 3.3,15.4 AND 18.4 WERE P 248598 1 4 YRELL FOAM THAT WAS REMOVED DEFECTS 4.3,4.6,6.1,7. 248598 1 5 1,8.1,9.1,16.3,17.1 AND 17.2 WERE VOIDS THAT WERE 248598 1 6 VENTED DEFECTS 3,1,3.4,5.1,5.5,6.2,12.4,13.3,13.4, 248598 1 7 14.2,14.3 AND 20.3 WERE AREAS THAT WERE POTTED. DE 248598 1 8 FECTS 1.1,3.2,5.3,5.4,12.5,13.1,13.2,15.2,16.5,18. 248598 1 9 1,14.1, AND 14.2 WERE DEBONDED HEAT SINK THAT WAS 248598 1 10 REBONDED. EXCESSIVE RTV WAS REMOVED AT DEFECTS 248598 1 11 9.3,10.1,11.3,12.2,12.3,15.3,15.5 AND 22.1. HEAT S 248598 1 12 INK WAS TRIMMED FOR DEFECTS 4.1,5.2,6.3,7.2,10.2 A 248598 1 13 ND 12.1. DISCREPANT HEAT SINK WAS REMOVED AND A NE 248598 1 14 W PIECE BONDED IN AT DEFECTS 16.1 AND 16.2. DEFECT 248598 1 15 S 17.3, 20.2 AND 21.2 WERE OFF CENTER HEAT HEAT SI 248598 1 16 NK WHICH IS NOT A PR CONDITION. DEFECTS 1.2 AND 4. 248598 1 17 5 WERE A SMALL (0.25") TEAR IN HEAT SINK AND ACCEP 248598 1 18 TED AS IS.DEFECTS 1.4,4.2,11.2,13.5,14.4,16.4,16.6 248598 1 19 ,18.2,20.1,21.1,23.1 AND 24 WERE SMALL DEBONDS WHI 248598 1 20 CH WERE ACCEPTED AS IS. DEFECT 10.3 WAS A 0.3" GAP 248598 1 21 BETWEEN HEAT SINK & BRACKET WHICH WAS ACCEPTED AS 248598 1 22 IS. DEFECTS 1.3,2.1,4.4,9.2,11.1,15.1,18.3 AND 19 248598 1 23 .1 WERE HEAT SINK TOO CLOSE TO FRAME AND ACCEPTED 248598 1 24 AS IS. DESIGN INTENT OF THE RTV-HEAT SINK INSTALLA 248598 1 25 TION HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. 248654 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 - THE V070-198702-024 TRAILING EDGE SEAL WAS MR ACCEPTE 248654 1 2 D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE WITH MINOR 'BENDS' OR WRINKLES AT THE END OF TH 248654 1 3 E SEAL. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 248892 1 1 RE-INSTALLING CARRIER PANEL AND TORQUING TO THE 248892 1 2 PROPER VALUE RETURNS PART TO PRINT CONFIGURATION 249052 1 1 THE ACTUATOR INSTALLED ON THE SIDE HATCH PRIOR TO INITIATION OF THIS P 249052 1 2 R WAS A REPLACEMENT ACTUATOR INSTALLED PER PR MEQ-3-11-0481. TROUBLESH 249052 1 3 OOTING DETERMINED THAT THE HIGHER LATCHING FORCES NOTED ON PAGES 1 AND 249052 1 4 3 WERE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE NEW ACTUATOR (S/N 23) HAVING A HIGHER RUNN 249052 1 5 ING TORQUE THAN THE ACTUATOR (S/N 15) IT REPLACED (7 IN LBS FOR OLD AC 249052 1 6 TUATOR, 13 IN LBS FOR NEW ONE). HOWEVER, THERE IS PRESENTLY NO SPECIFI 249052 1 7 CATION GOVERNING ALLOWABLE ACTUATOR RUNNING TORQUES, AND THE REPLACEME 249052 1 8 NT ACTUATOR HAD PASSED THE SERVICE CENTER TESTING PROCEDURE PRIOR TO D 249052 1 9 ELIVERY TO KSC. TO RESOLVE THE DISCREPANCY OF HIGH LATCHING FORCES, TH 249052 1 10 IS PR REMOVED THE NEW ACTUATOR AND RETURNED IT TO NSLD (REF LRU PR IN 249052 1 11 ABOVE STEP) FOR ANALYSIS. THE OLD ACTUATOR HAS BEEN REINSTALLED AND WI 249052 1 12 LL BE MR ACCEPTED FOR ONE FLIGHT PER PR MEQ-0481. RETEST OF PAGE 1 AND 249052 1 13 1B DISCREPANCIES WAS PERFORMED PER V1058 RUN 2, PROBABLE CAUSE IS HIG 249052 1 14 HER RUNNING TORQUE OF THE S/N 23 ACTUATOR. ITEM 2 PG 1A IS AN EXPECTED 249052 1 15 CONDITION WHICH OCCURS AS THE LATCH MECHANISM PASSES THE OVERCENTER P 249052 1 16 OSITION. ITEM 4 PG 1C DISCREPANCY WAS UNIQUE TO THE S/N 23 ACTUATOR WH 249052 1 17 EN CONNECTED TO THE LATCHES, PROBABLE CAUSE BEING SEVERAL DEGREES DIFF 249052 1 18 ERENCE BETWEEN THE FINAL LATCHED POSITION OF THE TWO ACTUATORS. THE S/ 249052 1 19 N 15 ACTUATOR WAS VERIFIED TO NOT HAVE THIS SAME CONDITION PER STEP 97 249052 1 20 .1. RC ACTION- REVIEW ACCEPTANCE TESTING PROCEDURE AND REVIEW OMRSD CR 249052 1 21 ITERIA FOR VALIDITY. 249059 1 1 PREVIOUS MR DISPO ALLOWS USE OF V070-356735-012 249059 1 2 ACCESS PNL. "AS-IS" SURFACE COATING WAS APPLIED TO 249059 1 3 ANY OTHER AREAS, WHERE CHIPPING/SCRATCHES OCCURED 249059 1 4 IN SURFACE COATING, PER PRINT. 249109 1 1 02 TK2 VENT POPPET FAILED MOST LOAD POPPER LK CK AT 72 PSI/10 MIN (ALL 249109 1 2 OWABLE IS NMT 2.2 PSI/10 MIN.) DURIN OV-103 FLT 9 LOAD. PR WAS DEFERRE 249109 1 3 D TO FLT 10 (USING SECONDARY SEAL, FLT CAP) FOR FLT 9. FLT POPPET HAS 249109 1 4 BEEN REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH SUBSEQUENT SUCCESSFUL LOW PRESSURE POPP 249109 1 5 ET AND HIGH PRESSURE MASS SPEC LK CHECK. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL COMPON 249109 1 6 ENT WEAR. 249136 1 1 ITEM 1: V070-194106-004 CARRIER PNL WAS TRIMMED PE 249136 1 2 R STR-3-07-2080 WHICH BROUGHT STEP MEASUREMENTS WI 249136 1 3 THIN PRINT TOLERANCES. AN E.O-TO-FOLLOW WAS ORIGIN 249136 1 4 ATED TO CLARIFY THE DESIGN STEP IN THIS LOCATION. 249136 1 5 ITEM 2: ORIGINAL DISCREPANCY IS OBSOLETE DUE TO TH 249136 1 6 E FACT THAT THE V070-194103-002 CARRIER PNL WAS TR 249136 1 7 IMMED AFTER STEP MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN. NEW STEP 249136 1 8 MEASUREMENTS WILL BE TAKEN ON THE WAD(STR-3-07-19 249136 1 9 27) THAT TRIMMED CARRIER PNL. 249141 1 1 THE RUST LIKE SUBSTANCE ON THE INSULATORS IS NOT A PRODUCT OF INSULATO 249141 1 2 R CORROSION. IT IS A PRODUCT OF THE STEEL PARTICLES LEFT BEHIND WHEN A 249141 1 3 STEEL BRUSH WAS USED TO SMOOTH WELDS IN THE STIFFENER PLATES. THE INS 249141 1 4 ULATORS HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO MR ID PERFORMED. P 249141 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE IS THE CORROSION OF STEEL PARTICLES ON THE INSULATORS. 249211 1 1 THE FWD. MOST EDGE OF THE R.H., O/B RIB WAS DEBONDED IN THE BODY FLAP 249211 1 2 COVE AREA. MBO120-037 TYPE II ADHESIVE WAS USED TO REBOND THIS AEA PE 249211 1 3 MR ACCEPTANCE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CLOSE THIS PR. 249491 1 1 PARTS REWORKED PER MR. ACCEPTABLE FOR USE AFTER RE 249491 1 2 WORK. 249581 1 1 BODY FLAP HONEY COMB STRUCTURE WAS FOUNDED TO BE DENTED AND CRACKED. A 249581 1 2 REA OF DENTED AND CRACKED FACESHEET WAS CUT OUT AND EXPOSED CELLS WERE 249581 1 3 FILLED WITH MB0120-008 ADHESIVE AND A DOUBLER WAS BONDED OVER AREA. I 249581 1 4 TEM 2 PAGE 1A WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT INCORRECT SURFACE PREP OF BONDIN 249581 1 5 G AREA WHICH WAS REPERFORMED IN STEP 18.0-18.3. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMA 249581 1 6 GE IS WORKMANSHIP. 249753 1 1 PAGE 1 WAS PICKED UP ON L/H AND R/H VENT DOOR 6 AFT HINGE HAVING GAPS 249753 1 2 BETWEEN BUSHINGS AND HINGE. ATTACHMENTS 1 AND 2 WERE WRITTEN TO REMOVE 249753 1 3 AND INSPECT THE HARDWARE. SEVERAL V070-384312-001 AND V070-384318-001 249753 1 4 BUSHINGS WERE BINDING IN THE CLEVIS AND IT WAS DECIDED TO REPLACE THEM 249753 1 5 . ATTACHMENTS 3 AND 4 WERE WRITTEN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS AND -001 BUSHING 249753 1 6 S WERE ORDERED FROM RI. PAGE 1A WAS PICKED UP WHEN THE -001 BUSHINGS R 249753 1 7 ECEIVED FROM RI WOULD NOT FIT INTO THE VEHICLE CLEVISES. ATTACHMENT "V 249753 1 8 EHICLE CLEVIS BUSHING CHECK" WAS WRITTEN WHICH INSPECTED AND MEASURED 249753 1 9 THE CLEVISES AND NONE WERE FOUND TO BE UNDERSIZED. FURTHER INSPECTION 249753 1 10 OF THE -001 BUSHINGS SHOWED THAT MANY WERE ACTUALLY OVERSIZED. AN MR 249753 1 11 WAS WRITTEN TO ALLOW US TO POLISH THE DRY SURFACE AT THE LES SHOP. THI 249753 1 12 S DID NOT PRODUCE A BUSHING THAT FIT AND ALSO DAMAGED THE DRY LUBE. LS 249753 1 13 OC, RI AND NASA ENGINEERING DECIDED THAT AN E.O. WAS NEEDED TO BOTH V0 249753 1 14 70-384312 AND V070-384318 BUSHINGS TO CHANGE THE O.D. FROM .3727 (+0.0 249753 1 15 /-0.0005") TO .3711(+0.0/-0.0010") TO ALLOW ADEQUATE CLEARANCE FOR THE 249753 1 16 BUSHINGS TO ROTATE FREELY IN THE CLEVIS (THIS E.O. CREATED THE -0003 B 249753 1 17 USHINGS) AND ALSO TO V070-384306 TO FOLLOW RATIONAL WAS WRITTEN TO ACC 249753 1 18 OMPLISH THIS AND ALL AVAILABLE -001 BUSHINGS WERE SENT TO RI SERVICE C 249753 1 19 ENTER ON PR MEQ-3-07-0227 FOR REWORK TO -003 DIMENSIONS. THE NEW -003 249753 1 20 BUSHINGS WERE RETURNED TO KSC AND ALL WERE WITHIN SPEC. PAGE 1B WAS PI 249753 1 21 CKED UP BECAUSE RI PRR#'S WERE ANNOTATED ON THE INDIVIDUAL BUSHING BAG 249753 1 22 S AND NO OCN#'S AND A STEP WAS ADDED TO CORRECT THE OCN'S IN THE PAPER 249753 1 23 . A FIT CHECK OF THE -003 BUSHINGS OF THE VEHICLE SHOWED AN EXCELLENT 249753 1 24 FIT WITHFREE ROTATION. DOOR INSTALLATION RESUMED IN ATTACHMENTS IN 3 A 249753 1 25 ND 4 USING THE 003 BUSHINGS WITH NO OTHER PROBLEMS AND DOOR SET UP WAS 249753 1 26 COMPLETED. RETEST WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER V1016. THESE DISCREPANCIES NO L 249753 1 27 ONGER EXIST. UPON VERIFICATION IN STEP 21 THAT RELEASED EO'S REFLECT E 249753 1 28 ENGINEERING DISPOSITION. 249768 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 INTERFERENCE OF MD153-0018-0003 WASHERS WITH THE FLANGE 249768 1 2 OF THE SILL LONGERON FRAME, WAS RESOLVED WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVA 249768 1 3 L, BY REMOVING .06" OF MATERIAL FROM ONE SIDE OF THE WASHER. THE CAUSE 249768 1 4 OF THE INTERFERENCE WAS DUE TO THE HOLE BEING MISLOCATED .06" FROM PR 249768 1 5 INT REQUIREMENTS. CONCLUDE THE INTERFERENCE HAS BEEN REMOVED AND NO FU 249768 1 6 RTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. THE MR MODIFIED WASHER WILL BE INSTALLED ON ST 249768 1 7 R-3-10-446. 249839 1 1 THE STOP RING ON FUEL CELL THREE COOLANT DISCHARGE QD WAS FOUND MISSING 249839 1 2 DURING OPF FLOW FOR MISSION 31R. THE CONDITION FOR MISSION 31R. THE COND 249839 1 3 ITION WAS DEFERRED UNTIL FUEL THREE REMOVAL. FUEL CELL THREE WAS REMOVED 249839 1 4 /REPLACED THIS FLOW STS-60. THE COOLANT QD WAS REMOVED, REPLACED AND LEA 249839 1 5 K CHECKED. PROBABLE CAUSE OF STOP RING LOSS IS NORMAL WEAR ON QD FROM MU 249839 1 6 LTIPLE MATES/DEMATES. THIS PR IS READY TO CLOSE. 249847 1 1 THE DISCREPANT UPPER TEE #21 (R/S #22) INSULATOR WAS ROUTED THRU HDA T 249847 1 2 O RIC SERVICE CENTER FOR REPAIR. THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REPLACED 249847 1 3 WITH A NEW INSULATOR. THE NEW INSULATOR WAS INSTLD INTO TEE #21 AND T 249847 1 4 HE GAPS ADJUSTED WITHIN DWG TOLERANCE. THE DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXIST 249847 1 5 S AND THE PR CAN CLOSE. CLOSE PR. 249850 01 1 THIS PR IS TO REMAIN A DR. PR WRITTEN IN ERROR. 249873 1 1 THE NEW OVERSIZE INSERT FIT CORRECTLY. APPARENTLY 249873 1 2 PNL R4 WAS REPAIRED BEFORE USING AN OVERSIZE INSE 249873 1 3 RT AND THE REPAIR WAS NOT RECORDED IN CVAS SYSTEM. 249873 1 4 NO MR ID IS TO BE MADE IN THE FLT DECT AREA. CO 249873 1 5 NCLUSION: PREVIOUS OVERSIZE INSERT WAS NOT INSTAL 249873 1 6 LED CORRECTLY, AND BACKED-OUT. NO FURTHER DISPO I 249873 1 7 S REQUIRED. 249887 1 1 THE JO-BOLTS PLANNED TO BE INSTL'D COULD NOT BE DO 249887 1 2 NE DUE TO ACCESS REST. THE V070-858037-003 SUPPORT 249887 1 3 S WERE TEMP INSTL'D & REMOVED TO SUPPORT CAP-3-07- 249887 1 4 003. AFTER THAT THE SUPPORTS WERE PLACED PERM USIN 249887 1 5 G ME112-0006-0502 & -0504 HI-LOKS. PRIME BOARD CON 249887 1 6 CURRENCE WAS OBTAINED FOR THE PARTS SUBSTITUTION & 249887 1 7 THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINT. 249913 1 1 V070-146012-004 ELEVON UPPER SEAL PANEL HAD A DISCREPANT ME131-0043-00 249913 1 2 43-0006 BEARING. THE -004 PANEL WAS SENT TO THE ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTE 249913 1 3 R, WHERE THE DISCREPANT BEARING WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED RETURNING THE 249913 1 4 V070-146012-004 PANEL TO PRINT. CLOSE THIS PR. 249946 1 1 VOID THIS PR. REASON: WHEEL ASSEMBLY IS PROCESSED AS AN ASSEMBLY. DAMAG 249946 1 2 ED TIRE CONDITION IS DOCUMENTED ON MEQ-3-05-0143, ITEM 2. 250004 1 1 WHILE PERFORMING OMI V1067, FUEL CELL INERTING, FUEL CELL #3 PURGE VAL 250004 1 2 VE STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION. IMMEDIATE ACTION WAS TAKEN TO SAFE AND 250004 1 3 ISOLATE THE F/C FROM THE SYSTEM TO PREVENT DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE SYS 250004 1 4 TEM. ALSO STEPS WERE WRITTEN TO SUPPORT ECLSS H2O REMOVAL FROM FC #3. 250004 1 5 THE FUEL CELL WAS DEPRESSURIZED AND JUNPER TUBE INSTALLED FOR NORMAL S 250004 1 6 TORAGE CONFIGURATION. NORMAL LERRY FLIGHT CONFIGURATION IS PRESSURIZED 250004 1 7 (SEE MR RATIONAL PG 9). FUEL CELL #3 (SN 115) HAS BEEN REMOVED AND RE 250004 1 8 PLACED BY SN 116. RETEST WILL BE REPERFORMED PER V5R01. (NOTE: FC3 R/R 250004 1 9 PERFORMED PER V5R01, MCR 10455). FUEL CELL IS BEING RETURNED TO VENDO 250004 1 10 R FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS. 250054 1 1 VO70-396401-002 CARRIER PANEL WAS FOUND TO HAVE 2-EACH BENT CORNERS. C 250054 1 2 ORER #1 WAS DETERMINED TO HAVE SMALL PORTION OF CORNER CRACKED AND IT 250054 1 3 WAS CUT AWAY. THE REMAINING PORTION OF CORNER #1 AND ALSO CORNER2 WA 250054 1 4 S MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE WORKMANSHIP. CLOSE 250054 1 5 THIS PR. 250130 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 250130 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION R/H Xo891.75 Zo396.50 IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORIGINAL 250130 1 3 RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 1.0 INCH POUNDS. N 250130 1 4 UT WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE T 250130 1 5 O THE APPROPIATE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO PRI 250130 1 6 INT CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. T 250130 1 7 HIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 250219 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 250219 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION 1166.58 XO 396.50 ZO RH IN THE MIDBODY. THE ROIGIN 250219 1 3 AL RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 7 INCH POUNDS. N 250219 1 4 UT WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE T 250219 1 5 O THE APPROPRIATE 14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO PR 250219 1 6 INT CONIFUGRATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. T 250219 1 7 HIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 250416 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST FLT 11 AND DEFERRED UNTIL OPF PROCESSING 250416 1 2 OF FLT 12. THE V070-510395-003 (INDICATOR ASSEMBLY DOOR BOOSTER) WAS 250416 1 3 REMOVED FROM OV103 LH WHEEL WELL AND REINSTALLED IN THE RH WHELL WELL 250416 1 4 (PER MEQ-3-07-067). DURING THE REMOVAL AND REINSTALLATION OF THE 395-0 250416 1 5 03 ASSEMBLY, THE S/N ON THE MC452-0123-0003 (MICRO SWITCH SUBASSEMBLY) 250416 1 6 WAS NOT VERIFIED. DUE TO TRACKING PROBLEMS AND THE POSITION OF THE MI 250416 1 7 CRO-SWITCH IN THE RH WHEEL WELL MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO VERIFY THE S/N W 250416 1 8 ITHOUT DISASSEMBLY OF THE V070-510395-003 ASSEMBLY. THE PREVIOUS DISPO 250416 1 9 HAS CORRECTED THE PROBLEM IDENTIFIED BY THIS PR. THE DISPO DISASSEMBL 250416 1 10 ED THE V070-510397-001 ASSEMBLY FROM THE V070-510395-001 ASSEMBLY IN T 250416 1 11 HE RH WHEEL WELL, AFATER WHICH THE S/N OF THE MC452-0123-0003 MICRO-SW 250416 1 12 ITCH WAS ACCESSIBLE. THE S/N WAS RECORDED AND THE V070-510397-001 REIN 250416 1 13 STALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE OF PROBLEM-PROCEDURAL ERROR. S/N SHOULD HAVE B 250416 1 14 EEN RECORDED PREVIOUS TO INSTALLATION OF THE V070-510395-003 ASSEMBLY 250416 1 15 IN RH WHEEL WELL, FROM LH WHEEL WELL. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. 250473 1 1 C/P HOLES ON V070-316236-002 DOOR WERE NOT ALIGNED DUE TO OV-102'S DOO 250473 1 2 R BEING INSTALLED. OV-103'S DOOR WAS PLACED IN APPROVED CONDITION FROM 250473 1 3 PR FRC3-A0010 AND INSTALLED ON STEP 5.0 FOR FLIGHT. OV-102'S DOOR WIT 250473 1 4 H INCORRECT OCN IN SHARPIE WAS REMOVED AND TPS STR-2-08-315 WILL VERIF 250473 1 5 Y CORRECT HARDWARE FOR DOOR AND GENERATE DR/PR AS REQUIRED. PROBABLE C 250473 1 6 AUSE WORKMANSHIP. CLOSE THIS PR. 250591 1 1 THE MINOR RESIDUAL RTV ADHESIVE ON THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE OF THE L/H R 250591 1 2 ADIATOR PANEL #3 HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "AS IS". NO 250591 1 3 FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: SEE MR RATIONALE. 250641 1 1 ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3 DISCRIBE MINOR TAPE DEFECTS IN THE LH #3 RADIATOR. T 250641 1 2 HESE WERE ALL MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF EACH WAS OPERAT 250641 1 3 IONAL DAGRADATION. 250876 1 1 MR ACCEPTANCE OF BOND FOR DOUBLER V070-352306-020 250876 1 2 ON AFT HEAT SHIELD. 250931 1 1 THE (19) LOCATIONS WHERE THE PLBD ENVIRONMENTAL BULB SEAL SPLICES WERE N 250931 1 2 OT BONDED THE ENTIRE LENGTH THAT WERE DOCUMENTED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WERE 250931 1 3 RESTRICTED MR APPROVED FOR (1) FLIGHT (FLIGHT 12, STS 39). POST FLIGHT P 250931 1 4 ROCESSING, THE SEAL WAS INSPECTED ON TPS STR-3-13-507. AT (2) OF THE (19 250931 1 5 ) LOCATIONS (XO 624.64 AND XO 1208.76) THE SPLICE WAS REPLACED ON STR-3- 250931 1 6 13-3788. THE REMAINING (17) LOCATIONS WERE UNRESTRICTED MR ACCEPTED AS-I 250931 1 7 S. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE SHORT BOND LINE IS VENDOR AT ORIGINAL MANUFACTU 250931 1 8 RE. CONCLUDE NO FURTHER WORK OR INSPECTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 250998 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES DESCRIBED IN ITEM 1 OF THIS PR HAVE BEEN REPAIRED, A 250998 1 2 ND THE L/H Y-WEB DOOR HAS BEEN RETURNED TO A PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE 250998 1 3 DISCREPANT SCREWS AT F/N LOCATIONS 12, 14, AND 20 HAVE BEEN REMOVED. C 250998 1 4 ONICAL WASHERS HAVE BEEN BONDED IN THEIR PLACE. AT F/N LOCATIONS 18 AN 250998 1 5 D 22 CONICAL WASHERS HAVE BEEN BONDED AS REQUIRED PER PRINT. PROBABLE 250998 1 6 CAUSE OF DAMAGE IS IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF THESE PARTS AT THE HMF. 251081 1 1 73B760003-1009 ELECTRICAL GROUNDING CABLE WAS FOUND TO HAVE ENOUGH PLA 251081 1 2 Y THAT CONTACT COULD BE MADE WITH WIRE BUNDLES. TEFLON TAPE WAS WRAPPE 251081 1 3 D AROUND THE -1009 GROUND STRAP, AND USING PLASTIC TIE WRAPS THE -1009 251081 1 4 GROUND STRAP WAS SECURED TO THE ADJACENT WIRE BUNDLES TO PREVENT CHAF 251081 1 5 FING. 251116 1 1 THE HINGE BRACKET WAS REMOVED BY RI, THIS ELIMINATING THE INTERFERRENC 251116 1 2 E. 251198 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP ON RH VENT DOOR 7 DURING TPS MEQ-3-07-079 WHEN T 251198 1 2 HE V070-384312-001 AND V070-384318-001 BUSHINGS COULD NOT BE REMOVED B 251198 1 3 Y HAND. ATTACHMENT "HINGE BUSHING REPLACEMENT" WAS WRITTEN TO REMOVE T 251198 1 4 HE HINGE HARDWARE AND REPLACE THE BUSHINGS. PAGE 1A WAS PICKED UP WHEN 251198 1 5 THE 001 BUSHINGS RECEIVED FROM RI WOULD NOT FIT INTO THE VEHICLE CLEV 251198 1 6 ISES. THE -001 BUSHINGS HAD BEEN MEASURED AND FOUND TO BE OVERSIZE IN 251198 1 7 PR MEQ-3-07-0227. AFTER EVALUATION BETWEEN LSOC, NASA, AND RI ENG, IT 251198 1 8 WAS DECIDED TO RELEASE E.O.'S TO CHANGE THE O.D. OF THE BUSHINGS FROM 251198 1 9 .3727 (+0.0/-0.0005) TO .3711 (+0.0/-0.0010) TO ALLOW ADEQUATE CLEARAN 251198 1 10 CE FOR INSTALLATION DWG TO ALLOW THE USE OF THE NEW -003 BUSHINGS. EO 251198 1 11 TO FOLLOW RATIONALE WAS WRITTEN AND THE REDESIGNED -003 BUSHINGS WERE 251198 1 12 INSTALLED WITH NO BINDING -003 BUSHINGS WERE INSTALLED WITH NO BINDING 251198 1 13 AND DOOR SET UP WAS COMPLETED. ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A WAS CORRECTED BY SCR 251198 1 14 APPING LOCALLY THE RD153 WASHERS. THE OLD -001 BUSHINGS WERE SENT OUT 251198 1 15 ON LRU PR'S FOR REWORK TO -003 DIMENSIONS. THE FINAL DOOR INSTALLATION 251198 1 16 WAS PERFORMED IN TPS MEQ-3-07-079. RETEST WAS DONE PER V1016. THESE D 251198 1 17 ISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXIST. 251449 1 1 THE DELAMINATION OF THE NLG DOOR PERIMETER WAS REPAIRED BY REMOVING TH 251449 1 2 E EXISTING RETAINER RIVETS & ADDING A DOUBLE ROW OF NEW RIVETS ON 1" C 251449 1 3 ENTERS. ADHESIVE WAS APPLIED TO THE DOOR EDGE TO PREVENT WATER INTRUS 251449 1 4 ION INTO THE DOOR. OVERSIZED HOLE (REF. PG 1B) WAS MR REPAIRED TO USE 251449 1 5 LONGER RIVETS. GAP CREATED BY RIVET INSTL'N AT DOOR CORNER WAS ELIMA 251449 1 6 NATED BY REMOVING RIVET & CLAMPING FACE SHT TOGETHER DURING INSTL'N & 251449 1 7 EPOXY FILLING OPEN HOLE. REPAIR WAS MR APPROVED. 251586 1 1 ON THE R/H OB ELEVON, THE OB SEAL PANEL HAD A WORN AND DETERIORATED KN 251586 1 2 UCKLE SEAL (V070-199860-019) AND WIPER SEAL (V070-198864-005) (ITEMS 1 251586 1 3 ,2,3). BOTH SEALS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW SEALS. THE SPANWI 251586 1 4 SE WIPER SEAL HOUSING WOULD NOT TRAVEL FREELY WITHIN THE RETAINER (ITE 251586 1 5 M 4). THE HOUSING WAS DISASSEMBLED AND CLEANED TO REMOVE CONTAMINATION 251586 1 6 . HOWEVER THE WIPER WEAL HOUSING STILL DID NOT MOVE FREELY (ITEM 5). A 251586 1 7 SMALL AMOUNT OF MATERIAL WAS REMOVED FROM THE FLANGES OF THE V070-198 251586 1 8 511-012 RETAINER TO ALLEVIATE INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE SPANWISE WIPER 251586 1 9 SEAL AND THE RETAINER. THE GAP BETWEEN THE V070-198552-001 ANGLE AND B 251586 1 10 OTH ENDS OF THE V070-198576 ASSY IS GREATER THAN PRINT TOLERANCE (ITEM 251586 1 11 6). THE INSTALLATION WAS FOUND TO HAVE EXCESS LAMINATIONS ON SHIMS. TH 251586 1 12 E LAMINATIONS WERE REMOVED TO OBTAIN A PER PRINT GAP. THE V070-198864- 251586 1 13 005 SEAL ASSY COULD NOT BE INSTALLED WITH PER PRINT OVERHANG (ITEM 7). 251586 1 14 THE ATTACH HOLES IN THE SEAL WERE SLOTTED BY MR DISPO SO THAT THE SEA 251586 1 15 L COULD BE INSTALLED WITH THE CORRECT OVERHANG. ITEM #8: GAP AT THE OB 251586 1 16 END OF V070-198552-001 ANGLE AND V070-198511-012 RETAINER WAS GREATER 251586 1 17 THAN PRINT TOLERANCE. THE ANGLE WAS REMOVED AND REINSTALLED PER PRINT 251586 1 18 . PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION (ITEMS 1,2,3); MANUFACTURIN 251586 1 19 G(ITEMS 4-5-7); WORKMANSHIP (ITEM 6). 251656 1 1 THE V070-193123-001 CARRIER PANEL FORWARD FORWARD ATTACH POINTS WERE S 251656 1 2 HIMMED TO ACHIEVE ACCEPTABLE CARRIER PANEL TO CARRIER PANEL STEP CONDI 251656 1 3 TIONS. THE DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. THE V070-193123,126, AND 127 251656 1 4 CARRIER PANELS WERE ACCEPTED AS IS BY MR. 251662 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 251662 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 251662 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE CARRI 251662 1 4 ER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE P 251662 1 5 OSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO PREVENT FURTHER 251662 1 6 DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. CLOSE PR. 251709 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 251709 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 251709 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 251709 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 251709 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURATHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121- 251709 1 6 87-103-C1). THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 251821 1 1 V070-565385-022 RETAINER SET ASSY (3 PART SET) WAS FOUND TO BE OUTSIDE 251821 1 2 DWG REQUIREMENT OF FLATNESS AND WAVINESS EXCEEDING .020 BETWEEN ANY T 251821 1 3 WO ADJACENT HOLES. THE RETAINER SET ASSY WHICH CONSIST OF V070-565385- 251821 1 4 019,020 & -021 SUBASSEMBLIES IS A MATCHED SET AND WAS REPLACED WITH A 251821 1 5 NEW SET. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 251863 1 1 2EA MD111-4027-0620 BOLTS ARE TORQUED TO NEW TORQUE IN STEP 9.0. ACCES 251863 1 2 S WAS GAINED BY ENGINE #1 BEING REMOVED FOR FLIGHT 08. CLOSE THIS PR. 251871 1 1 INSPECTION OF THE R/H RADIATOR PANEL #3 REVEALED TWO SMALL AREAS OF SI 251871 1 2 LVERTEFLON TAPE DELAMINATION AND A MINOR INDENTATION IN THE TAPE. THES 251871 1 3 E DISCREPANCIES ARE ACCEPTABLE PER THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL A 251871 1 4 ND HAVE BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "AS-IS". NO FURTHER DISC 251871 1 5 REPANCIES EXIST. 251876 1 1 ABOVE REWORK ON BUSHING REMOVES MARKS, BUSHING 251876 1 2 HAS NO DAMAGE TO STRUTURAL INTEGRIYT 251941 1 1 DAMAGED THREADS WERE DISCOVERED ON AFT SEPARATION BOLT P/N V072-565231 251941 1 2 -003, OCN EA7317. DISCREPANT BOLT WAS SHIPPED TO HDA FOR VENDOR ANALYS 251941 1 3 IS. REPLACEMENT BOLT WAS OBTAINED AND FIT CHECKED IN OV-103 AFT SEPARA 251941 1 4 TION NUTS (OMRSD V55ANO.070-1). PROCEEDED WITH S0004, POSU8. NO FURTHE 251941 1 5 R WORK OR DISPO REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGED THREADS: MISHANDLI 251941 1 6 NG. 252003 1 1 THIS LOCATION DOES NOT REQUIRE RTV. RTV BONDING IN 252003 1 2 OTHER AREAS WILL BE INSPECTED BY MOD-015 TO TPS 252003 1 3 VSTR-3-07-281. 252095 1 1 INSTALLATION OF FASTENERS WHICH WERE NOT INSTALLED 252095 1 2 DUE TO DWG. ERROR RESTORES INSTLN TO FLT WORTHY C 252095 1 3 ONFIG. ADJACENT FASTENERS WERE OVERSIZED DUE TO EL 252095 1 4 ONGATED HOLES. CLOSE PR. 252112 1 1 NO SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE AND NO CRACK HAS OCCURED TO 252112 1 2 THE V070-393316-002 C/P AND IS ACCEPTABLE. 252121 1 1 THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE DAMAGE ON THE UNDER SIDE OF THE R/H RADIATOR PA 252121 1 2 NEL #2 HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. KOROPON WAS APPLIED 252121 1 3 TO THE REGION OF ALUMINUM FACESHEET THAT WAS VISIBLE FOLLOWED BY WASH 252121 1 4 PRIMER AND WHITE THERMAL TOPCOAT. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 252121 1 5 ION. 252143 1 1 SEE MR RATIONALE ON PGE 2, FLEXHOSE TOUCHING CONDITION IS ACCEPTED PER M 252143 1 2 R RATIONALE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP ON INSTALLATION. 252143 1 3 252171 1 1 PR WAS INITIATED INCORRECTLY. SHOULD NOT BE A VEHICLE PR. PROBABLE CAU 252171 1 2 SE: WORKMANSHIP. 252204 1 1 THE DISCREPANT ELEVON THERMAL ROPE SEALS WERE REPLACED WITH NEW SEALS. 252204 1 2 THE SEALS WILL BE INSTALLED PER STR-3-07-241 MOD 002. NO FURTHER DISC 252204 1 3 REPANCIES EXIST ON THIS PR. 252212 1 1 DISCREPANT BOLT WITH BOLT LOCATOR THAT IS INSTALLED AND CANNOT BE REMO 252212 1 2 VED HAS BEEN ROUTED TO HDA FOR FURTHER DISPOSITION. ENGINEERING RECOMM 252212 1 3 ENDS ROUTING BOLT TO RI SERVICE CENTER FOR POSSIBLE REUSE OF PARTS AFT 252212 1 4 ER REPAIR. A SPARE BOLT AND LOCATOR WAS AVAILABLE AND WERE INSTALLED P 252212 1 5 ER S0004. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBA 252212 1 6 BLE CAUSE: BOLT LOCATOR CROSS THREADED INTO BOLT. 252212 1 7 MSG-ID NOT KNOWN. 252302 1 1 LOWER AFT NUTPLATE IS DAMAGED AND NOT USABLE (REF. 252302 1 2 PR STR-3-A0059 MR). THREE REMAINING FASTENERS 252302 1 3 WILL SUPPORT SCUPPER WITHOUT DAMAGE TO ORBITER AIR 252302 1 4 FRAME OR SCUPPER. 252601 1 1 THE SPLITS IN THE INSULATORS WERE REPAIRED AT ROCK 252601 1 2 WELL SERVICE CENTER & ARE OK FOR FLIGHT. 252782 1 1 THE (2) DENTS WERE APPROVED BY MR TO BE WITHIN ACC 252782 1 2 EPTABLE LIMITS. CAUSE OF DENTS WERE DUE TO CARELES 252782 1 3 SNESS. CLOSE THIS PR. 252949 1 1 PNL V669-000771-002 WAS TRIMMED AS PER FIG 1.0 TO ALLOW CLEARANCE OF E 252949 1 2 CL DUCT V070-613793-003. AT THE TRIMMED AREA, 1 MS21266 TFE GROMMET W 252949 1 3 AS BONDED TO THE -002 PNL USING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. THE GROMMET DID 252949 1 4 MAKE SLIGHT CONTACT W/ THE ECL DUCT INSULATION, AND WAS MR ACCEPTED FO 252949 1 5 R USE AS IS. THE TRIMMING & USE OF THE GROMMET ON THE V669-000771-002 252949 1 6 PNL WAS PERFORMED PER EO-TO-FOLLOW. UPON VERIF THAT RELE'D EO REFLEC 252949 1 7 TS ENG DISPO, CLOSE THIS PR. 253306 1 1 THE CAPTIVE FASTENERS DOCUMENTED IN ITEMS 1 AND 2 ARE THE SAME FASTENE 253306 1 2 RS. QC RESOLVED THE DISCREPANCIES BY ORDERING THE PROPER FASTENERS AND 253306 1 3 REMOVING THE EXTRA WASHERS. THE CAPTIVE FASTENERS REMOVED WERE A GRIP 253306 1 4 LENGTH LONGER THAN THOSE CALLED FOR IN THE PRINT. THE V070-396425-001 253306 1 5 WITH CORRECT HARDWARE WAS INSTALLED PER V80-95964. 253310 1 1 THIS PR REPORTED SEVEN INTERRELATED DISCREPANCIES. THE FOLLOWING LISTS 253310 1 2 A SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEMS AND WHAT WAS DONE TO CORRECT THEM. THE FIRS 253310 1 3 T PROBLEM DESCRIBED IN THIS PR WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE CARRIER PANEL TO F 253310 1 4 ILLER BAR SUPPORT STEPS (ALLOWABLE MR STEP RANGE IS 0.040 TO 0.085). T 253310 1 5 HE OUT OF TOLERANCE STEPS WERE DISCREPANT AREAS. THE SECOND DISCREPANC 253310 1 6 Y, PAGE 1A ITEM 2, DESCRIBED OUT OF TOLERANCE CARRIER PANEL TO WING TR 253310 1 7 AINLIN EDGE STEPS (ALLOWABLE MR STEP RANGE IS 0.040 TO 0.085). SHIMS W 253310 1 8 RE USED HERE ALSO TO PUT DISCREPANT STEPS IN TOLERANCE. THE THIRD DISC 253310 1 9 REPANCY AROSE WHEN TRAILING EDGE DUE TO FILLER BAR INTERFERENCE. THIS 253310 1 10 PROBLEM WAS SOLVED BY TRIMMMING THE WIDTH DIMENSION OF THE SHIM SO IT 253310 1 11 COULD BE INSTALLED WITHOUT FILLER BAR INTERFERENCE. THE DISCREPANCY DE 253310 1 12 SCRIBED BY ITEM 4 PAGE 1C WAS SIMILIAR TO THE ITEM 3 DISCREPANCY IN AS 253310 1 13 MUCH AS A DIMENSION WAS TOO LARGE. IN THIS CASE AN MR SHIM WAS DIMENS 253310 1 14 IONED AND FABRICATED TOO LARGE TO FIT THE BOTTOM OF THE FILLER BAR SUP 253310 1 15 PORT. TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM THE SHIM WAS DIMENSIONED AND TRIMMED TO MA 253310 1 16 TCH THE DIMENSION OF THE BOTTOM OF THE FILLER BAR SUPPORT. PAGE 1D, IT 253310 1 17 EM 5 DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED A LAMINATED SHIM THAT DEBONDED FROM A CARRI 253310 1 18 ER PANEL FOOT. TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM A SHIM WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED 253310 1 19 IN PLACE OF THE DEBONDED SHIM. PAGE 1D ALSO DESCRIBED AN ITEM 6 DISCRE 253310 1 20 PANCY. THE DISCREPANCY REPORTED A MISALIGNED SHIM AND WAS MR ACCEPTED 253310 1 21 SINCE THE MISALIGNMENT DID NOT COMPROMISE THE INTENT OF THE SHIM. THE 253310 1 22 LAST DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED BY THIS PR WAS A PAGE 1E, ITEM 7. THIS DESC 253310 1 23 RIBED A CONDITION OF INSUFFICIENT FILLER BAR CONTACT SURFACE FOR PROPE 253310 1 24 R THERMAL SEALING. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS TRANSFERED TO TPS ENGINEERING. 253420 1 1 RCC PNL #3 OUTBOARD INSULATORS ARE BEINGREPLAED P 253420 1 2 ER VSTR-3-07-253 MOD 002. PANEL #3 OUTBOARD SIDE H 253420 1 3 AS HAD MOMENT THE ARMS ADDED AND THEREFORE REQUIRE 253420 1 4 LARGER INSULATORS WHICH WILL BE INSTALLED PER VST 253420 1 5 R-3-07-253 MOD 002. VSTR-3-07-253 MOD 005 WILL ROU 253420 1 6 TE V070-190018-002 INSULATOR WITH OTHERS TO HDA FO 253420 1 7 R FURTHER DISPOSITIONING THEREFORE NO REPAIR WORK 253420 1 8 IS REQUIRED FOR THIS INSULATOR. 253467 1 1 THE 25 AREAS OF CORROSION ON THE ELEVON SKIN WERE MANUALLY AND CHEMICA 253467 1 2 LLY CLEANED. AN OPTICAL INSPECTION OF EACH PIT DEPTH WAS PERFORMED AND 253467 1 3 ANALYZED BY RI/DOWNEY STRESS AND RI/DOWNEY DESIGN. TWENTY-FOUR OF THE 253467 1 4 CORROSION AREAS WERE VERIFIED OXIDE FREE AND ONE AREA REQUIRED A DOUB 253467 1 5 LER. THE DOUBLER HAS BEEN BONDED AND THE PROCESS VERIFICATION PANELS H 253467 1 6 AVE BEEN VERIFIED ABOVE SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. STRUCTURAL INTEGRI 253467 1 7 TY OF THE ELEVON SKIN HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. NO DISCREPANCIES EXIST. 253542 1 1 DISCREPANT FASTENER HEADS LISTED IN ITEM 1. PAGE 1 253542 1 2 WERE SHAVED SO THE CROWN WOULD NOT PROTRUDE MORE 253542 1 3 THAN 0.020 INCHES. FASTENERS MRB APPROVED FOR UNRE 253542 1 4 STRICTED USE. THE DISPCREPANT FASTENERS LISTE DIN 253542 1 5 ITEM 2, PAGE 1A WRE REPLACED WITH SUBSTITUTE FASTE 253542 1 6 NERS PER CONVAIR DWG 70Z1411. FASTENERS WERE REPLA 253542 1 7 CED IN THIS CASE BECAUSE A FLUSH SURFACE WAS NEEDE 253542 1 8 D FOR THE BONDING OF AN ALUMINUM SHIM. 253757 1 1 REF ITEM 1, PG 1, FIBERGLASS CHANNEL BRACKET, 73A560001-2083 HAS STRESS 253757 1 2 CRACKS ADJACENT TO FASTNER HOLES, (3) LOCATIONS. BRACKET SECURES (3) 253757 1 3 PROPELANT FEED LINES. LOCATED ON LP04, LHOMS STINGER, BEHIND 59-49 DOOR. 253757 1 4 ITEM 1, PG1, DISCREPANCY WAS RESOLVED BY STRENGTHENING THE CHANNEL 253757 1 5 BRACKET AT THE LOCATION OF THE 3 PROPELLANT FEED LINE CLAMPS. 253757 1 6 STRENGTHENING WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY SANDWICHING THE FIGERGLASS BRACKET 253757 1 7 BETWEEN FABRICATED CRES STIFFENERS. SPACERS WERE USED BETWEEN THE LINE 253757 1 8 CLAMPS AND BRACKET TO SECURE LINES IN A NEUTRAL POSITION AND RELIEVE A 253757 1 9 PRELOADING CONDITION. DURING WORK, ITEM 2, PG 1A, ITEM 3, PG 1B AND ITEM 253757 1 10 4, PG 1C WERE WRITTEN. ITEM 2, PG 1A, MISLOCATED HOLE ON CHANNEL 253757 1 11 BRACKET, NOTED BY INTERFERENCE BETWEEN INNER MR CHANNEL STIFFENER AND 253757 1 12 MISLOCATED HOLE. DISCREPANCY WAS RESOLVED BY MODIFYING THE INNER MR 253757 1 13 CHANNEL STIFFNER. ITEM 3, PG 1B, MISMATCH OF HOLE ALIGNMENT BETWEEN 253757 1 14 LOWER PROPELLANT FEED LINE CLAMP AND CHANNEL BRACKET. MISMATCH BETWEEN 253757 1 15 CLAMP AND CHANNEL BRACKET WOULD CAUSE AN UNDESIRABLE PRELOAD CONDITION. 253757 1 16 DISCREPANCY WAS RESOLVED BY REVERSING THE CLAMP DIRECTION AND ADDING AN 253757 1 17 MR STRAP AND SPACER BETWEEN THE CLAMP AND CHANNEL BRACKET TO ALLEVIATE 253757 1 18 THE MISMATCH. ITEM 4, PG 1C WAS NOT VALID DISCREPANCY. PAGE 1C WAS 253757 1 19 WRITTEN BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL DISPOSITION WAS NOT PERFORMED AS WRITTEN, 253757 1 20 THUS PREVENTING TIMELY COMPLETION OF THIS REPAIR. FIBERGLASS CHANNEL 253757 1 21 BRACKET IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THIS PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 253757 1 22 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION DUE TO MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN CHANNEL BRACKET AND 253757 1 23 PROPELLANT FEEDLINES DURING ORIGINAL INSTALLATION. 253757 1 24 253914 1 1 FILE 3 OMRS V45CG0.060-C STATES, A FUEL CELL CONDENSER EXIT TEMP EXCUR 253914 1 2 SION MAY EXCEED 160 DEGREE F AFTER FUEL CELL READY "ON". THE TEMPERATU 253914 1 3 RE EXCLUSIONS SHALL NOT EXCEED 180 DEGREE F NOR LAST LONGER THAN 15 MI 253914 1 4 NUTES. FUEL CELL #3 CONDENSER EXIT TEMP EXCEEDED 160 DEGREE F AT 1 MIN 253914 1 5 UTE AFTER READY FOR LOAD INDICATION AND DROPPED BELOW 160 DEGREE F 19 253914 1 6 MINUTES LATER, EXCEEDING OMRS BY 4 MINUTES. FC #3 CONDENSER EXIT TEMP 253914 1 7 DID NOT EXCEED 180 DEGREE F. THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN EXPERIENCED IN THE 253914 1 8 PAST AND CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE THERMAL CONTROL VLV ACTUATOR RUBBER 253914 1 9 "BOOT" NOT BEING FULLY SOAKED WITH COOLANT. THIS FUEL CELL DID NOT COM 253914 1 10 E SERVICED WITH COOLANT FROM THE VENDOR (I.F.C) WHICH IS A CONTRIBUTIN 253914 1 11 G FACTOR. SINCE COMPLETION OF FUEL CELL START, FUEL CELL THERMAL CONTR 253914 1 12 OL SYSTEM HAS RESPONDED WELL TO A WIDE RANGE OF LOAD ADJUSTS. CONDENSE 253914 1 13 R EXIT TEMP STAYED WITHIN THE SPECIFIED RANGE (140DG-160DGF) DURING FU 253914 1 14 EL CELL PERFORMANCE CALIBRATION AND LOAD ADJUST, WHICH INDICATES "BOOT 253914 1 15 " IS NOW SOAKED AND RESPONDING ACCURATELY TO LOAD CHANGES. THIS PR WIL 253914 1 16 L BE UPGRADED TO A PR AGAINST FUEL CELL #3, AND CLOSED UPON RECEIPT OF 253914 1 17 WAIVER # WK0680. UPGRADE THIS IPR TO PR AGAINST: EICN- FCP-3-07-0230, 253914 1 18 PT NAME# FUEL CELL#3, P/N: MC464-0115-3000, S/N: 115, NHA: V070-45490 253914 1 19 7-001, VENDOR: INTERNATIONAL FUEL CELLS. CLOSURE: FC3 CONDENSER EXIT E 253914 1 20 XCEEDING READY FOR LOAD BY 4 MIN. IS NOT DETERMENTAL TO FC. CLOSEPR. 254006 1 1 P/N 73A310092-5009 IS AN INHOUSE MANUFACTURING # U 254006 1 2 SED BY MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DURING CONSTRUCTION. DWG 254006 1 3 SHOWS P/N IS 73A310092-1007 AS STATED BY J/C. RE-I 254006 1 4 DENTIFY 59-19 DOOR TO SHOW CORRECT P/N 73A310092-1 254006 1 5 007 PER MAO104-301. 254026 1 1 RESISTANCE WAS INCORRECTLY CALCULATED FOR MLO310-0 254026 1 2 064 INSTL SPEC. HTRs AS TESTED ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR 254026 1 3 FLT. EO-TO-FOLLOW WILL CORRECT RESISTANCE VALUE 254026 1 4 FROM 86.0 +/- 5.25 TO 111.5 +/- 9.5 OHMS (TESTED V 254026 1 5 ALUE WAS 109.8 OHMS, SEE PG. 1). VERIFY EO CHANGE 254026 1 6 TO SPEC CORRECTS PROBLEM. MLO310-0064 EO F01. 254388 1 1 WHERE THE RIGHT SIDE CABLE TRAY ATTACHES TO THE Xo 254388 1 2 807 FRAME, HOLES 2, 6, 7, 9 & 11 WERE REAMED UP T 254388 1 3 O .2180" & HOLE 12 WAS REAMED UP TO .2188" TO PREV 254388 1 4 ENT HAVING DAMAGE DONE TO THE HOLES BY HAVING THE 254388 1 5 FASTENER THREADS IN BEARING. EDDY CURRENT INSPs WE 254388 1 6 RE DONE W/ NO DAMAGE DETECTED. THIS REPAIR MAKES 254388 1 7 THE HOLES ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE SP 254388 1 8 ACERS & WASHERS REMOVED BY STEP 4 OF THIS PR WILL 254388 1 9 BE RE-INSTL'D BY STEP 14 OF BASIC STR-3-07-135. 254407 1 1 CONN DESCRIBED IN ITEM 1 COULD NOT BE INSTL'D INTO CONN BRKT DUE TO CO 254407 1 2 NN BRKT DUE TO V070-340463-002 CONN BRKT AT Xo 731.90 & V070-340463-00 254407 1 3 1 CONN BRKT AT Xo 709.56 BEING REVERSED PER PRINT. CONN BRKTs WERE EX 254407 1 4 CHANGED BY EO-TO-FOLLOW ALLOWING FOR CONN TO BE INSTL'D. CLOSE THIS P 254407 1 5 R UPON RECEIPT OF EO (REF. STEP 6.0) 254636 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP WHEN THE SLEEVE, P/N 1170183-1A, WOULD NOT FIT O 254636 1 2 NTO THE AXLE PROPERLY. THE INTERFERENCE IS AROUND THE KEYS WHERE THERE 254636 1 3 SEEMS TO BE A RAISED AREA ON THE SLEEVE. TOW ADDITIONAL SLEEVES WERE 254636 1 4 OBTAINED FROM STOCK AND FIT CHECKED. THE FIT FOR BOTH WAS NOMINAL. UPO 254636 1 5 N ADDITIONAL ENGINEERING INSPECTION IT WAS NOTICED THAT THE NEW SLEEVE 254636 1 6 S SHOWED SIGNS OF MACHINING IN AREA AROUND KEYS WHERE THE DISCREPANT S 254636 1 7 LEEVE DID NOT. ONE OF THE NEW SLEEVES WAS USED FOR WHEEL INSTALLATION 254636 1 8 AND THE OTHER RETURNED TO STOCK. THE DISCREPANT SLEEVE WAS ROUTED TO H 254636 1 9 DA FOR DISPO. CAUSE FOR THE DISCREPANCY WAS A BAD PART FROM THE VENDOR 254636 1 10 ALL WORK COMPLETE AND NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 254682 1 1 THIS SHIM WAS SUCCESSFULLY TRIMMED TO DRWG. NOTES. 254682 1 2 NO OTHER PROBLEM WAS FOUND, THE FID #8 WAS INSTALL 254682 1 3 ED PER TPS VSTR-3-05-109 254810 1 1 (ITEM 1) V070-856927-003 ANGLE HAS A CRACK IN IT. DISCREPANT ANGLE REM 254810 1 2 OVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW ANGLE. (ITEM 2) DUE TO THE COMPLEXITY OF 254810 1 3 REMOVING THE GROUND SUPPORT SUPPLY HYD. INTERFACE FOR SYSTEMS 1 AND 3 254810 1 4 AND THE V070-856927-002 SUPPORT TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE 2 OUTER RIVETS, 254810 1 5 THESE RIVETS WERE GROUND FLUSH WITH THE SUPPORT, CORROSION PROTECTED, 254810 1 6 AND FOR UNRESTRICTED USE ON PG. 11. (ITEM 3) MISLOCATED HOLE WHILE DRI 254810 1 7 LLING IN V070-856927-003 ANGLE. INBD SIDE OF THE ANGLE TRIMMED AND COR 254810 1 8 ROSION PROTECTED. MISLOCATED HOLE NOW IN PROPER LOCATION. MR FOR UNRES 254810 1 9 TRICTED USE ON PAGE 10.3. 254911 1 1 "RUST" IS SUPPERFICIAL SURFACE CONDITION ONLY. THE RUST RESIDUE WAS RE 254911 1 2 MOVED FROM THE INCONEL INSULATOR. THE INSULATORS ARE MADE OF INCONEL A 254911 1 3 ND ARE NOT SUSEPTIBLE TO THE RUST THAT APPEARS IN THE DISCRIBED LOCATI 254911 1 4 ON. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCY IS CORROSION OF STEEL PARTIC 254911 1 5 LE RESIDUE THAT WAS LEFT ON THE INSULATOR BY THE STEEL GRINDER USED TO 254911 1 6 SMOOTH OUT THE WELD LINES. NO FURTHER ENG IS REQUIED 255054 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 255054 1 2 CTION. C/Ps ACCEPTABLE FOR FLT. RC ACTION TO INV 255054 1 3 ESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO PREVE 255054 1 4 NT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 255056 1 1 THE SAFETY WIRE HOLE ON LINK V070-510615-006 ON RH NLG DOOR WAS DAMAGE 255056 1 2 D DURING MEQ-3-07-0269. AFTER INVESTIGATION BY LSOC, ROCKWELL & NASA E 255056 1 3 NGINEERING, IT WAS DECIDED TO DRILL A NEW SAFETY WIRE HOLE IN THE LIND 255056 1 4 AND MR THE LIND. THE LINK WAS REMOVED, A NEW HOLE WAS DRILLED IN THE 255056 1 5 OPPOSITE CORNER, THE MR I.D. WAS APPLIED AND THE LINK WAS REINSTALLED. 255056 1 6 THIS CORRECTED THE PROBLEM AND THE LINK IS MR'D OK FOR UNRESTRICTED U 255056 1 7 SE. 255266 1 1 THE SCRATCHES HAD THEIR RAISED EDGES REMOVED. 255266 1 2 THEY WERE CORROSION PROTECTED BY CHEM. FILMING. 255266 1 3 THEY WERE MR'd OK FOR UNRESTRICTED ACCEPTANCE. 255266 1 4 CAUSED BY POOR BLACK REMOVL TECHNIQUE. 255385 1 1 THE WORST DAMAGE WAS MEASURED AND DOCUMENTED. LSOC/STR AND RI/SS/STR E 255385 1 2 NGINEERING ACCESSED THE DAMAGE AND THE DAMAGE WAS MR ACCEPTED. EXPOSED 255385 1 3 METAL WAS THEN CORROSION PROTECTED. 255415 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED BY LSOC MEQ ENGINEERING DURING A VISUAL INSPECTI 255415 1 2 ON OF THE RH MAIN LANDING GEAR. IT WAS OBSERVED FROM THE LINKAGE CONFI 255415 1 3 GURATIONS THAT RIGGING DISCREPANCIES EXISTED. THE FOLLOWING FIVE DISCR 255415 1 4 EPANCIES WERE NOTED DURING RH MLG RIGGING CHECKS AND SUBSEQUENT RIGGIN 255415 1 5 B PROCEDURES. ITEM #1, PAGE 1: A SERIES OF ADJUSTMENTS WERE MADE TO TH 255415 1 6 E RH MLG BY MEANS OF MLG CYCLES, MEASURING GAP DIMENSIONS, AND MAKING 255415 1 7 CORRECTIVE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE FOLLOWING: DOOR RETRACT LINKAGES. UPON C 255415 1 8 OMPLETION OF THIS SERIES OF MEASUREMENTS AND ADJUSTMENTS, ALL OF THE R 255415 1 9 H MLG DOOR STOPS, DOOR PEDESTAL STOPS, HOOK TO ROLLER GAPS, AND LINKAG 255415 1 10 E OVER-CENTER MEASUREMENTS WERE RETURNED/VERIFIED TO BE WITHIN SPECIFI 255415 1 11 ED TOLERANCES PER MLO308-0029, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FOLLOWING THR 255415 1 12 E: A.) THE RH FWD/INBD, FWD/OTBD, & AFT/OTBD DOOR STOP GAPS WERE MEASU 255415 1 13 RED TO BE 0.005" (SHOULD BE 0.0")- (REF. MR PAGE 206). THE AFT/INBD DO 255415 1 14 OR STOP GAP WAS 0.010". PROPER BULB SEAL CONTACT WAS ACHIEVED AND THE 255415 1 15 THERMAL BARRIERS ARE WITHIN SPECIFICATION. THESE DISCREPANCIES ARE ACC 255415 1 16 EPTABLE AND APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. B.) THE RH MLG DOOR LATCH B 255415 1 17 ELLCRACK STOP IS NOT WITHIN SPEC. THE GAP DIMENSION WAS MEASURED TO BE 255415 1 18 0.076" (SHOULD BE 0.0"). THE PURPOSE OF THE BELLCRACK STOP IS TO PROV 255415 1 19 IDE A STOPPING POINT OF HOW FAR THE HOOKS SHOULD ENGAGE THE DOOR ROLLE 255415 1 20 RS. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE DOOR HOOK TO ROLLER GAPS WERE ALL WITHIN SPE 255415 1 21 C INDICATING SUFFICIENT HOOK/ROLLER ENGAGEMENT. B.)THE ONLY FUNCTION A 255415 1 22 FFECTED BY THE 0.076" GAP IS THE BOOSTER BENGEE TRIGGER GAP. THIS HAS 255415 1 23 BEEN VERIFIED TO BE WITHIN SPEC WITH THE CURRENT 0.076" BELLCRANK GAP. 255415 1 24 (REF. MR PAGE 207). C.) THE STRUCTURAL MOLD LINE WAS MEASURED TO BE FR 255415 1 25 OM 0.027" TO 0.170" AND SHOULD BE 0 +/- 0.030 (REF. MR PAGE 208). THE 255415 1 26 TILE ALONG THE RH MLG DOOR WAS SHAVED TO OBRAIN A FLUSH MOLD LINE. PRO 255415 1 27 EPR ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL CONTACT IS BEING MADE TO ALLOW A GOOD SEALING S 255415 1 28 URFACE AND PROPER HOOK/ROLLER ENGAGEMENT IS APPARENT TO HOLD THE DOOR 255415 1 29 IN THE PROPER POSITION. MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUS 255415 1 30 E: IMPROPER INITIAL RIGGING. ITEM #2, PAGE 1A: A 0.188" DIAMETER DRILL 255415 1 31 BIT WAS USED AS A RIG PIN AND COULD NOT BE FREELY INSERTED INTO THE RH 255415 1 32 MLG FWD DOOR HOOK RIGGING HOLE. A SLIGHT FORCE APPLIED TO THE HOOK/LI 255415 1 33 NE ASSEMBLY WAS REQUIRED TO TAKE UP THE SLACK IN THE LINK AND THUS ALI 255415 1 34 GN THE RIGGING HOLE ALLOWING THE RIG PIN TO BE INSERTED. ADJUSTMENTS O 255415 1 35 F THE ROD ENDS TO LENGTHEN OR SHORTEN THE LINKAGE WOULD ONLY INCREASE 255415 1 36 THE MISALIGNMENT OF THE RIGGING HOLE. ITEM #2 IS NOT A PR CONDITION. P 255415 1 37 ROBABLE CAUSE: SMALL AMOUNT OF SLACK IN DOOR HOOK LINAGES. ITEM #3 PAG 255415 1 38 E 1B: AFTER RETRACTING THE RH MLG, THE RH DOOR UPLOCK INDICATION WAS N 255415 1 39 OT RECEIVED. GAP "'A" & "B" TARGET TO SENSOR MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN A 255415 1 40 ND FOUND TO BE WITHIN SPECIFICATION. THE UPLOCK HOOK WAS THEN MANUALLY 255415 1 41 CYCLED AND THE INDICATION WAS VERIFIED TO BE OPERATIVE (REF. RETEST CY 255415 1 42 CLES; PAGES 154-160, STEPS 362-383). THIS DISCREPANCY OCCURRED DURING 255415 1 43 A MLG CYCLE IN WHICH THE V070-510452-001 MLG DOOR RETRACAT LINK WAS PR 255415 1 44 EVIOUSLY EXTENDED (WHICH DECREASED THE DOOR RETRACT LINKAGE PRELOAD). 255415 1 45 THIS RESULTED IN THE DOOR HOOKS NOT BEING ABLE TO FULLY ENGAGE THE ROL 255415 1 46 LERS AND THUS THE UPLOCK SENSOR AND TARGET DID NOT ALIGN AND GIVE AN U 255415 1 47 PLOCK INDICATION. (REF PAGE 29, STEP 93-DOOR HOOK MEASUREMENTS) THE ME 255415 1 48 162-0009-0011 ROD ASSEMBLY PRE-LOAD WAS REVERIFIED TO BE WIRHIN SPECIF 255415 1 49 ICATION AND AFTER THE LANDING GEAR WAS RETRACTED, THE DESIRED UPLOCK I 255415 1 50 NDICATION WAS OBTAINED. THIS PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE C 255415 1 51 AUSE: DOOR HOOKS DID NOT FULLY ENGAGE THE DOOR ROLELRS THEREFORE THE M 255415 1 52 LG DOOR WAS NOT PULLED UP TO THE FULL CLOSE POSITION. ITEMS 4 & 5 PAGE 255415 1 53 1C: THESE TWO DISCREPANCIES WERE INITIATED WHEN IT WAS OBSERVED THAT 255415 1 54 THE V070-510101 RH MLG DOOR BUNGEE WAS BEING ADJUSTED INCORRECTLY. THE 255415 1 55 V070-510138 RING NUT WAS BEING ADJUSTED/TURNED WHEN THE V070-510141 T 255415 1 56 UBE WAS THE PART THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADJSUTED. ITEM 4: ADDRESSED THE 255415 1 57 CONDITION OF V070-510138 RING NUT NOT BEING PROPERLY TORQUED DUE TO S 255415 1 58 USPECT ADJUSTMENT. THE RING NUT WAS RETORQUED/VERIFIED TO 300 IN-LBS. 255415 1 59 PE RSTEP 384, PAGE 161. PROBABLE CAUSE: ADJUSTMENT MADE TO WRONG PART 255415 1 60 OF HARDWARE. ITEM 5: TWO TABS WERE PUNCHED IN THE V070-510145-002 WASH 255415 1 61 ER TO HOLD THE RING NUT IN PLACE AFATER THE RING NUT WAS RE-TORQUED (S 255415 1 62 EE ITEM #4) -(REF. STEP 385, PAGE 161 & DWG V070-510101). PROBABLE CAU 255415 1 63 SE: DURING ADJUSTMENT OF THE V070-510138 RING NUT, THE TABS ON THE NOT 255415 1 64 ED WASHER MUST BE RAISED TO ALLOW THE RING NUT TO TURN. TABS WERE NEVE 255415 1 65 R RE-FORMED. PR CONDITONS 4 & 5 NO LONGER EXIST. ALL FIVE DISCREPANCIE 255415 1 66 S NOTED BY THIS PR HAVE BEEN CORRECTED, RE-TESTED, AND/OR MR ACCEPTED. 255415 1 67 CLOSE THIS PR. 255422 1 1 E.O-TO-FOLLOW DISPO REPLACED V070-156856-003 BACKP 255422 1 2 LATE (INSTALLED BY PR STR 3-07-1349) WITH A V070-1 255422 1 3 56856-005 BRACKET WHICH HAS A SMALLER CONNECTOR HO 255422 1 4 LE. 255492 1 1 A FASTENER HEAD SHEARED OFF LEAVING THE SHANK PORTION REMAINING IN THE 255492 1 2 NUT PLATE. THE NS103623-02-5U NUT PLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED RETU 255492 1 3 RNING TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 255643 01 1 JSC HAS AGREED TO RPL THE NUT PLATE, 255643 01 2 NO KSC WORK REQUIRED 255764 1 1 THE BURRS ON THE FLANGE OF THE V070-198301-002 HINGE TUBE END FITTING 255764 1 2 WERE REMOVED AND KOROPON WAS APPLIED WHERE MATERIAL WAS REMOVED. KOROP 255764 1 3 ON AND DEBURRING WAS PERFORMED WITH MR APPROVAL. THE FITTING WAS MR ID 255764 1 4 AS "MR STR-3-12-3581". BOTH THE FITTING AND THE SEAL PANEL WERE PER P 255764 1 5 RINT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS A BUILD UP OF TOLERNACE. THE M 255764 1 6 ATERIAL REMOVAL WILL ELIMINATE THE INTERFERENCE. 255952 1 1 THE DING ON THE FLIPPER DOOR RUB PANEL, V070-198801-053, IDENTIFIED IN 255952 1 2 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS PREVIOUSLY MR IDENTIFIED PER "STR-3-07-1128". THE 255952 1 3 MR MARKING WAS REMOVED AND NEW MARKING WAS APPLIED TO INCREASE VISIBI 255952 1 4 LITY. THE DISCREPANCY IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, IS RESOLVED. PROBA 255952 1 5 BLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 256254 1 1 DENTS FOUND IN AV-BAY #6 PANEL V070-356735-012 ARE MINOR AND HAVE BEEN 256254 1 2 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR. DENTS WERE CHECKED FOR DEBOND A 256254 1 3 ND CRACKS AND NONE WERE FOUND. ITEM 1, PAGE 1, HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND N 256254 1 4 O LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: AV-BAY PANELS ARE DENTED DURING VEHIC 256254 1 5 LE PROCESSING WITH TOOLS, ETC. 256293 1 1 THE SEAL WAS MR REPAIRED BY APPLYING WHITE RTV TO ITS LOWER SURFACE. P 256293 1 2 ROBABLE CAUSE: DAMAGE CAUSED BY RE-ENTRY HEAT. 256565 1 1 PREVIOUS MR DISPO ALLOWS USE OF V070-356735-012 AC 256565 1 2 CESS PNL. AS-IS SURFACE COATING WAS APPLIED TO ANY 256565 1 3 OTHER AREAS WHERE CHIPPING/SCRATCHES OCCURED IN S 256565 1 4 URFACE COATING PER PRINT. 256847 1 1 (1) POLYIMIDE SEAL AND (10) BLOCK SEAL WERE CAHRRED AND DEGRADED. THE 256847 1 2 PARTS WERE BOTH ROUTED TO HDA WITH A RECOMMENDATION TO SCRAP. NEW PART 256847 1 3 S WERE ORDERED AND PUT IN WITH THE ELEVON COVE REWORK TPS'S FOR REPLAC 256847 1 4 EMENT INSTALLATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE OPE 256847 1 5 RATINAL DEGRADATION FROM AIR FLOW PATHS WHICH SHOULD BE FIXED BY THE F 256847 1 6 LIGHT 12 REWORK. 256857 1 1 THE .25" O.D. H2 T-O LINE V070-454706-032 RUNS = 256857 1 2 ROM FROM THE T-O UMBILICAL I/F TO H2 MANIFOLD PNL 256857 1 3 NO. 2. THE MAX. SYS. SERVICE PRESSURE THIS LINE 256857 1 4 WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO IS 302 PSIG (H2 TANK RELIEF 256857 1 5 VLV CRACKING PRESSURE). NORMAL OPERATING PRESSURE 256857 1 6 IS 250 PSIG. THIS LINE IS FABRICATED FROM .25" X 256857 1 7 .016" 21-6-9 CRESS (PER MBO160-035 CLASS 2). PER 256857 1 8 SPEC MBO160-035 THE HYDROSTAT PRESSURE OF THIS 256857 1 9 SIZE LINE THAT WOULD NOT CAUSE DEFORMATION IS AP- 256857 1 10 PROX. 15,900 PSI. THE BEND MEASUREMENT DOCUMENTA- 256857 1 11 TION OF THIS PR IS IN STEP 2, (.25" MAX. DEFLEC- 256857 1 12 TIONIN A 15" SPAN). BEND IS MORE OF A GRADUAL BOW 256857 1 13 . LINE WAS INSP'd AT MILK STOOL SUPPORT POINT AND 256857 1 14 NO INDENTATION NOTED (STEP 3). LINE TY-WRAPS RE- 256857 1 15 INSTL'D PER PRINT. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE 256857 1 16 "AS IS". NOTE: THIS PR HAS BEEN COORDINATED W/ 256857 1 17 MEL PRUKOP, R.I. DOWNEY ENG. 257183 1 1 CONCLUSION: DOUBLER HAS BEEN REMOVED AND RE-BONDED 257183 1 2 PER PRINT. 257225 1 1 THE FAILED AFT CENTERLINE LATCH MOTOR 1 STOWED INDICATION WAS CAUSED B 257225 1 2 Y A BLOWN FUSE AS A RESULT OF A DAMAGED WIRE. THE WIRE WAS REPAIRED AN 257225 1 3 D RETESTED PER PR EPD-3-08-1092. THE FUSE WAS REPLACED PER THIS WAD AN 257225 1 4 D RETESTED PER V1097 ON 1/15/89. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS WITH TH 257225 1 5 E CENTERLINE LATCH INDICATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 257345 1 1 WAVINESS OF DOOR IS CAUSED BY THE RIVETING OF TWO 257345 1 2 DEBONDED FACE SHEETS. THIS REPAIR HAS BEEN MR'D OK 257345 1 3 AS IS AND CANNOT BE FIXED. NO FURTHER STRUCTURAL 257345 1 4 ACTION WILL BE TAKEN. REF. PR STR-3-07-1354 LH, 13 257345 1 5 58 RH. CLOSE PR. 257530 1 1 THE LOOSE MD111-4027 BOLT WHICH ATTACHES THE V070-352877-009 CLIP, DOC 257530 1 2 UMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY TORQUED CORRECTLY. ENGINE 257530 1 3 ERING INSPECTED AREA AND FOUND NO DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF THE LOOSE CLIP 257530 1 4 . OMI V5E29, SSME GIMBAL BOLT REMOVAL/REPLACEMENT, SEQ 01-017 WILL TOR 257530 1 5 QUE THE MD111-4027 BOLT TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS, PROBABLE CAUSE: BOLT PR 257530 1 6 EVIOUSLY NOT TORQUED PROPERLY. 257538 1 1 ON THE R/H WIRE TRAY AT THE XO 1040 FRAME LOCATION 257538 1 2 . HOLES 2,5,6,7,10,11, AND 12 WERE REAMED TO REMOV 257538 1 3 E DAMAGE CAUSED BY THREADS IN BEARING. THE FINAL H 257538 1 4 OLE DIMENSIONS ARE WITHIN THE ALLOWABLE RANGE AND 257538 1 5 NDE (REPORT 30325) HAS NOT DETECTED ANY CRACKS. TH 257538 1 6 IS REPAIR IS ACCEPTABLE AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 257647 1 1 THIS DISCREPANCY WAS DETERMINED TO BE A TPS PR CON 257647 1 2 DITION AND TRANSFERRED TO FWD-3-07-1735. REF. ATTA 257647 1 3 CHED COPY OF TILE PR. CLOSE PR. 257705 1 1 TWO NUTPLATE BRACKETS USED IN ATTACHING CARRIER PANELS TO THE BASE HEA 257705 1 2 T SHIELD WERE SLIGHTLY BENT. THE TWO BRACKETS WERE REMOVED AND STRAIGH 257705 1 3 TENED WITH MR APPROVAL. A DYE PEN INSPECTION VERIFIED THAT NO CRACKS E 257705 1 4 XISTED OR DAMAGED HAD OCCURRED. THE BRACKETS WERE REINSTALLED PER PRIN 257705 1 5 T. DAMAGE OCCURRED DURING GSE HANDLING. CLOSE THIS PR. 257722 1 1 DISCREPANT PART WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW PART TO BE INSTALLED DURING PO 257722 1 2 D INSTALLATION. CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 257775 1 1 ITEM 1.0 DISCREPANCY, FASTENER INTERFERENCE WITH BRACKET WAS CORRECTED 257775 1 2 BY REMOVING THE FASTENER AND RE-ORIENTING WITH THE HEAD OF THE FASTEN 257775 1 3 ER BOLT ADJACENT TO THE BUNGEE ASSY BRACKET. THIS RESULTED IN A NON-IN 257775 1 4 TERFERENCE FIT. THE BRACKET REQUIRED LOOSENING OF ASSOCIATED FASTENERS 257775 1 5 TO ALLOW THE RE-ORIENTATION OF BOLT. A RETEST OF SWITCH DE-ACTUATION 257775 1 6 UPON COMPLETION OF ALL FASTENER INSTALLATIONS PROVIDED NOMINAL PERFORM 257775 1 7 ANCE OF SWITCH DE-ACTUATION. THE RETEST PERFORMED WITHIN THE WAD SATIF 257775 1 8 IES THE RETEST OF THE SWITCH FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES FOR THE MINO 257775 1 9 R RIGGING VERIFICATION. V1098 LANDING GEAR FUNCTIONAL WILL RE-VERIFY 257775 1 10 CORRECT RIGGING OF SWITCH DE-ACTUATION. ITEM 2.0 WAS IN-ADVERTANT CLER 257775 1 11 ICAL ERROR IN RECORDING A PART NUMBER THIS WAS CORRECTED BY A PEN AND 257775 1 12 INK CHANGE. ALL ITEMS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED AND CORRECTED TO FLIGHT CONF 257775 1 13 IGURATION. 257833 1 1 DELAMINATED CLAMP SET ASSY, V070-853270-002, NOTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, 257833 1 2 WAS REPAIRED BY INJECTING ADHESIVE BETWEEN DELAMINATES OF THE V070-853 257833 1 3 270-006 CLAMP HALF AND CLAMPING TOGETHER UNTIL CURED. THE REPAIR WAS A 257833 1 4 N MR REPAIR AND IDENTIFIED. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A, WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING 257833 1 5 THE V070-853270-006 CLAMP HALF WITH A NON-METALLIC TOOL. ITEMS 1 & 2 H 257833 1 6 AVE BEEN RESOLVED AND DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 257923 1 1 THE V070-346090-022 INNER CHANNEL BLOCKS WERE RELO 257923 1 2 CATED 1" INBOARD ON EACH STRAP V070-346095-098 AND 257923 1 3 -100, FOR LOCATIONS Xo995.50 (L/H) AND Xo995.50 ( 257923 1 4 R/H), RESPECTIVELY. THE RELOCATION OF THE -022 B 257923 1 5 LOCKS ALLOWED THE CHANNEL STRAPS TO FIT PER DESIGN 257923 1 6 INTENT. 257962 1 1 R/H INBRD WHEEL AND TIRE ASSY, WAS REMOVED AT KSC 257962 1 2 SHUTTLE, AND SENT TO B.F. GOODRICH THRU HDA 257968 1 1 THE V070-852761-002 SHIM WAS SUCCESSFULLY TRIMMED TO ELEMINATE THE INT 257968 1 2 ERFERENCE WITH THE RADIUS OF THE CLEVIS. NO FURTHER PROBLEMS WERE ENCO 257968 1 3 UNTERED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUIL 257968 1 4 D UP. 258036 1 1 OUTER SKIN PANEL WAS CUT USING A RAZOR. CUT WAS ME 258036 1 2 ASURED AND WAS DETERMINED TO BE MINOR AND SUPERFIC 258036 1 3 IAL IN DEPTH. CUT WAS ACCEPTED AS IS PER MRB. DESI 258036 1 4 GN INTENT OF PRIMARY STRUCTURE IS MAINTAINED. 258141 1 1 A PAGE 1A WAS INITIATED WHEN DIFFICULTY WAS ENCOUNTERED WHILE INSTALLI 258141 1 2 NG HEAT SHIELD TORQUE BARS. RESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION WAS INITIATED TO 258141 1 3 LIGHTLY SAND THE PAINT AND KOROPON OFF THE RIBS (TORQUE BAR KEYWAYS) 258141 1 4 TO FACILITATE TORQUE BAR INSTALLATION. THE MR DISPOSITION WAS SUBSEQUE 258141 1 5 NTLY VOIDED WHEN RI LSS DETERMINED THAT SEATING THE TORQUE BARS ONTO T 258141 1 6 HE RIBS USING A RUBBER MALLET WAS THE INSTALLATION METHOD PREFERRED BY 258141 1 7 BF GOODRICH. THE TORQUE BARS AND HEAT SHIELD ASSEMBLY WERE REINSTALLE 258141 1 8 D ON THE WHEEL. THE WHEEL ASSEMBLY WAS REINSTALLED ON THE VEHICLE AND 258141 1 9 NO BINDING WAS OBSERVED DURING WHEEL ROTATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF T 258141 1 10 HIS PR IS INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE WHEEL HEAT SHIELD AND BRAKE ASSEMBL 258141 1 11 Y. THIS INTERFERENCE WAS CAUSED BY A DESIGN FLAW IN THE ROUTING OF THE 258141 1 12 TPMS HARNESS AROUND THE HEAT SHIELD. 258461 1 1 PAGE 1 OF THIS PR ID'D AMOCO AMDEX GREASE WHICH WAS NOT CERTIFIED FOR 258461 1 2 FLIGHT. LRU RECD PR PV-6-088920 (ATTACHED) ADDRESSED THE GREASE AND MR 258461 1 3 APPROVED IT FOR INSTALLATION OF FLIGHT WHEELS UPON RECEIVING RESULTS 258461 1 4 OF ACCEPTANCE TESTING. THE GREASE WAS USED ON THE L/MAIN GEAR WHEN IT 258461 1 5 WAS DISCOVERED THAT NOT ENOUGH GREASE WAS AVAILABLE FOR INSTALLATION A 258461 1 6 ND AN ACCEPTANCE TESTING. A PAGE 1A WAS THEN PICKED UP IDENTIFYING A 2 258461 1 7 ND LOT/BATCH NUMBER (#B-0LA702268) WHICH WAS OF A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT TO 258461 1 8 USE AT KSC AND BE TESTED FOR ACCEPTABILITY. THE 1ST BATCH INSTALLED O 258461 1 9 N THE L/MAIN GEAR WAS REMOVED BY THIS PR AN V1165. THE NEW GREASE WAS 258461 1 10 THEN USED TO PACK THE BEARINGS. THIS PR HAS RELABELED THE GREASE AND A 258461 1 11 TTACHED IS THE RESULTS OF THE ACCEPTANCE TESTS FOR BATCH #B-02A702268. 258461 1 12 THE FIRST BATCH HAS BEEN SCRAPPED BY THE LRU RECD PR. 258697 1 1 THE DISCREPANT INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVICE CNTR AND IS 258697 1 2 INSTL'D. THE INSULATOR & PNL ARE OK FOR FLT. 258710 1 1 INTERFERENCE BETWEEN RETAINER AND SHIM WAS RESOLVE 258710 1 2 D BY MR TRIMMING OF THE SHIM TO ACCOMODATE RETAINE 258710 1 3 R. CAUSE OF INTERFERENCE WAS DUE TO SHIM MISPLACE 258710 1 4 MENT ON ORIGINAL ASSEMBLY. CLOSE THIS PR. 258989 1 1 REPAIR OF TEE INSULATOR RESTORES PART TO ITS' INTE 258989 1 2 NDED THERMAL INTEGRITY. 259058 1 1 EO TO FOLLOW WILL CHANGE BUSHING SIZE FROM MD137-0 259058 1 2 013-0002 (.360 DIA SHOLDER OF BUSHING) TO A MD137- 259058 1 3 0013-0001 (.235 DIA SHOLDER BUSHING) WHICH WILL EX 259058 1 4 CEPT .250 DIA HOLD PER V070-346048 STRUCTURES DWG. 259058 1 5 HOLE INSTLN 2 PLACES. EO TO FOLLOW WORK STEPS WIL 259058 1 6 L BE VERIFIED COMPLETE ON VSTR-3-07-219 MOD 002 (S 259058 1 7 EE ATTACHED COPY). CLOSE PR. 259082 1 1 SEAL INTERFERS W/ C/P & PR IS A DUP OF STR-3-07-19 259082 1 2 33 WHICH WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED PER STR-3-07-1933. 259101 1 1 THE V070-198704-004 RING IS SPLIT AND DISTORTED. A NEW RING WAS OBTAIN 259101 1 2 ED AND THE DISCREPANT RING ROUTED TO HDA FOR SCRAP. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE 259101 1 3 TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR FROM REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION. 259137 1 1 ENTRAPPED RIVET STEMS ARE ACCEPTABLE PER DWG. PR C 259137 1 2 ONDITION DOES NOT EXIST. CLOSE PR. 259160 1 1 THE 7 NICKS OF ITEM 1 & 7 AREAS OF TAPE DELAMINATION FROM ITEM 2, WERE 259160 1 2 MR'D AS IS. THE DELAMINATED TAPE NOTED IN ITEMS 3 & 4 WAS TRIMMED BAC 259160 1 3 K & THE REPAIRS MR'D OK FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ALL DINGS & TAPE IRREGUL 259160 1 4 ARITIES WERE LOGGED ON THE OV-103 RADIATOR DING MAP. THIS WAD DOES NOT 259160 1 5 REQUIRE RETEST & NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D ON THIS WAD. 259181 1 1 STRUT WAS PRESSURIZED TO ATTAIN PROPER DIMENSION. 259181 1 2 "GREEN JUICE MACHINE" WAS USED TO VERIFY NO LEAKAG 259181 1 3 E (STEP 16). FILLER VALVE CAP AND JACK PAD WERE R 259181 1 4 EINSTALLED. REWORKED PER DRAWING & SPEC. NO FURTHE 259181 1 5 R ACTION REQUIRED. CLOSE THIS PR. 259276 1 1 PG.1 ITEM 1: BONDLINE THICKNESS IS EXCESSIVE CAUSING INTERFERENCE BETW 259276 1 2 EEN THE V070-367052-007 TCS LINER RETAINER AND CM BRIDGE INSTALLATION. 259276 1 3 MR TO TRIM INTERFERENCE. DURING TRIMMING, ITEM 2, PG. 1A, WAS PICKED 259276 1 4 UP. PG. 1A, ITEM 2: AFTER PAINT WAS REMOVED DURING MR TRIMMING, IT WAS 259276 1 5 DISCOVERED THAT THE RETAINER HAS ALREADY BEEN TRIMMED AND THAT ANY AD 259276 1 6 DITIONAL TRIMMING COULD CAUSE EXCESSIVE METAL REMOVAL. THE LINER RETAI 259276 1 7 NER WAS ACCEPTED AS IS FOR 1 FLIGHT PER MR ON PAGE 7 OF THIS PR. POST 259276 1 8 FLIGHT 10 DISPO TO REMOVE PREVIOUSLY SANDED RETAINER FROM RH BAY 2 AND 259276 1 9 REPLACED WITH A NEW RETIANER. PG. 1B, ITEM 3: DWG. V070-367052 DOES N 259276 1 10 OT SHOW A NOTCHED SECTION FOR THE -007 TCS RETAINER. AN EO TO FOLLOW T 259276 1 11 O V070-367052 CORRECTED THIS MISTAKE. PG. 1C, ITEM 4: DURING DRAWING A 259276 1 12 "A" REVISION UPDATE, THE "A" DIMENSION WAS INADVERTANTLY MOVED. AN EO 259276 1 13 TO FOLLOW TO DWG V070-367052 CORRECTED THIS PROBLEM. 259301 1 1 DISCREPANCY ITEM #1: BROKEN FCP COOLANT DRAIN # Q.D. 40V45MD383 PROTEC 259301 1 2 TIVE CAP LANYARD WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER M/R DISPOSITION. LANYARD 259301 1 3 IS FLIGHT WORTHY. DISCREPANCY ITEM #2 BROKEN FCP COOLANT DRAIN#1 40V4 259301 1 4 5MD182 PROTECTIVE CAP LANYARD WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER M/R DISPOSI 259301 1 5 TION. LANYARD IS FLIGHT WORTHY. 259350 1 1 THE SEAL WILL BE TRIMMED ON STR-3-07-1824 W/ MR AP 259350 1 2 PROVAL. THE PROBLEM IS DUE TO A TOLERANCE BUILD-U 259350 1 3 P & SOME FLEXING, OF THE SEAL, DURING OPS. THE SE 259350 1 4 AL IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLT. 259482 1 1 INIATE PMR TO OBTAIN TWO (2) EACH MC621-0051-0022 259482 1 2 BRAKE ASSY. FROM B.F. GOODRICH. PART NO. 169758. 259482 1 3 NOTE: NEW BRAKES WILL BE INSTALLED PER OMI V1165. 259538 1 1 RCC PNL #4 INBOARD INSULATORS ARE BEING REPLACED P 259538 1 2 ER VSTR-3-07-253 MOD 002. PNL #4 INBOARD SIDE HAS 259538 1 3 HAD MOMENT TIE ARMS ADDED & THEREFORE REQUIRE LARG 259538 1 4 ER INSULATORS WHICH WILL BE INSTLD PER VSTR-3-07-2 259538 1 5 53 MOD 002. VSTR-3-07-253 MOD 005 WILL ROUTE V070- 259538 1 6 190093-002 INSULATOR WITH OTHERS TO HDA FOR FURTHE 259538 1 7 R DISPO. THEREFORE NO REPAIR WORK IS REQUIRED FOR 259538 1 8 THIS INSULATOR. CLOSE PR. 259588 1 1 PROBLEM INVESTIGATION REVEALS THE FOLLOWING INFOR- 259588 1 2 MATION: ITEM 16.1 SPACER WAS ACTUALLY RE-INSTALLED 259588 1 3 ON PR AND THUS REQUIRES NO OCN # RECORDING. ITEM 259588 1 4 16.2 & 16.3 THERMAL BARRIERS WERE TRANSFORMED TO H 259588 1 5 DA CATEGORY TO BE SCRAPPED. NEW ITEMS WITH RECORD 259588 1 6 ED OCN #S WERE INSTALLED, THUS NO VEHICLE RELATED 259588 1 7 PROBLEM EXISTS. 259592 1 1 BRACKET TO CARRIER PANEL STEPS DID NOT MEET THE DE 259592 1 2 SIGN INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS, AFTER REWORK BRACK 259592 1 3 ET TO CARRIER PANEL STEPS DO MEET THE INSTALLATION 259592 1 4 DESIGN INTENT. 259656 1 1 INSULATOR HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUFACTURER SPEC. 259656 1 2 GAP MEASUREMENTS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED ON THIS PR. 259978 1 1 THE STIFFENER IS BEING MODIFIED PER RELEASED ENG ( 259978 1 2 V070-100008 B13), TO ELIMINATE THE INTERFERENCE PR 259978 1 3 OBLEM WITH THE BONDED ON STUDS. PROBLEM WAS CAUSED 259978 1 4 BY A DESIGN DEFICIENCY. CLOSE THIS PR. 260229 1 1 SUSPECT CRACK DETECTED DURING EDDY CURRENT WAS NOT A CRACK BUT A PLUG 260229 1 2 RIVET. WITH THE KOROPON REMOVED THE .090 PLUG RIVET COULD BE SEEN AND 260229 1 3 FOLLOW UP EDDY CURRENT CONFIRMED NO CRACK. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RES 260229 1 4 OLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. AREA WAS IDENTIFIED FOR FUTURE EDDY CURREN 260229 1 5 T INSPECTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING PLUG RIVET GIVING FALSE IN 260229 1 6 DICATION OF CRACK. 260395 1 1 THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE INADVERTANTLY WRITTEN UP 260395 1 2 AGAINST WRONG SYS. DISPO TRANSFERED PR PROBLEM DI 260395 1 3 SPO TRANSFERED PR PROBLEM ONTO "TILE" PAPER. NO F 260395 1 4 URTHER DISPO REQ'D ON THIS PR. 260665 1 1 INTERFACE PANEL WAS FOUND TO INTERFERE WITH BLANKET BRACKETS DUE TO LO 260665 1 2 CATION OF 70C2931 SUPPORT. SUPPORT WAS SHIMMED OUT TO ELIMINATE INTERF 260665 1 3 ERENCE WITH BLANKET RETAINERS AND BRING RETAINER IN SAME PLANE. INTERF 260665 1 4 ACE PANEL GRIP LENGTHS WERE ALSO CHANGED TO ACCOUNT FOR SHIMS ADDED. P 260665 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE IS TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. CLOSE THIS PR. 260860 1 1 DISCREPANT/MISSING FASTENER WASREPLACED WITH PER PRINT FASTENERS. REF 260860 1 2 DISCREPANCY PG 1A. DURING WORKING DISPO TO PG 1A IT WAS NOTED THAT NO 260860 1 3 ACTUAL H/W ANOMALY EXISTED. H/W HAS BEEN INSTALLED PER PRINT WITHOUT 260860 1 4 DIFFICULTY. PG 1A APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN GENERATED DUE TO IMPROPERLY TRY 260860 1 5 ING TO INSTALL BOLT. FASTENER IN ITEM 1. IS AS OML OF VEHICLE. NO LAF 260860 1 6 PR IS NECESSARY. ALL ANOMALIES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED VIA RETURN TO PRINT 260860 1 7 DISPOSITION. 260909 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO PROPERLY SEAT THREE FASTENERS O 260909 1 2 N THE 73-01 DOOR. THE THREADS OF THREE NUTPLATES WERE CLEANED WITH ALC 260909 1 3 OHOL AND COTTON SWABS. AFTER CLEANING, RUNNING TORUE WAS WITHIN TOLERA 260909 1 4 NCE ON ALL THREE NUTPLATES AND NEW BOLTS WERE PROPERLY INSTALLED. THE 260909 1 5 DOOR IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS NORMAL WE 260909 1 6 AR AND TEAR. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE #10 NUT PLATE. THE #10 BOLT WA 260909 1 7 S "SPINNING" BECAUSE IT WAS HUNG UP ON THE DOOR. 261077 1 1 THE SPLIT V070-398954-002 FLOW RESTRICTOR PAD IS A TPS ENGINEERING RES 261077 1 2 PONSIBILITY, NOT STR ENGINEERING. A TPS WAD WAS INITIATED AND THIS WAD 261077 1 3 CAN BE CLOSED. NO FURTHER STR ENG ACTION REQUIRED. 261081 1 1 INSULATOR HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUFACTURERE SPEC 261175 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATES, IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS RESOLVED, 261175 1 2 WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL, BY REMOVING THE NUTPLATES AND RE-INSTAL 261175 1 3 LING NEW NUTPLATES USING BLIND RIVETS. THISDISCREPANCY WAS DUE TO NORM 261175 1 4 AL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE NUTPLATES ARE ACCEPTABLE AS INSTALLED AND N 261175 1 5 O FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 261217 1 1 ENG. INVESTIGATION DISCOVERED HOLE DESCRIBED ON PA 261217 1 2 GE 1, ITEM 1 IS NOT A DRAIN HOLE BUT A TOOLING HOL 261217 1 3 E. THERE IS NO PROBLEM INSTALLING V070-857351-002 261217 1 4 BRACKET OVER TOOLING HOLE. PAGE 1 ITEM 1 PROBLEM 261217 1 5 DOES NOT EXIST. 261226 1 1 CARRIER PANEL V070-194126-001 WAS MACHINED ALONG T 261226 1 2 HE TRAILING EDGE AS IT DID NOT FIT PROPERLY DUE TO 261226 1 3 INTERFERENCE WITH THE ELEVON STRUCTURE. THE REPAI 261226 1 4 R CLEARS THE PANEL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE WITH NO LO 261226 1 5 SS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. 261299 1 1 ENGINEERING EVALUATION FOUND DENTS IN TRUSS WERE A 261299 1 2 CEPTABLE; TRUSS CAN BE USED AS IS. NO FURTHER DISP 261299 1 3 O OR WORK IS REQUIRED. CLOSE THIS PR. 261309 1 1 AS STATED IN THE INITIAL DISCREPANCY FLIGHT CAPS AT THE FOLLOWING LOCA 261309 1 2 TIONS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITHOUT RECORDING THE OCN'S: 40V45PD11 261309 1 3 0 (O2 TK1 FILL), 40V45PD020 (O2 TK 2 FILL), 40V45PD410 (O2 TK 3 FILL), 261309 1 4 40V45PD500 (O2 TK 4 FILL). PRSD FLIGHT CAPS ARE REMOVED AND REPLACED 261309 1 5 SEVERAL TIMES THROUGHOUT THE FLOW TO SUPPORT ROUTINE TESTING. THE FINA 261309 1 6 L FLIGHT CAP INSTALLATION (PRIOR TO FLIGHT) IS PERFORMED IN OMI V3538. 261309 1 7 THE OCN'S ARE RECORDED AT THAT TIME. A COPY OF OMI V3538 (STEP 04-028 261309 1 8 ) IS ATTACHED (ATTACHMENT 1). 261362 1 1 TEN APPARENT DISCREPANCIES WERE NOTED IN THE MID-B 261362 1 2 ODY BAY 10 ON THE LEFT SIDE. ITEM #1 WITH THE LOOS 261362 1 3 E CORNER WAS REBONDED. ITEM #2 WITH MINOR VOIDS AT 261362 1 4 BUTT FIT WAS VENTED. ITEM #3 HAD AN EXCESSIVE GAP 261362 1 5 BETWEEN THE STRINGER AND THE HEATSINK SO AN ADDIT 261362 1 6 IONAL HEATSINK STRIP WAS ADDED. ITEM #4 IS WITHIN 261362 1 7 THE GAP TOLERANCE OF 0.10" SO NO DISCREPANCY EXIST 261362 1 8 S. ITEM #5 HAD THE IMPROPER HEATSINK REMOVED WITH 261362 1 9 THE REPLACEMENTTO BE BONDED BY VSTR-3-07-292 (SEE 261362 1 10 PCR TPS ATTACHED). ITEM #6 HAD A HEATSINK WITH A 261362 1 11 VOID AND A WRINKLE BUT THE WERE VENTED. ITEM #7 HA 261362 1 12 D VOIDS AND WRINKLES WITH FOAM ADHERED TO THE HEAT 261362 1 13 SINK. THE VOIDS AND WRINKLES WERE VENTED, THE FOAM 261362 1 14 ABRADED AWAY, AND THE OPEN AREAS POTTED FLUSH TO 261362 1 15 THE RTV SURFACE. ITEM #8 IS OKAY AS IS BUT FOAM WA 261362 1 16 S BONDED TO THE HEATSINK. FOAM WAS ABRADED AWAY. I 261362 1 17 TEM #9 HAD AN EXCESSIVE VOID WHICH WAS TRIMMED AND 261362 1 18 POTTED. ITEM #10 IS OKAY AS IS. THESE REPAIRS ARE 261362 1 19 APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND DO NOT AFFECT T 261362 1 20 HE HEATSINK CAPABILITY OF THE RTV MODS. 261517 1 1 RELIEF VALVE A81059 WAS REPLACED WITH NEW RELIEF VALVE. DURING PANEL P 261517 1 2 RESSURIZATION, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE 1/2" TUBING CONNECTED TO INL 261517 1 3 ET OF A81049 R/V HAD A CRACKED FLARE. THE FAILED TUBING WAS REMOVED AN 261517 1 4 D A TEMPORARY 1/2" FLEXHOSE WAS INSTALLED. LES FABRICATED NEW TUBE SPO 261517 1 5 OL AND INSTALLED IN SYSTEM AFTER 1/2" FLEXHOSE WAS REMOVED. PANEL PRES 261517 1 6 SURE WAS BROUGHT UP AND NEW A81059 R/V WAS ADJUSTED FINAL MEASUREMENTS 261517 1 7 WERE...CRACK: 905 PSIG. RESEAT: 810 PSIG THESE MEASUREMENTS ARE ACCEP 261517 1 8 TABLE ANY AIR THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN REPLACED TUBING/COMPONENET WAS P 261517 1 9 URGED TO LH2 VENT LINE. THE 258 SCFM PURGE (PC) WAS TURNED ON FOR 30 M 261517 1 10 INUTES AND THEN TURNED ON FOR 30 MINUTES AND THEN TURNED OFF WITH NO P 261517 1 11 ROBLEMS OCCURRING. THE FAILED TUBING IN PAGE 1A OF THIS PR WAS ROUTED 261517 1 12 FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS. REPORT NO. IS MAB 312-89. LEAK CHECK OF NEW COMP 261517 1 13 ONENTS REVEALED NO LEAKS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION. 261621 1 1 DURING PROCESSING OF FLIGHT 10, THE LH OUTBOARD ELEVON COVE'S INBOARD 261621 1 2 COLUMBIUM SEAL WAS FOUND TO HAVE WEAK INTERNAL SPRINGS (REF ITEM 1, PA 261621 1 3 GE 1) AND THE ADJACENT GAP FILLER WAS FOUND TO BE INSTALLED OUT OF PRI 261621 1 4 NT REQUIREMENTS (REF ITEM 2, PAGE 1A). BOTH DISCREPANCIES WERE MR ACCE 261621 1 5 PTED AS IS FOR ONE FLIGHT. DURING PROCESSING OF FLIGHT 11, THE COLUMBI 261621 1 6 UM SEAL SPRINGS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW SPRINGS ON TPS STR- 261621 1 7 3-11-454. AFTER INSTALLATION OF THE NEW SPRINGS GAP MESUREMENTS WERE T 261621 1 8 AKEN ON STR-3-11-454 AND DETERMINED TO BE WITHIN DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. 261621 1 9 THE ELEVON SEAL LEAK TEST, V1164, WAS PERFORMED AND THE FLOW RATES WE 261621 1 10 RE WITHIN DESIGN REQUIREMENTS, THE WEAK SPRINGS (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) WAS D 261621 1 11 ETERMINED DESIGN GAP FILLER WAS RESOLVED ON LWNG-3-11-2943. CONCLUDE T 261621 1 12 HAT THE SEAL IS RETURNED TO PRINT REQUIRENTS AND NO FURTHER WORK IS RE 261621 1 13 QUIRED ON THIS PR. 261643 1 1 1 EACH NUTPLATE AT Xo979.50 Zo401.75 WAS FOUND TO BE BELOW MIN. OF 9.5 261643 1 2 INCH LBS. DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER DWG. PROBA 261643 1 3 BLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 261698 1 1 ITEM 1 - SEAL INTERFERENCE WAS CORRECTED BY TRIMMING SEALS AT I/B & O/ 261698 1 2 B EDGE PER ATTACHMENT A & B W/ EO-TO-FOLLOW. FASTENER INTERFERENCE CO 261698 1 3 RRECTED BY MR TRIM PER ATTACHMENT C. ITEM 2 - DEBOND ALONG I/B EDGE W 261698 1 4 AS REBONDED W/ NO SURFACE PREPARATION DUE TO SML WIDTH AFTER SEAL TRIM 261698 1 5 . SEAL INTEGRITY HAS BEEN MAINTAINED & IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED 261698 1 6 USE. A BOND VERIFICATION OF STEP 3 ON PG. 3. 261725 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2: THE END OF THE RETAINER IS BENT AND THE NUTPLATE ON THE 261725 1 2 END OF THE RETAINER IS BENT. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE MR ACCEPTED ON 261725 1 3 STR-3-09-2931. THE RETAINER IS MR ID'D. ORIGINAL PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WO 261725 1 4 RKMANSHIP. 261896 1 1 THIS PR WAS TAKEN TO DOC A RECV'D JACK XFER PROBLEM THAT WAS EVIDENCED 261896 1 2 BY THE HT OF THE ORB BEING MEAS'D AT 121.250". THIS MEASUREMENT WAS 261896 1 3 OBTAINED BY USE OF A STEEL TAPE MEASURE. THE MEASUREMENT WAS TAKEN AT 261896 1 4 AN ANGLE & NOT VERT. THIS ANGLE ADDED THE .384" TO THE HT. WHEN SA 261896 1 5 20-006 THE SLIDE RULE SCALE WAS USED TO OBTAIN THE MEASUREMENT IT WAS 261896 1 6 FOUND TO BE WITHIN TOLERANCE. THIS PR S/B CLOSED AS BEING CAUSED BY H 261896 1 7 UMAN ERR. 261902 1 1 ITEM 1.0: STEP 2.0 CALLS OUT TO OBTAIN THE REPAIRED V070-198702-005 TU 261902 1 2 BE SEAL FROM HDA; A NEW V070-198702-005 TUBE SEAL WAS OBTAINED FROM LO 261902 1 3 GISTICS INSTEAD AND STORED WITH THE LEFT HAND FLIPPER DOOR #9 HARDWARE 261902 1 4 IN MIDBODY SHOP BAY 1. THE NEW V070-198702-005 TUBE SEAL WILL BE INST 261902 1 5 ALLED IN THE VEHICLE PER THE RESPECTIVE JOB CARD. THE REPAIRED V070-19 261902 1 6 8702-005 TUBE SEAL WILL BE SENT BACK TO LOGISTICS FOR RESTOCK. THE V07 261902 1 7 0-198702-005 TUBE SEAL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAM 261902 1 8 AGE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 262051 1 1 SCRATCH WAS SUPERFICIAL. NO DAMAGE TO PLBD WIRE ME 262051 1 2 SH OR STRUCTURE OCCURRED. 262066 1 1 QUALITY INSPECTION REVEALED THAT ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 262066 1 2 DOES NOT EXIST AT THIS TIME 262071 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE RPLCD & WILL BE PEELED 262071 1 2 TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 262071 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. RC ACTIO 262071 1 4 N TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W 262071 1 5 TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87-103-C1) 262099 1 1 CRACKS IN PANELS HAVE BEEN REPAIRED WITH NO 262099 1 2 DEGRADATION IN STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 262251 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW SHIM. THE NEW SHIM HAD ITS 262251 1 2 MISSING HOLE MATCHED DRILLED PER E.O.T.F. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EX 262251 1 3 IST AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. UPON VERIFICATION THAT RELEASED EO REFLECTS 262251 1 4 PROPER CONFIGURATION CLOSE THIS PR. 262267 1 1 OMRSD REQUIREMENT OF 275 SCIM MINIMUM AT 8 PSIG IS IN ERROR, SHOULD BE 262267 1 2 (15.26 SCIM) 250 SCIM MINIMUM AT 8 PSIG. LSS HAS AGREED TO SUBMIT RCN 262267 1 3 TO CHANGE OMRSD. CHECK VALVE IS FUNCTIONING AS DESIGNED, CHECK VALVE 262267 1 4 FLOWS 181 SCIM AT 8 PSIG. 262373 1 1 DURING RSI-3-12-169, A VOID WAS FOUND IN THE EPOXY FILLER USED ON BLIN 262373 1 2 D FASTENER ON THE ELEVON HINGE TUBE. THE VOID WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTR 262373 1 3 ICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP DURING ORIGINAL INSTALLATION. 262606 1 1 THE PURPOSES OF THIS PR WERE TO: A) INSTALL SHIMS AT L/H RIB SPLICE #1 262606 1 2 3. B) MR ACCEPT TWO SMALL GOUGES ON THE V070-199213-001 SPAR FITTING. 262606 1 3 C) RE-SHIM L/H SPAR FITTING #13. THESE COMPONENTS ARE SECONDARY STRUCT 262606 1 4 URE EXEPT FOR THE SPAR FITTING, WHICH IS PRIMARY. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORK 262606 1 5 MANSHIP. 262649 1 1 THE PITTED AREAS (6 AREAS TOTAL) ON THE ELEVON 262649 1 2 SKIN SURFACE BELOW RUB PNL #13, R/H OUTBD ELEVON 262649 1 3 (Yw 382.808 TO Yw 401.748) WERE CLEANED, INSP'd & 262649 1 4 ACCEPTED AS "OK AS IS" BY RI DOWNEY/STRESS. THERE 262649 1 5 WERE (3) LAYERS OF KOROPON APPLIED TO EACH PITTED 262649 1 6 AREA TO INCREASE THE SKIN SURFACES ABILITY TO RE- 262649 1 7 SIST ADDITIONAL CORROSION. THE CORROSION HAD BEEN 262649 1 8 CAUSED BY GALVANIC ACTION BETWEEN THE ALUMINUM 262649 1 9 SKIN & THE INCONEL BLKTS. THE B91B30111-86 SKIN 262649 1 10 BETWEEN THE NOTED COORDINATES HAS BEEN MR ID'd. 262649 1 11 PAGE 1 ITEM 1 DESCREPANCY DESCRIBED SIX AREAS OF CORROSION ON UPPER SK 262649 1 12 IN SURFACE OF THE OTBD ELEVON UNDER RUB PANEL 13. TO CORRECT THIS DISC 262649 1 13 REPANCY, THE CORROSION WAS ETCHED AND THE DEPTH OF EACH PIT WAS MEASUR 262649 1 14 ED. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PITTED AREAS DID NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCT 262649 1 15 URAL FUNCTION OF THE ELEVON AND WAS ACEPTED "OK AS IS" BY RI/DOWNEY ST 262649 1 16 RESS. THE DISCREPANT AREAS WERE THEN COATED WITH 3 LAYERS OF KOROPON T 262649 1 17 O INCREASE THE SKIN SURFACE ABILITY TO RESIST CORROSION. DISCREPANT AR 262649 1 18 EA HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. REF: MR RATIONALE PG.7.0 262664 1 1 V070-394740-003 CARRIER PANEL WAS CRACKED APPROX. 3/4 INCH IN THE CORN 262664 1 2 ER THE PANEL. THGE PANEL WAS ROUTED TO ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER FOR REP 262664 1 3 AIR R.S.C. DETERMINED THE PANEL WAS UNREPAIRABLE -003 CARRIER PANEL WA 262664 1 4 S OBTAINED THRU LOGISTICS AND WAS INSTALLED ON THE VEHICLES PER STR-3- 262664 1 5 07-356. PANEL OTAINED FROM R.I.S.C. (ST. 6) WAS RTURNED TO LOGISTICS F 262664 1 6 OR A SPARE. CLOSE THIS PR. 262709 1 1 THE BORON STRUT WAS INSTALLED EIHT A GOOD SHOP PR 262709 1 2 ACTICE UNDER ENG. SUPERVISION. 262709 1 3 MSG-ID NOT KNOWN. 262789 1 1 GREEN RESIDUE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE SPAR WEB (REF D 262789 1 2 ISCREPANCY #1) WAS REMOVED AND THE AREA WAS RETURN 262789 1 3 ED TO PRINT. THE GREEN COMPOUND HAS CONSTITUENTS F 262789 1 4 OUND IN CORROSION INHIBITING EPOXY SEALANT MBO120- 262789 1 5 083 AND HAS POSSIBLE COMPONENTS FROM A PAINT. THE 262789 1 6 WHITE RESIDUE ON THE GRAPHITE EPOXY SPAR WEB (REF 262789 1 7 DISCREPANCY #2) WAS LEFT "AS IS" PER MR APPROVAL. 262789 1 8 THE WHITE RESIDUE WAS RUN-OFF FROM TPS WATERPROOFI 262789 1 9 NG. CLOSE THIS PR. 262821 1 1 THE CAUSE FOR THE EXCESSIVE STEP BETWEEN THE TEE 262821 1 2 AND PANELS WAS FOUND TO BE AN INTERFERENCE WITH 262821 1 3 THE UPPER AND LOWER TEE INSULATOR PLATES AND THE 262821 1 4 RCC PANEL ITSELF. THE MR ACTION TAKEN IN THIS PR 262821 1 5 OF FILING DOWN & REMOVING THIS INTERFERENCE PROVED 262821 1 6 SUCCESSFUL IN RETURNING THE STEP/GAP CRITERIA OF 262821 1 7 THE RCC PANELS AND TEES TO DWG CONFIGURATION. NO 262821 1 8 FURTHER ANOMOLY EXISTS 262828 1 1 ITEMS 1, 3, & 4 PAGE 1: THE CRACKED V070-298112-017/-021/-019 THERMAL 262828 1 2 BARRIER ASSEMBLIES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. ITEM 2 PAGE 1: THE BOTTO 262828 1 3 MED OUT SCREW WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A SCREW ONE GRIP LENGTH SH 262828 1 4 ORTER (PER MAO101-301) WHICH DID NOT BOTTOM OUT. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OP 262828 1 5 ERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 263263 1 1 AFTER ENGINEERING EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE BOLT WAS NOT 263263 1 2 RECORDING ITS CORRECT RUNNING TORQUE OF 32-300 IN/LBS BECAUSE THE RD11 263263 1 3 4-8005-1010 NUT WAS DISCREPANT. THE LOCATION OF THIS DISCREPANT NUT WA 263263 1 4 S RIGHT HAND BAY 13 (X01279.50,Z0408.25). THE NUT WAS REPLACED TO ACHI 263263 1 5 EVE THE CORRECT RUNNING TORQUE. THE CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCY WAS NORMA 263263 1 6 L WEAR AND TEAR. THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 263308 1 1 THE CONDITION DESCRIBED BY ITEM 1 PAGE 1 IS A DESIGNED GAP NOT A DENT. 263308 1 2 REF. DRAWING V070-198399 SEC K-K ZN 69C FOR VIEW OF AREA. DISCREPANCY 263308 1 3 DOES NOT EXIST. SEE ATTACHED SKETCH "A" FOR REFERENCE. 263529 1 1 WORK ACCOMPLISHED PER DISPOSITION. STANDOFF COR- 263529 1 2 RECTOR. CONCLUSION - NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED ON 263529 1 3 THIS PR. INSTALLATION SATISFIES DESIGN INTENT. 263578 1 1 THE INCORRECT LENGTH FASTENERS AND RECESSED WASHERS FOR THE FORWARD HO 263578 1 2 IST LH ATTACH POINT WAS REPLACED WITH LONGER FASTENERS AND FLAT WASHER 263578 1 3 S PER EO-TO-FOLLOW. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS A DESIGN DEFICIENCY, THE CAR 263578 1 4 RIER PANEL THICKNESS WAS INCREASED BUT THE FASTENERS WERE NOT LENGTHEN 263578 1 5 ED TO COMPENSATE THE DIFFERENCE. 263601 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE A DAMAGED ROSAN ON THE 263601 1 2 #1 WINDOW. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY 263601 1 3 WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 263671 1 1 THE SEAL WAS MR REPAIRED BY APPLYING WHITE RTV TO ITS LOWER SURFACE. P 263671 1 2 ROBABLE CAUSE: DAMAGE CAUSED BY RE-ENTRY HEAT. 263704 1 1 THE RH #12 RCC PANEL SPAR INSULATOR HAS TWO VERY SMALL PIN HOLES MEASU 263704 1 2 RING .020" AND .030". THE TWO HOLES ARE 1/16" APART. ALTHOUGH THE SPEC 263704 1 3 REQUIRES THE DISTANCE BETWEEN ANY TWO DEFECTS MUST NOT BE LESS THAN . 263704 1 4 50, THESE TWO PIN HOLES ARE SO SMALL AND SO CLOSE TOGETHER THAT EVEN I 263704 1 5 F A CRACK DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO HOLES CREATING A SINGLE DEFECT IT 263704 1 6 WOULD STILL BE WITHIN ACCEPTABLE SPEC LIMIT OF .25 FOR A CRACK (REF ML 263704 1 7 O601-0002). THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. 264051 1 1 DURING RETURN FROM FLIGHT 10 PROCESSING AT DFRF, THE LOWER FORWARD BOL 264051 1 2 T FOR THE R/H AFT CUP INSTALLATION COULD NOT BE INSTALLED. (ITEM 1, PA 264051 1 3 GE 1) IT WAS FOUND THAT THE NUTPLATE WAS COCKING WHEN INSTALLING THE B 264051 1 4 OLT PREVENTING THE BOLT FROM CATCHING. AFTER NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS OF CARE 264051 1 5 FULLY LINING UP THE NUTPLATE AND INSTALLING THE BOLT, THE BOLT WAS INS 264051 1 6 TALLED AND TORQUED.PER PRCBD S061531L, THE CUP WAS APPROVED TO FLY FO 264051 1 7 R FERRY FLIGHT ONLY, IN CASE THE CUP COULD NOT BE REINSTALLED AT KSC. 264051 1 8 AT KSC THE CUP WAS REMOVED AND THE NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. 264051 1 9 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: 264051 1 10 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 264337 1 1 COLUMBIUM SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE NOT SEALING WHEN PRESSURE WAS APPLIED F 264337 1 2 OR LEAK TEST PER V1164. THE V070-198552-001 ANGLE WAS FOUND TO BE BENT 264337 1 3 AND WAS REPLACED. THE GAP WAS MEASURED AGAIN AFTER THE ANGLE WAS REPL 264337 1 4 ACED AND IT IS WITHIN DWG. REQUIREMENTS OF .010 MAX GAP. GAP WAS ALSO 264337 1 5 VERIFIED C/P INSTALLATION WHIHC VERIFIES SEAL IS WORKING PROPERLY. PRO 264337 1 6 BABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 264345 1 1 REPAIRED BY PLUGGING HOLES. 264449 1 1 VOID PR AS VERIFICATION HAS BEEN SATISFIED BY 264449 1 2 BY STR-3-05-094 SHEET 77 264560 1 1 THE DELAMINATION OF THE NLG DOOR PERIMETER WAS REPAIRED BY REMOVING TH 264560 1 2 E EXISTING RETAINER RIVETS AND ADDING A DOUBLE ROW OF NEW RIVETS ON 1" 264560 1 3 CENTERS. ADHESIVE WAS APPLIED TO THE DOOR EDGE TO PREVENT WATER INTRU 264560 1 4 SION INTO THE DOOR. REPAIR WAS MR APPROVED. 264615 1 1 THE SCRATCHES DID NOT GO INTO THE STRUCTURE. REMOVAL OF THE KOROPON AN 264615 1 2 D VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE AREA, VERIFY THAT THE STRUCTURE WAS NOT DAM 264615 1 3 AGE. THE KOROPON WAS REAPPLIED PER LWNG-3-07-1586, 1587, 1588 TO TILE 264615 1 4 SURFACE PREPARATION STANDARDS FOR BONDING. THE PROBLEM WAS CAUSED, DUE 264615 1 5 TO WORKMANSHIP ERROR, BY USING RAZOR BLADES TO REMOVE THE FILLER BAR. 264615 1 6 THE INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 264730 1 1 FUEL CELL #3 ALTERNTE WATER LOOP CHK VLV ASSY P/N 264730 1 2 V070-454936-003 WAS REMOVED & RPLCD W/ ACCEPTABLE 264730 1 3 REPLACEMENT. ASSY PASSED MASS SPEC LK CHK. FUNCT 264730 1 4 IONAL CHK OF CHK VLV ASSY WILL BE PERFORMED PER TP 264730 1 5 S FCP-3-07-026. CHK VLV ASSY W/ PITTED B-NUT WAS 264730 1 6 SENT TO MSC PER LRU PR FOR FURTHER DISPO. 264819 1 1 (ITEM #1) HOLE IN RIGHT HAND RADIATOR #4 TAPE DUE TO A SMALL METEOR 264819 1 2 IMPACT. THIS DEFECT IS ACCEPTABLE PER THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR 264819 1 3 MANUAL. PROBABLE CAUSE: METEOR STRIKE. (ITEM #2) MINOR TEAR IN THE 264819 1 4 RADIATOR TAPE. THE TEAR DID NOT PENETRATE THROUGH ALL THE LEVELS OF THE 264819 1 5 TAPE AND IS ACCEPTABLE PER THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL. (ITEM #3) 264819 1 6 SMALL AREA OF RADIATOR TAPE IS DISCOLORED LOCATED ON THE FWD END OF THE 264819 1 7 RADIATOR. A SMALL AREA OF THE DISCOLORED TAPE WAS REMOVED AND CORROSION 264819 1 8 PROTECTED WITH KOROPON, AND CHEMGLAZE FOR RESTRICTED USE. (ITEM #4) THE 264819 1 9 ORIGINAL COPY OF THE PR WAS LOST. AN INVESTIGATION INCLUDED THE TAIR, 264819 1 10 LSOC AND NASA ENGINEERING AND QUALITY PERSONNEL HAS PRODUCED NO 264819 1 11 DOCUMENTATION. PER MR APPROVAL THE REPAIR FOR ITEM #3 AND ITEM 264819 1 12 #4 WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR RESTRICTED USE. (ITEM #5) THERE IS TAPE THAT IS 264819 1 13 DELAMINATING ON THE FWD EDGE OF THE RADIATOR. PER RESTRICTED MR THE TOP 264819 1 14 LAYER OF SILVER TAPE WAS REMOVED AND FLOWN (1 EA.) FLIGHT AS IS. (ITEMS 264819 1 15 1,2,3,4 AND 5) ALL THE DISCREPANT TAPE AND MR REPAIRS WERE REMOVED POST 264819 1 16 FLIGHT 12 AND NEW RADIATOR TAPE WAS INSTALLED RESTORING THE THERMAL 264819 1 17 INTEGRITY OF THE RADIATOR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 264849 1 1 2 BUSHINGS WERE DISCOVERED TO BE IMPROPERLY INSTALLED. THESE BUSHINGS 264849 1 2 WERE BONDED IN PLACE WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE TO PREVENT THEM FROM WOR 264849 1 3 KING FREE IN CLEVIS. BUSHINGS WERE INSPECTED AFTER FLIGHT 09 AND MR AC 264849 1 4 CEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 264853 1 1 ENLARGING THE TWO DISCREPANT HOLES TO .250-.253 264853 1 2 WILL CLEAN UP THE ELONGATION AND ALLOW USE OF THE 264853 1 3 DOUBLER AS THE DRAWING INTENDED. THIS RENDALL WILL 264853 1 4 NOT EFFECT THE FORM, FIT, OOR FUNCITON OF THE IN- 264853 1 5 STALLATION AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED 264853 1 6 USAGE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 264890 1 1 THE V070-199839-007 INCONEL INSULATOR LOCATED ON L/H RIB SPLICE #10 RC 264890 1 2 C TEE ASSEMBLY HAD A SMALL CRACK IN THE FOIL (ITEM 1). THE INSULATOR W 264890 1 3 AS REMOVED FROM THE TEE AND SENT TO RSC FOR REPAIR. THE REPAIR HAS RET 264890 1 4 URNED THE INSULATOR TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. A REPLACEMENT INSULATOR WA 264890 1 5 S OBTAINED BUT DURING ATTEMPTED INSTALLATION THERE WAS INTERFERENCE WI 264890 1 6 TH THE RCC TEE (ITEM 3) AND A MISALIGNED STIFFENER (ITEM 2). THE STIFF 264890 1 7 ENER WAS ADJUSTED TO FIT THE NEW INSULATOR CONFIGURATION, AND THE INSU 264890 1 8 LATOR WAS RESHAPED TO ALLEVIATE INTERFERENCE BY MR DISPO. IT WAS THEN 264890 1 9 DECIDED TO REINSTALL THE ORIGINAL REPAIRED INSULATOR. DURING INSTALLAT 264890 1 10 ION IT WAS FOUND THAT THE WRONG SHIMS WERE INSTALLED (ITEM 4). THE DIS 264890 1 11 CREPANT SHIMS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH PER PRINT SHIMS. PROBABLE 264890 1 12 CAUSE: MATERIAL DEGRADATION. 264908 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) TWO OF THE FOUR DISCREPANT FASTENERS WERE REPLACE 264908 1 2 D WITH FASTENERS ONE GRIP LENGTH LONGER THAN PRINT CALLOUT PER MA0101-30 264908 1 3 1 AND PROPER THREAD PROTRUSION WAS OBTAINED. AT THE REMAINING TWO LOCATI 264908 1 4 ONS, WITH E.O.T.F CONCURRENCE, LONGER FASTENERS WERE INSTALLED AND PROPE 264908 1 5 R THREAD PROTRUSION WAS OBTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS A BU 264908 1 6 ILT UP OF TOLERANCE AND IMPROPER HARDWARE CALL OUT ON PRINT. NO FURTHER 264908 1 7 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 264908 1 8 264928 1 1 THE FRAME WEBBING HAS BEEN CLEANED WITH BEHR-TEX PADS AND IPA TO REMOV 264928 1 2 E SURFACE CORROSION. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 265251 1 1 MOLD IMPRESSION RESULTS OF SCRATCH IN BORON STRUT 265251 1 2 SURFACE THAN ALLOWABLE DESIGN CRITERIA (< .003"). 265251 1 3 THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF CUT OR DISPLACED BORON FI 265251 1 4 BERS. BORON STRUT WILL UNDERGO FUNCTIONAL INTEGRI 265251 1 5 TY TEST AT VENDOR SITE FOR EVALUATION DUE TO DEPTH 265251 1 6 OF SCRATCHES. LRU PR WRTTEN TO ROUTE DISCREPANT 265251 1 7 STRUT TO VENDOR FOR EVALAUTION. REPLACEMENT STRUT 265251 1 8 OBTAINED FROM SPARES. REPLACEMENT STRUT WILL BE 265251 1 9 INSTL'D PER OMI V5R02. 265279 1 1 FITTING WAS REAMED TO THE NEXT OVERSIZE DIAMETER & OVERSIZED HI-LOKS W 265279 1 2 ERE INSTALLED. REPAIR WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 265429 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN BY ENGR TO STOP WORK ON TPS-ST 265429 1 2 R-3-07-193 TO PREVENT DRILLING HOLES IN AN INCORRE 265429 1 3 CT LOCTION. MOD-011 TO THE TPS HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO 265429 1 4 RELOCATE HOLES WITH AN E.O. TO FOLLOW. RELOCATION 265429 1 5 OF HOLES WILL ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. NO DISPO RE 265429 1 6 Q'D ON THIS PR. CLOSE PR. 265445 1 1 ITEM 1,2, & 3, PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS DISCREPANCIES IN R/H TEE #11 (R/ 265445 1 2 S 12) V070-199839-012 INSULATOR WAS RESOLVED BY ROUTING THE INSULATOR 265445 1 3 TO RI SERVICE CENTER FOR REPAIR. INSULATOR WAS RETURNED AND REINSTALLE 265445 1 4 D FOR FLIGHT. REWORK RETURNED THE INSULATOR TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PR 265445 1 5 OBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 265450 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 265450 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PNLS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLT. RC ACTION 265450 1 3 TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO 265450 1 4 PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87-103-C1) CL 265505 1 1 REINSTALL V070-190628-003 USING (2) MD112-3003-0544 SCREWS AS ORIGINALLY 265505 1 2 CALLED OUT PER V3511 VOL 4, REV G STEP 704-039. INSTALLED PER RTOMI 3 0 265505 1 3 22785-12. NOTE: THIS IS A RETURN TO PRINT "CONDITION". 265566 1 1 FASTENER THAT WAS INSTALLED IN THE INCORRECT HOLE HAS BEEN REMOVED. CA 265566 1 2 RRIER PANEL THAT THE FASTENER PREVENTED FROM BEING INSTALLED IS NOW IN 265566 1 3 STALLED. 265702 1 1 BRACKET WAS INSTALLED WITH HI-LOC'S INSTEAD OF RIV 265702 1 2 ET BECAUSE OF LIMITED SPACE IN ELEVON COVE WITH MR 265702 1 3 DISPOSITION.CLOSE THIS PR. 265707 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP ON RH VENT DOOR 7 DURING TPS MEQ-3-07-079 WHEN T 265707 1 2 HE AFT HINGE GAPS WERE NOT EQUAL WITHIN +/- .005" PER THE INSTALLATION 265707 1 3 AND RIGGING INSTRUCTIONS WHICH INDICATE TO CENTER THE FWD. HINGE IN I 265707 1 4 TS CLEVIS AND THEN POSITION THE AFT HINGE SUCH THAT THE AFT BUSHING/CL 265707 1 5 EVIS GAPS ARE EQUAL (+/- .005") AND DRILL THE HINGE MOUNTING HOLES IN 265707 1 6 THE DOOR. THE AFT HINGE GAPS WERE MEASURED AND FOUND TO BE .074" AND . 265707 1 7 021". THIS DIMENSION IS NOT ADJUSTABLE AFTER MANUFACTURE. THIS IS SUFF 265707 1 8 ICIENT TO ALLOW FOR MOVEMENT AND EXPANSION/CONTRACTION IN BOTH DIRECTI 265707 1 9 ONS, BECAUSE THE FWD HINGE CONFIGURATION LIMITS DOOR MOVEMENT TO .005" 265707 1 10 - .010". THEREFORE, THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT THE FIT, FORM OR 265707 1 11 FUNCTION OF THE VENT DOORS FOR INTENDED USE. THIS CONDITION WAS MR'D " 265707 1 12 ACCEPTABLE AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE" AND MR ID WAS APPLIED. FUNCTION 265707 1 13 AL RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER V1016. 265786 1 1 KORPON OF BORON TUBE 70B2000-84 WAS FOUND TO BE SC 265786 1 2 RATCHED OFF IN 3 EA PLACES DOWN TO BARE METAL ON U 265786 1 3 PPER AFT SIDE. MR ACTION WAS TAKEN ON BORON TUBE 265786 1 4 TO CORROSION PROTECT SCRATCHED AREAS. THIS ACTION 265786 1 5 ALLOWS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF BORON STRUT. 265832 01 1 VOID PR. TO REMAIN DR, DV-6-000289. 266070 1 1 PEELING KORPON IS ACTUALLY RT4 SQUEEZ-OUT RESULTING FROM PNL INSTL'N. 266070 1 2 THIS CONDITION & "PITS" IN CORE FILLER HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED OKAY-AS-IS 266070 1 3 PER MR CAUSE; MANUFACTURING/ASSY CONDITIONS. 266127 1 1 HINGE MISALIGNMENT ACCEPTED OKAY-AS-IS PER MR. MINOR MISALIGNED WILL N 266127 1 2 OT DEGRADE STRUCTURAL/MECHANICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE DOOR. 266195 1 1 A NUTPLATE WAS MISSING AT THE LEFTHAND SIDEWALL AT Xo 1352.5, Yo -90, 266195 1 2 AND Zo 350. THE V070-857133-003 BRACKET WAS REMOVED TO FACILITATE THE 266195 1 3 NUTPLATE REPAIR. THE NUTPLATE BARREL WAS REPLACED AND THE BRACKET WA 266195 1 4 S REINSTALLED. 266201 1 1 THE OCN AND S/N RECORDED IN V5R02 FOR H2 TK 2 FWD OUTBOARD STRUT WERE 266201 1 2 INCORRECT. BECAUSE THIS PR DID NOT AFFECT HARDWARE FUNCTION IT WAS DEF 266201 1 3 ERRED TO FUTURE FLT. BAY 5 RHS WAS OPENED, DURING STS-41 FLOW PROCESSI 266201 1 4 NG AND THE CORRECT OCN AND S/N OBTAINED AND RECORDED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 266201 1 5 PREVIOUSLY ONLY THE S/N OF THE STRUT COULD BE OBTAINED. SINCE THIS PR 266201 1 6 WAS TAKEN CVAS HAS STARTED TRACKING S/N AND OCN FOR CROSS REFERENCE. 266266 1 1 DISCREPANT ROSAN INSERT REPLACED WITH OVERSIZE INSERT DUE TO THREAD DA 266266 1 2 MAGE ON SEAL RETAINER. MR SHIM REBONDED TO MEET PREVIOUS MR INSTALLATI 266266 1 3 ON DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXISTS. CLOSE THIS PR. 266272 1 1 THE INTERFERING EDGE OF THE DOUBLER WAS CHAMFERED. 266272 1 2 (PER MRB APPROVAL) 266434 1 1 THE MD114-5017-005 NUTPLATE LOCATED AT THE 6 O'CLOCK POSITION ON ENGIN 266434 1 2 E #2 DOME HEAT SHIELD (ON ORBITER) HAD A BROKEN RIVET. THE RIVET HAS B 266434 1 3 EEN REPLACED AND THE NUTPLATE INSTALLATION RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURA 266434 1 4 TION. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CLOSE THIS PR. 266450 1 1 ITEM 1 PG. 1 I.B. & O.B. EDGE: ALL F/B BRKT TO C/P 266450 1 2 STEPS WERE WITHIN TOLERANCE OR MR APPROVED DUE TO 266450 1 3 BEING WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085 266450 1 4 PER PG. 2. ITEM 2 PG. 1A STR TO PNL STEPS: O/T C 266450 1 5 /P TO STR STEPS WERE REWORKED TO BEING .035 STEP T 266450 1 6 O ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE. A .010 SHIM WAS BONDED & 266450 1 7 STEPS WERE MEAS'D AGAIN & ARE LISTED IN STEP 5 PG. 266450 1 8 4. STEPS ARE ALL WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCE PER 266450 1 9 MR RATIONALE ON PG. 5. ITEM 3 PG. 1B: VOID UNDER 266450 1 10 MR SHIM -001 WAS CORRECTED BY REMOVING SHIM & REB 266450 1 11 ONDING PER PG. 7. ALL STEP DIMENSIONS FROM C/P AS 266450 1 12 REWORKED & DOC'D PROVIDE A F/B TO TILE CONFIG THA 266450 1 13 T WILL PREVENT OVERTEMP OF F/B, SIP & STR. 266458 1 1 ATTACH POINT #5 BOLT WAS FOUND TO HAVE FLATTENED THREADS. THE DISCREPA 266458 1 2 NT BOLT WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW ONE. THE NUT WHERE BOLT GOES INTO WAS 266458 1 3 INSPECTED PER STEP 3.0 AND FOUND TO BE GOOD WHILE HOLE IN SLIDE BUSHIN 266458 1 4 G WAS FOUND TO HAVE A SMALL METAL EDGE WHICH WAS ADDRESSED PER PR RP01 266458 1 5 -3-13-0435. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE TO BOLT IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR D 266458 1 6 UE TO POD REMOVAL. 266472 1 1 DISCREPANT SCREW LOCATION THAT WOULD NOT TORQUE PROPERLY ON PG 1A IS T 266472 1 2 HE SAME LOCATION THAT BOTTOMED OUT ON PG. 1. THIS CONDITION WAS DUE TO 266472 1 3 THIS LOCATION BEING TORQUED LAST WHICH CAUSED O/T OT BIND AGAINST SCR 266472 1 4 EW. THIS CONDITION WAS DRESOLVED BY LOOSENING SCREWS ANS TIGHTENING DI 266472 1 5 SCREPANT LOCATION FIRST FOLLOWED THE REST. 1 EACH PER DRAWING ROSAN IN 266472 1 6 SWERT BACKED OUT WITH SCREW. A OVERSIZED INSERT WAS INSTALLED BY MR DU 266472 1 7 E TO HOLE DAMAGE WHEN INSWERT WAS PULLED OUT. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMA 266472 1 8 NSHIP. 266517 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 266517 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 266517 1 3 EARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. 266517 1 4 THE DEBONDED SHIM(S) WERE REBONDED IN PLACE. R.C. 266517 1 5 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 266517 1 6 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 266517 1 7 7-103-C1) 266538 1 1 A SPOT OF FOREIGN MATERIAL WAS DISCOVERED ON LH #2 266538 1 2 RADIATOR. THIS SPOT WAS WIPED OFF WITH 99% ISEPRO 266538 1 3 PYL ALCOHOL AND THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE SURFACE WAS 266538 1 4 THE CLEANED USING 80% BY VOLUME TRICHLOROETHENE A 266538 1 5 ND 20% BY VOLUME METHANEL SOLUTION. THE CLEANING W 266538 1 6 AS SATISFACTORY AND NO DISCOLORATION WAS OBSERVED. 266538 1 7 THE DISCREPANT CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. 266628 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 266628 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 266628 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 266628 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 266628 1 5 3-C1. 266703 1 1 BOLT HOLE WAS CLEANED AND A NEW BOLT WAS INSTALLED PER JC V30-15428 WH 266703 1 2 ILE APPLYING A RIGHT TO LEFT LOAD AT TOP OF TAIL TO ALIGN FITTING. 266718 1 1 THE SMALL AREA OF MISSING SILVER-TEFLON TAPE DOCUMENTED ON THIS PR WAS 266718 1 2 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "AS-IS" WITH KOROPON CORROSION PROTE 266718 1 3 CTION AND NO THERMAL WHITE CHEMGLAZE. DUE TO THE LOCATION OF THIS AREA 266718 1 4 , THE THERMAL PROPERTIES OF THE RADIATOR PANEL HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. 266718 1 5 NO REWORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 266738 1 1 ALL DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED BY E.O.-TO- 266738 1 2 FOLLOW, MR, OR RETURN TO PRINT. 266807 1 1 TILE CAVITIES; 190002-233, 91124-024 & 191127-045 266807 1 2 HAD PROTRUDING FASTENERS IN EXCESS OF .020", ABOVE 266807 1 3 STR. THE FASTENERS HAVE A CROWNED HEAD, WHICH WA 266807 1 4 S GRND OFF, WHICH REDUCED HEAD PROTRUSION ABOVE ST 266807 1 5 R OML TO < .020". 266808 1 1 SLIGHT GAPS WERE FOUND BETWEEN LAND SEAL STRIPS IN THE CORNERS OF THE 266808 1 2 L/H AND R/H M.L.G. WHEELWELLS. THE GAPS WERE FILLED USING MBO130-119- 266808 1 3 TYPE III RTV, THIS WORK WILL BE DOCUMENTED ON A E.O. TO DWG. V070-1000 266808 1 4 08. UPON VERIFICATION THAT RELEASED DE.O. REFLECTS ENGINEERING DISPOSI 266808 1 5 TION CLOSE THIS PR. 266942 1 1 THE SEALS ON THE 50-2 ACCESS DOOR HAVE BEEN REPAIRED PER THIS MR DISPO 266942 1 2 SITION. USE OF THESE SEALS WILL NOT HINDER THE DESIGN INTENT OF THE SE 266942 1 3 AL INSTALLATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE IS THE INSTALLATION AND 266942 1 4 REMOVAL OF THE DOOR ON A REGULAR BASIS. THE DEBONDED SPACERS PAGE 1A H 266942 1 5 AVE BEEN REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS THE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF T 266942 1 6 HE DOOR ON A REGULAR BASIS. 267023 1 1 THE DISCREPANT STEP CONDITIONS FOUND FOR THE C/P-TO-F/B SUPT & C/P-TO- 267023 1 2 WING TRAILING EDGE STEPS WERE REPAIRED TO MEET AN ACCEPTABLE STEP COND 267023 1 3 ITION OF .070"/+.015"/-.040". ITEM 1.0 & 2.0, PGS. 1 & 1A (C/P-TO-F/B 267023 1 4 SUPT STEPS): SHIMS WERE BONDED TO V070-191076-002 C/P STIFFENER FEET 267023 1 5 & THE ADJ F/B SUPTS TO BRING DISCREPANT STEP CONDITIONS BACK WITHIN AC 267023 1 6 CEPTABLE MR TOLERANCE (.040" - .080"). THE FINAL MEASUREMENTS FOR THE 267023 1 7 PNL-TO-F/B SUPT STEPS WERE AS FOLLOWS: INBD "A" .0740" (ATT G), "B" 267023 1 8 .058" (STEP 46), "C" .069" (STEP 46), "D" .0754" (ATT G), OUTBD "A" .0 267023 1 9 717" (ATT G), "B" .0672" (ATT G), .0698" (ATT G), .0774" (ATT G). ITE 267023 1 10 M 3.0 PG. 1B (C/P-TO-WING TRAILING EDGE STR): SHIMS WERE BONDED ON THE 267023 1 11 WING TRAILING EDGE STR TO BRING DISCREPANT STEP CONDITION BACK W/IN T 267023 1 12 HE MR TOLERANCE (.040" - .080"). THE FINAL MEASUREMENTS WERE AS FOLLO 267023 1 13 WS: (STEP 34.0) I/B .0742, .0537, .0599, .0609, .0711, .0736, .0706, . 267023 1 14 0670, .0750, .0814, .0724, .0717, O/B .0635. ITEM 4, 5, 6 & 7 PG. 1C 267023 1 15 (SHIM VOIDS & DEBONDS): THE DISCREPANT SHIMS THAT HAD SHIFTED DURING B 267023 1 16 OND WERE REMOVED & RE-BONDING. (REF. STEPS 39 - 43) ITEM 8, PG. 1D ( 267023 1 17 SHIMS TOO WIDE): SHIMS BEING BONDED ON THE WING TRAILING EDGE IN CERTA 267023 1 18 IN LOCs NEEDED TO BE .40" WIDE, INSTEAD OF .75" WIDE. THESE SHIMS WER 267023 1 19 E TRIMMED ACCORDINGLY. ITEM 9, PG. 1E (SHIM INSTL'D INCORRECTLY): SHI 267023 1 20 M BONDED APPROX. 3" INBD OF PROPER LOC. SHIM WAS REMOVED & REBONDED I 267023 1 21 N PROPER LOC. ITEM 10, PG. 1F (SHIM INSTL'D INCORRECTLY): SHIM INSTL' 267023 1 22 D FLUSH W/ EDGE OF F/B SUPT INSTEAD OF EDGE OF C/PN. (APPROX .125" OU 267023 1 23 TBD) SHIM WAS MR APPROVED OKAY AS INSTL'D. ITEM 11, PG. 1G: PG. 1G WA 267023 1 24 S WRITTEN ADDRESSING INSUFFICIENT F/B CONTACT SURFACE & WAS DETERMINED 267023 1 25 TO BE A THERMAL PROTECTION SYS (TPS) CONCERN ONLY. NO STRUCTURAL WOR 267023 1 26 K WAS REQ'D. PR RWNG-3-07-1311 WAS INIT'D PER STEP 48 & WILL ADDRESS 267023 1 27 IMPROPER F/B SEAL ZONE. 267230 1 1 HEAT SYNC REMOVED BY STR-3-07-1677. NO DISCREPAN- 267230 1 2 CY EXIST. 267293 1 1 THIS STRUCTURES WAD HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO STR-3-12-3576 AS ITEM 4.0 267293 1 2 ON PAGE 1A (REFERENCE ATTACHMENT A). THE V070-3516614-001 SHELL ASSEMB 267293 1 3 LY IS BEING SENT TO VENDOR FOR REPAIR ON STR-3576, THEREFORE, THE DISC 267293 1 4 REPANT SPRING CLIP REFERENCED PER ITEM 1.0 ON THIS PR WILL BE REPAIRED 267293 1 5 BY VENDOR ON THE STR-3576 WAD (THE SPRING CLIP IS BONDED ONTO THE V07 267293 1 6 0-351614-001 SHELL ASSEMBLY). PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGREDATION. 267350 1 1 THE V070-350180-006 FIBERGLASS BRACKET WAS MR REPAIRED BY BONDING FIBE 267350 1 2 RGLASS PATCHES OVER CRACKED AREA. THIS BRACKET SUPPORTS ONE WIRE BUNDL 267350 1 3 E ABOVE AVIONICS BAY #5. THE ABOVE PERFORMED REPAIR WILL NOT ADVERSELY 267350 1 4 AFFECT THE ABILITY OF THE BRACKET TO SUPPORT THE WIRE BUNDLE. PROBABL 267350 1 5 E CAUSE OF DAMAGE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 267975 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 1) THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT AREAS AROUND VENT D 267975 1 2 OOR #9 WHERE AN UNIDENTIFIED SUBSTANCE WAS FOUND, ASSUMED TO BE CORROS 267975 1 3 ION. SAMPLES OF THE SUBSTANCE WERE TAKEN AND ROUTED THE MICROCHEMICAL 267975 1 4 LAB FOR ANALYSIS. THIS ANALYSIS IS DETERMINED THAT THE SUBSTANCE CONSI 267975 1 5 STED MOSTLY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEPOSITS, PROCESSING DEBRIS AND SMALL AMO 267975 1 6 UNTS OF SURFACE OXIDATION FROM CRES HARDWARE. ALL CONTAMINATION IN THE 267975 1 7 DISCREPANT AREA WAS REMOVED AN CORROSION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED. PROB 267975 1 8 ABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCIES IS ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION. NO FURTHE 267975 1 9 R ENGINEERING OR SHOP ACTION REQUIRED. 267976 1 1 H2 TANK 1 OUTBOARD AFT STRUT BOLT AT DOGLEG ATTACH POINT APPEARED RECE 267976 1 2 SSED IN LOCKING NUT DURING OFF-LINE QC INSPECTION. ONCE ACCESS WAS OBT 267976 1 3 AINED, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT BOLT WAS NOT ENGAGED INTO NUT LOCKING FE 267976 1 4 ATURE (IE NOT TORQUED). A GAP OF 0.91" WAS MEASURED BETWEEN NUT AND ST 267976 1 5 RUT. BOLT WAS THEN TORQUED AT 80-112 IN LBS WITH TECHNICIAN REPORTING 267976 1 6 NOMINAL RESISTANCE FROM NUT LOCKING FEATURE. GAP BETWEEN NUT AND STRUT 267976 1 7 WAS ELIMINATED. IN ADDITION, ONE THREAD WAS PROTURDING THRU NUT. PAGE 267976 1 8 1A: COPIES OF DRAWINGS ATTACHED TO PR WERE ENSERTED BY QC AS "TYPICAL 267976 1 9 " FOR REFERENCE ONLY AND NOT INTENDED TO DEPICT EXACT LOCATION OF DISC 267976 1 10 REPANCY. IN CONCLUSION, H2 TANK 1 IS IN DWG CONFIGURATION. IN ADDITION 267976 1 11 , ALL ACCESSABLE TANK STRUTS WERE INSPECTED BY ENGINEERING WITH NO ADD 267976 1 12 ITIONAL DISCREPANCIES NOTED. THIS PR READY FOR CLOSURE. PROBABLE CAUSE 267976 1 13 : WORKMANSHIP; STRUT BOLT NOT TORQUED DURING TANK INSTALLATION. 268030 1 1 H2 PURGE PORT FLIGHT FITTING V070-454720-004 HAS BEEN ASSIGNED AN OCN# 268030 1 2 . NO MARKING OF PART IS REQUIRED. 268167 1 1 RATIONALE: HOT BONDING OF DOUBLER OVER DENTED AREA 268167 1 2 IN PANEL FACE SHEET RESTORES THE STRUCTURAL INTEG- 268167 1 3 RITY OF THE AVIONICS BAY COVER DESIGN INTENT OF 268167 1 4 THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE IS MAINTAINED. 268214 1 1 (1) DELAMINATION WAS RECORDED AT RH PLBD #1 (Xo624.80) I/B STRONGBACK 268214 1 2 ATTACH POINT. THIS DELAMINATION WAS FOUND TO BE MINOR IN NATURE AND MR 268214 1 3 ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGR 268214 1 4 ADATION. 268338 1 1 COTTER PINS WERE TOO LONG, THUS SCRAPING AGAINST STR. THE COTTER PINS 268338 1 2 WERE TRIMMED, THEN THE ENDS WERE BENT AGAINST THE SHANK. THE SCRAPING 268338 1 3 WAS ELIMINATED. THE SCRAPES WERE COSMETIC ONLY & HAVE BEEN CORROSION P 268338 1 4 ROTECTED. THE INTEGRITY OF THE COTTER PIN INSTL'N & THE STR HAS BEEN M 268338 1 5 AINTAINED. SECONDARY STR. NOTE: RQMT FOR COTTER PIN INSTL'N PER MAO 10 268338 1 6 1-301 PARA 3.4.2 ARE STILL MET BY THIS TRIM MAKING IT PER SPEC. 268746 1 1 LOCATION WRITTEN UP IS A TOOLING HOLE AND NOT A DI 268746 1 2 SCREPANCY. FRAME IS IN PRINT CONFIGURATION. 269131 1 1 INSPECTION OF THE L/H RADIATOR PANEL #3 REVEALED TWO MINOR DEFECTS IN 269131 1 2 THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE. THESE DEFECTS ARE ACCEPTABLE PER THE VOUGHT RA 269131 1 3 DIATOR REPAIR MANUAL AND HAVE BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "A 269131 1 4 S-IS". NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXISTS. 269148 1 1 V070-660512-020 SEAL ON V070-660512-024 THERMAL/DEBRIS PANEL WAS FOUND 269148 1 2 TO BE TORN. A NEW SEAL WAS INSTALLED ON DEBRIS PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE N 269148 1 3 ORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CLOSE THIS PR. 269300 1 1 INSTALLATION OF MR DOUBLERS WILL REINFORCE DENTED 269300 1 2 AREAS. 269487 1 1 CORROSION DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY ITEMS 1,2,3 & 4 OF THIS PR HAVE BEEN 269487 1 2 REMOVED BY ABRASIVELY CLEANING THE DEFECTS & REMOVING PITS & CORROSION 269487 1 3 PRODUCTS PER MR APPROVED DISPO. ITEM 5, ELONGATED SCREW HOLE HAS BEEN 269487 1 4 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR APPROVED DISPO. ITEM 6 HAS BEEN 269487 1 5 RESOLVED PER MR APPROVED DISPO BY USING MD128-0002-0202 BLIND FASTENER 269487 1 6 S IN PLACE OF MD121-0004-0502 BLIND RIVITS. ALL ITEMS ADDRESSED & RESO 269487 1 7 LVED. 269571 1 1 THE DISCREPANT STEP CONDITIONS FOUND FOR THE C/P-TO-F/B SUPT & C/P-TO- 269571 1 2 WING TRAILING EDGE STEPS WERE REPAIRED TO MEET AN ACCEPTABLE STEP COND 269571 1 3 ITION OF .070"/+.015"/-.030". ENGRG NOTE: ITEMS 1.0 & 2.0 PGS. 1 & 1A 269571 1 4 ARE WRITTEN AGAINST THE SAME DISCREPANCY & WERE ADDRESSED TOGETHER TH 269571 1 5 ROUGHOUT THIS PR. ITEM 1.0 & 2.0 PGS. 1 & 1A (C/P-TO-F/B SUPT STEPS): 269571 1 6 SHIMS WERE BONDED TO THE ADJ F/B SUPTS TO BRING DISCREPANT F/B SUPTS 269571 1 7 TO BRING DISCREPANT STEP CONDITIONS BACK WITHIN ACCEPTABLE MR TOLERANC 269571 1 8 E (.040" - .085"). THE FINAL MEASUREMENTS FOR THE C/P-TO-F/B SUPT STE 269571 1 9 PS WERE AS FOLLOWS: INBD "A" .0571" (ATT. B), "B" .0731" (ATT. B), "C" 269571 1 10 .040" (STEP 52), "D" .0584" (ATT. B); OUTBD "A" .0690" (ATT. B), "B" 269571 1 11 .0605" (ATT. B), "C" .0663" (ATT. B), "D" .0559" (ATT. B). ITEM 3.0, 269571 1 12 PG. 1B (C/P-TO-WING TRAILING EDGE STR): SHIMS WERE BONDED ON THE WING 269571 1 13 TRAILING EDGE STR TO BRING DISCREPANT STEP CONDITION BACK WITHIN MR TO 269571 1 14 LERANCE (.040" - .080"). THE FINAL MEASUREMENTS WERE AS FOLLOWS: I/B 269571 1 15 .0474, .0477, .0498, .0636, .0637, .0667, .0592, .0640, .0711, .0829 O 269571 1 16 /B (STEP 33.0). ITEM 4, PG. 1C (SHIMS TOO WIDE): SHIMS BEING BONDED O 269571 1 17 N THE WING TRAILING IN CERTAIN LOCs NEEDED TO BE .40" WIDE. INSTEAD O 269571 1 18 F .75" WIDE. THESE SHIMS WERE TRIMMED ACCORDINGLY. ITEM 5, PG. 1D SH 269571 1 19 IM TO BE BONDED PER ATTACHMENT Z DID NOT MEET DIMENSIONS RQMTS. A NEW 269571 1 20 SHIM WAS ORDERED TO REPLACE IT. (REF. STEP 38.0) ITEM 6, PG. 1E (SH 269571 1 21 IM SHIFTED DURING BOND): THE SHIFT IN SHIM BONDED TO F/B SUPT WAS MINO 269571 1 22 R IN NATURE & WAS MR TRIMMED FLUSH W/ EDGE OF SUPT. 269574 1 1 R/H OUTBRD WHEEL/TIRE ASSY WAS REMOVED AT KSC 269574 1 2 SHUTTLE AND SENT TO B.F.GOODRICH THRU HDA 269692 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES NOTED ON PGS. 1 THRU 1D HAVE BEE 269692 1 2 N ACCEPTED AS IS OR RESOLVED BY MR DISPO CONSISTIN 269692 1 3 G MAINLY OF (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) VENTING OF VOIDS 269692 1 4 & REWORKING OF DEBONDS. DESIGN INTENT OF THE RTV- 269692 1 5 H/S INSTL'N HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. 269888 1 1 THE UNIVERSAL HEAD RIVETS WERE RPLCD, W/ FLUSH HEAD RIVETS, TO ELIMINA 269888 1 2 TE THE INTERFERENCE W/ THE FITTING INSTL'N. THE FLUSH HEAD RIVET INST 269888 1 3 L'N IS MR ACCEPTABLE. THE PROBLEM IS DUE TO A TOLERANCE BUILD UP. TH 269888 1 4 E FLUSH HEAD RIVET INSTL'N IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLT. 269925 1 1 DISREPANT RING, V070-198704-010 HAS BEEN ROUTED TO HDA FOR SCRAP AND H 269925 1 2 AS BEEN REPLACED WITH A NEW RING. ITEM 1, PAGE 1, HAS BEEN RESOLVED AN 269925 1 3 D NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR 269979 1 1 EOs V070-156850 B06 AND V070-156854 A02 REFLECTS T 269979 1 2 HE WORK ACCOMPLISHED ON THIS PR. CAUSE: DOUBLER WA 269979 1 3 S MODIFIED (IN TPS) AND CLIP NOT REQUIRED. CLOSE T 269979 1 4 HIS PR. 270179 1 1 THE AREAS OF PEELING PAINT LISTED IN ITEMS 1,2,AND 3 WERE SANDED AND R 270179 1 2 EPAINTED. ITEMS 4 AND 5 WERE NOT A PROBLEM AS A TECHNICIAN WAS ABLE TO 270179 1 3 SCREW THE FASTENERS IN AND TORQUE THEM AS REQUIRED. ALL ITEMS RETURNE 270179 1 4 D TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE INTEGRITY OF THE PAINT ON THE AIRLOCK WA 270179 1 5 LL IS RESTORED. 270215 1 1 VISUAL AND RECORDED INSPECTION FO THIS/THESE DAMAG 270215 1 2 E CONDITIONS INDICATES THAT THE DAMAGE IS MINOR. 270215 1 3 THIS/THESE CONDITIONS ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH T 270215 1 4 O REQUIRE A REPAIR. THE SCRATCHES AND/OR HOLES AN 270215 1 5 D/OR DAMAGE IS TO THE SILVER TEFLON TAPE ONLY. TH 270215 1 6 IS MINOR TAPE DAMAGE IS ALLOWABLE PER VOUGHT RADIA 270215 1 7 TOR REPAIR MANUAL (SECT. 3-11B). THE DINGS, IF AN 270215 1 8 Y, ARE MINOR AND DO NOT REQUIRE A REPAIR. THIS/TH 270215 1 9 ESE CONDITIONS WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE FIT, F 270215 1 10 ORM, AND/OR FUNCTION OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS 270215 1 11 CONDITION WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE HEAT TRANSF 270215 1 12 ER CAPACITY OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. THIS CONDITION 270215 1 13 IS ACCEPTABLE "AS-IS" FOR UN-RESTRICTED USE. NO 270215 1 14 MR I.D. REQ'D (DING MAP). 270462 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 THE V073-340114-009 BOLT THAT WAS INSTALLED AT THIS LOCA 270462 1 2 TION WAS REMOVED AND FOUND TO HAVE WORN THREADS CAUSING NO RUNNING TOR 270462 1 3 QUE. PR CM3-10-0165 WAS GENERATED AGAINST THE WORN V073-340114-009 BOL 270462 1 4 T. A NEW BOLT WAS OBTAINED RUNNING TORQUE WAS VERIFIED TO BE WITHIN PR 270462 1 5 INT REQUIREMENTS AND THE BOLT WAS INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERAT 270462 1 6 IONAL DEGRADATION. 270523 1 1 THE NON-CONFORMANCE OF THIS PR IS THE SUPPOSED WRONG INSTALLATION OF H 270523 1 2 2 TANK 2 STRUT FASTENER AT THE STRUT-TO-STRUT LOCATION. PRSD CRYO TANK 270523 1 3 SUPPORT STRUT FASTENING HARDWARE IS SHOWN IN BOTH ATTITUDES IN THE TA 270523 1 4 NK SET INSTALLATION PRINTS, WITH THE BOLT INSTALLED WITH THE BOLT HEAD 270523 1 5 TOWARD THE TANK AS WELL AS INSTALLED WITH THE FASTENING NUT TOWARD TH 270523 1 6 E TANK. THERE IS NO BOLT ATTITUDE REQUIREMENT GIVEN IN THE INSTALLATIO 270523 1 7 N PRINT, NOR IS THERE ONE DESIRED BY ENGINEERING. DESIGN CENTER CONCUR 270523 1 8 ES THAT THE BOLT ATTITUDE IS NOT A CONCERN. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION 270626 1 1 2 EACH V070-198348-008 SEALS WERE FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT. SEALS WERE R 270626 1 2 EMOVED AND EVALUATED BY ENGINEERING AND SCRAPPEDLOCALLY. NEW V070-198 270626 1 3 348-008 SEALS WERE INSTALLED RETURNING AREA TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PR 270626 1 4 OBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 270659 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 270659 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RE AC 270659 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 270659 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 270659 1 5 3-C1. 270705 1 1 THE MD112-1003-0414 SCREW WAS PROBABLY REMOVED BY MISTAKE, SO A NEW SC 270705 1 2 REW WAS INSTALLED. THE REST OF THE SCREWS WERE CHECKED TO VERIFY PROPE 270705 1 3 R TORQUE. THIS WILL RETURN THE HARDWARE TO A PRINT CONDITION. 270768 1 1 SUPPORTS V070-337603-001 AND V070-337603-002 WERE 270768 1 2 WIPED CLEAN & CORROSION PROTECTED. SUPPORTS ARE RE 270768 1 3 TURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. CLOSE PR. 270788 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 (SAM 270788 1 2 E OVN NUMBER RECORDED FOR BOTH E.T. SHELL ASSEMBLIES), ITEM 2.0 (AFTER S 270788 1 3 HELL ASSEMBLIES REMOVED, THE L/H SHELL HAD NO LEGIBLE OCN/SERIAL NUMBER) 270788 1 4 , AND ITEMS 3.0 AND 4.0 (GOUGES AND WEAR ON KAHRON SURFACE). ITEM 1.0: S 270788 1 5 TEP 2.0 DEFERRED THIS DISPOSITION FOR POST FLIGHT 12 INSPECTION. STEP 4. 270788 1 6 0 RECORDED THE PART NUMBER AND OCN NUMBER OF BOTH THE LEFT HAND AND RIGH 270788 1 7 T HAND E.T. SHELL ASSEMBLIES AFTER THEY WERE REMOVED PER JOB CARD V35-50 270788 1 8 002 STEP 4.0. THE RECORDED PART NUMBERS AND OCN NUMBERS RESOLVED THE DIS 270788 1 9 CREPANCY RECORDED BY CVAS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS INCORRECT ENTRY OF OCN 270788 1 10 NUMBERS ON JOB CARD V35-50002 STEP 10.0. ITEM 2.0: THE L/H 270788 1 11 V070-351614-001 SHELL WAS RE-INDENTIFIED WITH ITS CORRECT SERIAL NUMBER. 270788 1 12 PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE SERIAL NUMBER BEING UNREADABLE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND 270788 1 13 TEAR. ITEM 3.0 AND ITEM 4.0: THE DISCREPANT V070-351614-001 SHELL 270788 1 14 ASSEMBLY WAS ROUTED TO THE HARDWARE DISPOSITIONING AREA FOR REPAIR AND 270788 1 15 WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW SHELL ASSEMBLY. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE 270788 1 16 DAMAGED KAHRLON SURFACE AND THE GOUGES ON THE TOP OF THE SHELL ASSEMBLY 270788 1 17 IS DUE TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THE SHELL ASSEMBLY IS A SECONDARY 270788 1 18 STRUCTURE. 270791 1 1 DISCREPANCY IS WITHIN SPEC TOLERANCE FOR RCC INSUL 270791 1 2 ATORS. 270873 1 1 THE GOUGE IN B91B10522-13 FITTING WAS SMOOTHED OUT 270873 1 2 BY A MR DISPOSITION AND IS APPROVED FOR UNRESTRIC 270873 1 3 TED USE. THE FITTING IS RETURNED TO DESIGN INTENT. 271055 1 1 DISCOLORED KOROPON WAS DUE TO HIGH HEAT CONDITIONS 271055 1 2 BUT DID NOT RESULT IN STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. DISCOLOR 271055 1 3 ED KOROPON WAS REMOVED AND NO NEW COAT OF CORROSIO 271055 1 4 N PROTECTION NEEDED TO RETURN TO PRINT CONFIGURATI 271055 1 5 ON. SEE SUMMARY CONCLUSION PG. 10 DOCUMENT WAS REO 271055 1 6 PENED TO DELETE UNWORK STEPS 14.1 AND 17. CLOSE PR 271073 1 1 RAISED METAL WAS SANDED OFF AND HOLE WAS INSPECTED WITH MOLD IMPRESSIO 271073 1 2 NS AND EDDY CURRENT (PER J/C V30-14440), (VERIFIED COMPLETED & EDDY CU 271073 1 3 ERENT ACCEPTABLE). NO DISCREPANT RESULTS WERE OBTAINED. MR APPROVAL FO 271073 1 4 R REWORK WAS OBTAINED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 271443 1 1 INTENT OF DESIGN WAS TO LEAVE OPEN HOLES AFTER 271443 1 2 BLANKET SUPPORT REMOVAL, THE FACT THAT THESE HOLES 271443 1 3 WERE ELONGATED WILL NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASE 271443 1 4 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. OPEN HOLES WILL BE CORROSION 271443 1 5 PROTECTED PER VSTR-3-07-222. SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 271488 1 1 THE V070-198702-002 BULB SEAL'S OUTER SHEATH IS SLIGHTLY TORN. THE DIS 271488 1 2 CREPANT BULB SEAL WAS SENT TO HDA WITH THE RECOMMENDATION TO SENT TO R 271488 1 3 I SERVICE CENTER FOR REPAIR AND RETURN TO STOCK. A NEW BULB SEAL WAS O 271488 1 4 BTAINED AND STORED IN THE MIDBODY SHOP. PROBABLE CAUSE: DISCREPANCY CA 271488 1 5 USED DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 271738 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 271738 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 271738 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. 271738 1 4 ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 271738 1 5 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-8 271738 1 6 7-103-C1). THE CARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 272044 1 1 ITEM #1: THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE NLG TRUNNION FITTING ATTACHING H/W W 272044 1 2 AS NOT PER PRINT. THE H/W INSTL'D IN THE HOLES WERE: MD111-4001-1028 272044 1 3 BOLTS, RD153-5002-0010 WASHERS & MD114-3001-1010 NUTS. THE H/W S/B MD 272044 1 4 111-4001-1030 BOLTS, RD153-5002-0010 WASHERS, MD153-1001-0010 WASHERS 272044 1 5 & MD114-3001-1010 NUTS. ON BOTH THE R/H & L/H SIDES THE H/W IN HOLES 272044 1 6 1 & 5 WERE CHANGED BY JC V30-13409. THE H/W IN HOLES 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 & 272044 1 7 8 WERE CHANGED OUT BY THIS WAD. HOLES 1 & 5 WERE DONE ON THE JC BECAU 272044 1 8 SE IT IS MANDATORY TO DO SO. NDE WAS PERFORMED (EDDY CURRENT) AND THE 272044 1 9 RPT NOS ARE: 31,621/30,934/31,701. FOR ITEM #2 WHERE THE NUT BOTTOME 272044 1 10 D OUT: ADDITIONAL WASHERS ARE APPROVED PER SPEC & WERE INSTL'D. NO DI 272044 1 11 SCREPANCY REMAINS. 272054 1 1 PAGE 1 WAS PICKED UP ON L/H AND R/H VENT DOOR 3 AFT HINGES HAVING GAPS 272054 1 2 BETWEEN BUSHINGS AND HINGE. ATTACHMENTS 1 AND 2 WERE WRITTEN TO REMOV 272054 1 3 E AND INSPECT THE HARDWARE. DURING INSPECTION IT WAS NOTED THAT THE FW 272054 1 4 D HINGE BOLT GRIP LENGTH WAS TOO LONG TO ALLOW THE COTTER PIN TO ENGAG 272054 1 5 E THE NUT. E.O. TO FOLLOW RATIONALE WAS WRITTEN TO CHANGE THE FWD HING 272054 1 6 E BOLT FROM A NAS1004-18 TO A NAS1004-16. ALSO, THE V070-384312-001 AN 272054 1 7 V070-384318-001 BUSHINGS WERE BINDING IN THE CLEVIS AND IT WAS DECIDE 272054 1 8 D TO REPLACE THEM. ATTACHEMENTS 3 AND 4 WERE WRITTEN TO ACCOMPLISH THI 272054 1 9 S AND -001 BUSHINGS WERE ORDERED FROM RI. PAGE 1A WAS PICKED UP WHEN T 272054 1 10 HE -001 BUSHINGS RECEIVED FROM RI WOULD NOT FIT INTO THE VEHICLE CLEVI 272054 1 11 SES. INSPECTION OF THE -001 BUSHINGS IN STEP 11 SHOWED THAT MANY WERE 272054 1 12 ACTUALLY OVERSIZED, WHICH PROMPTED FURTHER INVESTIGATION INTO BUSHING/ 272054 1 13 CLEVIS DESIGN TOLERANCES. LSOC, RI, AND NASA ENGINEERING DECIDED THAT 272054 1 14 AN E.O. WAS NEEDED TO BOTH V070-384312 AND V070-384318 TO CHANGE THE B 272054 1 15 USHING O.D. FROM .3727 (+0.0/-0.0005") TO .3711 (+0.0/-0.0010") TO ALL 272054 1 16 OW ADEQUATE CLEARANCE FOR THE BUSHINGS TO ROTATE FREELY IN THE CLEVIS 272054 1 17 (THIS E.O. CREATED THE -003 BUSHINGS) AND ALSO TO V070-384303 TO ALLOW 272054 1 18 THE INSTALLATION OF THE -003 BUSHINGS. E.O. TO FOLLOW RATIONALE WAS W 272054 1 19 RITTEN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS AND ALL AVAILABLE -001 BUSHINGS WERE SENT TO 272054 1 20 RI SERVICE CENTER ON LRU PR'S IN STEPS 12 AND 13 FOR REWORK TO -003 272054 1 21 DIMENSIONS. THE NEW -003 BUSHINGS WERE RETURNED TO KSC AND ALL WERE WI 272054 1 22 THIN SPEC. A FIT CHECK OF THE -003 BUSHINGS IN THE VEHICLE SHOWED AN E 272054 1 23 XCELLENT FIT WITH FREE ROTATION. DOOR INSTALLATION RESUMED IN ATTACHME 272054 1 24 NTS 3 AND 4 USING THE -003 BUSHINGS AND DOOR SET UP WAS PERFORMED. PAG 272054 1 25 E 1B WAS PICKED UP BECAUSE THE ELECTRICAL BOND TEST OF THE BOND STRAP 272054 1 26 ON RH VENT DOOR 3 WAS OUT OF SPEC. ATTACHMENT "ELECTRICAL BOND TEST" W 272054 1 27 AS WRITTEN TO CORRECT THIS DISCREPANCY AND A RESISTANCE OF 1.40 MILLIO 272054 1 28 HMS WAS OBTAINED ON RETEST. THE VENT DOOR FUNCTIONAL RETEST WAS PERFOR 272054 1 29 MED PER V1016. THESE DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXIST. 272154 1 1 DAMAGED AREA WAS SANDED DOWN, RE-KOROPONED & MR'D OK AS IS. 272171 1 1 ITEM #1 WAS ABOUT A BRACKET THAT WAS DEBONDED. THE AREA WAS CLEANED AN 272171 1 2 D THE BRACKET WAS REBONDED. ITEMS #2, #3, AND #4 PERTAINED TO BRACKETS 272171 1 3 THAT WERE DISCOVERED TO BE PARTIALLY DEBONDED. ALL THREE BRACKETS WER 272171 1 4 E REMOVED, THE AREAS CLEANED, AND THE BRACKETS REBONDED. 272262 1 1 THIS PROBLEM CAUSED BY CONSOLE OPERATOR ERROR. REQUIREMENT S00FAC.361 272262 1 2 - 1R WAS WAIVED BY WAIVER WK0681. CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT OF APPROV 272262 1 3 ED WAIVER WK0681. 272288 1 1 DURING V1164, ELEVON COVE LEAK RATE CHECK, THREE LEAK PATHS WERE FOUND 272288 1 2 IN THE SECONDARY SEAL SYSTEM. THESE LEAK PATHS OCCURRED AT Yw-210, Yw 272288 1 3 -168, AND Yw-170 WHERE THE SECONDARY SEAL CURTAINS END. THESE LEAK PAT 272288 1 4 HS WERE SEALED WITH MBO130-119 TYPE 111 ADHESIVE PER PRINT REQUIREMENT 272288 1 5 . V1164 WAS RERUN AND SATISFACTORY FLOW RATES WERE OBTAINED. PROBABLE 272288 1 6 CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS THESE AREAS WERE MISSED DURING INITIAL APPLIC 272288 1 7 ATION OF SEALANT. 272339 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 - THREAD MARKS AT ATTACH POINTS 2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11 & 1 272339 1 2 WERE BURNISHED TO ELIMINATE ANY RAISED METAL AND SHARP EDGES AT THREAD 272339 1 3 MARKS THEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2, PAGE 1 - ELONGATE 272339 1 4 D ATTACH POINTS 4, & 1 WERE MEASURED IN STEPS 5.0, & 6.0 AND DETERMINE 272339 1 5 D WITHIN DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. ITEM 3 PAGE 1 - ORBITER SURFACE SCORED 272339 1 6 AROUND BUSHINGS AT ATTACH POINTS 6, & 10 WERE BURNISHED IN STEP 19 TO 272339 1 7 SMOOTH & BLEND AREA AND MR ACCEPTED. ITEM 4, PAGE 1 - THIS DISCREPANCY 272339 1 8 ON KOROPON TOUCHUP AROUND BEARING AREA IS NO DISCREPANCY DUE TO NO DWG 272339 1 9 REQUIREMENT FOR KOROPON IN BEARING AREA. CORROSION PROTECTION IS APPLI 272339 1 10 ED ON BOLT INSTALLATION PER DWG. ITEM 5 PAGE 1A - GROUND NUTPLATE ABOV 272339 1 11 E ATTACH POINT 10 WAS FOUND TO BE BAD AND WAS REPLACED PER STEP 17.0. 272339 1 12 HOLE IN STRUCTURE AT THIS LOCATION WAS FOUND TO HAVE THREAD MARKS AND 272339 1 13 WAS BURNISHED PER STEP 20. AND MR ACCEPTED. ITEM 6 PAGE 1A - BOND (GRO 272339 1 14 UND) STRAP WAS CORRODED AND TURNING GREEN AT ATTACH PINT 12 AND IT WAS 272339 1 15 REPLACED. ITEM 7 PAGE 1A - BEARING WAS FOUND TO BE STIFF AT ATTACH PO 272339 1 16 INT 12 AND IT WAS REPLACED PER STEPS 12 TO 14. ITEM 8 PAGE 1B AND ITEM 272339 1 17 9 PAGE 1C - TOOL DAMAE FROM RIVET INSTALLATION WAS MR ACCEPTED PER PAG 272339 1 18 E 11 AND RIVET HOLE WAS CLEANED UP MR MA0101-302 ON INSTALLATION IN ST 272339 1 19 EP 17. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ALL ITEMS IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO FRE 272339 1 20 QUENT R & R OF POD. 272677 1 1 PR WRITTEN ADDRESSING INSUFFICIENT FILLER BAR CONT 272677 1 2 ACT SURFACE WAS DETERMINED TO BE A TPS CONCERN ONL 272677 1 3 Y. NO STRUCTURAL WORK IS REQUIRED. PR LWNG-3-07-16 272677 1 4 88 WILL ADDRESS IMPROPER F/B SEAL ZONE. 273101 1 1 THE 50-01 DOOR WAS INSTALLED WITHOUT (1EA) SLEEVE BOLT/RETAINING RING. 273101 1 2 MR ACCEPTED TO INSTALL SLEEVE BOLT WITHOUT RETAINING RING FOR ONE FLI 273101 1 3 GHT. DOOR REMOVED POST FLIGHT AND RETAINING RING ADDED TO SLEEVE BOLT, 273101 1 4 RETURNING DOOR TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. CAUSE: FASTENER HOLE MISIDENTI 273101 1 5 FIED AS CARRIER PANEL ATTACH HOLE. 273135 1 1 ENGINEERING INSPECTION REVEALED THAT ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 DOES NOT EXIST A 273135 1 2 T THIS TIME. 273225 1 1 CRACK AT INBOARD CORNER WAS APPROX 1 INCH LONG AND MINOR IN NATURE. TO 273225 1 2 REINFORCE PANEL AT THIS LOCATION, PANEL WILL BE BRUSHED WITH A CHLORI 273225 1 3 NATED SOLVENT OVER CRACK. CRACKED PANEL WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICT 273225 1 4 ED USE AS REPAIRED. 273373 1 1 THE OV-103 LH WING LEADING EDGE RCC PANEL ASSEMBLIES WERE IDENTIFED AS 273373 1 2 HAVING OUT OF TOLERANCE CONDITIONS. RI HAS NOW OPENED UP THE KEQ TOLE 273373 1 3 RANCE FOR THE WING LEADING EDGE. THE NEW UNRESTRICTED KEQ RANGE IS AS 273373 1 4 FOLLOWS: R/S 1-5 <=.120 UNRESTRICTED R/S 61-22 <=.150 UNRESTRICTED. AL 273373 1 5 L OF THE CURRENT MEASUREMENTS FOR THE L/H WLE RCC ASSEMBLIES FALL WITH 273373 1 6 IN THE UNRESTRICTED RANGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ORIGINAL INSTALLATION WAS N 273373 1 7 OT PER ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS. THERMAL REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN REASSE 273373 1 8 SSED, AND CONDITION IS NO LONGER DISCREPANT. 273467 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO MR REPAIR GOUGES, NICKS, AND CU 273467 1 2 TS IN THE DOOR FRAME GASKET FOR DOOR 74-01. THE GASKET WAS REPAIRED WI 273467 1 3 TH WHITE RTV, MBO130-119 TYPE III. THIS REPAIR WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNREST 273467 1 4 RICTED USE. THIS DOOR AND FRAME ARE PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF TH 273467 1 5 IS DISCREPANCY WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 273612 1 1 ENTRAPPED RIVET STEMS ARE ACCEPTABLE PER DRAWING. 273612 1 2 PR CONDITION DOES NOT EXIST 273886 1 1 MOLD IMPRESSION RESULTS ON SCRATCHES IN THE BORON 273886 1 2 STRUT SURFACE SHOW A ALLOWABLE DESIGN CRITERIA OF 273886 1 3 .003 IN. (SCRATCH MEASURED .00435 IN.) AN LRU PR H 273886 1 4 AS BEEN WRITTEN TO ROUTE THE STRUT BACK TO THE VEN 273886 1 5 DOR WHERE IT WILL UNDERGO FUNCTIONAL INTEGRITY TES 273886 1 6 TS AND EVALUATION DUE TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED DISCR 273886 1 7 EPANCY. A REPLACEMENT STRUT HAS BEEN ORDERED. R.C. 273886 1 8 ACTION-DEVELOPE BETTER METHODS AND CRITERIA FOR T 273886 1 9 HE HANDLING, UNCRATING, AND THE STORAGE OF THE BOR 273886 1 10 ON STRUTS BY ALL PARTIES INVOLVED. IE SHOP LOGISTC 274017 1 1 THE LEFT MAIN LANDING GEAR STRUT SHOWED A GN2 LEAK AFTER FINAL PRESSUR 274017 1 2 IZATION FOR FLIGHT. THE LEAK WAS DETECTED DURING FOR FLIGHT. THE LEAK 274017 1 3 WAS DETECTED DURING A POST TOP OFF DECAY CHECK USING A VOLUMETRIC LEAK 274017 1 4 DETECTION UNIT (VLD). THE STRUT WAS REPRESSURIZED TO FLIGHT PRESSURE 274017 1 5 AND THE VALVE WAS TORQUED TO THE HIGH END OF THE SPEC AND NO LEAKAGE O 274017 1 6 CCURRED. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DE 274017 1 7 GRADATION. 274051 1 1 MBO130-173 RTV STOPS AT Xo 1052.58 WERE BONDED .10 274051 1 2 0" OFF STRG 22 (L/H) & .020" STRG 22 (R/H). THE R 274051 1 3 TV STOPS AT Xo 1075.83, STR 22 & Xo 1174.83 STRG 9 274051 1 4 WERE BONDED OVERLAPPING THE STRINGERS BY .020". 274051 1 5 ALL STOPS WERE REMOVED & REBONDED. 274236 1 1 THE S/N /OCN RECORDED IN OMI V5R02 FOR O2 TK1 INBOARD LOWER FWD STRUT 274236 1 2 (ME270-0006-0009) DURING OV-103 FLT 7 PROCESSING WAS INCORRECT. THIS 274236 1 3 PR WAS DEFERRED TO FLT 8 DUE TO ACCESS RESTRICTION (BAY 4 CLOSED OUT). 274236 1 4 DURING FLT 8 PROCESSING, ACCESS WAS OBTAINED AND STRUT S/N /OCN WAS 274236 1 5 OBTAINED. (REF STEPS 3,4, AND 5). TANK STRUT SERIAL NO.'S IN THE ALP 274236 1 6 HANUMERIC SERIES ARE NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE SAME MANNER AS STRUT SERIAL 274236 1 7 NO.'S IN THE NUMERICAL SERIES. THIS LED TO SOME CONFUSIONAS TO RECO 274236 1 8 RDING A SERIAL NO. CONSISTANT WITH THE CVAS TRACKING SYSTEM. THIS WAS 274236 1 9 RESOLVED WITH AN ENGINEERING NOTE (REF PAGE 3) AND S/N /OCN WAS OBTAI 274236 1 10 NED AND VERIFIED ALL DISCREPANCIES ON THIS PR HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. 274269 1 1 THE CRACK IN THE SIDE HATCH CLOSE-OUT PANEL WAS REPAIRED USING A STAND 274269 1 2 ARD MR FIBERGLASS REPAIR. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS ITS LOCATION IN A HIG 274269 1 3 H TRAFFIC ZONE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 274376 1 1 THE TWO MISSING HI-LOC'S WERE SUCCESSFULLY INSTALL 274376 1 2 ED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. 274387 1 1 V070-198708-001 SEAL ROLLED PORTION WAS FOUND TO BE BENT DOWN AND HAVE 274387 1 2 GOUGES. THEY ARE MINOR IN NATURE AND ARE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 274387 1 3 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DURING HANDLING. 274415 1 1 V070-198478-006 LAMINATED SHIM IS SLIGHTLY DELAMINATED. THIS CONDITION 274415 1 2 IS OKAY PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CLOSE THI 274415 1 3 S PR. 274700 1 1 HOLES REF IN ITEM #1 PROBLEM #1 DESCRIPTION ARE TO 274700 1 2 BE OPENED UP TO ACCOMMODATE #10 MOUNTING H/W ON 274700 1 3 TPS STR-3-07-239 MOD SHT 002 (WIRE HARNESS TRAY MO 274700 1 4 DIFICATIONS, UNDER MCR 10205 MOD KIT) SEE ATTACHED 274700 1 5 COPY OF APPROVED MOD SHT 002. 274732 1 1 FITTINGS WERE MR'D NOT TO COUNTER-BORE AND USE LONGER MOUNTING HARDWAR 274732 1 2 E FOR PLBD BELLCRANK STOPPER. APPROVAL IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 274910 1 1 THE FERRY FLIGHT TECHORDER M072-650012 FOR THE MAIN LANDING GEAR BUNGE 274910 1 2 E SAFING PINS DID NOT ALLOW FOR INSTALLATION OF A G070-502461-001 PIN. 274910 1 3 THIS PR ALLOWED USE OF THE -001 PIN WITH AN EO TO FOLLOW. A PR CONDID 274910 1 4 TION NO LONGER EXISTS. CLOSE THIS PR. 275221 1 1 UPON RETURN FROM FLT 10, (OV-103), AT DFRF, FLIPPER DOORS #5 & #6 TRAI 275221 1 2 LING EDGE BULB SEALS AND (1) RING, V070-198704-001, WERE FOUND IN THE 275221 1 3 UPPER ELEVON COVE AREA. (ITEM 1, PAGE 1). THE SEAL FELL OUT AS A RESUL 275221 1 4 T OF THE BULB SEAL RETAININER BEING INSTALLED BACKWARDS ON R/H FLIPPER 275221 1 5 DOORS 5 AND 6. (ITEM 2, PAGE 1). AT KSC, AN INSPECTION OF ALL OTHER F 275221 1 6 LIPRER FOOR RETAINERS WAS PERFORMED PER VSTR-3-11-462 AND NO OTHER RET 275221 1 7 AINERS WERE FOUND TO BE INSTALLED BACKWARDS. THE TPS ALSO INSPECTED FO 275221 1 8 R HEAT DAMAGE UNDER THE FLIPPER DOORS AND NONE WAS FOUND. FLIPPER DOOR 275221 1 9 SEALS ARE REMOVED PER JOB CARD FOR NORMAL OPF PROCESSING AND WILL BE 275221 1 10 REINSTALLED PER JOB CARD WHEN FLIPPER DOORS CLOSE PRIOR TO OPF ROLL OU 275221 1 11 T. TO ATTEMPT TO AVOID THIS PROBLEM IN THE FUTURE, A DEV TO EACH FLIPP 275221 1 12 ER DOOR JOB CARD HAS BEEN ADDED TO SHOW A TYPICAL RETAINER INSTALLATIO 275221 1 13 N. (REF. ATTACHED COPY FOR L/H FLIPPER DOOR #10. ITEMS 1 & 2 OF THIS P 275221 1 14 R HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 275307 1 1 ITEM 1, DEFECTS "A" WAS MACHINED OUT AND FILLED WITH RTV PRIOR TO FLIG 275307 1 2 HT 9. POST FLIGHT DISPO REINSPECTED AREA AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF F 275307 1 3 URTHER DAMAGE OR CRACKS. DEFECT "A" HAS BEEN MR'D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 275307 1 4 . ITEM 1, DEFECTS B" & "C" SHOWED NO EVIDENCE OF CRACKS PRIOR TO FLIGH 275307 1 5 T 9 AND POST FLIGHT INSPECTION SHOWED NO EVIDENCE OF FURTHER DAMAGE OR 275307 1 6 CRACKS. DEFECTS "B" & "C" HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. IT 275307 1 7 EM 2, PAGE 1A WAS RSOLVED BY REMOVING KOROPON USING BEHR-TEX AND ETCHA 275307 1 8 NT. ITEM 3, PAGE 1B WHICH DOCUMENTED THAT CRACKED SURFACE IS STILL VIS 275307 1 9 IBLE WAS RESOLVED BY ADDITIONAL MACHINING PER MR. 275517 1 1 HOUSING WITH BOW DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1 PAGE HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS PER 275517 1 2 MR DISPO. BLADE IS RETAINED IN THE HOUSING WITH THE BLADE PIN AND THE 275517 1 3 BLADE CAN NOT BE REMOVED WITHOUT BENDING OUT THE HOUSING (WITH THE FLI 275517 1 4 PPER DOOR OPEN.) WITH THE FLIPPER DOOR CLOSED, THE BLADE RIDES ON THE 275517 1 5 RUB PANEL TRACK AND IS CONTAINED BY THE HOUSING. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSTA 275517 1 6 LLATION OF BLADE WITH PIN INSTALLED. 275555 1 1 UPON EXAMINATION OF 70B2010-4 BORON TUBE, KOROPON 275555 1 2 ON TUBE WAS NOT SCRATCHED OR BROKEN. THIS IS DUE 275555 1 3 THAT THE BORON TUBE WAS MANUFACTURED AS SUCH. THE 275555 1 4 DISCREPANCY NOTED ARE MANUFACTURING VOIDS. THESE 275555 1 5 VOIDS RUN LONGITUNAL AND DO NOT CUT INTO BORON 275555 1 6 FIBERS. STRENGTH FROM THE BORON TUBE COMES FROM IT 275555 1 7 'S HIGH TENSION AND COMPRESSION CAPABILITIES DER-I 275555 1 8 VED FROM THE PRESENCE OF BORON FIBERS AND THE LONG 275555 1 9 ITUDINAL VOIDS, WHEN MANUFACTURED, DO NOT HAMPER I 275555 1 10 T'S CAPABILITY TO FUNCTION. 275555 1 11 PER TELECON WITH ROCKWELL DOWNEY, THIS BORON TUBE 275555 1 12 WAS ACCEPTED WITH THESE MANUFACTURING CHARACTERIST 275555 1 13 ICS WHEN DELIVERED. 275566 1 1 SOME FASTERES/WASHERS REMOVED DURING INBOARD ELEVON COVE REMOVED WERE 275566 1 2 NOT PER PRINT. GRIP LENGTH MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN AND VERIFIED WITH T 275566 1 3 HE DRAWING. THE PER PRINT HARDWARE WAS ORDERED AND INSTALLED ON THE EL 275566 1 4 EVON COVE REWORK TPS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS MANUFACTURING WORKMANSHIP OR H 275566 1 5 ARDWARE AVAILABILITY. 275878 1 1 THRUST STRUCTURE BOLTS WERE TORQUE CHECKED PER TPS STR-3-07-230, AS RE 275878 1 2 QUESTED PER CHIT J2044, AND 9 OF 16 WERE FOUND TO BE BELOW THE MINIMUM 275878 1 3 TORQUE. THE BOLTS WERE RELIEVED OF PRELOAD AND RETORQUED PER TPS STR- 275878 1 4 3-07-317 PRIOR TO FLIGHT. AFTER FLIGHT 7, THE BOLTS WERE MEASURED AGAI 275878 1 5 N AND 12 OF 16 WERE FOUND TO BE BELOW THE MINIMUM TORQUE. AT THAT TIME 275878 1 6 , THE BOLTS WERE RELIEVED OF PRELOAD, THEN INCREMENTALLY AND SEQUENTIA 275878 1 7 LY TORQUED TO THE UPPER LIMIT OF CLASS 3. AFTER FLIGHT 8, THE BOLTS WE 275878 1 8 RE CHECKED AGAIN AND 14 OF 16 WERE FOUND TO HAVE REMAINED AT THE UPPER 275878 1 9 TORQUE LIMIT AND TWO WERE JUST BELOW THE LOWER LIMIT. BOLTS AT L/H 5 275878 1 10 AND R/H 6 WHICH WERE INITIALLY FOUND TO BE LOW WERE REMEASURED AND FOU 275878 1 11 ND TO BE AT THE REQUIRED TORQUE. CONCLUDE THAT THE INITIAL AND THE SEC 275878 1 12 OND ABSENCE OF TORQUE WAS DUE TO IMPROPER TORQUING PROCEDURE (FAILURE 275878 1 13 TO TORQUE IN A PATTERN). THE POST-FLIGHT INSPECTION AFTER THE BOLTS WE 275878 1 14 RE CORRECTLY TORQUED SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT FLIGHT IS NOT CAUSING LOS 275878 1 15 S OF TORQUE FOR THESE FASTENERS AND THAT THE LOW TORQUE VALUES ARE SOL 275878 1 16 ELY DUE TO IMPROPER PROCEDURE. 275907 1 1 AN EO-TO-FOLLOW WILL ADD CALLOUT TO BOND CHECK BRA 275907 1 2 CKET. THE INTERFERENCE WAS FIXED BY MR TRIMMING TH 275907 1 3 E AV. BAY TRAY AND EO-TO-FOLLOW ROUNDING THE CORNE 275907 1 4 RS OF THE BRACKET AND PLATE. CLOSE THIS PR. 275917 1 1 DISCREPANT RIVET WAS R & R'D. VENT DOOR ASSY RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGU 275917 1 2 RATION. PROBABLE CAUSE INCORRECT INSTALLATION CAUSING RIVET TO CRACK U 275917 1 3 NDER LOAD. 276044 1 1 THE HOLE IN FLIPPER DOOR #13 INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SERVIC 276044 1 2 E CENTER. THE INSULATOR HAS BEEN INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT NO FURTHER DISCR 276044 1 3 EPANCIES EXIST. CLOSE THIS PR. 276052 1 1 THE BEARINGS ARE INSTALLED USING LOC-TITE ADHESIVE TO AID IN SECURING 276052 1 2 THEM. DURING REMOVAL OF THE RADIATOR, BEARING NUMBERS 4, 8 AND 10 WOUL 276052 1 3 D NOT COME OUT. PER THIS PR, THE BEARINGS WERE HEATED AND THEN REMOVED 276052 1 4 . THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OVERZEALOUS APPLICATION OF LOC-TITE UPON INST 276052 1 5 ALLATION. THE RADIATORS ARE READY TO INSTALL AND IN DRAWING CONFIGURAT 276052 1 6 ION. 276080 1 1 INSPECTION OF FASTENERS FROM INTERIOR INDICATES 276080 1 2 THEY ARE INSTALLED PROPERLY PER PRINT. THIS, IN 276080 1 3 ADDITION TO THE INSPECTION THAT IS DONE PRIOR TO 276080 1 4 INSTALLATION OF TILE, IS SUFFICIENT TO VERIFY PRO- 276080 1 5 PER INSTALLATION. NO FURTHER VERIFICATION IS RE- 276080 1 6 QUIRED. 276169 1 1 IDENTIFICATION ON V070-334024-001 DOOR IN V070-334019 FLOOR PANEL HAD 276169 1 2 WORN OFF. THE ID WAS REAPPLIED PER DRAWING/SPECIFICATION. PROBABLE CAU 276169 1 3 SE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 276291 1 1 THE V070-856558-003 & -004 STIFFENERS HAD THEIR P/ 276291 1 2 N'S AND OCN'S SWITCHED TO ALLOW HARDWARE TO AGREE 276291 1 3 WITH PRINT CONFIGURATION. SOME PREVIOUS MR ID'S ( 276291 1 4 MRBQ 2557-000M & MRBQ 8518-000M) WERE SWITCHED TO 276291 1 5 THE PROPER PARTS BUT THIS ACTION DOES NOT REQUIRE 276291 1 6 MRB APPROVAL. STR-3-07-221 CAN NOW PROCEED. 276482 1 1 ITEM 1 DISCRPEANCY WAS DETECTED ALONG WITH R MEQ-3-12-0554 DURING AN INS 276482 1 2 PECTION PER S0004 SEQ 45 AT PAD 39A. CRACKS WERE FOUND IN HOUSINGS AT TH 276482 1 3 E RIGHT FWD AND RIGH AFT ET DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM. BOROSCOPE, EDDY CURREN 276482 1 4 T, AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTIONS WERE PERFORMED WHICH VERIFIED CRACKS AT 276482 1 5 THE BASE OF EACH CLEVIS ATTACHING THE V070-565180 BELLCRANK TO THE HOUS 276482 1 6 ING. THE REPLACEMENT OF HOUSINGS AND ARETEST OF THE MECHANISM FORCES A R 276482 1 7 OLL BACK TO THE OPF. THE ET DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM WAS DISASSEMBLED AND TH 276482 1 8 E DISCREPANT HOUSINGS WERE REMOVED. MODIFIED HOUSINGS PREVIOUSLY INSTALL 276482 1 9 ED IN OV-102 WERE INSTALLED IN OV-103. TPS MEQ-3-12-186 CVR'S EO G03 AND 276482 1 10 EO G04 TO V070-565000. ITEM 2 WAS DETECTED DURING RE-INSTALLATION OF THE 276482 1 11 DRIVE MECHANISM. THE ME131-0030-0005 BEARINGS ON THE V070-565179-003 276482 1 12 PUSHROD WAS OBTAINED FROM LOGISTICS AND INSTALLED IN THE VEHICLE. ITEM 3 276482 1 13 WAS DETECTED DURING RE-INSTALLATION OF THE DRIVE MECHANISM. WHILE 276482 1 14 INSTALLING THE V070-565102-001 SLEEVE, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE 276482 1 15 V070-565011-001 AND V070-565011-002 TORQUE TUBES DID NOT ALIGN. INDEXING 276482 1 16 MARKS ON THE TORQUE TUBE WERE MISMARKED BY ONE SPLINE, CAUSING A 1/8" 276482 1 17 MISALIGNMENT. THE INDEXING MARK WAS OBLITERATED AND TEH V070-565011-001 276482 1 18 TUBE WAS THEN CORRECTLY MARKED AND REINSTALLED PER PRINT (REF STEPS 276482 1 19 70.3-70.6)/ ITEM 4 WAS DETECTED FURING CONNECTION OF THE V070-565048-002 276482 1 20 RH AFT INTERCOSTALS TO THE STRUCTURE. NAS1003-6H BOLTS WERE INSTALLED TO 276482 1 21 OBTAIN PROPER GRIP LENGTHS. THIS CONDITION IS NOT PER PRINT, BUT HS BEEN 276482 1 22 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER THIS WAD (REF P.151). ITEM 5 WAS 276482 1 23 DETECTED DURING FINAL INSTALLATION FOR FLIGHT OF THE V070-565025-001 276482 1 24 PUSHROD. 0.032 INCH (S/B 0.040 IN) SAFETY WIRE WAS INSTALLED ON THE 276482 1 25 NAS1423C6 JAM NUT BECAUSE NUT WOULD NOT ACCEPT CORRECT SIZE WIRE. THIS 276482 1 26 INSTALLATION IS NOT PER PRINT BUT HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 276482 1 27 USE (REF P. 152). ITEM 6 WAS DETECTED AFTER MEASURING/ADJUSTING STOP 276482 1 28 BOLTS, (REF P. 150) STOP BOLTS 2-7,10, & 11-14 HAVE GAPS IN EXCESS OF 276482 1 29 PSEC BUT HAVE BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE (REF MR RATIONALE ON 276482 1 30 P 153). THE RIGHT ET DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM HAS BEEN INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. 276482 1 31 A SUCCESSFUL RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER V1097-ORBITER/ET UMBILICAL 276482 1 32 CLOSEOUT DOOR FUNCTIONAL TEST. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE 276482 1 33 CAUSES: ITEM 1-DESING DEFICIENCY ITEM 2-OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION ITEM 276482 1 34 3-WORK AUTHORIZATION ERROR ITEM 4-INTERCOASTALS MIS-MACHINED, ITEM 4 276482 1 35 ADDRESSES USE OF LONGER BOLTS. INTERCOASTALS PREVIOUSLY MR'D AT INITIAL 276482 1 36 INSTALLATION (PALMDALE) ITEM 5-OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION ITEM 6-GAPS LEFT 276482 1 37 OUT-OF-SPEC TO ACCOMODATE THERMAL BARRIER RELAXATION. ROUTE PR TO OMRB 276482 1 38 PRIOR TO CLOSURE. 276703 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS PR IS TO DOCUMENTTHE MODIFICATION OF THE V070-390 276703 1 2 200-001 CARRIER PANEL BY TFRC-3-A0002. THIS MODIFICATION WAS MR APPROV 276703 1 3 ED ON PAGE 35 OF THE TFRC DOCUMENT. A COPY OF THE MODIFICATION REQUIRE 276703 1 4 MENTS FROM THE TFRC DOCUMENT IS APPENDED TO THIS PR AS ATTACHMENTS "A" 276703 1 5 , "B", AND "C". STEP 86 OF TFRC-3-A0002 REQUIRED THAT A STRUCTURES PR 276703 1 6 BE GENERATED WITH THE INFORMATION CONTANINED IN BLOCK 17 OF PAGE 1. CA 276703 1 7 RRIER PANEL IS MR ID'D TFRC-3-A0002. THIS CARRIE PANEL IS SECONDARY ST 276703 1 8 RUCTURE. NO STRUCTUAL DISCREPANCY EXISTED AT THE TIME OF INITIATION OF 276703 1 9 THIS PR. 276742 1 1 DOWN GRADE THIS PR TO A DR. 276778 1 1 SCREWS WERE OBTAINED AND INSTALLED TO PER PRINT CONDITION. 276980 1 1 THE FASTENERS IN THE STUB R/H SIDE OF THE BODY FLAP WERE REMOVED, THE 276980 1 2 HOLES WERE GRIPPED AND THE PROPER LENGTH SCREWS WERE INSTALLED. THE SC 276980 1 3 REWS INSTALLED ARE ONE GRIP LENGTH LONGER THAN PRINT REQ'S. WHICH IS A 276980 1 4 CCEPTABLE PER SPEC. (MAO 101-301). THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS A BUILD UP OF 276980 1 5 TOLERENCE WITHIN THE DESIGN. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING ACTION IS REQUIRE 276980 1 6 D AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. CLOSE THIS PR. 277079 1 1 ITEM 1, PG 1, SPRING SEAL ATTACHING HARDWARE ON LH RUDDER SPEED BRAKE AN 277079 1 2 D CONICAL SEAL BOLTS/CASTELLATED NUTS WITHIN SPLIT AREA OF RSB. HARDWARE 277079 1 3 APPEARS TO HAVE CORROSION, MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. ON ENGINEERING INSPECTIO 277079 1 4 N, RESIDUE ON SPRING SEAL ATTACHING HARDWARE WAS FOUND TO BE SUPERFICIAL 277079 1 5 WITH NO PITTING ON THE SURFACE. THIS CONDITON WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRES 277079 1 6 TRICTED USE AS IS. THE CONDITION OF THE CONICAL SEAL BOLTS/CASTELLATED N 277079 1 7 UTS WAS PREVIOUSLY MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. THIS PR CAN C 277079 1 8 LOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. 277168 1 1 THE WHITE RESIDUE, DOCUMENTED BY ITEMS 1 & 2, PAGE 1 WAS WIPED WITH SW 277168 1 2 ABS AND CLEAN WIPERS AND ROUTED TO THE MAB LAB FOR ANALYSIS. THE RESID 277168 1 3 UE WAS COMPLETELY WIPED CLEAN USING IPA AND CLEAN WIPERS AND VERIFIED 277168 1 4 THAT THE RESIDUE DID NOT PENETRATE THE KOROPON INTO BASE METAL. SURFAC 277168 1 5 E ONLY. ANALYSIS FOUND SILICONE, SILICA, HYDROCARBONS, OTHER TRACE ELE 277168 1 6 MENTS AND SOME AMORPHOUS INORGANIC ALUMINUM. RESIDUE WAS WIPED CLEAN A 277168 1 7 ND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: EXHAUST FUMES DURING ASCENT. 277310 1 1 BOLTS COULD NOT BE RETORQUED DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM OTHER BOLTS. DIS 277310 1 2 PO WAS WRITTEN TO ALLOW THE REMOVAL OF INTERFERING BOLTS FOR ACCESS. T 277310 1 3 HIS ALLOWED BOLTS TO BE RETORQUED PER VSTR 3-08-317 STEP 11.0 STEP 11. 277310 1 4 0 OF THE TPS IS COMPLETE. 277385 1 1 REMOVAL AND REINSTALLATION OF FITTING ASSY'S WILL 277385 1 2 ALLOW WING DOUBLERS TO BE INSTALLED AS THE MOD DWG 277385 1 3 INTENDS. 277498 1 1 THE PROBLEM DOCUMENTED IN THIS PR IS A REOCCURING PROBLEM (REFER PR'S 277498 1 2 MEQ-3-A0003 AND MEQ-3-A00014) AND HAS ALREADY BEEN EVALUATED BY ROCKWE 277498 1 3 LL DOWNEY. ROCKWELL HAS DETERMINED THAT THE PDU BACKDRIVE/DOOR SLIPPA 277498 1 4 GE CONDITION DOES NOT DAMAGE THE ET DOOR DRIVE SYSTEM OR DEGRADE THE T 277498 1 5 ORQUE SOUPUT OF THE PDU. THIS CONDITION ONLY OCCURS WHEN THE ET DOOR 277498 1 6 DREVE SYSTEM LINKAGES ARE NOT IN THE FULL OPEN OR CLOSE OVERCENTER POS 277498 1 7 TION. ATTEMPTING TO RE-RIG THE LINKAGE TO ACHIEVE A MORE CONSISTANT O 277498 1 8 VERCENTER POSITION WHEN THE ET DOOR IS IN THE FULL OPEN OR CLOSE POSIT 277498 1 9 ION HAS BEEN RULED OUT BY ROCKWELL. ROCKWELL FEELS THAT THE SLIGHT ST 277498 1 10 RUCTURAL SKEW IN THE R/H ET CAVITY WOULD MAKE A MORE ACCURATE RIGGING 277498 1 11 OF THE DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE FUTILE. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT THE 277498 1 12 PERFORMANCE OF THE R/H ET DOOR DRIVE SYSTEM AND IS ONLY APPARENT DURIN 277498 1 13 G GROUND OPERATIONS. (1-G ENVIRONMENT) THIS PROBLEM WILL BE INVISABLE 277498 1 14 DURING IN FLIGHT OPERATIONS, AND NO DEVIATION FROM MORMAL IN FLIGHT O 277498 1 15 PERATIONIS REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT THE FIT, FORM, FU 277498 1 16 NCTIONOR SAFETY MARGIN OF THE R/H ET DOOR DRIVE SYSTEM AND IS MR OR FO 277498 1 17 R UNRESTRICTED USE. NO MR IS REQUIRED. PRIOR TO CLOSURE, SUBMIT TO P 277498 1 18 MRB FOR CONCURRENCE. CLOSE THIS PR. 277755 1 1 ANOMALY PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED. ADDITIONAL MARKING 277755 1 2 ADDED FOR CLARITY. 278133 1 1 THE CORROSION ON THE RSB WAS ANALYZED TO BE ORGANIC MATERIAL CONTAININ 278133 1 2 G HIGH AL & C1. (SEE CHEMIST SHT). THE CORROSION WAS ALSO LOCALIZED IN 278133 1 3 THE FORM OF PITTING. THE PITTING WAS REMOVED & MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRIST 278133 1 4 RICTED USE. A RIVET IN THE AREA WAS REMOVED TO CK FOR CORROSION, NO CO 278133 1 5 RROSION WAS NOTED, THE RIVET WAS REPLACED. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN 278133 1 6 OF THE 2 WORST CASE AREAS OF CORROSION REMOVAL & REVEALED .0022 & .00 278133 1 7 24" METAL WAS REMOVED. 278389 1 1 THE O2 TANK FILL AIRBORNE HALF COUPLING POPPET WAS LEAKING AT AN EXCES 278389 1 2 SIVE RATE (1055 SCCM) MAX ALLOWABLE IS 900 SCCM. THE FLIGHT POPPET WA 278389 1 3 S CYCLED OPEN/CLOSE 3 TIMES TO EXCERCISE THE POPPET. THE POPPET LEAK C 278389 1 4 HECK WAS REPEATED AND THE LEAK RATE INCREASED (GREATER THAN 1400 SCCM. 278389 1 5 ) THE AHC WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH MC276-0010-2110 DISCONNECT. L 278389 1 6 OW & HIGH PRESSURE MASS SPEC LEAK CHECKS WERE SUCCESSFUL. FLIGHT POPPE 278389 1 7 T LEAKAGE WAS CHECKED AND WAS LESS THAN 59 SCCM. FLIGHT CAP WAS INSTAL 278389 1 8 LED AND SUCCESSFUL LEAK CHECK WAS PERFORMED PER V1022. 278561 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE DISCREPANT RD114-8005-1 278561 1 2 007 NUT AT LOCATION R/H Xo1065.92 Zo396.50 IN THE MIDBODY. THE ORIGINA 278561 1 3 L RD114-8005-1007 NUT CAUSED A LOW RUNNING TORQUE OF 0.0 INCH POUNDS. 278561 1 4 NUT WAS REPLACED BY RD114-8005-1007 NUT AND THIS CORRECTED THE TORQUE 278561 1 5 TO THE APPROPRIATE14 TO 100 INCH POUNDS, RETURNING THE STRUCTURE TO P 278561 1 6 RINT CONFIGURATION. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 278561 1 7 THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 278683 1 1 CARRIER PANEL V070-396430-009 WAS REMOVED FROM OV- 278683 1 2 103, ON WAS VERIFIED AS BE9924, .47" DIMENSION 278683 1 3 FROM ZONE 10 OF V070-396430 WAS VERIFIED. PHOTOS 278683 1 4 OF OCN, P/N AND DIMENSION ARE ATTACHED. CARRIER 278683 1 5 PANEL V070-396430-009 OCN BE9924 WAS RE-INSTALLED 278683 1 6 WITHOUT PROBLEM. 278738 1 1 DENTS 1-4 ARE MINOR AND SUPERFICIAL IN NATURE. STR 278738 1 2 UCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE AVONICS BAY COVER REMAINS 278738 1 3 AS DESIGN INTENDED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THIS 278738 1 4 SECONDARY STRUCTURE IS NOT COMPROMISED. 278749 1 1 THE THREAD BEARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR A 278749 1 2 CTION. CARRIER PANELS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. RC AC 278749 1 3 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 278749 1 4 ARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-10 278749 1 5 3-C1. 278843 1 1 INSTL'N OF BRACKET IS TO ORIGINAL DWG. INTENT. 278844 1 1 ALL THREE FUEL CELL (FC) H2 PURGE LINES ARE MANIFO 278844 1 2 LDED TO A COMMON OVERBOARD H2 PURGE PORT WHERE THE 278844 1 3 LEAKAGE OCCURED. THE INITIAL LEAKAGE WAS DETECTED 278844 1 4 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF TPS FCP-3-07-015 WITH T 278844 1 5 YGON HOSE AND WATER. TPS RESULTS ARE; FIRST BUBLE 278844 1 6 IN 2 MINUTES THEN ONE BUBBLE EVERY 40 TO 60 SECOND 278844 1 7 S THEREAFTER DURING THE 4 MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIO 278844 1 8 D. THE FOLLOWING PR'S WERE ASSIGNED TO EACH FC: 278844 1 9 PR FCP-3-07-0077 FC3 S/N 103 278844 1 10 PR FCP-3-07-0078 FC2 S/N 113 278844 1 11 PR FCP-3-07-0080 FC1 S/N 114 278844 1 12 VOLUMETRIC LEAK DETECTOR WAS USED DURING PR FCP-3- 278844 1 13 07-0080 FOR TWELVE (12) MINUTES. THE RESULT WAS ZE 278844 1 14 RO (0) LEAKAGE FROM PORT. ALL THREE FUEL CELL WERE 278844 1 15 REMOVED AND ROUTED TO INTERNATIONAL FUEL CELL (IF 278844 1 16 C) BY TPS FCP-3-07-016 FOR PLANNED MODIFICATIONS ( 278844 1 17 MCR 10455). IFC ANALYSIS INDICATED NO H2 LEAKAGE F 278844 1 18 ROM THE REMOVED FUEL CELLS. FUEL CELL'S ALLOWABLE 278844 1 19 LEAKAGE IS 25 BUBBLES IN 5 MINUTES (PER FUEL CELL) 278844 1 20 PER IFC'S ACCEPTANCE TEST CRITERIA. COMBINED LEAK 278844 1 21 AGE OF ALL THREE FC'S AT KSC WAS LESS THAN 1 BUBBL 278844 1 22 E PER MINUTE WHICH IS WELL WITHIN THE LIMITS OF IF 278844 1 23 C'S CRITERIA. 278870 1 1 SCRATCHES ON BORON STRUT ARE CONTAINED TO THE OUTER SURFACE AND ARE AC 278870 1 2 CEPTABLE PER SPEC. (REF 70B0001-G ITEM 3,4). 279066 1 1 THREE OUT OF FOUR DECAY CHECK VIOLATED THE OLD 279066 1 2 OMRSD REQUIREMENT V45BA0.050 LEAK RATE OF 3.6 279066 1 3 PSI/15 MINUTES. APPROVED RCN OV6588 CHANGES OMRSD 279135 1 1 INDICATIONS SHOW FLT STS-14,STS-23 & STS-25 ORBITE 279135 1 2 R TANK PRESSURE VALIDATE EACH OTHER TO SHOW NO KDE 279135 1 3 CREASE IN H2 TK RV CRACK PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH CLO 279135 1 4 SE TO THE LWR OMRSD LIMITS, THE STS-14 & STS-25 GS 279135 1 5 E GAGE RDGS WERE W/I LIMITS BUT STS-23 GAGE RDGS W 279135 1 6 ERE OUT OF THE OMRSD V45ARO.020 TOLERANCES OF 302- 279135 1 7 310 PSIG. BASED UPON STS-14,STS-25 DATA & THE VARI 279135 1 8 ABLE OF HUMAN & GSE ERROR, STS-23 GAGE READINGS WI 279135 1 9 LL BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN IN ERROR. FINAL GAGE 279135 1 10 RDGS VERIFY CRACK MEETS SPEC RQRMNT. 279185 1 1 HOLES WERE DRILLED IN THE TORQUE BOX, PER E.O. TO 279185 1 2 FOLLOW, TO FACILITATE THE INSTALLATION OF THE COAX 279185 1 3 CABLE. THE RELEASED ENGINEERING DOES REFLECT AS A 279185 1 4 CCOMPLISHED WORK. 279272 1 1 THIS PROBLEM IS WITH GSE ONLY. NO VEHICLE DISCREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE 279272 1 2 I/E HATCH LATCH LOCKING MECHANISM. THIS CONDITION WAS PREVIOUSLY DOCU 279272 1 3 MENTED BY GSE PR A70-0788-009-0001. THIS PR WILL BE CLOSED AS A DUPLIC 279272 1 4 ATE. CLOSE THIS PR AS A DUPLICATE TO GSE PR A70-0788-009-0001. 279422 1 1 H2 TANK 1 VENT LINE I/F FAILED HIGH PRESSURE MASS SPEC ON 3-22-88. THE 279422 1 2 TANK WAS VENTED AND THE LINE WAS DEMATED, INSPECTED, CLEANED AND REMA 279422 1 3 TED. THE LINE INSPECTION SHOWED SOME DISCOLORATION ON THE DYNATUBE SEA 279422 1 4 LING SURFACE (REF. STEP 17 AND PAGE 1A). THE DISCOLORATION WAS CLEANED 279422 1 5 WITH A QTIP AND THE LINE WAS REMATED TORQUED AND MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK 279422 1 6 ED. THE MASS SPEC AGAIN FAILED. THE DEMATE, CLEAN, REMATED WAS REPEATE 279422 1 7 D AGAIN (STEPS 25-28) AND THE LEAK WAS NOTED AT THE TOP OF THE B-NUT. 279422 1 8 THE LINE WAS DISCONNECTED ONE MORE TIME CLEANED AND CAREFULLY REMATED 279422 1 9 TO ASSURE PROPER ALIGNMENT. LOW PRESSURE MASS SPEC WAS SUCESSFULL (SPE 279422 1 10 P 34). THE HIGH PRESSURE MASS SPEC WAS ALSO SUCESSFUL (STEP 43). THE 279422 1 11 INITIAL PROBLEM HAS BEEN REMOVED WITH A Q-TIP AND THE QTIP WAS ROUTED 279422 1 12 TO MAB LAB FOR ANALYSIS. THE CHEMICAL ANALYSIS REVEALED SEVERAL COMPON 279422 1 13 ENTS OR ELEMENTS TAKEN FROM THE Q-TIP. SOME OF THE COMPONENTS WERE FIT 279422 1 14 TING LUBRICANT, STAINLESS STEEL AND INSULATION FIBERS. THESE PARTICLES 279422 1 15 VERY LIKELY WERE ON THE LINE. THE MAJORITY OF THE PARTICLES HOWEVER, 279422 1 16 WERE POSSIBLE PRESENT ON THE Q-TIP PRIOR TO WIPING THE LINE SEALING SU 279422 1 17 RFACE. THE CONTAMINATION (DISCOLORATION) WAS NOTED ON THE SEALING SURF 279422 1 18 ACE ONLY AND NOT INSIDE THE LINE. THE LINE IS CLEANED, REMATED, TORQUE 279422 1 19 D, SAFETY WIRED AND ALL TYE-WRAPS REPLACED. SYSTEM IS FLIGHT WORTHY. B 279422 1 20 OTH DISCREPANCIES (PG 1 AND PG 1A) HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. 279460 1 1 BOND JUMPERS FOR LONGERON BRIDGE COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO PART OF 279460 1 2 ARM ASSY BEING ON FWD SIDE OF Xo693 SIDE SKIN SUPPORT FITTING. THE NU 279460 1 3 TPLATE WAS SWITCHED AROUND FROM AFT SIDE OF FITTING TO FWD SIDE BY EO- 279460 1 4 TO-FOLLOW SO SCREW CAN BE INSTALLED. THIS PR WAS DEFERRED ONE FLIGHT U 279460 1 5 NTIL LONGERON BRIDGE WAS REMOVED ALLOWING ACCESS TO COMPLETE WORK ON P 279460 1 6 R. PROBABLE CAUSE DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 279550 1 1 THIS PR WAS UPGRADED FROM AN IPR WHEN DURING TROUBLESHOOTING IT WAS DI 279550 1 2 SCOVERED THAT THE ET DOOR DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM WAS SLIGHTLY OUT OF RIG 279550 1 3 . IPR TROUBLESHOOTING PERFORMED MANY CYCLES OF THE RH ET DOOR IN SEVER 279550 1 4 AL DIFFERENT CONFIGURATIONS TO DETERMINE WHAT WAS KEEPING THE DOOR FRO 279550 1 5 M CLOSING CORRECTLY. NUMEROUS MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN OF THE THERMAL B 279550 1 6 ARRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL, AND THE READY-TO-LATCH PADDLES, ALL WHICH 279550 1 7 SHOW NOMINAL PERFORMANCE. WEAR IN THE MANY LINKAGES, ROD END BEARINGS 279550 1 8 AND MECHANISMS IN THE DOOR DRIVE SYSTEM COMBINED WITH INSTALLATION OF 279550 1 9 A NEW THERMAL BARRIER AND NEW ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL, CAUSED THIS DOOR TO 279550 1 10 BE OUT OF RIG AND THE NEED FOR ADJUSTMENT. THE DOOR WAS RIGGED TO THE 279550 1 11 PROPER POSITION BY ADJUSTING THE DOOR PUSHRODS ONE FULL TURN IN. THE 279550 1 12 DOOR STEP WAS MEASURED IN THE CLOSED AND OPEN POSITION AS WELL AS THE 279550 1 13 FORCE REQ'D TO PUT THE DOOR ON CENTERLINE LATCHES. ALL OF THESE MEASUR 279550 1 14 EMENTS WERE PER SPECIFICATION MLO308-0058. THE RH ET DOOR HAS BEEN FUL 279550 1 15 LY RETESTED BY SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF V1097, ET DOOR FUNCTIONAL. PRO 279550 1 16 BABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 279568 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS WORN SEAL WAS MR ACCEPTABLE AS IS AFTER 279568 1 2 HAVING THE SHARP CORNER REMOVED FROM THE SEAL. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL 279568 1 3 WEAR AND TEAR. 279770 1 1 HEAT SINK HAS BEEN REWORKED TO ELIMINATE INTERFERE 279770 1 2 NCE WITH ADJACENT STRINGERS. TRIMMING WILL NOT SI 279770 1 3 GNIFICANTLY DECREASE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OR HEAT 279770 1 4 SINK CAPABILITIES. SECONDARY STRUCTURE. CLOSE TH 279770 1 5 IS PR. 279866 1 1 THE V070-731875-048 LUMINOUS CEILING WAS READJUSTED TO MEET GAP REQUIR 279866 1 2 EMENTS OF THE INSTALLATION DRAWING. MISSING FASTENERS NOTED IN STEPS 279866 1 3 1.0 AND 2.0 WERE NOT ACTUALLY MISSING BUT WERE PART OF A SUBPANEL NOT 279866 1 4 YET INSTALLED AND WILL NOT EFFECT GAPS AS NOTED ON PAGE 1. DISCREPANCY 279866 1 5 NO LONGER EXISTS. CLOSE THIS PR. 279911 1 1 THE DISCREPANT HOLES IN THE GUSSETS ARE NOT A CONCERN SINCE THE GUSSET 279911 1 2 S WILL BE SCRAPPED. THE DISCREPANT HOLES IN THE ATTACHING STRUCTURE HA 279911 1 3 VE BEEN ADDRESSED BY OTHER PR'S. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUS 279911 1 4 E OF THESE DISCREPANCIES WAS VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. 280094 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 280094 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 280094 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE C 280094 1 4 ARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. R.C. ACTION TO INVE 280094 1 5 STIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING HARDWARE TO P 280094 1 6 REVENT FURTHER DAMAGE CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 280117 1 1 THE DAMAGED V070-356735-012 PANEL IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS REP 280117 1 2 AIRED BY REMOVING A .50" DIA SECTION OF THE SKIN TO REMOVE THE CRACKED 280117 1 3 AREA. THE HONEYCOMB PANEL WAS THEN PLUG-FILLED WITH MB0102-008 ADHESI 280117 1 4 VE AND A .020" THICK BY 3.00" SQUAR DOUBLER WAS BONDED OVER THE FILLED 280117 1 5 AREA USING MBO120-053 ADHESIVE. THE PLUG-FILLED V070-356735-012 PANEL 280117 1 6 WITH BONDED DOUBLER WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE CAUSE O 280117 1 7 F THE DAMAGE WAS SUSPECTED TO BE DUE TO AN IMPACT TO THE PANEL WITH SU 280117 1 8 PPORT EQUIPMENT DURING PROCESSING. CONCLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN RE 280117 1 9 PAIRED TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL, AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 280156 1 1 PG 1 STATED THE DOOR WAS MISLOCATED. WHEN THE DOOR WAS REPOSITIONED AN 280156 1 2 D INSTALLATION ATTEMPTED, PAGES 1A AND 1B WERE GENERATED. PAGE 1 WAS I 280156 1 3 NCORRECT, THE DOOR WAS PROPERLY ORIENTED TO BEGIN WITH. PAGE 1A WAS RE 280156 1 4 SOLVED BY INSTALLING THE DOOR CORRECTLY. PAGE 1B WAS RESOLVED BY MRB A 280156 1 5 CCEPTANCE OF THE TRANSDUCER HOLE AND BRACKET LOCATION "OK AS IS" FOR U 280156 1 6 NRESTRICTED USE. 280199 1 1 THE CRACKS WERE STOPPED DRILLED TO STOP CRACK PRO- 280199 1 2 PAGATION. THE CAUSE OF THE CRACKS WAS FROM VIBRA- 280199 1 3 TION IN THE AREA, AND THE MATERIAL BEING TOO THIN. 280199 1 4 PATCHES WERE BONDED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE PNL, TO 280199 1 5 PROVIDE FOR A THICKER PNL IN THIS AREA, TO IN- 280199 1 6 CREASE THE STR INTEGRITY. THE PNL WAS MR'd W/ 280199 1 7 THIS REPAIR. 280504 1 1 SAMPLE WAS MRB ACCEPTED OK AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED 280504 1 2 USE. 280658 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES DESCRIBED IN ITEMS 1 THRU 5 OF THIS PR HAVE EACH BEE 280658 1 2 N ADDRESSED AND RESOLVED PER THIS PR. ITEMS 1 & 2 WERE RESOLVED BY CLE 280658 1 3 ANING UP THE CORROSION AND RECORROSION PROTECTING THE AREA PER MR. ITE 280658 1 4 M 3 WAS RESOLVED BY FINISHING RIVET REMOVAL. ITEM 4 WAS RESOLVED BY RE 280658 1 5 PLACING THE DISCREPANT SCREENS AND RETAINERS WITH NEW HARDWARE. ITEM 5 280658 1 6 WAS RESOLVED BY MR ACCEPTING THE OVERSIZED HOLES FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 280658 1 7 . THIS PR REQUIRES NO MORE EVALUATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF CORROSION 280658 1 8 IS EXPOSURE TO A CORROSIVE ENVIRONMENT AT THE PAD. 280847 1 1 PG. 1 ITEM 1.1: THE DISCOLORATION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 280847 1 2 "OKAY AS IS". SEE PG. 14.0 FOR MR RATIONALE. PG. 1 ITEM 1.2: THE DI 280847 1 3 SCREPANCIES FOUND A "DENT" & "GOUGE") WERE STOP DRILLED. THE HONEYCOM 280847 1 4 B PNL CAVITIES BEHIND THE DISCREPANT AREAS WERE POTTED W/ MBO120-008 A 280847 1 5 DHESIVE & A DOUBLER WAS BONDED OVER POTTED DISCREPANCIES. PG. 1 ITEM 280847 1 6 1.3: THE DISCOLORATION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE "OKAY AS I 280847 1 7 S". SEE PG. 14.0 FOR MR RATIONALE. PG. 2 ITEM 2.0: THE DISCREPANCY F 280847 1 8 OUND (A "DENT") WAS STOP DRILLED. THE HONEYCOMB PNL CAVITY BEHIND THE 280847 1 9 DISCREPANT AREA WAS POTTED W/ MBO120-008 ADHESIVE & A DOUBLER WAS BON 280847 1 10 DED OVER THE POTTED DISCREPANCY. PG. 3 ITEM 3.0: THE HOLE THAT WAS EX 280847 1 11 POSED DURING SANDING REVEALED IN ADDITIONAL CAVITY THAT REQ'D POTTING. 280847 1 12 THE HONEYCOMB PNL CAVITY BEHIND THE DISCREPANT AREA WAS POTTED W/ AD 280847 1 13 HESIVE & A DOUBLER WAS BONDED OVER THE AREA. CONCLUSION: THE DISCREPA 280847 1 14 NCIES FOUND IN THIS PR APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY GEN HANDLING. TH 280847 1 15 E HONEYCOMB STR OF THE PNL IS HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO DAMAGE. THE REPAI 280847 1 16 R OF THESE DISCREPANCIES BY POTTING THE HONEYCOMB CAVITIES & BONDING A 280847 1 17 DOUBLER OVER THE AREA WILL PROVIDE A REPAIR THAT MAINTAINS THE STRUCT 280847 1 18 URAL INTEGRITY OF THE CLOSE OUT PNL. 280919 1 1 A WAIVER HAS BEEN APPROVED TO ACCEPT INSTALLATION AS LISTED PER ITEM 1 280919 1 2 PAGE 1. THE OMRS TO HAVE AV BAY #1 ACCESS PANEL V070-660509-005 INSTA 280919 1 3 LLED PRIOR TO ROLLOUT, V00H00.020 TABLE, HAS BEEN WAIVED, REFERENCE AT 280919 1 4 TACHED COPY OF WAIVER. (WK0643) CLOSE THIS PR. 280988 1 1 THE V070-351413-001 STRUT HAS A GOUGE (.1883 WIDTH, .650" LENGTH, .034 280988 1 2 6" DEPTH). THE GOUGE WAS FILLED WITH ADHESIVE AND SANDED SMOOTH PER MR 280988 1 3 . PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO GSE PLATFORM INSTALLATION. 281022 1 1 ITEMS 1,2,3 OF THIS PR WERE TRANSFERRED TO STR-3-11-3410. ITEM 4: SPLI 281022 1 2 CE IS DEBONDED. Xo 1253 SEAL REBONDED PER STEP 8. ITEM 5: SEAL IS WRIN 281022 1 3 KLED AND DEFORMED. Xo 1290 SEAL MR ACCEPTED AS IS. ITEM 6: THE V070-39 281022 1 4 8558-037 SEAL IS DEBONDED. Xo 578 - 579 SEAL REBONDED PER STEP 12. ITE 281022 1 5 M 7: THE V070-398527-004 SEAL IS TORN 1.87". Xo 621 TEAR COVERED WITH 281022 1 6 RTV PER MR. ITEM 8: THE V070-398521-001 SEAL IS DEBONDED. Xo624 SEAL 281022 1 7 REBONDED PER STEP 12. ITEM 9: THE V070-398501-009 SEAL IS TORN AND DEB 281022 1 8 ONDED. Xo 625 SEAL REBONDED PER STEP 12. TORN SEAL RTV'D PER MR. ITEM 281022 1 9 10: THE V070-398558-038 SEAL IS DEBONDED. Xo 677 SEAL REBONDED PER STE 281022 1 10 P 12. ITEM 11: THE V070-398501-001 SEAL HAS 2EA. SMALL HOLES. Xo 710 T 281022 1 11 HE TWO HOLES WERE COVERED WITH RTV PER MR. ITEM 12: THE V070-398501-04 281022 1 12 5 SEAL HAS A SMALL SLIT. Xo 713 SLIT WAS COVERED WITH RTV PER MR. DAMA 281022 1 13 GE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 281028 1 1 THE CONICAL WASHER AND JO-BOLT WERE SUCCESSFULLY I 281028 1 2 NSTALLED WITHOUT FURTHER PROBLEM. NO FURTHER ACTIO 281028 1 3 N IS REQ'D. CLOSE PR. 281169 1 1 SCRATCHES WERE FOUND ON THE AIRLOCK WALL AT THE RIGHT HAND EMU ATTACK 281169 1 2 FITTINGS. MOLD IMPRESSIONS SHOWED THAT THE SCRATCHES ARE SUPERFICIAL. 281169 1 3 UPON MRB APPROVAL, THE SCRATCHES WERE SANDED AND CORROSION PROTECTED. 281169 1 4 THE INTEGRITY OF THE AIRLOCK WALL IS MAINTAINED. 281469 1 1 DISCREPANCY ITEM #1 SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DOCUMENTED ON THIS PR. THIS D 281469 1 2 ISCREPANCY WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE IN 1985. DISCREPANCY I 281469 1 3 TEM #2 AND A SMALL GOUGE BESIDE IT WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED U 281469 1 4 SE "AS-IS" AND DOCUMENTED ON THE DAMAGE DOCUMENTATION LOG AND GRID MAP 281469 1 5 . 281532 1 1 THE STRUCTURAL INTERFERENCES INSIDE THE WING PREVE 281532 1 2 NTED THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW PINS. AN EO-TO-F 281532 1 3 OLLOW WAS WRITTEN AND RELEASED TO RETURN THE ENGIN 281532 1 4 EERING DESIGN TO THE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THE WING. 281532 1 5 MR PINS WERE FABRICATED AND INSTALLED FOR UNRESTR 281532 1 6 ICTED USE. 281629 1 1 DENT WILL NOT EFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF 281629 1 2 V070-357229-007 (SER E62055) FITTING, AS SHOWN BY 281629 1 3 LACK OF DEFECTS/CRACKS NOTE DURING DYE/PEN INSPEC- 281629 1 4 TION. FUNCTION OF FITTING REMAINS AS DESIGN INT- 281629 1 5 ENDED. (SECONDARY STRUCTURE) 281728 1 1 RIVETS LISTED IN ITEM 1 WERE SHAVED TO SPEC. REQUIREMENTS WHICH ELIMIN 281728 1 2 ATED DISCREPANCY WITH TPS INSTALLATION. 281769 1 1 REPAIRED & APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. 281968 1 1 AS BOLTS #17 & #18 (R/H) WERE REMOVED,BURRS WERE 281968 1 2 FOUND ON ET FITTING AND HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY RE- 281968 1 3 MOVED. THE EXISTANCE OF THESE BURRS LED US TO SUS- 281968 1 4 PECT BURRS AT OTHER LOCATIONS ON THIS FITTING. A 281968 1 5 SPOT CHECK WAS PERFORMED AT THREE LOCATIONS(THE 281968 1 6 SIDEWALL BOLT PATTERN IS DIVIDED INTO 3 SECTIONS) 281968 1 7 AND NO ADDITIONAL BURRS WERE FOUND. WHEN THESE BOL 281968 1 8 TS WERE PREVIOUSLY REMOVED (ALL LOCATIONS) PER TPS 281968 1 9 -VSTR-3-07-218, HOLES WERE INSPECTED AND NO BURRS 281968 1 10 WERE DOCUMENTED WE FEEL THAT THE BURRS AT HOLES 281968 1 11 AT HOLES 17 & 18 ARE AN ISOLATED INSTANCE AND NOT 281968 1 12 A GENERIC DISCREPANCY. 282159 1 1 WING LEADING EDGE ANANLYSIS GUIDELINES HAVE BEEN REEVALUATED BY RI 282159 1 2 AERO-TERMAL FINDING THAT THE GAPS BETWEEN THE RCC PANELS HAVE LESS 282159 1 3 EFFECT ON THE VEHICLE ROUGHNESS THAN PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT. ALL THE WING 282159 1 4 LEADING EDGE KEQ VALUES HAVE BEEN CALCULATED BASED ON THE NEW GUIDELINES 282159 1 5 AND ALL THE STEP AND GAP MEASUREMENTS RECORDED WITHIN THIS PR HAVE BEEN 282159 1 6 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: BUILD UP OF TOLERANCES. 282159 1 7 282242 1 1 THE MATERIAL IS .250" THICK, MAINTAINING A MINI- 282242 1 2 MUM EDGE DISTANCE OF .24" WILL NOT EFFECT THE FORM 282242 1 3 FIT, OR FUNCTION OF THE INSTALLATION AND WILL AL- 282242 1 4 LOW THE B91B15020-11 DOUBLER TO BE INSTALLED PER 282242 1 5 DESIGN INTENT. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. 282352 1 1 THE DEBONDED SPACERS WERE BONDED BACK ON THE ISOLATERS PER DRAWING REQ 282352 1 2 UIREMENTS. THE SPACERS DEBONDED DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE HYDRAULIC AC 282352 1 3 CUMULATORS. THE ASSEMBLY IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 282488 1 1 THE WING TRAILING EDGE SEALS ARE CURLED UNDER AT FLIPPER DOORS #1-8. T 282488 1 2 HE SEALS HAVE BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: D 282488 1 3 ESIGN DEFICIENCY. 282612 1 1 GSE TRACK PAN PLATFORMS IN BAY 1 L/H AND R/H DID NOT ALIGN WITH THE MI 282612 1 2 LKSTOOL SUPPORT PROVISIONS. FITCHECKS WERE PERFORMED TO DETERMINE THE 282612 1 3 AMOUNT AND DIRECTION OF MISALIGNMENT. MILKSTOOLS WERE SHIFTED BETWEEN 282612 1 4 STRINGERS BY ALTERING THE SHIM REQUIREMENT, WITH MR APPROVAL, TO ALLOW 282612 1 5 PROPER ALIGNMENT OF THE PLATFORMS. DUE TO THE NON-LINEAR DRILLING OF T 282612 1 6 HE ORIGINAL HOLES, NEW SHIMS WERE FABRICATED AND MATCH-DRILLED TO THE 282612 1 7 EXISTING STRUCTURAL HOLES. ONE HOLE IN ONE MILKSTOOL WAS FOUND TO BE O 282612 1 8 UT OF ROUND AND WAS MR ACCEPTED BASED ON THE ABSENCE OF FLIGHT LOADS. 282612 1 9 PLATFORMS HAVE NOW BEEN PROPERLY INSTALLED. CONCLUDE THAT THE INSTALLA 282612 1 10 TION NOW MEETS THE DESIGN INTENT. 282796 1 1 THE R/H ET DOOR GROUND STRAP WAS FOUND TO BE FRAYED DURING INSPECTION. 282796 1 2 THE JUMPER WAS REPLACED AND DURING REMOVAL IT WAS NOTICED THAT THE OR 282796 1 3 BITER-SIDE LUG HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN INSTALLED BACKWARDS CAUSING ADDITIO 282796 1 4 NAL WEAR. THE NEW JUMPER WAS INSTALLED AND TESTED PER PRINT AND THE R/ 282796 1 5 H ET DOOR WAS CYCLED TO VERIFY NO BINDING. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXIS 282796 1 6 TS WITH THE GROUND JUMPER. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR ACCELERATED BY 282796 1 7 IMPROPER INSTALLATION. 282895 1 1 THE V070-351614-001 SHELL OCN'S RECORDED ON THE V35-50002 JOB CARD WHI 282895 1 2 CH INSTALLED THEM ONTO OV-103 FOR FLIGHT 10 WERE VERIFIED UPON REMOVAL 282895 1 3 AFTER FLIGHT 10 (FLIGHT 11 PROCESSING). THEREFORE, THE ROCKWELL DATA 282895 1 4 BASE FOR OV-102 AND OV-104 WERE INCORRECT. ROCKWELL DATA BANK SHOULD S 282895 1 5 HOW THE FOLLOWING OCN NUMBERS FOR THE VEHICLE AND FLIGHT AS FOLLOWS: O 282895 1 6 V-102, FLIGHT 10 - LH: BO6888, RH: AY9857; OV-103, FLIGHT 10 - LH: AY9 282895 1 7 856, RH BO6887; OV-104, FLIGHT 6 - LH: AY9857, RH: J56685. CONCLUDE TH 282895 1 8 AT THE ROCKWELL DATA BANK WAS INCORRECT AND THIS PR UPON CLOSURE WILL 282895 1 9 CORRECT THE DATA BANK. ITEM 1, PAGE 1, IS NOT A DISCREPANCY. 282896 1 1 ITEM 1.0 OF THIS PR HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO PR STR-3-11-3348 PAGE 1A A 282896 1 2 LONG WITH OTHER DISCREPANT STRUTS IN THE LEFT WING (REF ATTACHED COPY 282896 1 3 OF STR-3-11-3348). THIS TRANSFER WILL KEEP THE DISCREPANT STRUTS IN TH 282896 1 4 E LEFT WING TOGETHER WHICH WILL MAKE THEM EASIER TO ADDRESS SINCE THEY 282896 1 5 ALL HAVE SIMILAR PROBLEMS. 282963 1 1 CLIP V070-332733-003 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A .75 INCH CRACK. AFTER REMOVIN 282963 1 2 G THE DISCREPANT -003 CLIP, A NEW CLIP WAS FIT CHECKED AND FOUND TO HA 282963 1 3 VE A APPROX. 10 INCH GAP BETWEEN THE VERTICAL LEG OF THE CLIP AND THE 282963 1 4 MOUNTING STRUCTURE. TO FILL THIS GAP A SHIM WAS FABRICATED FROM 20-24 282963 1 5 T81 ALUMINUM PER SKETCH "B". THE SHIM WAS BONDED TO THE -003 CLIP USIN 282963 1 6 G MBO120-048 ADHESIVE. THE USE OF THE SHIM WITH THE CLIP WAS MR ACCEPT 282963 1 7 ED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, AND INSTALLED IN THE ORBITOR. 283004 1 1 THE INNER MOLD LINE OF THE V070-194105-001 CARRIER 283004 1 2 PAEL WAS DISCOVERED TO HAVE CHARRED AND POWDERED 283004 1 3 KOROPON AS WELL AS EXPOSED METAL. SAMPLES WERE TAK 283004 1 4 EN AND ANALYZED BY BRANCH (REQUEST#MCB 368-87) AN 283004 1 5 D IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE YELLOW POWDER IN THE 283004 1 6 SAMPLES HAD THE SAME CHEMISTRY AS THE KOROPON PRIM 283004 1 7 ER. THE REMAINING DISCOLORED KOROPON WAS REMOVED A 283004 1 8 ND NEW CORROSION PROTECTION APPLIED. 283004 1 9 THE IML ALSO HAD INDENTATIONS AS A RESULT OF THE H 283004 1 10 ARDNESS TESTING. THE INDENTATIONS HAVE BEEN ,R'D F 283004 1 11 OR UNRESTRICTED USE TO AVOID BEING WRITTEN UP AS A 283004 1 12 DISCREPANCY IN THE FUTURE. 283004 1 13 THE OUTER MOLD LINE OF THE CARRIER PANEL HAD SCRAT 283004 1 14 CHES AND BURRS DETECTED. THESE WERE SANDED OUT AND 283004 1 15 CORROSION PROTECTED BY ROUTINE TPS PROCESSING SIN 283004 1 16 CE A SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION OF THE OML REVEALED NO 283004 1 17 SCRATCHES. 283004 1 18 DISPOSITION WAS ALSO WRITTEN TO RE-ID THE CARRIER 283004 1 19 PANEL AFTER INITIAL SANDING OF THE IML REMOVED THE 283004 1 20 PANEL IDENTIFICATION. 283004 1 21 THIS SERIES OF DISCREPANCIES WILL NOT OCCUR AGAIN 283004 1 22 DUE TO MODIFICATIONS DONE IN THE ELEVON COVE AREA. 283004 1 23 THESE REPAIRS ALLOW THE CARRIER PANEL TO BE AVAIL 283004 1 24 ABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 283148 1 1 AS STATED IN THE IPR TRHE PRIMARY AND BACKUP SAMPLES FAILED TO MEET TH 283148 1 2 E PURITY SPEC PER SE-S-0073 TABLE 6.4-13 FOR LO2. THE TOTAL IMPURITIES 283148 1 3 ARE 225 AND 211 PPM FOR PRIMARY AND BACKUP SAMPLES RESPECTIVELY. THE 283148 1 4 MAX ALLOWABLE IMPURITY IS 110 PPM. THE HIGH TOTAL IMURITIES IS DUE TO 283148 1 5 HIGH GHC IN THE SAMPLE (184PPM-PRIMARY, 173 PPM BAKUP) THE HIGH IMPURI 283148 1 6 TY IS A VIOLATION OF OMRSD V45DMO.010-L. THE HIGH HELIUM IN THE SAMPLE 283148 1 7 BOTTLES IS DUE TO INADVERTENT DUMPING AND GHE PURGING OF SAMPLE BOTT 283148 1 8 LES THE SAMPLE BOTTLES WERE PURGED AGAIN WITH GO2 AND PRSD TANK EFFLVE 283148 1 9 NT SAMPLES WERE AGAIN GATHERED (REF DEV 16/01 TO OMI V1040). THE ACTUA 283148 1 10 L HELIUM CONTENT IN THE PRSD ONBOARD TANKS IS PROBABLY LOWER THAN THAT 283148 1 11 OBTAINED FROM THE SAMPLE BOTTLES EVEN IF THE TANK HELIUM CONTENT IS CO 283148 1 12 NSISTANT WITH THE SAMPLES. THERE WILL NOT BE ANY DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS T 283148 1 13 O THE FUEL CELLS WORST CASE WOULD REQUIRE ADDITIONAL FCP PURGING WANER 283148 1 14 HAS BEEN REQUESTED. CLOSE THIS PR UPON RECEIPT OF WAIVER #WK0790 283258 1 1 A FLAT SHIM OF AN ME115-0015-0002 INSERT BECAME DI 283258 1 2 SLODGED FROM THE V070-335097-001 PANEL. THE NUT WA 283258 1 3 S LOCATED BUT THE FLAT SHIM WAS MISSING. DURING TH 283258 1 4 E ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION A SECOND INSERT WAS RE 283258 1 5 MOVED BUT THE NUT & SHIM WERE INADVERTANTLY DISCAR 283258 1 6 DED. A LOST AND FOUND PR (LAF-3-07-0120) WAS INITI 283258 1 7 ATED AGAINST THE MISSING SHIM. REPLACEMENT HARDWAR 283258 1 8 E WAS ORDERED IN THE FORM OF ME115-0015-0002 INSER 283258 1 9 T (2). THE SHIMS AND NUTS WERE REMOVED FROM THE NE 283258 1 10 W INSERTS AND INSTALLED INTO THE EXISTING POTTED 283258 1 11 INSERTS WITH THE MISSING HARDWARE. CONFIGURATION R 283258 1 12 ETURNED TO PRINT. 283567 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY NOTED IN ITEM 1 WAS VISUALLY INSPECTED BY MEQ ENGINEER 283567 1 2 ING AND DETERMINED TO BE A TILE(TPS) CONDITION. NOTED DISCREPANCY WAS 283567 1 3 A CHIP IN THE THERMAL PROTECTION TILE COVERING THE PLBD HINGE AT THE 283567 1 4 POSITION NOTED. A TPS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT AND REPAIR NOTED DI 283567 1 5 SCREPANCY. THIS WAS NOT AN MEQ RESPONSIBILITY. 283794 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITIONWAS TO REMOVE AND REPLACE THE (1) DISCRE 283794 1 2 PANT MD114-5017-0005 NUTPLATE (ITEM 2.0-LOCATION: FIRST ATTACH POINT FRO 283794 1 3 M TOP, ENGINE #3 LH DOME SEGMENT). THE NUTPLATE WAS REPLACED RETURNING T 283794 1 4 HE INSTALLATION TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS. THE MISSING WASHER (ITEM 1.0) WAS 283794 1 5 REPLACED PRIOR TO FLIGHT 12. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR BOTH DISCREPANCIES 283794 1 6 WAS WORKMANSHIP. 283794 1 7 284000 1 1 RCC PANEL R/H 17 WAS NOT INSPECTED PER OMRSD REQUIREMENT. THIS INSPECT 284000 1 2 ION IS WAIVED UNTIL FLIGHT 11. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PRO 284000 1 3 BABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL/AUTHORIZATION ERROR. 284152 1 1 PARTS HAVE BEEN REVERSED AND THE BRACKLET CAN NOW 284152 1 2 BE INSTALLED 284211 1 1 THE INSULATED COVER IDENTIFIED ON PG 1 ITEM 1 WAS REMOVED FROM FUEL CE 284211 1 2 LL #1 H2O DISCHARGE F/H. FIBROUS THERMAL INSULATION WAS INSTALLED ON F 284211 1 3 LEXHOSE PER SPEC MAO105-317. H2O DISCHARGE F/H INSULATION COVER HAS BE 284211 1 4 EN RETURNED TO DWG. CONFIGURATION AND IS FLIGHT READY. 284244 1 1 THE POTTY DOOR WAS NOT OPENING OR CLOSING PROPERLY DUE TO INTERFERENCE 284244 1 2 WITH THE CEILING PANEL WITHIN THE COMPARTMENT. THE PANEL HAD A .25" A 284244 1 3 LLOWANCE ON THE EDGES FOR TRIMMING ON INSTALLATION. TRIMMING THE FORWA 284244 1 4 RD EDGE ELIMINATED THE INTERFERENCE AND ALLOWED THE DOOR TO OPEN AND C 284244 1 5 LOSE FREELY. DISCREPANCY WAS DUE TO NOT TRIMMING THE FORWARD EDGE ON O 284244 1 6 RIGINAL INSTALLATION OF THE PANEL. CLOSE THIS PR. 284424 1 1 DISCREPANT RADIATOR BEARING WERE LIGHTLY SANDED EN 284424 1 2 OUGH TO ALLOW THE HINGE BOLTS TO BE EASILY INSERTE 284424 1 3 D INTO BEARINGS. INTERIOR SURFACES OF BEARING WER 284424 1 4 E MR'D OK FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AFTER BEING SANDED 284424 1 5 SO THEIR HINGE PIN BOLT COULD BE INSERTED FREELY. 284424 1 6 THE BEARING STIFFNESS ADDRESSED ON PAGE 1A ITEM 3 284424 1 7 WAS WORKED ON PER ITEM 4. SPHERICAL BEARING BEIN 284424 1 8 G LOOSENED SO THEY OPERATE SMOOTHLY IS NOT A CONDI 284424 1 9 TION REQUIRING A MR. 284512 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATE HAS BEEN REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. ALL HOLE 284512 1 2 DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN REMOVED BY DRILLING AND INSTALLING AN ALUMINUM 284512 1 3 PLUG INTO FRAME. INSTALLATION HAS BEEN ACCEPTED UNRESTRICTED PER MR. 284512 1 4 HOLE DAMAGE WAS A RESULT OF PUNCH TIP REMOVAL ATTEMPS. 284546 1 1 TWO T01P31348-005 CLIPS NEEDED TO BE INSTALLED ON 284546 1 2 THE PAYLOAD BAY DOOR IN SUPPORT OF EPD TPS VEPD-3- 284546 1 3 07-030. THE (2) CLIPS WERE ATTACHED BY BOTH ADHES 284546 1 4 IVE RTV (MBO130-085) WAS USED TO BOND THE CLIP TO 284546 1 5 THE INTERCOSTAL ON THE PAYLOAD BAY DOOR. THIS WAS 284546 1 6 NOT AFFECTED BY THE "STOP BOND" ORDER. A HI-LOC, 284546 1 7 WASHER AND NUT ASSY WAS USED ALSO TO MECHANICALLY 284546 1 8 FASTEN THE CLIP TO THE INTERCOSTAL. WITH THE COM 284546 1 9 PLETION OF THESE WORK STEPS, THE ATTACHMENT OF THE 284546 1 10 T01P31348-005 CLIPS WERE COMPLETE AND THE PROBLEM 284546 1 11 S STATED ON PAGE 1 OF THIS PR WERE RESOLVED. 284600 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF FUEL CELL 2 CATHODE ACTIATION (V1040VL2),THE FUE 284600 1 2 L CELL 2 START /STOP SWITCH (PNL RI-S17) WAS HELD IN THE START POSITIO 284600 1 3 N FOR APPROXIMATELY 60 SECONDS. OMRSD PARAGRAPH V45CG0.020 SPECIFIES " 284600 1 4 START COMMAND SHALL BE ISSUED USING CABIN SWITCH AND MAINTAINED IN THE 284600 1 5 "START" POSITION ( 5 SECONDS MAX) UNTIL COOLANT PUMP STATUS ON. THE I 284600 1 6 NTENT OF THIS TIME LIMITATION ON THE "START" CMD IS TWO-FOLD. I) VERIF 284600 1 7 IES START CIRCUIT K-9 RELAY. 2) MINIMIZES SUSTAINING HEATER "ON" TIME 284600 1 8 IF A FAILURE OCCURS IN COOLANT PUMP CIRCUITRY. FUEL CELL 2 CATHODE ACT 284600 1 9 IVATION WAS RE-PERFORMED ON THIS IPR LIMITING "START" CMD TO LESS THAN 284600 1 10 5 SEC. THIS VERIFIES FC2 K-9 RECY START CIRCUITRY.FC2 COOLANT PUMP 284600 1 11 DELTA P PERFORMANCE DURING OTH TESTS WAS NOMINAL. IN ADDITION, SUSTAIN 284600 1 12 ING HTR ENERGY IS MINIMAL DUE TO FUEL CELL 02 SYSTEM BEING INERTED FOR 284600 1 13 THIS TEST. THIS IS CONFIRMED Y FC2 VOLTAGE DISSIPATION FROM 32 VDC TO 284600 1 14 LESS THAN 2 VDC TIN APPROX 11 SEC. IN CONCLUSION, NO DAMAGE TO FC2 OR 284600 1 15 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITRY OCCURRED DUE TO EXTEDNDED "STAT" CMD. IN ADDITIO 284600 1 16 N, ALL OMSD REQUIREMENT HAVE BEEN VERIFIED ADDOCIATED WITH THIS TEST. 284600 1 17 THIS IPR SHOULD BE UPGADED AGAINST FUEL CELL 2 AND CLOSED UPON APPROVA 284600 1 18 L OF OMRSD WAIVER. CAUSE: SCO ERROR. 284822 1 1 THE OVER-TORQUED HUBCAP FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACEDWITH NEW HA 284822 1 2 RDWARE PER THIS PR. A DEV WAS WRITTEN TO V1165 TO CORRCT WRONG TORQUE 284822 1 3 CALLOUT (COPY ATTACHED). THE MAIN LANDING GEAR WHEEL HAS BEEN RETURNED 284822 1 4 TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. CLOSE THIS PR 284928 1 1 MR MARK APPLIED AND RETAINER HAS BEEN ACCEPTED UNRESTRICTED FOR USE BY 284928 1 2 MR, TO BE INSTALLED WITH 10 RIVETS IN PLACE OF 11. THIS BRINGS THE V0 284928 1 3 70-326881-003 INSTALLATION TO PRINT INTENT. 284958 1 1 AS INSTALLED CONFIGURATION WILL BE ADDED TO CORREC 284958 1 2 T DWG. 284958 2 1 NO FURTHER RECURRENCE CONTROL JAIMIE POSEY 12-19-8 284958 2 2 5 285113 1 1 (1) 70C6408-1 BRACKET WAS FOUND MISSING WHILE ATTEMPTING TO INSTALL A 285113 1 2 WIRE BUNDLE CLAMP ON EPD-3-07-080. ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION DETERMINE 285113 1 3 D EO TO ISNTALL 70C6408-1 BRACKET WAS NOT RELEASED FOR OV 103. DISPO W 285113 1 4 AS WRITTEN TO INSTALL 70C6408-1 BRACKET WITH (2) MS20470AD RIVETS PER 285113 1 5 EO-TO-FOLLOW. BRACKET WAS INSTALLED PER PREMLIMARY ENGINEERING. 70C640 285113 1 6 8-1 BRACKET IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 285142 1 1 2 SPRUNG AND WORN LINKS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW ONES. 285215 1 1 DRAWING V070-101006 CALLS FOR THE USE OF -13 FASTE 285215 1 2 NERS FOR THE HOLES IN QUESTION. MEASUREMENTS WERE 285215 1 3 MADE AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT FOUR -11 FASTENERS 285215 1 4 AND FOUR -15 FASTENERS WERE THE APPROPRIATE ONES 285215 1 5 TO BE USED. THE PROBLEM IS UNIQUE TO THE RIGHT HAN 285215 1 6 D WING OF OV-103 SO NO E.O. IS TO FOLLOW. MRB APPR 285215 1 7 OVAL WAS RECEIVED WITH PRIME BOARD CONCURRENCE. TH 285215 1 8 E -11 AND -15 FASTENERS WERE INSTALLED AND STRUCTU 285215 1 9 RAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. 285272 1 1 DEFECT #1-MRB APPROVED OK AS IS. DEFECT #2-TRIMMED 285272 1 2 OUT 2" X1". DEBOND AND POTTED AREA. 285376 1 1 THE STRINGER AND MILKSTOOL INTERFERENCE PROBLEMS 285376 1 2 WERE ELIMINATED, BY RELOCATING THE HOLES FOR THE 285376 1 3 BRACKET INSTALLATION. AN EO WAS RELEASED TO REFLE 285376 1 4 CT THE HOLE RELOCATION DUE TO A DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 285394 1 1 SEAL DAMAGE OFITEMS 1 & 2 WAS REPAIRED BY RTV SILICONE WHICH DID NOT B 285394 1 2 OND COMPLETELY AFTER FIRST APPLICATION. A MORE EXTENSIVE SURFACE PREPA 285394 1 3 RATION WASTHEN PERFORMED, RTV REAPPLIED, AND VERIFIED TO HAVE COMPLETE 285394 1 4 LY BONDED AFTER CURING. REPAIR WAS LIGHTLY SANDED TO CONFORM WITH SEAL 285394 1 5 SURFACE. HINGE QUICK RELEASE PIN WAS REPLACED (ITEM 3). SUCCESSFUL RE 285394 1 6 TEST OF HATCH WAS PERFORMED PER STEP 34. SEAL LEAK RATE WAS 0 PSI/MIN 285394 1 7 (1.0 PSI/MIN MAX ALLOWABLE). PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 1 & 2 IS ALLOWING 285394 1 8 ADHESIVE PORTION OF SEAL PROTECTIVE TAPE TO CONTRACT SEALS, AND ITEM 3 285394 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE IS HINGE ARMS WERE NOT ALIGNED CORRECTLY (DUE TO LIMIT 285394 1 10 ED WORK AREA IN AIRLOCK) PRIOR TO INSTALLING PIN. RECURRENCE CONTROL - 285394 1 11 FOR ITEM 1 & 2, PROVIDE DURABLE, NON-ADHESIVE PROTECTIVE COVERS FOR S 285394 1 12 EALS. FOR ITEM 3, STRENGTH QUICK RELEASE PIN SHAFT, WHICH HAS BROKEN B 285394 1 13 EFORE AT THE SAME SPOT (NARROWEST DIAMETER). 285680 1 1 RETAINERS REMOVED & REPAIRED. 285692 1 1 THIS SUSPECT PR WAS GENERATED AGAINST THE V070-198482-001 PIN INSTALLA 285692 1 2 TION WELD TO THE R/H OUTBD ELEVON RUB PLATE. THE CONCERN WAS BASED ON 285692 1 3 A PREVIOUS PROBLEM WITH THE L/H INBD PIN WELD. A 1" DIA AREA OF SILVER 285692 1 4 PLATING AROUND THE PIN/PLATE WELD WAS REMOVED, AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UN 285692 1 5 RESTRICTED USE. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN BEFORE AND AFTER A 30 LBS 285692 1 6 FORCE (PUSH) TEST ON THE PIN. A DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION WAS ALSO PERF 285692 1 7 ORMED ON THE WELD LINE OF THE PIN/PLATE INTERFACE. NO DEFECTS WERE NOT 285692 1 8 ED DURING PENETRANT INSPECTION. SINCE ALL TESTING PERFORMED ON THE PIN 285692 1 9 INSTALLATION WAS POSITIVE. THIS PR MAY CLOSE. 285769 1 1 THE V070-156706 TYPE WASHERS WERE DESIGNED TO BE U 285769 1 2 SED TO FILL SCREW OR RIVET HOLES. THEY ARE CALLED 285769 1 3 OUT ON THE V070-101006 DWG BY LOC, USING A DASH # 285769 1 4 , FOR THE INSIDE DIA OF THE WASHER. NUMEROUS HOLE 285769 1 5 S TO BE FILLED BY THESE WASHERS, HAD HUCKBOLTS & H 285769 1 6 I-LOCS INSTL'D, WHICH HAVE SHALLOWER COUNTERSINK T 285769 1 7 HAN SCREWS OR RIVETS DO. SHAVING OR MILLING OF TH 285769 1 8 E CONICAL FLUSHING IS WITHIN THE DESIGN RQMTS OF T 285769 1 9 HE MOD. NO FURTHER ENG ACTION IS REQ'D. 285978 1 1 REFERENCE ITEM ONE: POLYIMIDE SEAL RETAINER WAS REMOVED AND RESHIMMED 285978 1 2 TO ACHIEVE A 0.010 MAXIMUM GAP BETWEEN POLYIMIDE SEAL AND PRIMARY SEAL 285978 1 3 PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE: INCORRECT ORIGINAL SHIMMING. REFERENCE ITEM TW 285978 1 4 O: POLYIMIDE SEAL RETAINER AS SUCCESSFULLY SHIMMED TO ACHIEVE 0.010 MA 285978 1 5 XIMUM GAP BETWEEN POLYIMIDE SEAL AND PRIMARY SEAL PANEL PER TPS STR-3- 285978 1 6 11-456 STEP 39.0. PROBABLE CAUSE: INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF TPS WORK 285978 1 7 STEP AND DRAWING REQUIREMENT. CURTAIN SEAL DID NOT AFFECT GAP AND DID 285978 1 8 NOT PREVENT ACCURATE GAP MEASUREMENT FROM BOTTOM SIDE. 286494 1 1 TOOLING PINS WERE CALLED OUT BY ORIGINAL WAS BUT N 286494 1 2 OT PROPERLY INSTALLED TO PREVENT MISALIGNMENT. PI 286494 1 3 NS FABRICATED IN STEP 3 WILL PREVENT REOCCURANCE O 286494 1 4 F MISALIGNEMENT DURING INSTALLATION 286728 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM (S) WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PE 286728 1 2 LED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEA 286728 1 3 RING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. AC 286728 1 4 TION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H 286728 1 5 /W TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87-103-C 286728 1 6 1). CLOSE PR. 286769 1 1 CHIPPING AND FRAYING EXIST ON PLBD (GRAPHITE EPOXY) CENTER LINE EDGE B 286769 1 2 AND. THE CHIPPING AND FRAYING WAS MR REPAIRED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PR 286769 1 3 OBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATON. 286789 1 1 UPON RETURN FROM FLIGHT 11 (OV-103) AT DFRF, R/H FLIPPER DOORS 12 AND 286789 1 2 13 BULB RETAINERS WERE FOUND TO BE INSTALLED BACKWARDS. THE BULD SEALS 286789 1 3 DID NOT FALL OUT OF THE INCONEL SEALS AND WERE FERRIED BACK TO KSC WI 286789 1 4 TH SEAL RETAINERS BACKWARDS PER MR FOR FERRY FLIGHT ONLY. AT KSC, AN I 286789 1 5 NSPECTION OF ALL OTHER FLIPPER DOOR RETAINERS WAS PERFORMED PER VSTR-3 286789 1 6 -11-462 AND NO OTHER RETAINERS WERE FOUND TO BE INSTALLED BACKWARDS. F 286789 1 7 LIPPER DOOR SEALS ARE REMOVED PER JOB CARD FOR NORMAL OPF PROCESSING A 286789 1 8 ND WILL BE REINSTALLED PER JOB CARD WHEN FLIPPER DOORS CLOSE PRIOR TO 286789 1 9 OPF ROLL OUT. TO ATTEMPT TO AVOID THIS PROBLEM IN THE FUTURE, A DEV TO 286789 1 10 EACH FLIPPER DOOR JOB CARD HAS BEEN ADDED TO SHOW A TYPICAL RETAINER 286789 1 11 INSTALLATION. (REF: ATTACHED COPY FOR L/H FLIPPER DOOR #10) ITEM 1 OF 286789 1 12 THIS PR HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND NO LONGER EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMA 286789 1 13 NSHIP. 286916 1 1 THE END OF THE SCREW THREAD ON A FASTENER WAS FOUN 286916 1 2 D TO BE IN CONTACT WITH A FITTING. CONDITION IS 286916 1 3 ACCEPTABLE, AND STRUCTURE CAN BE USED AS-IS. DESI 286916 1 4 GN OF STRUCTURE CAUSE CONTACT BETWEEN FASTENER, AN 286916 1 5 D FITTING. NO FURTHER DISPOSITION OR WORK IS REQU 286916 1 6 IRED. 286940 1 1 THE V539-340008-001 DOOR 45 HOLES DID NOT ALIGNED WITH THE EXISTING ST 286940 1 2 RUCTURE HOLES. THIS DOOR WAS RECEIVED FROM ROCKWELL DOWNEY WITH THE HO 286940 1 3 LES OPENED. THIS CONFIGURATION OF DOOR 45 WILL ONLY BE USED ON FLIGHT 286940 1 4 MISSIONS WHERE RTG COOLING IS REQUIRED. THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF REA 286940 1 5 MED AND SLOTTED HOLES MR APPROVED IN ORDER TO ALIGN DOOR 45 AND STRUCT 286940 1 6 URE (SEE ATTACHMENT 'E" FOR HOLE LOCATIONS): # OF HOLES - REPAIR: 2 LO 286940 1 7 CATOR - REAMED TO .1935 DIAMETER, 26 - REAMED TO .218 DIAMETER, 5 - RE 286940 1 8 AMED TO .228 DIAMETER AND 3 - ELONGATE PER STEP 9.0. PROBABLE CAUSE: V 286940 1 9 ENDOR TOOLING. 287119 1 1 ITEMS 1.0 AND 2.0: THE (2) HOLES ON THE LEFT HAND SIDE OF THE V070-321 287119 1 2 084-004 FWD BULKHEAD BY THE FWD ET ATTACH POINT HAVE SMALL BURRS AT TH 287119 1 3 EIR END BY THE OUTER MOLD LINE. THESE HOLES ARE TWO OF FOUR 3/4 INCH B 287119 1 4 OLTS, AND FIVE 3/8 INCH STUDS USED TO INSTALL THE FWD ARROWHEAD ASSY. 287119 1 5 THE BURRS WERE BURNISHED TO REMOVE THE LOOSE DEBRIS AND ROUGH EDGES. T 287119 1 6 HE BURNISHING IS COSMETIC IN NATURE AND WILL NOT AFFECT THE DESIGN INT 287119 1 7 ENT, SAFETY OR PERFORMANCE OF THE ARROWHEAD STRUCTURE. THE (2) BURNISH 287119 1 8 ED HOLES ON THE V070-321084-004 FORWARD BULKHEAD ARE APPROVED FOR UNRE 287119 1 9 STRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 287663 1 1 THE RUB PANEL & FASTENER CALLOUTS ARE "TYPO" ERRORS WITHIN THE DRAWING 287663 1 2 . THERE IS NO WORK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED ON THIS PR OTHER THEN OF THE REL 287663 1 3 EASED EO AND THAT THE DOCUMENT INSTALLS THE PANELS & FASTENER IN THE P 287663 1 4 ROPER CONFIGURATION. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS AND THE PR CAN CLOS 287663 1 5 E. CLOSE THIS PR, UPON VERIFICATION THAT RELEASED EO REFLECTS PROPER C 287663 1 6 ONFIGURATION. 287830 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING V9028 WHEN A LEAK WAS DISCOVERED IN THE N 287830 1 2 LG STRUT GAS FILLER VALVE DURING THE VALVE LEAK CHECK AFTER PRESSURIZA 287830 1 3 TION FOR FLIGHT. THE VALVE WAS RETORQUED TO THE HIGH END OF ITS RANGE 287830 1 4 AND THE LEAK STOPPED. THE STRUT PRESSURE WAS RECHECKED AND FOUND TO BE 287830 1 5 WITHIN TOLERANCE. THE VALVE RECEIVED A FINEL VOLUMETRIC LEAK DETECTOR 287830 1 6 CHECK AND PASSED. THIS PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE- 287830 1 7 VALVE DID NOT FULLY SEAT AFTER INITIAL PRESSURIZATION FOR FLIGHT. NO 287830 1 8 ADDITIONAL RETEST REQUIRED. 288025 1 1 SCRATCHES INSIDE THE NLG LH AFT XO375 7:00 OCLOCK TRUNNION HOLE ARE SU 288025 1 2 PERFICAIL IN NATURE. EDDY CURRENT REVEALED NO CRACKS. MR IS FOR UNREST 288025 1 3 RICTED USE, OK AS IS. 288039 1 1 THE DEFECT WAS REPAIRED & WAS MR'D. 288266 1 1 A 30 LB PUSH TEST WAS PERFORMED ON THE L/H INBOARD ELEVON GUIDE PIN/RU 288266 1 2 B PLATE, FOLLOWED BY DYE PEN INSPECTION. THE DYE PEN INSPECTION REVEAL 288266 1 3 ED A .030" FLAW IN THE WELD. THE FLAW FELL WITHIN SPEC CRITERIA. THE F 288266 1 4 LAW WAS APPROVED FOR ONE FLIGHT. POST FLIGHT DYE PEN INSPECTION SHOWED 288266 1 5 NO EVIDENCE OF PROPAGATION. THEREFORE, THIS PR ACN CLOSE. A NEW OMRSD 288266 1 6 REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO INSPECT EACH PIN WELD AFTER EACH 288266 1 7 FLIGHT (REF: V30-14446). V30MA0.070. 288292 1 1 RUST LIKE SUBSTANCE IS ON OUTER SURFACE OF STIFFN- 288292 1 2 ER PLATES (4) ON V070-190315-001 INSULATOR. SINCE 288292 1 3 STIFFNER PLATES ARE INCONEL, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT 288292 1 4 THIS SUBSTANCE IS A RESULT OF STIFFNER PLATE CORR- 288292 1 5 ODING. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE IS THAT A STEEL BRUSH 288292 1 6 WAS USED TO SMOOTH SPOT WELDED AREAS ON STIFFNER 288292 1 7 PLATES LEAVING SMALL PARTICLES OF STEEL THAT CORR- 288292 1 8 ODE AND LEAVE STAINS ON OUTSIDE SURFACE OF STIFFNE 288292 1 9 R PLATES. SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN REMOVED USING A STAIN 288292 1 10 LESS STEEL BRUSH. NO STRUCTURAL OR THERMAL INTEGR- 288292 1 11 ITY IS COMPROMISED - SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 288358 1 1 CORROSION FOUND AT LOCATIONS LISTED IN ITEM 1 PG.1 288358 1 2 OF THIS PR WAS REMOVED & ANALYZED AT LAB. LOCATION 288358 1 3 X0 1150 WAS RE-CORROSION PROTECTED DUE TO NO CORRO- 288358 1 4 SION DAMAGE. CORROSION DAMAGE FOUND AT XO 1180 TO 288358 1 5 X0 1191 AND XO 1203 THE TWO SCRATCHES AT LOCATIONS 288358 1 6 WERE DETERMINED TO BE SUPERFICIAL OR MINOR IN NATURE 288358 1 7 REF MR PG 6 AND RE-CORROSION PROTECTED WITH NO FURTHER 288358 1 8 WORK. LAB ANALYSIS RESULTS REVEAL THAT THE SUSPECTED 288358 1 9 CORROSION IS NOT A MAJOR CONCERN ALLOWING FOR RE-CO 288358 1 10 RROSION PROTECTION. ALL DISCREPANCIES AS ADDRESSED 288358 1 11 MAINTAIN WIRE TRAY INTEGRITY. CLOSE PR. 288456 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF THE WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL V070-198753-006 BENDING 288456 1 2 DURING ELEVON CYCLING TO FULL UP POSITION, IDENTIFIED AS ITEM 1.0 OF 288456 1 3 THIS PR, WAS SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED AFTER ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS INDIC 288456 1 4 ATED THAT THE SEAL WAS FUNCTIONING AS DESIGN INTENDED. THE SEAL WAS MR 288456 1 5 ACCEPTED WITH THE SLIGHT BEND CONDITION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, AND THE 288456 1 6 SEAL CONTACT SURFACES WERE CLEANED TO ELIMINATE ANY DEBRIS. PROBABLE 288456 1 7 CAUSE IS HIGHER FRICTIONAL FORCES DUE TO DEBRIS. 288467 1 1 D-STAMP WAS NOT CLOSED UPON ACCEPTANCE OF MRD 0074 288467 1 2 33. D-STAMP WAS CLOSED/CLEARED, PER MRD 007433. 288723 1 1 LOOSE HARDWARE IN ELEVON IS A RESULT OF THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS. ALL 288723 1 2 ACCESSIBLE HARDWARE HAS BEEN REMOVED PER TPS VSTR-3-07-241. INACCESSI 288723 1 3 BLE HARDWARE IS ALLOWED TO REMAIN PER PRINT. 288832 1 1 DEFECTS ACCEPTABLE PER SPECIFICATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 288843 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF TPS FCP-3-07-020 (MASS SPEC SEQ) A LEAK RATE OF 288843 1 2 9.96X10-6 SCCM WAS DETECTED AT THE V070-454923-001 END OF V070-45410-1 288843 1 3 46 TUBE ASSY(PG-1) MAX ALLOWABLE LEAK RATE IS 1X10-7 SCCM. THE V070-45 288843 1 4 4110-146 TUBE ASSY WAS DISCONNECTED FOR INSPECTION AND FOUND TO BE GRO 288843 1 5 SSLY MISALIGNED(MORE THAN 5 DEGREES) AT THE V070-454923-001 END. THE M 288843 1 6 AX MISALIGNMENT IS < 3 DEGREES(PG-1A) DURING THE ALIGNMENT CORRECTION( 288843 1 7 STEPS 4.1 AND 4.2) A GOUGE WAS NOTED IN THE STRAIGHT END DYNA-TUBE FIT 288843 1 8 TING OF THE V070-454110-146 TUBE ASSY(PG-1B) A NEW TUBE ASSY WAS FABRI 288843 1 9 CATED, (STEPS 4.4-4.7) INSTALLED(STEP 6), AND LEAK CHECKED (MASS SPEC 288843 1 10 STEP 10). MASS SPEC WAS SUCCESSFUL AND RESULTS ARE RECORDED IN ATTACHM 288843 1 11 ENT AA. THE INSTALLATION AND SUCCESSFUL LEAK CORRECT DISCREPANCIES LIS 288843 1 12 TED ON PG'S 1,1A, AND 1B. QC NOTE: MASS SPEC PERFORMED WAS FOR VERIFIC 288843 1 13 ATION OF POTENTIAL LEAKS NOT AN OMRSD LEAK CHECK. 288954 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS A SPLIT IN R/H TEE #10 (R/S 11) LOWER I 288954 1 2 NSULATOR WAS RESOLVED BY ROUTING THE INSULATOR TO RI SERVICE CENTER FO 288954 1 3 R REPAIR. INSULATOR WAS RETURNED AND REINSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. PROBABLE 288954 1 4 CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 288975 1 1 USING FULLY LAMINATED SHIMS IN PLACE OF 1/2 SOLID 288975 1 2 AND 1/2 LAMINATED SHIMS WILL NOT COMPROMISE THE ST 288975 1 3 RUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF CARRIER PNL INSTALLATION. F 288975 1 4 ULLY LAMINATED SHIMS WILL ALSO PROVIDE FOR INCREAS 288975 1 5 ED ADJUSTMENT WHEN TRYING TO ACHIEVE PROPER STEP A 288975 1 6 ND GAP AT INSTALLATION OF CARRIER PNL IS SECONDARY 288975 1 7 STRUCTURE. CLOSE THIS PR. 288990 1 1 ABOVE DISCREPANCIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN AGAIN 288990 1 2 ST PR STR-3-07-1704 WHICH ALREADY DOCUMENTS HEATSI 288990 1 3 NK PROBLEMS IN R/H BAY 5. A PAGE 1B HAS NOW BEEN W 288990 1 4 RITTEN CORRECTING THIS ERROR. THIS PR IS NO LONGER 288990 1 5 REQ'D 289110 1 1 O.D. OF WASHER MD153-1002-0010 UNDER NUT IS 1.070 289110 1 2 IN. O.D. OF NUT MD114-3007-0010 IS 1.195 IN. DIAME 289110 1 3 TER DIFFERENCE IS .125 IN. O.D. OF WASHER MD153-50 289110 1 4 04-0010 UNDER BOLT HEAD IS 1.070 IN. O.D. OF BOLT 289110 1 5 HEAD MD111-4020-1028 IS 1.195 (MAX). DIAMETER DIFF 289110 1 6 ERENCE IS .125 IN. BOTH DIFFERENCES APPROXIMATE WH 289110 1 7 AT INSTALLATION SHOWS PER VISUAL INSPECTION. THE 289110 1 8 ATTACHING HARDWARE IS PER DWG. ROCKWELL DOWNEY STR 289110 1 9 ESS GROUP HAS REVIEWED INSTALLATION, AND CONCLUDED 289110 1 10 THAT NO STRUCTURAL PROBLEM EXISTS. NO DISPOSITION 289110 1 11 OR WORK IS REQUIRED. 289342 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN TABS BENEATH TWO OF THE SIX BRAKE RING SCRE 289342 1 2 WS SPREAD OPEN AROUND THE HEAD OF THE SCREWS. THIS CONDITION RESULTED 289342 1 3 FROM THE CAP SCREW HAVING INSUFFICIENT SURFACE AREA BENEATH ITS HEAD T 289342 1 4 O PROPERLY SET THE HEAT SHIELD TABS. A ONE FLIGHT RESTRICTED MR WAS AP 289342 1 5 PROVED TO INSTALL A MODIFIED NAS620C416L WASHER BENEATH THE HEAD OF EA 289342 1 6 CH MS16998-43 CAP SCREW. POST FLIGHT THE BRAKES WERE REMOVED AT DFRF F 289342 1 7 OR VENDOR EVALUATION & REFURBISHMENT. THE VENDOR, B.F. GOODRICH, REPLA 289342 1 8 CED THE SMALLER HEADED SCREW, P/N SPS 56878-20098-4F-12, FOR A LARGER 289342 1 9 HEADED SCREW, P/N SPS 383031-4F-12. BRAKES CURRENTLY IN STOCK AT KSC W 289342 1 10 ILL HAVE FASTENERS REPLACED BY KSC PERFONNEL AUTHORIZED BY A TYPE A TP 289342 1 11 S TO CVR THE RELEASED EO. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS A BRAKE RI 289342 1 12 NG SCREW HAVING A HEAD OF INSUFFICIENT DIAMETER. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED 289629 1 1 MBO130-173 RTV STOPS AT Xo 1102.50 WERE BONDED .10 289629 1 2 0" OFF STGR 22 & .030" OFF STGR 1. THE RTV STOP A 289629 1 3 T STGR 22 WAS REMOVED & REBONDED. THE RTV STOP AT 289629 1 4 STGR 1 WAS TRIMMED TO REMOVE THE .030" OVERLAP & 289629 1 5 MR ID'D. 289743 1 1 ITEM 1, PG 1-DISCREPANT CHAMFER WAS MR ACCEPTED AS 289743 1 2 IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. DESIGN INTENT OF THIS IN 289743 1 3 STL'N HAS BEEN MAINT. 289744 1 1 MR REQUIRED FOR RESTRICTED USE OF ONE FLIGHT WITH 289744 1 2 NOTED SCREWS REMOVED. RATIONALE: THE TWO BLANKING 289744 1 3 PLATES ARE MINOR STRUCTURAL PARTS, USED PRIMARILY 289744 1 4 TO SEAL OPENINGS INTO MID-BODY. REMOVAL OF TWO OF 289744 1 5 32 SCREWS FROM PLATE AND ONE OF 28 SCREWS FROM 289744 1 6 PLATE WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT STRUCTURAL INTEGRI 289744 1 7 TY. REMOVAL OF TOT OF THREE SCREWS WILL PROVIDE 289744 1 8 ADEQUATE PURGE FOR CAVITY. NO ID. REQUIRED. 289763 1 1 V070-339757-001 SUPPORT ASSY. WAS REMOVED FROM THE CREW MODULE STR. DU 289763 1 2 E TO DEBONDING AT THE FWD END. THE -001 SUPPORT ASSY. WAS REBONDED, US 289763 1 3 ING MBO130-136 ADHESIVE. THIS ADHESIVE WAS ACCEPTED FOR USE IN PLACE O 289763 1 4 F MBO120-053 TYPE III ADHESIVE WHICH IS PER DWG. THE MBO130-136 ADHESI 289763 1 5 VE SUBSTITUTION WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE MBO120-053 ADHESIVE REQUIRED 289763 1 6 HEAT WHICH WAS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF DAMAGE TO WIRING/TUBING AND PYRO 289763 1 7 S IN THE BONDING AREA. 289794 1 1 THE 3 HOLES IN PROBLEM ITEMS 1,2, AND 3 PAGES 1 AN 289794 1 2 D 1A HAD THEIR CORRESPONDING INTERFEREING STRINGER 289794 1 3 S MR RELEIF NOTCHED USING A 3/8" DIA COUNTERBORE T 289794 1 4 OOL CENTERED WITH THE HOLES. CAUSE OF PROBLEMS IS 289794 1 5 DESIGN ERROR. CLOSE PR. 289892 1 1 A DING WAS NOTED ON THE TOP LEFT HAND SIDE OF THE AIRLOCK. MOLD IMPRES 289892 1 2 SIONS SHOWED DING AT .0014 DEEP, .1491 IN LENGTH, AND .0553 IN WIDTH. 289892 1 3 A .020 INCH THICK, 2024-T81 ALUMINUM DOUBLER, WAS BONDED OVER THE DING 289892 1 4 USING MB0120-053, TYPE III ADHESIVE, PER V9045, PROCES 152. LAP SHEAR 289892 1 5 S PASSED AND THE REPAIR WAS ACCEPTED AS UNRESTRICTED USE. 289932 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A CONDITION WHERE NO ACCES 289932 1 2 S WAS AVAILABLE TO PERFORM PER PRINT SEALING AROUND THE PERIMETER OF T 289932 1 3 HE NOSE CAP. DURING FLIGHT 11 PROCESSING, A FILLER BAR AND RTV SEAL WA 289932 1 4 S APPLIED, WITH MR APPROVAL, TO THE AFT SIDE OF THE INTERFACE INSTEAD 289932 1 5 OF THE PER PRINT FWD SIDE AND THIS PR WAS DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 12. DURIN 289932 1 6 G FLIGHT 12 PROCESSING OV-103'S NOSE CAP WAS REMOVED AND THE RTV SEAL 289932 1 7 APPLIED DURING PREVIOUS FLIGHT WAS VIOLATED. WITH EOTF CONCURRENCE, TH 289932 1 8 E FILLER BAR AND RTV SEAL WAS REAPPLIED. EO B15 TO DRAWING V070-399252 289932 1 9 HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY RELEASED. SYSTEM HAS BEEN MADE TO PRINT CONFIGURA 289932 1 10 TION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCRPANCY IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. NO FURTHER S 289932 1 11 HOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 289992 1 1 THE V070-510466 GUIDES IN BOTH LMG AND RMG ARE NICKED DUE TO AN INTERF 289992 1 2 ERENCE WITH THE V070-510432 ARM. THE ARM ASSY HAS BEEN REWORKED PER EO 289992 1 3 . V070-510432B03 (MCR11784). THE GUIDES WERE MR'D PER THIS PR AND SUCE 289992 1 4 SSFULLY RETESTED AND INSPECTED WITH A MAIN LANDING GEAR CYCLE. A PR CO 289992 1 5 NDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. REF: PR MEQ-3-07-0208. 290232 1 1 NAS 1007-10 BOLT INSTALLED INTO NUT AT LH Xo609.75 20 398.50 WAS FOUND 290232 1 2 TO BE 100 SHORT AS DOCUMENTED ON PR CM3-10-0166. THE LOCKING FEATURE 290232 1 3 FOR NUT IS AT THE END OF NUT SO LOW RUNNING TORQUE WAS DUE TO BOLT NOT 290232 1 4 ENGAGING LOCKING FEATURE. THE RUNNING TORQUE FOR A LONGER BOLT AS MEA 290232 1 5 SURED IN CM3-10-0166 IS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE RANGE OF 14-100 IN/LBS. NO D 290232 1 6 ISCREPANCY EXISTS WITH NUT LISTED ON PG1. THE BOLT REMOVED IN STEP 1.0 290232 1 7 WILL BE INSTALLED ON PR CM3-10-0166. PROBABLE CAUSE IS CARGO BOLT TOO 290232 1 8 SHORT. 290339 1 1 STRUT DAMAGE WAS MR'D OK AS-IS; HILOK ON STRUT WAS 290339 1 2 REVERSED TO ELIMINATE CONTACT W/ BRKT. BRKT DAMA 290339 1 3 GE WAS ADDRESSED ON PR STR-3-07-1471; ELEVON WAS C 290339 1 4 YCLED TO VERIFY CONTACT WAS ELIMINATED W/ BRKT HIL 290339 1 5 OK. BRKT HILOK DAMAGE WAS ADDRESSED ON PR STR-3-0 290339 1 6 7-1470. CAUSE IS MOST PROBABLY DUE TO A BUILD-UP 290339 1 7 OF TOLERANCES. 290352 1 1 UPPER & LOWER INSULATORS AT R/S #9, LH, TEE HAVE B 290352 1 2 EEN REMOVED, REPAIRED, RE-INSTALLED & GAPPED PER P 290352 1 3 RINT. FINAL INSTALLATION OF TEE WILL BE ACCOMPLIS 290352 1 4 HED PER TPS VSTR-3-07-155. WORK ON THIS PR IS COM 290352 1 5 PLETE. CLOSE THIS PR. 290482 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN AGAINST STRUCTURAL CLOSE OUT PANELS WITH DETERIORA 290482 1 2 TING VELCRO. PER V612-660602 E.O. B07, THE VELCRO WILL NO LONGER BE RE 290482 1 3 QUIRED ON THE V612-660602 PANELS. AND THE PANELS WILL BE MODIFIED TO A 290482 1 4 -004 CONFIGURATION ON AN ATTRITION BASIS. ALL THE PANELS REMOVED IN S 290482 1 5 TEP 19.0 WERE MODIFIED AND REIDENTIFIED AS -004'S. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPE 290482 1 6 RATIONAL DEGRADATIN. SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 290610 1 1 THE SPLITS & HOLES IN THE FOUR INSULATORS OF PNL # 290610 1 2 5 L/H WERE REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SRVC CNTR. THE IN 290610 1 3 SULATORS ARE INSTL'D IN RCC PNL & ARE OK FOR FLT. 290631 1 1 A SML AMT OF PAINT WAS RAISED ON THE R/H AFT PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ACTUATIO 290631 1 2 N MECHANISM BRKT AT Xo 1264.20 & Z 410.0. THE RAISED PAINT AREA OF T 290631 1 3 HE 70E3800-Z BRKT WAS DYE PENETRANT INSP'D & FOUND TO HAVE NO CRACKS. 290631 1 4 THE AREA WAS THEN CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301. 290632 1 1 M2 TK1 SCRATCH ON SURFACE OF TANK WAS SUCCESSFULLY 290632 1 2 REPAIRED. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED FOR UNRESTRICT 290632 1 3 ED USE. 290660 1 1 REFERENCE DISCREPANCY ITEMS 1 THRU 5 AND 7 THRU 11, THE INCORRECT/DEFE 290660 1 2 CTIVE WASHERS WERE REMOVED AND THE CORRECT WASHERS WERE INSTALLED PER 290660 1 3 PRINT. REFERENCE DISCREPANCY ITEM 1, 12, 13, 14, 15 AND 16 AT FOUR LOC 290660 1 4 ATIONS, MR RADIUS BLOCKS WERE FABRICATED AND INSTALLED TO PROVIDE FULL 290660 1 5 BEARING SURFACE FOR FASTENERS WHOSE HOLES WERE DRILLED TOO CLOSE TO F 290660 1 6 ITTING WEBS. REFERENCE DISCREPANCY ITEM 17, THE BOLT AT THIS POSITION 290660 1 7 WAS TORQUED TO CLASS 2 INSTEAD OF CLASS 3, WITH MR APPROVAL, DUE TO IN 290660 1 8 SUFFICIENT TOOLING ACCESS. REFERENCE DISCREPANCY ITEMS 6 AND 18, ALL O 290660 1 9 RBITER/ET FITTING ATTACH BOLTS THAT WERE FOUND LOW WERE FULLY TORQUED 290660 1 10 PRIOR TO FLIGHT PER THIS PR. THIS PR WAS THEN HELD OPEN PENDINGTHE RE 290660 1 11 SULTS OF A POST-FLIGHT TORQUE INSPECTION WHICH HAS BEEN PERFORMED PER 290660 1 12 VSTR-3-08-401. ALL INSPECTED BOLTS WERE FOUND TO BE AT OR NEAR THE MAX 290660 1 13 IMUM DESIGN TORQUE. CONCLUDE THAT THE ABSENCE OF FULL TORQUE WAS DUE S 290660 1 14 OLELY TO IMPROPER FASTENER INSTALLATION AND/OR TORQUE SEQUENCING DURIN 290660 1 15 G MANUFACTURING AND THAT THERE IS NO REASON TO SUSPECT FLIGHT AS A CAU 290660 1 16 SE OF TORQUE LOSS. THIS INSTALLATION IS NOW ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTE 290660 1 17 D FLIGHT AND NO FURTHER ACTION IS WARRANTED. CLOSE THIS PR. 290667 1 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: FASTENERS WITH IMPROPER GRIP LENGTH WERE REPLACED 290667 1 2 BY LONGER FASTENER BY E.O.T.F. DISPOSITION. DAMAGED CAPTURED NUT ON 290667 1 3 HOLE 23 WAS REPLACED BY MR ACTION. DAMAGED MOUNTING HOLES HAVE MINOR 290667 1 4 IMPERFECTIONS AND WERE ACCEPTED "OK AS IS." 290667 1 5 290667 1 6 UPON VERIFICATION OF E.O. PER STEP 31 CLOSE THIS PR. 290707 1 1 THE (V070-199859-002) UPPER OUTBD INSULATOR FOR R/ 290707 1 2 H RCC PNL #5 WAS REPAIRED AT ROCKWELL SRVC CNTR PE 290707 1 3 R MANUFACTURERS SPEC. THE INSULATOR IS INSTL'D & 290707 1 4 IS OK FOR FLT. 290848 1 1 PRSD O2 SYSTEM EXPERIENCED EXCESSIVE DECAY. LEAK WAS FOUND AT O2 HORIZ 290848 1 2 ONTAL DRAIN FLT CAP AT 6 O'CLOCK POSITION. FLT CAP SEAL WAS REMOVED/RE 290848 1 3 PLACED WITH SEBSEQUENT FLT CAP BUBBLE LEAK CHECK SUCCESSFUL. THIS PR R 290848 1 4 EADY FOR CLOSURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: DAMAGE/DEFECTIVE FLT CAP SEAL. 290858 1 1 STUD RETAINER V070-352881-001 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. RETAINER ASSEM 290858 1 2 BLY V070-352877-001 WAS REINSTALLED PER DRAWING CONFIGURATION. CLOSE T 290858 1 3 HIS PR. 290865 1 1 INSTALLATION OF NEW H/W IN THE DISCREPANT HOLE, 290865 1 2 PROVIDED A SUFFICIENT SCREW PROTRUSION FROM NUT 290865 1 3 PLATE. THE CARRIER PANEL CAN NOW BE INSTALLED 290865 1 4 PROPERLY. 290977 1 1 ALL ITEM RETURNED TO PRINT/USABLE CONDITION 291181 1 1 THE V070-351927-002 RING WAS MR REWORKED IN ORDER TO REPAIR THE CRACK 291181 1 2 AS NTOED ON PAGE 1. A RECTANGULAR SECTION THAT INCLUDED THE CRACK WAS 291181 1 3 REMOVED AND A MR SPACER WAS INSTALLED IN ITS PLACE. A MR DOUBLER WAS I 291181 1 4 NSTALLED OVER THIS AREA IN ORDER TO BEEF UP RING. NO FURTHER ACTION RE 291181 1 5 QUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS NORMAL OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 291308 1 1 INSULATORS HAVE BEEN REPAIRED PER MANUFACTURER'S S 291308 1 2 PECIFICATION. RC ACTION STILL IN WORK. 291358 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SPAR INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCK 291358 1 2 WELL SERVICE CENTER AND IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 291469 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM (S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE 291469 1 2 PEELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD 291469 1 3 BEARING MARKS AND THE INDENTATION/GOUGE WERE ACCEP 291469 1 4 TED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIG 291469 1 5 ATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING HARDWARE TO PREVE 291469 1 6 NT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87-103-C1). 291477 1 1 CRACK IN FIBERGLASS CLOSEOUT PANEL HAS BEEN REPAIR 291477 1 2 ED BY MR. CLOSEOUT PANEL WILL FUNCTION AS DESIGN 291477 1 3 INTENDED. 291769 1 1 ITEM 1.0 OF THIS PR HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO PR STR-3-11-3348 PAGE 1 AL 291769 1 2 ONG WITH OTHER DISCREPANT STRUTS IN THE LEFT WING (REF ATTACHED COPY O 291769 1 3 F STR-3-11-3348). THIS TRANSFER WILL KEEP THE DISCREPANT STRUTS IN THE 291769 1 4 LEFT WING TOGETHER WHICH WILL MAKE THEM EASIER TO ADDRESS SINCE THEY 291769 1 5 ALL HAVE SIMILAR PROBLEMS. 291946 1 1 THE V608-778001-001 WIRE HARNESS COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO INTERFE 291946 1 2 RENCE WITH THE LOWER CLOSEOUT ASSY V070-337448-006. THE HOLE IN THE CL 291946 1 3 OSEOUT ASSY WAS FILLED .10" TO ALLOW THE WIRE HARNESS TO BE INSTALLED. 291946 1 4 THE V070-337448-006 PANEL WAS MR'D UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 291946 1 5 NONCONFORMANCE. 292050 1 1 TECH NEEDS TO WORK CAREFULLY AND PERFORM TORQUE 292050 1 2 STEPS. 292172 1 1 THE NICKED V070-346063-001 STRUT, IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS RE 292172 1 2 SOLVED BY FEATHERING THE CHIPPED PAINT, BY SANDING, AND REAPPLYING THE 292172 1 3 CORROSION PROTECTION PER THE DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. ENGINEERING INVEST 292172 1 4 IGATION OF THE STRUT AFTER SANDING DETERMINED THAT THE NICKS WERE IN T 292172 1 5 HE PAINT ONLY AND NO DAMAGE HAD OCCURRED TO THE ALUMINUM. THE NICKED P 292172 1 6 AINT WAS SUSPECTED TO BE CAUSED BY THE PSA DURING INTALLATION AND/OR R 292172 1 7 EMOVAL. CONCLUDE THAT THE STRUT HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT AND NO FURT 292172 1 8 HER WORK IS REQUIRE DONE THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 292188 1 1 MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED, AND L-T-80 TAPE WAS APPLIED TO THE WALLS OF TH 292188 1 2 E SEAL GRROVE TO REDUCE ITS WIDTH. A NEW SEAL WAS THEN INSTALLED IN THE 292188 1 3 GROOVE AND A LEAK TEST PERFORMED (1.0 PSI/MIN LEAK RATE). THE WIDTH OF T 292188 1 4 HE GROOVE ON THE COLLAR WAS THEN MEASURED AND COMPARED TO THAT OF THE GR 292188 1 5 OOVE ON THE HATCH. THE TAPE INSTALLED PER THIS PR HAS SINCE BEEN REMOVED 292188 1 6 FROM THE GROOVE (PER PR MEQ-3-12-0524) TO ASSIST WITH TROUBLESHOOTING T 292188 1 7 O OBTAIN AN ACCEPTABLE SEAL LEAK REATE. SEAL LEAK IS NOW 0 PSI (PER PR M 292188 1 8 EQ-3-12-0524). THE GROOVE WIDTH HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED 292188 1 9 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS GROOVE MACHINED OUT OF SPEC DURING PRODUCTION. 292188 1 10 RETEST PERFORMED PER STEP 21. 292296 1 1 TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE, .180 WAS FILED OFF LOWER EDGE OF V669-00077 292296 1 2 4-001 ACCESS DOOR, LEAVING .070 WIDTH ON DOOR EDGE. THIS WORK WAS ACCO 292296 1 3 MPLISHED BY E.O. TO FOLLOW PER STEP 9.0. UPON VERIFICATION THAT RELEAS 292296 1 4 ED BY E.O. REFLECTS PROPER CONFIGURATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 292425 1 1 OMRSD V45 FILE III PARAGRAPH V45AJ0.030 WILL BE CHANGED FOR FC O2 FLOW F 292425 1 2 ROM 2.75 +/- 1 PPH TO 3.5 +/- 1 PPH. 292498 1 1 ITEM 1: SLIGHT DISCOLORATION AROUND FASTENER HOLES IN RING COVER. THE 292498 1 2 DISCOLORATION WAS CLEANED WITH MEK AND BEHR-TEX. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A PICKE 292498 1 3 D UP AT THIS TIME. ITEM 2: MINOR (1 TO 4 MILS DEEP) PITTING THRU-OUT T 292498 1 4 HE RING COVER. THE RING COVER WAS PASSIVATED PER MPP110M3021M12 PER MR 292498 1 5 . PROBABLE CAUSE: THIS IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR FOR CORROSION RESISTANT 292498 1 6 CRES IN THE SALT AIR AND MAIN ENGINER AND SRB EXHAUST ENVIRONMENT. 292783 1 1 O2 TANK #3, S/N SXT0005 WAS SCRATCHED IN THE LOWER 292783 1 2 AREA OF THE FOAM BLOCK. MR ATION WAS TAKEN AND SC 292783 1 3 RATCHES/DINGS WERE COVERED WITH SUPER KOROPON AND 292783 1 4 ID'D. TANK IS FLIGHT WORTHY 292817 1 1 TRIMMING OF THE STIFFENER BY 1/32" ALLOWED THE INS 292817 1 2 TALLATION TO BE COMPLETED WITHOUT INTERFERENCE. 292817 1 3 THE CAUSE OF THE INTERFERENCE WAS A TOLERANCE BUIL 292817 1 4 D-UP. 292872 1 1 R/H MAIN LANDING GEAR DOOR UPLOCK SENSOR BRACKET ( 292872 1 2 V070-510016) WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. SENSOR RIGG 292872 1 3 ING WAS CHECKED/ADJUSTED AND SENSOR WAS RETESTED. 292872 1 4 NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. HARDWARE WAS RETURNED 292872 1 5 TO FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. 292937 1 1 SCRATCHES BURNISHED OUT TO REMOVE STRESS RISERS AN 292937 1 2 D BANG AREAS CORROSION PROTECTED. DISCREPANT AREA 292937 1 3 REWORKED AND ACCEPTABLE AS REPAIRED. CLOSE PR. 292973 1 1 THE THREADED INSERTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED TO 292973 1 2 CORRECT THE THREAD DAMAGE ON THE TWO CENTER AFT HO 292973 1 3 LES OF THE PYRO CHARGE HOLDER AROUND WINDOW NO 8. 292973 1 4 THE CORRESPONDING TWO HOLES OF THE FIBERGLASS CLO 292973 1 5 SEOUT PANEL WERE SLOTTED .015 AND .03 INCH TO CORR 292973 1 6 ECT FOR SLIGHT MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN THE CLOSEOUT C 292973 1 7 OVER AND THE CHARGE HOLDER. THIS SLOTTING WILL AL 292973 1 8 LOW THE INSTALLATION OF THE CLOSEOUT PANEL WITHOUT 292973 1 9 DAMAGING THE OUTSIDE OF THE HOLES ON THE PYRO CHA 292973 1 10 RGE HOLDER. THE HOLE ENTRANCE DAMAGE TO THE TWO 292973 1 11 HOLES OF THE CHARGE HOLDER WAS CORROSION PROTECTED 292973 1 12 AND ACCEPTED FOR USE 'AS-IS'. 293144 1 1 IN BAY 11 ON THE PORT LONGERON, ONE(1) RD114-8005-1007 SELF LOCKING NU 293144 1 2 T WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED RETURNING TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. 293750 1 1 PER PRINT GAP MEASUREMENTS HAVE BEEN OBTAINED PER STR-3-11-461, STEPS 293750 1 2 72 & 73. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 293788 I 1 BY CUTTING OFF THE CRACKED AREA OF THE FLANGE (APP 293788 I 2 ROX. 2") WILL NOT EFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 293788 I 3 OF THE WIRE TRAY. THE REMAINING 61" OF FLANGE WIL 293788 I 4 L SUFFICIENTLY PROTECT THE ELECTRICAL WIRING. THE 293788 I 5 REFORE IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 293788 I 6 BY CUTTING OFF THE CRACKED AREA OF THE FLANGE (APP 293788 I 7 ROX. 2") WILL NOT EFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 293788 I 8 OF THE WIRE TRAY. THE REMAINING 61" OF FLANGE WIL 293788 I 9 L SUFFICIENTLY PROTECT THE ELECTRICAL WIRING. THE 293788 I 10 REFORE IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 294019 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2 HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE ON PAGE 4. 294019 1 2 ITEM 3 WAS REWORKED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION PER DISPO PAGE 2. MR MARKIN 294019 1 3 G PERFORMED PER STEP 2.0. 294260 1 1 DOORS ARE NOW PER DWG. CAUSE: MANUFACTURING ERROR 294392 1 1 WASHERS WERE MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS AN EQUIVALENT SUBSTIT 294392 1 2 UTION. 294425 1 1 DURING T/B ANALYSIS ON MID-3-07-0495, L/H VENT DOOR 3 WAS FOUND TO BE 294425 1 2 "OVER-CLOSING" APPROX. .060". IF THERMAL PROTECTION IS INSTL'D ON THE 294425 1 3 DOOR WHICH PREVENTS A TRUE IML MSMT, THE RIGGING SPEC STATES TO MEAS 294425 1 4 THE DISTANCE FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE DOOR TO THE SKIN OF THE VEH ALONG 294425 1 5 THE DOOR CENTERLINE TO DETERMINE THE RIGGING FROM THE INSIDE. DUE TO 294425 1 6 THE PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS OF TAKING THIS MSMT, IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE 294425 1 7 THE MSMTs FWD & AFT OF THE CENTERLINE & AVG THE TWO DIMENSIONS. A DI 294425 1 8 MENSION OF .978" WAS RECORDED INITIALLY, BUT THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN 1.0 294425 1 9 60 +/- .010". THE DRIVE LINK WAS ADJUSTED TO BRING THE DOOR RIGGING B 294425 1 10 ACK TO WITHIN SPEC & A FINAL VALUE OF 1.056" WAS OBTAINED. THEREFORE, 294425 1 11 L/H VD 3 RIGGING WAS RTN'D TO SPEC & THE DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS 294425 1 12 . 294600 1 1 LRU PR INITIATED AGAINST STRUT TO ROUTE BACK TO VENDOR FOR REPAIR. NEW 294600 1 2 STRUT OBTAINED AND RETURNED TO LOGISTICS STAGING FOR USE. 294614 1 1 A SMALL GAP EXISTED BETWEEN THE BOLT HEAD AND THE FIRST WASHER ON THE 294614 1 2 UPPER RIGHT (O/B) BOLT ON CONNECTOR PLATE V070-793271-001. THE GAP A 294614 1 3 PPEARED TO BE CAUSED BY WHITE PAINT INTERFERING BETWEEN THE BOLT HEAD 294614 1 4 (NAS1003-4H) AND THE C'SUNK WASHER (RD153-5002-1003). NEW BOLT AND WA 294614 1 5 SHER WAS INSTALLED, WHICH RETURNED THE CONNECTOR PLATE TO PRINT CONFIG 294614 1 6 URATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 294687 1 1 DISCREPANT BOOT & DEBONDED SEAL HAVE BEEN REMOVED & REPLACED. NEW BOOT 294687 1 2 HAS P/N VISABLE COMPLETION OF RETAINER INSTL'N & SEALING OF THE INSTL 294687 1 3 'N IS PERFORMED BY STR-3-07-191. CAUSE IS DUE TO NRL WEAR & TEAR. VEH 294687 1 4 OV-103 RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIG. 294759 1 1 THE (2) V070-146068-002 KEYSTONE BOLTS OF R/H FLIPPER DOOR #4 WERE FOU 294759 1 2 ND FLATTENED WHEN REMOVED AT THE OPF AT THE CONCLUSION OF STS-41. THES 294759 1 3 E V070-146068-002 BOLTS WERE LOOKED AT LAST FLOW (FLIGHT 11 PROCESSING 294759 1 4 , REF PR STR-3-11-3203) SINCE THE SAME DISCREPANCY WAS FOUND. EXTENSIV 294759 1 5 E RESEARCH AND REPAIR WAS PERFORMED DURING THAT FLOW TO SOLVE SUCH PRO 294759 1 6 BLEM. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN OF THE FLIPPER DOOR BOLT HOLES AND S 294759 1 7 HOWED NO SIGNIFICANT DIVIATIONS FROM THE DRAWING DIMENSION. IT WAS OBS 294759 1 8 ERVED DURING THE WORK OF THIS PR AND THE PREVIOUS FLOW PR THAT THE (2) 294759 1 9 V070-146068-002 BOLTS AND THE NUTPLATES MAY NOT BE PERPENDICULAR TO E 294759 1 10 ACH OTHER DURING INSTALLATION AND TORQUING DUE TO TIGHT TOLERANCES. IT 294759 1 11 WAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT DURING BOLT INSTALLATION THE LINK ASSEMBLY HAS 294759 1 12 A LOT OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WHICH MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO ALIGN THE BO 294759 1 13 LT AND NUTPLATE IN THE V070-146070 LINK. CLOSE ATTENTION WILL BE PAID 294759 1 14 AT THE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF THESE BOLTS TO FIND IF THE CAUSE IS 294759 1 15 THE METHOD OF INSTALLATION/REMOVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. POSSIBLE 294759 1 16 HOLE MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN FLIPPER DOOR AND V070-146070 LINK. 294767 1 1 ON 12-08-85 OV-103 WAS INDEED NOSED INTO HB-2 AT T 294767 1 2 HE VAB & NOT BACKED & SPOTTED PER OMI V5103 AS SPE 294767 1 3 CIFIED. STR ENG DID NOT CONCUR WITH THIS DECISION 294767 1 4 & DID NOT WISH TO DEV THEIR PROCEDURE TO ALLOW LE 294767 1 5 AVING AN ORB IN SUCH A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS CONFI 294767 1 6 GURATION. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS MANUVER 294767 1 7 WAS ACCOMPLISHED BECAUSE OF A HIGHER PRIORITY NEE 294767 1 8 D FOR THE TOW TRACTOR TO BE USED ON ANOTHER VEH. 1 294767 1 9 03 WAS LATER BACKED & SPOTTED PROPERLY & HAS NO SI 294767 1 10 GNIFICANT DISCREPANCIES. 294771 1 1 THE MD114-3007-0004 NUT ON THE RH ET DOOR FWD HINGE FITTING WAS FOUND 294771 1 2 TO BE LOOSE & COULD NOT BE TORQUED PROPERLY DUE TO THE HEAD OF THE MD1 294771 1 3 11-3001-0424 BOLT BEING COVERED BY TILE. TO AVOID TILE REMOVAL, THE EN 294771 1 4 D OF THE BOLT WAS SLOTTED TO ALLOW THE USE OF A SCREWDRIVER TO HOLD TH 294771 1 5 E BOLT WHILE TORQUING THE NUT. THE LOOSE NUT HAS BEEN PROPERLY TORQUED 294771 1 6 & THE REPAIR WAS MR'D ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO RETEST IS R 294771 1 7 EQ'D & WORK IS COMPLETE ON THIS WAD. 294840 1 1 DISCREPANT HDWE HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH PER PRINT H 294840 1 2 DWE. 294915 1 1 A SPARE FLT CAP WILL BE USED TO FILL THE OV-103 RE 294915 1 2 QUIREMENT. THIS CAP WAS OBTAINED PER STEP 3 OF THI 294915 1 3 S PR. THE SUSPECT FLT CAP WILL ROUTED TO THE OPF & 294915 1 4 IT WILL BE EVALUATED PER THE OV-104 PR INITIATED 294915 1 5 IN STEP 9. 294966 1 1 ATTACH PT#5 BUSHING WAS SENT TO ROCKWELL DOWNEY FO 294966 1 2 R FURTHER EVALUATION ON LRU PR 4-07-2063. A NEW BU 294966 1 3 SHING WAS OBTAINED AND IS IN V5011 MERL. NO FURTHE 294966 1 4 R DISPOSITION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 294967 1 1 THE TYPE AND LOCATION OF ONE NUTPLATE WAS CHANGED 294967 1 2 TO ALLOW COVER PLATE INSTALLATION WITH PROPER FAST 294967 1 3 ENER EDGE DISTANCE. DESIGN OF COVER PLATE DID NOT 294967 1 4 PROVIDE FOR PICKUP OF ALL ATTACH POINTS. IN COOR- 294967 1 5 WITH RI/DNY, IT WAS CHOSEN TO RELOCATE ONE NUT PLA 294967 1 6 TE RATHER THAN FABRICATE A NEW COVER. PG. 1A WAS D 294967 1 7 ISPO'D TO REPERFORM RIVET INSTALLATION WHICH WORKE 294967 1 8 D IMPROPERLY. INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRES 294967 1 9 TRICTED USE. 294981 1 1 "B" HATCH WAS REMOVED, SEAL WAS REAPLCED HATCH WAS REINSTALLED. FUNCTI 294981 1 2 ONAL OPERATION OF HATCH WAS RE-VERIFIED AND SEAL LEAK TEST PASSED W/ 0 294981 1 3 LEAKING. HATCH WAS THEN CLOSED FOR ROLLOUT. RETEST COMPLETE PER STEP 294981 1 4 3, PROBABLE CAUSE IS IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF HATCH PROTECTIVE TAPE. R 294981 1 5 C ACTION: PROVIDE REUSABLE RIGID, NON-ADHESIVE PROTECTIVE SEAL COVERS. 294993 1 1 DISCREPANCY1 DAMAGED V070-197152-001 INSULATION STRIP WAS REMOVED. RO 294993 1 2 UTED TO HDA FOR REPAIR AND REINSTALLED. THIS RETURNS THIS INSTALLATION 294993 1 3 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. CLOSE PR. 295010 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1 I.B. EDGE: "A"(.065),"B"(.070) AND "C" 295010 1 2 (.070) STEP DIMENSIONS ARE ALL WITHIN DIMENSION IS 295010 1 3 MR APPROVED ON PG 10 DUE TO BEING WITHIN ACCEPTAB 295010 1 4 LE TOLERANCE OF .040 TO .085. ITEM 1 PG 1 O.B. EDG 295010 1 5 E: "A"(.062), "B" (.070)AND "D" (.065) STEP DIMENS 295010 1 6 SIONS ARE ALL WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE OF .070+/- . 295010 1 7 008. STEP "C"(.095) STEP DIMENSION WAS REWORKED TO 295010 1 8 REDUCE STEP TO .061 WHICH IS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TO 295010 1 9 LERANCE OF .040 TO .085 PER MR ON PG 6. ITEM 2 PG 295010 1 10 2 C/P TO WING STRUCTURE STEP: ALL CARRIER PANEL TO 295010 1 11 STRUCTURE STEPS WERE WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE OR M 295010 1 12 R APPROVED DUE TO BEING WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANC 295010 1 13 E OF .040 TO .085 PER PG. 4. ITEM 3 PG 1B: ADHESIV 295010 1 14 E THICKNESS ESTIMATED FROM PG 1B WAS MR OK PER PG 295010 1 15 7. SHIM WAS REPLACED DUE TO SHIFTED SHIM (REF ITEM 295010 1 16 4 PG 1C) AND ADHESIVE APPLIED TO NEW SHIM WAS APPR 295010 1 17 OX. 8 TO 12 MILS ELIMINATING REQUIREMENT FOR EXACT 295010 1 18 VERIFICATION. ITEM 4 PG 1C: SHIFTED SHIM WAS REMO 295010 1 19 VED AND REBOUNDED TO CORRECT O/T CONDITION ON PG 8 295010 1 20 ALL STEP DIMENSIONS FROM CARRIER PANEL AS REQORKED 295010 1 21 OR DOCUMENTED PROVIDE A FILLER BAR TO TILE CONFIG 295010 1 22 URATION THAT WILL PREVENT OVERTEMP OF FILLER BAR, 295010 1 23 SIP & STRUCTURE. 295206 1 1 EO RELEASED TO DOCUMENT TORQUE REQ'D. 295218 1 1 THE SUPPORT PANEL (V070-361699-005) HAS BEEN REPAIRED WITH SEVERAL PAT 295218 1 2 CHES AND MB0120-037, TYPE II ADHESIVE PER MR DISPOSITION. THE PANEL HA 295218 1 3 S BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. THE PANEL NO LONGER REQUIR 295218 1 4 ES ENGINEERING ACTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE PANEL WAS INADVERTANTLY KIC 295218 1 5 KED DURING PROCESSING. 295231 1 1 BORON/EPOXY REINFORCEMENT LAMINATIONS ON FWD CROSS TIE BEAM HAS SPLINT 295231 1 2 ERED EDGES. XO 1307 BULKHEAD, YO +82 TO -82, ZO 409 SPLICE LINE. MBO12 295231 1 3 0-008 ADHESIVE WAS APPLIED TO THE SPLINTERED AREAS ON THE SPLICE PLATE 295231 1 4 PER MR TO PREVENT FURTHER SPLINTERING. FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 295686 1 1 THIS PR LISTED (3) DISCREPANCIES (PAGES 1,1A,AND 1B). THE FIRST DISCRE 295686 1 2 PANCY NOTED A STIFFENER THAT SHOWED EVIDENCE OF CRACKS IN RIVET PATTER 295686 1 3 N. AN INVESTIGATION WAS STARTED ON THE STIFFENER BY REMOVING HARDWARE 295686 1 4 ATTACHED TO IT AND THEN A DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION WAS PERFOMED ON BOT 295686 1 5 H SIDES OF THE STRIPPED AREA OF THE STIFFENER. THE RESULTS OF THE DYE 295686 1 6 PENETRANT ISNPECTION WAS-NO DEFECTS IN STIFFENER. UPON REINSTALLATION 295686 1 7 OF HARDWARE ON THE STIFFENER IT WAS NOTED (PAGE 1A, ITEM 2) THAT THE S 295686 1 8 TIFFENER HAD ONE EXTRA PILOT HOLE WHERE THE V070-856901-001 BRACKET AT 295686 1 9 TACHED. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS CORRECTED BY RECEIVING MR APPROVAL TO PLU 295686 1 10 G THE OPEN PILOT HOLE WITH SILICON ADHESIVE. THE THIRD DISCREPANCY 295686 1 11 (PAGE 1B ITEM 3) WAS DISCOVERED DURING INSTALLATION OF THE V070-856901 295686 1 12 -001 BRACKET. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE PRINT) DUE TO INACCESSABLILITY OF 295686 1 13 AREA FOR TOOLS TO INSTALL RIVETS. PR STR-3-07-2147 NOTED 6 ENLONGATED 295686 1 14 HOLES ON THE BRACKET AND THESE HOLES WERE ENLARGES. THE REMAINING HOLE 295686 1 15 S ON THE BRACKET WERE ENLARGED PER THIS PR AND HI-LOKS WERE MR APPROVE 295686 1 16 D FOR USE IN REINSTALLING THE BRACKET. DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXIST. 295730 1 1 THE V070-334564 MID DECK FLOOR CLOSEOUT PANEL RETAINER WAS FOUND TO IN 295730 1 2 TERFERE WITH THE INSTALLATION OF THE 3+1 SLEEP STATION. A E-O-T-F DISP 295730 1 3 O WAS WRITTEN TO TRIM RETAINER THIS FLOW WHICH WAS PLANNED FOR USE TO 295730 1 4 SLEEP STATION WHICH CORRECTED INTERFERENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS DESIGN 295730 1 5 DEFICIENCY. 295825 1 1 THE NUT WAS FOUND TO BE DISCONNECTED FROM THE V070-305005-001 RETAINER A 295825 1 2 T ATTACH POINT #8 ON THE LEFT SIDE. THE OMS POD WAS MOUNTED BY HOLDING T 295825 1 3 HE NUT DURING TORQUING AND THE PR WAS DEFERRED WITH PMRB APPROVAL. AFTER 295825 1 4 THE POD WAS PULLED OFF, THE RETAINER WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT 295825 1 5 . NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE. PROBABLE CAUSE - OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 295826 1 1 THERE ARE APPROX. 32 CLIPS EACH WING, FOR A TOTAL 295826 1 2 OF 96 FASTENERS. NOT REAMING 1 HOLE OUT OF 3 WILL 295826 1 3 NOT AFFECT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY NOR CHANGE THE DRA 295826 1 4 WING INTENT FOR THIS INSTALLATION. BY OMITTING THE 295826 1 5 ANCHOR SLEEVE & MODIFYING THE HARDWARE REQR'MNT, 295826 1 6 AS REQUESTED BY GRUMMAN, THE CLIPS CAN BE INSTALLE 295826 1 7 D. 295893 1 1 ENGINE COVER HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURAT 295893 1 2 ION 296135 1 1 BENT STRUT WAS REPLACED, THUS RETURNING INSTALLATI 296135 1 2 ON TO DESIGN INTENT. THIS PR INTERFACED WITH STR- 296135 1 3 3-07-1590 WHICH INSTALLED AN OVERSIZE RIVET AT STR 296135 1 4 UT & V070-326117-010 STIFFENER LOCATION. CAUSE CA 296135 1 5 N BE ATTRIBUTED TO INADVERTENT SIDE LOAD BEING APP 296135 1 6 LIED TO STRUT BY AN UNKNOWN PERSON. 296389 1 1 OMRSD REQUIREMENT OF 275 SCIM MINIMUM AT 8 PSIG IS IN ERROR; SHOULD BE 296389 1 2 250 SCIM (15.26 SCIM) MINIMUM AT 8 PSIG. LSS HAS AGREED TO SUBMIT RCN 296389 1 3 TO CHANGE OMRSD. CHECK VALVE IS FUNCTIONING AS DESIGNED, CHECK VALVE 296389 1 4 FLOWS 172 SCIM AT 8 PSIG. 296403 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THE AREAS WHERE CORROSION WAS FOUND AT THE 296403 1 2 SECONDARY SEAL CURTAIN ATTACH LOCATIONS ON THE V070-198320 SEAL PANEL 296403 1 3 ABRADED WITH BEHR-TEX, ETCHED WITH TURCO METALGLO NO. 6, AND MR ACCEPTED 296403 1 4 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS IMPROPER CORROSION PROTECTION 296403 1 5 APPLICATION DURING INITIAL ASSEMBLY ALLOWING CATHODIC CORROSION DUE TO 296403 1 6 DISSIMILAR METAL CONTACT. (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1) THE NUTPLATES AT THE 296403 1 7 LOCATIONS WHERE CORROSION WAS FOUND WERE REMOVED TO ALLOW FOR INSPECTION 296403 1 8 OF UNDERLYING STRUCTURE. LIGHT PITTING WAS FOUND AROUND THE 0.191" DIA 296403 1 9 FASTENER HOLES AND A 0.098" DIA RIVIT HOLE. PANEL WAS ETCHED WITH TURCO 296403 1 10 METALGLO NO. 6 TO REMOVE ANY RESIDUAL CORROSIVE PARTICLES. CHEM FILM AND 296403 1 11 KOROPON HAVE BEEN REAPPLIED AND NEW NUTPLATES WERE INSTALLED. PITTING 296403 1 12 WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS IMPROPER CORROSION 296403 1 13 PROTECTION APPLICATION DURING INITIAL ASSEMBLY ALLOWING CATHODIC 296403 1 14 CORROSION DUE TO DISSIMILAR METAL CONTACT. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1A) 296403 1 15 AFTER SURFACE OXIDATION WAS REMOVED FROM THE SECONDARY SEAL CURTAIN 296403 1 16 ATTACH HOLES, THREAD MARKS WERE FOUND IN THE HOLES. THE THREAD MARKS 296403 1 17 WERE DETERMINED TO BE COSMETIC AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 296403 1 18 PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. CONCLUDE ITEM 1 THROUGH 3 296403 1 19 HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED AND ALL SUBSEQUENT REWORK COMPLETE. NO FURTHER 296403 1 20 ENGINEERING OR SHOP ACTION REQUIRED. 296403 1 21 296478 1 1 REF ITEM 1.0 A EO WAS RELEASED WHICH DELETED TH CONVAIR NUTPLATE AND I 296478 1 2 NSTALLS A NEW MD114-5017-0004 NUTPLATE. THIS NUTPLATE PROVIDE ENOUGH R 296478 1 3 ADIAL MOVEMENT FOR FASTENER INSTALLATION. REF ITEM 2.0 A EO WAS RELEAS 296478 1 4 ED WHICH DELETED THE FIXED CONVAIR NUTPLATE AND INSTALLS A NEW MD114-5 296478 1 5 009-0601 NUTPLATE. THIS NUTPLATE PROVIDED RADIAL MOVEMENT FOR FASTENER 296478 1 6 INSTALLATION. REF. ITEM 3.0 BOTH HOLES WHERE REAMED UP TO WITHIN PRIN 296478 1 7 T TOLERANCE. THIS PROVIDED PROPER FASTENER INSTALLATION. REF ITEM 4.0 296478 1 8 (6) OF (10) OVERSIZED PEDESTAL MOUNTING HOLES WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNREST 296478 1 9 RICTED USE. CLOSE THIS PR 296686 1 1 ITEM 1: THE WHITE SUBSTANCE FOUND NEAR LINK #8 WAS REMOVED AND SAMPLES 296686 1 2 WERE SENT TO THE MAB LAB FOR IDENTIFICATION. THE SAMPLES WERE FOUND T 296686 1 3 O BE OUTGASSED AND RESIDUAL RTV. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE 296686 1 4 CAUSE IS NORMAL OPERATIONAL USE. ITEM 2: THE BLACK DEPOSITS IDENTIFIED 296686 1 5 ARE A RESULT OF OUTGASSING OF THE RESIN IN THE RCC PANEL DURING RE-EN 296686 1 6 TRY. THESE DEPOSITS HAVE STAINED THE STRUCTURE. THE STAIN DOES NOT AFF 296686 1 7 ECT THE STRUCTURE IN ANY WAY. THE STAIN IS COSMETIC ONLY. NO FURTHER A 296686 1 8 CTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL OPERATIONAL USE. 296710 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIALLY PICKED UP DURING A ZONAL INSPECTION IN THE AFT F 296710 1 2 OR IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF THE COTTER PIN IN THE RH VENT DOOR 9 AFT H 296710 1 3 INGE BOLT AND ALSO FOR RUSTY/CORRODED HINGE BOLTS. ATTACHMENT 1 OF THI 296710 1 4 S PR REMOVED THE DOOR TO INSPECT THE HARDWARE. IN STEPS 7 AND 8 OF ATT 296710 1 5 ACHMENT 1, THE BUSHINGS WERE BINDING IN THE CLEVISES AND PAGE 1A WAS P 296710 1 6 ICKED UP. AFTER CONTACTING R.I. ENGINEERING, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE A 296710 1 7 DDITION OF RD153-5002-0004 WASHERS UNDER THE BOLT HEADS WOULD CORRECT 296710 1 8 THE PAGE 1 PROBLEM AND "EO TO FOLLOW" DISPO WAS WRITTEN. ATTACHMENT 2 296710 1 9 REPLACED THE BINDING BUSHINGS AND INSTALLED THE NEW WASHERS PER THE "E 296710 1 10 .O. TO FOLLOW". WORK RESUMED ON ATTACHMENT 2, BUT IN STEP 4 THE SPHERI 296710 1 11 CAL BEARINGS DID NOT "ROTATE FREELY" AND THE PAGE 1B DISCREPANCY WAS P 296710 1 12 ICKED UP. R.I. ENGINEERING PRODUCED A COPY OF THEIR MANUFACTURING SPEC 296710 1 13 FOR THE SPHERICAL BEARING INSTALLATION AND CLARIFIED THE METHOD OF CH 296710 1 14 ECKING THE BEARINGS. ALSO AT THIS TIME, R.I. DETERMINED THAT AN E.O. D 296710 1 15 ID NOT NEED TO BE RELEASED TO THE DWG. FOR THE ADDITION OF RD153-5002- 296710 1 16 0004 WASHERS. THEREFORE, THE "E.O. TO FOLLOW" STEPS WERE DELETED AND C 296710 1 17 LARIFICATION OF THE BEARING CONDITION CHECK WAS ADDED. THE CLARIFICATI 296710 1 18 ON WHICH DELETED THE "E.O. TO FOLLOW" AND THE RD153-5002-0004 WASHERS 296710 1 19 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERLOOKED AND ATTACHMENT 2 WAS PERFORMED AS ORIGINA 296710 1 20 LLY WRITTEN. TO CORRECT THIS, ATTACHMENT 3 REMOVED THE RH VENT DOOR 296710 1 21 9 HINGE HARDWARE, REINSTALLED THE HARDWARE PER PRINT, THEN CHECKED AND 296710 1 22 ADJUSTED INSTALLATION TOLLERANCES. THIS WORK HAS CORRECTED THE PROBLE 296710 1 23 MS AND THE DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. 296847 1 1 THE PAYLOAD BAY LINER RETAINERS WERE TRIMMED TO 296847 1 2 ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE WITH THE MOUNTING BRACKET 296847 1 3 OF THE BRIDGE IN BAY 09 297031 1 1 REF ITEM 1: SUSPECT CAPS WERE NOT FOUND TO BE INSTL'D ON WHEEL/TIRE AS 297031 1 2 SY'S PRESENTLY INSTL'D ON OV103. FLIGHT WHEELS HAVE ALREADY BEEN CKD A 297031 1 3 T THE WHEEL/TIRE SHOP & HAVE AN ACCEPTABLE VALVE CAPS INSTL'D. REF ITE 297031 1 4 M 2: THE STRUTS DO NOT USE THE SAME INFLATION SYS AS THE WHEELS. THERE 297031 1 5 IS NO VALVE IN (REF PARA 2 ATTACH 'A') FOR THE VALVE CAP TO INTERFACE 297031 1 6 WITH TO CAUSE A LEAK. 297314 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE P 297314 1 2 EELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD B 297314 1 3 EARING MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE C 297314 1 4 ARRIER PANEL IS OK FOR FLIGHT. R.C. ACTION TO INVE 297314 1 5 STIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING HARDWARE TO P 297314 1 6 REVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. 297364 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 - A NEW V070-198705-001 TRAILING EDGE RETAINER WAS OBTA 297364 1 2 INED AND STORED WITH OTHER L/H FLIPPER DOOR #3 HARDWARE TO BE INSTALLE 297364 1 3 D ON J.C. V80-96003. THE V070-198705-002 TRAILING EDGE RETAINER WAS RO 297364 1 4 UTED TO LOGISTICS FOR RESTOCK. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP. 297469 1 1 ITEM 1: BULB SEAL INSTALLED WRONG. BULB SEAL INSTALLED WITH RING ON TH 297469 1 2 E OTBD SIDE. SEAL INSTALLED CORRECTLY. ITEM 2: V070-198708-001 RETAINE 297469 1 3 R NSTALLED (1) HOLE OTBD. REINSTALLED CORRECTLY. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO 297469 1 4 WORKMANSHIP. 297701 1 1 CORROSION AND PITTING WAS WRITTEN UP ON RUDDER SPEED BRAKE (RSB) THERM 297701 1 2 AL BARRIERS (SPRING SEALS). THE THERMAL BARRIERS WERE INSPECTED FURTHE 297701 1 3 R BY SHOP AND SEVEN OF THE ORIGINAL NINE WERE DETERMINED TO BE DISCREP 297701 1 4 ANT BY SHOP. THERMAL BARRIERS WERE INSPECTED BY ENGINEERING AND DETERM 297701 1 5 INED TO BE DISCOLORATION FROM NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THE DISCOLORATION 297701 1 6 IS MR ACCEPTED DUE TO BEING COSMETIC ONLY AND NOT HAVING ANY AFFECT ON 297701 1 7 SEALS TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN. THE OTHER TWO OCN'S NOT LISTED IN STEPS 297701 1 8 3.0 OR 4.0 HAVE NO DISCREPANCIES. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 297701 1 9 ION. CLOSE THIS PR. 297709 1 1 THE 1/4" CRACK IN CLOSE-OUT PNL V070-337427-004 NOTED ON PG. 1, WAS PA 297709 1 2 TCHED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE PNL W/ GLASS FABRIC & EPOXY RESIN. THE PNL 297709 1 3 WAS REPAIRED BY PATCHING & THE CRACK NO LONGER EXISTS. REPAIR WAS MR 297709 1 4 ID'D "STR-3-07-2218". NO FURTHER WORK REQ'D. 297803 1 1 REVIEW OF DRAWING V070-198399 AND EO B01 AND EFFE- 297803 1 2 CTIVITY CHANGE WAS MADE FROM AN-008 TO -009 WHICH 297803 1 3 INCORPORATES 1 (QUANTILY) BRACKET. VIEW 2-2 WAS 297803 1 4 ALSO REFERENCED IN ZONE 71B SHOWING INSTALLATION 297803 1 5 DIMENSIONS IN REF. TO THE V070-156554-001 BRACKET. 297836 1 1 ITEMS 1.0 AND 2.0: THE V070-382115-003 AND V070-382115-004 DUCT SUPPOR 297836 1 2 T BRACKETS LOCATED IN FRCS CAVITY (Xo273, Yo-8) WERE FOUND DAMAGED. TH 297836 1 3 ESE BRACKETS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED BY NEW BRACKETS. THE DAMAGED BR 297836 1 4 ACKETS WERE ROUTED TO HDA FOR REPAIR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE: OPERAT 297836 1 5 IONAL DEGRADATION. 297953 1 1 THE INITIAL TROUBLESHOOTING PLAN ATTEMPTED TO IDENTIFY THE RELATIONSHI 297953 1 2 P BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL LEAKS, AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE FLOW RATE. EACH "L 297953 1 3 EAK" WAS TEMPORARILY SEALED AND FLOW RATE CHANGES, IF ANY, WERE RECORD 297953 1 4 ED. STR'S PR'S WERE INITIATED TO SEAL THE LEAK(S) MOST AFFECTING FLOW 297953 1 5 RATE. AS RTV REPAIR DID NOT SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE THE FLOW RATES, DISP 297953 1 6 O WS ADDED TO LEAK CHECK THE GSE (C70-1183 S/N 001) UNIT PROBE ASSEMBL 297953 1 7 Y AND VERIFY THE RELIEF VALVE WAS OPERATING NOMINALLY. THE PROBE ASSEM 297953 1 8 BLY PASSED ALL TESTS. DURING A TRANSFER OF THE PROBE BETWEEN TWO SEALS 297953 1 9 , THE G070-622277-001 SENSOR ASSEMBLY BROKE OFF. FAILURE ANALYSIS OF T 297953 1 10 HE SHEARED END REVEALED CONTAMINATION PRESENT, INDICATING LEAK PATHS ( 297953 1 11 CRACKS) HAD BEEN PRESENT ON THE ALUMINUM TUBE OF THE SENSOR ASSEMBLY. 297953 1 12 THE S/N -002 C70-1183 UNIT WAS CHANGED OUT WITH THE S/N -001 UNIT AND 297953 1 13 THE ELEVON COVE SEAL LEAK RATE CHECKS WERE REPERFORMED. SUBSEQUENT COV 297953 1 14 E SEAL LEAK RATES WERE ALL FOUND TO BE LOWER (BETTER) THAN THE PREVIOU 297953 1 15 S FLIGHT DATA (STS-26). THIS IMPROVEMENT IS ACCOUNTABLE TO THE RTV REP 297953 1 16 AIRS PERFORMED DURING TROUBLESHOOTING. THEORETICAL CALCULATIONS ON THE 297953 1 17 EFFECT OF THE CRACK IN THE PROBE SENSOR INDICATED THE BACK PRESSURES, 297953 1 18 BEING READ BY THE PG-4 GAGE, WOULD BE ASPIRATED THRU THE CRACK AND GI 297953 1 19 VE FALSE LOW READINGS. WITH 30 PSIG UNIT PRESSURE, CALCULATIONS PRODUC 297953 1 20 ED A THERORETICAL (.03 PSIG) OVER PRESSURIZATION OF THE ELEVON COVE SE 297953 1 21 AL(S). SUBSEQUENT FLOW RATES ACHIEVED WITH THE REPLACEMENT C70-1183 UN 297953 1 22 IT VERIFIED NO DETRIMENTAL EFFECT TO THE SEALS, AND A WAIVER (COPY ATT 297953 1 23 ACHED) WAS GENERATED AND ACCEPTED FOR THE THEORETICAL OVER-PRESSURIZAT 297953 1 24 ION. AS A FINAL CONFIDENCE CHECK, THE REPLACEMENT C70-1183 S/N -002 PR 297953 1 25 OBE ASSEMBLY WAS PRESSURE CHECK (4 PSIG), AND THE SENSOR WAS REMOVED, 297953 1 26 VISUALLY INSPECTED WITH MAGNIFICATION, AND PRESSURE CHECKED (2-3 PSIG) 297953 1 27 . ALL TESTING PROVIDED EVIDENCE THE S/N -002 SENSOR AND PROBE ASSEMBLY 297953 1 28 ARE FUNCTIONING NOMINALLY. AN INSPECTION O THE PROBE ASSEMBLY SENSOR 297953 1 29 G070-622277-001 TO THE C70-1183 VALIDATION OMI V2364 WILL BE ADDED AS 297953 1 30 CORRECTIVE ACTION. A COPY OF THE REDLINE TO V2364 VALIDATION OMI, CURR 297953 1 31 ENTLY UNDER REVISION "B", IS ATTACHED. CLOSE THIS PR AS AN EXPLAINED C 297953 1 32 ONDITION, HARDWARE FAILURE DUE TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 297953 1 33 CONTINUED FROM BLOCK 36: ATT C70-1183 UNIT/OMRS DATA SHEET/CRR/RETAMET 297953 1 34 ER COPIES/ATTA GSE HOOK-UP/TUBE BANK 297980 1 1 CONDITION ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. 298112 1 1 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF ELEVON WAS RESTORED BY 298112 1 2 INSTALLATION OF MR DOUBLERS/PLATES AS DOCUMENTED 298112 1 3 IN BODY OF THIS PR. 298112 1 4 COVE SEAL LEAKL CHECK WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY IN 298112 1 5 TEGRITY OF SEAL INSTALLED--ALL CHECKS WERRE WITHIN 298112 1 6 REQ'S. 298112 1 7 ELEVON CYCLE WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY NO-INTGERFE 298112 1 8 RENCE BETWEEN SEALS/TILES AND ADJ. COMPONENTS. 298112 1 9 NO INTERFERENCE WAS OBSERVED. 298112 1 10 CLOSE THIS PR..................................... 298322 1 1 THE STRAIGHTENING OF THE SPRING FINGERS WILL ALLOW 298322 1 2 THE OMRSD REQUIREMENT TO BE MET, AND WILL NOT EF- 298322 1 3 FECT THE FORM, FIT OR FUNCTION OF THE ORIGINAL IN- 298322 1 4 STALLATION. 298329 1 1 2 EACH LOCATIONS SHOWN ON PAGE 1 WERE FOUND TO HAVE LOW RUNNING TORQUE 298329 1 2 . THESE LOCATIONS WERE REPLACED WITH NEW NUTS PER DWG. PROBABLE CAUSE 298329 1 3 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 298340 1 1 PNL INSTL WAS NOT PER DWG & OCN # WAS NOT VISIBLE. 298340 1 2 A NEW OCN # HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO PNL & AN EO TO 298340 1 3 FOLLOW WILL BRING DWG TO AS IS CONDITION. DOOR 19 298340 1 4 -04 WILL BE REINSTL'D PER MDC JC V30-13327 STEP 05 298340 1 5 -10 298539 1 1 DURING INSPECTION OF THE V070-351614-001 SHELL ASSY (RIGHT HAND LO2), 298539 1 2 THE LOWER KAHRLON SURFACE WAS OBSERVED TO BE WORN AND FRAYED AROUND TH 298539 1 3 E OUTER EDGE. THE DISCREPANT V070-351614-001 SHELL ASSY WAS ROUTED TO 298539 1 4 VENDOR FOR REFURBISHMENT AND WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW PART. THE NEW SHE 298539 1 5 LL ASSEMBLY HAS A V070-855059-001 PART NUMBER AND THIS PART NUMBER IS 298539 1 6 INTERCHANGEABLE WITH THE V070-35114-001 SHELL ASSY PER DRAWING V070-56 298539 1 7 5250 FLAG NOTE 10. THE NEW OCN NUMBER FOR THE SHELL ASSY INSTALLED ON 298539 1 8 THE RIGHT HAND SIDE (LO2) OF OV-103 IS S00433. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE 298539 1 9 TO THE V070-351614-001 SHELL ASSY WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 298771 1 1 THE CRACK IN THE DISCREPANT SPAR INSULATOR WAS REP 298771 1 2 AIRED AT ROCKWELL SRVC CNTR. THE WARP IN THE INSU 298771 1 3 LATOR WAS MR'D "OK AS IS". THE INSULATOR IS OK FO 298771 1 4 R FLT & THE PR CAN BE CLOSED. 299040 1 1 O2 TANK 2 VENT FTG FAIED LOW PRESS MASS AT 1.9 X 10-6 SCCS AND S/B 1 299040 1 2 X 10-7 SCCS (ITEM 1 PG. 1) DEMATED, CLEAN, AND REMATEDTHE FTG 3 TIMES 299040 1 3 WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THE VENT FTG WAS DEMATED, THE TANK PORT CAPPED 299040 1 4 , THE LINE PLUGGED, AND MASS SPEC BOTH PORTS. THE TANK SIDE FAILED 3 X 299040 1 5 10-5 SCCS. O2 TK 2 S/N 0014 WAS REMOVED FROM THE ORBITER TO THE FLOOR 299040 1 6 . THE TK VENT POT WAS POLISHED (MR) AND FAILED MASS SPEC. THE LEAK WAS 299040 1 7 LATER DETECTED COMING FROM THE TK FOAM BOX. THE DISCREPANT TK (S/N 00 299040 1 8 14) WAS ROUTED TO BALL BROTHERS FOR REPAIR. THE O2 TK MOCKUP TOOL WAS 299040 1 9 OPTICALLY CHECKED AND FOUND TO HAVE SEVERAL OUT-OF-SPEC LIMITS. RSC IN 299040 1 10 SPECTED THE TOOL AND FOUND THE VENT PORT IS IN ALIGNMENT. O2 TK MOCKUP 299040 1 11 TOOL WAS INSTALLED. THE VENT LINE WAS MOCKED UP AND NON-COMFORMANCE WA 299040 1 12 S NOTED (ITEM 2 PG. 1A). SEVERAL MR RATIONALS/STEPS CORRECTEDTHE PROB 299040 1 13 LEM BY REMOCK-UP AND MODIFYING THE FOAM AS TO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE S 299040 1 14 TRUT. THE NEW O2 TK 2 WAS INSTALLED )S/N 0020) AND FAIED HIGH PRESS MA 299040 1 15 SS SPEC AT THE VENT FTG (ITEM 3 PG 1B). FINAL READING WAS 1.95 X 10-6 299040 1 16 (S/B 1 X 10-7 SCCS). A BUBBLE LEAK CHECK WAS PERFORMED WITH NO INDICAT 299040 1 17 ED BUBBLES AT FLIGHT PRESSURE. WAIVER WK0540 WILL APPROVE THE 1.95 X 1 299040 1 18 0-6 SCCS READING AS FLT WORTHY BASED UPON THE FAACT THE O2 QUANTITY LO 299040 1 19 SS DURING FLT WOULD BE MINUTE AND UNDISTINGUISHABLE. CKISE OR UPON REC 299040 1 20 EIPT OF WAIVER WK0540. 299060 1 1 DISCREPANT NUT PLATE ON PG. 1 WAS REMOVED & RPLCD W/ NEW NUT PLATE TO 299060 1 2 RTN TO PRINT CONFIG. 299098 1 1 CRACKED INSULATOR, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS REPAIRED BY RI SE 299098 1 2 RVICE CENTER AND RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. ITEM 1 HAS BEEN RESO 299098 1 3 LVED AND NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 299370 1 1 THE BENT CONER OF THE DOME HEAT WAS BENT BACK AND BONDED IN PLACE PER 299370 1 2 MR ACTION. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS AND THE PR CAN CLOSE. CLOSE 299370 1 3 THIS PR. 299695 1 1 V070-565314-004 RETAINER ANGLE, V070-565316-021 RETAINER SET ASSY (3 P 299695 1 2 ART SET) & V070-565321-022 RETAINER SET ASSY (3 PART SET) WAS FOUND TO 299695 1 3 BE OUTSIDE DRAWING REQUIREMENT OF FLATNESS AND WAVINESS EXCEEDING .02 299695 1 4 0 BETWEEN ANY TWO ADJACENT HOLES. THE RETAINERS WERE REPLACED WITH A N 299695 1 5 EW SET. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CLOSE THIS PR. 299970 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM (S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE 299970 1 2 PEELED TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE EDGE DI 299970 1 3 STANCE WAS CORRECTED BY CENTERING THE SHIM (S) OVE 299970 1 4 R THE BOLT HOLES PER MR ACTION. THE THREAD BEARING 299970 1 5 MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. R.C. A 299970 1 6 CTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING 299970 1 7 HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87 299970 1 8 -103-C1). 300144 1 1 NINE HOLES, IN THE DOUBLER INSTALLATION, WERE INAD 300144 1 2 VERTANTLY DRILLED OUT TOO LARGE. THE DISCREPANT H 300144 1 3 OLE LOCATIONS WERE MR'D TO USE THE NEXT SIZE RIVET 300144 1 4 (3/16). A MINIMUM EDGE DISTANCE OF 1 1/2 D WAS M 300144 1 5 AINTAINED. CLOSE THIS PR. 300167 1 1 LINE VIBRATION ISOLATOR (MILKSTOOL) 70A2804-14E WA 300167 1 2 S REMOVED & REPLACED USING MR APPROVED, EIGHT (8) 300167 1 3 ME112-0013-0503 HI-LOKS, (8) ME114-0022-0105 FASTE 300167 1 4 NERS, AND (8) NAS620C8L WASHERS. CLOSE PR. 300291 1 1 THE S/N /OCN RECORDED IN OMI V5R02 FOR H2 TANK 1 UPPER AFT STRUT (ME27 300291 1 2 0-0006-0014) DURING OV-103 FLT 7 PROCESSING WAS INCORRECT THIS PR WAS 300291 1 3 DEFERRED TO FLT 8 DUE TO ACCESS RESTRICTION (BAY 6 LHS COSE OUT) DURIN 300291 1 4 G FLT 8 PROCESSING ACCESS WAS OBTAINED AND TANK STRUT S/N /OCN WAS OB 300291 1 5 TAINED (REF STEPS 3,4, AND 5) CLOSE THIS PR 300535 1 1 X 300619 1 1 ELONGATED STRUT HOLE REPAIRED USING MR BUSHING. 301454 1 1 MR RATIONAL FOR UNRESTRICTEN USE ON CHAMFER AREA 301454 1 2 .025 BY 15 DEGREES ON DOUBLER DUE TO INTERFERANCE 301454 1 3 WITH LOWER R/H HI LOCK COLLAR PATTERN. THE FOAM, 301454 1 4 FIT OR FUNCTION OF THE DOUBLER IS NOT EFFECTED. 301454 1 5 STRUCTURAL INTERGRITY IS MAINTAINED. NO MRID RE- 301454 1 6 QUIRED. 301522 1 1 A BUSHING WAS GALLED DRUING A FIT CHK OF BORON STR 301522 1 2 UT. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN OF THE DISCREPANT 301522 1 3 BUSHING & ANALYZED. RESULTS IND'D A RAISED METAL 301522 1 4 SURFACE WHICH WAS REAMED TO WITHIN SPECIFIED TOLE 301522 1 5 RANCES. BOLT INSTL'N INTO THE BUSHING WAS THEN AC 301522 1 6 COMPLISHED WOUT INCIDENT. 301605 1 1 AFTER REMOVAL OF JUMPERS AND VECONNECITON/PRESSURIZATION OF FC2; 02 SU 301605 1 2 PPLY LINE (PORT F3) FAILED HIGH PRESSURE MASS-SPEC. SUBSEQUENT DEMATE/ 301605 1 3 INSPECTIONS INDICATED NO ANOMALIES ON DYNATUBE SEALING SURFACE. ITEM 8 301605 1 4 90 CLEANED ENTIRE FITTING (NOT JUST SEALING FACES) AND ITEM 81 USED A 301605 1 5 BOXED END CROWSFOOT IN TORQUEING PROCEDURE. HIGH PRESSURE MASS-SPEC WA 301605 1 6 S SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHED IN ITEM 87 WITH A LEAK RATE OF LESS THAN 5 301605 1 7 *10-9. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS EITHER THE PRESENCE OF A 301605 1 8 MICROSCOPE PARTICLE ON MATING. SURFACES OR AN ALIGHMENT PROBLEM DURIN 301605 1 9 G TORQUE. THIS PR IS READY TO CLOSE. 301624 1 1 FITTING WAS REMOVED AND HARDWARE WAS INSPECTED, THE ONLY PROBLEM DISCO 301624 1 2 VERED WAS THREAD MARKS IN RADIUS BLOCK. BLOCK WAS REAMED TO UPPER END 301624 1 3 OF HOLE TOLERANCE AND DAMAGE WAS REMOVED. HARDWARE WAS REINSTALLED WIT 301624 1 4 HOUT INCIDENT. 301628 1 1 MOLD IMPRESSIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN OF AFFECTED AREAS 301628 1 2 AND HAVE SHOWN THE SCRATCHES TO BE SUPERFICIAL IN 301628 1 3 NATURE. SCRATCHES MR'D OKAY-AS-IS (UNRESTRICTED). 301628 1 4 AREA TO BE CORROSION PROTECTED PER AFT-3-07-026. 301628 1 5 SCRATCH ORIGIN: TOOLING MARKS. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 301628 1 6 CLOSE THIS PR. 301727 1 1 EVALUATION OF NLG DOOR BY ROCKWELL DOWNEY & LSOC S 301727 1 2 TRUCTURES REVEALS THE DEBOND IS IN FACT AN AREA WH 301727 1 3 ERE A REWORK FITTING WAS ADDED USING AN ADHESIVE W 301727 1 4 HICH IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH ULTRASONIC TESTING. NO 301727 1 5 PR CONDITION EXISTS. 301860 1 1 PR FCP-3-07-0070 WAS GENERATED BECAUSE DURING PR F 301860 1 2 CP-3-07-0067 OPERATION: 1) FUEL CELL S/N 110 ARRI 301860 1 3 VED AT OPF WITHOUT TIP-N-TELL INDICATORS INSTALLED 301860 1 4 (OMRSD V45ANO.030 VIOLATION) AND SUBSEQUENT WAIVE 301860 1 5 R WAS NOT APPROVED. 2) INADVERTENT VACUUM WAS PUL 301860 1 6 LED ON FUEL CELL NO 2 S/N 110 COOLANT LOOP WITH CL 301860 1 7 OSED O2/H2 REACTANT VALVES (OMRSD V45AHO.020 VIOLA 301860 1 8 TION). FUEL CELL NO 2 S/N 110 WAS REMOVED AND ROU 301860 1 9 TED TO VENDOR FOR EXAMINATION AND POSSIBLE REPAIR 301860 1 10 PER THIS DOCUMENT. DURING OPERATION OF THIS DOCUM 301860 1 11 MENT PAGE 1B WAS GENERATED BECAUSE FIGURE 1A IN AT 301860 1 12 TACHMENT "E" WAS MODIFIED CONTRARY TO SPI DIRECTIO 301860 1 13 N. TO CORRECT PAGE 1B DISCREPANCY ORIGINAL FIGURE 301860 1 14 1A WAS RETAINED AND NEW FIGURE 1AA WAS ATTACHED T 301860 1 15 O CORRECT THIS DISCREPANCY AND TO DOCUMENT THE CHA 301860 1 16 NGES MADE TO THE SETUP PER STEP 11. FUEL CELL NO 301860 1 17 2 S/N 113 WAS INSTALLED AND SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED 301860 1 18 EXCEPT THAT: (1) IPR 1W-0136 WAS GENERATED BECAUS 301860 1 19 E FUEL CELL END CELL HEATERS DID NOT COME ON DURIN 301860 1 20 G FUEL CELL MINI START, (2) IPR 1W-0134 WAS GENERA 301860 1 21 TED BECAUSE FUEL CELL COOLANT LOOP INDICATED VOLUM 301860 1 22 E LOSS OF 16.77 CU. IN. IN APPROX 4 MONTHS PERIOD. 301860 1 23 (3) PR FCP-3-07-0074 WAS GENERATED BECAUSE MASS 301860 1 24 SPEC ON FUEL CELL END CELL PLATE FAILED THE OMRSD 301860 1 25 LIMIT. (4) STBD PSA WILL BE RE-INSTALLED PER TPS 301860 1 26 VFCP-3-07-014. (5) LEAK CHECK OF FC2 F5 WATER DIS 301860 1 27 CHARGE PORT WILL BE VERIFIED PER TPS VFCP-3-07-014 301860 1 28 (ECLSS WILL PERFORM ACTUAL LEAK CHECK). 301966 1 1 VISUAL & RECORDED INSPECTION OF THIS CONDITION 301966 1 2 INDICATES THAT THE DING IS NOT IN A HIGH STRESS 301966 1 3 AREA NOR IS IT LOCATED ON A FREON TUBE. THE 301966 1 4 DAMAGE IS MINOR AND DOES NOT REQUIRE A REPAIR. THE 301966 1 5 DING DID NOT CUT/TEAR THE TEFLON SHEET. THIS 301966 1 6 CONDITION WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE FIT,FORM, 301966 1 7 OR HEAT TRANSFER CAPABILITY OF THE RADIATOR PNL. 301966 1 8 THIS CONDITION IS O.K. "AS-IS" FOR UNRESTRICTED 301966 1 9 USE. 302011 1 1 HATCH SEAL WAS REPLACED DURING HATCH MODIFICATION REF. MCR #11862. HAT 302011 1 2 CH SEAL LEAK CHECKED PER V1058 ON 3/19/88 AND SHOWED NO LEAKAGE. PR CO 302011 1 3 NDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. 302044 1 1 THE CAUSE OF THE NICKS ARE POOR WORKMANSHIP, PROBA 302044 1 2 BLY AT THE VENDOR. THE SHARP EDGES WERE REMOVED & 302044 1 3 MR'd AS IS. 302127 1 1 THE TORN AREA OF THE LO2 "BAGGIE" PURGE CURTAIN WAS REPAIRED (MR) PER 302127 1 2 THE SAME PROCEDURE AS THE INSTALLATION SPEC. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES 302127 1 3 EXIST WITH THE E.T. BOOK "BAGGIES". NO RETEST REQ'D. CLOSE THIS PR. 302209 1 1 ITEM 1: LH FD #15, THERE IS A SMALL GAP BETWEEN THE TRAILING EDGE SEAL 302209 1 2 AND THE RUB PANEL. THE .010" WIDE BY 1.00" LONG GAP WAS DEFERRED FOR 302209 1 3 1 FLIGHT AS IS. UPON FLIPPER DOOR OPENING IN THE OPF ITEMS 2,3,4 WERE 302209 1 4 PICKED UP. THE ORIGINAL GAP WAS ELIMINATED BY BENDING THE TRAILING EDG 302209 1 5 E SEAL TO AN ACCEPTABLE INSTALLATION. ITEM 2: THE TRAILING EDGE SEAL H 302209 1 6 AS A SMALL TEAR ON THE INBD SIDE. PER MR ON PG 4 THE TEAR WAS GROUND O 302209 1 7 UT, CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR ID'D. ITEM 3: SEAL RETAINER DOES NOT HA 302209 1 8 VE A NUTPLATE ON THE OUTBD HOLE. DWG. V070-198724 E.O. B02 DELETES THE 302209 1 9 NUTPLATE AND REPLACES IT WITH A NUT. NOT A PR CONDITION. ITEM 4: THE 302209 1 10 TRAILING EDGE SEAL HAS A TEAR ON THE AFT INBD SIDE. PER MR ON PG 6 THE 302209 1 11 TEAR WAS GROUND OUT, CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR ID'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: 302209 1 12 ITEM 1: THIS WS SUSPECT PR WRITTEN UP DUE TO A PR ON OV-102. OV-102'S 302209 1 13 GAP WAS DUE TO A WARPED FLIPPER DOOR. OV-103'S GAP WAS DUE TO THE TRA 302209 1 14 ILING EDGE SEAL BEING SLIGHTLY BENT DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 302209 1 15 2,4: TEARS DUE TO ROUGH HANDLING OF PARTS. ITEM 3: NOT A PR CONDITION. 302216 1 1 THE V070-156626-002 CH WAS INSTL'D BY MANUFACTURER 180 DEG FROM DESIGN 302216 1 2 . MR ON PG 4 APPROVES REVERSED CH INSTL & FLANGE TRIM ACCOMPLISHED TO 302216 1 3 CREATE ACCESS LOST BY CH BEING INSTL'D 180 DEG FROM DESIGN. REF PG 2.1 302216 1 4 FOR ENG NOTE ON HOW PROBLEM WAS DETERMINED. 302280 1 1 THE 70B2000-14 BORON/AL STRUT AT Xo 1140 R/H SIDE 302280 1 2 HAS VARIOUS DISCREPANCIES (SCRATCHES & SCUFFS) THA 302280 1 3 T WERE DOC'D ON TWO PRs STR-3-07-1670 & -1767. TH 302280 1 4 E ORIGINAL DISCREPANCY ON PR-1670 WAS DISPO'D ACCE 302280 1 5 PTABLE - AS IS REQ'G ONLY THE APPLICATION OF PAINT 302280 1 6 . DISCREPANCY #2 ON PR STR-3-07-1670 PG. 1A IS A 302280 1 7 DUPLICATE OF DISCREPANCY #1 ON PR STR-3-07-1767. 302280 1 8 SINCE THE STRUT HAD NUMEROUS DISCREPANCIES DOC'D O 302280 1 9 N BOTH PRs THE OVERALL CONDITION OF THE STRUT COUL 302280 1 10 D NOT BE DETERMINED. ENG DETERMINED THAT A PROOFL 302280 1 11 OAD TEST OF THE STRUT WAS REQ'D IN ORDER TO CERTIF 302280 1 12 Y THE STRUT ACCEPTABLE FOR FLT. *PR STR-3-07-1767 302280 1 13 WAS DISPO'D TO RTN THE 70B2000-14 STRUT TO ROCKWE 302280 1 14 LL DOWNEY FOR PROOFLOAD TEST AFTE WHICH THE STRUT 302280 1 15 S/B RTN'D TO KSC W/ ALL DISCREPANCIES RESOLVED. 302683 1 1 AS DESCRIBED IN THE MR RATIONALE THE CENTERLINE SH 302683 1 2 EAR ROLLER LOC'D AT Xo 592.415 IS MR OK AS IS FOR 302683 1 3 UNRESTRICTED USE. 302863 01 1 CANCELLED - THIS PR IS A DUPLICATE OF PR TES-3- 302863 01 2 0036. 302880 1 1 COUNTER BORE VOIDS FILLED BY BONDING IN WASHERS, PER MR DISPO. DOOR RE 302880 1 2 CEIVED FROM VENDOR WITH COUNTER BORES. NOT PERPRINT. 302886 1 1 LOOSE NUTS ON THE BRACKET/V070-192143-001 SUPPORT WERE RETORQUED TO PR 302886 1 2 OPER SPECIFICATION. INSTALLATION WAS RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. 302886 1 3 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: IMPROPER INITIAL TORQUE DU 302886 1 4 RING INSTALLATION. 303085 1 1 THE SEALS WERE REMOVED & RPLCD RTN'G THE INSTL'N TO PRINT CONFIG. THE 303085 1 2 CAUSE OF THE SEAL DAMAGE IS DUE TO THE SEALS POSITIONING & I/F W/ THE 303085 1 3 FLIPPER DOOR SEALS, PREVENT THE SEALS TO OPERATE PROPERLY. RC ACTION 303085 1 4 HAS REQUESTED THE REDESIGN THE WING TAILING EDGE SEAL INSTL'N. A CHA 303085 1 5 NGE REQUEST HAS BEEN SUBMITTED BECAUSE THIS PROBLEM EXISTS ON OTHER OR 303085 1 6 Bs. THE CHANGE REQUEST NO. IS S41169. THE SEAL INSTL'N IS ACCEPTABLE 303085 1 7 FOR FLT. 303087 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SPAR INSULATOR WAS REPAIRED AT ROCK 303087 1 2 WELL SERVICE CENTER AND IS OK FOR FLIGHT. 303239 1 1 BY REPAIRING CHIPPED RCC TEE, PART IS RETURNED TO 303239 1 2 INTENDED THERMAL INTEGRITY. NO MR I.D. REQUIRED-VE 303239 1 3 NDOR REPAIR. 303631 1 1 PR ITEM #1 WAS WRITTEN AGAINST THE AFT CENTER DOOR-TO-OML GAP MEASUREM 303631 1 2 ENT (ON THE RH ET FERRY DOOR) BEING OUT OF SPEC. THE FWD & AFT DOOR ST 303631 1 3 EP GAP SHOULD BE 0.00" +/-0.12". AFTER FINAL RIGGING OF THE FERRY DOOR 303631 1 4 S, THE DOORS, THE DOOR STEP GAP WAS MEASURED TO BE 0.14" (0.02" OUT OF 303631 1 5 SPEC). AFTER 3ITERATIONS O THE RIGGING PROCEDURE, THERE WERE NO MORE 303631 1 6 SHIMS UNDERNEATH THE AFT LATCH ROLLER PEDESTAL (SECTION E-E) WHILE GAP 303631 1 7 S OF 0.010" & 0.025" STILL EXISTED AT STOP BOLT LOCATIONS C-C AND E-E 303631 1 8 (REF. DWG M072-355000) THEREFORE, THE DOOR COULD NOT BE BROUGHT IN ANY 303631 1 9 FURTHER TO BRING THE DOOR STEP GAP WITHIN 0.00" +/-0.12". AN MR RATIO 303631 1 10 NALE WAS WRITTEN AND APPROVED TO ACCEPT THIS GAP CONDITION FOR A ONE 303631 1 11 TIME FERRY FLIGHT TO KSC (REF. PAGE 2). IN ADDITION, E.O. A07 OF DWG M 303631 1 12 072-355001 (SEE REF. PAGE) WAS RELEASED CHANGING THE FWD (SECTION B-B) 303631 1 13 AND AFT (SECTION A-A) DOOR-TO-OML GAP MEASUREMENT FROM 0.00" +/-0.12" 303631 1 14 TO 0.00"+0.20 OUTBOARD/-0.15" INBOARD(FROM THE ORBITER MOLD LINE). AN 303631 1 15 E.O. WAS REQUESTED TO PREVENT SIMILAR PROBLEMS--(MR CONDITIONS) IN TH 303631 1 16 E FUTURE WHILE RIGGING THE ET FERRY DOORS. THE PR CONDITION NO LONGER 303631 1 17 EXISTS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE AFT DOOR STEP GAP NOT BEING WITHIN S 303631 1 18 PEC IS DUE TO THE INCONSISTENCIES OF THE GSE EQUIPMENT WHILE PERFORMIN 303631 1 19 G RIGGING PROCEDURES. CLOSE THIS PR. 303635 1 1 THE V070-731874-037 LUMINOUS CEILING PANEL HAD ONE CRACK AT THE FORWAR 303635 1 2 D OUTBOARD CORNER OF THE 2 3/8" X 2 1/2" OPENING. THE PANEL WAS REPAI 303635 1 3 RED USING MIX OF ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE AND METHYULENE CHLORIDE. THIS MR 303635 1 4 REPAIR WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE PANEL. THIS PA 303635 1 5 NEL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AN 303635 1 6 D FAULTY WORKMANSHIP. 303653 1 1 BRACKET TAB V070-194118-003 IS DEBONDED FROM STRUC 303653 1 2 TURE. PR STR-3-07-1688 WILL REINSTALL BRACKET AND 303653 1 3 RETURN IT TO B/P REQUIREMENTS. REF_RPT_NO TEXT_ SEQ_NO DISPOSITION ---------- ----- ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 303852 1 1 TPS TCS-3-07-061 WILL ELIMINATE PROBLEM REF STEP 1 303852 1 2 . CLOSE THIS PR. 303919 1 1 THE LOOSE NUT PLATE WAS SUCCESSFULLY REMOVED FROM THE R/H AIR DATA PRO 303919 1 2 BE AND ALL HARDWARE WAS ACCOUNTED FOR. A NEW NUT PLATE WAS INSTALLED U 303919 1 3 SING ME121-0014-0302 BLIND RIVETS AND USE OF THESE RIVETS WAS MR'D ACC 303919 1 4 EPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE ACCESS PLATE WAS REINSTALLED USING M 303919 1 5 D112-3003-0205 SCREWS SINCE THE SPECIFIED HARDWARE WAS NOT AVAILABLE F 303919 1 6 OR INSTALLATION. THIS SUBSTITUTION WAS MR'D AS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRI 303919 1 7 CTED USE. THE R/H AIR DATA PROBE AFT FAIRING WAS REINSTALLED PER V1115 303919 1 8 . THE R/H ADP SINGLE AND DUAL MOTOR FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY WAS SUCCESSF 303919 1 9 ULLY RETESTED BY THIS WAD. SPA PRINT AND DATA REVIEW HAS VERIFIED THE 303919 1 10 RETEST TO BE COMPLETE WITHOUT ERROR (REF ATTACHED SPA PRINT AND OMRSAD 303919 1 11 ). NO FURTHER WORK OR RETEST IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. 304101 1 1 ABOVE WORK IS COMPLETED - SYSTEM IS RETURNED TO 304101 1 2 PRINT. 304186 1 1 LOWER STUD PLATE ON WINDOW NUMBER 3 INBD SIDE HAS 304186 1 2 BEEN REMOVED AND REPLACED BY STR-3-07-1266. THE 304186 1 3 FOLLOWING DISPOSITION WILL REMOVE AND REPLACE OVER 304186 1 4 TORQUED V070-333743-001 STUD PLATES AND MD114-1001 304186 1 5 0004 NUTS AT REMAINING LOCATIONS ON WINDOWS NUMBER 304186 1 6 2, 3, AND 4. 304472 1 1 THE DINGS IN THE FLIPER DOOR RUB PANEL, V070-198801-051, IDENTIFIED IN 304472 1 2 ITEM1 AND ITEM 2 PAGE 1, WERE RESOLVED BY COATING THE EXPOSED INCONEL 304472 1 3 WITH MB0125-063 HIGH TEMPERATURE COATING AND MR ACCEPTING THE TWO DIN 304472 1 4 GS IS WORKMANSHIP. CONCLUDE THAT THE RUB PANEL IS ACCEPTABLE AS REPAIR 304472 1 5 ED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 304607 1 1 NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS, HOLE WAS DRILLED FROM UNDER 304607 1 2 NEATH BODY FLAP, PER PRINT. 304674 1 1 DURING INSPECTION, DAMAGED INSULATION WAS FOUND AT THE ELBOW PORTION O 304674 1 2 F THE V070-454866-127 LINE. DAMAGE TO THE INSULATION WAS MINIMAL AND N 304674 1 3 O DAMAGE TO THE LINE OCCURRED. LT-80 TAPE WAS WRAPPED AROUND THE AREA 304674 1 4 OF DAMAGED INSULATION FOR ADDED PROTECTION AND MR IDENTIFIED. PROBABLE 304674 1 5 CAUSE: A FLOOR PLATFORM IN THE AREA HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO CORRECT FOR 304674 1 6 INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE LINE AND A LEG ON THE PLATFORM. 304870 1 1 A SMALL INDENTATION WAS FOUND ON THE DIAGONAL THRUST STRUT (V070-35141 304870 1 2 5-001) ABOVE #2 MAINE ENGINE. DATA WAS RECORDED AND EVALUATED. SINCE N 304870 1 3 O FIBER DAMAGE WAS FOUND, THE INDENTATION WAS DETERMINED TO BE A MANUF 304870 1 4 ACTURING DEFECT. A REQUEST FOR "UNRESTRICTED USE" WAS PRESENTED TO THE 304870 1 5 PMRB. PERMISSION HAS BEEN GRANTED FOR "UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS". THE D 304870 1 6 EFECT HAS BEEN "MR" IDENTIFIED AND NO FURTHER ACTION WILL BE REQUIRED. 304881 1 1 THE RESISTANCE READING WAS CHANGED TO 40 MILLIOHMS 304881 1 2 , PER EO A14 DWG V070-565250. THE READING OBTAINE 304881 1 3 D PER STEP 9 OF JOB CARD V30-15410 IS NOW ACCEPTAB 304881 1 4 LE. 304896 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES LISTED ON PAGES 1 THROUGH 1C HAV 304896 1 2 E BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS OR RESOLVED BY THE FOLLOWING 304896 1 3 MR DISPOSITIONS. DEFECTS 5,10,14 AND 17 WERE AREA 304896 1 4 S THAT WERE POTTED FLUSH WITH RTV. DEFECTS 9,18, A 304896 1 5 ND 19 WERE DEBONDED HEAT SINK THAT WAS REBONDED. D 304896 1 6 EFECT 12 WAS AN OVERLAP OF HEAT SINK THAT WAS TRIM 304896 1 7 MED OUT AND A NEW PIECE OF HEAT SINK WAS REBONDED 304896 1 8 AT THE AREA. DEFECTS 1 AND 20 WERE ACCEPTED AS IS. 304896 1 9 DEFECTS 2,3,4,6,7,8,11,13,15 AND 16 WERE OFF CENT 304896 1 10 ER HEAT SINK WHICH IS NOT A PR DISCREPANCY. DEFECT 304896 1 11 21 WAS ACCEPTED AS IS AFTER RE-INSPECTION OF THE A 304896 1 12 REA. DESIGN INTENT OF THE RTV-HEAT SINK INSTALLATI 304896 1 13 ON HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. 304935 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REMOVE THE FACESHEET IN THE AREA 304935 1 2 OF THE DENT, POT THE HONEYCOMB CORE WITH MB0120-008 ADHESIVE, AND BOND A 304935 1 3 DOUBLER OVER THE TOP. THIS WAS PERFROMED AS AN UNRESTRICTED MR ACTION. 304935 1 4 ANOTHER MR WAS REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE POTTING ADHESIVE AFTER IT WAS DETE 304935 1 5 RMINED THAT THE NECESSARY MIX DOCUMENTATION WAS NOT RECORDED. THE ELEVON 304935 1 6 IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS MISHANDLING OF 304935 1 7 GSE EQUIPMENT. 304935 1 8 305019 1 1 THE BENT V070-796053 BRACKET SUPPORT WAS MR'D ACCEPTABLE AS IS FOR UNR 305019 1 2 ESTRICTED USE. THE PART WAS MR ID'D AND THE PAINT DAMAGE WAS REPAIRED. 305019 1 3 NO RETEST OR FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. CLOSE THIS PR. 305180 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DETECTED THAT CONNECTOR 50P644 HAD A BROKEN T 305180 1 2 ANG ON THE BACKSHELL. SRP V-EL-0001-A-0 WAS USED TO REPAIR BACKSHELL WIT 305180 1 3 H A SPLIT TYPE. REPAIR RETURNS CONNECTOR TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON-DESIGN 305180 1 4 CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY 305180 1 5 , PERFORMANCE OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. PROBABLE CAUSE NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR 305180 1 6 . 305180 1 7 305199 1 1 THE V070-198371-001 SEAL LOCATED ON THE RIGHT HAND INBOARD ELEVON WAS 305199 1 2 NOT BONDED PER PRINT. DISPO. WAS WRITTEN TO REMOVE AND REBOND THE SEAL 305199 1 3 PER PRINT. UPON REMOVAL OF SEAL, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A CORNER OF T 305199 1 4 EFLON WAS NOT BONDED TO THE SILICONE. THIS IS DOCUMENTED ON PAGE 1A, A 305199 1 5 ND MR DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO BOND THE TEFLON TO THE SILICONE. THE SEAL C 305199 1 6 OULD NOT BE MR ID'D BECAUSE THE INK DID NOT ADHERE TO TEFLON (DOCUMENT 305199 1 7 ED ON PAGE 1B). STRUCTURE ADJACENT TO THE SEAL WAS MR ID'D. SEAL HAS S 305199 1 8 UCESSFULLY BEEN BONDED IN PLACE AND RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIG. SECONDAR 305199 1 9 Y STR. 305349 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2 DESCRIBE CORROSION ON A SECONDARY SEAL RETAINER AND ITS NU 305349 1 2 TPLATES AND RIVETS. THE LOCATIN OF THIS RETAINER IS ON THE RH ONBD ELEVO 305349 1 3 N COVER (RH PER MR). THE NUTPLATES AND RIVETS WERE R&R'D. THE SURFACE AN 305349 1 4 D THE HOLES IN THE RETAINER WERE STRIPPED, ACID ETCHED, INSPECTED, AND C 305349 1 5 ORROSION PROTECTED. THE REMAINING PITS IN THE METAL FROM THE CORROSION W 305349 1 6 RE MR ACCEPTED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE CORROSION WAS OPERATIONAL DEGR 305349 1 7 ADATION IN THE ELEVON COVE. 305349 1 8 305453 1 1 THE V070-199839-005 INCONEL INSULATOR LOCATED ON L/H R/S #9 RCC TEE HA 305453 1 2 S A SMALL CRACK IN THE FOIL. THE INSULATOR WAS REMOVED FROM THE TEE AN 305453 1 3 D SENT TO RSC FOR REPAIR. THE REPAIR HAS RETURNED THE INSULATOR TO PRI 305453 1 4 NT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: MATERIAL DEGRADATION. 305503 1 1 CARRIER PANEL WAS VERIFIED AS BEING PROPERLY INSTALLED, PER JOB CARD, 305503 1 2 USINGNEW FASTENER HARDWARE. DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. CAUSE: ORIG 305503 1 3 INAL FASTENER HARDWARE WAS DAMAGED. CLOSE THIS PR. 305760 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REPLACE (2) DAMAGED MS20995N32 305760 1 2 LOCKWIRES (ONE ON THE UPPER OUTBOARD RCC ATTACH POINT AND ONE ON THE U 305760 1 3 PPER INBOARD RCC ATTACH POINT OF PANEL #13. THE DISCREPANCY DOCUMENTED 305760 1 4 IN ITEM 1.0 PAGE 1.0 HAS BEEN RESOLVED. DISCREPANCY DOCUMENTED IN ITE 305760 1 5 M 2.0 PAGE 1A HAS BEEN RESOLVED. THE LOCKWIRE IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE 305760 1 6 . PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGREDATION. 305778 1 1 ITEM #1 SCREW, 10-32 IS USED FOR GROUNDING SAFING PLUG IS A PYRO INST 305778 1 2 L. FOR GROUND PYRO OPERATIONS. SCREW WAS REMOVED BY PYRO AFTER GROUND 305778 1 3 WAS NO LONGER REQUIRED AND NUT PLATE WHICH WAS DAMGED BY PYRO SCREW WA 305778 1 4 S REMOVED AND REPLACED IN STEPS 3.0 & 4.0. PROBABLE CAUSE OPERATIONAL 305778 1 5 DEGRADATION. ITEM 2 WAS RESOLVED BY CHANGING PR GROUNDING CLIP TO PART 305778 1 6 #. CLOSE THIS PR. 305957 1 1 THE ABOVE REWORK WILL RESTORE THE STRUCTURE TO THE 305957 1 2 DRAWING. THE TWO HOLES NOTED ON PO#1 ARE TO BE COR 305957 1 3 RECTED BY PR-STR-3-07-0035 EO TO FOLLOW. NO FUR- 305957 1 4 THER ACTION REQUIRED. 306144 1 1 REF. PAGE 1 FILLERBAR BRACKETS NOTED DID NOT CONFORM TO B/P REQUIRMENT 306144 1 2 S. BRACKETS WERE REWORKED. BRACKET WAS REWORKED. (SHIMMED PROPERLY) TH 306144 1 3 EN REINSTALLED PER DRAWING/MR TOLERENCE OF -.010 TO +.050. INSTALALTIO 306144 1 4 N REQUIREMENTS. RE. PAGE 1A, SCREW HEAD GALLED IN NUT. SCREW AND NUT R 306144 1 5 EMOVED. NEW SCREW AND NUT OBTAINED AND REINSTALLED PER DRAWING REQUIRE 306144 1 6 MENTS. REF. PAGE 1B, FILLERBAR BRACKET WAS MISALIGNED. EXISTING FILLER 306144 1 7 BAR WAS SCRAPPED. A NEW FILLERBAR BRACKET WAS OBTAINED, REWORKED AND T 306144 1 8 HEN REINSTALLED PER MR DISPOSITION AND DRAWING. REF. PAGE 1C, ADHESIVE 306144 1 9 FILL IN BRACKET WAS DISLODGED DURING THE DRILLING OF DOUBLER. HOLE WA 306144 1 10 S REFILLED WITH ADHESIVE PER MR DISPO. REF. PAGE 1D, WATER BREAK WAS 306144 1 11 NOT VERIFIED BY NASA QC. NASA QC STAMP/VERIFICATION IS NOT REQUIREED F 306144 1 12 OR A WATER FREE SURFACE ON VEHICLE WORK. NOTE: THE CALCULATIONS TAKEN 306144 1 13 CLARIFICATION OF +/- SIGNS. - SIGN INDICATES THAT THE C/P IN QUESTION 306144 1 14 IS CLOSER SURFACE ON VEHICLE WORK. 306175 1 1 S/L - ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED A 3/4" LONG CUT IN THE BULB 306175 1 2 SEAL. MR ACTION ALLOWED CORRECTING THE DISCREPANCY BY APPLYING ADHESI 306175 1 3 VE TO SPLIT AREA AND GLUING SPLIT TOGETHER. DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXIS 306175 1 4 TS. 306250 1 1 THE V070-856146-003 STIFFENER WAS TAKEN TO AN V070 306250 1 2 -856146-007 STIFFENER BY COMPLETING ALL AVAILABLE 306250 1 3 TRIMS ON STR-3-07-265 WITH MR ACCEPTANCE OF THE FI 306250 1 4 NAL CONFIGURATION ON THIS PR. MISSING DIMENSTIONS 306250 1 5 HAVE BEEN AMEDED BY E.O TO FOLLOW GENERATING E.O C 306250 1 6 03 TO DWG V070-856146. P61A WAS ADDRESSED BY FURTH 306250 1 7 ER MR TRIMMING OF STIFFENER END. BOTH MR'S ARE FOR 306250 1 8 UNRESTRICTED USE OF STIFFENER. MR'S COMPLETE DESI 306250 1 9 GN INTENT WITH NO COMPROMISE TO STRUCTURAL INTEGRI 306250 1 10 TY OF THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. 306252 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIMS WERE REPLACED & WILL BE PEELE 306252 1 2 D TO PROPER FIT PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARI 306252 1 3 NG MARKS ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER MR ACTION. THE CARRI 306252 1 4 ER PNL IS OK FOR FLT. R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE P 306252 1 5 OSSIBLE CHANGE OF ATTACHING H/W TO PREVENT FURTHER 306252 1 6 DAMAGE. CARR #5121-87-103-C1. CLOSE PR. 306434 1 1 (3) DELAMINATIONS WERE RECORDED AT PLBD #5 (-Xo1301.50) BOTH INBD AND 306434 1 2 OUTBD STRONGBACK ATTACH POINTS. THESE DELAMINATIONS WERE FOUND TO BE M 306434 1 3 INOR IN NATURE AND MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CA 306434 1 4 USE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 306557 1 1 THE TIRE IN QUESTION HAS EXCESSIVE FLTS. THIS PR MR'D THE TIRE FOR ROL 306557 1 2 LAROUND USE ONLY AND MARKED THE TIRE AS SUCH ALONG WITH A MR ID. A PR 306557 1 3 CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. CLOSE PR. 306700 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE WHEEL ASSEMBLY HEA 306700 1 2 T SHIELD AND THE BRAKE WAS OBSERVED DURNG INSTALLATION OF THE LEFT HAN 306700 1 3 D INBOARD WHEEL ASSEMBLY (MWA-032/019). THE WHEEL ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED 306700 1 4 FROM THE VEHICLE. THE HEAT SHIELD AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE WAS REMOVED 306700 1 5 FROM THE WHEEL. EO-TO-FOLLOW DISPOSITION (AUTHORIZED BY PR MEQ-3-10-0 306700 1 6 446) WAS PERFORMED TO REMOVED THE SPACERS ADJACENT TO THE TPMS HARNESS 306700 1 7 , REROUTE THE HARNESS, AND SECURE THE HARNESS WITH TAPE AND A "BANDAID 306700 1 8 " TYPE BOND. A PAGE 1A WAS INITIATED WHEN DIFFICULTY WAS ENCOUNTERED W 306700 1 9 HILE INSTALLING HEAT SHIELD TORQUE BARS. RESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION WAS 306700 1 10 INITIATED TO LIGHTLY SAND THE PAINT AND KOROPON OFF THE RIBS (TORQUE 306700 1 11 BAR KEYWAYS) TO FACILITATE TORQUE BAR INSTALLATION. THE MR DISPOSITION 306700 1 12 WAS SUBSEQUENTLY VOIDED WHEN RI LSS DETERMINED THAT SEATING THE TORQU 306700 1 13 E BARS ONTO THE RIBS USING A RUBBER MALLET WAS THE INSTALLATION METHOD 306700 1 14 PREFERRED BY B.F.GOODRICH. THE TORQUE BARS AND HEAT SHIELD ASSEMBLY W 306700 1 15 ERE REINSTALLED ON THE WHEEL. THE WHEEL ASSEMBLY WAS REINSTALLED ON TH 306700 1 16 E VEHICLE AND NO BINDING WAS OBSERVED DURNG WHEEL ROTATION. THE PROBAB 306700 1 17 LE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE WHEEL HEAT SHIELD AND 306700 1 18 BRAKE ASSEMBLY. THIS INTERFERENCE WAS CAUSED BY A DESIGN FLAW IN THE R 306700 1 19 OUTING OF THE TPMS HARNESS AROUND THE HEAT SHIELD. 306715 1 1 DOUBLERS TRIMMED. 306777 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SHIM(S) WERE REPLACED AND WILL BE PEELED TO PROPER FIT 306777 1 2 PER STR-3-07-213. THE THREAD BEARING MARKS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" PER M 306777 1 3 R ACTION. THE SHIM (S) WERE CENTERED OVER THE BOLT HOLES PER MR ACTION 306777 1 4 TO RESOLVE THE MISALIGNMENT (EDGE DISTANCE) PROBLEM. VOIDED/DEBONED S 306777 1 5 HIM(S) WERE REBONEDED IN PLACE. R.C. ACTION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CH 306777 1 6 ANGE OF ATTACHING HARDWARE TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE. (CARR #5121-87-1 306777 1 7 03-C1). 306901 1 1 VR70-341168-001 SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED ON FWD SIDE OF LH LONGER 306901 1 2 ON XO966.35. THE AREA WAS FLOWN ONE FLIGHT WITH 1 OF 2 SEALS. THE SEAL 306901 1 3 WAS THEN REBONDED BUT DID NOT STICK DUE TO TEFLON MATERIAL OF SEALS B 306901 1 4 EING PAST 6 MONTHS EFFECTIVITY ON ETCH FOR TFE (TEFLON). THE 2 CLOSEOU 306901 1 5 TS WERE SEWED TO RTV COATED FABRIC BY MR WHICH WAS THEN BONDED TO LONG 306901 1 6 ERON. PROBABLE CAUSE IS EXPIRATION OF ETCH FOR TFE (TEFLON) OF CLOSEOU 306901 1 7 TS. 307099 1 1 THE EVA HATCH INSULATION SUPPORT RING WAS DISCOVER 307099 1 2 ED TO BE BROKEN IN TWO PLACES. THE RING WAS REMOVE 307099 1 3 D FROM THE VEHICLE. THE CRACKS WERE STOP-DRILLED A 307099 1 4 ND LOOSE FIBERS WERE REMOVED AS THE SURFACE WAS PR 307099 1 5 EPARED. FIBERGLASS PATCHES WERE BONDED TO THE RING 307099 1 6 USING EPOXY RESIN AND THE REPAIR WAS CURED TO A M 307099 1 7 INIMUM SHOR D OF 80. THE REPAIR AND ADJACENT AREAS 307099 1 8 WERE TOUCHED UP AND THE RING INSTALLED BACK IN TH 307099 1 9 E SPACECRAFT. NO MR ID REQ'D. THIS PART WAS MR'D F 307099 1 10 OR UNRESTRICTED USE. CLOSE THIS PR. 307134 1 1 NO DAMAGE TO STR. 307167 1 1 RUST LIKE SUBSTANCE IS ON SURFACES OF SHIMS AND ON 307167 1 2 SPAR INSULATOR/STIFFNER, (INCONEL) IT IS UNLIKELY 307167 1 3 THAT THIS SUBSTANCE IS A RESULT OF PARENT MATERI- 307167 1 4 AL (INCONEL) CORRODING. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE IS 307167 1 5 THAT A STEEL BRUSH WAS USED, TO SMOOTH SPOT WELDED 307167 1 6 AREAS ON STIFFNER PLATES, OR TO CLEAN UP AREAS OF 307167 1 7 STEE OUTSIDE SURFACE OF STIFFNER/SHIMS/INSULATOR. 307167 1 8 A STAINLESS STEEL BRUSH, ELIMINATING ANY EITHER 307167 1 9 PROBLEM. NO STRUCTURAL OR THERMAL INTEGRITY IS 307167 1 10 COMPROMISED. THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED & 307167 1 11 DISPO'D BEFORE (REF. STR-3-07-1186) 307442 1 1 THE LEFT HAND RADIATOR PANEL #1 IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. TH 307442 1 2 E STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY HAS BEEN MAINTAINED THE MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAIN 307442 1 3 S POSITIVE THE RADIATOR PANELS ARE PRIMARY STRUCTURE. CLOSE THIS PR 307627 1 1 PAGE 1 ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY DESCRIBED (4) MOUNTING BOLTS THAT ARE USED T 307627 1 2 HE V070-321418-013 BRACKET, WERE RECESSED IN NUT PLATES. THE DRAWING C 307627 1 3 ALLED OUT THE USE OF (4) MD111-4024-0521 BOLTS. AFTER GRIP LENGTH MEAS 307627 1 4 UREMENTS WERE TAKEN AND CALCULATED FROM DRAWINGS, THE DISCREPANCY WAS 307627 1 5 RESOLVED BY USING (4) MD111-4024-0523 BOLTS PER E.O.T.F. DISCREPANCY N 307627 1 6 O LONGER EXISTS. 307743 1 1 THERE WERE TO BE TWO HOLES DRILLED APPROXIMATELY A 307743 1 2 T X COORDINATES 863, Y COORDINATES -105, Z COORDIN 307743 1 3 ATES 378.33. ON HOLE WAS PARTIALLY DRILLED AND THE 307743 1 4 OTHER DIDN'T EXIST AT ALL TO FACILITATE THE INSTA 307743 1 5 LLATION OF THE V070-754122-001 BRACKET. STEP 3.0 O 307743 1 6 F MOD 014 OF TPS VSTR-3-07-193 DRILLS THESE HOLES 307743 1 7 AND ELIMINATES THE NOTED DISCREPANCY IN ITEM #1. 307880 1 1 DISCRAPANCY HAS BEEN ADDRESSED PER EO TO FOLLOW. 307891 1 1 SCRATCH ON STRUT WAS CORROSION PROTECTED W/ KOROPO 307891 1 2 N. SCRATCH HAS NO EFFECT ON STRUTS STRUCTURAL INT 307891 1 3 EGRITY. MR APPROVAL PER PG. 4 FOR UNRESTRICTED US 307891 1 4 E. 307917 1 1 TWO SMALL VOIDS WERE FOUND IN THE FACE SHEET OF THE DOME ASSY. THE TWO 307917 1 2 VOIDS WERE FILLED WITH STRUCTURAL ADHESIVE, BY "MR" ACTION. THIS REWO 307917 1 3 RK RETURNED THE FACE SHEET TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. NO FURTHER DISC 307917 1 4 REPANCIES WERE ENCOUNTED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. THE CAUSE OF 307917 1 5 THE TWO VOIDS IS UNKNOWN. 307926 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN ON A BURNT LOWER INSULATOR FOR TEE #17 (R/S #18) L 307926 1 2 /H ON OV-103 PREVIOUS FLOW. THE INSULATOR WAS MR'D OK FOR ONE (1) FLIG 307926 1 3 HT. UPON RETURN FROM FLIGHT SIX (6) THE INSULATOR WAS SENT TO HI-TEMP 307926 1 4 (VENDOR) FOR REPAIRS. A NEW PLATE WAS ORDERED TO REPLACE THE MISSING P 307926 1 5 LATE. THE INSULATOR WAS INSTALLED AND ADJUSTED AS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A 307926 1 6 GAP VALUE WITHIN DRAWING TOLERANCE. THE INSULATOR AND TEE ARE INSTALL 307926 1 7 ED FOR FLIGHT. 307933 1 1 THE INSULATOR PLUG WILL BE INSTATTED USING THE SUGGESTED LARGER SPACER 307933 1 2 THE LARGER BOLT WAS NOT REQUIRED. MR ACTION ACCEPTED THE LARGER SPACER 307933 1 3 AND THE ENLARGED INSULATOR REQUIRING THE LARGER SPACER. NO FURTHER DIS 307933 1 4 CREPANCY EXISTS. 307942 1 1 THE (8) VERT TAIL TO FUSELAGE BOLTS AT Xo 1417, 14 307942 1 2 23, 1429, 1435, Zo 515, Yo +/- 14 HAVE ALL BEEN VE 307942 1 3 RIFIED AS HAVING PROPER TORQUE (REF. V30-15428 STE 307942 1 4 P 5.0). SIX OF THESE BOLT ASSYs HAVE BEEN NOTED O 307942 1 5 N PG. 1 AS HAVING TURNED W/ 10 - 300 IN-LBS FORCE 307942 1 6 APPLIED. THE STRUCTURAL INSP JC DID NOT STATE THA 307942 1 7 T THESE (8) BOLTS, ARE SHOULDER BOLTS, & ARE INTEN 307942 1 8 DED TO SHANK OUT WHILE TORQUED. THESE BOLTS ARE D 307942 1 9 ESIGNED FOR SHEAR LOADS, & ARE NOT REQ'D TO BE TOR 307942 1 10 QUED AGAINST THE STR AT THESE LOCs. A .002 - .000 307942 1 11 /+.010 GAP BETWEEN THE SHIMS & THE ATTACH FITTING 307942 1 12 IS REQ'D PER PRINT (REF. V070-200003 ZN 21G, VIEW 307942 1 13 C). THIS WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE BOLT ASSYs BEING A 307942 1 14 BLE TO TURN. THE JC WILL BE CHANGED TO INCORPORAT 307942 1 15 E THIS CONFIG. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. THIS PR CA 307942 1 16 N BE CLOSED. 307964 1 1 PART RETURNED TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND INSTALLED 307964 1 2 PER PR STR-3-05-0762 STEP 162 EXCEPT FOR MR 307964 1 3 ACTION (SEE RATIONAL DOCUMENTED WERE APPLICABLE) 307964 1 4 ALL ACTION TAKE VERIFIED BY QC & APPROVED BY 307964 1 5 ENGINEERING AS REQUIRED. 308148 1 1 2 GUGES AND AREA WITH RAISED METAL WERE FOUND AT DOME HEAT SHIELD #3. 308148 1 2 GOUGES ARE AT EDGE OF HEAT SHIELD SEGMENT AT LOWER SPLICE. GOUGES WERE 308148 1 3 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND T 308148 1 4 EAR DURING PROCESSING. 308223 1 1 1 HOLE IN V07-332711-001 LH LATCH FITTING AND 2 HOLES IN V070-332716-0 308223 1 2 01 SUPPORT FITTING HAVE PILOT HOLE CENTERED ON EDGE OF HOLE CAUSING 2 308223 1 3 OVERSIZED HOLES. HOLES WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE 308223 1 4 CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 308294 1 1 CRACK IN THE MID DECK FIBER-GLASS CLOSE-OUT PANEL 308294 1 2 V070-337427-004 WAS SUPERFICIAL AND PROBABLY CAUSE 308294 1 3 D BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THE PNL WAS PATCHED EPO 308294 1 4 XY OVER THE DAMAGED AREA FOLLOWED BY SMOOTHING REP 308294 1 5 AIR & PAINTING TO MATCH. PANEL IS SECONDARY STRUCT 308294 1 6 URE. CLOSE PR. 308406 1 1 DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION DID NOT SHOW ANY CRACK. 308406 1 2 CONCLUSION: NO PROBLEM EXISTS. 308573 1 1 REF PROBLEM ITEMS 1 & 2: THE MR PATCHES WERE SAND 308573 1 2 ED DOWN TO .016" AT THE AREAS OF INTERFERENCE. TH 308573 1 3 E STIFFENERS WERE INSTALLED WITH A COMBINATION OF 308573 1 4 CRES LAMINATED SHIM STOCK AND LIQUID SHIM. REF: 308573 1 5 PROBLEM ITEM 3: THE VOIDS WERE FILLED WITH LIQUID 308573 1 6 SHIM. THIS WAS A WORKMANSHIP PROBLEM IN THE APPL 308573 1 7 ICATION OF THE MR PATCHES. 308582 1 1 ITEM 1, PG 1: V070-332750-001 & -002 STUD MOUNTINGS WERE FOUND TO BE DES 308582 1 2 IGNED TOO TALL FOR INSTALLATION ON V070-334019-001 FLOOR PANEL. THEY WER 308582 1 3 E TRIMMED AND HOLES RELOCATED BY EO-TO-FOLLOW TO ALLOW FOR PROPER INSTAL 308582 1 4 LATION. PROBABLE CAUSE IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. ITEM 2, PG 1A: EO'S RELEASE 308582 1 5 D FOR STEP 9.0 EOTF CHANGED DASH NUMBERS FOR V070-332750 STUD MOUNTINGS 308582 1 6 AND V070-332754 RETAINERS WHICH ARE PART OF V070-332750 ASSY. WHICH RESU 308582 1 7 LTED IN INCORRECT IDENTIFICATION OF PARTS. THIS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRE 308582 1 8 STRICTED USE AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 308655 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE OUTER/STARTER TH 308655 1 2 HREAD ON THE LH NLG AXLE HAD ITS CREST BROKEN OFF. THREE DISCREPANT AR 308655 1 3 EAS WERE FOUND ON THE OUTER THREAD WITH THE LARGEST BROKEN CREST AREA 308655 1 4 HAVING THE FOLLOWING DIMENSIONS: 0.1215" LENGTH, 0.0038" WIDTH, 0.0042 308655 1 5 DEPTH. THE THREE NOTED AREAS WERE ALL BUNCHED TOGETHER WITHIN AN ARC 308655 1 6 OF 1.0 INCH. ONE OTHER SMALL NICK WAS FOUND ON THE FIFTH THREAD INWARD 308655 1 7 AND HAD THE FOLLOWING DIMENSIONS: 0.1704" LENGTH, 0.018" WIDTH, 0.017 308655 1 8 6" DEPTH. THE 1170656-3 AXLE NUT WAS INSTALLED ONTO THE AXLE AND TIGHT 308655 1 9 ENEDBY HAND AND NO BINDING OVER THE DISCREPANT THREADS WAS NOTED. IN 308655 1 10 ADDITION, A "GO" THREAD CALIBRATION GAUGE WAS INSTALLED ONTO THE AXLE 308655 1 11 BY HAND AND NO EVIDENCE OF BINDING EXISTED. THIS PROCESS WAS REPEATED 308655 1 12 NUMEROUS TIMES AND VERIFIED THAT ALL THE TRHEADS WERE INTACT. MRB APPR 308655 1 13 OVAL WAS OBTAINED TO ACCEPT THE AXLE THREAD FOR UNRESTRICTED USE (REF. 308655 1 14 PAGE 4). PROBABLE CAUSE: IMPROPER HANDLING OF NWA/NORMAL WEAR OF THRE 308655 1 15 ADS. A "NO GO" THREAD CALIBRATION GAUGE WAS ALSO INSTALLED AND ONLY 1/ 308655 1 16 2 REVOLUTION WAS MADE BEFORE BINDING, VERIFYING THE THREADS ARE INTACT 308769 1 1 2.0 INCH DIMENSION WAS ADDED PER E.O.-TO-FOLLOW, 308769 1 2 TO AID IN LOCATING HOLE PER STR-3-07-237, MOD 002. 308922 1 1 V070-198002-079 PANEL HAD "OIL CAN EFFECT" WHEN LIGHT PRESSURE WAS APP 308922 1 2 LIED. THE MD112-3002-0305 SCREW WHICH SECURES THE -079 PANEL IN PLACE, 308922 1 3 WAS TORQUED TO 30 IN. LBS, WHICH IS PER SPEC., AND THIS TORQUING RESO 308922 1 4 LVED THE OIL CAN EFFECT OF THE -079 PANEL. 308922 1 5 CLOSE THIS P. 308997 1 1 ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF THE DSCREPANCY DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, 308997 1 2 FOUND NO CRACKS OR HOLES IN THE INSULATOR WHICH DEVIATE FROM SPEC. M 308997 1 3 L0601-0002. ITEM ITEM , PAGE 1 IS NOT A DISCREPANT CONDITION. PROBAB 308997 1 4 LE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 309263 1 1 PART NOW MEETS PRINT REQ FOR FILLER BAR INSTL 309268 1 1 FUEL CELL 3 COOLANT LINE V070-454500-034 WAS INSPE 309268 1 2 CTED VISUALLY BY PROCESS ENGINEERING AND DESIGN EN 309268 1 3 GINEERING. LINE HAS A VERY SLIGHT DEVIATION TO ST 309268 1 4 RAIGHT LINE PATH, WHICH MAY BE DETECTED WITH SEVER 309268 1 5 E SCRUTINY AND INSPECTION. LINE DEVIATION AND SPA 309268 1 6 N DIMENSIONS WERE TAKEN BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN ST 309268 1 7 EP 5 THIS PR. LINE DEVIATION IS SMALL AND GRADUAL 309268 1 8 , MORE OF A GENTLE BOW THAN A SHARP BEND. ORBITER 309268 1 9 FLOOR MOLD LINE HAS A GENTLE ARC, INCLINING UPWAR 309268 1 10 D FROM CENTERLINE OF SHIP. LINE SUPPORTS MAINTAIN 309268 1 11 AN EQUAL HEIGHT OF LINE FROM FLOOR, THUS CREATING 309268 1 12 A NOMINAL SLIGHT ARC TO LINE PATH IN QUESTION. 309268 1 13 LINE V070-454500-034 MR ID'D WITH THIS PR NO. MR 309268 1 14 RATIONALE COORDINATED WITH DOWNEY ENGINEERING. FU 309268 1 15 EL CELL COOLANT SYSTEM INTEGRITY WAS NOT INVALIDAT 309268 1 16 ED BY THIS PR. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 309306 1 1 THIS PR IS A DUPLICATE TO PR MEQ-3-08-0397 WHICH CORRECTED THE DISCREP 309306 1 2 ANCY. CLOSE THIS PR AS A DUPLICATE TO PR MEQ-3-08-0397. 309508 1 1 THE DAMAGE IN THE C/P WAS SUPERFICIAL IN NATURE. ALL RAISED METAL WAS 309508 1 2 REMOVED W/ MR APPROVAL & THE REWORKED AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED & 309508 1 3 MR ID'D. THE C/P W/ THE DAMAGED AREA REWORKED, IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLT. 309510 1 1 P/N & OCN WERE MARKED PER BP RQMTS. 309587 1 1 THE TRIPOD ASSEMBLY WAS DAMAGED DURING A RMG CYCLE DUE TO IMPROPER CON 309587 1 2 FIGURATION DURING A CYCLE. THE TRIPOD ASSEMBLY WAS CHANGED OUT AND A R 309587 1 3 OD END WAS DAMAGED DURING INSTALLATION. THIS DAMAGE WAS ACCEPTED RESTR 309587 1 4 ICTED FOR ONE FLIGHT (FLT 10) AND INSPECTED. EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE 309587 1 5 DAMAGE DID NOT DETERIORATE OR AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF THE ROD END. THE 309587 1 6 ROD END WAS ACCEPTED FOR FURTHER USE UNRESTRICTED. CAUSE: IMPROPER STO 309587 1 7 RAGE OF A TEMPORARILY REMOVED PIECE OF HARDWARE ON A VEHICLE INTERFACI 309587 1 8 NG SURFACE OF A DYNAMIC/MOVABLE STRUCTURE AND USE OF IMPROPER TOOLING 309587 1 9 FOR TORQUING OF ROD END. 309589 1 1 THE V070-351406-002 STRUT HAS A DAMAGED AREA (APPROX .0476" X .1729" X 309589 1 2 4.6172"). THE AREA WAS FILLED WITH ADHESIVE AND SANDED SMOOTH PER MR. 309589 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO GSE PLATFORM INSTALLATION. 309595 1 1 ITEM 1.0 PG 1O/T C/P TO F/B BRKT STEPS WERE BROUGHT BACK TO MR APPROV 309595 1 2 ED TOLEANCE BY RELOC'G HOLES IN UPPER SURFACE PER PGS 13 - 19 AND BOND 309595 1 3 ING SHIMS AT "C" LOCs TO CORRECT STEP DIMENSIONS. FINAL STEPS FOR IB 309595 1 4 EDGE WERE MEAS'D AS "A" = .040, "B" = .058 (STEP 35 PG 20), "C" = .085 309595 1 5 (STEP 55 PG 29) & "D" = .074 (STEP 36.1 PG 20.2). FINAL STEPS OB EDG 309595 1 6 E WERE MEAS'D AS "A" = .046, "B" = .058 (STEP 35 PG 20, "C" = .083 (ST 309595 1 7 EP 49 PG 26) AND "D" = .074 (STEPS 36.1 PG 20.2). ALL STEP DIMENSIONS 309595 1 8 ARE WITHIN MR APPROVED TOLERANCE OF .040 - .085. ITEM 2 PG 1A C/P TO 309595 1 9 C/P STEPS WERE MEAS'D PER STEP 1.0 & REWORKED BY RELOC'G HOLES IN UPP 309595 1 10 ER SURFACE PER PGS 13 - 19. AFFECTED C/P TO C/P STEPS WERE THEN MEAS' 309595 1 11 D IN STEP 36.0 & ALL STEPS WERE FOUND TO BE WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TOLERANC 309595 1 12 E OF FLUSH +/- .045 WHICH IS APPROVED BY MR ON PG 31. ITEM 3 PG 1B C/ 309595 1 13 P TO STR STEPS WERE REWORKED BY BONDING 2 EA SHIMS LOC'D PER ATTACH Y 309595 1 14 & Z TO WING T/E AT OB & IB EDGE LOCs OF C/P. DIMENSIONS WERE REMEAS'D 309595 1 15 IN STEP 11 PG 6 & ARE ALL WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE OF .070 +/- .010. 309595 1 16 ITEM 4 PG 1C MR SHIM WITH VOID WAS REBONDED PER DISPO PG 11. ITEM 5 P 309595 1 17 G 1D MR SHIM WITH VOID WAS REBONDED PER DISPO PG 12. ITEM 6 PG 1E 1 E 309595 1 18 A MD121-0002-04XX RIVET W/ NO ACCESS WAS INSTL'D BY REMOVING INTERFERI 309595 1 19 NG H/W & REINSTL'G AFTER RIVET INSTL'N COMPLETE. REF. PGS 21 - 22. I 309595 1 20 TEMS 7 & 8 PG 1F GUIDE PIN THREAD DAMAGE WAS ADDRESSED BY REPLACING GU 309595 1 21 IDE PIN ORDERED PER STEP 39 PG 23 & INSTL'D PER STEP 32C. GUIDE PIN N 309595 1 22 UT BOTTOMING OUT WAS ADDRESSED BY REF'G SPEC WHICH ALLOWS FOR ONE OR T 309595 1 23 WO ADDITIONAL WASHERS TO PROVIDE FOR PROPER GRIP. ITEM 9 PG 1G O/T "C 309595 1 24 " POSITION FROM V070-198068 C/P AT I/B EDGE WAS CORRECTED BY BONDING A 309595 1 25 NEW MR -005 SHIM W/ THICKNESS OF .032. SEE ITEM 1 SUMMARY FOR FINAL 309595 1 26 STEP DIMENSION. ALL STEP DIMENSIONS FROM C/P AS REWORKED & DOC'D PROV 309595 1 27 IDES A F/B TO TILE CONFIG THAT WILL PREVENT OVERTEMP OF F/B, SIP & STR 309595 1 28 . 309609 1 1 THE PG 1 DISCREPANCY INDICATES THAT THE MD112-1002-0407 BOLTS ARE TOO 309609 1 2 LONG TO BE INSTALLED IN THE FWD SIDE OF THE AFT NLG DOOR ROLLER ASSY. 309609 1 3 BY UTILIZING MAO101-301 PP 3.2.1 AND MD112-1002-0406 MAY BE USED WITH 309609 1 4 UP TO TWO ADDITIONAL NAS620C416 WASHERS TO PROVIDE PROPER GRIP. THIS I 309609 1 5 S NOT A PR CONDITION SINCE MINOR GRIP ADJUSTMENTS ARE ALLOWED PER MAO1 309609 1 6 01-301 AND THE HARDWARE INSTALLED IS PER PRINT. 309632 1 1 MEASUREMENTS OF THE STRUT END FITTING AND THE OUTSIDE DIAMETER OF BUSH 309632 1 2 ING B91B10669-15 WERE FOUND TO BE .500 AND .499 INCH, RESPECTIVELY. AF 309632 1 3 TER OBTAINING THIS INFORMATION, A SHOP AID SA-026R-029 DRIFT PIN WHICH 309632 1 4 IS 0.498 INCH IN DIAMETER WAS USED TO ALIGN HOLES BETWEEN THE STRUT A 309632 1 5 ND WING FITTING, RETURNING TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. CLOSE THIS PR. 309655 01 1 CANCELLED - DUPLICATE PR - PREVIOUSLY CORRECTED ON 309655 01 2 PALMDAUS MR REF. BH9798000M. 309693 1 1 ALL EXPOSED LOOP PINS WERE ORIENTATED TO ELIMINATE ANY SHARP EDGE COND 309693 1 2 ITIONS. ALL BENT LOOP PINS WERE REPLACED WITH NEW ONES. THE PR CONDITI 309693 1 3 ON NO LONGER EXISTS. 309822 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DUE TO LEAK DETECTED IN THE INFLATION VALVE CORE 309822 1 2 OF MWA S/N 022 (A.K.A. S/N BAQ892). THE PROBLEM WAS FIRST ADDRESSED B 309822 1 3 Y MOMENTARILY DEPRESSING THE INFLATION VALVE CORE IN AN ATTEMPT TO RES 309822 1 4 EAT THE VALVE CORE. THE LEAK STILL EXISTED AFTER ATTEMPTING TO RESEAT 309822 1 5 THE VALVE CORE AND A VOLUMETRIC DISPLACEMENT METER (VLD) WAS ATTACHED 309822 1 6 TO THE INFLATION VALVE TO MONITOR THE LEAKAGE. A LEAK RATE OF 0.70 CC/ 309822 1 7 10 MIN WAS ESTABLISHED. A SECOND ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RESEAT THE VALVE 309822 1 8 CORE BY MOMENTARILY DEPRESSING THE VALVE CORE, BUT A SMALL LEAK STILL 309822 1 9 EXISTED. THE WHEEL ASSEMBLY WAS TOPED OFF TO 368 PSIG AT 72.4 DEG F AN 309822 1 10 D A VLD WAS ATTACHED. A LEAK RATE OF 0.50 CC/10 MIN WAS ESTABLISHED . 309822 1 11 ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO RESEAT THE VALVE CORE WAS INITIATED AND THIS TIME A 309822 1 12 LEAK RATE OF 0.9 CC/10 MIN WAS RECORDED FROM THE VLD. THE LAST TWO AT 309822 1 13 TEMPTS TO RESEAT THE VALVE CORE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL AND A LEAK RATE OF 2 309822 1 14 .0 CC/30 MIN AND 1.0 CC/30 MIN WERE RECORDED ON STEP 24 AND 35 RESPECT 309822 1 15 IVELY USING THE VLD. THE INFLATION VALVE CAP WAS THEN INSTALLED FOR FL 309822 1 16 IGHT AND A VLD WAS ATTACHED AND ZERO LEAKAGE WAS RECORDED ON STEP 32. 309822 1 17 THE VALVE CAP WAS TORQUED STRIPPED TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE SE 309822 1 18 AL. THE VALVE CAP ACTED AS THE PRIMARY SEAL AND PREVENTED ANY LEAKAGE 309822 1 19 FROM OCCURING. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS A DEFECTIVE SEAL ON TH 309822 1 20 E INFLATION VALVE CORE. THE INFLATION VALVE CORE WAS ROUTED THROUGH 309822 1 21 MEQ ENGINEERING TO DOWNEY (ATTN B BLANKENSHIP D/DA24 841-2 DA23 DOWNEY 309822 1 22 X-1679) FOR ANALYSIS. 310058 1 1 DISCOLORATION OF THE PNL WAS RESIDUE FROM THERMAL 310058 1 2 PROTECTION ELEMENTS, NOT FROM BEING SCORCHED. THE 310058 1 3 DISCOLORATION WAS CLEANED OFF & A TEMPERILABLE 310058 1 4 WAS APPLIED TO THE SURFACE TO RECORD AIR TEMP FLOW 310058 1 5 . TO AVOID REDUNDANT PROCEDURES BETWEEN DEPT WADS 310058 1 6 , THE KOROPON APPLICATION WAS PERFORMED IN WAD 310058 1 7 RWNG-3-07-1073 &B VERIFIED BY QC. 310103 1 1 PER V070-336751 "LOCKER ASSY" STOWAGE LOCKER "G" & "H" MID DECK FLOOR, 310103 1 2 ZONE 13 F AND VIEW P ZONE 35 D, MARKING "MDBOR" ON LOCKER G IS PER DR 310103 1 3 AWING CONFIGURATION. 310195 1 1 THE LOWER FORWARD NUTPLATE OF THE RIGHT HAND AFT ATTACH POINT WOULD NO 310195 1 2 T ACCEPT THE BOLT OF THE HOST RECEPTACLE COVER. THIS NUTPLATE HAD BEEN 310195 1 3 CHANGED EARLIER IN THE FLOW (PER PR STR-3-11-3202). WHEN THE DISCREPA 310195 1 4 NT NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED PER THIS PR IT WAS FOUND THAT ONE OF THE STEEL 310195 1 5 RIVITS THAT SUPPORT THE NUTPLATE TO THE STRUCTURE WAS NOT BUCKED. THE 310195 1 6 UNBUCKED RIVIT CAUSED THE NUTHOLDER TO COME LOOSE AND BEND WHEN ATTEM 310195 1 7 PTS TO INSTALL THE BOLT OF THE HOIST RECEPTACLE COVER WERE MADE. THE N 310195 1 8 UTHOLDER, NUT ELEMENT AND RIVITS, WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED AT THE PAD 310195 1 9 AN ENGINEERING INSPECTION AFTER THE INSTALLATION OF THE NUTPLATE SHOWE 310195 1 10 D THAT THE STEEL RIVITS WERE FULLY BUCKED. THE RIGHT HAND SIDE HOISTP 310195 1 11 POINT COVER WAS INSTALLED PER V80-95006. PROBALBE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP 310217 1 1 TO RELIEVE THE SHEAR STRESS & PREVENT THE BUCKLING 310217 1 2 OF (2) UPPER WING DOUBLERS, GROOVES HAVE BEEN CUT 310217 1 3 IN THE DOUBLERS AT AREAS WHERE FAULTY ADHESIVE BO 310217 1 4 NDS ARE SUSPECTED. A TEAM OF (2) ENGs & (2) TECHs 310217 1 5 FROM GTSI HAVE IMPLEMENTED THE REPAIR PROCs IN TH 310217 1 6 IS PR & CUT A TOTAL OF (7) GROOVES IN THESE (2) DO 310217 1 7 UBLERS. THIS WILL PREVENT BUCKLING ALONG THE ADHE 310217 1 8 SIVE BOND LINES & ALLOW THE DOUBLERS TO SHEAR ALON 310217 1 9 G THE GROOES AS NECESSARY. THE COMPLETION OF THE 310217 1 10 PREVIOUS MENTIONED TASKS WILL RESOLVE ALL THE PROB 310217 1 11 LEMS OUTLINED ON PG. 1. 310313 1 1 THE PROBLEM WAS THAT A MISLOCATED AND FILLED FASTENER HOLE WAS DETECTE 310313 1 2 D DURING EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE FWD ET FITTIN 310313 1 3 G. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO ACCEPT THE CONDITION OKAY AS IS FOR UN 310313 1 4 RESTRICTED USE. 310331 1 1 DOGHOUSE BEAM V070-357231-013 MISALIGNED HOLES MR 310331 1 2 ID'D. WORK CONTINUES ON VSTR-137 310430 1 1 1 EA HOLE LOCATION AT UPPER SPLICE LINE WAS FOUND TO BE SLIGHTLY ELONG 310430 1 2 ATED WITH RAISED METAL ON OUTSIDE. RAISED METAL WAS BLENDED AND CONDIT 310430 1 3 ION MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE NORMAL WEAR AND T 310430 1 4 EAR 310641 1 1 STRUT ASSY IS WELL WITHIN TOLERANCE FOR END PLAY 310641 1 2 AS CALLED OUT ON DWG. V070-565431 AND NO 310641 1 3 DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 310664 1 1 THE NOSE LANDING GEAR HINGE BOOT ZIPPER WAS DAMAGED BEYOND USE FROM NO 310664 1 2 RMAL WEAR. THE BOOT WAS REMOVED, DISCARDED ON AN LRU PR, AND REPLACED 310664 1 3 WITH A NEW BOOT. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE BOOT INSTALLA 310664 1 4 TION. 310741 1 1 ITEM 1 DESCRIBED (2) RETAINERS REMOVED FROM THE RH SIDE WHICH HAD DASH # 310741 1 2 'S FOR THE LH SIDE. A PARALLEL PR WAS WRITTEN FOR THE LH SIDE DUIRNG RET 310741 1 3 AINER REMOVALS. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE RETAINERS WERE PER PRINT, BUT 310741 1 4 THE INSTALLATION HOLES WERE DRILLED INCORRECTLY DURING MANUFACTURING. AN 310741 1 5 MR WAS WRITTEN TO ACCEPT THESE WRONG HOLES AND THE WRONG LH/RH RETAINER 310741 1 6 INSTALLATIONS SINCE THE RETAINERS ARE NOT INTERCHANGEABLE. THE PROBABLE 310741 1 7 CAUSE WAS MANUFACTURING ERROR. ITEM 2 DESCRIBED AN ANGLE HAVING INDENTA 310741 1 8 TIONS AND BARE METAL. THESE WERE SMOOTHED OUT AND CORROSION PROTECTED PE 310741 1 9 R MR REPAIR. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS THE TOOL USED TO GRIP THE ANGLE DURING 310741 1 10 REMOVAL. 310751 1 1 THE HEAT SINKS WERE MISLOCATED DUE TO WORKMANSHIP 310751 1 2 ERR. THE HEAT SINK DOCUMENTED PER ITEM 1 PG. 1 310751 1 3 WAS REMOVED PER STR-3-07-1677, AND THE HEAT SINK 310751 1 4 DOCUMENTED ON PG. 1A WAS REMOVED PER THIS PR DISPO 310900 1 1 MR PARTS WERE REMOVED FROM THE 1307 BULKHEAD & FIL 310900 1 2 LED WITH JO-BOLTS & RIVETS, AS REQ'D. THE AREAS WE 310900 1 3 RE THEN CORROSION PROTECTED. THIS WORK ALLOWS UNRE 310900 1 4 STRICTED USE OF THE 1307 BULKHEAD WITH MR PARTS RE 310900 1 5 MOVED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. CLOSE P 310900 1 6 R. 311007 1 1 THE DISCREPANT V070-198702-022 BULB SEAL, ID'D IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS 311007 1 2 RESOLVED BY SENDING THE BULB SEAL TO ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER FOR REPAI 311007 1 3 R. THE REWORKED BULB SEAL WILL BE REINSTALLED ON F/C V80-96012. THE DA 311007 1 4 MAGED SEAL (ITEM 1) WAS PROBABLE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE 311007 1 5 THAT THE BULB ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND NO 311007 1 6 FURTHER WORK IS REQURIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 311109 1 1 EVALUATION OF THE (4) LWR CCTV BRKT BONDS TO THE AFT Xo 576 BLKHD DETE 311109 1 2 RMINED THAT ALTHOUGH THE TEMP/PRESS DATA SHTs IND'D SPEC VALUES OF TEM 311109 1 3 P & PRESS WERE MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THE SPECIFIED CURE TIME, THE ADHE 311109 1 4 SIVE WAS SUSPECTED AS HAVING INADEQUATE BOND STRENGTH (TACKY BONDLINES 311109 1 5 & EASE OF BRKT REMOVAL). SEVERAL DIFFICULTIES WERE ENCOUNTERED IN SU 311109 1 6 BSEQUENT BONDING OPS OF THESE BRKTs USING MBO120-053 ADHESIVE. THESE 311109 1 7 DIFFICULTIES WERE ADDRESSED BY LSOC, NASA & RI ENGINEERING. TPS STR-3 311109 1 8 -07-355 WAS GENERATED TO ADDRESS THE THERMAL GRADIENTS, HEAT SINK EFFE 311109 1 9 CTS. PRESS LOSSES & THERMOCOUPLE LOCs THAT IN COMBINATION HINDERED AC 311109 1 10 QUIRING THE REQ'D CURE PARAMETERS (TEMP & PRESS). INSULATING THE THER 311109 1 11 MOCOUPLES FROM THE HEAT SOURCE & LOC'G THEM IN THE ADHESIVE FLASH AREA 311109 1 12 , AS WELL AS DEVISING A METHOD OF "STACKING" THE HEAT BLKTs W/O OVERHE 311109 1 13 ATING THE BLKTs RESULTING IN BONDING THE CCTV BRKTs TO THE BLKHD W/ CO 311109 1 14 NFIDENCE THAT THE BOND STRENGTH CONCURS W/ THE DESIGN INTENT. ADDITIO 311109 1 15 NALLY, THE MISLOC'D UPPER CCTV CAMERA SUPPORTS WERE ACCEPTED "AS IS" P 311109 1 16 ER MR (L/H SIDE). CONCLUSION: THE (4) LWR CCTV SUPT BRKTs HAVE BEEN B 311109 1 17 ONDED TO THE AFT Xo 576 BLKHD USING MBO120-053 ADHESIVE. DUE TO THE D 311109 1 18 IFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN MAINTAINING THE SPEC VALUES OF TEMP & PRESS 311109 1 19 A "CONFIDENCE" PULL TEST PERFORMED (REF. TPS STR-3-07-362). THE DATA 311109 1 20 SHTs & PULL TEST BOTH IND THAT THE (4) LWR CCTV SUPT BRKTs ARE BONDED 311109 1 21 PER SPEC USING MBO120-053 ADHESIVE. 311113 1 1 EO HAS BEEN RELEASED TO UPDATE DWG TO AS-INSTALLED 311113 1 2 CONFIGURATION OF V070-351599-001 CLOSE PR 311264 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1: 2 NEW V070-146068-002 BOLTS WERE OBTAINED TO REPLACE T 311264 1 2 HE GALLED BOLTS WHICH WERE SCRAPPED LOCALLY. ITEM 2, PAGE 1: THE 2 DIS 311264 1 3 CREPANT MD114-5004-0005 NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH 2 NEW 311264 1 4 MD114-5004-0005 NUTPLATES. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION 311416 1 1 NON-CONFORMANCE OF THIS PR WAS CUT SAFETY WIRE AT 311416 1 2 FUEL CELL NO. 1 COOLANT RETURN FLEXHOSE AT TUBE EN 311416 1 3 D OF FLEXHOSE, AS WELL AS SLIGHT MISCLOCKING OF MA 311416 1 4 TING QD. SUSPECT B-NUT TORQUE WAS CHECKED AND THER 311416 1 5 E WAS NO MOVEMENT. COOLANT LOOP FC-40 COMMODITY WA 311416 1 6 S SAMPLED AND PASSED. 'MIS-CLOCKING' OF FLEXLINE W 311416 1 7 AS EVALUATED AND NOT CONSIDERED TO BE A PROBLEM. Q 311416 1 8 D WAS MATED TO ATTACHMENT 'E', STEP 48. QD MATED S 311416 1 9 ECURELY AND WITHOUT LEAKAGE. SYSTEM RETURNED TO DR 311416 1 10 AWING CONFIGURATION. 318085 1 1 DURING S0030. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT OUTER SEAL P/N: V070-565411-002 WAS 318085 1 2 TORN IN SEVERAL PLACES. AN LRU PR WAS GENERATED AGAINST THE SEAL AND SE 318085 1 3 NT TO HDA FOR REFURBISHMENT. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO N 318085 1 4 ORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO RESTEST IS REQUIRED. 318085 1 5 318389 1 1 THE MISSING SEALANT IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS SEALED WITH RTV ADH 318389 1 2 ESIVE PER THE V070-857038 DWG REQUIREMENTS. DISCREPANCY 1 WAS SUSPECTED 318389 1 3 TO BE CAUSED BY OMISSION AT ORIGINAL BUILD BY THE VENDOR. CONCLUDE THAT 318389 1 4 NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 318389 1 5 318608 1 1 THE SUSPECTED BENT 3/8" DIABOLT IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS REMOVE 318608 1 2 D AND SENT TO THE NASA LAB FOR DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS. THE LAB ANALYSIS (# 318608 1 3 91-3036 ATTACHED) REVEALED THAT THE BOLT DID HAVE A .024" TIR STRAIGHT B 318608 1 4 END (BOW), NOT A DOUBLE SHEAR TYPE DEFORMATION (PER THE NAS1006 SPEC. MA 318608 1 5 XIMUM TIR ALLOWANCE IS .0073" FOR THIS BOLT). THE CENTER OF THE BEND IS 318608 1 6 LOCATED AT THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE THREADS AND THE SHANK OF THE BOLT. 318608 1 7 PREVIOUS BOLT DEFORMATIONS ON THE T-O BLOCK HAVE BEEN DOUBLE SHEAR TYPE. 318608 1 8 BECAUSE THE BOLT HAD A STRAIGHT BEND IT IS SUSPECTED TO HAVE BEEN DEFOR 318608 1 9 MED DURING MANUFACTURING AND/OR SHIPMENT, NOT AS A RESULT OF KSC 318608 1 10 PROCESSING. CONCLUDE THAT THE BENT BOLT HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH STRAIGHT 318608 1 11 ONE AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 319154 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED ON OV-103 DURING SEQ 17, NLG ROLL AROUND WHEEL AND 319154 1 2 TIRE REMOVAL, OF V9028 WHEN MINOR SURFACE SCRATCHES AND CORROSION WERE 319154 1 3 NOTICED ON BOTH RH AND LH AXLES AND AXLE NUT THREADS. CORROSION WAS PART 319154 1 4 ICULARLY PREVALENT ON THE RH AXLE THREADS. ITEM 1 AND 2 DISCREPANCIES ON 319154 1 5 BOTH AXLES AND AXLE NUTS WERE WIRE BRUSHED VISIBLY CLEAN OF ALL CORROSI 319154 1 6 ON AND THE OBSERVED "ROUGHNESS," WHEN INSTALLING/REMOVING THE AXLE NUTS, 319154 1 7 REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY. THE THREAD DAMAGE ON THE LH SIDE HAS BEEN PREVIO 319154 1 8 USLY MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE (REF MEQ 03-11-0486). THE RH AXLE 319154 1 9 THREAD "DAMAGE" WAS PRINCIPALLY ATTRIBUTED TO CORROSION WHICH HAS BEEN 319154 1 10 REMOVED. A PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR 319154 1 11 AND TEAR AND CORROSION. 319196 1 1 AT THIS TIME, GROUND POINT ATTACHMENTS CALLED OUT ON THE GF70-500702 DRA 319196 1 2 WING AT XO 1454.00 YO +71.461 AND XO 1454.00 YO-71.461 ARE NOT AVAILABLE 319196 1 3 ON OV-103. THE V070-355438-002 AND -001 INTERCOASTALS CALLED OUT HAVE E 319196 1 4 FFECTIVITIES OF 099 AND 102 ONLY. GROUNDING ATTACHMENTS WILL BE PROVIDE 319196 1 5 D BY EO B03 TO V070-855394 DWG TO BE WORKED ON A FLIGHT 13 (NEXT FLIGHT) 319196 1 6 TPS. THESE GROUNDING POINTS ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THIS IS NOT A DISC 319196 1 7 RPEANY CONDITION V070-855394 B03 EO HAS A FLIGHT 13 (NEXT FLIGHT) EFFECT 319196 1 8 IVITY. 319231 1 1 SCRATCHES WERE SANDED OFF, SURFACE CORROSION PROTECTED. RETEST PERFORMED 319231 1 2 PER STEP 3. PROBABLE CAUSE IS TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT OVER HATCH. 319231 1 3 319267 1 1 SHARP EDGES NOTED ON PAGE 1 ARE PER DRAWING (REF V070-332506 ZN 11B) AND 319267 1 2 ARE INTENDED TO HOLD THE SEAL IN THE GROOVE AFTER IT IS INSTALLED. TO 319267 1 3 PREVENT FUTURE DAMAGE TO SEALS DURING INSTALLATION, TEFLON TAPE WILL BE 319267 1 4 TEMPORARILY INSTALLED OVER EDGES. PROBABLE CAUSE IS DESIGN REQUIREMENT. 319267 1 5 NO RETEST REQUIRED. 319267 1 6 319274 1 1 NICKS WERE SANDED SMOOTH THEN CORROSION PROTECTED. PROBABLE CASUE IS MOV 319274 1 2 EMENT OF EQUIPMENT THROUGH HATCHWAY, STRIKING GROOVE. RETEST PERFORMED P 319274 1 3 ER STEP 3. 319274 1 4 319393 1 1 DURING JC V76-10001 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 2J130B12-1 HAD EXPOSED C 319393 1 2 ONDUCTOR. WITH MR APRPOVAL WIRE 2J130B12-1 WAS REPAIRED BY INSTALLING HE 319393 1 3 AT SHRINKABLE TUBING (CLAM SHELL) OVER DAMAGED AREA. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE 319393 1 4 TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. REPAIR RETURNS WIRE TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON-DE 319393 1 5 SIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURAB 319393 1 6 ILITY, PERFORMANCE OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. NO RETEST REQUIRED PER THIS WA 319393 1 7 D. WIRE WILL BE RETESTED PER S0008. 319393 1 8 319496 1 1 DURING V76-10002 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE INTERFACIAL SEAL ON 319496 1 2 50V77W13P523 HAD SEVERAL CUTS AND GOUGES. MR APPROVAL WAS REQUESTED AND 319496 1 3 APPROVED TO USE SEAL OFR UNRESTRICTED USE. IT WAS ALSO DETECTED THAT 319496 1 4 WIRE 1J233A22 HAD KAPTON AND SHIELD DAMAGE WITH NO CONDUCTOR DAMAGE. 319496 1 5 WIRE 1J233A22 WAS REPAIRED PER SRP V-EL-0007 OPTION A USING MYSTIC 7503 319496 1 6 TEFLON TAPE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR BOTH ITEM 1 AND 2 WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR 319496 1 7 AND TEAR. NO RETEST REQUIRED. THIS RETURNS ITEMS 1 AND 2 TO AN 319496 1 8 ACCEPTABLE BUT NON-DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT 319496 1 9 SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. 319496 1 10 319571 1 1 AT CONNECTOR 50P505, WIRE 1J130B12-2 HAD CRACKED KAPTON. THE CONDUCTOR W 319571 1 2 AS EXPOSED, BUT NOT DAMAGED. A CLAMSHELL REPAIR WAS PERFORMED ON THE WIR 319571 1 3 E. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR; NO RETEST REQUIRED. CAUSE: OP 319571 1 4 ERATION. 319571 1 5 319585 1 1 DURING A V76-10001 INSPECTION OF MONOBALL AREA, WIRE 2J138B12-1 WAS FOUN 319585 1 2 D TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. THE EXTENSION TUBE ON 50P515 WAS REMOVED FOR AC 319585 1 3 CESS AND A CLAMSHELL REPAIR WAS PERFORMED PER AND APPROVED MR. RE-ASSEMB 319585 1 4 LY OF CONNECTOR EXTENSION WAS PERFORMED TO COMPLETE THE DISPO. RETEST WI 319585 1 5 LL BE PERFORMED DURING S0008. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PRO 319585 1 6 BABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DURING ORBITER PROCESSING. 319585 1 7 319601 1 1 DURING A V76-10001 INSPECTION OF MONOBALL AREA, WIRES S145A22 AND 319601 1 2 2J233A22 WERE FOUND TO HAVE CRACKED KAPTON DAMAGE IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS 319601 1 3 BUT NO SHEILD DAMAGE. THE EXTENSION TUBE ON 50P536 WAS REMOVED FOR 319601 1 4 ACCESS AND SRP-V-EL-0007-A-0 WAS PERFORMED ON BOTH WIRES. A PAGE 1A WAS 319601 1 5 WRITTEN ON KAPTON DAMAGE (NO SHIELD DAMAGE) TO WIRE 2J232A22. 319601 1 6 SRP-V-EL-0007-A-0 WAS USED FOR THIS REPAIR ALSO. PAGE 1B RESULTED WHEN 319601 1 7 JR24 WIRE FROM S145A22 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE TO WIRE. A 319601 1 8 CLAMSHELL REPAIR WAS PERFORMED PER AN APPROVED MR TO FIX THE WIRE. 319601 1 9 RE-ASSEMBLY OF CONNECTOR EXTENSION WAS PERFORMED TO COMPLETE THE DISPO. 319601 1 10 RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED TO COMPLETE THE DISPO. RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED 319601 1 11 DURING S0008. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 319601 1 12 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DURING ORBITER PROCESSING 319601 1 13 319635 1 1 DURING A V76-10001 INSPECTION OF MONOBALL AREA, WIRE 2P616C22-1 WAS 319635 1 2 FOUND TO BE DAMAGED. FURTHER INSPECTION SHOWED THE KAPTON MISSING AND 319635 1 3 PRIMARY CONDUCTOR DAMAGED AND PAGE 1A NOTED THIS DISCREPANCY. A 319635 1 4 CLAMSHELL WAS PERFORMED DURING S0008. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS 319635 1 5 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DURING ORBITER PROCESSING. 319635 1 6 319782 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING MEQ-3-12-0524 WHEN L-T-80 TAPE DAMAGE WAS D 319782 1 2 ISCOVERED ON THE OUTER SEAL GROOVE OF THE I/E HATCH. THIS TAPE WAS PREVI 319782 1 3 OUSLY APPLIED TO THE SEAL GROOVE PER MR PR MEQ-3-12-0037. THE TAPE WAS A 319782 1 4 PPLIED BECAUSE THE SEAL GROOVE WAS NOT PER PRINT (TOO LARGE). THE TAPE W 319782 1 5 AS USED TO REDUCE THE GROOVE WIDTH. AN UNRESTRICTED MR WAS APPROVED TO A 319782 1 6 LLOW REPAIR OF THE EXISTING L-T-80 TAPE ON THE OUTER HATCH SEAL GROOVE. 319782 1 7 A PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE TAPE WAS DAMAGED WHILE H 319782 1 8 ATCH COVER WAS REMOVED FOR SEAL LEAK TROUBLESHOOTING. RETEST WAS ACCOMPL 319782 1 9 ISHED ON PR MEQ-3-12-,0524. 320044 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ONG PAGE 1; THE DISCREPANT V070-565321-020 RETAINER WAS MR 320044 1 2 ID'D AND ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 320044 1 3 DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 320044 1 4 ACTION REQUIRED. 320044 1 5 320085 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP AS A RESULT OF IPR 39V-0214 WHEN THE ORBITER MLG W 320085 1 2 AS LOWERED IN THE VAB AND CONTACED THE FLOOR APPROX. 15 DEG FROM FULL DO 320085 1 3 WNLOCKED. SEVERAL MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN AND THE MLG INSPECTED AND NO A 320085 1 4 NOMALIES WERE NOTED. THE ORBITER WAS RAISED, THE GEAR WENT FULL DOWN & L 320085 1 5 OCKED WITH NO PROBLEM. AN ADDITIONAL INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED, AGAIN WIT 320085 1 6 H NO ANOMALIES. THE VEHICLE WAS LOWERED TO THE GROUND THEN TOWED TOTHE O 320085 1 7 PF. ROCKWELL ENGINEERING ALONG WITH THE VENDOR (MENASCO) HAS EVALUATED T 320085 1 8 HIS CONDITION AND HAVE DETERMINED THAT NO DAMAGE COULD HAVE OCCURRED BY 320085 1 9 THE MLG HITTING THE FLOOR. RETEST HAS BEEN PERFORMED BY A SUCCESSFUL 320085 1 10 CYCLE OF THE LANDING GEAR. ALL INSPECTIONS AND WORK WAS PERFORMED ON IPR 320085 1 11 39V-0214. NO WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE 320085 1 12 CONDITION IS HUMAN ERROR (ADDRESSED ON IPR). 320199 1 1 THIS WAD WAS INITIATED AS AN IPR DURING V1097 ET DOOR FUNCTIONAL TEST WH 320199 1 2 EN AN "UNUSUAL CREAKING" SOUND WAS HEARD WHEN THE R/H ET. DOOR WAS RUNNI 320199 1 3 NG IN THE OPEN DIRECTION. ADDITIONAL TROUBLESHOOTING LOCALIZED THE SOUND 320199 1 4 , BUT FAILED TO CONFIRM IT'S SOURCE. THE IPR WAS UPGRADED TO A PR AND DE 320199 1 5 FERRED FOR ONE FLIGHT. IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN AN INTE 320199 1 6 REFERENCE BETWEEN THE V070-565017-005 PUSHROD AND THE V070-565187-001 HI 320199 1 7 GE BRACKET SHIELD ON THE R/H FWD ET DOOR MECHANISM ASSEMBLY. POST-FLIGHT 320199 1 8 INSPECTION OF THE DISCREPANT "CREAKING" CONDITION WAS OBSERVED FROM ACCE 320199 1 9 SS STANDS DURING ET DOOR CYCLING DURING V1097 FUNCTIONAL TEST. OBSERVERS 320199 1 10 INCLUDED THIS MEQ MECHANICAL TECHNICIAN. NO INTERFERENCE WAS VERIFIED 320199 1 11 BETWEEN THE V070-565017-005 PUSHROD AND THE V070-565187-001 HINGE 320199 1 12 BRACKET SHIELD WITH A CLEARANCE GAP OF 0.75". IT WAS OBSERVED THAT WHEN 320199 1 13 THE R/H ET DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE WAS UNLOADED, THE "CREAKING" SOUND COULD 320199 1 14 BE DUPLICATED BY TWISTING THE V070-565025 PUSHROD ABOUT ITS SPHERICAL 320199 1 15 ROD END BEARINGS. THE DISCREPANT SOUND IS CAUSED BY THE V070-565025 320199 1 16 PUSHROD AND THE V070-565180 BELLCRANK ON THE R/H FWD ET MECHANISM 320199 1 17 ASSEMBLY SHIFTING SLIGHTLY AS THE LINKAGE LOADS SHIFT FROM TENSION TO 320199 1 18 COMPRESSION AND VISE VERSA. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT THE FIT, FORM 320199 1 19 OR FUNCTION OF THE R/H ET DOOR AS TESTED DURING V1097 ET DOOR FUNCTIONAL 320199 1 20 TEST. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL MECHANICAL LINKAGE ACTION AS LOADING SHIFTS 320199 1 21 FROM TENSION TO COMPRESSION AND VISE VERSA. 320249 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING J/C V51-50002 (STEP 21) DURING OV-103 FLT 1 320249 1 2 2 FLOW. CONDITION WAS THAT THE LMG SPRING ENGAGE LIGHT (DS3 ON THE C70-0 320249 1 3 894 UNIT STAYED ON (S/B OFF WHEN BUNGEE SWITCH WAS RELEASED. IT WAS OBSE 320249 1 4 RVED THAT THE BUNGEE SWITCH WAS STUCK IN THE ACTIVATED POSITION. THE BUN 320249 1 5 GEE SWITCH WAS MAUNUALLY DEACTIVATED AND HAS SINCE WORKED NOMINALLY. THE 320249 1 6 SWITCH WAS MANUALLY ACTUATED FIVE TIMES AND PERFORMED NOMINALLY. THE PR 320249 1 7 CONDITION WAS DEFERED TO OV-103 FLT 13 TO BE TESTED FOR ANY FURTHER POS 320249 1 8 SIBLE BINDING. THE SWITCH MECHANISM WAS CYCLED SEVERAL TIMES AND NO BIND 320249 1 9 ING WAS RECORDED. IN ADDITION THE SWICH MADE AN AUDIBLE CLICK WHICH 320249 1 10 INDICATES THE SWITCH IS ACTUATION PROPERLY. THERE IS NO LONGER A PR 320249 1 11 CONDITION AND THIS PR CAN BE CLOSED. PROBABLE CAUSE: SWITCH IMPOPERLY 320249 1 12 OPERATED DURING THE CHECKOUT PROCEDURE OF J/C V51-50002, LEADING TO THE 320249 1 13 SWITCH BEING STUCK IN THE ON POSITION. 320314 1 1 DURING V35-10010 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLE DF204A24 HAD KAPTON AND SH 320314 1 2 IELD DAMAGE. CABLE WAS REPAIRED PER SRP V-EL-0007-A-0 USING MYSTIC 7503 320314 1 3 TEFLON TAPE. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. REPAIR RETURNS 320314 1 4 CABLE TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON-DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSELY 320314 1 5 AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE OR INTERCHAGEABILITY 320314 1 6 . 320314 1 7 320579 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS AN OCN DISCREPANCY ON THE V070-199839-005 INSULATOR ON 320579 1 2 THE LH #9 TEE. AN OCN BBN181 WAS RECORDED AS INSTALLED ON OV-103 BUT TH 320579 1 3 E INSULATOR WAS VERIFIED TO BE INSTALLED ON OV-102. THIS CREATED A SUSPE 320579 1 4 CT CONDITION ON OV-103. AS A RESULT, THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING FLIGHT 320579 1 5 12 AND DEFERRED UNTIL NEXT REMOVAL. DURING FLIGHT 15 PROCESSING, THE TE 320579 1 6 E WAS REMOVED AND THE V070-199839-005 INSULATOR S/N WAS RECORDED AND CRO 320579 1 7 SS REFERENCED TO OCN BFF897. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP. 320579 1 8 NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 320579 1 9 NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 320607 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 13 TAIR DUE TO THE PARTS BEING INS 320607 1 2 TALLED FOR FLIGHT AND INACCESSIBLE TO VERIFY THE SERIAL NUMBER WITH THE 320607 1 3 ORBITER IN THE VERTICAL POSITION. POST FLIGHT 12 (FLIGHT 13 PROCESSING) 320607 1 4 THE V070-190322-001 INSULATOR WAS REMOVED AND THE SERIAL NUMBER WAS VERI 320607 1 5 FIED. UPON CLOSURE OF THIS PR THE CVAS DATA BANK WILL BE UPDATED. CONCLU 320607 1 6 E THAT THE OCN HAS BEEN VERIFIED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS 320607 1 7 PR. 320695 1 1 THE INCORRECT HOLE PATTERN IN THE V070-390458-002 PANEL IDENTIFIED IN IT 320695 1 2 EM 1, PAGE 1, WAS RESOLVED BY SLOTTING THE FORWARD UPPER HOLE OF THE PAN 320695 1 3 EL WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. CONCLUDE THAT THE PANEL MAY NOW BE INS 320695 1 4 TALLED PER THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 320695 1 5 320700 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DETECTED THAT SEAL P/N: V070-565411-002 HAD A 320700 1 2 SMALL PUNCTURE HOLE. A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND A LRU PR WAS INITIATED 320700 1 3 AGAINST SEAL AND ROUTED TO HDA FOR REPAIR BY VENDOR. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE 320700 1 4 TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NEW SEAL INSTALLED PER S0004. 320700 1 5 320889 1 1 DURING INSPECTION IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT SEAL P/N: V070-565411 HAD A SMA 320889 1 2 LL PUNCTURE HOLE. A LRU PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST SEAL AND SEAL WAS ROUTE 320889 1 3 D TO HDA FOR REPAIR BY VENDOR. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEA 320889 1 4 R. 320889 1 5 320903 1 1 ITEM 2 PG 1A WAS TRANSFERRED TO PLBD-3-12-0622. THE V070-397057-001 CARR 320903 1 2 IER PLATE WAS SPOTFACED TO ALLEVIATE INTERFERENCE WITH THE HI-LOK PER EO 320903 1 3 -TO-FOLLOW, (REF ITEM 1, PAGE 1). CONCLUDE THAT THE CARRIER PLATE NOW SI 320903 1 4 TS FLUSH WITH THE PAYLOAD BAY DOOR AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON TH 320903 1 5 IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 320903 1 6 320904 1 1 ITEM 2 PAGE 1A WAS TRANSFERRED TO PLBD-3-12-0624 THE V070-397057-002 CAR 320904 1 2 RIER PLATE WAS SPOTFACED TO ALLEVIATE INTERFERECNEC WITH THE HI-LOK PER 320904 1 3 EO-TO-FOLLOW, (REF. ITEM 1, PAGE 10. CONCLUDE THAT THE CARRIER PLATE NOW 320904 1 4 SITS FLUSH WITH THE PAYLOAD BAY DOOR AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON 320904 1 5 THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 320904 1 6 321570 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: REBONDED DEBONDED STUD TO 28-13 DOOR. (SEE PAGE 2). PROBA 321570 1 2 BLE CAUSE: NORMAL PROCESSING/WEAR. 321570 1 3 321678 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: DOOR 56-35 WAS REMOVED AND THE MISSING BARREL WAS FOUND. 321678 1 2 BARREL NUTPLATE WAS R&R'D AND DOOR REINSTALLED. (SEE PAGE 2). PROBABLE C 321678 1 3 AUSE: NORMAL PROCESSING. 321678 1 4 321908 1 1 THE DELAMINATED TAP (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) WAS TRANSFERRED TO STR-3-12-3531,IT 321908 1 2 EM 5, PAGE 1B (COPY ATTACHED). CONCLUDE DISCREPANCY WILL BE WORKED ON ST 321908 1 3 R-3-12-3531 AND NO WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 321908 1 4 321920 1 1 THIS IPR WAS TAKEN DUE TO THE FES HI LOAD B SUPPLY FEEDLINE TEMP TRANSDU 321920 1 2 CER (V63T1896A1) FOUND TO BE INDICATING OFF SCALE LOW. A DAMAGED WIRE HA 321920 1 3 S BEEN REPAIRED BY OEL AND THE ABOVE RETEST STEP WAS SUCCESSFUL. PROBABL 321920 1 4 E CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 322192 1 1 THE DISCREPANT CAPTIVE BOLT INSTALLED IN THE AVIONICS BAY #5 UPPER CENTE 322192 1 2 R ACCESS DOOR, V070-356735-012 WAS REPLACED WITH AN ME128-0026-4005 CAPT 322192 1 3 IVE BOLT PER THE DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE DISCREPA 322192 1 4 NT BOLT WAS INSTALLED IN THE OPF DURING CLOSEOUT OF AVIONICS BAY #5, PRI 322192 1 5 OR TO ROLLOUT. CONCLUDE THAT THE DISCREPANT BOLT HAS BEEN REMOVED AND A 322192 1 6 PER PRINT BOLT INSTALLED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 322192 1 7 322723 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THAT BACKSHELL WAS BROKEN ON 322723 1 2 CONNECTOR 50P742. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY PERFORMING MR APPROV 322723 1 3 ED SRP V-EL-0001-O-0 TO REMOVE AND REPLACE THE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TY 322723 1 4 PE. THIS RETURNS CONNECTOR 50P742 TO DESIGN INTENT. NO RETEST OR FURTHER 322723 1 5 ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS DOCUMENT. PROBABLE CASUE FOR THIS PR WAS NOR 322723 1 6 MAL WEAR AND TEST ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 322723 1 7 323067 1 1 THE 5TH SCREW FROM THE UPPER LEFT HAND CORNER OF THE V070-354541-010 INB 323067 1 2 OARD SHROUND ON AV BAY 5 WILL NOT TORQUE DOWN. PER MAO101-301 A SHORTER 323067 1 3 GRIP LENGTH SCREW ALONG WITH ONE EXTRA WASHER WAS INSTALLED PROPERLY. PR 323067 1 4 OBABLE CAUSE: THE ORIGINAL SCREW INSTALLED WAS TOO LONG. 323067 1 5 323108 1 1 THE V070-350180-003 BRACKET WAS NOT INSTALLED. A NEW BRACKET WAS ORDERED 323108 1 2 AND INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE BRACKET WAS REMOVED PER V9002.10 AND 323108 1 3 NEVER REINSTALLED. 323108 1 4 323268 1 1 THREE VR70-354241-002 SPACERS WERE FOUND DEBONDED FROM THE 50-02 DOOR PE 323268 1 2 RIMETER (REFERENCE ATTACHMENT "A" FOR LOCATIONS). THESE SPACERS DEBONDED 323268 1 3 DURING REMOVAL/INSTALLATIN OF THE 50-02 DOOR. THREE VR70-354241-002 SPA 323268 1 4 CERS WERE BONDED PER PRINT TO THE ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION AROUND THE 50-0 323268 1 5 2 DOOR PERIMETER. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 323268 1 6 323320 1 1 DURING OV-102 FLIGHT 11 PROCESSING, LOOSE ELEVONLEADING EDGE CARRIER PA 323320 1 2 NEL GUIDE PINS WERE FOUND. AS A RESULT, THIS SUSPECT PR WAS INITIATED (O 323320 1 3 V-103 FLIGHT 12) AND DEFERRED ONE FLIGHT. DURING FLIGHT 13 PROCESSING, A 323320 1 4 LL GUIDE PINS HAVE BEEN REWORKED BY INSTALLATING NEW NUTS IN PLACE OF TH 323320 1 5 E OLD HARDWARE, AT ALL LOCATIONS EXCEPT YW-393.3, THE GUIDE PINS ARE NOW 323320 1 6 FULLY TOQQUED AND PROTRUDE A MINIMUM OF ONE THREAD THROUGH THE NUT. A Y 323320 1 7 W-393 (REF PAGE 1A) PIN PROTRUSION OF 0.021" EXISTS WITH FULLY TORQUED H 323320 1 8 ARDWARE. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 323320 1 9 1 OF THIS PR IS NO DISCREPANCY. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 2 OF THIS PR IS 323320 1 10 BUILD UP OF TOLERANCE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING REQUIRED. 323321 1 1 THE (28) GUIDE PINS ON THE R/H INBOARD AND OUTBOARD ELEVONS WITH 323321 1 2 SUSPECTED LOST PRETORQUE (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) WERE INSPECTED AGAINST THE 323321 1 3 MA0101-301 SPECIFICATION. THE INSPECTION CONSISTED OF REMOVING THE NUT 323321 1 4 FROM EACH PIN AND REPLACING THE NUT WITH A NEW NUT. THE RUNNING TORQUE 323321 1 5 OF THE OLD NUT WAS RECORDED ON ATT. 1, FOR HISTORICAL PURPOSES. AFTER 323321 1 6 THE NEW NUT WAS INSTALLED THE INSTALLATION WAS INSPECTION FOR THREAD 323321 1 7 PROTRUSION. ALL (28) PINS HAD SUFFICIENT THREAD PROTRUSION. THERE WERE 323321 1 8 (4) GUIDE PINS INDENTIFIED ON THE INBOARD ELEVON AS HAVING LOOSE GUIDE 323321 1 9 PINS PRIOR TO NUT REMOVAL. DISCUSSION WITH THE TECHNICIAN REVEALED THAT 323321 1 10 THE PINS DID HAVE A PRETORQUE LOAD AND THE THE PIN COULD BE ROTATED UP 323321 1 11 TO A MAXIMUM OF 45 DEG EACH WAS (90 DEG TOTAL) USING A WRENCH. SINCE 323321 1 12 THESE PINS ARE ONLY TORQUED TO 25 INCH POUNDS THE 90 DEG ROTATION WITH A 323321 1 13 WRENCH IS AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. NO OTHER SIGNIFICANT DISCREPANCIES 323321 1 14 WERE FOUND. CONCLUDE THAT THE GUIDE PINS WERE ORIGINALLY INSTALLED PER 323321 1 15 DESIGN AND THIS PR MERELY REVERIFIED THAT FACT AND NO FURTHER WORK OR 323321 1 16 INSPECTION IS REQUIRED. 323321 1 17 323502 1 1 DURING 50-02 DOOR INSTALLATION OV OV-103 PER V80-95002, TWO FASTENERS WO 323502 1 2 ULD NOT ENGAGE INTO THE 50-02 DOOR. THE INTERFERENCE WAS FOUND TO BE FLA 323502 1 3 SH FROM ADHESIVE USE TO BOND WSHERS IN PLAGE. A 0.375" DIA HAND REAMER W 323502 1 4 AS USED AND OBSTRUCTION WAS REMOVED. PROBABLE CASUE FOR DISCREPANCY IS W 323502 1 5 ORKMANSHIP DURING BONDING OF VR70-354241-002 WASHERS TO 50-02 DOOR. NO F 323502 1 6 URTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 323502 1 7 323788 1 1 THE LOOSENESS NOTED ON PAGE 1 WAS DUE TO EXCESSIVE PLAY IN THE ATTACH PO 323788 1 2 INT AND BEARING. THE BEARING WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS 323788 1 3 NORMAL WEAR. RETEST PERFORMED PER STEP 8. 323788 1 4 324871 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REBOND (1_ VR70-354241-002 SPACER 324871 1 2 ON THE BACKSIDE OF THE 50-01 DOOR. THE SPACER WAS REBONDED PER V9045 PR 324871 1 3 OCESS 900 AND THE 50-01 DOOR WAS INSTALLED TO APPLY PRESSURE. THE CURE W 324871 1 4 AS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF 7 DAY BOND VER 324871 1 5 IFICATION AT AMBIENT TEMPERATURE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEG 324871 1 6 RADATION. ROUTE TO PMRB BEFORE CLOSURE. CLOSE THIS PR AFTER VERIFICATION 324871 1 7 OF SHORE"D" 75 MINIMUM PER V9045 BONDING PROCESS. 324871 1 8 324895 1 1 DURING S1287, CLOSEOUT OF AFT SECTION, CONNECTOR 50P638 WAS FOUND WITH A 324895 1 2 BROKEN BACKSHELL. SRP V-EL-0001-B-O WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH 324895 1 3 A SPLIT TYPE. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NOR 324895 1 4 MAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 324895 1 5 325078 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) DURING CARRIER PANEL INSTALLATION, SEVERAL SCREWS 325078 1 2 (6) REACHED FINAL TORQUE BEFORE THE FASTENER HEAD SEATED. THE NUTPLATE 325078 1 3 THEREADS WERE CLEANED WITH A TAP AND THE MINIMUM LOCKING FEATURE WAS VER 325078 1 4 IFEID. THE CARRIER PANEL WAS INSTALLED AND RETURNED TO THE PRINT CONFIGU 325078 1 5 RATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FU 325078 1 6 RTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 325078 1 7 325169 1 1 THE FES FEEDLINE HEATER 'A' SUPPLY STRING 2 FAILED DUE TO A BLOWN FUSE I 325169 1 2 N LCA 2. THIS WAS CAUSED BY A SHORT IN WIRE #2E768N20 TO GROUND (SEE INT 325169 1 3 ERIM SUMMARY ON PAGE 93). THE DAMAGED WIRE WAS REPLACED AND THE ALCA #2 325169 1 4 FUSE CHANGED OUT. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER OMI V1291.002. N 325169 1 5 O FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: DUE TO OPERATIONAL DEGRAD/ 325169 1 6 WEAROUT. 325169 1 7 326642 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT REMOVAL OF THE 50-2 DOOR, THE V070-358375 RTV SEALS A 326642 1 2 ROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE DOOR WERE FOUND TO BE DENONDED AT SEVERAL LOC 326642 1 3 ATIONS. THE DEBONDED REGIONS WERE REBONDED TO THE DOOR WITH MR APPROVAL 326642 1 4 TO DELETE SURFACE PREPARATION AND LAP SHEAR REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE 326642 1 5 FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATOIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR EN 326642 1 6 GINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 326642 1 7 326644 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) DURING POST FLIGHT REMOVAL OF THE 50-01 DOOR, THE 326644 1 2 V070-358375 RTV SEALS AROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE DOOR WERE FOUND TO BE 326644 1 3 DEBONDED AT SEVERAL LOCATIONS. THE DEBONDED REGIONS WERE REBONDED TO TH 326644 1 4 E DOOR WITH MR APPROVAL TO DELECTS SURFACE PREPARATION AND LAP SHEAR REQ 326644 1 5 UIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERTIONAL DEGRADATION 326644 1 6 .(REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A LOCATION WHICH IS NOT A CA 326644 1 7 RRIER PANEL ATTACH POINT. THIS IS NOT A DISCREPANCY SINCE A SPACER IS NO 326644 1 8 T REQUIRED.(REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1) THE DISCREPANT SPACER WAS REMOVED AND 326644 1 9 A NEW VT70-35421-0012 SPACER WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 326644 1 10 THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR 326644 1 11 ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 326648 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2: CARRIER PANEL V070-397025-013 (LEFT HAND PLBD HINGE #10) 326648 1 2 HAS TWO SCRAPES. THE DISCREPANT AREAS WAS LIGHTLY SANDED AND PYROMARK PA 326648 1 3 INT MBO125-063 WAS APPLIED. ITEM 3: THERE IS MISSING PAINT ON THE HINGE 326648 1 4 CARRIER PANEL. PYROMARK PAINT MBO125-063 WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO 326648 1 5 RMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 326788 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIALLY INITIATED WHEN TRYING TO REMOVE THE RIGHT HAND 326788 1 2 NOSE WHEEL ASSY. THE BREAK-AWAY TORQUE STARTED AT 290 FT-LBS AND THEN 326788 1 3 FROZE UP, BREAK-AWAY TORQUE IS NOT TO EXCEED 600 FT LBS. THE PR WAS 326788 1 4 DISPOSTIONED TO APPLY LUBRICANT AND WHILE TAPPING ON OUTER BUSHING, TRY 326788 1 5 TO REMOVE THE NUT WITHOUT EXCEEDING 600 FT-LBS. THIS PROCEDURE WAS 326788 1 6 SUCCESSFUL AND THE NUT WAS REMOVED. UPON REMOVAL OF THE AXLE NUT, IT WAS 326788 1 7 FOUND THAT THE THREADS ON THE AXLE WERE GALLED AND A PG 1A WAS 326788 1 8 INITIATED. DUE TO THE GALLED CONDITON IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE AXLE 326788 1 9 AND THE AXLE NUTS HAD TO BE REPLACED. TO REPLACE THE AXLE, THE VENDOR 326788 1 10 (MENASCO) NEEDED TO PERFORM THE WORK (SINCE THE NOSE STRUT ASSEMBLY IS A 326788 1 11 LRU ITEM). MENASCO CAME TO KSC AND REPLACED THE AXLE AND UPON INSPECTION 326788 1 12 OF THE DAMAGED AXLE, THEY SUGGESTED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE COULD 326788 1 13 BE DUE TO THE AXLE NUT BEING WORK HARDENED, AFTER A DETERIORATION OF THE 326788 1 14 DRY LUBE, TO A HARDNESS GREATER THAN THE AXLE ITSELF. THE AXLE HAD BEEN 326788 1 15 MODIFIED DURING STS-1 PROCESSING TO A MATERIAL WITH A LOWE HARDNESS, 326788 1 16 WHILE THE AXLE NUT REMAINED THE SAME MATERIAL, THIS CAUSED AN 326788 1 17 INCOMPATABILITY OF MATERIALS. THEY SUGGESTED THAT THE AXLE BE ANANLYZED 326788 1 18 AND THE AXLE NUTS HAVE A ROCKWELL HARDNESS TEST PERFORMED ON THEM TO 326788 1 19 DETERMINE IF THEY WERE INDEED WORK HARDENED. RC ACTION IS REQUESTED TO 326788 1 20 TRACK AND DETERMINE IF AN ENGINEERING CHANGE IN PROCEDURE OR DESIGN 326788 1 21 NEEDS TO BE IMPLEMENTED. LRU PR HAS BEEN INITITATED TO TRACK THIS 326788 1 22 CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: AXLE NUT WORK HARDENED TO CAUSE AN 326788 1 23 INCOMPATABILITY OF MATERIALS. 326788 1 24 326928 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V76-40002, IT WAS FOUND THAT THERE WERE TWO CON 326928 1 2 NECTOR SAVERS (P/N ME414-0630-1001) THAT MATE TO J58 AND J60 THAT WERE C 326928 1 3 LOCKED INCORRECTLY. THIS DISCRPEANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY INITIATING A PMR F 326928 1 4 OR TWO NEW CONNECTOR SAVERS AND GENERATING AN FES PR AND ROUTE DEFECTIVE 326928 1 5 CONNECTOR SAVERS TO HDA FOR FURTHER DISPOSITION. NO RETEST OR FURTHER A 326928 1 6 CTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS DOCUMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE T 326928 1 7 O FABRICATION. 326928 1 8 326929 1 1 DURING V41-10002, PROPELLANT/PNEUMATIC SYSTEM LINES AND COMPONENTS VISUA 326929 1 2 L CHECK, WIRE T1870A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE WITHIN 2 INCHES O 326929 1 3 F 50P686. THE DISCREPANCY WAS REPAIRED BY RETERMINATING T1870A26 AT 50P6 326929 1 4 86. RETEST OF THIS REPAIR WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN 3-13-0201. NO FURTHER 326929 1 5 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DAMAGE ON ORBITER DURING PR 326929 1 6 OCESSING. 326929 1 7 326930 1 1 DURING V35-00002 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLE T279A26 HAD DAMAGED KAPTON. 326930 1 2 THE DAMAGE WAS REPAIRED BY PERFORMING SRP V-EL-0007-A-0 (SHIELDED CABLE 326930 1 3 REPAIR) TO REPAIR THE DAMAGED SECTION OF T279 A26 BY WRAPPING THE 326930 1 4 DISCREPANT AREA WITH MYSTIK 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE. THERE IS NO RETEST 326930 1 5 REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO NORMAL 326930 1 6 WEAR AND TEAR. 326930 1 7 326932 1 1 DURING V41-10002, PROPELLANT/PNEUMATIC SYSTEM LINES AND COMPONENTS VISUA 326932 1 2 L CHECK, WIRE T224A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE PRIMARY CONDUCTOR EXPOSED AT 50P 326932 1 3 607. A SECOND DISCREPANCY. KAPTON DAMAGE, WAS FOUND APPROXIMATELY 30 INC 326932 1 4 HES BACK FROM 50P607 ON THE SAME WIRE. THE FIRST DISCREPANCY WAS REPAIRE 326932 1 5 D BY RETERMINATING T224A26 AT 50P607. THE SECOND WAS REPAIRED BY TAPING 326932 1 6 THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007-A-O. A PAGE 1A WAS I 326932 1 7 NITIATED ON 50P607 WHICH HAD A BROKEN BACK-SHELL. A NEW BACKSHELL WAS IN 326932 1 8 STALLED WHILE WIRES WERE EXTRACTED. RETEST OF THIS REPAIR WILL BE TRACKE 326932 1 9 D PER SCAN 3-13-0203. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRD ON THIS PR. PROBABLE 326932 1 10 CAUSE: LACK OF ORBITER INTEGRITY DURING PROCESSING. 326933 1 1 DURING V41-10002, PROPELLANT/PNEUMATIC SYSTEM LINES AND COMPONENTS VISUA 326933 1 2 L INSPECTION, WIRE T289A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE WAS WRA 326933 1 3 PPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON T 326933 1 4 HIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND FEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSIN 326933 1 5 G. 326933 1 6 326935 1 1 SHEILDED CABLE T1834A26 HAD DAMAGE TO KAPTON INSULATION AS NOTED IN ITEM 326935 1 2 1 PG 1 AND ADDITIONAL KAPTON INSULATION WITH SHIELD DAMAGE AS NOTED IN 326935 1 3 ITEM 2 PAG 1A. ITEM 1 KAPTON DAMAGE ONLY WAS REPAIRED PER "SRP-V-EL-0007 326935 1 4 -A-0", METHOD B. ITEM 2, SHIELD DAMAGE WAS REPAIRED PER SEPERATE SRP "SR 326935 1 5 P-V-EL-0007-A-O" METHOD "A". PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATI 326935 1 6 ONAL DEGRADATION. 326935 1 7 327201 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT INSPECTION, TWO TEARS WERE FOUND IN THE V070-565371-0 327201 1 2 03 MONEL MESH. THE TEARS WERE ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR MA 327201 1 3 RKINGS WERE APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRA 327201 1 4 DATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 327201 1 5 327286 1 1 THE DEFECT NOTED ON THIS PR WAS VISUALLY INSPECTED USING A BORESCOPE AND 327286 1 2 GOOD LIGHTING AND WAS DETERMINED TO BE A SCRATCH IN THE KORPON FINISH. 327286 1 3 NO ADDITIONAL PAINT WAS REMOVED FOR THE INSPECTION THE KORPOR WAS REAPPL 327286 1 4 IED FOR CORROSION PROTECTION. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CA 327286 1 5 USE: WORKMANSHIP - PAINT WAS PROBABLY SCRATCHED DURING INSTALLATION OF C 327286 1 6 OTTER PIN IN DIFFICULT ACCESS AREA. 327286 1 7 327287 1 1 DURING V32-15109, POST FLIGHT ET DOOR CAVITY INSPECTION, TWO (2) DISCREP 327287 1 2 ANCIES WERE FOUND WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL BULB SEALS. ITEM 1 DOCUMENTS TW 327287 1 3 O (2) PINCHED AREAS ON THE V070-351993-003 SEAL. THE PINCHING OF THE SEA 327287 1 4 L RESULTED FROM CONTACT BETWEEN THE SEAL AND THE DOOR LINKAGES. BOTH PIN 327287 1 5 CHED AREAS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2 DOCUMENTE 327287 1 6 D AN AREA AT THE SPLICE AT THE OUTBOARD END OF THE V070-351992-002 SEAL 327287 1 7 WHERE PART OF THE SEAL HAD DEGRADED. AT THIS LOCATION, PER UNRESTRICTED 327287 1 8 MR DISPOSITION, A LONGER INTERNAL SPLICE WAS INSTALLED AND RTV WAS APPLI 327287 1 9 ED TO THE DEGRADED PORTION OF THE SEAL TO RESTORE ITS SEALING 327287 1 10 INTEGRITY. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 1 CONTACT BETWEEN SEAL AND LINKAGE 327287 1 11 ASSY WHEN DOOR IS ON CENTERLINE LATCHES. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 2 IN 327287 1 12 FLIGHT DAMAGE. 327388 1 1 DURING V31-13115, AVIONICS BAY 1 INSPECTION, THREE HARNESSES WERE FOUND 327388 1 2 TO BE ROUTED OVER EACH OTHER, BECAUSE OF THE EMC LEVEL OF EACH HARNESS W 327388 1 3 AS DIFFERENT, MINIMIZING THIS CONTACT WAS ESSENTIAL. CONNECTORS 81P6 AND 327388 1 4 81P10 WERE DEMATED AND HARNESSES UNCROSSED TO ACHIEVE THIS. RETEST OF 8 327388 1 5 1P6 AND 81P10 WILL BE TRACKED BY CIG 3-13-0044 AND 0045. NO FURTHER ACT 327388 1 6 ION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKAMNSHIP, HARNESSES WERE NOT 327388 1 7 ROUTED AS EFFECTIVELY AS THEY COULD HAVE BEEN. 327388 1 8 327428 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED UPON INSPECTION OF THE RIB BRAKE ASSY PRIOR TO BRA 327428 1 2 KE REMOVAL. THE NOTED DISCREPANCY IS ON THE OUTBOARD ROTOR ON THE OUTER 327428 1 3 DIAMETER SURFACE. THIS SURFACE IS NOT A BRAKING CONTACT SURFACE AND DOES 327428 1 4 NOT AFFECT THE BRAKING FUNCITON. THE BRAKES ARE ROUTED TO THE VENDOR. ( 327428 1 5 BF GOODRICH) AFTER REMOVAL FOR INSPECTION AND REFURBISHMENT PRIOR TO FLY 327428 1 6 ING AGAIN. THE DISCREPANCY HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED PER PR LRU MEQ-3-13-0571 327428 1 7 AND PHOTOGRAPHED PER OMI V1165.005 AND WILL BE ADDRESSED BY THE VENDOR. 327428 1 8 HANDLING DAMAGE IS THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY. 327429 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED UPON INSPECTION OF THE ROB BRAKE ASSY PRIOR TO BRA 327429 1 2 KE REMOVAL. THE NOTED DISCREPANCY IS ON THE OB ROTOR ON THE OUTER DIAMET 327429 1 3 ER SURFACE. THIS SURFACE IS NOT A BRAKING CONTACT SURFACE AND DOES NOT A 327429 1 4 FFECT THE BRAKING FUNCTION. THE BRAKES ARE ROUTED TO THE VENDOR (BF GOOD 327429 1 5 RICH) AFTER REMOVAL FOR INSPECTION AND REFURBISHMENT PRIOR TO FLYING AGA 327429 1 6 IN. THE DISCREPANCY HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED PER PR LRU-MEQ-3-13-0572 AND PHO 327429 1 7 TOGRAPHED PER OMI V1165.005 AND WILL BE ADDRESSED BY THE VENDOR. HANDLIN 327429 1 8 G DAMAGE IS THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY. 327477 1 1 DURING V31-15104, SURVEILLANCE AND INSPECTION OF PENTHOUSE AREA, 6 BAIND 327477 1 2 AIDS ON THE HEAT SHIELD WALL WERE FOUND TO HAVE DEBONDED. THE OLD BANDAI 327477 1 3 DS WERE REMOVED AND NEW BANDAIDS INSTALLED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED O 327477 1 4 N THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP, BANDAIDS WERE NOT INSTALLED PROP 327477 1 5 ERLY. 327477 1 6 327483 1 1 THE V070-194118-001 FILLER BAR SUPPORT TAB THAT DEBONDED FROM THE PRIMAR 327483 1 2 Y SEAL PANEL AT YW 342 WAS REBONDED PER V9045. THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN RETU 327483 1 3 RNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS POOR SURF 327483 1 4 ACE PREPARATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 327483 1 5 327774 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPO WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ON PAGE 1. 327774 1 2 0 (BURN MARKS ON THE SURFACE OF THE V070-320505-006 ET FWD FITTING ATTAC 327774 1 3 H). THE ABOVE DISPO CLEANED AND REMOVED THE BURN MARKS WITH IPA. THE ET 327774 1 4 FWD FITTING ATTACH WAS THEN CORROSION PROTECTED TO COVER ANY EXPOSED MET 327774 1 5 AL. THESE BURN MARKS WERE ONLY ON THE SURFACE OF THE ATTACH FITTING. IN 327774 1 6 THE PROCESS OF REMOVING THE BURN MARKS WITH IPS, THE KOROPON WAS STAINED 327774 1 7 (DISCOLORED). BECAUSE THE KOROPON IS ONLY DISCOLORED AND NO BUBBLING, L 327774 1 8 OOSE, OR CHIPPED KOROPON EXISTS, THE KOROPON IS ACCEPTABLE AS IS (NO PR 327774 1 9 CONDITION). THE V070-320505-006 ET FWD FITTING ATTACH IS RETURNED TO 327774 1 10 PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE: FLIGHT DAMAGE. 327782 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT INSPECTION OF THE AIRLOCK, A SMALL NICK WAS FOUND ON 327782 1 2 THE V075-322409-005 HATCH ASSEMBLY. PER MR DISPOSITION, THE ROUGH EDGES 327782 1 3 WERE REMOVED AND THE NICK WAS BLENDED SMOOTH WITH SURROUNDING MATERIAL. 327782 1 4 DISCPREANCY HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS REPAIRED. PROBA 327782 1 5 BLE CAUSE FOR DISCPREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP O 327782 1 6 R ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 327782 1 7 327783 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ( TH 327783 1 2 E 170D432470-1 THERMAL SEAL IS CRUSHED). ENGINEERING INSPECTION OF THE T 327783 1 3 HERMAL SEAL REVEALED THAT THERE WERE NO CRACKS IN THE OUTER FOIL COVERIN 327783 1 4 G (INCONEL) AND THAT THE THERMAL SEAL (FOIL ASSY) MAINTAINS ITS WELD WIT 327783 1 5 H THE PANEL ASSEMBLY. THE THERMAL SEAL WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTR 327783 1 6 ICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR A 327783 1 7 ND TEAR, 327783 1 8 327784 1 1 DURING V31-13121, THE "A" HATCH WINDOW WAS FOUND TO HAVE TWO SCRATCHES I 327784 1 2 N ITS FORWARD SURFACE (REF ITEM 1). THE SCRATCHES WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS 327784 1 3 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE TWO "BUBBLE LIKE DEFECTS" (REF ITEM2) WERE AC 327784 1 4 TUALLY DEBRIS WHICH WIPED OFF WITH RYMPLE CLOTH. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 327784 1 5 1 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 2 NO DISCREPANCY. 327784 1 6 327785 1 1 THE V070-194118-004 FILLER BAR SUPPORT TAB THAT DEBONDED FROM THE PRIMAR 327785 1 2 Y SEAL PANEL AT YW 437 WAS REBONDED PER V9045. THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN RETU 327785 1 3 RNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS POOR SURF 327785 1 4 ACE PREPARATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 327785 1 5 327814 1 1 THE V070-198371-001 CENTER HINGE SEALS NOTED IN ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 1 327814 1 2 WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPA 327814 1 3 NCY IS FLIGHT DAMAGE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING REQUIRED FOR THIS P 327814 1 4 R. 327814 1 5 327846 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ON P 327846 1 2 AGE 1.0 (NUMEROUS FASTENER HEADS IN AND OUTSIDE OF THE RUDDER SPEED BRAK 327846 1 3 E HAVE SUSPECT CORROSION). ENGINEERING INSPECTION OF THE 170D432788-15 B 327846 1 4 OLTS AND THE NAS1003-7A BOLTS REVEALED THAT THE SUSPECT CORROSION WAS AC 327846 1 5 TUALLY SUPERFICIAL SURFACE CORROSION. NO PITTING OF THE BOLT SURFACES EX 327846 1 6 ISTS. THE SURFACE CORROSION DOES NOT AFFECT THE FORM, FIT, OR FUNCTION O 327846 1 7 F THE BOLTS. THE BOLTS WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. THE PRO 327846 1 8 BABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 327847 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ON P 327847 1 2 AGE 1.0 (APPROXIMATELY 1" OF THE FORWARD END OF THE V070-298112-019 THER 327847 1 3 MAL BARRIER ASSEMBLY IS TORN AND BENT BACK). THE DISCREPANT THERMAL BARR 327847 1 4 IER ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW ASSEMBLY. THE R&R OF TH 327847 1 5 E ASSEMBLY RETURNED THE THERMAL BARRIER INSTALLATION TO PRINT CONFIGURAT 327847 1 6 ION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 327847 1 7 327849 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSTION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ON PA 327849 1 2 GE 1.0 (SCRATCHED AREA ON THE 170D441321TRAILING EDGE ASSEMBLY). THE AR 327849 1 3 EA WAS SANDED TO REMOVE ANY RAISED METAL OR ROUGH EDGES. AFTER SANDING, 327849 1 4 MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN WHICH REVEALED A MAXIMUM DEPTH OF .003". THE 327849 1 5 THICKNESS OF THE FACESHEET IN THE AREA IS .090" - .160". DUE TO THE THI 327849 1 6 CKNESS OF THE FACESHEET, THE SKIN PANEL WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 327849 1 7 USE AS IS . THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 327849 1 8 327890 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 AND 327890 1 2 DISCREPANCY ITEM 2.0 ON PAGE 1.0 (SUSPECT CORROSION DETECTED ON THE ATTA 327890 1 3 CHING HARDWARE FOR CARRIER PANEL V070-393314-001 (49-32) AND CARRIER PAN 327890 1 4 EL V070-393314-001 (49-31). ENGINEERING INSPECTION OF THE ATTACHING HARD 327890 1 5 WARE REVEALED THAT WHAT APPEARED TO BE SUSPECT CORROSION WAS ACTUALLY RT 327890 1 6 V OUTGASSING DEPOSITS. THERE WAS NO PITTING OF THE SCREW HEADS. THE ABOV 327890 1 7 E DISPOSITION REMOVED THE RTV OUTGASSING DEPOSITS WITH BEHR-TEX AND WIRE 327890 1 8 BRUSH. REMOVING ALL THE OUTGASSING DEPOSITS RETURNED THE C/P INSTALLATI 327890 1 9 ONS TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL 327890 1 10 DEGRADATION. 328081 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ON P 328081 1 2 AGE 1.0 (AFTER REMOVAL OF THE V070-146068-002 BOLTS FROM RH INBOARD F/D 328081 1 3 #4 AND RH OUTBOARD F/D #12, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE THREADS OF THE BO 328081 1 4 LTS WERE GAULLED AND ROUNDED OUT). AFTER AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF TH 328081 1 5 E DISCREPANCY, IT WAS DETERMINED BY LSOC/ENG, RI/ENG, AND NASA/ENG THAT 328081 1 6 THE BOLTS WERE BECOMING GAULLED ON INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL BECAUSE THE 328081 1 7 V070-146070 LINK ASSEMBLES DID NOT ALIGN WITH THE FLIPPER DOOR BOLT HOLE 328081 1 8 LOCATIONS. AS A RESULT OF THE MISALIGNMENT, UPON INSTALLATION THE THREA 328081 1 9 DS OF THE BOLTS WOULD CATCH ON THE INSIDE DIAMETER OF THE HOLES IN THE 328081 1 10 LINK ASSEMBLIES. THE FIRST STEP WAS TO TRY TO ALIGN THE LINK ASSEMBLIES 328081 1 11 BY HAND BEFORE INSTALLING THE BOLTS. THIS WAS PERFORMED FOR RIGHT HAND 328081 1 12 FLIPPER DOORS NUMBER 4 AND NUMBER 12. AS A RESULT OF ALIGNING THE LINK 328081 1 13 ASSEMBLIES ONLY SLIGHT WEAR WAS OBSERVED ON THE BOLTS. AT THIS TIME IT 328081 1 14 WAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT THE BOLTS WERE SEATED WHEN THEY WERE LESS THAN 328081 1 15 3/16" ABOVE THE FLIPPER DOOR PANEL. THE SECOND STEP WAS TO REMOVE THE 328081 1 16 LINK ASSEMBLIES, SAND DOWN THE PROTRUDING RIVET HEADS, MEASURE THE HOLE 328081 1 17 DIAMETERS AND BREAK ALL THE SHARP EDGES AROUND THE HOLES. TWO 328081 1 18 DISCREPANCIES WERE PICKED UP AT THIS TIME. ITEM 2.0 ON PAGE 1A (HOLE IN 328081 1 19 THE V070-146070-002 RH F/D NUMBER 12 OUTBOARD LINK ASSY IS OUT OF 328081 1 20 TOLERANCE) AND ITEM 3.0 ON PAGE 1B (HOLE IN THE V070-146070-001 RH F/D 328081 1 21 NUMBER 12 INBOARD LINK ASSY IS OUT OF TOLERANCE). BOTH OF THESE 328081 1 22 DISCREPANCIES WERE ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTICTED USE DUE TO THE FACT 328081 1 23 THAT THE BOLTS DO NOT EXPERIENCE SHEAR IN THE INBOARD OR OUTBOARD 328081 1 24 DIRECTION WHERE THE LARGEST OUT OF TOLERANCE CONDITION EXISTS. THE 328081 1 25 PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE OUT OF TOLERANCE HOLES WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 328081 1 26 THE THIRD STEP WAS TO REMOVE THE V070-146061 CLEVIS ATTACHES ALONG WITH 328081 1 27 THE V070-146100 SHIMS. THE SHIM THICKNESS WERE MEASURED AND FITCHECKS 328081 1 28 WITH DIFFERENT SIZE SHIMS WERE PERFORMED TO DETERMINE THE OPTIMUM SHIM 328081 1 29 THICKNESS TO ALIGN THE LINK ASSEMBLIES. THE FOLLOWING WAS DETERMINED: RH 328081 1 30 F/D NO. 4 INBOARD - NO SHIM REQUIRED. RH F/D NO. 4 OUTBOARD - .023" 328081 1 31 THICK. RH F/D NO. 12 INBOARD - .046" THICK. RH F/D NO. 12 OUTBOARD - 328081 1 32 .051" THICK. ITEM 4.0 ON PAGE 1C WAS PICKED UP AT THIS TIME (ON THE 328081 1 33 OUTBOARD SIDE OF F/D NO. 12, THE GAP BETWEEN THE V070-146070-002 LINK 328081 1 34 ASSY AND THE V070-146051 BEAM MEASURE .015" SHOULD ONLY BE A MAX OF 328081 1 35 .010"). RH F/D NO. 12 WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS WITH THE 328081 1 36 OUT OF TOLERANCE GAP. THE GAP DID NOT AFFECT THE INSTALLATION OF THE 328081 1 37 BOLTS AND THE LINK ASSY DID NOT BIND DOWN AGAINST THE FITTING. THE 328081 1 38 FITTINGS AND LINK ASSEMBLIES WERE THEN INSTALLED WITH THE REQUIRED SHIM 328081 1 39 THICKNESS. THIS ALLOWED FOR THE LINK ASSY TO ALIGN PROPERLY WITH THE 328081 1 40 FLIPPER DOOR BOLT LOCATIONS. DURING THIS TIME IT WAS ALSO NOTICED THAT 328081 1 41 SLIGHT PRESSURE ON THE TRAILING EDGE SEAL OF THE FLIPPER DOOR BEING 328081 1 42 WORKED HELPS ALIGN THE LINK ASSY AND THE FLIPPER DOOR PANEL. PERMANENT 328081 1 43 DEV'S WERE WRITTEN TO THE OPENING A 328081 1 44 ND CLOSING JOBCARDS FOR FLIPPER DOORS NO. 4 AND 12 (LH AND RH) TO ASSIST 328081 1 45 THE TECHNICIAN IN INSTALLING THE BOLTS. THESE DEV'S INCLUDE ALLOWING FOR 328081 1 46 FLIGHT PRESSURE ON THE TRAILING EDGE SEALS. THE DEV'S TO THE JOBCARDS 328081 1 47 ALONG WITH THE REWORK ON THE STRUCTURE ALLOWS FOR COMPLETE ALIGNMENT OF 328081 1 48 THE BOLTS AND STRUCTURE IF THE PROCEDURE IS FOLLOWED AS STATED ON THE 328081 1 49 DEV'S, THE THREADS ON THE BOLTS WILL NOT BE DAMAGED. DISCREPANCY ITEM 328081 1 50 1.0 IS RESOLVED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 328330 1 1 AT APPROXIMATELY 500 SECONDS AFTER ENGINE START FOR STS-39 LAUNCH, THE M 328330 1 2 FV PRE-LAUNCH SKIN TEMP #1 MEASUREMENT WENT FROM A NORMAL READING OF ABO 328330 1 3 UT 80 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT TO ABOUT 670 DEGREES AND STAYED THERE FOR SEVER 328330 1 4 AL SECONDS. IT CAME BACK DOWN TO ALMOST NORMAL AFTER ABOUT 20 SECONDS. W 328330 1 5 ORK WAS DONE BY INS AND OEL ENGINEERING. WIRE SEGMENT T1885B26 FOUND TO 328330 1 6 BE INTERMITTENT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. THE FINAL END TO END TEST SHOW 328330 1 7 N GOOD READING OF SENSOR. THIS PR WILL BE CLOSED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO 328330 1 8 WORKMANSHIP. 328390 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ON P 328390 1 2 AGE 1.0 (DENTED V070-565418-007 SHIELD). THE SHIELD WAS NOT CRACKED AND 328390 1 3 WAS ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE SHIELD MAINTAINS ITS DESIGN 328390 1 4 INTENT (LIGHTNING PROTECTION FOR THE LO2 ET CURTAIN CLOSEOUT AREA). THE 328390 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 328390 1 6 328496 1 1 REFERENCE DISCREPANCY ON PAGE 1, THE BROKEN GROUND WIRE WAS REPAIRED BY 328496 1 2 THE INSTALLATION OF A NEW JUMPER WIRE AND SOLDER SLEEVE ON WIRE E238A26. 328496 1 3 THE GROUND WIRE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RETERMINATED TO THE CONNECTOR BACKSHEL 328496 1 4 L, THEREBY RETURNING WIRE HARNESS TO A DRAWING/FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. A S 328496 1 5 UCCESSFUL RETEST OF THE REPAIRED WIRE WAS PERFORMED PER OMI V1291.003 (R 328496 1 6 EFERENCE INTERIM SUMMRAY ON PAGE 20). RETEST OF DEPINNED/REPINNED WIRES 328496 1 7 E238A26 AND 2C112B24 TO BE TRACKED BY CIG/SCAN SYSTEM. NO FURTHER ACTION 328496 1 8 REQUIRED ON PR. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 328542 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, WIRE BUNDLE 50W90 WAS FOUND TO INTERFERE WITH GSE C 328542 1 2 LAMP P/N: G070-502843-008. PHOTOS OF BEFORE AND AFTER PLATFORM WERE TAKE 328542 1 3 N AND SHOWN TO R1. TWO WIRE HARNESS CLAMPS HAVE TO BE REMOVED TO ELIMINA 328542 1 4 TE WIRE HARNESS INTERFERENCE. A PERMANENT DEV WAS WRITTEN TO V35-00001 T 328542 1 5 O REMOVE AND RE-INSTALL CLAMP AS REQUIRED FOR PLATFORM REMOVAL AND INSTA 328542 1 6 LLATION. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROBLEM 328542 1 7 WITH DESIGN AND INTERFACE OF THE ORBITER AND GSE HARDWARE. 328542 1 8 328692 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, DESCRIBED (4) DENTS IN THE FACESHEET OF THE INSIDE OF TH 328692 1 2 E ENGINE NO. 1, LH-HALF, BASE-MOUNTED, DOME HEARSHIELD. THESE DENTS WERE 328692 1 3 MINOR IN DEPTH AND NATURE. MOLD IMPRESSIONS, EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION, A 328692 1 4 ND 10X MAGNIFICATION REVELAED NO CONCERNS. THE DENTS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS 328692 1 5 IS. DENT NO.3 WAS ORIGINALLY DOCUMENTED WITH A 0.0465" DEPTH, AND DISPO 328692 1 6 SITION WAS WRITTEN TO BOND A DOUBLER OVER IT PER MR. LATER, IT WAS DISCO 328692 1 7 VERED THAT THE QC HAD INCORRECTLY TRANPOSED THE INFORMATION ONTO THE PR. 328692 1 8 THE CORRECT DEPTH OF 0.0046" WAS ENTERED, AND A NEW MR WAS WRITTEN TO A 328692 1 9 CCEPT DENT NO.3. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THESE DENTS WAS OPERATIONAL 328692 1 10 DEGRADATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE INCORRECT DENT NO.3 DEPTH WAS QC 328692 1 11 PAPER ERROR WHILE TRANSFERRING DATA BETWEEN TWO PAPER. 328693 1 1 REF ITEM 1, PG 1, DENTS #1, #2 ON V070-351901-013 HONEYCOMB FACESHEET OF 328693 1 2 THE ENGINE #1 RH BASEMOUNTED DOME HEAT SHIELD. DENT #2 WAS MR APPROVED 328693 1 3 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. DENT #1 WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 328693 1 4 AS REPAIRED BY BONDING A DOUBLER. THE PRESENCE OF DENT #2 AND THE DOUBL 328693 1 5 ER REPAIR OF DENT #1 DOES NOT AFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE V07 328693 1 6 0-351901-013 HONEYCOMB FACESHEET OF THE ENGINE #1 RH BASE-MOUNTED DOME H 328693 1 7 EAT SHIELD. BOTH LOCATIONS ARE MR MARKED. THIS PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE CA 328693 1 8 USE: PROCESSING WEAR AND TEAR. 328727 1 1 ITEMS 1-5, PAGE 1, DEPRESSED AREAS WITH MISSING COATING ALONG THE FORWAR 328727 1 2 D EDGES OF LH INBOARD ELEVON FLIPPER DOOR RUB PANELS #2,4,5,6 AND 8, V07 328727 1 3 0-198002-076,-080,-082,-084,-088, RESPECTIVELY. (THE INBOARD ELEVON RUB 328727 1 4 PANELS ARE NUMBERED FROM INBOARD OUTWARD FROM #1 TO #9). ALL LOCATIONS W 328727 1 5 ERE INSPECTED FOR CRACKS USING 10X MAGNIFIYING LENS. CRACKS WERE OBSERVE 328727 1 6 D ON PANEL #2 ONLY. A COIN TAP INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED, NO DEBONDING OF 328727 1 7 THE FACESHEET WAS REVEALED. PANEL #2 WAS MR REPAIRED BY REMOVING THE CR 328727 1 8 ACKED AREA AND SMOOTHING OUT THE FORWARD EDGE. ANY EXPOSED INCONEL WAS C 328727 1 9 OATED WITH MBO125-063 HIGH TEMPERATURE COATING ON PANEL 2. THE EXPOSED 328727 1 10 INCONEL ON PANELS 4,5,6 AND 8 WERE MR REPAIRED BY COATING WITH 328727 1 11 MBO125-063 HIGH TEMPERATURE COATING. THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 329072 1 1 DURING V6012 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLE T198A26 HAD DAMAGED SHIELD 329072 1 2 JACKET INSULATION AT MULTIPLE LOCATIONS (REFERENCE ITEM 1). THE CABLE 329072 1 3 WAS REPAIRED BY PERFORMING SRP V-EL-0007-A-0 TO WRAP THE DAMAGED 329072 1 4 SECTIONS OF CABLE WITH MYSTIK 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE. IT WAS ALSO DETECTED 329072 1 5 THAT THREE BANDAIDS IN THE AREA WERE DAMAGED (REFERENCE ITEM 2). THE 329072 1 6 DISCREPANT BANDAIDS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW BANDAIDS. THE 329072 1 7 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEMS 1 AND 2 WERE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THERE 329072 1 8 IS NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 329072 1 9 329270 1 1 DURING V6012 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLE 5ZK361A26 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE. INS 329270 1 2 PECTION OF THE CABLE REVEALED THE SHIELD JACKET WAS DAMAGED WITH NO SHIE 329270 1 3 LD STRANDS BROKEN. THE DAMAGE WAS REPAIRED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA 329270 1 4 WITH MYSTIK 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE WITH MR APPROVAL. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FO 329270 1 5 R THIS PR WAS DUE TO NORMAL AND TEAR. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR TH 329270 1 6 IS PR. 329270 1 7 329271 1 1 DURING V6012 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLE 4ZK324R24 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE. INS 329271 1 2 PECTION OF THE CABLE REVEALED THE SHIELD JACKET WAS DAMAGED WITH NO SHIE 329271 1 3 LD STRANDS BROKEN. THE DAMAGE WAS REPAIRED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA 329271 1 4 WITH MYSTIK 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE WITH MR APPROVAL. THE PROBABLE CASUE FO 329271 1 5 R THIS PR WAS DUE TO NORMAL AND TEAR. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR TH 329271 1 6 IS PR. 329271 1 7 329295 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V6012 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE T1962A26 HAD 329295 1 2 KAPTON DAMAGED WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTOR(S). THI 329295 1 3 S DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIK 750 329295 1 4 3 ELECTRICAL TAPE PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRE 329295 1 5 D ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL 329295 1 6 HARDWARE. MR APPROVED. 329295 1 7 329360 1 1 A BAD DRIVER FOR THE FES FEEDLING HEATERS 'A' SUPPLY STRING 2 WAS FOUND 329360 1 2 IN THE AFT LCA #2 (REF PR OEL-3-13-0085). THE LCA WAS REPLACED AND SUCCE 329360 1 3 SSFULLY RETESTED PER OMI V1291.002. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. PROBA 329360 1 4 BLE CAUSE: SHORT TO GROUND FOUND IN WIRE HARNESS BETWEEN LCA #2 AND FES 329360 1 5 HEATERS. 329360 1 6 329638 1 1 THESE LOCATIONS WITH TORN SEALS (ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGES 1 AND 1A) WERE R 329638 1 2 EPAIRED PER MR DISPOSITION BY WRAPPING THE DISCREPANT AREA OF THE SEAL W 329638 1 3 ITH MYSTIC 7503 TAPE. LOCATIONS WITH IMPROPERLY BONDED OR DEBONDED SPLIC 329638 1 4 ES (ITEMS 1,2,3 AND 7 ON PAGES 1, 1A, 1B, AND 1F) WERE RETURNED TO PRINT 329638 1 5 CONFIGURATION BY REPLACING THE DISCREPANT SPLICES AND BONDING PER PRINT 329638 1 6 . THE DEBONDED FOOT (ITEM 4 ON PAGE 1C) WAS REBONDED PER PRINT REQUIREME 329638 1 7 NTS. THE DISCREPANT PRIMER APPLIED AND CURED PER SPECIFICATION. THE BOND 329638 1 8 WITH FAILED LAP SHEARS (ITEM 6 ON PAGE 1E) WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UN 329638 1 9 RESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEMS WITH DEBONDS (ITEMS 1,2,3 AND 4 329638 1 10 ON PAGES 1, 1A, 1B, AND 1C) IS IMPROPER BONDING DURING ORIGINAL 329638 1 11 INSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEMS 5 AND 6 ON PAGES 1D AND 1E IS 329638 1 12 WORKMANSHIP. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR TORN SEALS (ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGES 1 AND 329638 1 13 1A) IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION 329638 1 14 REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 329699 1 1 DURING TPS DIG-3-13-137 STEP 143, PIN 114 IN CONNECTOR 83P8 WAS FOUND TO 329699 1 2 HAVE DAMAGE AT THE CONNECTOR INSERT. THE CONNECTOR WAS REPLACED. DURING 329699 1 3 CONNECTOR R & R, THE BACKSHELL WAS DAMAGED AND PINS 46 AND 57 WERE FOUND 329699 1 4 BENT (PAGE 1A). THE BACKSHELL WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW ONE AND THE BENT 329699 1 5 CONTACTS WERE REPLACED. AFTER REPAIR OF CONNECTOR WAS COMPLETE, HI-POT T 329699 1 6 ESTING WAS PERFORMED AND PIN F ON B.O.B. NO.2 (PIN 67 ON 83P8) AND FAILE 329699 1 7 D (PAGE 1B.) AN INSPECTION OF WIRE OF HARNESS IN THE ECLSS BAY REVEALED 329699 1 8 WIRE 5ZK422A24 HAD KAPTON AND SHIELD DAMAGE (PAGE 1C). SRP-V-EL-0008-0-0 329699 1 9 (REPAIR OF DAMAGE DATA BUS AND PYRO INITIATOR WIRES) WAS USED TO REPAIR 329699 1 10 WIRE AND HYPOT TEST WASREPEATED AND SUCCESSFUL. NO FURTHER ACTION 329699 1 11 REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP, DAMAGE CAUSED DURING 329699 1 12 MATE OF CONNECTOR. PAGE 1A: WORKMANSHIP, TOO MUCH LOCKTITE WAS USED AND 329699 1 13 BACKSHELL WAS BROKE DURING REMOVAL. PAGE 1B: FUNTIONAL FAILURE. PAGE 1C: 329699 1 14 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DURING PROCESSING. 329717 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1, TWO BLIND RIVETS WERE FOUND TO BE LOOSE ON THE AFT SIDE 329717 1 2 OF THE XO1365 WING CARRY THRU. THE RIVETS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER 329717 1 3 STEPS 2 & 3. ITEM 2 PAGE 1A, 2 MORE BLIND RIVETS WERE FOUND TO BE SPINNI 329717 1 4 NG ON THE AFT SIDE OF THE XO1365 WING CARRY THRU AND WERE ALSO CHANGED O 329717 1 5 UT PER STEPS 1-3. ITEM 3 PAGE 1B, 2 ADDITIONAL JO-BOLTS OUTBOARD OF THE 329717 1 6 REPLACED JO-BOLTS WERE FOUND TO BE LOOSE, THESE JO-BOLTS WERE REMOVED AN 329717 1 7 D REPLACED PER STEPS 5 & 6. ALL SPINNING JO-SPINNING JO-BOLTS WERE REPLA 329717 1 8 CED. ALL JO-BOLTS FOR WING CARRY THRU WERE INSPECTED TO VERIFY THEY DO N 329717 1 9 OT SPIN. PROBABLE CAUSE IS PREVIOUS JO-BOLTS NOT INSTALLED PER 329717 1 10 SPECIFICATION. 329718 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1 NTOED THAT TEFLON TAPE WRAPPED AROUND HARNESS AT 40P871 WAS 329718 1 2 DAMAGED. TEFLON TAPE WAS REMOVED. ENGINEERING INSPECTION/EVALUATION OF T 329718 1 3 HE OWER CABLES AT 40P871 REVEALED ONLY COSMETIC IMPERFECTIONS OF THE CAB 329718 1 4 LES. THIS IS ALLOWABLE PER SPEC MLO303-0013 PARA 5.1.2.1 FOR CABLES TYPE 329718 1 5 MBO150-048. DUE TO THE MULTIPLE LOCATIONS OF OUTER COATING MISSING ON T 329718 1 6 HE CABLES THEY WERE RE-WRAPPED WITH PTFE TAPE PER MLO303-0014 PARA 4.1.3 329718 1 7 .2.4. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OEPRATIONAL DEGRADATION. 329718 1 8 329797 1 1 UPON REMOVAL OF THE 74-01 DOOR, ONE FASTENER HOLE WAS FOUND TO BE 329797 1 2 ELONGATED SUCH THAT ONLY 70 PERCENT OF THE FASTENER HEAD MAKES CONTACT 329797 1 3 WITH THE DOOR. THE HOLE WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR 329797 1 4 MARKINGS HAVE BEEN APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS 329797 1 5 WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 329797 1 6 329827 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V31-15105 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE H1063C26 329827 1 2 HAD EXPOSED PRIMARY CONDUCTOR(S). THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY PERF 329827 1 3 ORMING SRP V-EL-0002-B-0 TO INSTALL KSC SPLICE #0454 AT THE DAMAGED AREA 329827 1 4 . TIS RETURNS THE WIRE TO DESIGN INTENT. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQ 329827 1 5 UIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND 329827 1 6 TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. THE WIRE & SPLICE INTEGRITY WAS VERI 329827 1 7 FIED DURING TESTING PROCEDURES IN IMI SS1287 ON 9/3/91 & 9/7/91. THIS IS 329827 1 8 PERFORMED DURING FINAL AFT CLOSEOUT PRIOR TO FLIGHT. 329900 1 1 ITEM 1, DEPRESSED AREAS ALONG THE FORWARD EDGES OF LH OUTBOARD ELEVON FL 329900 1 2 IPPER DOOR RUB PANELS #10, 15 AND 16, V070-198801-026, -060, V070-198809 329900 1 3 -010, RESPECTIVELY. (THE OUTBOARD ELEVON RUB PANELS ARE NUMBERED FROM IN 329900 1 4 BOARD OUTWARD FROM #10 TO #16) ALL LOCATIONS WERE MISSING COATING AT THE 329900 1 5 DEPRESSED AREAS. ALL LOCATIONS WERE INSPECTED FOR CRACKS USING A 10X MA 329900 1 6 GNIFYING LENS. NO CRACKS WERE OBSERVED. A COIN TAP INSPECTION WAS PERFOR 329900 1 7 MED WITH NO DEBONDING OF THE FACESHEET REVEALED. THE EXPOSED INCONEL ON 329900 1 8 PANELS #10, 15 AND 16 WERE MR REPAIRED BY COATING WITH MBO125-063 HIGH 329900 1 9 TEMPERATURE COATING. THIS PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 329900 1 10 DEGRADATION. 329900 1 11 329919 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ON P 329919 1 2 AGE 1.0 AND ITEM 2.0 ON PAGE 1A. THE DISCREPANT V070-565249-006 BASE PLA 329919 1 3 TE WAS ROUTED TO ROCKWELL DOWNEY FOR REPAIR OF THE THREAD IMPRESSIONS ON 329919 1 4 THE CENTER BORE (ITEM 1.0) AND FOR THE INSERT HOLES TO BE BROACHED IF R 329919 1 5 EQUIRED (ITEM 2.0). THE BASE PLATE WAS RETURNED AND INSTALLED PER JOBCAR 329919 1 6 D V35-50002. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE THREAD MARKS WAS NORMAL WEAR AND 329919 1 7 TEAR AND THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE INSERT HOLES NOT BEING BROACHED WAS 329919 1 8 VENDOR. 329936 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCIES ITEM 1.0 AN 329936 1 2 D 2.0 ON PAGE 1.0 AND ITEM 3.0 ON PAGE 1A. THE DISCREPANT V070-565249-00 329936 1 3 5 BASE PLATE WAS ROUTED TO ROCKWELL DOWNEY FOR REPAIR OF THE NICKS AND G 329936 1 4 OUGES ON THE LOWER SURFACE OF THE BASE PLATE (ITEM 1.0), FOR THE REPLACE 329936 1 5 MENT OF THE FWD AND AFT INSERTS (ITEM 2.0), AND FOR THE INSERT HOLES TO 329936 1 6 BE BROACHED IF REQUIRED (ITEM 3.0). THE BASE PATE WAS RETURNED AND INSTA 329936 1 7 LLED PER JOBCARD V35-50002. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEMS 1.0 AND 2.0 WAS 329936 1 8 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AND THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE INSERT HOLES NOT BE 329936 1 9 ING BROACHED WAS VENDOR. 329948 1 1 DURING NUTPLATE INSTALLATION PER STR-3-13-504, IT WAS FOUND THAT THERE W 329948 1 2 AS NO ACCESS TO INSTALL CONVENTIONAL SOLID RIVETS. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAI 329948 1 3 NED TO INSTALL BLIND RIVETS. PRIOR TO BLIND RIVET INSTALLATION, IT WAS D 329948 1 4 ETERMINED THAT THERE WAS ACCESS TO INSTALL PER PRINT RIVETS. PER PRINT R 329948 1 5 IVETS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG 329948 1 6 ACTION REQUIRED. 329948 1 7 330050 1 1 DURING ECL-3-A0034 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CONNECTOR 40P9342 HAD A BROKEN B 330050 1 2 ACKSHELL STRAIN RELIEF. THE DAMAGED BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND AREPLACED 330050 1 3 WITH A SPLIT BACKSHELL PER SRP V-EL-0001-B-0. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRE 330050 1 4 D FOR CONNECTOR 40P9342. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS NORMAL WEAR 330050 1 5 AND TEAR. 330050 1 6 330135 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING V31-14163 WHEN CORROSION WAS FOUND ON BOTH 330135 1 2 LOCK TABS AT BOTH ENDS OF (V070-595512-005) PUSH ROD #4 RIGHT HAND VENT 330135 1 3 DOOR. THE CORROSION WAS WIPED CLEAN FROM THE LOCK TABS WERE VISUALLY INS 330135 1 4 PECTED AND IT WAS VERIFIED THAT ALL SURFACE CORROSION HAD BEEN REMOVED. 330135 1 5 A SAMPLE OF THE CORROSION WAS SENT TO NASA ANALYSIS LAB DM-MSL-1. THE LA 330135 1 6 B DETERMINED IT TO BE PRIMARY SEAL CORROSION WITH CHLORIDES AND OXIDES. 330135 1 7 PROBABLE CAUSE: THE CORROSION WAS DUE TO NORMAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 330135 1 8 330136 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF JC V31-14163 ON LH VENT 330136 1 2 DOOR #4. CORROSION WAS NOTIVED ON BOTH OF THE LOCK TABS AT EACH END OF 330136 1 3 THE V070-594512-005 PUSH ROD. THE SURFACE CORROSION WAS REMOVED USING 330136 1 4 IPA AND BEARTEX AND THE DISCREPANT CONDITION NO LONGER EXIXTS. PROBABLE 330136 1 5 CAUSE: CORROSION DEVELOPED FROM NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 330136 1 6 330137 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF JC V31-14171 ON RH VENT 330137 1 2 DOOR #6. CORROSION WAS NOTICED ON BOTH OF THE LOCK TABS AT EACH END OF 330137 1 3 THE V070-594575-001 PUSH ROD. THE SURFACE CORROSION WAS REMOVED USING 330137 1 4 IPA AND BEARTEX AND THE DISCREPANT CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE 330137 1 5 CAUSE: CORROSION DEVELOPED FROM NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 330137 1 6 330138 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF JC V31-14171 ON LH VENT 330138 1 2 DOOR #6. CORROSION WAS NOTICED ON BOTH OF THE LOCK TABS AT EAC END OF 330138 1 3 THE V070-594575-001 PUSH ROD. THE SURFACE CORROSION WAS REMOVED USING 330138 1 4 IPA BEARTEX AND THE DISCREPANT CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE 330138 1 5 CAUSE: CORROSION DEVELOPED FROM NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 330138 1 6 330164 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WS DETECTED THAT CONNECTOR 50P12 HAD WHITE OXIDAT 330164 1 2 ION ON THE CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELL. AN ANALYSIS OF THE WHITE POWDER FOUN 330164 1 3 D ON CONNECTORS LOCATED IN THE BODY FLAP NEAR THE PDU WAS PERFORMED ON P 330164 1 4 R EPD-4-08-0771. THE RESULTS FOUND THAT THE WHITE POWDER WS ALUMINUM OXI 330164 1 5 DE. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS DETERINED THAT SMALL NICKS OR CRACKS IN THE NICKLE 330164 1 6 PLATE OF THE CONNECTORS ALLOW MOISTURE AND POOSSBILE HCL FROM SRB EXHAU 330164 1 7 ST TO REACT WITH THE UNDERLYING ALUMINUM. THE EXPANDED ALUMINUM OXIDE IS 330164 1 8 THEN ENGOLIATING THE NICKEL PLATE, ALLOWING MORE CORROSION (OXIDATION). 330164 1 9 IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS WOULD NOT AFFECT THE FUNTION OF THE 330164 1 10 CONNECTROS/BACKSHELLS. THE CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELL WERE CLEANED WITH 330164 1 11 ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL PER MLO303-0014 EO F02 FOR CONNECTOR/BACKSHELL 330164 1 12 OXIDATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOAR THIS PR WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 330164 1 13 THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 330165 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DETECTED THAT CONNECTOR 50P12 HAD WHITE OXIDA 330165 1 2 TION ON THE CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELL. AN ANALYSIS OF THE WHITE POWDER FOU 330165 1 3 ND ON CONNECTORS LOCATED IN THE BODY FLAP NEAR THE PDU WAS PERFORMED ON 330165 1 4 PR EPD-4-08-0771. THE RESULTS FOUND THAT THE WHITE POWDER WAS ALUMINUM O 330165 1 5 XIDE. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS DETERMINED THAT SMALL NICKS OR RACKS IN THE NICK 330165 1 6 THEN ENFOLIATING THE NICKEL PLATE, ALLOWING MOARE CORROSION (OXIDATION) 330165 1 7 . IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS WOULD NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF THE 330165 1 8 CONNECTORS/BACKSHELLS. THE CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELL WERE CLEANED WITH 330165 1 9 ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL PER MLO303-0014 EO F02 FOR CONNECTOR/BACKSHELL 330165 1 10 OXIDATION. THE PROBABLE CASUE FOR THIS PR WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 330165 1 11 THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 330207 1 1 DURING WORK OF TPS-505, STEP 6.0, IT WAS NOTICED THAT INTERFERENCE WOULD 330207 1 2 OCCUR BETWEEN THE SPIDER GROUND NUTPLATE ON THE V070-855337-002 FRAME S 330207 1 3 UPPORT AND AN EXISTING GASEOUS HELIUM P08 HARD LINE LOCATED ADJACENT TO 330207 1 4 THE V070-855337-002 FRAME SUPPORT IF THE NUTPLATE WAS TO BE INSTALLED PE 330207 1 5 R THE WAD. THE LOCATION OF THE NUTPLATE WAS CHANGED BY 2.25" AS SHOWN BY 330207 1 6 ATTACHMENT #1 OF THIS PR. THE V070-85533-002 FRAME SUPPORT WAS MR ACCEP 330207 1 7 TED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS MODIFIED. THIS MR IS REFLECTED IN A MOD TO T 330207 1 8 PS-505. THIS PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 330339 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF JC V31-14151 ON RH VENT 330339 1 2 DOOR #3, CORROSION WAS NOTICED ON BOTH OF THE LOCK TABS AT EACH END OF 330339 1 3 THE V070-594557-001 PUSH ROD. THE SURFACE CORROSION WAS REMOVED USING 330339 1 4 IPA AND BEARTEX AND THE DISCREPANT CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE 330339 1 5 CAUSE: CORROSION DEVELOPED FROM NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 330339 1 6 330340 1 1 ON THE LH #3 VENT DOOR DRIVE ROD, THE LOWER LOCK TAB WAS BROKEN OUT AT T 330340 1 2 HE LOCKWIRE HOLE. THE UPPER TAB ALSO SHOWED EVIDENCE OF SLIGHT SURFACE C 330340 1 3 ORROSION. THE ROD WAS REMOVED FROM THE SHIP FOR BETTER ACCESS AND THE T 330340 1 4 AB (LOWER) WAS REPLACED. THE UPPER TAB WAS CLEANED WITH IPA AND ABRASIVE 330340 1 5 PADS WITHOUT REMOVING METAL. THE ROD WAS REINSTALLED AND RETESTED PER V 330340 1 6 9001. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND ENV 330340 1 7 IRONMENTAL DEGRADATION. 330340 1 8 330343 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED WHEN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A GSE GROUND POINT DID 330343 1 2 NOT EXIST UNDER THE 50-02 DOOR AS SPECIFIED PER THE GSE PRINT. PER E.O. 330343 1 3 T.F. A GROUND POINT WAS PROVIDED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS DESIGN DEFICIENC 330343 1 4 Y. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. 330343 1 5 330352 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT WINDOW INSPECTION, MINOR ACCUMLATION OF DUST AND PART 330352 1 2 ICULATE DEBRIS WAS FOUND TO EXIST ALONG THE EDGE OF THE SEAL AND WINDOW 330352 1 3 PANE INTERFACE OF WINDOW #9. THIS CONTIMINATION WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FO 330352 1 4 R UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS OPERTIONAL DEGRADA 330352 1 5 TION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 330352 1 6 330353 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT WINDOW INSPECTION, MINOR ACCUMLATION OF DUST AND PART 330353 1 2 ICULATE DEBRIS WAS FOUND TO EXIST ALONG THE EDGE OF THE SEAL AND WINDOW 330353 1 3 PANE INTERFACE OF WINDOW #10. THIS CONTAMINATION WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS F 330353 1 4 OR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS OPERTIONAL DEGRAD 330353 1 5 ATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 330353 1 6 330466 1 1 DURING INS-3-13-129 WIRE 2ZK468A24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE NUMEROUS KAPTON DAM 330466 1 2 AGES AT 54P24. THE WIRE WAS REPLACED, THEN A CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND H 330466 1 3 YPOT TEST WAS RUN TO VERIFY INTEGRITY OF THE WIRE. NO FURTHER ACTION REQ 330466 1 4 IRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING 330466 1 5 PROCESSING. 330466 1 6 330481 1 1 CABLE 1ZK518B24 WAS REPAIRED PER SRP V-EL-0007-A0 METHOD B UPON THE ADDR 330481 1 2 ESSMENT OF ITEM 2 PG 1A. ITEM 2 NOTED THAT TAPE REPAIR COULD NOT BE PERF 330481 1 3 ORMED DUE TO THE INABILITY TO REMOVE WIRE I.D. ADJ TO WIRE DAMAGE. ENGIN 330481 1 4 EERING EVALUATION DETERMINED THAT SRP-0007 MAY BE PERFORMED ADJ AND OVER 330481 1 5 LAPPING AN EXISTING WIRE I.D. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR KAPTON DAMAGE CAN BE AT 330481 1 6 TRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 330481 1 7 330501 1 1 DUE TO A RECURRENCE OF THESE GROUNDING CLIPS BEING DAMAGED FREQUENTLY DU 330501 1 2 RING PROCESSING OPERATIONS. A CR WILL BE SUBMITTED TO RE-DESIGN A NEW LO 330501 1 3 CATION FOR THESE TWO CLIPS. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH A ROCKWELL 330501 1 4 MCR. THE RECURRENCE CONTROL BLOCK ON PAGE 1.0 IS BEING MARKED TO MAINTAI 330501 1 5 N TRACKING OF THIS MODIFICATION. THE DISCREPANT CLIPS HAVE BEEN REPLACED 330501 1 6 PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 330501 1 7 330542 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS AN FLIGHT 12 IFA WITH THE LIOH DOOR LATCHES. THE LEFT 330542 1 2 HAND, AFT LATCH WAS FOUND TO HANG DURING CYCLING. THE V070-332710-002 LA 330542 1 3 TCH FITTING WAS TRIMMED PER MR DISPOSITION TO ALLEVIATE THE INTERFERENCE 330542 1 4 .THE REMAINING LATCHES WERE CYCLED AND FREE TRAVEL HAS BEEN VERIFIED. PR 330542 1 5 OBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS A BUILD UP OF TOLERANCE. NO FURTHER 330542 1 6 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 330542 1 7 330626 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) DURING INSTALLATION OF (2) VR70-326918-001 DOUBLE 330626 1 2 RS PER STR-3-13-503, THE POSSIBILTY OF BREAKOUT WAS FOUND TO EXIST AT TH 330626 1 3 E 0.216 DIA HOLE LOCATION. PER E.O.T.F. DISPOSITION, A 0.141 DIA HOLE WA 330626 1 4 S DRILLED AND SMALLER DIA HARDWARE INSTALLED FOR THE LOCKWIRE PROVISION. 330626 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. (REF ITEM 2 O 330626 1 6 N PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS MISDRILLED HOLES THROUGH THE VR70-326918-0 330626 1 7 01 DOUBLERS. THE HOLES DRILLED DO NOT LINE UP WITH HOLES IN VEHICLE STRU 330626 1 8 CTURE. NEW DOUBLERS WERE OBTAINED AND THE HOLES WERE REDRILLED ALLOWING 330626 1 9 THE DOUBLERS TO BE INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS 330626 1 10 WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 330768 1 1 DURING ECL-3-13-228, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE NUTPLATE SPACING ON THE 70C29 330768 1 2 32 BRACKET WOULD NOT ALLOW INSTALLATION OF THE ME275-0004-1010 CLAMP. TH 330768 1 3 E SPACING WAS 2.90 INCHA DN 1.535 INCH IS REQUIRED FOR CLAMP INSTALLATIO 330768 1 4 N. PER EOTF DISPOSITION, (1) MD114-5003-0004 NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED PROV 330768 1 5 IDING PROPER SPACING TO ALLOW CLAMP INSTALLATION. RELEASED EO REFLECTS W 330768 1 6 ORK PERFORMED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCU IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 330768 1 7 NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINNERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 330768 1 8 330777 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V41-10002 IT WAS DICOVERED THAT WIRE T163A26 330777 1 2 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTORS. 330777 1 3 THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 330777 1 4 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 330777 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. MR 330777 1 6 APPROVED. 330777 1 7 330778 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V41-10002 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE YX631A24 330778 1 2 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO VISIBLE DAMAGE TO THE PRIMARY CONDUCTOR(S) OR 330778 1 3 THE SHIELD. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY PERFORMING AN MR TAPE REP 330778 1 4 AIR SINCE THE DAMAGE WAS ADJACENT TO A CLAMP AND SRP V-EL-0007 WASN'T AP 330778 1 5 PLICABLE. THIS RETURNS WIRE YX631A24 TO DESIGN INTENT WITH NO RETEST OR 330778 1 6 FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS DOCUMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS 330778 1 7 DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 330778 1 8 330814 1 1 DURING V41-10002, PROPELLANT/PNEUMANTIC SYSTEM LINES AND COMPONENTS 330814 1 2 VISUAL INSPECTION, WIRE T258A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE 330814 1 3 WAS WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION 330814 1 4 REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER 330814 1 5 DURING PROCESSING. 330814 1 6 330815 1 1 DURING V41-10002, PROPELLANT/PNEUMATIC SYSTEM LINES AND COMPONENTS 330815 1 2 VISUAL INPSECTIO, WIRE T222A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE WAS 330815 1 3 WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP-V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED 330815 1 4 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING 330815 1 5 PROCESSING. 330815 1 6 330817 1 1 DURING V41-10002, THE FOLLOWING THREE WIRE'S T257A26,T272A26 & T273A26 W 330817 1 2 RE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. THE REPAIR WAS PERFORMED BY USING SRP V- 330817 1 3 EL-0007-A-0 METHOD B. THE THREE CABLE'S WERE WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 EL 330817 1 4 ECTRICAL TAPE. THE BACKSHELL OF CONNECTOR 50P613 WAS LOOSENED AND THE BA 330817 1 5 CKSHELL WAS RECLOCKED TO RELIEVE STRESS ON THE WIRE LEAVING THE CONNECTO 330817 1 6 R. PROBABLE CASUE FOR THE DISCREPANT WIRE'S WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND T 330817 1 7 EAR. THE CLOCKING ON THE BACKSHELL WAS DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. THERE IS NO R 330817 1 8 ETEST REQUIRED. 330870 1 1 DURING A RECEIVING INSPECTION, WIRE HARNESS V070-772934-002 ARRIVED FROM 330870 1 2 ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER (NSLD) WITH OPEN RAMA 143155. THIS RAMA WAS 330870 1 3 WAITING FOR EO V070-772934 A03 TO BE RELEASED. EO V070-772934 A03 WAS 330870 1 4 RELEASED AS REQUESTED ON THE RAMA. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS 330870 1 5 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR - SENT HARDWARE TO KSC NOT IN PRINT 330870 1 6 CONFIGURATION. 330870 1 7 330872 1 1 DURING A RECEIVING INSPECTION, WIRE HARNESS V070-772935-002 ARRIVED FROM 330872 1 2 ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER (N.S.L.D) WITH OPEN RAMA 143151. THIS RAMA WAS 330872 1 3 WAITING FOR E.O. V070-772935 A03 TO BE RELEASED. E.O. V070-772935 A03 WA 330872 1 4 S RELEASED AS REQUESTED ON THE RAMA. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS 330872 1 5 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR-SENT HARDWARE TO KSC NOT IN PRINT CONFIGURATI 330872 1 6 ON. 330872 1 7 330907 1 1 DURING V5C17.005 ALCA #2 INSTALLATION, CONNECTOR 55P315 WAS FOUND TO HAV 330907 1 2 E A CHIP IN THE PHENALIC. AN MR WAS APPROVED TO ACCEPT AS IS. NO FURTHER 330907 1 3 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. CONN HAS BEEN MR ID. PROB CAUSE: NORMAL WEA 330907 1 4 R AND TEAR DUIRNG MATE/DEMATE. 330907 1 5 330940 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V41-10002 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE T258A26 H 330940 1 2 AD KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTOR(S). T 330940 1 3 HIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7 330940 1 4 503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 330940 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. MR A 330940 1 6 PPROVED. 330940 1 7 330941 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V41-10002 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE T226A26 H 330941 1 2 AD KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO DAMGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTOR(S). TH 330941 1 3 IS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 75 330941 1 4 03 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. P 330941 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. MR AP 330941 1 6 PROVED. 330941 1 7 330960 1 1 DURING V41-10002, PROPELLANT/PNEUMATIC SYSTEM LINES AND COMPONENTS VISUA 330960 1 2 L INSPECTION, WIRE P650A22 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE WAS WRA 330960 1 3 PPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON T 330960 1 4 HIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSIN 330960 1 5 G. 330960 1 6 330962 1 1 DURING V41-10002, PROPELLANT/PNEUMATIC SYSTEM LINES AND COMPONENTS INSPE 330962 1 2 CTION, WIRED 2ZK550B24 AND 2ZK551B24 WERE FOUND TO HAVE NUMEROUS KAPTON 330962 1 3 SEPARATIONS. BOTH WIRES WERE REPLACED FROM 50J18 TO 50P258. WHEN 50J18 W 330962 1 4 AS OPENED A PAGE 1A WAS INITIATED DUE TO THE LOCKING FEATURES BEING WORN 330962 1 5 AND WOULD NOT LOCK. AFTER 50J18 WAS REPLACED, CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND 330962 1 6 HYPOT WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY THE INTEGRITY OF THE NEW WIRES. NO FURTHE 330962 1 7 R ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: )PAGE 1 AND 1A) NORMAL WEA 330962 1 8 R AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 330991 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS TWO DIMPLES IN THE WING U 330991 1 2 PPER SKIN NEAR THE WING LEADING EDGE SPAR. THE DIMPLES WERE MR ACCEPTED 330991 1 3 AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO MR MARKINGS WERE REQUIRED. PROBABLE CASUE 330991 1 4 FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP DURING ORIGINAL MANUFACTURE ASSEMBLY OF THE 330991 1 5 WING. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 330991 1 6 331088 1 1 ITEM 1.0: PROPER INDENTIFICATION WAS MARKED ON THE XO1380 FRAME WEB ADJ 331088 1 2 TO THE ANGLE. ITEM 2.0: WIRE HARNESS CLAMP WAS REMOVED FROM THE GROUND P 331088 1 3 OINT. PER EOTF THE FAYING SURFACES OF THE ANGLE AND WEB WERE PROPERLY CO 331088 1 4 RROSION PROTECTED AND ELECTRICAL BOND TESTED TO PROVIDE PROPER GROUNDING 331088 1 5 INTEGRITY. PROBABLE CAUSE IS DESIGN DIFICIENCY. 331088 1 6 331090 1 1 THE V070-398934-001 AND -002 FLOW RESTRICTOR SUPPORTS ARE SLIGHTLY BENT 331090 1 2 AND MISLOCATED. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS PER MR. PROBABLE CA 331090 1 3 USE: DEFECT IS FROM MANUFACTURING. 331090 1 4 331141 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V5012 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 2E822B26 HAD 331141 1 2 KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTOR(S). THIS 331141 1 3 DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503 331141 1 4 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PRO 331141 1 5 BABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 331141 1 6 331142 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V5012 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE T1795A26 HAD 331142 1 2 KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTOR(S). THIS 331142 1 3 DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIK 7503 331142 1 4 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PRO 331142 1 5 BABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 331142 1 6 331155 1 1 DURING V41-10002, PROPELLANT/PNEUMATIC SYSTEM LINES AND COMPONENTS 331155 1 2 VISUAL INSPECTION, WIRE T1854A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE AND 331155 1 3 SHIELD DAMAGE. WIRE STRANDS WERE TRIMMED AND WIRE WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 331155 1 4 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE 331155 1 5 CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 331155 1 6 331277 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN A SWIVEL CAP WAS FOUND TO BE MISSING ON THE F 331277 1 2 WD STOW STOP BOLT ON THE AFT MPM PEDESTAL DURING AN INSPECTION AFTER OMI 331277 1 3 V1173. THE CAP WAS REPLACED AFTER THE MPM WAS DEPLOYED DURING OMI V1173 331277 1 4 . A LOST AND FOUND PR IS OPEN ON THE MISSING CAP. RETEST-A RETEST WILL B 331277 1 5 E PERFORMED DURING OMI V1182. PROBABLE CAUSE: RETAINING TAB BROKE ALLOWI 331277 1 6 NG THE CAP TO SLIP FREE WHEN THE PEDESTAL WAS DEPLOYED. 331277 1 7 331283 1 1 THE V070-339683-002 FIBERGLASS CLOSEOUT PANEL HAD (1) CRACK WHICH WAS RE 331283 1 2 PAIRED WITH FIBERGLASS PATCHES. THIS MR REPAIR WILL NOTADVERSELY AFFECT 331283 1 3 THE INTEGRITY OF THE PANEL. THE CLOSEOUT PANEL IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE 331283 1 4 . PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AND FAULTY WORKMANSHIP. 331283 1 5 331298 1 1 DURING V41-10002, PROPELLANT/PNEUMATIC SYSTEM LINES AND COMPONENTS VISUA 331298 1 2 L INSPECTION, WIRE T171A26 AND T172A26 WERE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. 331298 1 3 WIRES WERE WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTIO 331298 1 4 N REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER D 331298 1 5 URING PROCESSING. 331298 1 6 331354 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT DEGRADING RTV SEALANT AROUND THE RH ML 331354 1 2 G INBOARD TRUNION FITTING/BUSHING (REF ITEM #1). IN ADDITION, THE NOTED 331354 1 3 BUSHING WAS NOTICED TO HAVE SHIFTED 1/16" OUTBOARD FROM THE FITTING (REF 331354 1 4 ITEM #2). THE DISCREPANT CONDITIONS WERE CORRECTED WHEN THE BUSHING WAS 331354 1 5 TAPPPED INTO PLACE AND SEATED CORRECTLY IN THE FITTING. THE DISCREPANT 331354 1 6 RTV SEALANT WAS REMOVED AND A NEW SEAL WAS APPLIED TO THE BUSHING/FITTIN 331354 1 7 G. THE PR CONDITIONS NO LONGER EXIST. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CA 331354 1 8 USE (ITEMS 1 & 2): NORMAL OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 332383 1 1 CONN 82P104 HAS GOUGE ON FACE OF CONNECTOR. MR ACCEPTED AS IS UPON VERIF 332383 1 2 ICATION THAT PIN HOLE NEAR GOUGE WAS FREE OF OBSTRUCTIONS. PROBABLE CAUS 332383 1 3 E CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. CLOSE PR UPON THE FOLLOWING CONCURRE 332383 1 4 NCE 332383 1 5 332384 1 1 DURING OEL-3-13-0032 IT WAS NOTED THAT CONNECTOR/RECEPTACLE 82V72A61J1 P 332384 1 2 IN 112 WAS BENT 90 DEG. CONNECTOR/RECEPTACLE 82J1 IS MOUNTED TO A STRUC 332384 1 3 TURE BRACKET FOR WHICH CONNECTOR 82P104 IS MATED. CONNECTOR/RECEPTACLE 8 332384 1 4 2J1 WAS REMOVED AND A NEW CONNECTOR/RECEPTACLE WAS INSTALLED. THE CONNEC 332384 1 5 TOR/RECEPTACLE 82J1 IS A BUSSED CONTACT 24 SHELL HERMETIC RECEPTACLE THA 332384 1 6 T CONTAINS PINS AND BUSS JUMPERS INSIDE THE BACK OF RECEPTACLE. RETEST O 332384 1 7 F CONNECTOR/RECEPTACLE 82J1 WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED PER V1059. PROBABLE CAU 332384 1 8 SE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. 332395 1 1 DURINGV1017, WIRE H1037B24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE/WITH MINOR SH 332395 1 2 IELD DAMAGE (1 OR 2) BROKEN STRANDS. THE REPAIR WAS PERFORMED BY USING S 332395 1 3 RP V-EL-0007-A-0 METHOD "A" BY TRIMMING THE SHIELD AND WRAPPING THE WIRE 332395 1 4 WITH MYSTIC 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR 332395 1 5 AND TEAR. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED. 332395 1 6 332397 1 1 DURING V1017,WIRE T184AB26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE WAS WRA 332397 1 2 PPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON T 332397 1 3 HIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSIN 332397 1 4 G. 332397 1 5 332399 1 1 DURING V1017, WIRES T235A26 AND T237AB26 WERE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAG 332399 1 2 E. WIRES WERE WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACT 332399 1 3 ION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER 332399 1 4 DURING PROCESSING. 332399 1 5 332402 1 1 DURING V1017, WIRE T159A26, T154A26, T160A26, T168A26 AND T167A26 WERE 332402 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE T159A26 WAS INSPECTED BY ENGINEERING 332402 1 3 AND DETERMINED THAT THE DAMAGED KAPTON WAS COSMETIC ONLY. WIRES T154A26, 332402 1 4 T160A26, T168A26 AND T167A26 WAS WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER 332402 1 5 SRP-V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 332402 1 6 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 332402 1 7 332403 1 1 DURING V1017, WIRE T215A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO SHIEL 332403 1 2 D OR CONDUCTOR DAMAGE. THE REPAIR WAS PERFORMED BY USING SRP V-EL-0007-A 332403 1 3 -0 BY WRAPPING THE WIRE WITH MYSTIC 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE. PROBABLE CAUSE 332403 1 4 WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THERE IS NOT RETEST REQUIRED. 332403 1 5 332405 1 1 DURING V1017, WIRE T1995A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE, WITH NO SHI 332405 1 2 ELD OR CONDUCTOR DAMAGE. THE REPAIR WAS PERFORMED BY USING SRP V-EL-0007 332405 1 3 -A-0 BY WRAPPING THE WIRE WITH MYSTIC 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE. PROBABLE CAS 332405 1 4 UE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED. 332405 1 5 332406 1 1 DURING V1017, WIRE T262A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE WAS WRA 332406 1 2 PPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON T 332406 1 3 HIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSIN 332406 1 4 G. 332406 1 5 332409 1 1 ITEM 1 PG. 1 NOTED WIRE HARNESS ASSOCIATED WITH CONN. 21P81 TO HAVE POSS 332409 1 2 IBLE CONDUCTOR DAMAGE DUE TO BENDS IN WIRE HARNESS. ALSO NOTED WAS THE P 332409 1 3 OSSIBILITY OF SHIELD DAMAGE. WIRE HARNESS HAS NO SIGNS OF DAMAGE TO COND 332409 1 4 UCTORS OR CABLE SHIELDING. WIRE HARNESS IS INCASED IN CONVOLUTED TUBING 332409 1 5 FOLLOWED BY BRAIDED TUBING THEN LT-80 TAPE AND MIL-I-23594 TYPE 1 TAPE. 332409 1 6 THE REASON THE HARNESS IS BENT IN THE MANNER NOTED ON PG.1 IS THE CONVOL 332409 1 7 UTED TUBING IS NOT ABLE TO MAKE SHARP BENDS AND TENDS TO COMPRESS SLIGHT 332409 1 8 LY. MR IDENTIFICATION WAS INSTALLED ON HARNESS V070-772264-201 FOR FUTU 332409 1 9 RE REFERENCE TO IDENTIFY HARNESS BEING SLIGHTLY CRIMPED. THE BRAIDED 332409 1 10 TUBING WAS FOUND TO BE EXPOSED AT CONN. 21P81. THE BRAIDED TUBING WAS 332409 1 11 RE-WRAPPED WITH LT-80 AND MIL-I-23594 TYPE I TAPE OVERWRAPPING CONN. 332409 1 12 21P81 PER DRAWING SPECIFICATION. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO 332409 1 13 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 332410 1 1 DURING V6012, WIRE DF698A24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE (ITEM 2 AND 332410 1 2 3) AND CHAFFING AGAINST WIRE TRAY (ITEM 1). WIRE WAS WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 332410 1 3 7503 PER SRP-V-EL-0007 AND PROTECTED WITH PTFE TEFLON TAPE. NO FURTHER 332410 1 4 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AND ON 332410 1 5 ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 332410 1 6 332413 1 1 DURING V070-3-13-144, OV-102 PLBD BULB SEAL SIMULATION TEST, THE V070-39 332413 1 2 8506-012 BULB SEAL HAD TO BE CUT AT XO 1307, YO -33. THE DISCREPANT SEAL 332413 1 3 WAS REMOVED AND A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED. THE ADJACENT V07 332413 1 4 0-398558-034 (-050) SPLICE AT XO 1307, YO-63.8 WAS R & R'D TO SUPPORT TH 332413 1 5 IS OPERATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 332413 1 6 (REF ITEM 2 PAGE 1A) THIS DISCREPANCY DOCUMENTS PRIMER CURE WHICH SURPA 332413 1 7 SSED MAX ALLOWABLE PER SPECIFICATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANC 332413 1 8 Y IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THI 332413 1 9 S PR. 332522 1 1 FOUND SEVERAL WIRES HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE ON WIRES WHICH IS VISIBLE. DAMAGE 332522 1 2 D CABLE 3P7B14 HAD A SECTION OF CABLE REMOVED ELIMINATING DAMAGE AREA. W 332522 1 3 IRE SEGMENT WAS SPLICED TO GETHER USING 6 KSC SPLICES. WIRE 2P4B14-3 WAS 332522 1 4 REPAIRED BY INSTALLING AN INSULATION SLEEVE OVER WIRE UPON MR APPROVAL. 332522 1 5 WIRE 2P1B14-2 WAS DISCOVERED TO HAVE PAINT DAMAGE ONLY WHICH IS ACCEPTA 332522 1 6 BLE. RETEST WAS COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY BY ENGINE 3 AC3 RETEST ATTACHMENT 332522 1 7 . THIS PRWILL BE CLOSED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. 332522 1 8 332524 1 1 UPON ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF THE NOTED ITEM 1 AND 2 DISCREPANCIES IT W 332524 1 2 AS DISCOVERED THAT ITEMS WERE INCORRECTLY ANNOTATED. EVALUATION CONCLUDE 332524 1 3 D THAT CABLE NOTED IN ITEM 1 WAS NOT FUSED TOGETHER. CABLES NOTED IN ITE 332524 1 4 MS 1,2 ANFD 3 ARE TWISTED NON-SHIELDED WIRES. THE CABLE 2D1601C20 WAS DE 332524 1 5 TERMINED AFTER REMOVING SPOT TIES SHOWED VISIBLE CONDUCTOR EXPOSURE AND 332524 1 6 DAMAGE. THE CABLE ALSO HAD NO GREY MATTER UPON INSPECTION/EVALUATION AS 332524 1 7 NOTED. THE DISCREPANCIES NOTE ON PG 1 AND 1A WERE CHANGED PER STEP 2-1 T 332524 1 8 O REFLECT THE CORRECT ANNOTATION OF DISCREPANCIES. THE CABLE 2D1601C20 H 332524 1 9 AD A SECTION OF CABLE REMOVED FROM BEYOND THE DAMAGED AREA TO CONNECTOR 332524 1 10 40P156. THE CABLE SECTION WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW SECTION AND 332524 1 11 RETERMINATED INTO CONNECTOR 40P156 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2). THE CABLE 332524 1 12 2D1600C20-3 HAD A CLAMSHELL REPAIR PERFORMED TO REPAIR EXPOSED UNDAMAGED 332524 1 13 CONDUCTOR (REF ITEMS 3). AS NOTED IN ITEM 4 IT WAS NOTED THAT CONTINUITY 332524 1 14 WAS REVERSED BETWEEN 40P156 PIN U+V TO 55P597 PIN L+U. IT WAS DETERMINED 332524 1 15 THAT STEP 2-27 WAS INCORRECTLY ANNOTATED AS TO WHAT PIN LOCATIONS TO 332524 1 16 PERFORM CONTINUITY CHECK BETWEEN CORRECT LOCATIONS 40P156 PIN U TO 332524 1 17 55P597 PIN U AND 40P156 PIN V TO 55P597 PIN L. NO FURTHER RETEST IS 332524 1 18 REQUIRED. WIRE REPAIRS THAT WERE PERFORMED ON CABLES 2D1601C20 AND 332524 1 19 2D1600C20-3 ARE BOTH PINNED IN CONNECTOR 40P156 WHICH WAS DEMATED TO 332524 1 20 PERFORM DISPOSITIONED WORK. CONNECTOR RETEST OF 40P156 WILL BE TRACKED 332524 1 21 PER CIG/SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE FROR ITEMS 1,2 AND 3 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO 332524 1 22 WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 4 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO WORK AUTHORIZATION ERROR. 332551 1 1 INSPECTION OF THE RIGHT HAND RADIATOR PANEL NO. 1 REVEALED TWO SMALL ARE 332551 1 2 AS OF SILVER-TEFLON TAPE DELAMINATION. THESE DISCREPANCIES ARE ACCEPTABL 332551 1 3 E PER THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL AND HAVE BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UN 332551 1 4 RESTRICTED USE "AS-IS" PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 332551 1 5 332553 1 1 THE ROLLER ASSY WAS CHECKED BY LSOC MEQ, NASA MEQ AND RI LSS AND FOUND T 332553 1 2 O ROTATE FREELY. THE ROLLER DID NOT FREE WHEEL AS MUCH AS SOME OTHER BUL 332553 1 3 KHEAD ROLLERS, BUT IT DOES SPIN WITH VERY LITTLE RESISTANCE. THE ORIGINA 332553 1 4 L DISCREPANCY WAS PROBABLY CAUSED BY A BUILD-UP OF WORN DRYLUBE WHICH MA 332553 1 5 Y HAVE BEEN WORKED FREE BY ALL THE DIFFERENT PEOPLE WHO EVALUATED IT. NO 332553 1 6 FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 332553 1 7 332603 1 1 DURING V6012, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR 50V77W118P662 HAS A LOOSE 332603 1 2 BACKSHELL. THE BACKSHELL ON 50P662 WAS OPENED AND IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT 332603 1 3 THE LOCKING TABS ON 50P662 WERE MISSING (ITEM 2). CONNECTOR 50P662 AND 332603 1 4 BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELL. 332603 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THIS RETURNS CONNECTOR ASSY 332603 1 6 TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. RETEST OF 50P662 WILL BE PER CIG/SCAN TRACK. 332603 1 7 332658 1 1 ITEM 1: SMALL HOLE IN THE FACESHEET OF LEFT HAND NO.3 RADIATOR FACESHEET 332658 1 2 . PER MR (1 EA.) DOUBLER WAS BONDED OVER THE HOLE AND RADIATOR TAPE WAS 332658 1 3 INSTALLED OVER THE DOUBLER. PROBABLE CAUSE: METEOR STRIKE 332658 1 4 332659 1 1 (ITEM #1) METEOR STRIKE ON LEFT HAND RADIATOR #3 CAUSING A SMALL DENT IN 332659 1 2 THE FACESHEET. THE DEFECT IS LOCATED 91" FROM THE FWD EDGE OF THE RADIA 332659 1 3 TOR AND 18" FROM THE HINGE LINE AND .4" INBD FROM THE NEAREST FREON TUBE 332659 1 4 . PER THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA THE DENT WAS 332659 1 5 MR ACCEPTED AS IS AND THE RADIATOR TAPE WAS REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: M 332659 1 6 ETEOR STRIKE. (ITEM #2) SMALL TRIANGULAR AREA OF SILVER-TEFLON TAPE DEBO 332659 1 7 NDED. THIS TAPE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AN 332659 1 8 D TEAR. 332682 1 1 ITEM 1: MINOR DEPRESSION IN THE RIGHT HAND NO.4 RADIATOR FACESHEET. THE 332682 1 2 DEPRESSION IS .2223" DIAMETER AND .0419" IN DEPTH. THERE WAS NO CRACKS I 332682 1 3 N THE FACESHEET AND NO DEBOND. PER MR (1EA) AL DOUBLER WAS BONDED OVER T 332682 1 4 HE DEPRESSION AND RADIATOR TAPE WAS INSTALLED OVER THE DOUBLER. PROBABLE 332682 1 5 CAUSE: METEOR STRIKE. 332682 1 6 332683 1 1 SMALL METEOR IMPACT ON RIGHT HAND RADIATOR NO.4 CAUSING A MINOR DENT IN 332683 1 2 THE FACESHEET AT XO1216, YO 21.75, 3" INBD OF NEARST FREON TUBE. THE DEN 332683 1 3 T WAS MR ACCPETED AS IS PER THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MANUAL AND ALL TH 332683 1 4 E RADIATOR TAPE WAS REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: METEOR STRIKE. 332683 1 5 332684 1 1 THERE IS MINOR TAPE DAMAGE TO RIGHT HAND RADIATOR #3. THE DAMAGE IS CONT 332684 1 2 AINED IN THE TAPE AND MR ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE: METEOR IMPACT. 332684 1 3 332685 1 1 THERE IS A MINOR PINHOLE DENT IN THE FACESHEET OF THE UPPER RIGHT HAND # 332685 1 2 3 RADIATOR PANEL. THE SILVER TEFLON TAPE WAS REMOVED FOR AN INSPECTION O 332685 1 3 F THE RADIATOR FACESHEET REINSTALLED USING RTV-142 PER MR. PROBABLE CAUS 332685 1 4 E: METEORITE IMPACT DURING FLIGHT. 332685 1 5 332686 1 1 THERE IS MINOR TAPE DAMAGE TO RIGHT HAND RADIATOR NO.3. THE DAMAGE IS CO 332686 1 2 NTAINED IN THE TAPE AND MR ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR A 332686 1 3 ND TEAR DUE TO PROCESSING. 332686 1 4 332687 1 1 ITEM NO.1: SMALL METEOR IMPACT ON RIGHT HAND RADIATOR NO.2 CAUSING A SMA 332687 1 2 LL DENT IN THE FACESHEET. THE DEFECT IS 38/ 3/4" FROM THE FWD EDGE OF TH 332687 1 3 E RADIATOR AND 63 1/4" FROM THE HINGE LINE, AND 1.1" OUTBD OF THE NEARES 332687 1 4 T FREON TUBE. THE DENT WAS MR ACCEPTED PER THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAIR MA 332687 1 5 NUAL AND ALL THE RADIATOR TAPE WAS REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: METEOR STRI 332687 1 6 KE. ITEM NO.2: THERMAL CONTROL COATING TAPE (RADIATOR TAOE) WAS OUT OF T 332687 1 7 HE DESSICATED STORAGE BAG MORE THAN 13 HOURS. NEW TAPE WAS OBTAINED. 332687 1 8 332688 1 1 THE METEOR IMPACT AT XO 821.39, YO 76.0 (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) WAS RESOLVED BY 332688 1 2 REMOVING THE DAMAGED SILVER/TEFLON TAPE AND INSPECTING THE RADIATOR FAC 332688 1 3 ESHEET. INSPECTION OF THE RADIATOR FACESHEET REVEALED THAT THE FACESHEET 332688 1 4 WAS NOT PENETRATED, DEBONDED OR CRACKED. THE INSPECTION DID REVEAL THAT 332688 1 5 THE FACESHEET WAS SLIGHTLY (.003" DEEP) DENTED. THE SLIGHT DENT WAS DET 332688 1 6 ERMINED TO BE WITHIN THE ACCEPTABLE LIMITS PER THE VOUGHT RADIATOR REPAI 332688 1 7 R MANUAL AND THEREFORE ACCETABLE AS IS. THE SILVER/TEFLON TAPE THAT WAS 332688 1 8 REMOVED TO INSPECT THE RADIATOR FACESHEET WAS UNRESTRICTED MR REPAIRED W 332688 1 9 ITH SILVER/TEFLON TAPE. THE SILVER/TEFLON (THERMAL CONTROL COATING) TAPE 332688 1 10 THAT WAS OUT OF THE DESSICATED BAG FOR MORE THAN 13 HOURS (ITEM 2, PAGE 332688 1 11 1A) WAS RESOLVED BY SCRAPPING IT AND OBTAINING A NEW PIECE OF TAPE. THE 332688 1 12 DEBONDED TAPE REPAIR (ITEM 3, PAGE 1B) WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE TAPE 332688 1 13 AND REBONDING A NEW PIECE OF TAPE. THE CAUSE OF ITEM 1 WAS FLIGHT DAMAG 332688 1 14 E AND THE CAUSE OF ITEMS 2 AND 3 WERE WORKMANSHIP. CONCLUDE THAT METEOR 332688 1 15 IMPACT IS ACCEPTABLE AND THE MR REPAIRED TAPE PATCH IS ACCEPTABLE AND NO 332688 1 16 FURTHER INSPECTION OR WORK IS REQUIRED. 332689 1 1 THERE IS A SMALL CUT IN THE SILVER-TEFLON RADIATOR TAPE IN R/H NO.2 PER 332689 1 2 THE VOUGHT MANUAL THE DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE: 332689 1 3 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 332689 1 4 332690 1 1 ITEM #1: METEOR IMPACT ON RIGHT HAND RADIATOR #2 CAUSING A SMALL DENT IN 332690 1 2 THE FACESHEET. THE DEFECT IS LOCATED 58" FROM THE FWD EDGE OF THE RADIA 332690 1 3 TOR AND 46 1/2" FROM THE HINGE LINE AND .3" OUTBOARD FROM THE NEAREST FR 332690 1 4 EON LINE. THE DENT IN THE FACESHEET WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS AND THE RADITO 332690 1 5 R TAPE WAS REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: METEOR STRIKE. ITEM #2: THERMAL CON 332690 1 6 TROL COATING TAPE WAS OUT OF THE DESSICATED STORAGE BAG MORE THAN 13 HOU 332690 1 7 RS. NEW TAPE WAS OBTAINED. 332690 1 8 332691 1 1 THERE IS A MINOR PINHOLE DENT IN THE FACESHEET OF THE UPPER RIGHT HAND # 332691 1 2 2 RADIATOR PANEL. THE SILVER-TEFLON TAPE WAS REMOVED FOR AN INSPECTION O 332691 1 3 F THE RADIATOR FACESHEET REINSTALLED USING RTV-142 PER MR. PROBABLE CAUS 332691 1 4 E: METEORITE IMPACT DURING FLIGHT. 332691 1 5 332692 1 1 DURING V6012, WIRE 2J112B16 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE/WITH MINOR 332692 1 2 SHIELD DAMAGE (2) BROKEN STRANDS. THE REPAIR WAS PERFORMED BY USING SRP 332692 1 3 V-EL-0007-A-0 METHOD "A" BY TRIMMING THE SHIELD AND WRAPPING THE WIRE 332692 1 4 WITH MYSTIC 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR 332692 1 5 AND TEAR. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED. 332692 1 6 332693 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE T1258A26 HAD KAPTON DAMG 332693 1 2 E WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTOR(S). THIS DISCREPANCY 332693 1 3 WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-E 332693 1 4 L-0007. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 332693 1 5 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. MR APPROVED. 332693 1 6 332802 1 1 DURING V3014. IT WAS DETECTED THAT WIRE HARNESS V070-776292-201HAD BRAI 332802 1 2 DED SHIELD DAMAGE FROM CHAFFING AGAINST THE LANDING GEAR DOWN LOCK SWITC 332802 1 3 H. MR CONCURRENCE WAS REQUESTED TO ACCEPT AS IS THE BRAIDED SHIELDING. T 332802 1 4 HE WIRE HARNESS WAS WRAPPED WITH LT-80 & PTFE TEFLON TAPE FOR PROTECTION 332802 1 5 AGAINST ANY FURTHER OUTER SHIELD DAMAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORM 332802 1 6 AL WEAR AND TEAR. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED. 332802 1 7 332910 1 1 DURING IPR 48V-0011, WIRES 1F176A26 AND 1F177A26 WERE INADVERENTLY CUT W 332910 1 2 HILE REMOVING SPOT TIES. WIRE 1F176A26 IS THE COPPER PATH FOR ASA 3 MNA 332910 1 3 PWR ON, 30P655 PIN 2 AND 30P307 PIN 34. WIRE 1F177A26 IS THE COPPER PATH 332910 1 4 FOR ASA 4 MN A PWR ON, 30P655 PIN 1 AND 30P307 PIN 55. WIRES WERE REPAI 332910 1 5 RED AND RETEST WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED ON JUNE 17,1991. RETEST WAS PE 332910 1 6 R V9002.05,SEQ02. AS INDICATED ON INTERIM SUMMARY ON PG 3, PROBABLE CAUS 332910 1 7 E: WORKMANSHIP, WIRES WERE INADVERTENTLY CUT. 332910 1 8 333067 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ON P 333067 1 2 AGE 1.0 (BOLTS THAT INSTALL THE V070-198252 CLAMP SHOULD BE NAS1581C3T4 333067 1 3 BOLTS INSTEAD OF NAS1581C3T9 BOLTS) AND ITEM 2.0 ON PAGE 1A (THE TORQUE 333067 1 4 TIPPED BOLTS WERE STRIPPED DURING REMOVAL). ALL (31) BOLTS WERE LOOSENED 333067 1 5 AND THEN REMOVED ONE AT A TIME. IF THE BOLT HEAD WAS STRIPPED, AN E-Z O 333067 1 6 UT WAS USED TO REMOVE THE BOLT. THE GRIP LENGTH OF THE REMOVED BOLTS WAS 333067 1 7 MEASURED AND RECORDED AND THE INSERTS WERE CLEANED WITH IPA AND COTTON 333067 1 8 SWAB. THE NEW -4 BOLTS WERE THEN INSTALLED RETURNING THE SECONDARY STRUC 333067 1 9 TURE TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS VENDOR. 333068 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ON P 333068 1 2 AGE 1.0 (BOLTS THAT INSTALL THE V070-198252 CLAMP SHOUND BE NAS1581C3T4 333068 1 3 BOLTS INSTEAD OF NAS1581C3T9 BOLTS) AND ITEM 2.0 PAGE 1A (BOLTS RUNNING 333068 1 4 TORQUE EXCEEDED 30 IN LBS). AFTER ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION OF DISCREPAN 333068 1 5 CY ITEM 2.0, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE BOLTS WERE EXCEEDING THEIR RUNNI 333068 1 6 NG TORQUE DUE TO THE RUB PANEL AEROTHERMAL SEAL FLEXING. THE FLEXING OF 333068 1 7 THE SEAL CAUSED THE BOLTS TO BIND UP AGAINST THE SEAL. TO SOLVE THIS PRO 333068 1 8 BLEM, ALL (31) BOLTS WERE LOOSENED AND THEN REMOVED ONE AT A TIME. IF TH 333068 1 9 E BOLT HEAD WAS STRIPPED, AN E-Z OUT WAS USED TO REMOVE THE BOLT. THE 333068 1 10 GRIP LENGTH OF THE BOLTS WAS MEASURED AND RECORDED AND THE INSERTS WERE 333068 1 11 CLEANED WITH IPA AND COTTON SWAB. THE NEW -4 BOLTS WERE THEN INSTALLED 333068 1 12 RETURNING THE SECONDARY STRUCTURE TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE 333068 1 13 WAS VENDOR. 333081 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V31-15114, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 3F46B22 333081 1 2 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO VISIBLE DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUC 333081 1 3 TOR(S). MR APPROVAL WAS REQUESTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF MYSTIK 7503 EL 333081 1 4 ECTRICAL TAPE TO REPAIR THE DAMAGED AREA. PROBABLE CASUE WAS DUE TO NORM 333081 1 5 AL WEAR AND TEAR. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED. 333081 1 6 333083 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V31-15114, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE'S 1ZK462 333083 1 2 B24 AND 2B1117C26 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO VISIBLE DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD 333083 1 3 OR PRIMARY CONDUCTOR(S). MR APPROVAL WAS REQUESTED FOR TAHE UN-RESTRICT 333083 1 4 ED USE OF MYSTIC 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE TO REPAIR THE DAMAGED AREA ON THE 333083 1 5 TWO WIRE'S. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THERE IS NO 333083 1 6 RE-TEST REQUIRED. 333083 1 7 333140 1 1 OXYGEN HORIZONTAL DRAIN DISCONNECT P/N MC276-0010-1180 S/N 0007 FAILED P 333140 1 2 OPPET LEAK CHECK. LEAK RATE WAS 1050 SCCM GHE AT 902 PSIA. ALLOWABLE LEA 333140 1 3 K RATE IS 900 SCCM MAX. DISCONNECT WAS REPLACED WITH NEW DISCONNECT S/N 333140 1 4 0010 ABD SUCCESSFULL LEAK CHECKED. DISCONNECT IS NOW PER PRINT. PROBABLE 333140 1 5 CAUSE: DEGRADATION. 333140 1 6 333252 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN THE CARBON BRAKE ASSY HEATSHIELD (P/N 378-35) 333252 1 2 WAS DAMAGED DURING BRAKE HANDLING. THE HEATSHIELD DAMAGE DID NOT ADVERS 333252 1 3 ELY AFFECT THE CARBON BRAKE ASSY. THE CARBON BRAKE ASSY (MC621-0075-0001 333252 1 4 , S/N 0022) WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE AS IS. MR ID APPLIED. 333252 1 5 333273 1 1 DURING IPF 48V-0002, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 2E768N20 HAD CONDUCTOR 333273 1 2 DAMAGE APPROX 12 INCHES FROM DESIGN SPLICE 50SP290. ALSO DURING IPR 333273 1 3 048V-0002, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 2E768N20 HAD CONDUCTOR DAMAGE IN 333273 1 4 SEVERAL OTHER PLACES IPR 048V-0002 WAS UPGRADED TO OEL-3-13-0085 AND 333273 1 5 WIRE 2E768N20 WILL BE REPLACED FROM 50P264 TO 50SP920 PER OEL-3-13-0085. 333273 1 6 NO ACTION REQUIRED BY THIS PR. 333273 1 7 333301 1 1 THE 245-230 INNER BRAKE SEAL WAS INADVERTENTLY DAMAGED DURING BRAKE INST 333301 1 2 ALLATION. INSTALLATION WAS DISCONTINUED AND THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REP 333301 1 3 LACED. AUTHORIZATION FOR REPAIR OF THE BRAKE LRU AT KSC WAS APPROVED PER 333301 1 4 CHIT K3702. THE BRAKE WILL BE INSTALLED PER V1165.006 AS PREVIOUSLY SCH 333301 1 5 EDULED. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRA 333301 1 6 DATION/NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 333301 1 7 333327 1 1 CONNECTORS 50P757 AND 50P901 BOTH WERE ANNOTATED TO HAVE BROKEN GROUND L 333327 1 2 UGS, REF ITEM 1 PG 1 AND 2 PG 1A. BOTH CONNECTORS WERE DEMATED IN ORDER 333327 1 3 TO GAIN SUFFICIENT ACCESS TO REMOVE/REPLACE BROKEN GROUND LUG. GROUND LU 333327 1 4 G WAS REPLACED ON ASSOCIATED WIRES P527D22 AND P1231C22. A CONTINUITY TE 333327 1 5 ST WAS PERFORMED FOR EACH CONN. FROM BACKSHELL TO STRUCTURE GROUND TO VE 333327 1 6 RIFIY CONTINUITY FOR REPLACED GROUND LUGS. CONNECTOR RETEST WILL BE TRAC 333327 1 7 KER PER CIG/SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEMS 1 AND 2 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO 333327 1 8 WORKMANSHIP. 333330 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING INSPECTION OF THE LH AFT ET LATCH ASSEMBLY 333330 1 2 PER PR MEQ-3-A0046. THE V070-565111-001 ROD AND V070-565132-001 SPRING 333330 1 3 ASSEMBLY WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED FOR DEFECTS. NON WERE OBSERVED. SAID 333330 1 4 ASSEMBLY WAS THEN CLEANWIPED WITH IPA. ENGINEERING AND QUALITY 333330 1 5 INSPECTION RESULTS SHOWED NO BINDING AFTER CLEANING. PR CONDITION NO 333330 1 6 LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: CONTAMINATION ON THE V070-565111-001 ROD 333330 1 7 AND V070-565132-001 SPRING ASSEMBLY DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 333330 1 8 333344 1 1 DURING IPR- 48V-0011, CONNECTOR 30P661 HAD ONLY ONE BAYONETT ENGAGED. TH 333344 1 2 E CONNECTOR WAS COCKED AT AN UPWARD ANGLE. THE CONNECTOR WAS DEMATED AND 333344 1 3 30P661 WAS INSPECTED FOR ANOMOLIES. PIN'S 25 & 36 WERE FOUND TO BE BENT 333344 1 4 . PIN 36 WAS STRAIGHTENED WITH A MATING CONTACT AND PIN 25 WAS EXTRACTED 333344 1 5 AND A NEW CONTACT WAS CRIMPED ON THE WIRE 1M731A26. THE WIRE WAS RETERM 333344 1 6 INATED AND THE CONNECTOR WAS REMATED 30P661 TO 30J661. PROBABLE CAUSE WA 333344 1 7 S DUE TO WORKMANSHIP RETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY CIG 3-13-0461. 333344 1 8 333346 1 1 ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF ITEM 1, WIRE 2T53C20 DISICOVERED NO DAMAGE WAS 333346 1 2 EVIDENT. HOWEVER DAMAGE WAS EVIDENT ON ADJACENT WIRE 2T54A16. WIRE MUST 333346 1 3 HAVE BEEN MISTAKENLY IDENTIFIED. UPON VERIFICATION THAT WIRE DAMAGE (KA 333346 1 4 PTON ONLY) WAS LOCATED ON WIRE 2T54A16, WIRE WAS REPAIRED PER SRP-V-EL-0 333346 1 5 007-A-0 METHOD B. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 1 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATI 333346 1 6 ONAL DEGRADATION. 333346 1 7 333347 1 1 DURING REMOVAL OF THE V070-352566-002 EDGE MEMBER, THE HEX RECESS IN THE 333347 1 2 ME112-0024-0604 SCREW BECAME STRIPPED. IN ORDER TO REMOVE THE TEMPORARI 333347 1 3 LY INSTALLED HARDWARE, THE A SMALL SLOT WAS CUT INTO THE END OF THE SCRE 333347 1 4 W. THE SLOTTED FASTENER WAS MR ACCEPTED AS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABL 333347 1 5 E CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP 333347 1 6 OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 333347 1 7 333350 1 1 DURING V5U02, WIRES T166A26,T172A26 AND T171A26 WERE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTO 333350 1 2 N DAMAGE. WIRES WERE WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURT 333350 1 3 HER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON 333350 1 4 ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 333350 1 5 333361 1 1 IN OMI V1165.006, STEPS 02-014 TO 02-030 WERE PERFORMED BUT NOT STAMPED 333361 1 2 OFF. THESE STEPS ARE NOW STAMPED AND VERIFIED COMPLETE BY THE TECH, LSOC 333361 1 3 QC AND NASA QC WHO PERFORMED THE WORK. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. PROBABLE 333361 1 4 CAUSE: OPERATIONAL ERROR. 333361 1 5 333562 1ITEM 1 *D 333562 1ITEM 2 333562 1 1 ITEM 1 PG. 1 NOTED A GROUND LUG BROKEN OFF OF CONNECTOR BACKSHELL 62J88. 333562 1 2 THE DISCREPANT GROUND LUG WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE CRIMPED ON JUMPER W 333562 1 3 IRE MP571-0086-0004. THE JUMPER WIRE WAS RE-INSTALLED ON THE BACKSHELL O 333562 1 4 F 62J88. CONTINUITY TESTING WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY WIRE INTEGRITY. PROB 333562 1 5 ABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. 333562 1 6 333564 1 1 THE BROKEN CARRIER PANEL IDENTIFIED ON PAGE 1, ITEM 1 WAS REPLACED WITH 333564 1 2 A NEW PANEL FROM LOGISTICS. THE OVERSIZED PANEL IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2 PAG 333564 1 3 E 1A WAS TRIMMED TO UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DIM'S REF SKETCH ON PAGE 2. 333564 1 4 1. THE INTERFERENCE OF THE CARRIER PANEL AND THE HI-LOKS ON THE PLBD WAS 333564 1 5 RESOLVED BY TRIMMING THE CARRIER PANEL WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. C 333564 1 6 ONCLUDE THAT THE CARRIER PANEL MAY BE INSTALLED PER THE DESIGN INTENT AN 333564 1 7 D NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 333608 1 1 ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY WAS CAUSED BY CONTACT WITH THE ET DOOR CENTERLINE LAT 333608 1 2 CH. DENTAL MOLDS WERE TAKEN OF THE NICKS AND MEASURED. EDDY CURRENT AND 333608 1 3 X-RAY INSPECTIONS WERE PERFORMED ON ALL FITTINGS AND NO CRACKS WERE FOUN 333608 1 4 D. ITEM 2 WAS DOCUMENTED AFTER EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION SHOWED A CHANGE I 333608 1 5 N CONDUCTIVITY AND PERMIABILITY ACROSS THE FITTING. DESIGN CENTER ANALYS 333608 1 6 IS DETERMINED THAT THE NOTED CHANGE IN MATERIAL PROPERTIES WAS SAFE AND 333608 1 7 ACCPETABLE FOR CONTINUED USE. BOTH ITEMS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICT 333608 1 8 ED USE AS IS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 333832 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ON 333832 1 2 PAGE 1.0 (V070-397096-001 CARRIER PLATE HAS A CRACK 1.2 INCHES LONG). TH 333832 1 3 E CARRIER PLATE WAS MR REPAIRED WITH (1) FIBERGLASS PATCH. THIS MR REPAI 333832 1 4 R WILL NOT AFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE CARRIER PLATE. THE CAR 333832 1 5 RIER PLATE IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEA 333832 1 6 R. 333832 1 7 333834 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 (THR 333834 1 2 EADS DAMAGED ON THE V070-565362-001 CLEVIS ROD END AND ON THE V070-56542 333834 1 3 3-001 SHAFT). THE V070-565362-001 CLEVIS ROD END WAS REMOVED AND REPLACE 333834 1 4 D RETURNING THE CLEVIS ROD END TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. THE V070-565429-0 333834 1 5 01 SIDE STRUT ASSEMBLY WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE WITH T 333834 1 6 HE DAMAGED THREADS ON THE V070-565423-001 SHAFT. THE FIRST THREE THREADS 333834 1 7 OF THE SHAFT ARE DAMAGED AND THESE THREE THREADS ARE NOT ENGAGED DURING 333834 1 8 THE ALIGNMENT OF THE UMBILICAL ATTACH. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP 333834 1 9 THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. TIR #A0182 WILL BE CLEARED PER JOB CARD V35 333834 1 10 -50004 (STRUT INSTALLATION). 333837 1 1 THE V070-339529-003 FIBERGLASS COVER HAD ONE CRACK WHICH WAS REPAIRED WI 333837 1 2 TH FIBERGLASS PATCHES ON THE FRONT SIDE AND BACKSIDE OF THE COVER. THIS 333837 1 3 MR REPAIR WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE COVE 333837 1 4 R. THE COVER IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND T 333837 1 5 EAR. 333837 1 6 334186 1 1 WIRE SEGMENTS T2357A22.T2358A22,T2356A22 AND T2359A22 DID NOT HAVE VISIB 334186 1 2 LE WIRE I.D'S AND COULD NOT BE PROPERLY IDENTIFIED AS NOTED IN ITEM 1 PG 334186 1 3 . 1. THE CONNECTOR 67P91 WAS DEMATED TO PERFORM A CONTINUITY TEST IN ORD 334186 1 4 ER TO VERIFY CORRECT WIRE SEGMENT NUMBER. WIRE SEGMENTS WERE THEN IDENTI 334186 1 5 FIED WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE I.D. NUMBERS AND CONNECTOR 67P91 REMATED. THE 334186 1 6 RETEST FOR CONN 67P91 WILL BE TRACKED PER CIG/SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN 334186 1 7 BE ATTRIBUTED TO NON-SPLIT CONVOLUTED TUBING COVERING UNDERLYING I.D. TA 334186 1 8 GS FARTHER UP THE NOTED HARNESS. 334263 1 1 DURING REMOVAL OF THE V070-352578-001 EDGE MEMBER, THE HEX RECESS IN THE 334263 1 2 ME112-0024-0604 SCREW BECAME STRIPPED. IN ORDER TO REMOVE THE TEMPORARI 334263 1 3 LY INSTALLED HARDWARE, THE A SMALL SLOT WAS CUT INTO THE END OF THE SCRE 334263 1 4 W AND NUT. THE NUT WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW ME114-0047-0003 NUT AND THE S 334263 1 5 LOTTED ME112-0024-0604 SCREW WAS MR ACCEPTED AS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PR 334263 1 6 OBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 334263 1 7 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 334263 1 8 334276 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE H1018B26 HAD KAPTON DAMA 334276 1 2 GE WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTOR(S). THIS DISCREPANC 334276 1 3 Y WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503 SRP V-EL-0 334276 1 4 007. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO 334276 1 5 RMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. MR APPROVED. 334276 1 6 334553 1 1 DURING STR-3-13-507, PLBD BULB SEAL INSPECTION. THE V070-398503-012 BULB 334553 1 2 SEAL WAS FOUND TO HAVE WRINKLES IN ITS TEFLON TUBE AT XO590 ON THE LEFT 334553 1 3 HAND HINGLINE. THE DISCREPANT REGION OF THE SEAL WAS WRAPPED, PER MR DI 334553 1 4 SPOSITION, USING MYSTIC 7503 TAPE. THE SEAL WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTE 334553 1 5 D USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1) 334553 1 6 THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A V070-398558-040(-056) PLBD BULB SEAL SPLICE WHICH 334553 1 7 WAS NOT CENTERED PROPERLY BETWEEN THE ADJACENT BULB SEALS AT XO886 ON TH 334553 1 8 E LEFT HAND HINGELINE. THE DISCREPANT SPLICE WAS REMOVED AND A NEW V070- 334553 1 9 398558-056 SEAL WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 334553 1 10 DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP DURING ORIGINAL INSTALLATION. (REF ITEM 3 ON 334553 1 11 PAGE 1A) WHILE PERFORMING THE TAPE REPAIR OF THE V070-398503-012 BULB 334553 1 12 SEAL AT XO590 ON THE LEFT HAND HINGELINE, THE V070-398558-036(-052) 334553 1 13 SPLICE BECAME DEBONDED. THE DISCREPANT SPLICE WAS REMOVED AND A NEW 334553 1 14 V070-398558-052 SEAL WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 334553 1 15 DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 334553 1 16 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 334555 1 1 THE LOCATION WITH THE TORN SEAL (ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1B) WAS REPAIRED PER MR 334555 1 2 DISPOSITION BY WRAPPING THE SEAL WITH MYSTIC 7503 TAPE. LOCATIONS WHERE 334555 1 3 DEBONDING OCCURRED (ITEMS 1,2, AND 4 ON PAGES 1, 1A AND 1C) WERE REPAIRE 334555 1 4 D BY INSTALLING NEW SPLICES AND BONDING PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE 334555 1 5 CAUSE FOR ITEMS 1,2, AND 4, ON PAGES 1, 1A, AND 1C IS IMPROPER BONDING 334555 1 6 DURING ORIGINAL INSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1B IS O 334555 1 7 PERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED F 334555 1 8 OR THIS PR. 334556 1 1 DURING STR-3-13-507, PLBD BULB SEAL INSPECTION, THE V070-398511-012 BULB 334556 1 2 SEAL AT XO582, ZT55.5 ON THE LOWER, LEFT SIDE OF THE FORWARD BULKHEAD 334556 1 3 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A SPLIT APPROXIMATELY 1" LONG ON ITS INBOARD SIDE. THE 334556 1 4 DISCREPANT REGION OF THE SEAL WAS WRAPPED, WITH MR APPROVAL, USING 334556 1 5 MYSTIC 7503 TAPE. THIS REPAIR WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 334556 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF 334556 1 7 ITEM 2 PAGE 1) THE V070-398533-012 BULB SEAL AT XO582, YO3.5 WAS ALSO 334556 1 8 FOUND TO BE SPLIT. THE DISCREPANT REGION OF THE SEL WAS WRAPPED, WITH 334556 1 9 MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICETD USE. PROBABLE CUASE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY 334556 1 10 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION 334556 1 11 REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 334556 1 12 334557 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) DURING STR-3-13-507, PLBD BULB SEAL INSPECTION, T 334557 1 2 HE V070-398505-012 BULB SEAL AT XO 590 ON THE RIGHT HAND HINGELINE WAS F 334557 1 3 OUND TO BE SPLIT ALONG ITS AFT END. THE SEAL WAS REPAIRED, PER MR DISPOS 334557 1 4 ITION, BY WRAPPING THE DISCREPANT REGION WITH MYSTIC 7503 TAPE. THIS REP 334557 1 5 AIR WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEG 334557 1 6 RADATION. (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A) THE V070-398503-012 BULB SEAL AT XO 1 334557 1 7 084 ON THE RIGHT HAND HINGELINE WAS FOUND TO BE SPLIT ALONG ITS FORWARD 334557 1 8 END. THE SEAL WAS REPAIRED, PER MR DISPOSITION, BY WRAPPING THE DISCREPA 334557 1 9 NT REGION WITH MYSTIC 7503 TAPE. THIS REPAIR WAS ACCEPTED FOR 334557 1 10 UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CASUE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 3 334557 1 11 ON PAGE 1B) THE V070-398505-012 BULB SEAL AT X0 590 ON THE RIGHT HAND 334557 1 12 HINGELINE WAS FOUND TO BE SPLIT ALONG ITS FWD END. THE SEAL WAS 334557 1 13 REPAIRED, PER MR DISPOSITION, BY WRAPPING THE DISCREPANT REGION WITH 334557 1 14 MYSTIC 7503 TAPE. THIS REPAIR WS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE 334557 1 15 CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION 334557 1 16 REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 334608 1 1 DURING CE 3-13-100, CONNECTOR 40P9107 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BROKEN GROUND 334608 1 2 LUG. BECAUSE LUG WAS A CHASSES GROUND A PR NOT PR WAS INITIATED. THE LUG 334608 1 3 WAS REPLACED AND A CONTINUITY CHECK WAS PERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY TO SATIS 334608 1 4 FY RETEST REQUIEMENTS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE C 334608 1 5 AUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 334608 1 6 334766 1 1 DURING AN INSPECTION, WIRE HARNESS V070-779301, V070-779311, V070-779305 334766 1 2 AND V070-779306 WERE FOUND TO BE SUBJECT DAMAGE DURING LITHIUM HYDROXID 334766 1 3 E STOWAGE LOCKER INSTALLATION/REMOVAL. AN EO TO FOLLOW WAS REQUESTED AND 334766 1 4 APPROVED TO CHANGE THE ROUTING OF THE AFFECTED HARNESSES. NO FURTHER AC 334766 1 5 TION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR ON HARNESSES DUR 334766 1 6 ING LOCKER REMOVAL/INSTALLATION. 334766 1 7 334966 1 1 (ITEM 1) WHITE RTV SEAL ON THE PERIMETER OF THE LH2 ET DISCONNECT AREA H 334966 1 2 AS VOIDS AT SEVERAL LOCATIONS. WHITE RTV WAS APPLIED IN THESE VOIDS. (I 334966 1 3 TEM 2) UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF WHITE RTV IS INSTALLED AT THE TWO LOCATION 334966 1 4 S OF THE HINGES DUE TO BLACK THERMAL BARRIERS INSTALLED. THERE IS NO EV 334966 1 5 IDENCE OF ANY RTV MISSING. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: 334966 1 6 NORMAL OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. IDENCE OF ANY RTV MISSING. THIS IS NOT 334966 1 7 A PR CONDIDTION. (ITEM 3) WHITE RTV SEAL ON THE PERIMETER OF THE LO2 E 334966 1 8 T DISCONNECT AREA HAS VOIDS AT SEVERAL LOCATIONS. WHITE RTV WAS APPLIED 334966 1 9 IN THESE VOIDS. (ITEM 4) UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF WHITE RTV IS INSTALLED 334966 1 10 AT THE TWO INNER LOCATIONS OF THE HINGES DUE TO BLACK THERMAL BARRIERS I 334966 1 11 NSTALLED. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY RTV MISSING. THIS IS NOT A PR COND 334966 1 12 IDTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 335177 1 1 DURING REMOVAL OF THE B/F COVE C/P'S IT WAS NOTED THAT SOME OF THE C/P'S 335177 1 2 HAD CAPTIVE FASTENERS WITH RETAINING RINGS BUT THE B/F DOORS AND THE C/ 335177 1 3 P'S WERE NOT COUNTERBORED TO PROVIDE ACCESS. A FIT CHECK WAS PERFORMED 335177 1 4 TO ENSURE THAT THE REMOVAL OF THE RETAINING RINGS WOULD NOT CAUSE A STEP 335177 1 5 AND GAP PROBLEM. TPS ENGINEERING EVALUATED THE INSTALLATION AND HAD NO 335177 1 6 CONCERNS. AN EO TO FOLLOW WAS INITIATED TO REFLECT THE REMOVAL OF THE RI 335177 1 7 NGS FOR THE INSTALLATION. DEV'S HAVE BEEN GENERATED TO REFLECT THE DELET 335177 1 8 ION OF THE RETAINING RINGS ON THE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF JOB CARDS 335177 1 9 . NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR OVERSIGHT 335312 1 1 DURING V63-50006,BAY 3 BLANKET INSTALLATION, WIRE YC167B24 WAS FOUND TO 335312 1 2 HAVE KAPTON DAMGE WITH NUMEROUS SHIELD STRANDS BROKEN. THE WIRE WAS CUT 335312 1 3 AND A Z-SPLICE INSTALLED PER SRP V-EL-0008-0-0. WHILE WORKING THE SRP A 335312 1 4 PAGE 1A WAS WRITTEN WHEN A LIMITATION ABOUT THE SPLICE FALLING UNDER A C 335312 1 5 LAMP WOULD HAVE BEEN VIOLATED. AN MR WAS APPROVED TO INSTALL CONVOULTED 335312 1 6 TUBING OVER WIRE TO PROTECT AGAINST CHAFFING. THIS ALSO ELIMINATE THE LI 335312 1 7 MITATION THAT SPLICE WOULD FALL UNDER A CLAMP. WHEN CONVOLUTED TUBING WA 335312 1 8 S INSTALLED THE CLAMP SECURING IT WAS TOO SMALL AND A PAGE 1B WAS INITIA 335312 1 9 TED. MR WAS REQUESTED TO CHANGE THE CLAMP FROM A SIZE 4 TO 14. AFTER REP 335312 1 10 AIR AND HI-POT TEST WERE COMPLETE A PAGE 1C WAS INITATED BECAUSE A CLAMP 335312 1 11 WAS INADVERTENTLY LEFT OFF WIRE HARNESS PRIOR TO FIRST HI-POT. THE CLAMP 335312 1 12 INSTALLATION RETURNED ORBITER TO PRINT CONFIGURATION BUT INVALIDATED TH 335312 1 13 E HI-POT TEST. THE HI-POT WAS REPERFORMED AND WAS SUCCESSFUL. NO FURTHER 335312 1 14 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. CIG WILL TRACT CONNECTOR RETEST. PROBABLE C 335312 1 15 AUSE: WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 1A)LIMITATION OF THE P 335312 1 16 APER WORK. 1B)DESIGN PROBLEM 1C) WORKMANSHIP, ALL CLAMPS WERE NOT INSTAL 335312 1 17 LED PRIOR TO TEST. 335369 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 4ZK364B24 HAD KAPTON 335369 1 2 DAMAGE WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTORS. THIS 335369 1 3 DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503 335369 1 4 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 335369 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 335369 1 6 335371 1 1 DURING MPS-3-13-0935, WIRE J106A16 WAS FOUND TO HAVE NUMEROUS KAPTON DAM 335371 1 2 AGE EXPOSING SHIELD. DUE TO THE LARGE AREA OF THE WIRE DAMAGED, THE ENTI 335371 1 3 RE SEGMENT WAS REPLACED FROM CONNECTOR 54P119 TO 54E3. CONTINUITY CHECKS 335371 1 4 WERE THEN PERFORMED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CA 335371 1 5 USE:VENDOR-SENT HARDWARE TO KSC NOT IN PRINT CONFIGURATION. 335371 1 6 335373 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 2ZK361A24 HAD KAPTON 335373 1 2 DAMAGE WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTORS. THIS 335373 1 3 DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503 335373 1 4 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 335373 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 335373 1 6 335474 STAT 1 VERIFIED HOLDING IN OISR, 12-15-92. REQUIRES DEFER. 335474 1 1 ITEM 1: CORROSION FINISH (COINING) APPLIED ON V070-340135 HAS BEEN SANDE 335474 1 2 D AWAY AT XO693 AND XO1249 RIGHT AND LEFT HAND FRAMES AT ZO388. COINING 335474 1 3 WAS PERFORMED AT THESE TWO LOCATIONS. ITEM 2: THE COINING SCREEN AT XO10 335474 1 4 40 AND XO1090 DEBONDED UPON REMOVAL OF THE PRESSURE PADS AND THE PRIMER 335474 1 5 DID NOT FULLY CURE. THE PRIMER AND SCREENS WERE REAPPLIED AND THE COININ 335474 1 6 G PROCESS WAS PERFORMED. ITEM 3: SIX LOCATIONS FAILED DC RESISTANCE CHEC 335474 1 7 K. THE SCREENS WERE CLEANED WITH DEIONIZED WATER AND ABRASIVE CLOTH, AND 335474 1 8 THE COINING PROCESS WAS PERFORMED. ITEM 3: SIX LOCATIONS FAILED DC RESI 335474 1 9 STANCE CHECK. THE SCREENS WERE CLEANED WITH DEIONIZED WATER AND ABRASIVE 335474 1 10 CLOTH, AND THE COINING PROCESS WAS PERFORMED. ITEM 4: SCREEN IS DEBONDED 335474 1 11 IN THREE LOCATIONS. THE PRIMER AND SCREENS WERE REAPPLIED AND THE 335474 1 12 COINING PROCESS WAS PERFORMED. ITEM 5: SCREEN MISSING 1/2" AROUND AFT 335474 1 13 HOLE AT XO807. AT THIS LOCATION THE SCREEN PASSED THE DC RESISTANCE 335474 1 14 CHECK AND IS NOT A PR CONDITION. ITEM 6: SCREEN IS DEBONDED AT XO979 335474 1 15 RIGHT HAND SIDE. THE SCREEN WAS REAPPLIED AND THE COINING PROCESS WAS 335474 1 16 PERFORMED. ITEM 7: THE GROUND POINTS AT XO693 PORT SIDE, XO863 PORT 335474 1 17 SIDE, XO756 STBD SIDE HAS POINT COVERING THEM. THE PAINT WAS REMOVED AND 335474 1 18 THE GROUND POINTS PASSED THE DC RESISTANCE CHECKS. PROBABLE CAUSE: 335474 1 19 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 335713 1 1 DURING STR-3-13-507, PLB BULB SEAL INSPECTION, NUMEROUS LOCATIONS WERE F 335713 1 2 OUND TO HAVE DEBONDED OR PARTIALLY BONDED SPLICES AND/OR TEAR IN THE SEA 335713 1 3 L TUBE. (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A V070-398558-034 (-0 335713 1 4 50) SPLICE AT XO 1208 (S/B XO 1281 REF ITEM 11 ON PAGE 1E) WHICH WAS PAR 335713 1 5 TIALLY DEBONDED. THE SPLICE WAS REMOVED AND A NEW SPLICE WAS INSTALLED. 335713 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP DURING ORIGINAL INSTA 335713 1 7 LLATION OF SPLICE. (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A V070-398 335713 1 8 558-036 (-052) SPLICE AT XO 1281 (S/B XO 1208 REF ITEM 12 ON PAGE 1E) WH 335713 1 9 ICH WAS PARTIALLY DEBONDED. THE SPLICE WAS REMOVED AND A NEW SPLICE WAS 335713 1 10 INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP DURING 335713 1 11 ORIGINAL INSTALLATION OF SPLICE. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1A) THIS ITEM 335713 1 12 DOCUMENTS A V070-398558-034 (-050) SPLICE AT XO 624 WHICH WAS PARTIALLY 335713 1 13 DEBONDED. THE SPLICE WAS REMOVED AND A NEW SPLICE WAS INSTALLED. 335713 1 14 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCRPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP DURING ORIGINAL 335713 1 15 INSTALLATION OF SPLICE. (REF ITEMS 4-10 ON PAGES 1A-1D) THESE ITEMS 335713 1 16 DOCUMENT TEARS IN THE ENDS OF THE BULB SEALS ALONG THE L/H PLBD 335713 1 17 CENTERLINE. THE DISCREPANT REGIONS OF THE SEALS WERE REPAIRED, PER MR 335713 1 18 DISPOSITION, BY WRAPPING MYSTIC 7503 AROUND THE SEALS. THIS REPAIRS WERE 335713 1 19 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES 335713 1 20 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEMS 11 AND 12 ON PAGE 1E) UPON 335713 1 21 COMPLETION OF THE INSTALLATION OF THE BULB SEAL SPLCIES DOCUMENTED PER 335713 1 22 ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 1, IT WAS FOUND THE SEALS WERE INSTALLED IN THE 335713 1 23 WRONG LOCATIONS. THE SEALS WERE REMOVED AND REINSTALLED IN THE CORRECT 335713 1 24 LOCATIONS PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPACIE 335713 1 25 S IS PROCEDURAL/WORK AUTHORIZATION ERROR. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 335713 1 26 ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 335915 1 1 DURING OEL-3-13-007, CONNECTOR 30P9565 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A LOOSE STRAIN 335915 1 2 RELIEF TANG AND THE HEAD OF THE SET SCREW WAS STRIPPED. PER AN APPROVED 335915 1 3 MR, THE TANG WAS EPOXIED TO THE BACKSHELL WITH 2 DROPS 180 DEGREES APART 335915 1 4 . NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND 335915 1 5 TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 335915 1 6 336184 1 1 DURING OEL-3-13-0093, WIRES T522A26 AND T523A26 WERE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTO 336184 1 2 N DAMAGE. WIRES WERE WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURT 336184 1 3 HER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON 336184 1 4 ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 336184 1 5 336188 1 1 DURING OEL-3-13-0093, WIRE 2M1843A16 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WI 336188 1 2 RE WAS WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQ 336188 1 3 UIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING 336188 1 4 PROCESSING. 336188 1 5 336238 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V76-10001, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR 50P 336238 1 2 512 HAD THE FOLLOWING DISCREPANCIES: 1) MISSING GROUND LUG WIRE ON 2G152 336238 1 3 B22. 2)ONE MISSING BAYONET TOOTH AND TWO WORN BAYONET TEETH ON CONNECTOR 336238 1 4 BODY. 3) GFI GROUND RING MISSING SEVEN FINGERS ON A ONE INCH AREA (SIX 336238 1 5 ALLOWABLE). 4) PAGE 1A-PARALLEL SPLICE E1 HAS LOOSE HEAT SHRINK SLEEVE O 336238 1 6 N PARALLEL SPLICE E1 AND E2. DISCREPANCIES 1 THROUGH 5 WERE ADDRESSED BY 336238 1 7 REMOVING AND REPLACING DISCREPANT CONNECTOR 50P512 AND BY APPLYING HEAT 336238 1 8 TO COMPLETELY SHRINK SLEEVING MATERIAL TO PARALLEL SPLICE E1 AND E2. TH 336238 1 9 IS RETURNS CONNECTORS 50P512 AND 50P501 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. RETEST 336238 1 10 OF CONNECTORS DEMATED PER THIS WAD WILL BE CIG TRACKED WHILE RETEST OF 336238 1 11 50P512 WILL BE PER S0008. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. PRO 336238 1 12 BABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTR 336238 1 13 ICAL HARDWARE. 336356 1 1 FITTING WAS ISSUED WITH SLIGHT THREAD DEFECT. PART WAS RETURNED TO HDA F 336356 1 2 OR REPAIR OR SCRAP. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR FROM PREVIOUS USE. NO FU 336356 1 3 RTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 336356 1 4 336404 1 1 DURING V76-10002. IT WAS NOTED THAT CONNECTOR 50P533 HAD MINOR NICKS/SCR 336404 1 2 ATCHES. ENGINEERING INSPECTION DETERMINED THAT THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE 336404 1 3 WITHIN SPECIFICATIONS MLO303-0014 AND DO NOT REQUIRE ANY REPAIR. PROBABL 336404 1 4 E CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED. 336404 1 5 336432 1 1 DURING V5005, ITEM NO. 1 CONNECTOR 50P418 B/S TANG MOVES WITHIN THE BACK 336432 1 2 SHELL. THE BACKSHELL WAS OPENED, INSPECTED/NO ANOMOLIES WERE FOUND & RE- 336432 1 3 TORQUED. ITEM NO.2 GROUND LUG BROKE WHILE CLOSING THE BACKSHELL. THE DIS 336432 1 4 CREPANT LUG WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE WAS CRIMPED ON THE JR-20 WIRE AND 336432 1 5 RE-INSTALLED ON THE BACKSHELL TANG. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO WORKMANSHI 336432 1 6 P. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED. 336432 1 7 336591 1 1 DURING V35-100002 IT WAS DETECTED THAT THERE WERE MULTIPLE DISCREPANCIES 336591 1 2 WITH THE LH2 MONOBALL CONNECTOR ASSEMBLIES (REFERENCE PAGE 1 1A, AND 1B 336591 1 3 . ITEM 1 NOTED THAT CABLES 1F264C22, 1F265C22, AND S121A22 HAD DAMAGED K 336591 1 4 APTON EXPOSING THE SHIELD AND WIRE 1G150B22 HAD A MISSING AND LUG. CABLE 336591 1 5 S 1F265C22 AND 1F265C22 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW CABLES DUE TO 336591 1 6 THE DAMAGE DETECTED ON THE CABLES. CABLE S121A22 WAS REPAIRED BY PERFOR 336591 1 7 MING SRP V-EL-0007-A-O METHOD "B" TO WRAP MYSTIK 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE OV 336591 1 8 ER THE DAMAGED SECTION. A NEW LUG WAS INSTALLED ON WIRE 1G150B22. ITEMS 336591 1 9 2 AND 5 RECORDED DAMAGE TO THE RUBBER SEALS AT CONNECTORS 50P502 AND 336591 1 10 50P516. ENGINEERING RESEARCH OF THE MR TAGS WHICH READ "MR EPD 336591 1 11 3-09-1115" LOCATED ON THE HARNESSES AT THE CONNECTORS FOUND THAT THE 336591 1 12 DAMAGE TO THE SEALS WERE MR'D BY EPD 3-09-1115. NO ACTION WAS REQUIRED 336591 1 13 FOR THESE ITEMS. ITEM 3 NOTED THAT CABLES 1F1C22 AND 1ZK550C24 HAD 336591 1 14 KAPTON DAMAGE EXPOSING THE SHIELD AND WIRE 1G152B22 HAD A MISSING GND 336591 1 15 LUG. THE CABLES WERE REPAIRED BY PERFORMING SECTIONS WITH MYSTIK 7503 336591 1 16 ELECTRICAL TAPE. A NEW LUG WAS INSTALLED ON WIRE 1G152B22. ITEM 4 NOTED 336591 1 17 DAMAGE TO THE RFI RING OF CONNECTOR 50P511. ENGINEERING INSPECTION 336591 1 18 REVEALED THAT THE MISSING RFI TEETH WERE WITHIN THE ALLOWABLE LIMIT PER 336591 1 19 SPECIFICATION 40M39569. NO ACTION WAS REQUIRED FOR THIS ITEM. ITEM 6 336591 1 20 RECORDED DAMAGE TO THE KEYWAYS OF CONNECTOR 50P526. THE KEYWAYS WERE 336591 1 21 ROUNDED AT THE FACE OF THE CONNECTOR ABOUT 25 PERCENT. THE KEYWAYS WERE 336591 1 22 MR'D TO ACCEPT AS IS SINCE THE DAMAGE WOULD NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF 336591 1 23 THE KEYWAYS WHICH ARE USED FOR PROPER CONNECTOR MATE AND MAINTAIN 336591 1 24 ALIGNMENT OF THE CONNECTOR TO THE RECPETACLE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 336591 1 25 ITEMS 2,4, AND 5 WAS NO DISCREPANCY. FUNCTIONAL RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED 336591 1 26 PER S0008. 336735 1 1 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF OMI V1055, POTABLE WATER SERVICING, THE FC WAT 336735 1 2 ER DISCHARGE OD'S WERE NOT MATED. OMI V1055 SERVICES THE WATER LINES OR 336735 1 3 THE FC & ECLSS BY FIRST EVACUATING THESE LINES AND THEN BACKFILLING THEM 336735 1 4 WITH WATER. ATTACHMENT A SHOWS THE LINES THAT ARE SERVICED IN V1055. (B 336735 1 5 LUE & YELLOW SHADED AREAS). WITH THE FC WATER DISCHARGE OD'S DEMATED THE 336735 1 6 AREA SHADED IN BLUE WAS NOT SERVICED TO SERVICE THESE LINES THE FC WATE 336735 1 7 R DISCHARGE OD'S WERE MATED, THE BLUE SHADED AREA EVACUATED AND THEN BAC 336735 1 8 KFILLED WITH WATER. PRESSURE DECAY TEST OF THE WATER SYSTEM WAS SUCCESSF 336735 1 9 UL AND THE WATER SYSTEM IS NOW IN PROPER FLT CONFIGURATION. THE FCI OD 336735 1 10 WAS DOCUMENTED ON FCP-3-13-0279, FCP 2 OD ON FCP-3-13-0277 AND FC3 OD ON 336735 1 11 FCP-3-13-0278 BECAUSE THE EVACUATION AND SUBSEQUENT BACKFILL OF THESE 336735 1 12 LINES MUST BE DONE IN PARALLEL ALL WORK WAS PERFORMED ON FCP-3-13-0277. 336735 1 13 CAUSE: FC WATER DISCHANGED OD'S WERE DEMATED DURING OMI V1032 FC/PASSED 336735 1 14 SYSTEM TEST. 336736 1 1 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF OMI V1055, POTABLE WATER SERVICING, THE FC WAT 336736 1 2 ER DISCHARGE QD'S WERE NOT MATED. OMI V1055 SERVICES THE WATER LINES FOR 336736 1 3 THE FC & ECLSS SYSTEMS BY FIRST EVACUATING THESE LINES AND THEN BACK FI 336736 1 4 LLING THEM WITH WATER. ATTACHMENT A SHOWS THE LINES THAT ARE SERVICED IN 336736 1 5 V1055.(BLUE & YELLOW SHADED AREAS). WITH THE FC WATER DISCHARGE QD'S DE 336736 1 6 MATED THE AREA SHADED WITH BLUE (ATTACHMENT A) WAS NOT SERVICED. TO SERV 336736 1 7 ICE THESE LINES THE FC WATER QD'S WERE MATED, THE BLUE SHADED AREA EVACU 336736 1 8 ATED AND THEN BACKFILLED WITH WATER. PRESSURE DECAY TEST OF THE WATER SY 336736 1 9 STEM WAS SUCCESSUL AND THE WATER SYSTEM IS NOW IN PROPER FLT 336736 1 10 CONFIGURATION. THE FC1 QD WAS DOCUMENTED ON FCP-3-13-0279, FC2 ON 336736 1 11 FPC-3-13-0277 & FC3 QD ON FCP-3-13-0278. BECAUSE THE EVACUATION AND 336736 1 12 SUBSEQUENT BACKFILL OF THESE LINES MUST BE DONE IN PARALLEL ALL WORK WAS 336736 1 13 PERFORMED ON FCP-3-13-0277. CAUSE: FC QD'S WERE DEMATED DURING OMI 336736 1 14 V1022. FC/PRSD SYSTEM TEST. 336737 1 1 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF OMI V1055, POTABLE WATER SERVICING, THE FC WAT 336737 1 2 ER DISCHARGE QD'S WERE NOT MATED. OMI V1055 SERVICES THE WATER LINES FOR 336737 1 3 THE FC & ECLSS SYSTEMS BY FIRST EVACUATING THESE LINES AND THEN BACK FI 336737 1 4 LLING THEM WITH WATER. ATTACHMENT A SHOWS THE LINES THAT ARE SERVICED IN 336737 1 5 V1055.(BLUE & YELLOW SHADED AREAS). WITH THE FC WATER DISCHARGE QD'S DE 336737 1 6 MATED THE AREA SHADED WITH BLUE (ATTACHMENT A) WAS NOT SERVICED. TO SERV 336737 1 7 ICE THESE LINES THE FC WATER QD'S WERE MATED, THE BLUE SHADED AREA EVACU 336737 1 8 ATED AND THEN BACKFILLED WITH WATER. PRESSURE DECAY TEST OF THE WATER SY 336737 1 9 STEM WAS SUCCESSFUL AND THE WATER SYSTEM IS NOW IN PROPER FLT 336737 1 10 CONFIGURATION. THE FC1 QD WAS DOCUMENTED ON FCP-3-13-0279, FC2 ON 336737 1 11 FCP-3-13-0277 & FC3 QD ON FCP-3-13-0278. BECAUSE THE EVACUATION AND 336737 1 12 SUBSEQUENT BACKFILL OF THESE LINES MUST BE DONE IN PARALLEL ALL WORK WAS 336737 1 13 PERFORMED ON FCP-3-13-0277 CAUSE:FC QD'S WERE DEMATED DURING OMI V1022 336737 1 14 FC/PRSD SYSTEM TEST. 336738 1 1 DURING V1165.015 SEQ. 01, 62TB111 COULD NOT BE LOCATED ON DRAWING V070-7 336738 1 2 96231 TO MAKE A POSITIVE ID. ENGINEERING RESEARCH REVEALED TERMINAL BOAR 336738 1 3 D SHOULD BE ON THIS DRAWING AND ENGINEERING EXISTED TO INSTALL IT. WHEN 336738 1 4 THE "A" REV WAS INCORPORATED ON DRAWING V070-796231 THE TERMINAL BOARD W 336738 1 5 AS NOT INCORPORATED. AN EO-TO-FOLLOW WAS REQUESTED TO SHOW 62TB111 ON DR 336738 1 6 AWING V070-796231. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE 336738 1 7 : VENDOR - FAILED TO INCORPORATE ENGINEER INTO DRAWING AT TIME OF REVISI 336738 1 8 ON. 336902 1 1 DURING V80-00456 AFT AVOINICS BAY CLOSEOUT, WIRE 2F154A16-2 WAS FOUND TO 336902 1 2 HAVE DAMAGED INSULATION WITH PRIMARY CONDUCTOR DAMAGED. ALL THREE CONDU 336902 1 3 CTORS ON WIRE 2F154A16 WERE RETERMINATED TO PREVENT STRAIN ON WIRE HARNE 336902 1 4 SS. CONNECTOR 55994, WHICH WAS DEMATED DURING REPAIR, WILL BE TRACKED BY 336902 1 5 CIG FOR RETEST. NO FURTHER ACTION RQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: N 336902 1 6 ORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 336902 1 7 336912 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP WHEN THE LH INBD WHEEL/BRAKE ASSEMBLY WAS BINDING 336912 1 2 PRIOR TO FLIGHT TORQUE. THE WHEEL ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED AND SOME INTERFER 336912 1 3 ENCE BETWEEN THE HEAT SHIELD AND THE OUTER BRAKE ROTOR WAS NOTED. INTERF 336912 1 4 ERENCE WAS AT THE LOCATION WHERE TPMS HARNESS GOES UNDER HEAT SHIELD. TH 336912 1 5 E WHEEL WAS ROTATED UNTIL THIS LOCATION WAS IN THE VERTICAL POSITION TO 336912 1 6 MAXIMIZE HEAT SHIELD TO BRAKE CLEARANCE. WHEEL WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RE-INSTA 336912 1 7 LLED WITH NO FURTHER BINDING. NO FURTHER WORK OR RETEST REQUIRED. PROBAB 336912 1 8 LE CAUSE: MINIMAL HEAT SHIELD TO BRAKE GAP WITH PRESSURE TRANSDUCER HAR 336912 1 9 NESS AT 6 O'CLOCK POSITION. CLOSE THIS PR. 337120 1 1 NUTPLATE FAILED DURING DOME HEAT SHIELD INSTALLATION FOR FLIGHT 13. A SE 337120 1 2 LF LOCKING NUT WAS USED AS A TEMOIRARY FIX AND ACCEPTED PER MR APPROVAL 337120 1 3 FOR ONE FLIGHT ONLY. THE PR WAS DERFERRED. FOLLOWING FLIGHT 13, THE NUTP 337120 1 4 LATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON T 337120 1 5 HIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE-OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 337230 1 1 DURING SURV, RCPT'S 82J467 & 82J2 WERE FOUND TO HAVE LOOSE BACKSHELL'S. 337230 1 2 THE BACKSHELL'S WERE OPENED ON 82J467 & 82J2, INSPECTED NO DISCREPANCIES 337230 1 3 WERE NOTED AND RE-TORQUED PER SPEC MLO303-0040. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE 337230 1 4 TO WORKMANSHIP. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED. 337230 1 5 337343 1 1 WIRE HARNESS V070-772264-201 WAS ROUTED INCORRECTLY. PER DISPOSITION THE 337343 1 2 CONNECTOR 21V77W14P81 ASSOCIATED WITH THE NOTED HARNESS WAS DEMATED AND 337343 1 3 HARNESS ROUTED AS DESIGNATED PER DRAWING. CONNECTOR WAS MATED AND THEN 337343 1 4 DISCOVERED THAT HARNESS WAS STILL ROUTED INCORRECTLY BECAUSE DRAWING V07 337343 1 5 0-792211 DID NOT REFLECT THE SAME ROUTING IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT VIEWS. EN 337343 1 6 GINEERING EVALUATION OF THE HARNESS ROUTING CONCLUDED THAT DRAWING SHOUL 337343 1 7 D BE CORRECTED TO REFLECT THE SAME ROUTING AS DESIGNATED BY LSOC, RI LSS 337343 1 8 AND NASA ENGINEERING. WIRE HARNESS WAS ROUTED PER ENGINEERING DIRECTION 337343 1 9 AND A E.O. TO DRAWING V070-792211 WAS OBTAINED TO REFLECT THE CORRECTED 337343 1 10 HARNESS INSTALLATION. THE CONNECTOR 21P81 WILL BE TRACKED PER CIG/SCAN. 337343 1 11 PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO INSTALLATION DRAWING ERROR. 337496 1 1 DURING V80-94931, CARRIER PANEL INSTALLATION, THE V070-393314-001 CARRIE 337496 1 2 R PANEL WAS FOUND TO BE BENT ON ONE CORNER. THE BEND WAS SMOOTH RADIUSED 337496 1 3 AND APPROXIMATELY 0.10" HIGH. THE PANEL WAS FIT CHECKED TO VERIFY CONTA 337496 1 4 CT WITH FILLER BAR AND MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO DAMAGE 337496 1 5 WAS NOTED DURING POST REMOVAL INSPECTION OF CARRIER PANEL. PROBABLE CAU 337496 1 6 SE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. 337496 1 7 337700 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO ADDRESS DISCREPANCY ITEM 1.0 ON P 337700 1 2 AGE 1.0 (DENTED AREA ON THE 170D441411-1 RIGHT HAND UPPER COVER ASSEMBLY 337700 1 3 ). MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN WHICH REVEALED A MAXIMUM DEPTH OF .009". 337700 1 4 THE THICKNESS OF THE FACESHEET IN THIS AREA IS .010" TO .015". ENGINEERI 337700 1 5 NG PERFORMED A COIN TAP WHICH VERIFIED NO DELAMINATION OF THE FACESHEET, 337700 1 6 THE COVER ASSEMBLY WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. PROBABLE 337700 1 7 CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS IN THE RUDDER SPEED BRAKE AREA DURING PROCESSING 337700 1 8 (RESTRICTED SPACE WORK). 337701 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A DENT FOUND ON THE LEFT HAN 337701 1 2 D INNER, UPPER PANEL OF THE RSB. THE DENT DIMENSIONS WERE 0.418L X 0.306 337701 1 3 W X 0.015D. A DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED WITH MBO120-048 ADHESIVE 337701 1 4 AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS W 337701 1 5 ORKMANSHIP. (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A). THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS AN OVERTEMP CON 337701 1 6 DITION RESULTING FROM ELEVATED CURE TEMPERATURE FOR BOND. MAX ALLOWABLE 337701 1 7 IS 275 DEGREES. ACTUAL IS 292 DEGREES AVERAGE WITH MAX TEMP OF 310 DEGRE 337701 1 8 ES. ULTRASONIC INSPECTION SHOWED NO DELAMINATION. THIS CONDITION WAS MR 337701 1 9 ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY 337701 1 10 IS WORKMANSHIP/WORK AUTHORIZATION ERROR. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 337701 1 11 ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 337858 1 1 DURING FLIGHT 13 PROCESSING, CORROSION WAS FOUND ALONG THE CHEM MILL LIN 337858 1 2 ES ON THE LH AND RH UPPER AND LOWER RSB INNER PANELS. THE CONDITION WAS 337858 1 3 ACCEPTED FOR ONE FLIGHT AND DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 14. DURING FLIGHT 14 PROC 337858 1 4 ESSING, ACCESSIBLE AREAS OF CORROSION WERE REWORKED AND THE REMAINDER OF 337858 1 5 THE CORROSION WAS ACCEPTED FOR ONE ADDITIONAL FLIGHT AND DEFERRED TO FL 337858 1 6 IGHT 15. DURING FLIGHT 15 PROCESSING, CHIT J-3880 WAS RELEASED REQUIRING 337858 1 7 THE INSPECTION AND MAPPING OF ALL CORROSION ON THE RSB INNER PANELS. TH 337858 1 8 E INSP WAS PERFORMED ON STR-3-15-559 AND 4 PR'S WERE GENERATED DOCUMENTI 337858 1 9 NG THE DETAILED LOCATIONS OF ALL CORROSION ON THE RSB INNER PANELS. THE 337858 1 10 PR NUMBERS ARE STR-3-15-4286, 4288, 4299, 4300. THIS PR, STR-3-A0177, 337858 1 11 MAY NOW CLOSE AS A DUPLICATE OF THESE 4 NEW PR'S. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG 337858 1 12 ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL. 337885 1 1 ITEM 1 ANNOTATED THAT THE GROUND LUG WAS BROKEN ON CONNECTOR 81V77W8P46. 337885 1 2 CONDITION WAS EVALUATED AND THEN DISPOSITIONED TO REPLACE GROUND LUG PE 337885 1 3 R DETAILED STEPS. A CONTINUITY TEST WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY GROUND LUG I 337885 1 4 NTEGRITY. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER AC 337885 1 5 TION IS REQUIRED. 337885 1 6 338128 1 1 THE TORN SEALS WERE DEFERED INITIALLY FOR ONE FLIGHT TO PERFORM A POST F 338128 1 2 LIGHT OF THE DISCREPANCIES. INSPECTION REVEALED THAT NO ADDITIONAL DAMAG 338128 1 3 E RESULTED FROM FLIGHT, SO THE TORN SEALS WERE IDENTIFIED AND ACCEPTED W 338128 1 4 ITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE - OPERATIONAL DEGR 338128 1 5 ADATION. 338282 1 1 THIS IPR WAS TAKEN TO DOCUMENT THAT MADS STRIP CHART DATA REVIEW PER V10 338282 1 2 5 SEQ 12 SHOWS THE MADS MEAS. V51P364A, ROB4 BRAKE PUCK PRESSURE XDCR, R 338282 1 3 EADS HIGH, APPROXIMATELY 90%, WITH NO RIGHT BRAKE PEDAL APPLIED. TROUBL 338282 1 4 ESHOOTING DETERMINED THAT THE PRESSURE XDCR'S SIGNAL RETURN WIRE CONTACT 338282 1 5 AS MISPINNED AT THE RIGHT MAIN LANDING GEAR 62TB112 TERMINAL BLOCK. THE 338282 1 6 CONTACT WAS PINNED IN TERMINAL "Y" SHOULD BE TERMINAL "R". THE SIGNAL R 338282 1 7 TURN CONTACT WAS REPINNED IN TERMINAL "R" AT THE 62TB112 TERMINAL BLOCK. 338282 1 8 RETEST WAS SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED PER ATTACHMENT "1" OF THIS PR. MADS M 338282 1 9 EAS. V51P9364A, ROB4 BRAKE PUCK PRESSURE XDCR, IS NOW FUNCTIONING NOMINA 338282 1 10 L. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 338291 1 1 DURING A SURVEILLANCE, WIRES 1YT77C24, 1A44A26, 1A46A26, 1A49A26 AND 1A4 338291 1 2 8A26 WERE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE AT THE CONNECTOR BACKSHELL TANG. W 338291 1 3 IRE C116A24 HAD DAMAGED PRIMARY INSULATION DAMAGE AT THE GROUND LUG. ALL 338291 1 4 WIRES WERE RETERMINATED AT THERE RESPECTIVE CONNECTORS, 81P163, 81P171 338291 1 5 AND 81P320. PAGE 1A WAS TAKEN WHEN THE BACKSHELL OF 81P171 WAS ATTEMPTED 338291 1 6 TO BE REMOVED. TOO MUCH LOCKTITE WAS INSTALLED AND THE LOCKING TEETH ON 338291 1 7 CONNECTOR 81P171 WERE SHEARED OFF. CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELLL WERE CHANGE 338291 1 8 D WHILE CONNECTOR WAS DEPINNED. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED PER CIG. NO FURTH 338291 1 9 HER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON 338291 1 10 ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 1A-WORKMANSHIP, TOO MUCH LOCKTITE WAS USED. 338365 1 1 DURING MPS-3-13-0952, CONNECTOR 50P720 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL 338365 1 2 . SRP V-EL-0001-C-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO 338365 1 3 FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR 338365 1 4 ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 338365 1 5 338409 1 1 (1 EA). CAPTIVE FASTENER WOULD NOT SEAT FLUSH WHEN INSTALLED TO FLIGHT T 338409 1 2 ORQUE REQUIREMENTS. THE FASTENER WAS LOOSENED AND INSTALLED PROPERLY TO 338409 1 3 FLIGHT TORQUE PER MAO101-308. PROBABLE CAUSE: THIS CONDITION WAS DUE TO 338409 1 4 LIMITED ACCESS AROUND THE ENGINE DOME HEAT SHIELD AT THE TIME OF CARRIER 338409 1 5 PANEL INSTALLATION. 338409 1 6 338448 1 1 DURING AN INPSECTION, PYRO WIRES GOING TO 50P817, 50P818, 50P819 AND (PA 338448 1 2 GE 1A) 50P820 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE TO CONTROLLED IMPEDANCE WI 338448 1 3 RES. THE WIRE SEGMENTS WERE REPLACED FROM DESIGN SPLICES (APPROXIMATELY 338448 1 4 18 INCHES FROM CONNECTOR). IN ADDITIONAL TO REPLACEMENT OF E.O-TO-FOLLOW 338448 1 5 WAS REQUESTED TO INSTALL A COVERING OF HEAT SHRINK TUBING FROM DESIGN S 338448 1 6 PLICE TO CONNECTOR FOR ADDITIONAL CHAFF PROTECTION . INCLUDED WITH THIS 338448 1 7 EO, WAS A REQUEST TO CUT 4 SPARE WIRES BACK TO AND INCLUDING THE DESIGN 338448 1 8 SPLICE AND CAP AND STOW IN A SAFER LOCATION. PRIOR TO COMPLETING THE HYP 338448 1 9 OT, CONNECTOR 80P820 WAS FOUND TO HAVE BEEN ILLEGALLY REPLACED WITH A WR 338448 1 10 ONG CONNECTOR RESULTING IN A PAGE 1B, THIS CONNECTOR WAS REPLACED AND AL 338448 1 11 L HYPOT TESTS WERE SUCCESSFUL. FIRING ROOM, PIC RESTANCE & LOAD TEST, BY 338448 1 12 LSOC EPD WAS SUCCESSFUL. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE 338448 1 13 CAUSE: 1 & 1A) NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DURING PROCESSING. 1B) WORKMANSHIP. 338470 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT TWO HARNESS CLAMPS WERE NOT I 338470 1 2 NSTALLED ON HARNESS LOCATED BELOW RMS ELECTRONIC BOX AGAINST ORBITER SIL 338470 1 3 L. THE TWO CLAMPS WERE INSTALLED USING MD112-1003-0405 SCREWS. PROBABLE 338470 1 4 CAUSE DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. THIS RETURNS ASSEMBLY TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION 338470 1 5 338510 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES WERE MR ACCEPTED ON THE LH #1 RADIATOR. ITEMS 1 AND 2, 338510 1 2 PAGE 1, WERE DINGS CAUSED BY A ROLL OF TAPE DROPPING. ITEM 1 WAS THE LA 338510 1 3 RGEST DING WHICH HAD TAPE REMOVED AND X-RAYS TAKEN. THE ITEM 1 DING WAS 338510 1 4 MR ACCEPTED, AND NEW RADIATOR TAPE WAS BONDED OVER THE AREA. ITEM 2 WAS 338510 1 5 THE "2ND BOUNCE" OF THE TAPE ROLL DROP. ITS MOLDS INDICATED MINOR DING D 338510 1 6 AMAGE, AND NO TAPE WAS BROKEN, SO IT WAS MR ACCEPTED. THESE DINGS WERE E 338510 1 7 NTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP 338510 1 8 . 338517 1 1 DURING AFT CLOSE OUT IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLES T278A26 AND T279A26 H 338517 1 2 AD KAPTON DAMAGE. THE CABLES WERE REPAIRED PER SRP V-EL-007-C-0 USING MY 338517 1 3 STIC 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. T 338517 1 4 HIS RETURNS ASSEMBLY TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON-DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES 338517 1 5 NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE OR IN 338517 1 6 TERCHANGEABILITY. 338517 1 7 338518 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS A TAPE-ONLY DING ON THE LH #2 RAD 338518 1 2 IATOR. THIS TAPE DING WAS MR ACCEPTED AND ENTERED ON THE RADIATOR DAMAGE 338518 1 3 LOG AND MAP. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS A MICRO-METEORITE HIT DURING FLIGHT 338518 1 4 338520 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS A TAPE-ONLY SCUFF/TEAR ON THE LH 338520 1 2 #1 RADIATOR OVER THE HINGE ATTACH POINT #1 AREA. THIS TAPE SCUFF WAS MR 338520 1 3 ACCEPTED AND ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. THE PROBABLE CA 338520 1 4 USE WAS A AN ACCIDENTAL WORKMANSHIP SCUFF. 338520 1 5 338521 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS A TAPE-ONLY DING ON THE LH #3 RAD 338521 1 2 IATOR, THIS SMOOTH BOTTOM DING DID NOT PENETRATE ANY TAPE LAYERS AND WAS 338521 1 3 MR ACCEPTED AND ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. THE PROBABL 338521 1 4 E CAUSE WAS GROUND PROCESSING HANDLING. 338521 1 5 338522 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS A TAPE-ONLY DING ON THE LH NO.3 R 338522 1 2 ADIATOR. THE SMOOTH-BOTTOM DING DID NOT PENETRATE ANY TAPE LAYERS AND WA 338522 1 3 S MR ACCEPTED AND ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. THE PROBAB 338522 1 4 LE CAUSE WAS GROUND PROCESSING HANDLING. 338522 1 5 338523 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM, PAGE 1, WAS A TAPE-ONLY SCUFF/TEAR ON THE LH NO 338523 1 2 .3 RADIATOR. NO FACESHEET WAS SHOWING. THIS TAPE SCUFF WAS MR ACCEPTED A 338523 1 3 ND ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS AN 338523 1 4 ACCIDENTAL WORKMANSHIP SCUFF. 338523 1 5 338524 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS A TAPE-ONLY SCUFF ON THE LH NO.3 338524 1 2 RADIATOR OVER THE HINGE ATTACH POINT AREA. THE SCUFF AREA HAS SOME SLIGH 338524 1 3 TLY WRINKLED TAPE, BUT NO AIR BUBBLES AND NO DAMAGE TO THE ATTACH POINT 338524 1 4 DOUBLER AREA. THE TAPE SCUFF WAS MR ACCEPTED AND ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR 338524 1 5 DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS AN ACCIDENTAL WORKMANSHIP S 338524 1 6 CUFF WHEN WORKING AROUND THIS ATTACH POINT. 338524 1 7 338525 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS A DING ON THE LH NO.4 RADIATOR. T 338525 1 2 HIS SMOOTH-BOTTOM DING DID NOT PENETRATE ANY TAPE LAYERS IS 0.014" DEEP 338525 1 3 WHICH IS LESS THAN THE ACCEPTABLE 0.020" DING DEPTH. IT WAS MR ACCEPTED 338525 1 4 AND ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS G 338525 1 5 OUND PROCESSING HANDLING. 338525 1 6 338526 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS A TAPE-ONLY DING ON THE LH NO.4 R 338526 1 2 ADIATOR. THIS DING ONLY PENETRATED THE TOP TAPE LAYER AND WAS MR ACCEPTE 338526 1 3 D AND ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS 338526 1 4 GROUND HANDLING OR A MICRO-METEORITE HIT. 338526 1 5 338527 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS A SMALL, TAPE-ONLY SCUFF ON THE L 338527 1 2 H NO.4 RADIATOR. THIS TAPE SCUFF WAS MR ACCEPTED AND ENTERED IN THE RADI 338527 1 3 ATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS AN ACCIDENTAL WORKMANSHI 338527 1 4 P SCUFF. 338527 1 5 338529 1 1 THE ITEM 1 AND ITEM 3 DISCREPANCIES WERE MR ACCEPTED ON THE RH #4 RADIAT 338529 1 2 OR. ITEM 2 WAS NOT FOUND ANYWHERE IN THE VICINITY ALONG THE "CL" OR THE 338529 1 3 HL EDGES, AND THEREFORE REQUIRES NO ACTION. ITEM 1 WAS A SMALL TAPE TEAR 338529 1 4 WHICH HAD A FEW LOOSE LAYERS STICKING OUT. THESE LOOSE LAYERS WERE MR T 338529 1 5 RIMMED WITH ONLY THE KAPTON TAPE LAYER LEFT EXPOSED, BEING MR ACCEPTABLE 338529 1 6 ITEM 3 WAS A LONG "SCRATCH LIKE" IMPRESSION IN THE TAPE, THOUGH NOT PEN 338529 1 7 ETRATING ANY LAYERS, AND WAS MR ACCEPTED. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE ENTER 338529 1 8 ED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF EACH ITEM 338529 1 9 WAS ACCIDENTAL WORKMANSHIP TAPE DAMAGE. 338529 1 10 338530 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES OF PAGES 1 & 1A WERE ON THE RH #3 RADIATOR. ITEM 1 IS 338530 1 2 A MINOR SCUFF--PROBABLE CAUSE WAS AN ACCIDENTAL WORKMANSHIP SCUFF. ITEMS 338530 1 3 2 TO 4 ARE MINOR TAPE-ONLY DINGS--PROBABLE CAUSE WAS MICRO-METEORITE HI 338530 1 4 TS DURING FLIGHT. ITEM 5 IS A MANUFACTURING MR NOT PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED 338530 1 5 . A SMALL AREA OF TAPE WAS TRIMMED AWAY ON THE ROUNDED EDGE WITH KOROPON 338530 1 6 LEFT EXPOSED-PROBABLE CAUSE WAS MANUFACTURING/VENDOR ERROR. THESE DISCR 338530 1 7 EPANCIES WERE ALL MR ACCEPTED AND ENTERED ON THE RH #3 TOP RADIATOR DAMA 338530 1 8 GE LOG AND MAP. 338576 1 1 THE (5) DISCREPANCIES OF PAGES 1 & 1A WERE TAPE-ONLY DINGS ON THE LH NO. 338576 1 2 2 RADIATOR. ITEMS 1 TO 4 ARE SMALL PIN HOLES IN THE TAPE WHICH HAVE A PR 338576 1 3 OBABLE CAUSE OF MICRO-METEORITE IMPACTS DURING FLIGHT. ITEM 5 IS A BAREL 338576 1 4 Y DETECTABLE DEPRESSION IN THE TAPE WHICH DOES NOT PENETRATE ANY TAPE LA 338576 1 5 YERS. INSUFFIECIENT DATA IS AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE A PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 338576 1 6 ITEM 5. THESE TAPE DISCREPANCIES WERE MR ACCEPTED AND ENTERED ON THE RAD 338576 1 7 IATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. 338576 1 8 338599 1 1 BROKEN BACKSHELL NOTED IN ITEM 1 ON CONN 50P9013 WAS REPAIRED PER SRP-V- 338599 1 2 EL-0001-C-0, SPLIT BACKSHELL REPAIR. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO 338599 1 3 WORKMANSHIP. 338599 1 4 338811 1 1 DURING V34-10010, ALL WIRES GOING TO 50P786 WERE FOUND TO HAVE DAMAGE. 338811 1 2 WIRES WERE P649A22, P650A22, P648A22 AND JR24 WERE RETERMINATED AT 50P78 338811 1 3 6. RETEST OF REPAIR WILL BE TRACKED PER CIG/SCAN #3-13-0913. NO FURTHER 338811 1 4 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBI 338811 1 5 TER DURING PROCESSING. 338811 1 6 339014 1 1 UNDERSIZE GAPS WERE DOCUMENTED AT R/H RIBSPLICE #1. MEASUREMENTS TAKEN B 339014 1 2 ETWEEN THE RCC ANGLE AND THE WING GLOVE TPS INDICATE SUFFICIENT CLEARANC 339014 1 3 E FOR THERMAL EXPANSION AND COMPONENT MOVEMENT. THIS CONDITION HAS BEEN 339014 1 4 ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREPANCY IS A 339014 1 5 BUILDUP OF TOLERANCE OVER THE ENTIRE WING LEADING EDGE SYSTEM. 339014 1 6 339035 1 1 DURING THE TROUBLESHOOTING OF AN UNRELATED IPR (48V-0085), A MEC PREFLIG 339035 1 2 HT BITE REVEALED A FAILURE BIT SET ON WORD 7 BIT 13 OF MEC 2. THIS BIT I 339035 1 3 NDICATES THAT THE CHANNEL 3, -12 VOLT POWER SUPPLY WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE. 339035 1 4 MEC NO.2 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A SPARE FROM STOCK (P/N: MC450- 339035 1 5 0016-0006, S/N:0001) PER OMI V5C04. EPD RETEST ON PAGES 6.1 THROUGH 14 339035 1 6 6 (OPERATIONS 2 THRU 7) WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED ON AUG. 9,1991. ALL O 339035 1 7 THER MEC 2 SYSTEM RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRACKED. PROBABLE CAUSE: FUNCTIONA 339035 1 8 L FAILURE OF MEC NO. 2 INTERNAL POWER SUPPLY. 339114 1 1 UPON INSPECTION OF THE LMG BUNGEE SWITCH DURING STS-48 (OV-103/FLT 13) P 339114 1 2 ROCESSING, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS STICKING AND THE I 339114 1 3 PR WAS UPGRADED TO A PR THEN DEFERRED FOR THIS FLOW (FLT 14). TESTING OF 339114 1 4 THE SWITCH REVEALED THAT IT WOULD OPERATE NOMINALLY WHEN ACTUATED BY HA 339114 1 5 ND BUT NOT WHEN ACTUATED BY THE BUNGEE TRIGGER PLUNGER MECHANISM DURING 339114 1 6 A MANUAL UPLOCK CYCLE. THE BUNGEE TRIGGER SWITCH MECHANISM WAS REMOVED A 339114 1 7 ND THE V070-510397-002 SWITCH/HARNESS ASSEMBLY WAS REPLACED AND RIGGED O 339114 1 8 N THE BENCH AND IN THE SHIP. HAND ACTUATION CYCLES AS WELL AS MANUAL UPL 339114 1 9 OCK CYCLES VERIFIED NOMINAL PERFORMANCE OF THE SWITCH. THE SYSTEM HAS BE 339114 1 10 EN RESTORED TO PRINT AND SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR T 339114 1 11 HIS CONDITION IS THE FRAGILE NATURE OF THE MICROSWITCH AND THE AMOUNT OF 339114 1 12 TRAVEL INDUCED BY THE BUNGEE TRIGGER PLUNGER. 339382 1 1 DURING A RECEIVING INSPECTION ON S0004, ROD END V070-565309-001 WAS FOUN 339382 1 2 D TO HAVE DAMAGED THREADS. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON TH 339382 1 3 IS PR. ROD END WILL BE INSTALLED PER S0004. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR 339382 1 4 AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 339382 1 5 340372 1 1 THE S/N 008 A70-0719 HATCH HANDLE WAS FOUND TO BE LOOSE AGAINST THE I/E 340372 1 2 HATCH. THIS PROBLEM WAS ORIGINALLY DOCUMENTED PER PR A70-0719-02-008-000 340372 1 3 4. THE HANDLE WAS REMOVED FROM THE HATCH PER S0004 AND COULD NOT BE REIN 340372 1 4 STALLED TIGHTLY. THE S/N 008 HANDLE WAS THEN REMOVED FROM THE HATCH AND 340372 1 5 REPLACED WITH THE S/N 006 HANDLE BASE PER THIS PR. THE NEW BASE EXHIBITE 340372 1 6 D O SIGNS OF LOOSENESS WHEN TORQUED. PR A70-0719-02-008-0004 WILL INVEST 340372 1 7 IGATE/REPAIR THE DISCREPANT S/N 008 HANDLE BASE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY 340372 1 8 EXISTS WITH THE INSTALLED HATCH HANDLE OR ATTACHING HARDWARE. PROBABLE C 340372 1 9 AUSE: NORMAL WEAR OF ATTACH H/W. 340580 1 1 THE LO2 T-O BEARING WAS FOUND TO HAVE A RAISED METAL LIP ON IT'S INNER E 340580 1 2 DGE. THE LIP WAS REMOVED & THE BERING WAS RETURNED TO PRINT. PROBABLE CA 340580 1 3 USE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 340580 1 4 340581 1 1 THE L/H 2 T-0 BEARING WAS FOUND TO HAVE A RAISED METAL LIP ON IT'S INNER 340581 1 2 EDGE. THE LIP WAS REMOVED & THE BEARING WAS RETURNED TO PRINT PROBABLE C 340581 1 3 AUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 340581 1 4 340676 1 1 THE (2) DISCREPANT HI-LOK INSTALLATIONS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WER 340676 1 2 E RESOLVED BY INSTALLING (2) NEW HI-LOK NUTS PER THE DRAWING SPECIFICATI 340676 1 3 ONS. RESEARCH THRU RI CVAS DETERMINED THAT THESE HI-LOKS WERE INSTALLED 340676 1 4 BY RI AT ORIGINAL MANUFACTURE. CONCLUDE THAT THE HI-LOKS ARE INSTALLED P 340676 1 5 ER PRINT AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 340676 1 6 340862 1 1 THE ABOVE STEPS WILL SATISFY THE ITEM 1 & 2 IN BLK 16 OF THIS PR. NO FUR 340862 1 2 THER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS DOCUMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE-PROCEDURAL ERROR. 340862 1 3 NOTE OMRSDS WILL BE BOUGHT ON V80-00456. 340862 1 4 340907 1 1 DURING S0004 SEQ 18, CONNECTOR 50P765 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BROKEN GROUND 340907 1 2 LUG. BECAUSE LUG WAS A CHASSIS GROUND A PR NOT DR WAS INITIATED. THE LUG 340907 1 3 WAS REPLACED AND A CONTINUITY CHECK WAS PERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY TO SATIS 340907 1 4 FY RETEST REQUIREMENTS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE 340907 1 5 CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 340907 1 6 341547 1 1 THE V070-352232-002 XO1456.2798 LOWER O/B FRAME CAP HAD SEVERAL DENTS ON 341547 1 2 THE AFT SIDE OF THE FILLET RADIUS. THE DISCREPANT MATERIAL WAS REMOVED 341547 1 3 AND AN 1/8" ALUMINUM DOUBLER WAS INSTALLED OVER THE REMOVED MATERIAL WIT 341547 1 4 H HI-LOKS. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE EXACT CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE IS UNKNOWN BUT 341547 1 5 THE DAMAGE WAS PROBABLY CAUSED BY FALLING GSE OR TOOLS IN THE OPF. 341548 1 1 THERE WAS A SMALL CRACK IN THE V070-855326-001 FRAME CAP AT YO29 AND XO1 341548 1 2 454. THE CRACK WAS STOP DRILLED AND MATERIAL AROUND THE CRACK WAS REMOVE 341548 1 3 D. A 1/8" ALUMINUM DOUBLER WAS INSTALLED OVER THE REMOVED METAL WITH HO- 341548 1 4 LOKS PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE EXACT CAUSE IS UNKNOWN BUT THE DAMAGE P 341548 1 5 ROBABLY OCCURRED DURING OPF PROCESSING AND WAS CAUSED BY FALLING GSE OR 341548 1 6 TOOLS. RC ACTIO REQUIRED. 343074 1 1 THE FAILURE TO ESTABLISH PURGE AIR TO THE PLBD WITHIN 72 HOURS (ITEM 1, 343074 1 2 PAGE 1) RESULTED IN A REQUIREMENT TO PERFORM AN ANALYSIS OF THE PLBD FOR 343074 1 3 MOISTURE CONTENT (REF OMRSD V34ABO.010). THE ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED BY 343074 1 4 ARNOLD LEVINE AT NASA JSC THEREBY SATISFYING THE OMRSD REQUIREMENT. CONC 343074 1 5 LUDE THAT THE PLBD WILL HAVE A LESS THAN 50% MOISTURE CONTENT PRIOR TO S 343074 1 6 EPT 12 SCHEDULED LAUNCH AND NO FURTHER ANALYSIS OR WORK IS REQUIRED. THE 343074 1 7 PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS FAILURE TO MEET OMRSD REQUIREMENT DUE TO P 343074 1 8 LANNED AND UNPLANNED PURGE AIR STOPPAGES. 344482 1 1 THERE ARE TWO MINOR DENTS IN THE V070-855326-001 FRAME CAP. THE DENTS A 344482 1 2 RE ACCEPTABLE AS IS PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE EXACT CAUSE OF THE DAMAG 344482 1 3 E IS UNKNOWN BUT THE DAMAGE WAS PROBABLY CAUSED BY GSE OR TOOLS IN THE O 344482 1 4 PF. 344485 1 1 THERE IS ONE MINOR DENT IN THE V070-352232-001 FRAME CAP. THE DENT IS AC 344485 1 2 CEPTABLE AS IS PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE EXACT CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE IS 344485 1 3 UNKNOWN BUT THE DAMAGE WAS PROBABLY CAUSED BY FALLING GSE OR TOOLS IN TH 344485 1 4 E OPF. 344510 1 1 THERE ARE TWO MINOR DENTS IN THE V070-855325-001 FRAME CAP. THE DENTS A 344510 1 2 RE ACCEPTABLE AS IS PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE EXACT CAUSE OF THE DAMAG 344510 1 3 E IS UNKNOWN BUT THE DAMAGE WAS PROBABLY CAUSED BY GSE OR TOOLS IN THE O 344510 1 4 PF. 344912 1 1 THE V082-544611-002 SWIVEL CAP FROM THE FWD INBD (STOW) STOP BOLT ON THE 344912 1 2 AFT MPM (XO 1256) WAS REPLACED WITHOUT RECORDING THE NEW OCN #. THE PAR 344912 1 3 T IS APPROXIMATELY .5" IN DIAMETEER AND THEREFORE HAS NO MARKINGS ON IT. 344912 1 4 CVAS ASSIGNED A REPLACEMENT OCN# PER MR TO PROVIDE FUTURE TRACEABILITY. 344912 1 5 NO FURTHER TRACEABILITY DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROABABLE CAUSE: HUMAN ERR 344912 1 6 OR -OCN SHOULD HAVE BEEN RECORED PRIOR TO INSTALLATION. 344926 1 1 THE BROKEN BACKSHELL TANG NOTED IN ITEM 1 WAS REPAIRED PER SRP-V-EL-0001 344926 1 2 -C-O, "SPLIT BACKSHELL REPAIR". PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPER 344926 1 3 ATIONAL DEGRADATION. 344926 1 4 345369 1 1 WIRE SEGMENT 1M17B24-1 RUNS BETWEEN CONNECTOR 50P151 PIN 78 AND 50P885 P 345369 1 2 IN A, WHICH IS PHASE A A-C POWER TO THE ET DOOR FWD CENTERLINE LATCH MOT 345369 1 3 OR 1. THE WIRE WAS REPARIED BY EPD PER THIS PR AND TH COPPER PATH WAS RE 345369 1 4 TESTED BY MEQ PER V1097 ON 11-08-91. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROB 345369 1 5 ABLE CAUSE: WIRE DAMAGED DUE TO WORK IN THIS AREA. 345902 1 1 THE RH RADIATOR #4 ATTACH POINTS 1 AND 9 WERE IDENTIFIED AS BEING LOOSE 345902 1 2 DURING RADIATOR CLEANLINESS INSPECTION AT THE PAD. THE FIXED AFT RADIATO 345902 1 3 RS ARE SECURED TO THE PLB DOOR STRUCTURE USING STUDS WHICH ARE HINGED TO 345902 1 4 THE DOOR AND DISK SHAPED BUSHINGS WHICH THREAD INTO THE RADIATOR PANEL. 345902 1 5 THE STUDS PASS THROUGH SELF ALIGNING SPHERICAL BEARINGS IN THE BUSHINGS 345902 1 6 AND ARE SECURED WTIH RETAINING NUTS. THE LOOSE FIT NOTED IS NORMAL AXIA 345902 1 7 L END PLAY CAUSED BY THE SPHERICAL BEARINGS FLOATING IN THE BUSHING .002 345902 1 8 5 PER PRINT. THIS IS A TYPICAL CONDITION EXISTING ON ALL VEHICLES AT VAR 345902 1 9 IOUS BUSHING LOCATIONS. THE INCONSISTENCY IS MOST LIKELY THE RESULT OF 345902 1 10 VARIATIONS IN WEAR OF THE DRY LUBRICANT WHICH COATS THE CONTACTING 345902 1 11 SURSFACES BETWEEN THE BEARINGS AND THE HOUSING IN THE BUSHINGS. NO 345902 1 12 DISCREPANCY EXISTS WITH THE FIXED RADIATOR ATTACH POINTS. PROBABLE 345902 1 13 CAUSE: MISIDENTIFICATION OF NORMAL CONDITION/NORMAL WEAR. 346684 1 1 CDR CM3-1397 WAS PICKED UP WHEN THE WRONG WIRE HARNESS ID WAS INSTALLED 346684 1 2 PER AN EO-TO-FOLLOW. THE CDR CREATED THIS PR WHICH WAS DEFERRED TO FLIGH 346684 1 3 T 14. THE WIRE HARNESS ID WAS THEN CORRECTED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED 346684 1 4 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: INCORRECT CALL-OUT ON WAD. 346892 1 1 THE INCORRECT TECH ORDERS CALLED OUT ON THE V072-200113, REV "H", MECSLS 346892 1 2 I IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE REMOVED BY EO-TO-FOLLOW. THE PROBABL 346892 1 3 E CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS FAILURE OF ECL DOCUMENTATION TO FULLY CO 346892 1 4 RRECT THE MECSLSI. CONCLUDE THAT NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 346901 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AS AN IPR WHEN THE C70-0894 UNIT CABLE APPLIED A L 346901 1 2 OAD TO THE I/E HATCH AND CABIN LEAK CHECK TEST PORT DURING WEIGHT AND C- 346901 1 3 G MEASUREMENT. THE CABLE WAS ROUTED THROUGH THE TEST PORT AND MATED TO 2 346901 1 4 VEHICLE CONNECTORS INSIDE THE CREW MODULE. THE FREE END OF THE CABLE WA 346901 1 5 S SECURED TO A FACILITY HAND RAIL RATHER THAN THE HATCH HANDLE AS WAS SP 346901 1 6 ECIFIED. WHEN THE VEHICLE WAS ROLLED OFF THE WEIGHT & C-G SCALES, THE CA 346901 1 7 BLE WAS PULLED TAUT AND BROKE UNDER TENSION. THE GSE CABLE WAS ADDRESSED 346901 1 8 PER A SEPARATE PR. ALL CONNECTORS INVOLVED (BOTH VEHICLE AND GSE) WERE 346901 1 9 VISUALLY INSPECTED AND NO DAMAGE WAS NOTED. THE HATCH AND TEST PORT WERE 346901 1 10 VISUALLY INSPECTED, THE CAP WAS INSTALLED IN THE TEST PORT AND THE TPS 346901 1 11 CARRIER PANEL WAS FIT CHECKED WITH THE HATCH FRAME AND NO ANOMALIES WERE 346901 1 12 NOTED EXCEPT SLIGHT MARKING TO THE KORPON FINISH ON THE HATCH FRAME. TH 346901 1 13 E KORPON WAS TOUCHED UP PER THIS PR. RESULTS FROM FAILURE ANALYSIS OF TH 346901 1 14 E BROKEN CABLE SHOWED THAT APPROXIMATELY 800 LBS OF FORCE WAS SUSTAINED 346901 1 15 AT THE HATCH PORT/FRAME. RI STRESS FOUND THAT 1000 LBS. IN THIS LOAD CON 346901 1 16 FIGURATION WAS STILL WITHIN THE DESIGN MARGIN. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EX 346901 1 17 ISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS HUMAN ERROR. NO RETEST IS REQ'D. 347922 1 1 WHEN THE ET UMBILICAL DOOR CENTERLINE LATCHES WERE STOWED, RELEASING THE 347922 1 2 ET DOORS IN FLIGHT (STS 48, FLT 13) THE FORWARD LATCH MOTOR 2 DREW AC C 347922 1 3 URRENT ON ONLY 2 OUT OF 3 PHASES. TROUBLESHOOTING ISOLATED THE FAILURE T 347922 1 4 O THE AFT MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY #2. EPD REPLACED THE MCA PER LRU OMI V5 347922 1 5 C12.002 (KICKED OFF BY THIS PR) AND MEQ PERFORMED RETEST ON THE AFT VENT 347922 1 6 DOORS AND ET DOORS PER THIS PR. PAGE 1A DOCUMENTED DAMAGE TO A THREADED 347922 1 7 INSERT IN AFT MCA #3. THIS WILL BE ADDRESSED BY THE VENDOR PER THE LRU 347922 1 8 PR ALONG WITH THE RELAY FAILURE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE 347922 1 9 CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. HARDWARE FAILURE IN AFT MCA #2. 348034 1 1 THE LOWER AFT FASTENER OF THE V070-390458-001 CARRIER PANEL GOT STUCK DU 348034 1 2 RING PROCESSING FOR FLIGHT 14. THE THREADS OF THE NUT PLATE WERE CLEANED 348034 1 3 WITH A TAP AND THE SCREW WAS INSTALLED WITH LOCKING COMPOUND FOR FLIGHT 348034 1 4 14 ON AN MR BASIS. DURING FLIGHT 15 PROCESSING THE DISCREPANT NUT PLATE 348034 1 5 WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE WAS INSTALLED. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON 348034 1 6 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 348132 1 1 DURING V1086.001 SEQ 01-006 INSPECTION WIRE HARNESS V070-775227-201 HAS 348132 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE BROKEN RFI GROUNDING SPRING. WIRE HARNESS WAS SENT TO LOGI 348132 1 3 STICS FOR RETURN TO VENDOR FOR POSSIBLE REPAIR. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIR 348132 1 4 ED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: HARNESS WAS NOT CORRECTLY REFURBISHED WHE 348132 1 5 N SENT TO LOGISTICS FOR A SPARE. 348245 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING POST LANDING DESERVICING INSPECTION OF THE 348245 1 2 NLG AT DFRF WHEN A SUSPECT CRACK IN THE V070-510775-002 BUNGEE BARREL AS 348245 1 3 SY WAS DISCOVERED. NDT INSPECTION INCLUDED BOTH BORESCOPE EXAMIATION AND 348245 1 4 EDDY CURRENT TEST. BORESCOPE EXAMINATION PROVED INCONCLUSIVE, BUT EDDY 348245 1 5 CURRENT TESTS CONFIRMED NO CRACK WAS PRESENT IN THE V070-510775-002 ASSY 348245 1 6 . SURFACE AREA OF SUSPECT DISCREPANCY WAS TOUCHED UP PER SPECIFICATION ( 348245 1 7 REF DWG V070-510755). NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR 348245 1 8 AND TEAR FROM NLG GEAR CYCLING. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 348565 1 1 ITEM 1: THE GAULING WAS BLENDED SMOOTH AND REFINISHED ON AN MR BASIS. TH 348565 1 2 E SHELL ASSEMBLY WAS MR ID'D. ITEM 2: THE DISCREPANCY LISTED ON ITEM 2 W 348565 1 3 AS WORKED ON PR STR-3-14-3854. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. P 348565 1 4 ROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 348566 1 1 DURING V5032, RECEPTACLE 50J827 WAS FOUND BROKEN FROM A SUPPORT BRACKET. 348566 1 2 DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO REPLACE THE BROKEN PYRO RECEPTACLE AND REMOUNT TO 348566 1 3 THE SUPPORT BRACKRT. THE HARNESS HAD CONTINUITY, ISOLATION, AND HIPOT RU 348566 1 4 N SUCCESSFULLY. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: U 348566 1 5 NAVOIDABLE DAMAGE ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 348707 1 1 THE BULB SEAL WAS DAMAGED WHEN AN ADJACENT FLIPPER DOOR FELL ON IT. UPON 348707 1 2 REMOVAL & INSPECTION IT WAS DETERMINED TO BE USEABLE AND WAS ACCEPTED F 348707 1 3 OR UNRESTRICTED USE BY THE MRB. A SCRATCH IN THE TOP FACESHEET PAINT ON 348707 1 4 THE FLIPPER DOOR WAS FOUND UPON REMOVAL OF THE SEAL AND WAS ALSO MR ACCE 348707 1 5 PTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 348707 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE - WORKMANSHIP. 348834 1 1 4 EA NAS620C16L WASHERS WERE USED DURING INSTALLATION OF THE LH2 ET FERR 348834 1 2 Y DOOR. THIS CONFIGURATION WAS APPROVED PER MR ON THIS PR AND WAS LISTED 348834 1 3 AS ITEM 4 ON THE CDFR EXCEPTION SHEET FOR FERRY FLIGHT (DFRF TO KSC). T 348834 1 4 HE WASHERS WERE REMOVED PER JC V35-40002 AND SCRAPPED LOCALLY PER THIS P 348834 1 5 R TO AVOID RE-USE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: INCORR 348834 1 6 ECT HARDWARE FITTED FOR 103. 348835 1 1 DURING A S5022,S21-004, THE WRONG OCN WAS RECORDED FOR SUPPORT BRACKET V 348835 1 2 074-857237-001. THE WRONG OCN WAS EW6953. ADDITIONAL INSPECTION UPON REM 348835 1 3 OVAL ON PART FROM ORBITER, AN OCN OF EW6593 WAS OBTAINED. NO FURTHER ACT 348835 1 4 ION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP-INCORRECT OCN WAS R 348835 1 5 ECORDED. 349607 1 1 THE V070-351583-021 AND V070-351583-022 BRACKETS WERE REMOVED AND REBOND 349607 1 2 ED TWO INCHES LOWER TO ELIMINATE INTERFERNCE WITH GSE INSTALLATION. PROB 349607 1 3 ABLE CAUSE: MISLOCATION OF BRACKETS BY VENDOR. CONCLUDE NO FURTHER WORK 349607 1 4 REQUIRED. 349658 1 1 UPON POWERING UP THE C70-0864 S/N 001 LANDING GEAR CONTROL AND MONITOR U 349658 1 2 NIT BOX AT THE SLF, THE RMG UPLOCK INDICATION WAS ERRATIC (S/B +5.0 +/-1 349658 1 3 .0 VDC) AND THE SHUTTLE VALVE READY LIGHTS WERE OFF (S/B ON). THE S/N 00 349658 1 4 1 BOX WAS POWERED DOWN AND THE S/N 002 BOX WAS INSTALLED TO EXTEND THE L 349658 1 5 ANDING GEAR. TROUBLESHOOTING ISOLATED THE ANOMALY TO AN OPEN RELAY IN FM 349658 1 6 CA #3 AND THE IPR WAS UPGRADED TO AN OEL PR. IN ADDITION, THE S/N 001 BO 349658 1 7 X WAS RED TAGGED AND A PR WAS TAKEN TO TROUBLESHOOT THE BOX DISCREPANCY. 349658 1 8 DISPOSITION WAS WRITTEN TO R/R THE MCA PER OMI V5C03.003 BUT DURING REM 349658 1 9 OVAL PROCEDURES IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT DISCREPANCIES EXISTED AGAINST THE 349658 1 10 ROLLER BARS USED TO REMOVE THE MCA. DISPOSITION WAS THEN WRITTEN TO 349658 1 11 REMOVE AND INSTALL A NEW MCA PER MANUAL METHOD UPON MR APPROVAL. THE PG 349658 1 12 1A DISCREPANCY IS TO BE ADDRESSED ON THE PRS NOTED ON PAGE 1A; 349658 1 13 EPD-2-10-1616 AND H70-0561-05-0103. RETEST OF THE IH VENT DOORS 1 AND 2 349658 1 14 THE -Z STAR TRACKET DOOR, THE RH AIR DATA PROBE AND THE LANDING GEAR 349658 1 15 INDICATIONS WAS COMPLETED PER THIS PR WITH ALL SYSTEMS OPERATING 349658 1 16 NORMALLY. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 349658 1 17 DEGRADATION. 349812 1 1 THIS PR WAS INCORRECTLY WRITTEN ON A STRUCTURE PR. IT WILL BE TRANSFERRE 349812 1 2 D TO A LRU-FES-ORD PR. PV-6-201601. 349814 1 1 THE SPACERSS FELL OFF FOLLOWING REMOVAL OF THE 50-2 DOOR. ONE SPACER WAS 349814 1 2 RECOVERED. LAF PR #3-14-0282 WAS PICKED UP ON THE MISSING SPACER. SPACE 349814 1 3 RS WERE LOCALLY SCRAPPED. NEW SPACERS WERE PROCURED AND BONDED TO THE DO 349814 1 4 OR PER DRAWING. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE-WO 349814 1 5 RKMANSHIP, POOR SURFACE PREPARATION. 349821 1 1 THE SPACERS FELL OFF FOLLOWING REMOVAL OF THE 50-1 DOOR. THE SPACERS WER 349821 1 2 E RECOVERED AND LOCALLY SCRAPPED. NEW SPACERS WERE PROCURED AND BONDED T 349821 1 3 O THE DOOR PER DRAWING. THREE OF THE NEW SPACERS DEBONDED AND PAGE 1A WA 349821 1 4 S TAKEN. THESE WERE REBONDED IN THE SAME MANNER. TWO OF THESE SPACERS DE 349821 1 5 BONDED AND A PAGE 1B WAS TAKEN. THESE SPACERS WERE REBONDED IN THE SAME 349821 1 6 MANNER. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE-WORKMANSH 349821 1 7 IP, POOR SURFACE PREPARATION, POOR APPLICATION OF MOLD RELEASE. 349823 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST A SIX TO EIGHT INCH CUT AT THE ONE O'CLOCK 349823 1 2 POSITION IN THE SIDE HATCH COLLAR SEAL. THE DAMAGED SEAL WAS REMOVED, R 349823 1 3 EPLACED AND RETESTED PER OMI V5K17 SEQ 02. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS P 349823 1 4 R IS THAT THE SEAL CAME OUT OF THE COLLAR GROOVE DURING HATCH OPENING AN 349823 1 5 D WAS RE-INSTALLED INTO THE COLLAR GROOVE WTIHOUT PINCHING THE SEAL SUFF 349823 1 6 ICIENTLY TO PREVENT THE GROOVE FROM CUTTING THE SEAL. NO FURTHER RETEST 349823 1 7 REQUIRED. 349824 1 1 THE V070-332902-002 ENVIORNMENTAL SEAL WAS FOUND TO HAVE A TEAR/HOLE IN 349824 1 2 THE MESH COVERING. ONLY THE OUTER LAYER OF MESH IS DAMAGED, THE INNER LA 349824 1 3 YER REMAINS INTACT. PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION, MBO130-119 TYPE III 349824 1 4 ADHESIVE WAS APPLIED TO THE DISCREPANT AREA TO PREVENT FURTHER FRAYING 349824 1 5 AND TEAR PROPAGATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL 349824 1 6 DEGRADATION. 349848 1 1 WHILE WORKING JOB CARD V76-40001 INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE CONNECTOR 349848 1 2 SAVER FOR 50J71 HAD A TEAR ON THE FACE OF THE PHENOLIC. THE DISCREPANT P 349848 1 3 ART WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW PART. THIS RETURNS THE VEHICLE TO DRAWING CO 349848 1 4 NFIGURATION. NO FURTHER DISPO OR RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: PAR 349848 1 5 T WAS PROBABLY DAMAGE AFTER DEMATE AT EDWARDS. 349852 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT INSPECTION, A HI-LOK WAS FOUND TO BE INTERFERING WITH 349852 1 2 AN ATTACH FASTENER FOR DOOR 44. BY REMOVING THE HI-LOK AND REVERSING DI 349852 1 3 RECTION, THE INTERFERENCE HAS BEEN ALLEVIATED. MR APPROVAL WAS GRANTED F 349852 1 4 OR THIS ACTION AND THE INSTALLATION OF BLIND RIVETS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 349852 1 5 THIS DISCREPANCY IS BUILD UP OF TOLERANCE IN HOLE REQUIRED. 349885 1 1 THE GAP BETWEEN THE O/B RMG TRUNION AND RMG WHEEL WELL WALL HAS BEEN INS 349885 1 2 PECTED BY LSOC MEQ NASA MEQ AND RILSS MEQ AND ALL PARTIES AGREE THAT THI 349885 1 3 S IS NOT A PR CONDITION AND THAT IT DOES NOT VIOLATE ANY DWG OR SPEC. SI 349885 1 4 MILAR GAPS EXIST ON OTHER VEHICLES AND THIS IS A NORMAL INSTALLATION OCC 349885 1 5 URRENCE. THIS GAP IS DEFINED IN ROCKWELL SPEC MLO308-0029 AS GAP 'C' AND 349885 1 6 IS SET OT 0.500" MIN PRIOR TO SHIMMING THE I/B GAPS 'A' AND 'B' WHICH R 349885 1 7 EDUCES THE 'C' GAP. THIS GAP IS DESIGNED TO ACCOMODATE MANUFACTURING TOL 349885 1 8 ERANCES BETWEEN THE WHEEL WELL OPENING AND THE MLG STRUT STRUCTURE. THE 349885 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS ERROR IN RECORDING A NON-PR CONDITION. NO 349885 1 10 RETEST REQUIRED. 349900 1 1 THE SCREW WAS REMOVED. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN TO MEASURE THE SCRATC 349900 1 2 HES. THE RAISED METAL WAS REMOVED WITH SANDPAPER AND THE SCRATCHES WERE 349900 1 3 ACCEPTED WITH MRB ACTION. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WO 349900 1 4 RKMANSHIP. 349910 1 1 THE DEBONDED V070-390392-001 STUD IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PG 1, WAS RESOLV 349910 1 2 ED BY REBONDING THE STUD TO THE V070-316234-006 (28-12) DOOR PER PRINT R 349910 1 3 EQUIREMENTS. THE LOST SHORE "A" HARDNESS SAMPLE IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2, PG 349910 1 4 1A WAS RESOLVED BY ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOND AS-IS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR AP 349910 1 5 PROVAL. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEMS 1 AND 2 IS WORKMANSHIP. CONCLUDE THA 349910 1 6 T STUD AND DOOR HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER 349910 1 7 WORK IS REQUIRED. 350222 1 1 DURING IPR 042V-0009, CONNECTOR SAVER P/N ME414-0630-6001 WAS FOUND TO H 350222 1 2 AVE DAMAGED THREADS. THIS PREVENTED CONNECTOR SAVER FROM FULLY ENGAGING. 350222 1 3 THE CONNECTOR SAVER WAS REPLACED AND THE OLD ONE SENT TO HDA FOR REFURB 350222 1 4 ISHMENT AND THE T-O MATED FOR POWER UP. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON TH 350222 1 5 IS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP, CONNECTOR SAVER WAS NOT CORRECTLY IN 350222 1 6 STALLED. 350223 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT SURV INSPECTION OF NOSE LANDING GEAR WHEELWELL, V30-1 350223 1 2 3201, EVIDENCE OF METAL TO METAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE V070-510729-001 TAR 350223 1 3 GET ARM AND THE V070-510778-001 ROLLER SUPPORT RESULTED IN THE INITIATIO 350223 1 4 N OF THIS PR. DURING OV-103'S REPROCESSING, THE V070-510702-001 FWD DOOR 350223 1 5 HOOK WAS R & R'D PER MEQ-3-A0042 (FORMERLY MEQ-3-12-0519). SINCE BOTH T 350223 1 6 HE TARGET ARM AND THE FWD DOOR HOOK ARE BOTH PART OF THE V070-510701 DOO 350223 1 7 R HOOK ASSY, THE R & R HAD A BENEFICIAL IMPACT BY INCREASING THE CLEARAN 350223 1 8 CE BETWEEN THE TARGET ARM AND THE ROLLER SUPPORT. THE TARGET ARM HAS BEE 350223 1 9 N TOUCHED UP AND SINCE THE REPLACEMENT OF THE FWD DOOR HOOK THE METAL TO 350223 1 10 METAL CONDITION, AND THUS THE PR CONDITION, NO LONGER EXISTS. NO RETEST 350223 1 11 REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 350224 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT SURV INSP OF NOSE LANDING GEAR DOORS, V30-13204, THIS 350224 1 2 PR WAS INITIATED WHEN "IMPACT MARKS" FROM THE FWD DOOR STOP WERE NOTICE 350224 1 3 D ON THE ALUMINUM TAPE COVERING THE INTERIOR OF THE RH NLG DOOR. PER DWG 350224 1 4 V070-361200 MINOR SCRATCHES ARE ALLOWED WHILE SEVERE SCRATCHES AND GOUG 350224 1 5 ES ARE CAUSE FOR REJECTION AND TAPE REPLACEMENT. THE TAPE ON THE RH NLG 350224 1 6 DOOR THAT INTERFACES WITH THE MD111-0002-3111 STOP BOLT OF THE V070-3261 350224 1 7 67-001 ASSY, ALTHOUGH COMPRESSED, IS NOT SCRATCHED OR GOUGED. ITS SURFAC 350224 1 8 E INTEGRITY REMAINS INTACT. THE CIRCULAR WRINKLE FORMED DOES NOT EXCEED 350224 1 9 1/32" IN HEIGHT AND IS APPROX 1" IN LINEAR LENGTH (WELL BELOW THE MAX 350224 1 10 ALLOWABLE SIX LINEAR INCHES IN LENGTH PER SQ FT REF DWG V070-361200). NO 350224 1 11 DISCREPANT CONDITION EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR FROM 350224 1 12 NLG CYCLING/EXCESSIVE TAPE LAYERING (MAX NUMBER OF ONE LAYER OF TAPE 350224 1 13 SPECIFIED PER V070-361200. TAPE IN STOP BOLT/DOOR CONTACT AREA HAS A 350224 1 14 LEAST TWO LAYERS OF TAPE WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTES TO THE 350224 1 15 WRINKLING TENDENCY). 350226 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITATED DURING AN INTERNAL SURVEILLACE INSPECTION OF THE NL 350226 1 2 G WHEELWELL WHEN METAL-TO-METAL CONTACT WAS DISCOVERED BETWEEN THE 11708 350226 1 3 02-101 UPPER DRAG BRACE AND THE 1170801-101 LOWER DRAG BRACE. MR APPROVA 350226 1 4 L WAS REQUESTED TO FILE AND BURNISH THE RAISED METAL SECTION OF THE 1170 350226 1 5 802-101 WHERE CONTACT WAS BEING MADE WITH THE 1170801-101 LOWER DRAG BRA 350226 1 6 CE. MR APPROVAL GRANTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. BOTH BARE METAL AREAS WERE 350226 1 7 CORROSION PROTECTED AND THE 1170802-101 ASSEMBLY MR ID'D. RETEST VERIFI 350226 1 8 ED DISCREPANT CONDITON NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING 350226 1 9 ERROR. 350338 1 1 THE STRIKER PLATE IS ATTACHED WITH JO-BOLTS WHICH CANNOT BE TIGHTENED. A 350338 1 2 DHESIVE WAS FORCED UNDER THE STRIKER PLATE TO FILL THE GAP SO THAT THE S 350338 1 3 TRIKER PLATE WOULD NOT MOVE AND ENLARGE THE HOLES IN THE FACESHEET. THIS 350338 1 4 WAS DONE WITH MR CONCURRENCE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO B 350338 1 5 E DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 350339 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT SURV INSP OF NLGD, V30-13204, THIS PR WAS INITIATED W 350339 1 2 HEN 'IMPACT MARKS' FROM THE MID DOOR STOP WERE NOTICED ON THE ALUMINUM T 350339 1 3 APE COVERING THE DOUBLER ON THE INTERIOR OF THE RH NLGD. PER DWG V070-36 350339 1 4 1200 MINOR SCRATCHES ARE ALLOWED WHILE SEVERE SCRATCHES AND GOUGES ARE C 350339 1 5 AUSE FOR REJECTION AND TAPE REPLACEMENT. THE TAPE ON THE RH NLGD THAT IN 350339 1 6 TERFACES WITH THE STOP BOLT OF THE V070-512521-001 ASSY. ALTHOUGH COMPRE 350339 1 7 SSED, IS NOT SCRATCHED OR GOUGED. ITS SURFACE INTEGRITY REMAINS INTACT. 350339 1 8 THE L-SHAPED WRINKLE FORMED DOES NOT EXCEED 1/32" IN HEIGHT AND IS APPRO 350339 1 9 X 1 & 1/2" IN LINEAR LENGTH (WELL BELOW THE MAX ALLOWABLE SIX LINEAR INC 350339 1 10 LENGTH PER SQ FT REF DWG V070-361200). NO DISCREPANT CONDITION EXISTS. P 350339 1 11 CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR FROM NLG CYCLING/EXCESSIVE TAPE LAYERING (M 350339 1 12 ER OF ONE LAYER OF TAPE SPECIFIED PER V070-361200. TAPE IN STOP BOLT/DOO 350339 1 13 CT AREA HAS AT LEAST TWO LAYERS OF TAPE WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTES 350339 1 14 WRINKLING TENDENCY). 350342 1 1 THE RH FORWARD NLG DOOR HINGE BOOT WAS TORN. THE BOOT WAS REMOVED AND A 350342 1 2 NEW BOOT WAS INITIALLY INSTALLED BACKWARDS. PAGE 1A WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUM 350342 1 3 ENT THIS OCCURRENCE. THE BOOT WAS AGAIN REMOVED AND RE-INSTALLED PER DRA 350342 1 4 WING. THE NEW BOOT WAS SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED PER V1098 LANDING GEAR FUNC 350342 1 5 TIONAL. NO FURTHER WORK OR RETEST REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. PROBABLE CAUSE: 350342 1 6 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 350560 1 1 DURING JOB CARD V80-40456 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 2B452A12 HAD EXPOS 350560 1 2 ED CONDUCTOR. WIRE 2B452A12 WAS REPAIRED PER SRP V-EL-0012-A-0 BY HEAT S 350560 1 3 HRINKING INSULATOR SLEEVE OVER DAMAGED AREA. THIS RETURNS WIRE 2B452A12 350560 1 4 TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON-DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT 350560 1 5 SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. PRO 350560 1 6 BABLE CAUSE DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN REFERENCE 350560 1 7 SCAN #3-14-0384. 350562 1 1 DURING V80-40456, WIRE 2F15A26 AND 2F14A26 WRE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMA 350562 1 2 GE. WIRES WERE WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER AC 350562 1 3 TION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURIN 350562 1 4 G PROCESSING. 351014 1 1 DURING V31-13117, CONNECTOR 82P306 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A LOOSE BACKSHELL. 351014 1 2 THE BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND THE CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELL INSPECTED TO V 351014 1 3 ERIFIED NO DAMAGE. THE BACKSHELL WAS THEN CLOSED AND TORQUED TO SPEC. NO 351014 1 4 FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP, BACKSH 351014 1 5 ELL WAS NOT PROPERLY TORQUED DURING LAST REWORK. 351059 1 1 DURING V31-13115, WIRES 2ZK297B24, 5ZK297A24, ZK458A24, 1ZK498A24, YC66A 351059 1 2 24, 1YT77C24, 1ZK513A24 AND X72C22 WERE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. SRP 351059 1 3 V-EL-0007-C-0 WAS USED TO TAPE REPAIR WIRES X72C22, 2ZK297B24, 5ZK297A2 351059 1 4 4, YC66A24, AND 1YT77C24. WIRES 1ZK498A24, ZK458A24 AND 1ZK513A24 HAD RA 351059 1 5 DIAL SEPARATION AT THE BACKSHELL OF A CONNECTOR AND AN UNRESTRICTED MR W 351059 1 6 AS APPROVED TO USE MYSTIC 7503 TAPE TO REPAIR THE KAPTON DAMAGE. NO FURT 351059 1 7 HER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON 351059 1 8 ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 351061 1 1 DURING V31-13117, AVIONICS BAY 2 INSPECTION, WIRES 1YC489A24, 3K660B26, 351061 1 2 2E45C20, 1YC114C24 AND YT1098A24 WERE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE AND WR 351061 1 3 ITTEN UP ON PAGE 1 AND 1A. WIRES 3K660B26, 1YC114C24 AND YT1098A24 WERE 351061 1 4 TAPED WITH MYSTIK 7503 TAPE PER AND APPROVED MR. WIRES 1YC489A24 AND 2E4 351061 1 5 5C20 WERE RETERMINATED AT CONNECTORS 82P384 AND 82J469 RESPECTIVELY. AFT 351061 1 6 ER WIRE RETERMINATION, CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT WERE PERFORMED ON 351061 1 7 THE 2 WIRES. A PAGE 1B AND 1C WAS INITIATED WHEN WIRE 1YC489A24 WAS FOU 351061 1 8 ND TO HAVE CRACKED KAPTON APPROX 3 INCHES FROM CONNECTOR. SPR-V-EL-0007 351061 1 9 WAS USED AND THE DAMAGE TAPED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 351061 1 10 PROBABLE CAUSE: 1, 1A, 1B, AND 1C NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING 351061 1 11 PROCESSING. 351162 1 1 THE DISCREPANT AREA OF THE GASKET WAS TRIMMED AWAY AND RED RTV WAS BONDE 351162 1 2 D TO THE ALUMINUM TO FORM A REPLACEMENT GASKET. THIS WAS ACCEPTED FOR ON 351162 1 3 E FLIGHT BY MRB ACTION. THE POST FLIGHT INSPECTION SHOWED THAT THE REPAI 351162 1 4 R HELD UP WELL SO THE REPAIR AREA WAS TOUCHED UP BY THE SAME METHOD AND 351162 1 5 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PR 351162 1 6 OBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 351164 1 1 THE FASTENER NOTED AS ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 IS RECESSED INTO THE NUTPLATE 0.0 351164 1 2 17". DUE TO INACCESSIBILITY OF THE FASTENER HEAD, THE SCREW CAN NOT BE R 351164 1 3 EPLACED, THIS FASTENER IS ONE OF 24 FASTENERS WHICH INSTALLS THE COVE PA 351164 1 4 NEL AND SHOWS NO EVIDENCE OF BACKING OUT OF THE NUTPLATE, THE DISCREPANT 351164 1 5 FASTENER WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 351164 1 6 THIS DISCREPANCY IS MANUFACTURING WORKMANSHIP--NO VERIFICATION OF THREA 351164 1 7 D PROTRUSTION DURING BOLT INSTALLATION. 351251 1 1 THE "CORROSION" ON THE CREW FASTENERS NOTED AS OTEM 1 ON PAGE 1 IS IDENT 351251 1 2 ICAL TO THE MINOR SURFACE OXIDATION WHICH HAS BEEN PREVIOSULY DOCUMENTED 351251 1 3 (REF STR-1-13-3722) AND ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THIS DISCR 351251 1 4 EPANCY HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER REWOR 351251 1 5 K REQUIRED. 351254 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT RSB INSP, (2) V070-298112-017 RSB SPRING SEAL ASSYS W 351254 1 2 ERE FOUND TO BE TORN. THE SEAL ASSYS WERE REMOVED AND NEW HARDWARE HAS B 351254 1 3 EEN INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRAD 351254 1 4 ATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 351255 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT INSPECTION OF THE RSB, EVIDENCE OF CORROSION WAS FOUN 351255 1 2 D AROUND (3) INSERTS IN THE LOWER, AFT CORNER OF THE R/H LOWER RSB INNER 351255 1 3 PANEL. TOP COAT WAS REMOVED AND REVEALED NO PITTING OF THE SUBSTRATE. C 351255 1 4 ORROSION PROTECTION WAS REAPPLIED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. NO DISCREPANT 351255 1 5 CONDITION EXISTS. 351992 1 1 THE DISCREPANT V070-198371-001 SEAL DOCUMENTED AS ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 WAS P 351992 1 2 REVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER DEGRADATION 351992 1 3 OF THE SEAL WAS NOTED. NO NEW DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 351994 1 1 THE DISCREPANT CONDITION NOTED AS ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1, "EVIDENCE OF HEAT IN 351994 1 2 THE CENTER HINGE AREA...", ON THE RH OB ELEVON IS AN ANTICIPATED RESULT 351994 1 3 OF HOT GAS FLOW DURING THE RE-ENTRY. CHARRED KOROPON IS MERELY SURFACE 351994 1 4 DISCOLORATION DUE TO FLASHES OF HOT GAS DURING RE-ENTRY. PARTIAL CHARRIN 351994 1 5 G OF HINGE SEALS WAS DOCUMENTED AND MR ACCEPTED PER STR-3-12-3500 FOR UN 351994 1 6 RESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER DEGRADATION OF THE SEAL WAS NOTED. DISCOLORED 351994 1 7 KOROPON WAS REMOVED AND FRESH KOROPON APPLIED. RTV OUTGASSING WAS CLEAN 351994 1 8 ED WITH WIPES DAMPENED WITH IPA. THIS WAS A NON-PR CONDITION. 351995 1 1 THE DISCREPANT V070-198371-001 SEAL DOCUMENTED AS ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 WAS P 351995 1 2 REVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER DEGRADATION 351995 1 3 OF THE SEAL WAS NOTED. NO NEW DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 351996 1 1 THE DISCREPANT V070-198373-001 SEAL DOCUMENTED AS ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 WAS P 351996 1 2 REVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER DEGRADATION 351996 1 3 OF THE SEAL WAS NOTED. NO NEW DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 352131 1 1 THE HOLE ON THE V070-396430-003 CARRIER PANEL WAS SLOTTED ON AN MR BASIS 352131 1 2 TO ALLOW FASTENER INSTALLATION. THE PANEL WAS MR ID'D AND INSTALLED ON 352131 1 3 PR TLP04-0853. PROBABLE CAUSE: FASTENER HOLE AND VEHICLE RECEPTACLE MISA 352131 1 4 LIGNMENT. 352173 1 1 THE PANEL WAS REMOVED AND THE FIBERGLASS WAS REPAIRED WITH MBO120-037 AD 352173 1 2 HESIVE AND A FIBERGLASS PATCH WITH MRB APPROVAL. UPON REINSTALLING THE P 352173 1 3 ANEL, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE FASTENERS HOLDING THE ADJACENT PANEL, W 352173 1 4 HICH HAD TO BE LOOSENED FOR PANEL REMOVAL, COULD NOT BE INSTALLED. THIS 352173 1 5 PANEL WAS REMOVED, AND A NUTPLATE WAS R&R'D AND A ROSAN INSERT WAS R&R'D 352173 1 6 . UPON REINSTALLING THE PANEL, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE ROSAN HOLE WAS 352173 1 7 NOT DEEP ENOUGH TO ACCOMODATE THE PER PRINT SCREW, SO A SHORTER SCREW W 352173 1 8 AS USED WITH MRB APPROVAL. THE ROSAN HAD TO BE TAPPED OUT BECAUSE OF THE 352173 1 9 THREAD DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE LONGER SCREW, SO THE SHORTER SCREW WAS INSTA 352173 1 10 LLED WITH LOCKTITE AND THE PR WAS DEFERRED FOR 1 FLIGHT. AFTER FLIGHT 14 352173 1 11 , THE ROSAN WAS R&R'D. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE 352173 1 12 CAUSE: ITEM 1-WORKMANSHIP, ITEM 2-OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION, ITEM 3-VENDOR 352173 1 13 WORKMANSHIP, ITEM 4-DUPLICATE OF ITEM 3. 352273 1 1 DURING V31-15144 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRES 4F14A26, 4F210A26, AF15A26 352273 1 2 , 4F10A26, 4F213A26, 4F212A26, 4F207A26,4F215A26, 4F214A26, 4R3133C26, 3 352273 1 3 B370C26, 3B356C26 AND 4B3137C26 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE 352273 1 4 SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTOR(S). THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPI 352273 1 5 NG DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. IN ADDITION THE HARN 352273 1 6 ESS FORM EACH CONN. TO FIRST CLAMP WAS WRAPPED WITH PTFE TAPE TO PROVIDE 352273 1 7 ADDED PROTECTION. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROB 352273 1 8 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 352742 1 1 DURING DAILY MONITORING, THE MAIN A AFT PCA VOLTAGE WAS OBSERVED TO TOGG 352742 1 2 LE BETWEEN 28.8 AND 29.0 VDC. THE NOMINAL AFT PCA-4 VOLTAGE SHOULD BE AP 352742 1 3 PROXIMATELY 29.3 VDC. TROUBLESHOOTING DETERMINED THAT THE RESISTANCE ACR 352742 1 4 OSS THE APCA-4 GROUND MOTOR SWITCH WAS ABOUT 4 MILLIOHMS (APPROX 1 MILLO 352742 1 5 HM WAS OBSERVED ACROSS THE MOTOR SWITCHES OF MAIN BUSSES B & C). THE ADD 352742 1 6 ITIONAL 3 MILLOHMS OF RESISTANCE ACCOUNTED FOR THE SLIGHTLY LOWER VOLTAG 352742 1 7 E FOR MAIN BUS A. THE DISCREPANT APCA-4 WAS ARMEOVED AND REPLACED WITH A 352742 1 8 NEW APCA PER OMI V5C03.004. A MULTI-SYSTEM RETEST OF AFT PCA-4 HAS SUCC 352742 1 9 ESSFULLY BEEN COMPLETED AND NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. NOTE: RESULTS 352742 1 10 BACK FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE DISCREPANT APCA-4 DETERMINED THAT THE 352742 1 11 INCORRECT HARDWARE WAS USED TO ATTACH THE MOTOR SWITCH TO THE BUS BAR. 352742 1 12 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 352830 1 1 DURING A V1086.001 SEQ 01-024, RECEPTACLE 50J828 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BRO 352830 1 2 KEN BACKSHELL. THE RECEPTACLE WAS DEPINNED AND ME127 BACKSHELL REPLACED. 352830 1 3 AFTER REPINNING, CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT CHECKS WERE PERFORMED. 352830 1 4 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE DAMA 352830 1 5 GE ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 352861 1 1 A REPLACEMENT V070-565247-001 KAHRLON INSERT WAS OBTAINED AND WILL BE IN 352861 1 2 STALLED ON JOB CARD V35-50002. AN LRU PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE DAMAG 352861 1 3 ED INSERT TO ROUTE IT TO THE VENDOR FOR REPAIR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIO 352861 1 4 NAL DEGRADATION. 352958 1 1 AFTER MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION OF THE NOTED DEFECTS, IT WAS DETERMINED TH 352958 1 2 AT THE ACTUAL CONDITION IS SUPERFICIAL COATING DAMAGE THAT IS ALLOWABLE 352958 1 3 PER MLO601-0002 PARAGRAPH 4.12.4. CONCLUDE THAT COMPONENT IS ACCEPTABLE 352958 1 4 FOR FLIGHT. 352965 1 1 THE STRUT WAS FIT CHECKED USING NORMAL INSTALLATION PROCEDURES FROM THE 352965 1 2 JOB CARD IN WHICH THE "PROBLE," WAS DETECTED. THE STRUT FIT IN WITHOUT A 352965 1 3 PROBLEM. THE GAP MEASUREMENTS WERE ALL WITHIN TOLERANCES SPECIFICED IN 352965 1 4 THE JOB CARD. NO PROBLEM EXISTS. WORK CONTINURED WHERE IT LEFT OFF. NO 352965 1 5 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CASUE-NO DISCREPANCY. 353140 1 1 THE DEBONDED SEAL SPLICE IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY RE 353140 1 2 MOVING THE SPLICE AND REBONDING A NEW SPLICE IN PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. 353140 1 3 A NEW SPLICE WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE ETCHING OF A TEFLON SEAL IS ONLY E 353140 1 4 FFECTIVE FOR LIMITED TIME AND THE SEAL REMOVED HAD EXCEEDED THE TIME LIM 353140 1 5 IT. -056 SPLICE SUPERCEDES -040 SPLICE PER DWG. CONCLUDE THAT REPLACEMEN 353140 1 6 T OF THE SEAL SPLICE HAS RETURNED THE SEAL TO PRINT CONFIGURATION AND NO 353140 1 7 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF 353140 1 8 THE SEAL BECOMING DEBONDED IS POOR WORKMANSHIP OF ORIGINAL VENDOR BOND. 353141 1 1 THE PLBD BULB SEAL BECAME DEBONDED. IT WAS REBONDED PER PRINT. NO FURTHE 353141 1 2 R WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP - POOR SURFACE 353141 1 3 PREP. 353142 1 1 THE TORN/CRACKED SEAL IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED WITH UNR 353142 1 2 ESTRICTED MR APPROVAL BY TAPING OVER THE SPLIT WITH MYSTIC 7503 TAPE. CO 353142 1 3 NCLUDE THAT BY TAPING OVER THE SPLIT WITH MYSTIC TAPE THE SECONDARY STRU 353142 1 4 CTURAL SEAL WILL FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUI 353142 1 5 RED ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE SPLIT IN THE 353142 1 6 TEFLON BULB SEAL IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 353143 1 1 THE DEBONDED SEAL SPLICE IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY RE 353143 1 2 MOVING THE SPLICE AND REBONDING A NEW SPLICE IN PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. 353143 1 3 A NEW SPLICE WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE ETCHING OF A TEFLON SEAL IS ONLY E 353143 1 4 FFECTIVE FOR A LIMITED TIME AND THE SEAL REMOVED HAD EXCEEDED THE TIME L 353143 1 5 IMIT. CONCLUDE THAT REPLACEMENT OF THE SEAL SPLICE HAS RETURNED THE SEAL 353143 1 6 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDAR 353143 1 7 Y STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEBONDED SEAL IS POOR WORKMANSHIP OF ORIG 353143 1 8 INAL BOND BY VENDOR. 353191 1 1 CORROSION WAS SUSPECTED AT TWO FASTENERS WHERE THE SPAR FITTING FOR L/H 353191 1 2 RIBSPLICE 17 CONNECTS TO THE LEADING EDGE SPAR. THOROUGH CLEANING AND BO 353191 1 3 RESCOPE INSPECTION REVEALED ONE LOCATION WITH ACTIVE CORROSION WHICH WAS 353191 1 4 REMOVED. BOTH SIDES WERE SEALED WITH PRIMER. THE ONE CORROSION PIT WAS 353191 1 5 MEASURED AT 0.006 MAXIMUM DEPTH IN 0.120 THICK FLANGE OF THE FITTING AND 353191 1 6 WAS ACCEPTED AS IS BY MR APPROVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE OF CORROSION IS GALVA 353191 1 7 NIC ACTION BETWEEN FASTENER AND FITTING. CONCLUDE THAT THIS CONDITION IS 353191 1 8 ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 353197 1 1 THE STRUT WAS FOUND TO BE DENTED DURING INSTALLATION OF THE PROTECTIVE C 353197 1 2 OVERS. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN REVEALING THAT THE STRUT WAS UNACCEPT 353197 1 3 ABLE FOR FURTHER USE. THE STRUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. AN L 353197 1 4 RU-PR WAS INITIATED TO SCRAP THE OLD STRUT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE O 353197 1 5 N THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE-WORKMANSHIP. 353198 1 1 ENGINEERING INSPECTED THE STRUT UNDER MAGNIFICATION, AND MOLD IMPRESSION 353198 1 2 S WERE TAKEN AND READ WITH AN OPTICAL COMPARATOR. RESULTS SHOWED THE DAM 353198 1 3 AGE TO BE MINIMAL. THE AREA WAS TREATED WITH KOROPON AND MRB APPROVAL WA 353198 1 4 S OBTAINED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - WORK 353198 1 5 MANSHIP. 353336 1 1 DURING V31-15105, WIRE HARNESS V070-775341-002 WAS FOUND TO BE CHAFFING 353336 1 2 ON 54J193 AND 54J39. TEFLON TAPE WAS INSTALLED AT CHAFFING AREA AND DISC 353336 1 3 REPANCY WAS RECORDED IN THE WIRE PROTECTION LOG LOCATED IN TAIR. NO FURT 353336 1 4 HER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY/LOCKHE 353336 1 5 ED WORKMANSHIP. WIRES WERE NOT ORIGINALLY PROTECTED/TOOL 14 FLIGHTS TO N 353336 1 6 OTICE PROBLEM. 353375 1 1 THE DEBONDED SEAL SPLICE IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY RE 353375 1 2 MOVING THE SPLICE AND REBONDING A NEW SPLICE IN PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. 353375 1 3 A NEW SPLICE WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE ETCHING OF A TEFLON SEAL IS ONLY E 353375 1 4 FFECTIVE FOR A LIMITED TIME AND THE SEAL REMOVED HAD EXCEEDED THE TIME L 353375 1 5 IMIT. CONCLUDE THAT REPLACEMENT OF THE SEAL SPLICE HAS RETURNED THE SEAL 353375 1 6 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDAR 353375 1 7 Y STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEBOND IS POOR WORKMANSHIP OF ORIGINAL BO 353375 1 8 ND (VENDOR). 353376 1 1 THE DEBONDED SEAL SPLICE IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY RE 353376 1 2 MOVING THE SPLICE AND REBONDING A NEW SPLICE IN PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. 353376 1 3 A NEW SPLICE WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE ETCHING OF A TEFLON SEAL IS ONLY E 353376 1 4 FFECTIVE FOR A LIMITED TIME AND THE SEAL REMOVED HAD EXCEEDED THE TIME L 353376 1 5 IMIT. CONCLUDE THAT REPLACEMENT OF THE SEAL SPLICE HAS RETURNED THE SEAL 353376 1 6 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDAR 353376 1 7 Y STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEBOND IS POOR WORKMANSHIP OF ORIGINAL BO 353376 1 8 ND (VENDOR). 353378 1 1 THE DEBONDED PLBD BULB SEAL SPLICE AT XO1183 ON THE RIGHT HAND PLBD HING 353378 1 2 E LINE (ITEM 1, PG 1) WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE SPLICE AND BONDING IN 353378 1 3 A NEW SPLICE PER THE DWG REQUIREMENTS, THEREBY RETURNING THE INSTALLATI 353378 1 4 ON TO PRINT. THE TORN PLBD BULB SEAL AT XO1183 ON THE RIGHT HAND PLBD HI 353378 1 5 NGELINE WAS RESOLVED BY WRAPPING THE END OF THE SEAL WITH KAPTON TAPE WI 353378 1 6 TH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL, THEREBY RETURNING THE INSTALLATION TO DESIG 353378 1 7 N INTENT. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DEBONDED SEAL IS POOR WORKMANSHIP OF SUR 353378 1 8 FACE PREP OF THE SPLICE FOR BONDING AND THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE TORN S 353378 1 9 EAL IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THAT THE PLBD BULB SEAL 353378 1 10 INSTALLATION AT XO1183 HAS BEEN RETURNED TO DESIGN INTENT AND NO FURTHER 353378 1 11 WORK IS REQUIRED. 353423 1 1 AFTER THOROUGH ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF NOTED DISCPREPANCIES, THEY WERE 353423 1 2 DETERMINED TO BE SUPERFICIAL COATING DAMAGE WHICH IS ALLOWABLE PER MLO6 353423 1 3 01-0002 PARAGRAPH 4.12.4. CONCLUDE THAT COMPONENT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIG 353423 1 4 HT. 353552 1 1 UPON SURVEILLANCE, IT WAS FOUND THAT THERE WAS A SCRATCHED AREA ON THE F 353552 1 2 WD FACE OF THE AFT SIDE OF THE RH AFT ET DOOR LATCH HOUSING COVER. DENTA 353552 1 3 L MOLDS WERE TAKEN OF THE AREA AND OPTICAL COMPARATOR ANALYSIS SHOWED A 353552 1 4 DISCREPANCY OF 0.3887" X 0.2003" WITH A MAXIMUM DEPTH OF 0.0157", THIS D 353552 1 5 ISCREPANCY WAS MR UNRESTRICTED AND CORROSION PROTECTED IN ACCORDANCE WIT 353552 1 6 H MAO608-301 AND MR ID'D PER MAO104-301. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CON 353552 1 7 DITION IS VIBRATION OF THE FERRY DOOR DURING GERRY FLIGHT/FERRY DOOR INS 353552 1 8 TALLATION. INSPECTION OF THE ET DOOR LATCH SHOWS NO SIGNS OF CONTACT WIT 353552 1 9 H HOUSING. NO CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED BECAUSE NEW FERRY DOOR CONFI 353552 1 10 GURATIONS DO NOT USE THE LATCHES TO RETAIN THEM. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 353696 1 1 THE LEFT HAND SIDE FITTING WAS REMOVED AND A DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION WA 353696 1 2 S PERFORMED. THE RESULTS WERE INCONCLUSIVE DUE TO THE SURFACE SCRATCHES. 353696 1 3 THE SURFACE WAS SANDED TO REMOVE IMPERFECTIONS WITH MRB APPROVAL. THE P 353696 1 4 ART WAS ETCHED AND REINSPECTED WITH DYE PENETRANT. NO INDICATIONS WERE N 353696 1 5 OTED. THE PART WAS REINSTALLED PER PRINT. A PAGE 1A WAS TAKEN FOR THE SA 353696 1 6 ME CONDITION ON THE RIGHT HAND SIDE FITTING. THAT PART WAS REMOVED, SAND 353696 1 7 ED, ETCHED AND DYE PEN'D. NO INDICATIONS WERE NOTED. THE PART WAS REINST 353696 1 8 ALLED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 353696 1 9 WORKMANSHIP. THE MARKS WERE PROBABLY LEFT OVER FROM THE MACHINING PROCES 353696 1 10 S. 353936 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING SURVEILLANCE. THE FASTENER CONNECTING THE L 353936 1 2 H FWD V070-565180-009 BELLCRANK TO THE V070-565017-003 PUSHROD (ET DOOR 353936 1 3 DRIVE LINKAGE) WAS SUSPECTED TO HAVE BEEN INSTALLED INCORRECTLY. PER DWG 353936 1 4 /SPEC THE BOLT IS TO BE INSTALLED WITH THE HEAD ON THE FWD SIDE, UNLESS 353936 1 5 OTHERWISE SPECIFIED. THIS BOLT IS CORRECTLY INSTALLED. REFERENCE V070-56 353936 1 6 5000 EO H01 (FIGURE 1) AND ZN 21E. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. 353937 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING SURV. THE FASTENER CONNECTING THE RH FWD V0 353937 1 2 70-565180-010 BELLCRANK TO THE V070-565017-003 PUSHROD (ET DOOR DRIVE LI 353937 1 3 NKAGE) WAS SUSPECTED TO HAVE BEEN INSTALLED INCORRECTLY. PER DWG/SPEC TH 353937 1 4 E BOLT IS TO BE INSTALLED WITH THE HEAD ON THE FWD SIDE, UNLESS OTHERWIS 353937 1 5 E SPECIFIED. THIS BOLT IS CORRECTLY INSTALLED (REF V070-565000 ZN 39D & 353937 1 6 VIEW R-R ZN 38G). THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION 353984 1 1 PLB DOOR BULKHEAD GAP MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN TO SATISFY CHIT J3419. THE 353984 1 2 LH AFT #3 AND RH AFT #4 ROLLER GAPS WERE MEASURED TO BE .006" AND .008" 353984 1 3 RESPECTIVELY. RIGGING SPEC. MLO 308-022 CALLS FOR THE GAP TO BE SET AT 353984 1 4 000-.005" WITHOUT PRESSURE SEALS AND TPS INSTALLED. NO REQUIREMENT CURR 353984 1 5 ENTLY EXISTS FOR VERIFICATION OR RE RIGGING. THIS DATA WILL BE USED TO D 353984 1 6 EVELOP FIELD RIGGING CRITERIA. THESE GAPS ARE TYPICAL AND DO NOT VIOLATE 353984 1 7 ANY APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. 353985 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V1291.001.001 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE HARNE 353985 1 2 SS V070-779214 WAS CHAFFING RESULTING IN EXPOSED CONDUCTOR. INGINEERING 353985 1 3 INSPECTION BY LSOC AND NASA REVEALED THAT THERE WAS NO EXPOSED CONDUCTOR 353985 1 4 , ONLY MINOR COSMETIC DAMAGE TO THE INITIAL PROTECTIVE TAPE WRAP WITH EX 353985 1 5 POSED KAPTON. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY INSTALLING PTFE TEFLON T 353985 1 6 APE ON HARNESSES V070-779214 AND V070-779308 FOR CHAFFING PROTECTION. DA 353985 1 7 MAGE WAS CAUSED BY PERSONNEL STEPPING ON THE HARNESSES. NO RETEST OR FUR 353985 1 8 THER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS DOC. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP IN A CONFI 353985 1 9 NED AREA. 354066 1 1 DURING HYD-3-14-0492, ONE RIVET WAS FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT (SHEARED) ON 354066 1 2 THE V070-856365-002 SUPPORT BRACKET. PER MR DISPOSITION, A MD128-0002-02 354066 1 3 JO-BOLT HAS BEEN INSTALLED AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE 354066 1 4 CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS IMPROPER RIVET INSTALLATION. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING 354066 1 5 OR SHOP ACTION REQUIRED. 354086 1 1 A DING WAS FOUND ON THE INSIDE SURFACE OF THE DOME HEAT SHIELD. VISUAL I 354086 1 2 NSPECTION, COIN TAP TEST, EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION AND MOLD IMPRESSIONS A 354086 1 3 LL INDICATED THAT THE DING DID NOT THREATEN THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF 354086 1 4 THE PART. THE AREA WAS REPRIMED, AND MRB APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO ACCEPT 354086 1 5 THE DING FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. P 354086 1 6 ROBABLE CAUSE- WORKMANSHIP. 354434 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM 1 WAS A TAPE-ONLY SCUFF/NICK ON THE LH #4 RADIAT 354434 1 2 OR "TOP". THIS TAPE SCUFF WAS MR ACCEPTED AND ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DA 354434 1 3 MAGE LOG AND MAP. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS AN ACCIDENTAL WORKMANSHIP SCUFF 354434 1 4 DURING PROCESSING. 354436 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM 1 IS TWO LOCATIONS OF TAPE DISCOLORATIONS ON THE 354436 1 2 LH #3 RADIATOR :TOP" WHICH WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS M 354436 1 3 ATERIALS DEGRADATION. THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM 2 IS A TAPE ONLY NOCK OF T 354436 1 4 HE LH #3 RADIATOR "TOP" WHICH WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE 354436 1 5 WAS AN ACCIDENTAL WORKMANSHIP SCUFF/NICK DURING PROCESSING. THESE ITEMS 354436 1 6 WERE ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. 354437 1 1 THE FOLLOWING DISCREPANCY ITEMS ARE ON THE RH #3 RADIATOR. THESE DISCREP 354437 1 2 ANCIES WERE ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAAGE LOG AND MAP. ITAEMS 1 AND 2 354437 1 3 WERE SMALL MICROMETERORITE CRATERS WHICH CAUSED SMALL DENTS IN THE FACES 354437 1 4 HEET. RADIATOR TAPE WAS REMOVED AND 10X MAGNIFICATION AND MOLDS REVEALED 354437 1 5 MR ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS. NEW TAPE WAS THEN MR BONDED OVER THESE AREAS. 354437 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE WAS METEOR HITS DURING FLIGHT. ITEMS 3 AND 4 ARE MINOR " 354437 1 7 GOUGES" IN RADIATOR TAPE ONLY AND WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE 354437 1 8 WAS ACCIDENTIAL WORKMANSHIP GOUGES DURING PROCESSING. ITEM 5 IS A SMALL 354437 1 9 BUMP/BLISTER AREA OF RAISED TAPE AND WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBALBE 354437 1 10 CAUSE APPEARS TO BE NOTHING MORE THAN EXCESS ADHESIVE UNDER THE TAPE 354437 1 11 FROM MANUFACTURING. ITEMS 6 AND 7 ARE SMALL AREAS OF TAPE DISCOLORATION. 354437 1 12 THIS CONDITION HAS BEEN SEEN BEFORE, TESTS PERFORMED, AND NO CONCLUSION 354437 1 13 FOR THE CASUE, SO THESE WERE MR ACCEEPTED AS IS. PROBABLE CASUE WAS 354437 1 14 MATERIALS DEGRADATION. 354438 1 1 THE DISCREAPNCY OF ITEM #1 IS A TAPE-ONLY SURFACE SCRATCH ON THE LH #1 R 354438 1 2 ADIATOR "TOP: WHICH WAS MR ACCEPTED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP 354438 1 3 WHILE ATTACHING THE STRONGBACK TO THIS ATTACH POINT. THIS ITEM WAS ENTER 354438 1 4 ED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. 354439 1 1 "WHAT LOOKS LIKE SEAL TAB FROM TILE STUCK TO" THE LH #1 RADIATOR WAS REA 354439 1 2 LLY THE RED PROTECTIVE COVERLAY WHICH WAS NOT REMOVED FROM THE STR-3-13- 354439 1 3 3796 RADIATOR TAPE PATCH. A 1.4" X 1/4" CORNER CAME DEBONDED, APPARENTLY 354439 1 4 FROM WHEN THE "SEAL TAB" WAS ATTEMPTED TO BE PULLED UP. THE PROTECTIVE 354439 1 5 COVERLAY WAS REMOVED. THE TAPE CORNER WAS REBONDED PER MR USING RTV "142 354439 1 6 ". THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP WHEN THE PROTECTIVE COVERLAY WAS N 354439 1 7 OT PEELED OFF OF THE NEW RADIATOR TAPE REPAIR LAST FLOW. 354441 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES WERE MR ACCEPTED ON THE RH #1 RADIATOR. EACH OF THESE 354441 1 2 ITEMS WERE ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. ITEM 1 IS A SMALL 354441 1 3 NICK IN RADIATOR TAPE ONLY WHICH WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE PROBABLE CA 354441 1 4 USE WAS AN ACCIDENTAL WORKMANSHIP NICK DURING PROCESSING. ITEM 2 WAS CAL 354441 1 5 LED A PINHOLE BUT IS ACTUALLY A SUBSTANCE ON THE SURFACE OF THE RADIATOR 354441 1 6 TAPE. THIS WAS VERIFIED WITH 30X MAGNIFICATION. IT HAS BEEN SOLVENT WIP 354441 1 7 ED UP DURING V1176 CLEANING, SO NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR 354441 1 8 . IT WAS DELETED FROM THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP (#28). PROBABLE CA 354441 1 9 USE WAS ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION. ITEM 3 IS A DENT IN THE FACESHEET. 354441 1 10 RADIATOR TAPE WAS REMOVED, AND MOLDS, 10X MAG X-RAY, AND ETC TESTS 354441 1 11 EVEALED AN MR ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. NEW TAPE WAS BONDED OVER THIS AREA. 354441 1 12 PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP, ASSUMED TO BE DUE TO AN OBJECT HITTING 354441 1 13 THE RADIATOR. ITEM 4 WAS A 2" X 2" AREA OF TORN, BUBBLED, DISCOLORED 354441 1 14 TAPE WHICH WAS AT ATTACH PT 354441 1 15 5 A RECURRING PROBLEM AT ATTACH PTS. THE TAPE WAS REMOVED, AND 354441 1 16 KOROPON/RED WASH PRIMER/CHEMGLAZE WAS APPLIED PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS 354441 1 17 UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE DUE TO RADIATOR HANDLING WHEN STRONGBACKS ARE 354441 1 18 ATTACHED. 354476 1 1 ITEM 1 WAS A METEORITE IMPACT THROUGH THE FACESHEET IN THE RH #2 RADIATO 354476 1 2 R "TOP". HARDENED RESIDUE WAS LEFT ARUOND THE HOLE IN THE FACESHEET WHIC 354476 1 3 H WAS EVENTUALLY SCRAPPED OFF. NASA LABS (LAD REQUEST MCB-901-91) TESTED 354476 1 4 THIS RESIDUE WHICH WAS THOUGHT TO BE PART OF THE METEOR, BUT THE RESULT 354476 1 5 S YIELDED MATERIALS BELIEVED TO BE FROM DAMAGED RADIATOR TAPE AND FACESH 354476 1 6 EET. SOME RESIDUE WAS SEEN REMAINING INSIDE THE HOLE. LATER RESEARCH REV 354476 1 7 EALED THAT THIS SAME HOLE IN THE FACESHEET WAS DETECTED DURING FLIGHT 03 354476 1 8 PROCESSING, PROBABLY FROM A MICROMETEORITE HIT OF FLIGHT 02. MEQ-3-03-0 354476 1 9 116 (DEFERRED TO MEQ-3-A0012) WAS THE ORIGINAL PR WHICH DETECTED MR 354476 1 10 REPAIRED BY POTTING THE (TWO) HONEYCOMB CELLS WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. 354476 1 11 AFTER DEFERRAL AND FLIGHT, IT WAS EVALUATED TO BE AN ACCEPTABLE AND 354476 1 12 ENDURING REPAIR (REF COPY OF PR IN RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG). THIS 354476 1 13 DISCREPANCY WAS NOT NOTED ON THE DAMAGE LOG AND MAP UNTIL REDUNDANT 354476 1 14 DETECTION IN MEQ-3-06-0182, LOG ID 1, AND MEQ-3-06-0185 LOG ID 2, IT WAS 354476 1 15 ALDO REDUNDTANTLY DETECTED ON MEQ-3-07-0197 ITEM 2 (NO LOG ID) AND 354476 1 16 STR-3-12-3533 LOG ID 12, BUT NOT REENTERED ON MAP DUE TO EVALUATION AS 354476 1 17 NO WORSENED CONDITION. THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP WERE UPDATED 354476 1 18 ACCORDING TO ALL PR'S. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DEGRADATION AND FAILURE OF 354476 1 19 PREVIOUS MR REPAIR FROM FLIGHT 03, POSSIBLY FROM A PARTICULAR TIME WHEN 354476 1 20 THE RADIATOR HEAT DUMP REACHED A HIGHER THAN USUAL TEMPERATURE ON THIS 354476 1 21 RH 2 RADIATOR. THEREFORE, THIS INFORMATION, WITH THE NASA LAB REPORT, 354476 1 22 CONFIRM THAT THE DEBRIS STUCK TO THE FACESHEET WHICH WAS SCRAPPED OFF 354476 1 23 WAS MBO120-008 ADHESIVE FROM THE PREVIOUS MR REPAIR, ALUMINUM FACESHEET 354476 1 24 SHAVINGS, AND ANY MISCELLANEOUS MATERIAL WHICH ENTERED INTO THE HOLE 354476 1 25 LEFT "OPEN" OVER APPROX TEN FLIGHTS. MULTIPLE MOLD IMPRESSIONS, 10X 354476 1 26 MAGNIFICATIONS AND X-RAYS WERE TAKEN AND COIN TAP, EDDY CURRENT AND 354476 1 27 ULTRASONIC INSPECTIONS WERE PERFORMED AFTER RADIATOR TAPE WAS REMOVED. 354476 1 28 PHOTOGRAPHS AND BORESCOPE VIDEO WERE ALSO TAKEN. THE DAMAGE WAS MR 354476 1 29 REPAIRED BY ROUNDING OUT THE HOLE WITH A SMALL DRILL AND COLD-BONDING A 354476 1 30 DOUBLER ON THE FACESHEET. ITEM 2 PAGE 1A WAS THEN WRITTEN WHEN THE SHOT 354476 1 31 BAG DEAD WEIGHT SLID, CAUSING THE DOUBLER TO BOND MISALIGNED. PROBABLE 354476 1 32 CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP FOR NOT TAPING THE DOUBLER IN PLACE AND NOT 354476 1 33 TETHERING THE SHOT BAG. THIS MISALIGNED DOUBLER WAS SANDED DOWN UNTIL 354476 1 34 REMOVED, AND ANOTHER DOUBLER BOND WAS PERFORMED BUT AS A HOT BOND. THIS 354476 1 35 BOND WAS SUCCESSFUL. NEW RADIATOR TAPE WAS BONDED OVER THIS REPAIRED 354476 1 36 AREA PER MR. THIS REPAIR ELIMINATES THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE REPEATING 354476 1 37 PR'S AT THIS LOCATION, PREVENTS THE OLD MR POTTING REPAIR FROM FAILING 354476 1 38 AGAIN, AND STRENGTHENS THE RADIATOR STRUCTURE ACCORDING TO CURRENT 354476 1 39 ENGINEERING PROCEDURES. 354498 1 1 THE THREAD MARKS IN THE CARGO ATTACH HOLES IN THE XO 750 FRAME WERE BURN 354498 1 2 ISHED SMOOTH WITH SANDPAPER AND MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN TO MEASURE T 354498 1 3 HREAD DEPTH AND HOLE DIAMETER. THE DOUBLE DRILLED HOLE WAS PLUGGED WITH 354498 1 4 A DOUBLE FLUSH RIVET. MR FABIRCATED RECEPTACLE PLATES WERE INSTALLED TO 354498 1 5 CORRECT HOLE MISALIGNMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 354634 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITITATED DURING INSPECTION J/C V30-14301. BINDING WAS NOTE 354634 1 2 D ON RH AFT PLBD BULKHEAD ROLLER #2. ENGINEERING INSPECRTION HAS REVEALE 354634 1 3 D THAT THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. WHILE THE ROLLER WILL NOT "FREE SPIN" 354634 1 4 , IT WILL ROTATE THROUGH ITS FULL RANGE OF MOTION WITH LITTLE RESISTANCE 354634 1 5 . DURING DOOR LATCHING, THE ROLLERS ROTATE SLIGHTLY AS THEY COME IN CONT 354634 1 6 ACT WITH THE BULKHEAD LATCH HOOKS. SLIGHT RESISTANCE IN ROTATION WILL NO 354634 1 7 T AFFECT THE ROLLER'S PERFORMANCE. THE CONDITION DESCRIBED ABOVE IS NOT 354634 1 8 A DISCREPANCY. 354648 1 1 THE 2 LOCATIONS OF "PIN HOLES" OF ITEM 1 ARE ONLY TAPE SCUFFS ON THE L/H 354648 1 2 #2 RADIATOR "TOP". THE LOG ID #20 LOCATION IS AT ACTUATOR ATTACH POINT 354648 1 3 #2 AREA. THE LOG ID #21 LOCATION IS AT THE STRONGBACK ATTACH POINT #1 AR 354648 1 4 EA, BUT NOT NEXT TO THE BOLT HOLES. THESE WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBAB 354648 1 5 LE CAUSE WAS ACCIDENTAL SCUFFS DURING HANDLING THE RADIATOR. THE DISCREP 354648 1 6 ANCIES OF ITEMS 2 AND 3 WERE AREAS OF MARRED AND BUBBLED TAPE AT THE STR 354648 1 7 ONGBACK ATTACH POINT AREAS, BETWEEN THE BOLT HOLES, ON THE L/H #2 RADIAT 354648 1 8 OR "TOP". ITEMS 2 AND 3 WERE PREVIOUSLY REPAIRED ON STR-3-09-3027 (AFTER 354648 1 9 DEFERRAL TO A0109). THEY WERE ITEMS 2 AND 1 ON THAT PR, RESPECTIVELY, 354648 1 10 AND LOG ID 11 AND 10 RESPECTIVELY. RADIATOR TAPE WAS REMOVED FROM THESE 354648 1 11 AREAS, AND THEY WERE MR REPAIRED BY APPLYING KOROPON/RED WASH 354648 1 12 PRIMER/CHEMGLAZE. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE DUE TO RADIATOR 354648 1 13 HANDLING WITH STRONGBACKS ON AT THESE ATTACH POINTS, REGARDLESS OR 354648 1 14 PREVIOUS TAPE REBOND REPAIRS. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE ENTERED IN THE 354648 1 15 RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. 354921 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING V1165.004-NOSE WHEEL ASSY INSTALLATION. (2) 354921 1 2 DINGS/DENTS WERE FOUND ON THE NOSE LANDING GEAR AXLE JUST INBOARD OF TH 354921 1 3 E THREADS. ONE DEFECT WAS ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE AXLE, AND ONE WAS ON 354921 1 4 THE LEFT. THE NOTED DEFECTS WERE CAUSED DURING MANUFACTURING AND WERE AC 354921 1 5 CEPTED BY THE VENDOR, MENASCO AEROSYSTEMS, PRIOR TO DELIVERY TO KSC. VEN 354921 1 6 ODR DOCUMENTATION OF THE REWORK AND MRB ACCEPTANCE ARE ATTACHED TO THIS 354921 1 7 WAD. CORROSION WAS SUSPECTED ON THE DISCREPANT AREA ON THE LEFT SIDE. SA 354921 1 8 MPLES, TAKEN PER THIS WAD, WERE ANALYZED BY THE MALFUNCTIONS LAB, AND NO 354921 1 9 CORROSION WAS DETECTED (REF ATTACHED REPORT). THE NLG AXLE HAS BEEN 354921 1 10 WIPED DOEN WITH IPA TO REMOVE ANY DUST/DEBRIS. NO DISCREPANCIES EXIST. 354921 1 11 PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR MANFACTURING ERROR. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 355049 1 1 THE FOLLOWING PR WAS INITIATED DUE TO DEBRIS FOUND IN MAIN WHEEL ASSY (B 355049 1 2 EARING) RACE AREA AND MISSING PRIMER ON ASSY. (ITEM #1) THE AREAS ON THE 355049 1 3 MAIN WHEEL ASSY WHERE THE PRIMER WAS MISSING WERE TOUCHED-UP PER MAO608 355049 1 4 -301. (ITEM 32) THE BEARING RACE GREASE WAS REMOVED AND THE AREA WAS CLE 355049 1 5 ANED OF DEBRIS OVERSPRAY WITH IPA AND RYMPLE CLOTH. DISCREPANCY NO LONGE 355049 1 6 R EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING DEFECT (PAINT 355049 1 7 OVERSPRAY). 355050 1 1 THE FOLLOWING PR WAS INITIATED DUE TO DEBRIS FOUND IN MAIN WHEEL ASSY (B 355050 1 2 EARING) RACE AREA AND MISSING PRIMER ON ASSY (ITEM #1) THE AREAS ON THE 355050 1 3 MAIN WHEEL ASSY WHERE THE PRIMER WAS MISSING WERE TOUCHED-UP PER MA0608- 355050 1 4 301. (ITEM #2) THE BEARING RACE GREASE WAS REMOVED AND THE AREA WAS CLEA 355050 1 5 NED OF DEBRIS OVERSPRAY WITH IPA AND RYMPLE CLOTH. DISCREPANCY NO LONGER 355050 1 6 EXISTS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING DEFECT. (PAINT 355050 1 7 OVERSPRAY). 355192 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN CVAS IDENTIFIED MWA-020/032 AND MWA-022/031 A 355192 1 2 S V070-510002-146 MAIN WHEEL ASSEMBLIES WHICH ARE NOT AUTHORIZED FOR INS 355192 1 3 TALLATION ON OV-103. THE CVAS IDENTIFICATION AS -146 CONFIGURATION DID N 355192 1 4 OT REFLECT THE LATEST MODIFICATIONS TO THE WHEEL ASSEMBLY. BY REFERENCIN 355192 1 5 G THE TPS'S WHICH MODIFIED THE WHEEL ASSYS TO A V070-756020-003 IT WAS D 355192 1 6 ETERMINED THAT MWA-022/031 AND MWA-020/032 WERE V070-510002-171 CONFIGUR 355192 1 7 ATION, WHICH IS AUTHORIZED FOR INSTALLATION ON OV-103. THIS IS NO LONGER 355192 1 8 A PR CONDITION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION IS THAT CVAS HAD 355192 1 9 NOT RECEIVED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO UPDATE THEIR DATA BASE. 355193 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN CVAS IDENTIFIED MWA-070/034 AND MWA-074/033 A 355193 1 2 S V070-510002-146 MAIN WHEEL ASSEMBLIES WHICH ARE NOT AUTHORIZED FOR INS 355193 1 3 TALLATION ON OV-103. THE CVAS IDENTIFIED AS -146 CONFIGURATION DID NOT R 355193 1 4 EFLECT THE LATEST MODIFICATIONS TO THE WHEEL ASSEMBLY. BY REFERENCING TH 355193 1 5 E TPS'S WHICH MODIFIED THE WHEEL ASSYS TO A V070-756020-003 IT WAS DETER 355193 1 6 MINED THAT MWA-070/034 AND MWA-074/033 WERE V070-510002-171 CONFIGURATIO 355193 1 7 N, WHICH IS AUTHORIZED FOR INSTALLATION ON OV-103. THIS IS NO LONGER A P 355193 1 8 R CONDITION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION IS THAT CVAS HAD NOT 355193 1 9 RECEIVED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO UPDATE THEIR DATA BASE. 355425 1 1 DURING V1291.001 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 1M326B16 HAD EXTENSIVE 355425 1 2 SHIELD DAMAGE. THE ENTIRE WIRE LENGTH WAS REPLACED FROM CONNECTOR 90P110 355425 1 3 TO 90J747. A PAGE 1A WAS PICKED UP WHEN THE BACKSHELL OF 90J747 AND 355425 1 4 90P110 COULD NOT BE OPENED. ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL WAS USED TO BREAK THE 355425 1 5 LOCKTITE FREE (STANDARD SHOP PROCTICE) AND OPEN THE BACKSHELLS. WHILE 355425 1 6 REMOVING THE BACKSHELL ON 90J747 THE 3 LOCKING TABS WERE SHEARED OFF; 355425 1 7 CABLE 1E45B16 WAS FOUND TO HAVE EXTENSIVE SHIELD DAMAGE AT 90J747; AND 355425 1 8 WIRE S9087B26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE SHIELD DAMAGE AT 90P110. ALL OF THIE 355425 1 9 LEAD TO A PAGE 1B. WIRES 1E45B16 AND S9087B26 WERE RETERMINATED AT THEIR 355425 1 10 RESPECTIVE CONNECTORS AND RECEPTACLE 90J747 WAS REPLACED. AFTER 355425 1 11 REPLACEMENT AND RETERMINATIONS, RECEPTACLE 90J747 AND ALL WIRES IN IT 355425 1 12 WERE CHECKED BY CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT TESTING. PAGE 1C WAS 355425 1 13 WRITTEN WHEN THE CONTINUITY CHECK AT 90P110 PIN -T FAILED, IT WAS LATER 355425 1 14 FOUND THAT THE TECHNICIAN WAS CHECKING THE WRONG PIN AND PAGE 1C WAS NOT 355425 1 15 REQUIRED. THE OPPOSITE END OF S9087B26 WAS FOUND NOT TO BE CAPPED (PAGE 355425 1 16 1D) AND DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO CAP PER MLO303-0033. DISCREPANCIES 9 AND 355425 1 17 10 WERE WRITTEN ON PAGE 1E AND CONSISTED OF WIRES 1E261B26 AND E388A26 355425 1 18 HAVING INSULATION AND SHIELD DAMAGE. THESE WIRES WERE REPAIRED PER 355425 1 19 SRP-V-EL-0007 METHOD "A" SHIELD AND MYSTIC 7503 TAPE REPAIR. NO FURTHER 355425 1 20 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 1, 1D & 1E) UNAVOIDABLE 355425 1 21 DAMAGE ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING; 1A AND 1B) WORKMANSHIP; 1C) NO 355425 1 22 DISCREPANCY. 355465 1 1 WIRES ASSOCIATED WITH TERMINAL BOARD 40TB134 FOR THE FC/PRSD SYSTEM ARE 355465 1 2 NO LONGER USED (FC END CELL HTRS) THEREFORE NO RETEST REQD. 355619 1 1 THE MOISTURE FOUND IN THE PLBD BULB SEAL BETWEEN XO 788 AND XO 1183 ON T 355619 1 2 HE RIGHT HAND PLBD HINGE LINE (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) WAS RESOLVED BY OPENING T 355619 1 3 HE BULB SEAL AT XO 788 XO 1183 AND PURGING THE SEAL WITH DRY GN2. AFTER 355619 1 4 THE MOISURE WAS REMOVED THE SEAL WAS REINSTALLED. DURING REINSTALLATION, 355619 1 5 A TEAR WAS DISCOVERED IN THE BULB SEAL. THE TEAR WAS TAPED WITH TEFLON 355619 1 6 TAPE WITH MR CONCURRENCE. FOR RESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DON 355619 1 7 E ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF MOISTURE IN THE PLBD BULB SEAL WAS DURIN 355619 1 8 G WPS TEST WATER WAS PRUGED OUT INTO THIS AREA. PROBABLE CAUSE OF TEAR- 355619 1 9 WORKMANSHIP. NOTE: BULB SEAL P/N IS V070-398503-001. QC NOTE: THE XO1183 355619 1 10 LOCATION WAS REWORKED ON PR-STR-3-14-3866. 355866 1 1 THE INSERT WAS DAMAGED WHEN A FASTENER WAS BEING DRILLED OUT. THE INSERT 355866 1 2 WAS MACHINED DOWN TO MINIMUM TOLERANCE TO SEE IF THE IMPERFECTIONS COULD 355866 1 3 BE REMOVED. THE IMPERFECTIONS WERE STILL UNACCEPTABLE. THE INSERT WAS 355866 1 4 BORED OUT AND A NEW ONE WAS POTTED IN. THE HOLE ON THIS NEWLY POTTED 355866 1 5 INSERT DID NOT LINE UP WITH THE HOLE IN THE FACESHEET IN THE CARRIER 355866 1 6 PANEL. PAGE 1A WAS TAKEN. THE INSERT WAS BORED OUT AGAIN AND THE INSERT 355866 1 7 WAS FIT CHECKED. FIT CHECK REVEALED THAT THE HOLES AGAIN DID NOT LINE 355866 1 8 UP. THE HOLE IN THE LOWER FACESHEET WAS ELONGATED TO ACCOMODATE THE 355866 1 9 MISALIGNMENT WITH MRB APPROVAL. THE CARRIER PANEL WAS TEMPORARILY 355866 1 10 INSTALLED ON THE ORBITER AND THE INSERT WAS POTTED IN PLACE. THE INSERT 355866 1 11 WAS .010" BELOW FLUSH AND A PAGE 1B WAS TAKEN. THIS WAS ACCEPTED PER MRB 355866 1 12 APPROVAL. A VOID WAS DISCOVERED IN THE POTTING, AND A PAGE 1C WAS TAKEN. 355866 1 13 THIS WAS ACCPETED PER MRB APPROVAL. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS 355866 1 14 PR. CARRIER PANEL IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE - WORKMANSHIP. 355930 1 1 THE 50-02 DOOR AFT FRAME MEMBER THAT WAS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 AS 355930 1 2 GOUGED AND SCRATCHED WAS SANDED SMOOTH AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTED FOR 355930 1 3 ANY INDICATIONS OF CRACKS. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN TO DETERMINE AMOU 355930 1 4 NT OF METAL REMOVED. THE FIRST DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION INDICATED A POSS 355930 1 5 IBLILITY OF SMALL CRACKS. ENGINEERING INSPECTION DETERMINED THAT THE SCR 355930 1 6 ATCHES AND GOUGE WERE NOT COMPLETELY SANDED SMOOTH PRIOR TO THE FIRST DY 355930 1 7 E PENETRANT INSPECTION. FURTHER SANDING WAS PERFORMED AND A SECOND DYE P 355930 1 8 ENETRANT INSPECTION PERFORMED, THEREBY PROVING THAT NO CRACKS EXISTS. TH 355930 1 9 E SMOOTH SHALLOW DEPRESSION, LEFT IN THE FRAME AFTER DYE PENETRANT 355930 1 10 INSPECTION, WAS UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED FOR USE AS-IS. AFTER INSPECTION 355930 1 11 THE FRAME WAS CORROSION PROTECTED PER THE DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE 355930 1 12 CAUSE OF GOUGE WAS PAD MISSING FROM GSE PLATFORM WHICH WAS REPLACED ON 355930 1 13 DR A70-0698-03-004-0036. CONCLUDE THAT NO FURTAHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON 355930 1 14 THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE AND THIS PR MAY CLOSE. 356110 1 1 THIS PR WAS TAKEN BECAUSE PERSONNEL WHO WROTE JOB CARD, DID NOT UNDERSTA 356110 1 2 ND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR INSTALLATION OF THE BORON STRUT. A D 356110 1 3 EV WAS WRITTEN TO THE PSA INSTALLATION JOB CARD TO ELIMINATE FUTURE PROB 356110 1 4 LEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR. 356234 1 1 THE TWO DISCREPANT V070-333154-001 DIAPHRAGMS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 356234 1 2 1, WERE REMOVED AND TWO NEW DIAPHRAGMS WERE OBTAINED AND INSTALLED PER 356234 1 3 THE V070-333118-003 DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DISC 356234 1 4 REPANCY IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR TO SECONDARY STRUCTURE. CONCLUDE THAT TH 356234 1 5 E NEW SEALS WILL RETURN THE CONFIGURATION TO PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND 356234 1 6 NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 356259 1 1 DURING V1022.001 H2 HORIZONTAL DRAIN FLT CAP MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK, A LEA 356259 1 2 K RATE OF 3 X 10 (-5) SCCS WAS RECORDED. MAX ALLOWABLE IS 5 X 10 (-6) SC 356259 1 3 CS. THE FLIGHT CAP WAS REMOVED AND THE SEAL REPLACED. LEAK CHECK OF THE 356259 1 4 NEW SEAL WAS SUCCESSFUL WITH A LEAK RATE OF 3 X 10 (-8) SCCS/ PROBABLE C 356259 1 5 AUSE: DEBRIS IN SEALING SURFACE OR BAD RACO SEAL. 356395 1 1 THE RING WAS FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT. A NEW RING WAS PROCURED AND WILL BE 356395 1 2 INSTALLED DURING FLIPPER DOOR #14 CLOSING PER J/C V80-96113. THE OLD RI 356395 1 3 NG WAS ROUTED TO THE MSC-HDA WITH A RECOMENDATION TO SCRAP. PROBABLE CAU 356395 1 4 SE: WORKMANSHIP. PART DAMAGED DURING INSTALLATION OR REMOVAL. 356436 1 1 PROBLEM 1 WAS ACTUALLY NO DISCREPANCY. THE CONDITION IS WITHIN PRINT TOL 356436 1 2 ERANCE. PROBLEM 2 WAS ACCEPTED PER MRB ACTION AS IS. PROBLEM 3 WAS REPAI 356436 1 3 RED BY TRIMMING THE FIBERGLASS CLOTH- A PROCEDURE ALLOWED PER THE PRINT. 356436 1 4 NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE-PROBLEMS 1 AND 3- 356436 1 5 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. PROBLEM 2-WORKMANSHIP. 356478 1 1 THE POOR FINISH ON THE V070-337448-006 PANEL IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PG 1, 356478 1 2 WAS DETERMINED TO BE CAUSED BY NOT USING FILLER PRIOR TO FINAL PAINTING 356478 1 3 . DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF THE FILLER TO SUPPORT LAUNCH OF STS-42 THE DI 356478 1 4 SCREPANT PANEL WAS RESTRICTED MR APPROVED FOR ONE FLIGHT (FLIGHT 14). PO 356478 1 5 ST FLIGHT 14, THE PANEL WAS REMOVED AND ROUTED TO NSLD FOR REPAINTING PE 356478 1 6 R THE SPEC REQUIREMENTS CALLED OUT ON THE FACE OF THE DWG. AFTER REPAINT 356478 1 7 ING THE PANEL WAS ROUTED TO THE OPF FOR INSTALLATION. FIRST ATTEMPT TO R 356478 1 8 EINSTALL THE PANEL RESULTED IN ITEMS 2 AND 3 BEING WRITTEN INDICATING MI 356478 1 9 SALIGHMENT OF THE UPPER PVD OUTLET AND LOWER CUTOUT. WITH LSOC ENG 356478 1 10 PRESENT, THE PANEL WAS INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT WITH NO CHANGES TO THIS PR 356478 1 11 REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 1 (POOR FINISH) WAS WORKMANSHIP 356478 1 12 (FAILURE TO USE FILLER PRIOR TO APPLICATION OF FINAL TOPCOAT) AND ITEMS 356478 1 13 2 AND 3 WERE NOT PR CONDITIONS. CONCLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN 356478 1 14 FINISHED AND INSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER WORK IS 356478 1 15 REQUIRED. 356553 1 1 DISCREPANT BLOCK NUTS LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT R/H RIB SPLICE #14 356553 1 2 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED (2 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE BLOCK NU 356553 1 3 TS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERAT 356553 1 4 IONAL DEGRADATION. 356677 1 1 THE INSULATOR SHOWED NO SIGNS OF HOLES OR CRACKS IN THE SURFACE. THE DEN 356677 1 2 TS IN THE INSULATOR ARE ACCEPTED PER MR APPROVAL. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE 356677 1 3 DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 356680 1 1 DURING INITIAL INSTALLATION OF THE TUNNEL ADAPTER, THE PRESSURE SEALS BE 356680 1 2 TWEEN THE AIRLOCK AND THE ADAPTER FAILED LEAK CHECK. THE ADAPTER WAS REM 356680 1 3 OVED AND THE SEALING SURFACES WERE FOUND TO BE DIRTY AND CONTAMINATED WI 356680 1 4 TH ENVIRONMENTAL DEBRIS. ALL SEALING SURFACES WERE THOROUGHLY CLEANED WI 356680 1 5 TH IPA AND THE ADAPTER WAS REINSTALLED. THE SEAL LEAK RATE CHECK WAS REP 356680 1 6 EATED AND NO LEAKAGE WAS MEASURED IN ONE MINUTE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY 356680 1 7 EXISTS. FUTURE TUNNEL ADAPTER INSTALLATIONS SHALL INSPECT THE MATING SUR 356680 1 8 FACES. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION. 356723 1 1 THE BULB SEAL FELL OUT OF THE SPRING SEAL BECAUSE IT WAS SHORTER THAN ON 356723 1 2 E THAT BELONGED THERE AND COULD NOT BE HELD BY THE V070-198704 RINGS ON 356723 1 3 EACH SIDE. THE PROPER BULB SEAL WAS PROCURED AND INSTALLED AND THE ONE T 356723 1 4 HAT WAS REMOVED WAS MR ACCEPTED TO USE AS IS AND RETURNED TO STOCK. NO F 356723 1 5 URTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE- WORKMANSHIP THE INCOR 356723 1 6 RECT PART WAS INSTALLED. 356851 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING V5067 WHEN THE V075-593337-001 GUIDE SUPPOR 356851 1 2 T WAS FOUND TO HAVE DEBONDED FROM 'C' HATCH (ITEM 1). PER THIS WAD THE S 356851 1 3 UPPORT WAS REBONDED TO THE HATCH AND GUIDE ASSY WAS RIGGED FOR FLIGHT. P 356851 1 4 ROBABLE CAUSE: SHIPPING/HANDLING DAMAGE. ITEM 2 WAS INITIATED DURING THE 356851 1 5 BONDING PROCESS. THE VACUUM PRESSURE OBTAINED (17.6" OF HG) DID NOT MEE 356851 1 6 T THE MIN REQUIRED PRESSURE OF 20". MRB CONCURRENCE WAS OBTAINED TO ACCE 356851 1 7 PT THIS CONDITION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BASED ON SUCCESSFUL LAP SHEAR RES 356851 1 8 ULTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: TECHNIQUE. ITEM 3 WAS INITIATED WHEN 1 OF 4 LAP SH 356851 1 9 EAR SAMPLES FELL BELOW THE MIN FAILURE LOAD. MRB CONCURRENCE WAS 356851 1 10 OBTAINED TO ACCEPT THE BOND FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BASED ON THE FACT THAT 356851 1 11 3 OF 4 SAMPLES PASSED THE LAP SHEAR, AND THE AVERAGE OF ALL 4 SAMPLES 356851 1 12 WAS GREATER THAN THE MIN FAILURE LOAD. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 356851 1 13 4 WAS INITIATED WHEN LONGER SCREWS WERE REQUIRED TO RIG THE GUIDE ASSY 356851 1 14 TO MAINTAIN THE PROPER GUIDE TO COLLAR DIMENSION. MRB CONCURRENCE WAS 356851 1 15 OBTAINED TO ACCEPT THIS CONDITION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 356851 1 16 TOLERANCE BUILD UP. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. RETEST WILL BE PER 356851 1 17 V1058.005. 356856 1 1 THE BAND ON THE OUTBOARD END OF THE BULB SEAL WAS COMING LOOSE. AN LRU P 356856 1 2 R WAS INITIATED TO REWELD THE BAND AT THE HDA. A NEW BULB SEAL WAS PROCU 356856 1 3 RED AND INSTALLED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROB 356856 1 4 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 356857 1 1 DURING POST-FLIGHT ELEVON COVER INSPECTION, SEVERAL NICKS WERE ROUND IN 356857 1 2 THE V070-198071-048 CURTAIN SEAL. THESE NICKS WERE REPAIRED PER MR DISPO 356857 1 3 SITION USING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 356857 1 4 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SH 356857 1 5 OP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 356874 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATES LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT RH RIB SPLICE #15 WE 356874 1 2 RE REMOVED AND REPLACED (2 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NEW NUTPLA 356874 1 3 TES WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERA 356874 1 4 TIONAL DEGRADATION. 356875 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATES AND ANCHOR NUTS LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT RH R 356875 1 2 IB SPLICE NUMBER 13 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED (4 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED 356875 1 3 ACCESS, THE NEW NUTPLATES/ANCHOR NUTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS P 356875 1 4 ER MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 356876 1 1 DISCREPANT ANCHOR NUTS LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT R/H RIB SPLICE #12 356876 1 2 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED (2 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE ANCHORN 356876 1 3 UTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERA 356876 1 4 TIONAL DEGRADATION. 356877 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATES LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT RH RIB SPLICE NUMBER 356877 1 2 8 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED (2 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NEW N 356877 1 3 UTPLATES WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: 356877 1 4 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 356878 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO REMOVE AND REPLACE TWO NUTPLATES 356878 1 2 ON THE LEFT HAND RIB SPLICE NUMBER 8. BECAUSE OF LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT 356878 1 3 PLATES WERE INSTALLED PER UNRESTRICTED MR WITH BLIND RIVETS. THE NUTPLAT 356878 1 4 ES ARE FOR SECONDARY STRUCTURE ATTACHMENT (CARRIER PANELS). THE CAUSE OF 356878 1 5 THIS DISCREPANCY WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 356879 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATES AND ANCHOR NUTS LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT R/H 356879 1 2 RIB SPLICE #7 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED (4 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS 356879 1 3 , THE NEW NUTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER MR DISPO. PROBABLE C 356879 1 4 AUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 356880 1 1 DISCREPANT ANCHOR NUTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW ANCHOR NUTS. T 356880 1 2 HE ANCHOR NUTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND REVIETS AND THE REIVETS WERE IN 356880 1 3 STALLED WITH A HAND RIVET PULLER PER MR DISPO. RIVET INSTALLATION HAS BE 356880 1 4 EN INSPECTED AND ALL OUT SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN MR ACCEPTE 356880 1 5 D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 356881 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATES AND ANCHOR NUTS LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT R/H 356881 1 2 RIB SPLICE #5 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED (4 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS 356881 1 3 , THE NEW NUTPLATES/ANCHOR NUTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER MR 356881 1 4 DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 356882 1 1 DISCREPANT ANCHOR NUTS LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT R/H RIB SPLICE #4 356882 1 2 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED (2 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NEW ANCH 356882 1 3 OR NUTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: O 356882 1 4 PERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 356898 1 1 THE "CORROSION" WHICH WAS WRITTEN UP WAS ACTUALLY NOT CORROSION BUT DISC 356898 1 2 OLORATION. THE CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED AS NO PR CONDITION. NO FURTHER WOR 356898 1 3 K TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE- NO DISCREPANCY. 356899 1 1 THE "CORROSION" WHICH WAS WRITTEN UP WAS ACTUALLY NOT CORROSION BUT DISC 356899 1 2 OLORATION. THE CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED AS NO PR CONDITION. NO FURTHER WOR 356899 1 3 K TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE-NO DISCREPANCY. 356926 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING V5067, 'D' HATCH OPERATIONS, WHEN A CUT IN 356926 1 2 THE COLLAR SEAL WAS DETECTED. THE DISCREPANT SEAL WAS REPLACED BY OMI V5 356926 1 3 K17. 'D' HATCH FUNCTIONAL TEST WAS PERFORMED WITH NOMINAL RESULTS. HATCH 356926 1 4 SEAL LEAK RATE WAS RECORDED AT 0.9 PSIG/ 1 MIN. THIS IS WITHIN THE 1.0 356926 1 5 PSIG/MIN RATE ALLOWABLE. FURTHER DISPO WAS WORKED TO COMPARE THE COMPRES 356926 1 6 SIBILITY OF BOTH THE HATCH AND COLLAR SEALS. RESULTS INDICATED THAT SIMI 356926 1 7 LAR FORCES WERE REQUIRED TO COMPRESS BOTH SEALS. THIS INDICATES THAT BOT 356926 1 8 H SEALS ARE OF SIMILAR DENSITY AND SHOULD PROVIDE EVEN SEALING PERFORMAN 356926 1 9 CE. BOTH SEALS WERE CLEANED AND INSPECTED, WITH NO ANOMALIES NOTED. A 356926 1 10 SECOND SEAL LEAK CHECK YIELDED A LEAK RATE OF 0.8 PSIG/1 MIN. AGAIN, 356926 1 11 THIS IS WITHIN THE 1.0 PSIG/MIN RATE ALLOWABLE. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. 356926 1 12 THIS HATCH WILL BE INSPECTED AGAIN WHEN THE VEHICLE IS IN THE VERTICAL 356926 1 13 POSITION. SHOULD A FAILURE BE DETECTED, ANOTHER PR WILL BE INITIATED AT 356926 1 14 THAT TIME. 356992 1 1 THE PAINT BECAME SCRATCHED DURING NORMAL OPERATION OF FLIPPER DOORS 14 A 356992 1 2 ND 15. THE CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED PER MRB ACTION. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE 356992 1 3 DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 357000 1 1 DURING V1097, ET DOOR FUNCTIONAL TEST, THE MINIMUM GAP (Z) BETWEEN THE C 357000 1 2 LOSED RH ET DOOR AND THE ADJACENT OUTBOARD THERMAL BARRIER WAS MEASURED 357000 1 3 TO BE .040". THE MINIMUM GAP ALLOWED PER OMRSD V56AA0.200-B (MTR 2) IS . 357000 1 4 050". TPS ENG/SHOP MASSAGES THE THERMAL BARRIER AND THE MEASUREMENT WAS 357000 1 5 REPERFORMED PER THIS PR AND FOUND TO BE .140", SUCCESSFULLY SATISFYING R 357000 1 6 ETEST. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. RETEST SATISFYS OMRS V56AA0.200-A, 357000 1 7 -B. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP THERMAL BARRIER WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY RE 357000 1 8 WORKED PRIOR TO TESTING. 357001 1 1 THE ET UMBILICAL DOOR RH AFT READY TO LATCH PADDLE EXHIBITED A TENDENCY 357001 1 2 TO STAY ACTIVATED WHEN RELEASED CAUSING THE RTL INDICATION TO STAY "ON" 357001 1 3 WHEN THE ET DOOR WAS OPEN. THIS WAS DETECTED DURING FLIGHT 14 PROCESSING 357001 1 4 AND DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 15 FOR REPAIR. THE RH AFT LATCH ASSY WAS REMOVED 357001 1 5 , REBUILT AND REINSTALLED PER LRU OMI'S V5S03.016, .018, .017, RESPECTIV 357001 1 6 ELY. THE LATCH ASSY WAS FUNCTIONALLY RETESTED AND THE PADDLE NO LONGER S 357001 1 7 TICKS. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE LATCH ASSY. PROBABLE CAUS 357001 1 8 E: EXCESSIVE WEAR DUE TO PREVIOUS FERRY FLIGHT. 357001 1 9 E: EXCESSIVE WEAR DUE TO PREVIOUS FERRY FLIGHT. 357003 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM 1 WAS A DELAMINATION OF THE RADIATOR TAPE ON THE 357003 1 2 RH #1 RADIATOR. THE DELAMINATED TAPE WAS REBONDED PER MR USING MBO130-1 357003 1 3 44 (RTV 142). THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG & 357003 1 4 MAP. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION DURING PROCESSING DU 357003 1 5 E TO TAPE CATCHING ON THE RADIATOR CORNER. 357026 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATES IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE REMOVED BY DRILLING OUT 357026 1 2 THE SOLID RIVETS AND INSTALLING NEW NUTPLATES WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPRO 357026 1 3 VED BLIND RIVETS. THE MR BLIND RIVETS WERE REQUIRED DUE TO A LACK OF ACC 357026 1 4 ESS TO THE LOWER SIDE OF THE SPAR FITTING WITH THE RCC PANEL INSTALLED. 357026 1 5 THE DISCREPANT BLIND RIVET INSTALLATIONS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2, PAGE 1A, 357026 1 6 WERE REMOVED AND THE COUNTERSINKS INCREASED WITHIN DRAWING ALLOWANCE AND 357026 1 7 NEW RIVETS INSTALLED. CONCLUDE THAT REPLACEMENT OF THE NUTPLATES AND RI 357026 1 8 VETS ARE ACCEPTABLE AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDARY ST 357026 1 9 RUCTURE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE WORN OUT NUTPLATES IS OPERATIONAL DEG 357026 1 10 RADATION, AND THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE BLIND RIVET PROTRUSION IS WORKMA 357026 1 11 NSHIP. 357027 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATES IN ITEMS 1 AND 2, PAGE 1 WERE REMOVED BY DRILLI 357027 1 2 NG OUT THE SOLID RIVETS AND INSTALLING NEW NUTPLATES WITH UNRESTRICTED M 357027 1 3 R APPROVED BLIND RIVETS. THE MR BLIND RIVETS WERE REQUIRED DUE TO A LACK 357027 1 4 OF ACCESS TO THE LOWER SIDE OF THE SPAR FITTING WITH THE RCC PANEL INST 357027 1 5 ALLED. CONCLUDE THAT REPLACEMENT OF THE NUTPLATES ARE ACCEPTABLE AND NO 357027 1 6 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE 357027 1 7 OF THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION (WORN OUT). 357028 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATES LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT L/H RIB SPLICE #8 WE 357028 1 2 RE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NEW NUTPLATES WERE I 357028 1 3 NSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER MR DISPO. THE RIVETS DID NOT GO IN FLUSH 357028 1 4 BECAUSE THE COUNTERSINKS ON THE FITTING WERE LESS THAN PRINT DIMENSIONS, 357028 1 5 (REF PAGE 1A). THE RIVETS WERE REMOVED AND THE COUNTERSINKS ENLARGED TO 357028 1 6 PRINT DIMENSIONS AND THE RIVETS WERE REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERA 357028 1 7 TIONAL DEGRADATION. 357029 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATE LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT RH RIB SPLICE #9 WAS 357029 1 2 REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NEW NUTPLATE WAS INSTAL 357029 1 3 LED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER MR DISPO. THE RIVETS DID NOT GO IN FLUSH BECAU 357029 1 4 SE THE COUNTERSINKS ON THE FITTING WERE LESS THAN PRINT DIMENSIONS. (REF 357029 1 5 PG 1A). THE RIVETS WERE REMOVED AND THE COUNTERSINK ENLARGED TO PRINT D 357029 1 6 IMENSIONS AND THE RIVETS WERE REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL D 357029 1 7 EGRADATION. 357031 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS REMOVED BY DRILLING OUT TH 357031 1 2 E SOLID RIVETS AND INSTALLING A NEW NUTPLATE WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROV 357031 1 3 ED BLIND RIVETS. THE MR BLIND RIVETS WERE REQUIRED DUE TO A LACK OF ACCE 357031 1 4 SS TO THE LOWER SIDE OF THE SPAR FITTING WITH THE RCC PANEL INSTALLED. C 357031 1 5 ONCLUDE THAT REPLACEMENT OF THE NUTPLATE IS ACCEPTABLE AND NO FURTHER WO 357031 1 6 RK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS D 357031 1 7 ISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 357032 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATES AND ANCHOR NUT LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT L/H R 357032 1 2 IB SPLICE #13 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED (3 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS 357032 1 3 , THE NEW NUTPLATES/ANCHOR NUT WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PR MR DI 357032 1 4 SPO. THE FIRST TWO RIVETS INSTALLED DID NOT GO IN FLUSH BECAUSE THE COUN 357032 1 5 TERSINKS ON THE FITTING WERE LESS THAN PRINT DIMENSIONS, (REF PAGE 1A). 357032 1 6 THE RIVETS WERE REMOVED AND THE COUNTERSINKS ENLARGED TO PRINT DIMENSION 357032 1 7 S AND THE RIVETS WERE REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATI 357032 1 8 ON. 357039 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATE LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT LH RIB SPLICE NUMBER 357039 1 2 14 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED (1 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUTPLA 357039 1 3 TE WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATI 357039 1 4 ONAL DEGRADATION. 357041 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATE LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT L/H RIB SPLICE #15 WA 357041 1 2 S REMOVED AND REPLACED (1 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUTPLATE WA 357041 1 3 S INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 357041 1 4 DEGRADATION. 357042 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATES IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE REMOVED BY DRILLING OUT 357042 1 2 THE SOLID RIVETS AND INSTALLING NEW NUTPLATES WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPRO 357042 1 3 VED BLIND RIVETS. THE MR BLIND RIVETS WERE REQUIRED DUE TO A LACK OF ACC 357042 1 4 ESS TO THE LOWER SIDE OF THE SPAR FITTING WITH THE RCC PANEL INSTALLED. 357042 1 5 CONCLUDE THAT REPLACEMENT OF THE NUTPLATES ARE ACCEPTABLE AND NO FURTHER 357042 1 6 WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE LOSS OF RUNNING TORQU 357042 1 7 E IN THE NUTPLATE IS DUE TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION (WEAR OUT). 357043 1 1 DISCREPANT NUTPLATE LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT L/H RIB SPLICE #17 WA 357043 1 2 S REMOVED AND REPLACED (1 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUTPLATE WA 357043 1 3 S INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVITS PER MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 357043 1 4 DEGRADATION. 357044 1 1 DISCREPANT NUT PLATE AND ANCHOR NUT LOCATED ON THE SPAR FITTING AT L/H R 357044 1 2 IB SPLICE #18 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED (2 TOTAL). DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS 357044 1 3 , THE NEW NUT PLATE/ANCHOR NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER MR DI 357044 1 4 SPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 357045 1 1 THE BAND ON THE OUTBOARD END OF THE BULB SEAL WAS COMING LOOSE. AN LRU P 357045 1 2 R WAS INITIATED TO REWELD THE BAND AT THE HDA. A NEW BULB SEAL WAS PROCU 357045 1 3 RED AND INSTALLED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROB 357045 1 4 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 357113 1 1 TO ADDRESSED ITEM #1: THE COVER WOULD NOT SIT FLUSH AGAINST THE RUB PANE 357113 1 2 L. THE SHIM UNDER THE COVER WAS TRIMMED TO ALLOW THE COVER TO SIT FLUSH 357113 1 3 AGAINST THE RUB PANEL. TO ADDRESS ITEM #2: THE FASTENER WAS NOT FLUSH WI 357113 1 4 TH THE SURROUNDING STRUCTURE. THE SCREW WAS TORQUED PER SPEC, AND AFTER 357113 1 5 TORQUING IT WAS ONLY 0.002 INCH ABOVE FLUSH. THIS CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED 357113 1 6 PER MRB ACTION. TO ADDRESS ITEM #3: THE "CORROSION" WAS ACTUALLY NO COR 357113 1 7 ROSION BUT MERELY SUPERFICIAL DEPOSITS ON THE STAINLESS STEEL FASTENERS. 357113 1 8 TO ADDRESS ITEM 4: THE HEAD OF THE FASTENER WAS ROUNDED OUT DURING AN A 357113 1 9 TTEMPT TO REMOVE IT. THIS CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED PER MRB ACTION. NO FURT 357113 1 10 HER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - WORKMANSHIP. 357356 1 1 DURING V5L16.001, THE BACKSHELL ON CONNECTOR 36P5 WAS FOUND TO BE LOOSE. 357356 1 2 THE BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELL INSPECTED AND VERI 357356 1 3 FIED NO ANOMALIES WERE PRESENT. THE CONNECTOR WAS THEN CLOSED. NO FURTHE 357356 1 4 R ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP - INSUFFICIENT 357356 1 5 LOCKTITE WAS PLACED ON THREADS. 357360 1 1 ITEM 1: THE POSITION OF THE HINGES WAS ADJUSTED AND ALL QUICK RELEASE PI 357360 1 2 NS WERE VERIFIED TO BE EASILY REMOVABLE PER STEP 1-28. PROBABLE CAUSE IS 357360 1 3 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. RETEST PERFORMED PER STEP 1-28. ITEM 2: THE GA 357360 1 4 P AT EACH GUIDE WAS ADJUSTED AND VERIFIED TO BE WITHIN SPEC PER STEP 2-9 357360 1 5 . PROBABLE CAUSE IS GAPS NOT PROPERLY SET DURING INITIAL RIGGING. RETEST 357360 1 6 PERFORMED PER STEP 2-9. FINAL RETEST OF ITEMS 1 AND 2 TO BE PERFORMED P 357360 1 7 ER V1058.006 RUN 2. 357798 1 1 THE PREVIOUS STEP HAS SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED THE RETEST OF THE REPAIR WO 357798 1 2 RK COMPLETED BY OEL (REFERENCE OEL SUMMARY). NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIR 357798 1 3 ED. PROBABLE CAUSE: HARDWARE DEGRADATION. 357815 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) DURING CARRIER PANEL REMOVAL, THE MR-001 SHIM (MR 357815 1 2 STR-3-01-2645) WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED FROM THE SEAL PANEL. A NEW SHIM 357815 1 3 WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED PER THE ORIGINAL UNRESTRICTED MR. PROBABLE 357815 1 4 CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A) T 357815 1 5 HE OUTBOARD FASTENER HOLE ON THE V070-198106-003 CARRIER PANEL WAS FOUND 357815 1 6 TO BE DIMPLED ALONG ITS LOWER SURFACE. ALL AREAS OF RAISED METAL WERE R 357815 1 7 EMOVED AND CORROSION PROTECTION HAS BEEN APPLIED. THIS DISCREPANT CONDIT 357815 1 8 ION HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS I 357815 1 9 TEM IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR 357815 1 10 THIS PR. 358105 1 1 VOID DUPLICATE OF STR-3-14-3833. 358113 1 1 AFTER RELOCATION OF THE V070-613118-004 DUCT THE V070-337448-006 CLOSEOU 358113 1 2 T PANEL WAS MODIFIED ON AN MR BASIS. THIS MODIFICATION CONSISTED OF SLOT 358113 1 3 TING FIVE OF THE FASTENER HOLES AT THE UPPER VENT CUTOUT AND SHAVING THE 358113 1 4 UPPER AFT EDGE OF THE CUTOUT. THE CLOSEOUT PANEL WAS INSTALLED PER STR- 358113 1 5 3-14-522. PROBABLE CAUSE: MISALIGNMENT OF FASTENER HOLES. 358133 1 1 DURING V5C03.004 SEQ 01-006, CONNECTOR 54P561 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A TORN G 358133 1 2 ROMMET AT PIN F. PAGE 1A WAS ADDED AFTER CONNECTOR WAS DEMATED FOR AN AD 358133 1 3 DITIONAL INSPECTION WHEN MLO303-0015 FIG 10 WAS FOUND TO BE FOR THE REAR 358133 1 4 OF THE CONNECTOR NOT THE FACE. THE CONNECTOR WAS THEN R&R'D AND MATED. 358133 1 5 RETEST WILL BE TRACKED SCAN #3-14-0792. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON TH 358133 1 6 IS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING 358173 1 1 DURING OEL-3-14-0149, THE KAPTON INSULATION ON WIRE 1P206E26 WIRE WAS FO 358173 1 2 UND TO BE SPLIT. DAMAGE WAS APPROXIMATELY 1/2 INCH FROM CONNECTOR 54P555 358173 1 3 . THE WIRE WAS RETERMINATED AND CONNECTOR 54P555 WAS THEN MATED PER STEP 358173 1 4 02-011 ON V5C03.004. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION 358173 1 5 REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DUR 358173 1 6 ING PROCESSING. 358227 1 1 DURING AN V76-10001 STEP 19, THE TEFLON BRAIDED DID NOT EXTEND INTO CONN 358227 1 2 ECTOR 50P535. THE BRAID WAS REMOVED AND INSTALLED CORRECTLY, PENETRATING 358227 1 3 INTO CONNECTOR 50P535. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE 358227 1 4 CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 358361 1 1 DURING V76-10002 IT WAS DETECTED THAT WIRE 1J32B12-1 HAD EXPOSED CONDUCT 358361 1 2 OR. INSPECTION REVEALED ONLY INSULATION DAMAGE EXPOSING THE CONDUCTOR, 358361 1 3 NO CONDUCTOR DAMAGE WAS FOUND. THE WIRE WAS REPAIRED BY INSTALLING HEAT 358361 1 4 SHRINK SLEEVING OVER THE DAMAGED AREA. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR T 358361 1 5 HIS PR (FUNCTIONAL CHECK-OUT WILL BE PERFORMED PER S0008). THE PROBABLE 358361 1 6 CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 2 IS NO DISCREPANCY. HAR 358361 1 7 NESS RE-IDENTIFICATION IS REQUIRED AT ONE LOCATION ONLY. 358417 1 1 DURING A SURVEILLANCE, CONNECTOR 50P671 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHEL 358417 1 2 L. SRP V-EL-0001-B-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO 358417 1 3 FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE 358417 1 4 ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 358513 1 1 DURING AN ENGINEERING REVIEW IT WAS FOUND THAT THE M072-340501-010 INSTA 358513 1 2 LLATION REQUIRED LONGER SCREWS IN TWO LOCATIONS OUT OF THE FIVE THAT CAL 358513 1 3 L OUT FOR MD112-1002-0307 SCREWS. IT WAS LATER DETERMINED THAT WHEN THE 358513 1 4 SCREW WAS LENGTHENED SUFFICIENTLY TO ENGAGE THE NUT PLATE THAT ITS GRIP 358513 1 5 LENGTH WAS TO GREAT, CAUSING THE SCREW TO SHANK OUT. THEREFORE A DIFFERE 358513 1 6 NT TYPE BOLT AND WASHER WERE SUBSTITUTED IN THE TWO DISCREPANT AREAS. EN 358513 1 7 GINEERING WAS CHANGED PER EO TO FOLLOW TO CHANGE THE HARDWARE FROM MD112 358513 1 8 -1003-0407 SCREWS AND AN960DP10 WASHERS TO MD111-4025-0309 BOLTS AND RD1 358513 1 9 52-5002-1003. A PAGE 1A WAS GENERATED DUE TO DIFFICULTY IN REMOVING A 358513 1 10 MD112-1002-0310, WHICH WAS INSTALLED PER ORIGINAL INVESTIGATION. THE 358513 1 11 BOLT WAS LATER SUCCESSFULLY REMOVED AND THE CORRECT BOLT INSTALLED. 358513 1 12 PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY/WORKMANSHIP. 358768 1 1 THE HOLE IN THE ENGINE #3 DOME HEAT SHIELD WAS MEASURED TO DETERMINE THE 358768 1 2 PROPER GRIP LENGTH SCREW. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A PER PRINT -12 WAS TO 358768 1 3 O LONG DUE TO TOLERANCE BUILDUP AND THAT A -10 WOULD FIT PROPERLY. A PAG 358768 1 4 E 1A WAS TAKEN AGAINST THE SAME HOLE IN ENGINE #2 DOME HEAT SHIELD. A -1 358768 1 5 0 SCREW WAS INSTALLED IN BOTH ENGINES 2 AND 3 WITH MRB CONCURRENCE. VISU 358768 1 6 AL INSPECTION SHOULD PROPER THREAD PROTRUSION OF BOTH SCREWS. NO FURTHER 358768 1 7 WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY - THE DRA 358768 1 8 WING DID NOT ACCOUNT FOR POSSIBLE TOLERANCE BUILDUP. 358768 1 9 WING DID NOT ACCOUNT FOR POSSIBLE TOLERANCE BUILDUP. 358774 1 1 THE "CORROSION" WHICH WAS WRITTEN UP WAS ACTUALLY NOT CORROSION AT ALL B 358774 1 2 UT SUPERFICIAL DEPOSITS DUE TO THE OUTGASSING FROM OTHER MATERIALS. THIS 358774 1 3 IS NOT A PR CONDITION. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE 358774 1 4 CAUSE - NO DISCREPANCY. 358929 1 1 THE FOLLOWING PR WAS INITIATED DUE TO A BENT 1170657-9 PIN ON NLG ASSY. 358929 1 2 THE 1170657-9 PIN WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXIST 358929 1 3 . NO FURTHER RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERTIONAL DEGRADATION. 359035 1 1 THE LOWER FORWARD LESS CARRIER PANEL ATTACH NUTPLATE ON R/H #17 SPAR FIT 359035 1 2 TING HAD NO LOCKING FEATURE (REF ITEM 1). THE NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND R 359035 1 3 EPLACED. THE NEW NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED WITH BLICK RIVETS DUE TO LIMITED 359035 1 4 ACCESS. THE OUTBOARD RIVET HOLE WAS .005 ABOVE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE HOLE S 359035 1 5 IZE (REF ITEM 2). THIS CONDITION HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED U 359035 1 6 SE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 359054 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO INVESTIGATE A POSSIBLE CRACK ON A 359054 1 2 SUPPORT FOR THE CENTER CONSOLE PANEL. NO CRACK WAS FOUND UPON INVESTIGA 359054 1 3 TION, THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTED. 359425 1 1 THE CARRIER PANELS COVERING THE DISCREPANT RECEPTACLE WERE REMOVED. THE 359425 1 2 RECEPTACLE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. THE CARRIER PANELS WERE R 359425 1 3 EINSTALLED WITH NO PROBLEMS. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROB 359425 1 4 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 359479 1 1 THIS CONDITION WAS WRITTEN UP ON PR STR-3-08-2769 AND ACCEPTED PER MRB A 359479 1 2 CTION. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 359480 1 1 THE COTTER PIN HAD SCRATCHED OFF SOME OF KOROPON ON THE ADJACENT STRUCTU 359480 1 2 RE. THE COTTER PIN WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE WAS INSTALLED SO AS NOT INT 359480 1 3 ERFERE WITH THE STRUCTURE. THE SCRATCH WAS TOUCHED UP WITH KOROPON. NO F 359480 1 4 URTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 359732 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS TO INSTALL BLIND RIVETS IN PLACE OF 359732 1 2 SOLID RIVETS BECAUSE OF LACK OF ACCESS TO SQUEEZE THE SOLIDS. THE RIVETS 359732 1 3 WERE INSTALLED WITH A HAND SQUEEZER AND AN UNRESTRICTED MR ACTION. THIS 359732 1 4 IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS OPERATIONAL D 359732 1 5 EGRADATION. 359807 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPO WAS TO INSTALL BLIND RIVETS IN PLACE OF SOLID 359807 1 2 RIVETS BECAUSE OF A LACK OF ACCESS TO SQUEEZE THE SOLIDS THE RIVETS WERE 359807 1 3 INSTALLED WITH A HAND SQUEEZER AND AN UNRESTRICTED MR ACTION. THIS IS S 359807 1 4 ECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRAD 359807 1 5 ATION. 359840 1 1 THIS WAD ORIGINALLY DOCUMENTED THAT THE FORCE REQUIRED TO UNLOCK THE I/E 359840 1 2 HATCH ACTUATOR WITH THE S/N-018 T-TOOL WAS OUT OF SPEC (S/B 7-18 LBS). 359840 1 3 THE SAME T-TOOL WAS RE-INSTALLED AGAIN ON THIS WAD AND THE FORCE WAS MEA 359840 1 4 SURED TO BE WITHIN SPEC AT 12 LBS. PROBABLE CAUSE: T-TOOL NOT FULLY ENGA 359840 1 5 GED. PAGES 1A AND 1B DOCUMENT THAT THE UNLATCHING FORCE WAS NOT IN SPEC 359840 1 6 (S/B 210 IN-LBS MAX). THE UNLATCHING FORCE WAS MEASURED TWICE AND IN BOT 359840 1 7 H CASES THE HIGH TORQUE WAS MEASURED AS THE ACTUATOR WENT OVER THE VENT 359840 1 8 DETENT, RUNNING TORQUE OF THE UNLATCHING UP TO AND AFTER THE DETENT WAS 359840 1 9 INTENT OF OMRS V33AAO.010 TO CHECK THE RUNNING TORQUE REQUIRED TO UNLAT 359840 1 10 CH THE LATCHES, NOT TO OVERCOME THE VENT DETENT. V1058.003 WILL BE UPDAT 359840 1 11 ED TO CLARIFY THE INTENT OF THIS PORTION OF THE TEST. AS AN ADDED MEASUR 359840 1 12 E, AN OBSERVER MONITORED A HATCH CYCLE FROM INSIDE THE CREW MODULE DURIN 359840 1 13 G V1058.004 (I/E HATCH FUNCTIONAL IN THE VAB) AND VERIFIED NO BINDING OR 359840 1 14 ABNORMAL LOADS EXISTED DURING UNLATCHING. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL 359840 1 15 ERROR. PAGE 1C DOCUMENTS THAT ZO DIRECTION PLAY IN THE OUTER HATCH 359840 1 16 RELATIVE TO THE INNER HATCH WAS OUT OF SPEC AT 0.511 INCHES. THIS WAD 359840 1 17 DUE TO A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN THIS WAD WHICH SPECIFIED 0.060 INCH MAX 359840 1 18 ALLOWABLE AS OPPOSED TO 0.60 INCH MAX. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR. 359840 1 19 NO FURTHER WORK OR RETEST IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. 359909 1 1 ITEM 1: THE DING IN THE CARRIER PANEL WAS MEASURED BY TAKING MOLDS AND R 359909 1 2 EADING THEM WITH AN OPTICAL COMPARATOR. THE CORROSION PROTECTION WAS REM 359909 1 3 OVED AND THE DING WAS INSPECTED UNDER MAGNIFICATION. A COIN TAP WAS PERF 359909 1 4 ORMED BY ENGINEERING. RESULTS OF ALL TESTS SHOWED THAT THE DING WAS ACCE 359909 1 5 PTABLE AS IS WITH MRB APPROVAL. CORROSION CONTROL WAS APPLIED PER PRINT. 359909 1 6 ITEM 2: THE AREA OF CORROSION WAS SANDED AND ETCHED TO REMOVE ANY RESID 359909 1 7 UAL CORROSION DEPOSITS AND CORROSION CONTROL WAS APPLIED PER PRINT. THE 359909 1 8 AREA WAS ACCEPTED WITH MRB APPROVAL. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS 359909 1 9 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 1-WORKMANSHIP, ITEM 2-ENVIRONMENTAL 359909 1 10 DEGRADATION. 360067 1 1 DURING CLOSE OUT INSPECTION, THE V070-197125-001 INSULATOR ATTACHED TO R 360067 1 2 H FLIPPER DOOR NUMBER 11 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A CRACK APPROXIMATELY 0.5" LO 360067 1 3 NG. THE CRACK WAS REPAIRED WITH MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTE 360067 1 4 D AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS WOR 360067 1 5 KMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 360365 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V76-100002 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 1ZK550C2 360365 1 2 4 HAD RADIAL KAPTON SEPARATION WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR THE PRIMA 360365 1 3 RY CONDUCTOR(S). THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY INSTALLING MR APPROVE 360365 1 4 D MYSTIK 7503 TEFLON TAPE OVER THE DAMAGE. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION I 360365 1 5 S REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR 360365 1 6 AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 360366 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE S107A24 HAD KAPTON DAMAG 360366 1 2 E WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTORS. THIS DISCREPANCYW 360366 1 3 AS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL- 360366 1 4 0007. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE:N 360366 1 5 ORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 360493 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DUIRNG V5067- 'C' HATCH INSTALLATION. 1 OF 4 QUICK 360493 1 2 RELEASE HINGE PINS WAS DIFFICULT TO REMOVE. 'C' HATCH WAS UNLATCHED, RE 360493 1 3 POSITIONED, AND THEN RE-LATCHED. THIS WAS PERFORMED TO ELIMINATE ANY LOA 360493 1 4 DING OF THE HINGE ASSEMBLIES. THE HINGE PINS WERE THEN CHECKED, AND ALL 360493 1 5 4 PINS COULD BE REMOVED AND REINSTALLED WITHOUT BINDING. PROBABLE CAUSE: 360493 1 6 SLIGHT MISALIGNMENT OF HATCH. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. RETEST WI 360493 1 7 LL BE PER V1058.005-'C' HATCH FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION. 360641 1 1 THIS PR WAS UPGRADED FROM IPR 42V-0097. THE LMG BUNGEE SWITCH WAS STUCK 360641 1 2 IN THE ACTIVATED POSITION AND WOULD NOT ACTIVATE. THE SWITCH WAS UNSTUCK 360641 1 3 AND PROPER OPERATION WAS VERIFIED PER THIS WAD. THE SWITCH STICKING IS 360641 1 4 CAUSED BY OVERACTUATION OF THE SWITCH WHEN THE TRIGGER PLUNGER IS MANUAL 360641 1 5 LY DEPRESSED. A TOOL TO PERFORM THIS TASK HAS BEEN REQUESTED AND IS CURR 360641 1 6 ENTLY UNDER DEVELOPMENT TO ALIEVIATE THIS PROBLEM. RC ACTION IS REQUESTE 360641 1 7 D. NO ADDITIONAL RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS AS STATED ABOVE. 360908 1 1 ITEM 1 WHICH WAS ENTERED AS LOG ID 21 IN RH 4 RADIATOR MAP AND LOG IS A 360908 1 2 DUPLICATE OF LOG ID 17 FROM STR-3-13-3806. ID 21 WAS DELETED FROM THE LO 360908 1 3 G. IN THE PROCESS OF RESEARCHING THIS DISCREPANCY, IT WAS FOUND THAT NON 360908 1 4 E OF THE DISCREPANCIES WERE UPDATED ON STR-3-13-3806 PER DIRECTIONS IN S 360908 1 5 TEPS 2-1 AND 2-2. REFERENCE THE ARCHIVED, BOUGHT OFF COPY IN THE RADIATO 360908 1 6 R DING LOG. THEREFORE THE SAME DISPOSITION FROM THE PREVIOUS PR WAS DIRE 360908 1 7 CTED SO THE LOG WILL BE UPDATED PROPERLY AND DUPLICATE PR'S LIKE THIS ON 360908 1 8 E WILL BE AVOIDED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS DUPLICATION WAS FAILURE TO 360908 1 9 FOLLOW DIRECTIONS ON PREVIOUS PR. 360910 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY OF ITEM #1 IS A TAPE-ONLY SCUF ON THE LH #4 RADIATOR WHI 360910 1 2 CH WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS AN ACCIDENT WORKMANSHOP 360910 1 3 SCUFF DURING PROCESSING. THIS ITEM WAS ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE L 360910 1 4 OG AND MAP. 360912 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES OF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ARE TAPE ONLY SCUFFS ON THE LH #1 RAD 360912 1 2 IATOR "TOP" AND WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR EACH WAS 360912 1 3 ACCIDENTAL WORKMANSHIP SCUFFS DURING PROCESSING. THESE ITEMS WERE ENTERE 360912 1 4 D IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. 360925 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS A METEOR CRATER WITH A PINHOLE IN THE RH #3 RADIATOR 360925 1 2 "TOP". MOLDS AND 10X MAGNIFICATION WERE DONE TO SHOW THAT THIS WAS A SM 360925 1 3 ALL DENT IN THE FACTSHEET. THIS DENT WAS MR ACCEPTED, AND THE AREA WAS C 360925 1 4 OVERED WITH MR REPLACEMENT OF RADIATOR TAPE. PROBABLE CASUE OF PINHOLE/D 360925 1 5 NG WAS A MICROMETEORITE HIT DURING FLIGHT. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A, WAS ENCOUNTE 360925 1 6 RED DURING RADIATOR TAPE RMEOVAL IN STEPS 1-2 TO 1-6. THE SCRATCH IN THE 360925 1 7 FACESHEET IS MINOR AND WAS MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS A SCRATCH CA 360925 1 8 USED BY WORKMANSHIP DURING TAPE REMOVAL. ITEM 3, PAGE 1B, WAS WRITTEN BE 360925 1 9 CAUSE THE TARE CUP FOR THE SHORE A HARDNESS SAMPLE WAS LOST FOR THE NEW 360925 1 10 TAPE BOND OVER THE ITEM 1/ITEM 2 AREA. THE STEP TO TEST THE HARDNESS WAS 360925 1 11 DELETED, AND THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED (IN THIS CASE). PROBABLE CAU 360925 1 12 USE OF THE LOST TARE CUP WAS A PARTS TRACKING ERROR WHILE CLOSING OPF-3 360925 1 13 WORK TO ROLL OV-103 TO THE VAB, THEN TO THE PAD. 360930 1 1 ITEM #1 IS TWO LOCATIONS OF MINOR MICRO-METERORITE CRATERS WITH PINHOLES 360930 1 2 WHICH IMPACTED THE RADIATOR TAPE ONLY ON THE RH #1 RADIATOR "TOP". THES 360930 1 3 E DISCREPANT LOCATIONS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS A 360930 1 4 MICRO-METERORITE HIT DURING FLIGHT FOR EACH LOCATION. BOTH LOCATIONS WER 360930 1 5 E ENTERED ON THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG AND MAP. 360976 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS A METEOR CRATER WITH A PINHOLE IN THE LH #2 RADIATOR 360976 1 2 "TOP". MOLDS AND 10X MAGNIFICATION WERE DONE TO SHOW THAT THIS WAS A SM 360976 1 3 ALL DENT IN THE FACESHEET. THIS DENT WAS MR ACCEPTED, AND THE AREA WAS C 360976 1 4 OVERED WITH MR REPLACEMENT OF RADIATOR TAPE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF PINHOLE/D 360976 1 5 ING WAS A MICROMETERORITE HIT DURING FLIGHT. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A, WAS WRITTE 360976 1 6 N BECAUSE THE TARE CUP FOR THE SHORE A HARDNESS SAMPLE WAS LOST. THE STE 360976 1 7 P TO TEST THE HARDNESS WAS DELETED, AND THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED ( 360976 1 8 IN THIS CASE). PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE LOST TARE CUPE WA A PARTS TRACKING 360976 1 9 ERROR WHILE CLOSING OPF-3 WORK TO ROLL OV-103 TO THE VAB, THEN TO THE 360976 1 10 PAD. 360980 1 1 DURING V35-10010 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT RECEPTABLE 50J43 HAD A BROKEN BA 360980 1 2 CKSEHLL TANG. THE RECPETABLE HAD A SPLIT TYPE BACKSHELL PREVIOUSLY INSTA 360980 1 3 LLED. THE DAMAGED BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER SRP-0001 (REPLA 360980 1 4 CEMENT OF DAMAGED ELECTRICAL CONN CABLE TIE STRAIN RELIEF BACKSHELLS). N 360980 1 5 O RETEST IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. 361063 1 1 A CDR CM3-1440 WAS INITIATED WHEN THE INCORRECT DASH NUMBER WAS INSTALLE 361063 1 2 D ON WIRE HARNESS V070-774917 AT CONNECTOR 40P127 (LOCATED ON THE LEFT S 361063 1 3 IDE OF THE 576 BULKHEAD). A DASH 007 WAS INSTALLED INSTEAD OF A 008. CDR 361063 1 4 WAS NOT INITIATED UNTIL AFTER THE MIDBODY WAS CLOSED FOR FLIGHT 14. THE 361063 1 5 WIRE ID WAS CHANGED TO DASH 008 ONCE CONNECTOR 40P127 WAS ACCESSIBLE. N 361063 1 6 O FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL/WORK AU 361063 1 7 THORIZATION ERROR. 361093 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, WIRE 1YC489D24, 1YC1113B24, 1YC1114B24, 1Y900B24, 1 361093 1 2 YC489B24 AND 1YT85B24 WERE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRES WERE WRAPP 361093 1 3 ED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THI 361093 1 4 S PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 361383 1 1 THE DENT FOUND ON THE LH #12 V0740-198801-054 RUB PANEL WAS FOUND TO BE 361383 1 2 0.2" IN DIA AND 0.05" DEEP WITH A CRACK IN THE RADIUS OF THE DENT. THE C 361383 1 3 RACKED FACESHEET WAS DRILLED OUT TO PREVENT CRACK PROPAGATION AND EXPOSE 361383 1 4 D HONEYCAOMB CELLS WAS FILLED WITH MBO120-008 ADDHESIVE TO PREVENT MOIST 361383 1 5 URE ENTRAPMENT. THE REMOVED HIGH EMISSIVITY COATING WAS REAPPLIED PER ML 361383 1 6 O601-9026. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHE 361383 1 7 R SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 361567 1 1 ONE OF THE FASTENERS ON A FWD AV BAY CLOSEOUT PANEL WAS FOUND TO REACH A 361567 1 2 FALSE TORQUE. AFTER REMOVAL & REINSTALLATION. THE FASTENER SEATED WITHO 361567 1 3 UT A PROBLEM. NO FURTHER WORK WAS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: MINOR DEBRIS 361567 1 4 CAUGHT ON THREADS THAT WAS LATER DISLODGED. 362656 1 1 DURING SURV IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ONE OF THE JR24 SHIELD JUMPER WIRES O 362656 1 2 N THE V070-775213-201 HARNESS HAD EXPOSED CONDUCTOR WITH NO CONDUCTOR DA 362656 1 3 MAGE. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY INSTALLING MR APPROVED SHRINK SL 362656 1 4 EEVING OVER THE DAMAGED AREA. WHILE PERFORMING THIS REPAIR, THE MONEL ME 362656 1 5 SH WAS DAMAGED BY EXCESSIVE HEAT AT CONNECTORS 50P503 AND 50P502 RESULTI 362656 1 6 NG IN A PAGE 1A. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY INSPECTING THE ADJACE 362656 1 7 NT AREA FOR ANY OTHER HEAT INDUCED DAMAGE AND INSTALLING MYSTIK 7503 ELE 362656 1 8 CTRICAL TAPE OVER THE DAMAGED AREA PER MR APPROVA.. THIS RETURNS THE HAR 362656 1 9 NESS TO DESIGN INTENT. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 362656 1 10 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO WORKMANSHIP 362663 1 1 CURING S0004,S22-031, THE INNER SEAL CLAMP ON THE LH2 MONOBALL HAD SLID 362663 1 2 ON TO THE HUMP ON THE BALL JOINT AND THE CLAMP APPEARED LOOSE. TO CORREC 362663 1 3 TLY REPOSITION THE CLAMP AND SEAL THE MONOBALL ASSY HAD TO BE COMPLETELY 362663 1 4 REMOVED AND REASSEMBLED. THIS WAS DONE PER ATTACHMENTS FROM S0030 AND S 362663 1 5 0004. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP 362932 1 1 INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE CLAMP FOR THE MONOBALL INNER SEAL WAS LOOSE 362932 1 2 WHEN THE TURNBUCKLE WERE ADJUSTED. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS RESOLVED BY DIS 362932 1 3 ASSEMBLING THE MONOBALL HARDWARE, REINSTALLING/TORQUING THE CLAMP AND TH 362932 1 4 EN REASSEMBLING THE MONOBALL HARDWARE/ FURTHER INSPECTION REVEALED THAT 362932 1 5 THERE WERE 2 CUTS ON THE INNER SEALS. BOTH OF THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE R 362932 1 6 EPAIRED WITH RTV 577. SUBSEQUENTLY, A PURGE TEST PERFORMED BY MPS VERIFI 362932 1 7 ED THT THE SEAL WAS LEAK PROOF. PER V1149 NO RETEST OR FURTHER DISPO IS 362932 1 8 REQUIRED. 362933 1 1 DURING V35-00008, AFT PLATFORM SET (A70-0698) COULD NOT BE INSTALLED BEC 362933 1 2 AUSE HARNESS INTERFERES WITH THE PLACEMENT OF THE PLATFORM LEG. THE HARN 362933 1 3 ESS WAS REROUTED PER AN MR TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. NO FURTHER ACTION 362933 1 4 REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PRBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICENCY - GSE AND VEHICLE H 362933 1 5 AD AN INTERFERENCE. 363174 1 1 THE LH AFT VENT DOOR (8/9) FAILED TO STOP AT THE PURGE POSITION WHEN COM 363174 1 2 MANDED TO RUN FROM OPEN TO PURGE. DATA RETRIEVALS SHOWED THAT MOTOR #1 C 363174 1 3 ONTINUED TO RUN WHEN MOTOR #2 WAS INHIBITED BY ITS PURGE LIMIT SWITCH. A 363174 1 4 S THE DOOR PASSED THROUGH THE PURGE POSITION, MOTOR #2 RESUMED OPERATION 363174 1 5 A AND THE DOOR RAN TO FULL CLOSED. THIS ANOMALY REPEATED APPROX 50% OF T 363174 1 6 HE TIME WHEN THE DOOR WAS RUN USING BOTH MOTORS. WHEN RUN USING ONLY MOT 363174 1 7 OR #1 OR #2 THE FAILURE NEVER OCCURRED. FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING WITH A B 363174 1 8 REAK OUT BOX INSTALLED AT THE PDU FOUND THAT THE MOTOR #1 PURGE LIMIT 363174 1 9 SWITCH WAS NOT ACTIVATING WHEN THE FAILURE OCCURRED EVEN THOUGH THERE 363174 1 10 WAS POWER TO THE SWITCH. THE POWER DRIVE UNIT WAS REMOVED FROM THE 363174 1 11 VEHICLE AND A NEW PDU WAS BENCH CHECKED AND INSTALLED. THE MECHANISH 363174 1 12 RIGGING WAS VERIFIED TO BE IN SPEC AND AN LRU FUNCTIONAL RETEST WAS 363174 1 13 PERFORMED. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 363174 1 14 DEGRADATION OF THE SWITCH. 363388 1 1 THE INCORRECTLY RECORDED OCN IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS DETERMINED 363388 1 2 TO BE CAUSED BY POOR WORKMANSHIP. THE (2) V070-596010-024 RODS WERE BOT 363388 1 3 H IDENTIFIED AS "C13688" WITH A "SHARPIE" PEN. DUE TO THE INCORRECT IDEN 363388 1 4 TIFICATION BY AN UNACCEPTABLE MEANS, THE RODS WERE INSTALLED ON THE WRON 363388 1 5 G SIDE OF THE ORBITER LAST FLIGHT (FLIGHT 14). ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION 363388 1 6 DETERMINED WHICH OF THE TWO RODS WAS ACTUALLY THE OCN C13687 AND WHICH 363388 1 7 ONE WAS OCN C13688, BY TRACKING THROUGH CVAS USING THE MANUFACTURING DAT 363388 1 8 E. THE RODS WERE CLEANED AND PROPERLY IDENTIFIED PER THE DRAWING REQUIRE 363388 1 9 MENTS. THE FLIPPER DOORS AND UPPER COVE AREA HAVE BEEN INSPECTED BY LSOC 363388 1 10 ENGINEERING AND THE V30 INSPECTION JOB CARDS AND NO ANOMALIES WERE 363388 1 11 DETECTED. CONCLUDE THAT THE RODS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT 363388 1 12 CONFIGURATION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 364019 1 1 THE V070-351415-001 UPPER VERTICAL DIAGONAL STRUT ON THE LH SIDE INDICAT 364019 1 2 ED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A NICK MEASURING 0.4381" LONG BY 364019 1 3 0.2252" WIDE BY 0.0133" DEEP. THE NICK WAS FILLED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESI 364019 1 4 VE PER MAO106-305 WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF T 364019 1 5 HE NICK WAS A #10 SCREW ON THE AFT PLATFORM ACCESS LADDER COMING IN CONT 364019 1 6 ACT WITH THE STRUT. THE SCREW WILL BE RELOCATED ON GSE PR #A70-0698-03-0 364019 1 7 05-0026. THE SCREW HOLDS A WEBBED TETHER STRAP ON THE GSE LADDER. CONCLU 364019 1 8 DE THAT THE LADDER SCREW WILL BE MOVED AND THE STRUT HAS BEEN RETURNED T 364019 1 9 O AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION FOR FLIGHT AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON 364019 1 10 THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. 364074 1 1 DURING V1040,V1 O2 T-O TESTING THE O2 T-O AHC FAILED LK CK WITH A LEAK R 364074 1 2 ATE OF APPROX 5500 SCCMS. MAX ALLOWABLE IS 900 SCCMS THE O2 T-O GHC WAS 364074 1 3 CYCLED DURING T/S TO DISLODGE ANY CONTAMINATION THAT MAY HAVE BEEN ON TH 364074 1 4 E AHC SEALING SURFACE, AND THE TEST THEN REPEATED. THE LEAK RATE FOR THE 364074 1 5 2ND TEST WAS 4500 SCCMS. THE T-O AHC WAS REMOVED, REPLACED, AND SUCCESS 364074 1 6 FULLY RETESTED. THE FINAL LK RATE WAS APPROX 100 SCCMS. PROBABLE CASUE: 364074 1 7 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 364167 1 1 DURING POST REMOVAL INPSECTION OF THE 50-01 DOOR, THE V070-358375 RTV SE 364167 1 2 ALS AROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE DOOR WERE FOUND TO BE DEBONDED AT SEVERA 364167 1 3 L LOCATIONS. THE DEBONDED REGIONS WERE REBONDED TO THE DOOR WITH MR APPR 364167 1 4 OVAL TO DELETE SURFACE PREPARATION AND LAP SHEAR REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE 364167 1 5 CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP O 364167 1 6 R ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 364341 1 1 DURING OEL-3-14-042, WIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION, WIRE HARNESS W91 FROM T 364341 1 2 HE L/H SIDE WALL OVER TO THE HE REG PANEL #4 WAS FOUND TO BE SUSCEPTIBLE 364341 1 3 TO CHAFFING AND WIRE DAMAGE. DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO INSTALL CONVOLUTED OV 364341 1 4 ER THIS AREA. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEA 364341 1 5 R AND TEAR DURING PROCESSING. 364342 1 1 DURING OEL-3-14-042, WIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION, WIRE HARNESS W106 NEAR 364342 1 2 ME #1 LO2 FEEDLINE WAS FOUND TO BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO CHAFFING AND WIRE DAMA 364342 1 3 GE. DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO INSTALL CONVOLUTED OVER THIS AREA. NO FURTHER A 364342 1 4 CTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR DURING PROCESSI 364342 1 5 NG. 364457 1 1 THE RATCHING NOISE ON THE RIGHT HAND OUTBOARD AND INBOARD ELEVONS IDENTI 364457 1 2 FED ELEVONS IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 RESOLVED BY WIPING/WASHING OFF DEBRIS (CON 364457 1 3 TAMINATION) WITH CLEAN WIPES AND IPA. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DEBRIS W 364457 1 4 A OCEAN SPRAY RESIDUE (SALT) THAT WAS DEPOSITED ON THE SURFACE OF THE FL 364457 1 5 IPPER DOOR RUB PANELS. CONCLUDE THAT THE CONTAMINATION HAS BEEN REMOVED 364457 1 6 AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 364665 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A BROKEN ELECTRICAL SUPPORT BRACKET. THE DISCERPANT BR 364665 1 2 ACKET WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW BRACKET PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE C 364665 1 3 AUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 364665 1 4 ACTION REQUIRED. 364788 1 1 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF DIG-3-14-142, ENGINEERING INSPECTION DETECTED 364788 1 2 ONE WIRE WITH EXPOSED SHIELDING. STEPS WERE WRITTEN TO ID THE DISCREPANT 364788 1 3 WIRE. IT WAS THEN DETERMINED THAT CABLES 1ZK491A24, 3ZK420B24, AND 3YK6 364788 1 4 41H24 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO VISIBLE SHIELD DAMAGE AND CABLE 5ZK420A2 364788 1 5 4 HAD BROKEN SHIELD STRANDS. THE DISCREPANCY FOR CABLES 3YK641H24 AND 3Z 364788 1 6 K420B24 WAS ADDRESSED BY PERFORMING SRP-V-EL-0007-C-O METHOD B. CABLE 5Z 364788 1 7 K420A24 WAS REPAIRED BY TRIMMING FLUSH THE VARIOUS BROKEN SHIELD STRANDS 364788 1 8 AND SPIRAL WRAPPING THE DISCREPANT AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503 ELECTRICAL TAP 364788 1 9 E AND INSTALLING AN ID PLATE. WIRE 1ZK491A24 WAS ALSO REPAIRED WITH 364788 1 10 MYSTIC 7503 AND ID PLATE INSTALLED. MR APPROVAL WAS REQUESTED TO DEFER 364788 1 11 PROPER REPAIR ON CABLES 5ZK420A24 AND 1ZK491A24 TO FLIGHT 15. POST 364788 1 12 FLIGHT DISPO WAS WRITTEN AND PERFORMED TO ROUTE NEW CABLES IN PLACE OF 364788 1 13 EXISTING CABLES PER DRAWING V070-793811. A HI-POT WAS SUCCESSFULLY 364788 1 14 PERFORMED ON NEW CABLES 5ZK420A24 AND 1ZK491A24 FOR CABLE INTEGRITY. NO 364788 1 15 FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRACKED. 364788 1 16 PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DURING ORBITER PROCESSING. 364806 1 1 DURING OEL-3-14-0041 (DR), THE GROUND WIRE P904E22 WAS SAID TO BE TOO SH 364806 1 2 ORT TO WORK ON A DR. A PR WAS TAKEN AND THE DR LEFT OPEN. AN OFF-SHIFT T 364806 1 3 ECH WORKED DR AND DID NOT HAVE A PROBLEM OBTAINING SLACK. (NOTE THE DR W 364806 1 4 AS CLOSED PRIOR TO OBTAINING A COPY). NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS 364806 1 5 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DURING PROCESSING. 365461 1 1 WHILE PERFORMING V5029, CONNECTOR 50J828 WAS FOUND TO BE CHIPPED ON THE 365461 1 2 INSULATOR FACE. A MR WAS REQUESTED AND APPROVED TO FLY AS IS FOR ONE FLI 365461 1 3 GHT. ENGINEERING EVALUATION DETERMINED THAT THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONNECT 365461 1 4 OR WAS VALID. CONNECTOR 50J828 WAS PROVEN BY MATING AND TESTING PER V502 365461 1 5 9. AFTER OV-103 RETURN FROM FLIGHT 14, POST FLIGHT DISPO REMOVED AND REP 365461 1 6 LACED THE CONNECTOR, WITH IT PASSING CONTINUITY, ISOLATION, AND HI-POT. 365461 1 7 THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS DUE TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. N 365461 1 8 O FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED PER THIS PR. 365543 1 1 DURING IPR 42V-0117, CONNECTOR 50P727 WAS FOUND WITH A BORKEN BACKSHELL 365543 1 2 TANG. SRP V-EL-0001-C-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. 365543 1 3 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND 365543 1 4 TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 365692 1 1 DURING IPR-0117, WIRE 1B148B22-4 WAS FOUND TO HAVE EXPOSED CONDUCTOR WIT 365692 1 2 H NO CONDUCTOR DAMAGE. MR APPROVAL WAS REQUESTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE TO 365692 1 3 REPAIR THE WIRE WITH A 3" PIECE OF HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING. PROBABLE CAUSE 365692 1 4 WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 365740 1 1 THE V070-395974-006 CARRIER PANEL AND TILE "MISMATCH" IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 365740 1 2 1, PAGE 1 WAS DETERMINED TO BE INCOORECT SINCE ALL OF THE STEPS EXCEPT 365740 1 3 6.0 (INSTALL CARRIER PANEL PER JOB CARD) WERE "NOT PERFORMED". SINCE THE 365740 1 4 RE WAS NO DISCREPANCY THERE IS NO "PROBABLE" CAUSE EXCEPT WORKMANSHIP. C 365740 1 5 ONCLUDE THAT THE CARRIER PANEL HAS BEEN INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT PER THE JOB 365740 1 6 CARD AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 365956 1 1 DURING V80-00456, WIRES 2D193C18-1 AND -2 WERE FOUND TO HAVE EXPOSED CON 365956 1 2 DUCTOR WITH NO CONDUCTOR DAMAGE. MR WAS REQUESTED AND APPROVED TO INSTAL 365956 1 3 L A 3 INCH PIECE OF MBO150 HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING FOR PROTECTION AND ISOLA 365956 1 4 TION OF WIRE CONDUCTOR. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE 365956 1 5 CAUSE: 1 & 1A) NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 1A #3) 365956 1 6 WORKMANSHIP. 366325 1 1 WHILE WORKING DR-OEL-3-14-0043 (NOTING BROKEN GROUND LUG) IT WAS DISCOVE 366325 1 2 RED THAT THE WIRE ASSOCIATED WITH GROUND LUG ON CONN. 50P716 WAS TOO SHO 366325 1 3 RT TO RETERMINATE. THE DR WAS UPGRADED TO PR OEL-3-14-0171 (THIS PR). TH 366325 1 4 E WIRE P731B22 HAD AN ADDITONAL SEGMENT OF WIRE SPLICED UNTO ITS END AND 366325 1 5 A NEW GROUND LUG INSTALLED. A CONTINUITY TEST WAS PERFORMED ON THE GROU 366325 1 6 ND LUG PRIOR TO INSTALLING LUG AND WIRE ON THE BACKSHELL TO VERIFY THE I 366325 1 7 NTEGRITY OF THE CRIMP. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 366614 1 1 DURING CARRIER PANEL INSTALLATION ON 50-02 DOOR, (2) V070-354241-001 SPA 366614 1 2 CERS WERE FOUND TO BE MISLOCATED. PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION, THE H 366614 1 3 OLES WERE ELONGATED TO ALLEVIATE THE INTERFERENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR TH 366614 1 4 IS DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP 366924 1 1 THE PER GUIDE PIN WAS FOUND MISSING DURING S0007 FOR FLIGHT 14. A LOST-A 366924 1 2 ND-FOUND PR WAS INITIATED AND THE PR WAS DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 15. THE HOLE 366924 1 3 WAS REAMED AND MEASURED AND A NEW GUIDE PIN WAS MANUFACTURED TO FIT WIT 366924 1 4 H MRB APPROVAL. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE- O 366924 1 5 PERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 368425 1 1 FUEL CELL 2 EXHIBITS INTERMITTENT DROPS TO LOWER LIMIT. ON THE O2 FLOWME 368425 1 2 TER READOUT. TROUBLESHOOTING HAS PROVEN THE PROBLEM IS INTERNAL TO THE F 368425 1 3 UEL CELL. THE FUEL CELL HAS BEEN REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH S/N 115. ALL 368425 1 4 RETEST HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULL. PROBABLE CAUSE OF FAILURE IS A LOOSE OR INT 368425 1 5 ERMITTENT CONNECTION IN THE FLOWMETER CIRCUITRY. 368662 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AT DFRF FOLLOWING REMOVAL OF BRAKES S/N 0027 AND S 368662 1 2 /N 0032 FROM OV-103 DURING S5022. S5022 CALLS OUT TO INSTALL THE ADAPTER 368662 1 3 S WITH BLEEDERS BUT THESE PARTS COULD NOT BE LOCATED AND PLUGS WERE INST 368662 1 4 ALLED TO SEAL THE BRAKE SYSTEM. THE ADAPTER/BLEEDER ASSEMBLIES ARE NOT F 368662 1 5 LIGHT HARDWARE AND REMAIN ON WHILE TH BRAKES ARE REFURBISHED THEN THE FL 368662 1 6 IGHT BRAKE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER FITTINGS ARE INSTALLED. AT KSC, THE PLUGS 368662 1 7 WERE REMOVED AND THE ADAPTER/BLEEDER UNITS WERE INSTALLED. THE BRAKES H 368662 1 8 AVE BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT AND THE PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. THE PR 368662 1 9 OBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS LOSS OF SUPPORT HARDWARE. NO RETEST IS REQUI 368662 1 10 RED. 368699 1 1 TO ADDRESS ITEM 1 OF THIS PR, THE CLIPS WERE BENT BACK BY HAND TO RETURN 368699 1 2 THEM TO THEIR PRINT CONFIGURATION. AN INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED PER V30 368699 1 3 CRITERIA TO VERIFY THAT NO ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS EXISTED. ITEMS 2 AND 3 OF 368699 1 4 THIS PR WERE NO DISCREPANCY. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PRO 368699 1 5 BABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NOTE: STR-3-15-4015 SENDS THIS PAR 368699 1 6 T TO RSC FOR REFURBISHMENT VIA LRU PR. 369057 1 1 DURING FERRY LOCK INSTALLATION AT DFRF, THE V070-194068-002 BOLTS IN THE 369057 1 2 RHOB FLIPPER DOOR 12 WERE FOUND TO HAVE FLATTENED THREADS. NEW BOLTS WE 369057 1 3 RE OBTAINED, THE NUT PLATES WERE CLEANED, AND THE NEW HARDWARE WAS INSTA 369057 1 4 LLED. POST FERRY FLIGHT, NO DAMAGE WAS NOTED DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE B 369057 1 5 OLTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS A WORKMANSHIP, PROCEDURAL E 369057 1 6 RROR DURING INSTALLATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED 369057 1 7 ON THIS PR. 370567 1 1 THE M072-350002 WAS FOUND TO INCORRECTLY LIST TWO ACCESS PANEL REMOVALS 370567 1 2 THAT WERE NOT REQUIRED FOR FERRY FLIGHT (REF ITEM 1, PAGE 1). AN EO WAS 370567 1 3 RELEASED TO REMOVE THE TWO ACCESS PANELS FROM THE LIST OF PANELS TO BE R 370567 1 4 EMOVED FOR FERRY FLIGHT. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPANCY IS OVERSIGHT 370567 1 5 OF DESIGN ENGINEERING (I.E. VENDOR). CONCLUDE THAT THE LIST HAS BEEN CO 370567 1 6 RRECTED BY EO AND NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 371658 1 1 THE INTERFERING V070-395968-010 C/P ID'D IN ITEM 1, PG 1, WAS REMOVED TO 371658 1 2 ALLOW CERAMIC PLUG INSTALLAITON INTO THE V070-353589-009 C/P. AFTER THE 371658 1 3 CERAMIC PLUGS WERE INSTALLED PER THE V80-95964 JC THE V070-395968-010 C 371658 1 4 /P WAS REINSTALLED PER THE DWG REQUIREMENTS. THE INTERFERENCE WAS DUE TO 371658 1 5 INCORRECT PERFORMANCE OF PROCEDURE BY TECHNICIAN OF C/P INSTALLATION AS 371658 1 6 CALLED OUT ON THE JC (IE WORKMANSHIP). CONCLUDE THAT BOTH THE V070-3535 371658 1 7 89-009 AND V070-395968-010 C/P ARE NOW INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT PER THE DWG 371658 1 8 REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 371711 1 1 CORROSION WAS DISCOVERED IN THE VICINITY OF FASTENER TAILS INSIDE THE HO 371711 1 2 USING OF THE T-0 COLLET RECEPTACLE. THE COLLET RECEPTACLE WAS REMOVED. T 371711 1 3 HE JO-BOLTS WERE REMOVED AND DENTAL MOLDS WERE TAKEN OF THE CORRODED ARE 371711 1 4 A. THE PITS WERE GROUND OUT WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CORR 371711 1 5 OSION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED AND THE JO-BOLTS WERE REINSTALLED. THE COLL 371711 1 6 ET RECEPTACLE WAS REINSTALLED AND MEASUREMENTS REVEALED IT TO BE WITHIN 371711 1 7 TOLERANCE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRO 371711 1 8 NMENTAL DEGRADATION (CORROSION) 371711 1 9 NMENTAL DEGRADATION (CORROSION) 371712 1 1 THE GOUGES WERE PROBABLY CASUED BY THE T-0 CARRIER PLATE FOOT DURING MAT 371712 1 2 E OR DEMATE OF THE CARRIER PLATE. THE GOUGES PENETRATED ONLY THE CORROSI 371712 1 3 ON PROTECTION AND DID NOT DAMAGE THE STRUCTURE IN ANY WAY. THE CORROSION 371712 1 4 PROTECTION WAS TOUCHED UP PER SPEC. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS 371712 1 5 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE-OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 371733 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT INSPECTION, THE V070-352550-003 SHIM ON THE L/H ET DO 371733 1 2 OR WAS FOUND TO BE DELAMINATED. THE SHIM WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED RETURN 371733 1 3 ING THE ASSEMBLY TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS FL 371733 1 4 IGHT DAMAGE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 371734 1 1 DURING POSTFLIGHT INSPECTION, THE V070-352550-003 PEELABLE SHIM ON THE R 371734 1 2 H ET DOOR WAS FOUND TO BE DELAMINATED. THE DELAMINATED PORTION OF THE SH 371734 1 3 IM WAS ON THE EXPOSED, NONBEARING SURFACE. BY TRIMMING THE SHIM FLUSH WI 371734 1 4 TH THE ADJACENT STRUTURE, FURTHER DELAMINATION WAS ELIMINATED. PROBABLE 371734 1 5 CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS FLIGHT DAMAGE (HEAT EXPOSURE). NO FURTHER SHOP OR E 371734 1 6 NGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 371749 1 1 THIS PR IS A DUPLICATE OF ITEM 1 ON PR STR-3-15-3966. 371862 1 1 DURING V31-13103 WIRE HARNESS V070-772264 WAS FOUND TO BE CRUSHED AND TO 371862 1 2 RN AT PORT AFT TRUNION FITTING. THE WIRE HARNESS WILL BE INSPECTED AND R 371862 1 3 EPLACED ON OEL-3-J1-019 STEPS 6-7 AND 6-8. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON 371862 1 4 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING LANDING. 372000 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE WEAR OF THE DRY FILM LUBE PLATING 372000 1 2 ON THE V070-510551-001 NLG UPLOCK HOOK. DENTAL MOLDS, PHOTOGRAPHS, NDE E 372000 1 3 DDY CURRENT TESTING,AND VISUAL INSPECTIONS REVEALED THAT THE WEAR WAS IN 372000 1 4 THE DRY LUBE COATING AND CAD PLATING. LIGHT SANDING TO EVEN TRANSITION 372000 1 5 AREA WAS PERFORMED AND THE CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED US 372000 1 6 E BASED ON SMOOTH WEAR ON BOTH ROLLER AND HOOL SURFACES. THE PR CONDITIO 372000 1 7 N HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED, ADDRESSED AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE SYSTEM HAS BEE 372000 1 8 N RESTORED. NO RETEST REQUIRED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION IS 372000 1 9 OPERTIONAL DEGRADATION. 372001 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN NO THREADS WERE VISIBLE THROUGH THE WITNESS 372001 1 2 HOLE IN THE ME162-0009-0003 RH MLG AFT DOOR UPLOCK HOOK LINK. THE LACK O 372001 1 3 F VISIBLE THREADS WAS MR ACCEPTED UNRESTRICTED AS IS AN MR ID WAS APPLIC 372001 1 4 ED. PROBABLE CAUSE: LANDING GEAR RIGGING. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 372140 1 1 THIS PR ON THE MLG BRAKE MOUNT HOLES WAS INITALLY WRITTEN AGAINST "CHIPP 372140 1 2 ED COATING SHOWING CORROSION". THE ORIGINAL DISPOSITION WAS WRITTEN TO P 372140 1 3 ERFORM MR REPAIR BUT A SECOND INSPECTION SHOWED THE DISCSRPANCY WAS ONLY 372140 1 4 MINOR SURFACE CORRISION WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE CLEAR COATING. PAGE 1 WAS 372140 1 5 THEN MODIFIED TO SHOW ONLY SURFACE CORROSION EXISTED AND THE DISPOSITIO 372140 1 6 N WAS CHANGED TO SHOW THAT NO MR REPAIRS WERE REQUIRED. THE CORROSION WS 372140 1 7 WIPED FROM THE SURFACE OF ALL 4 BRAKE MOUNT HOLES USING TRICHLOROETHANE 372140 1 8 . A THIN COAT OF BRAYCOAT GREASE WAS APPLIED TO EACH OF THE HOLES TO PRE 372140 1 9 VENT FUTURE CORROSION. NO FURTHER DISCPARANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: 372140 1 10 ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND NORMAL WEAR. 372141 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN CHIPPED PLATING ON THE RH MAIN LANDING GEAR B 372141 1 2 RAKE MOUNT POINTS WAS DISCOVERED. IN ADDITION, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE ARE 372141 1 3 AS WITH THE CHIPPED PLATING HAD MINOR CORROSION. THE CHIPPED AND CORRODE 372141 1 4 D AREAS WERE MR SANDED AND PRIMED WITH AN EPOXY POLYAMIDE PRIMER COATING 372141 1 5 PER MIL-F-18264M09. THE AREA WAS MR ID'D. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE 372141 1 6 CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 372154 1 1 THE SCRATCHED LOWER SKINS AROUND THE RH MAIN LANDING GEAR DOOR, IDENTIFI 372154 1 2 ED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WERE MEASURED AND FOUND TO BE A MAXIMUM OF .0089" 372154 1 3 DEEP. BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL, THE SCRATCHES WERE BLENDED SMOOTH BY 372154 1 4 SANDING AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE SCRATCHES 372154 1 5 IN THE SKIN WERE A RESULT OF TPS TECHNICIANS USING METALLIC TOOLS TO REM 372154 1 6 OVE TPS COMPONENTS. REF BL 37 PG 1. CONCLUDE THAT THE SKINS HAVE BEEN RE 372154 1 7 TURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 372155 1 1 THE SCRATCHED LOWER SKINS AROUND THE LH MAIN LANDING GEAR DOOR, IDENTIFI 372155 1 2 ED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WERE MEASURED AND FOUND TO BE A MAXIMUM OF .0052" 372155 1 3 DEEP. BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL, THE SCRATCHES WERE BLENDED SMOOTH BY 372155 1 4 SANDING AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE SCRATCHES 372155 1 5 IN THE SKIN WERE A RESULT OF TPS TECHNICIANS USING METALLIC TOOLS TO REM 372155 1 6 OVE TPS COMPONENTS. CONCLUDE THAT THE SKINS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACC 372155 1 7 EPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 372195 1 1 SPRING CLIPS ON THE ET SALAD BOWL WERE FLATTENED OUT AND EXCEEDED MAX DI 372195 1 2 A. THE CLIPS WERE BENT BACK TO SHAPE AND RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION 372195 1 3 . DUE TO A FIT PROBLEM ON OV-105, MOLD IMPRESSIONS AND GAP MEASUREMENT W 372195 1 4 ERE TAKEN TO SEE IF THE PROBLEM EXISTED ON OV-103. RESULTS INDICATE THAT 372195 1 5 THE INSTALLATION WAS NOMINAL. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS OPERATI 372195 1 6 ONAL DEGRADATION. 372356 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 6 ON PAGE 1) THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT BROKEN, LOOSE OR 372356 1 2 PARTIALLY EMBEDDED FIBERS ON THE INTERNAL WING SPARS. THE DISCREPANT FIB 372356 1 3 ERS WERE COVERED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITIO 372356 1 4 N. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS IS NORMAL DEGRADATION OF EDGE FIBERS O 372356 1 5 N LAMINATES IN A COMPOSITION SUBSTRATE. (REF ITEM 7 ON PAGE 1A) THIS ITE 372356 1 6 M DOCUMENTS IMPROPER REPAIR OF DISCREPANT FIBERS WHICH WERE COATED WITH 372356 1 7 MBO120-008 ADHESIVE INSTEAD OF MBO125-055 KOROPON. THE IMPROPER REPAIR W 372356 1 8 AS ACCEPTED AS WORKED PER UNRESTRICTED MR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS 372356 1 9 WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS P 372356 1 10 R. 372631 1 1 THE SMALL TEARS IN THE V070-333889-012 DEBRIS NET WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL 372631 1 2 WEAR. THEY WERE SEWN UP WITH NOMEX THREAD WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRI 372631 1 3 CTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATI 372631 1 4 ONAL DEGRADATION. 372634 1 1 THE SMALL TEARS IN THE V070-333890-001 DEBRIS NET WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL 372634 1 2 WEAR. THEY WERE SEWN UP WITH NOMEX THREAD WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRI 372634 1 3 CTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATI 372634 1 4 ONAL DEGRADATION. 372765 1 1 DURING V30-153580, A BURR WAS FOUND ON THE V070-355070-008 BEAM AT THE A 372765 1 2 FT UPSTOP BOLT FITTING. PER DWG V070-355070-008 ZONE 18C VIEW G, THE BEA 372765 1 3 M WAS SUPPOSED TO BE CHAMFERED AT THIS LOCATION AND WAS NOT. THE CHAMFER 372765 1 4 REWORK HAS BEEN PERFORMED AND THE BEAM HAS BEEN RESTORED TO A PER PRINT 372765 1 5 CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS VENDOR WORKMANSHI 372765 1 6 P. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 372795 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) DURING V30-14184, POST FLIGHT INTERNAL WING INSPE 372795 1 2 CTION, SEVERAL FIBERS WERE FOUND TO BE BROKEN AND LOOSE ON THE INTERNAL 372795 1 3 WING SPAR AT XO1191. ENGINEERING EVALUATED THE CONDITION AND THE DISCREP 372795 1 4 ANT FIBERS WERE FOUND TO BE FIBERS AT THE EDGE OF THE LAYERS OF TAPE USE 372795 1 5 D TO BUILD THE COMPOSITE STRUCTURE. PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION, THE 372795 1 6 BROKEN AND LOOSE FIBERS WERE TRIMMED FLUSH WITH THE SURROUNDING STRUCTU 372795 1 7 RE AND COVERED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1) DURING V 372795 1 8 30-14184, POST FLIGHT INTERNAL WING INSPECTION, SEVERAL FIBERS WERE FOUN 372795 1 9 D TO BE EXPOSED (PARTIALLY EMBEDDED) IN THE COMPOSITE OF THE INTERNAL 372795 1 10 WING SPAR AT XO1307. ENGINEERING EVALUATED THE CONDITION AND THE 372795 1 11 DISCREPANT FIBERS WERE FOUND TO BE FIBERS AT THE EDGE OF THE LAYERS OF 372795 1 12 TAPE USED TO BUILD THE COMPOSITE OF THE INTERNAL WING SPAR AT XO1307. 372795 1 13 ENGINEERING EVALUATED THE CONDITION AND THE DISCREPANT FIBERS WERE FOUND 372795 1 14 TO BE FIBERS AT THE EDGE OF THE LAYERS OF TAPE USED TO BUILD THE 372795 1 15 COMPOSITE STRUCTURE. THESE END FIBERS ARE FREQUENTLY ONLY PARTIALLY 372795 1 16 EMBEDDED IN THE COMPOSITE AFTER MANUFACTURE. PER UNRESTRICTED MR 372795 1 17 DISPOSITION, THE PARTIALLY EMBEDDED FIBERS WERE COVERED WITH THREE (3) 372795 1 18 COATS OF MBO125-055 PRIMER. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS VENDOR 372795 1 19 WORKMANSHIP (IMPROPER FINISHING AFTER MANUFACTURE). NO FURTHER SHOP OR 372795 1 20 ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 372934 1 1 THIS PR WAS DETECTED DURING J/C V31-15115. THE DRAIN HOLE IN THE LEFT LO 372934 1 2 WER RUBBER WAS FOUND TO BE BLOCKED WITH RTV. PER THIS WAD THE OBSTRUCTIO 372934 1 3 NS WERE REMOVED AND THE DRAIN HOLE WAS CLEANED WITH IPA. NO FURTHER DISC 372934 1 4 REPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 373028 1 1 CORROSION WAS DISCOVERED IN THE VICINITY OF FASTENER TAILS INSIDE THE HO 373028 1 2 USING OF THE T-0 COLLET RECEPTACLE. THE COLLET RECEPTACLE WAS REMOVED. T 373028 1 3 HE JO-BOLTS WERE REMOVED AND DENTAL MOLDS WERE TAKEN OF THE CORRODED ARE 373028 1 4 A. THE PITS WERE GROUND OUT WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CORR 373028 1 5 OSION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED AND THE JO-BOLTS WERE REINSTALLED. THE COL 373028 1 6 LET RECEPTACLE WAS REINSTALLED AND MEASUREMENTS REVEALED IT TO BE WITHIN 373028 1 7 TOLERANCE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - ENVI 373028 1 8 RONMENTAL DEGRADATION (CORROSION). 373028 1 9 RONMENTAL DEGRADATION (CORROSION). 373082 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V35-40004 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT MONOBALL SEAL 373082 1 2 (P/N V070-565323-002) HAD FOUR CUTS FROM THE PREVIOUS FLIGHT. THIS DISCR 373082 1 3 EPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY INIIIATING AN LRU PR AGAINST THE DISCREPANT SEAL 373082 1 4 AND SENDING TO THE HDA FOR FURTHER DISPOSITION AND REPLACING THE OLD SE 373082 1 5 AL WITH A NEW ONE. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CA 373082 1 6 USE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HAR 373082 1 7 DWARE. 373083 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V35-40004 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT INNER MONOBALL 373083 1 2 SEAP (P/N V070-56411-001) HAD A SMALL TEAR ON MONOBALL SEAL AT P511 POS 373083 1 3 ITION. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY INITIATING AN LRU PR AGAINST TH 373083 1 4 E DISCREPANT SEAL AND SENDING TO THE HDA FOR FURTHER DISPOSTION AND REPL 373083 1 5 ACING THE OLD SEAL WITH A NEW ONE. THE NEW SEAL WILL BE SENT TO THE S000 373083 1 6 4 KITTING AREA AND WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE VAB PER S0004. NO FURTHER AC 373083 1 7 TION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO NORMA 373083 1 8 L WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 373113 1 1 DURING RSI-3-15-207, POST FLIGHT ELEVON COVE INSPECTION, SLIGHT DISCOLOR 373113 1 2 ATION WAS FOUND ON THE V070-198310-001 TUBE ASSY. THE DISCOLORATION RESU 373113 1 3 LTED FROM OUTGASSING IN THE REGION, A COMMON OCCURRENCE DURING FLIGHT. R 373113 1 4 ESIDUAL SURFACE CONTAMINATION HAS BEEN REMOVED. THE DISCOLORATION PRESEN 373113 1 5 T WAS NOT INDICATIVE OF SUBSTRATE OVERTEMP AND HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UNR 373113 1 6 ESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS FLIGHT DAMAGE. NO FURTHER S 373113 1 7 HOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 373130 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) DURING V6028, THREE V070-298112-0XX THERMAL BARRI 373130 1 2 ER SPRING SEALS WERE FOUND TO BE BENT AND OR CRACKED. THE THREE SEALS WE 373130 1 3 RE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 373130 1 4 ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1) THE "BENT, CRACK 373130 1 5 ED, OR MISSING" TABS WERE REPLACED AS PART OF THE NEW V070-298112-017 SP 373130 1 6 RING SEALS THAT WERE INSTALLED DUE TO REWORK OF ITEM 1. PROBABLE CAUSE F 373130 1 7 OR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1A) THE MIS 373130 1 8 SING -003 SPACER WAS REPLACED FROM A NEW SPACER OBTAINED FROM LOGISTICS. 373130 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS WORKMANSHIP. (REF ITEM 4 ON PAGE 1B) 373130 1 10 THE DISCREPANT V070-298112-017 THERMAL BARRIER (SPRING SEAL) WAS REMOVED 373130 1 11 AND REPLACED WITH A NEW BARRIER PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE 373130 1 12 FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 5 ON PAGE 1B) THIS 373130 1 13 ITEM DOCUMENTS V070-298108-009 RTV SEALS WHICH WERE IMPROPERLY 373130 1 14 POSITIONED DURING BONDING. THE SEALS WERE INSTALLED WITH OVERHANG ON 373130 1 15 WRONG END OF THE THERMAL BARRIER. THE RTV SEALS WERE REMOVED AND 373130 1 16 REBONDED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS 373130 1 17 WORKMANSHIP. 373697 1 1 MPS IPR-014 WAS TAKEN TO DOCUMENT THE FAILURE TO OPERATE OF THE E2-A SOL 373697 1 2 ENOID VALVE LV3. TROUBLESHOOTING REVEALED A BROKEN WIRE WHICH GENERATED 373697 1 3 THIS OEL PR. THIS PR REPAIRED THE WIRE AND MPS RETESTED THE LV3 SOLENOID 373697 1 4 VALVE PER STEP 2-19 ON PAGE 16. THIS TEST WAS SUCCESSFUL THEREFORE THIS 373697 1 5 PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 373837 1 1 DURING V31-15101, INSPECTION REVEALED THAT WIRE V58T385A POSSESSED A SEV 373837 1 2 ERE BEND WITH EXPOSED SHIELD. DISPOSITION WAS WRITTEN TO CUT OUT THE DES 373837 1 3 IGN SPLICES AND DAMAGED SEGMENT OF WIRE T1955A26; AND INSTALL NEW SEGMEN 373837 1 4 T WITH SPLICES. UPON INITIAL RETEST BY CHYD, MEASUREMENT V58T0385A1, SYS 373837 1 5 3 MAIN PUMP CASE ON TEMP WAS NOT FUNCTIONING. FURTHER EVALUATION REVEAL 373837 1 6 ED THAT WIRES WERE NOT SPLICED CORRECTLY. FURTHER DISPO WAS ADDED TO RES 373837 1 7 PLICE THE WIRES CORRECTLY. FUNCTIONAL RETEST BY CHYD WAS SUCCESSFUL. NO 373837 1 8 FURTHER ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRA 373837 1 9 DATION. 373987 1 1 PREVIOUS DISPOSITION REQUESTED AND RECEIVED MR APPROVAL TO INSTALL AN IN 373987 1 2 SULATOR SEALING SLEEVE ONTO WIRE P1064D26 IN A CLAMSHELL FASHION TO REIN 373987 1 3 SULATE THE NICKED WIRE. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED SUCCESSFULLY WITH NO OTHER 373987 1 4 ANOMALIES NOTED. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED BY THIS PR. MOST PROBABLE 373987 1 5 CAUSE OF THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION FROM ORDINARY PROCESSING PRO 373987 1 6 CEDURES. 374095 1 1 DURING V31-14121, THE V070-1398501-012 SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE TORN AT THE 374095 1 2 XO693 LOCATION ON THE FWD FEMALE END OF THE SEAL. THE DISCREPANT SEAL WA 374095 1 3 S WRAPPED WITH TEFLON TAPE TO PREVENT FURTHER DEGRADATION OF THE SEAL AN 374095 1 4 D ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS 374095 1 5 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED 374095 1 6 FOR THIS PR. 374098 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN IT WAS NOTICED THAT THE ME131-0050-0005 ROD E 374098 1 2 NMD BEARING WAS NOT CENTERED IN THE EYELET. THE SUSPECT ROD END WAS REMO 374098 1 3 VED AND REPLACED WITH A ME131-0077-0005 ROD END (SUPERCEDES ME131-0050-0 374098 1 4 005 ROD END, PER DRWG V070-594131). THE UNIT WAS REASSEMBLED AND REINSTA 374098 1 5 LLED. RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER V5006. NO FURTHER RETEST REQUIRED. PR CON 374098 1 6 DITON NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 374100 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) DURING V31-14127, A PREVIOUS REPAIR ON THE PLB EN 374100 1 2 VIRONMENTAL SEAL AT XO 792 ON THE RH HINGELINE WAS FOUND TO BE COMING O 374100 1 3 FF. THE TAPE APPLIED WAS NOT ADHERED TO THE SEAL PROPERLY. BY REMOVING T 374100 1 4 HE OLD TAPE AND APPLYING NEW TAPE, THE REPAIR WILL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL. (R 374100 1 5 EF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A) THE DEBONDED SEAL SPLICE IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2, PAG 374100 1 6 E 1A WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE SPLICE AND REBONDING A NEW SPLICE IN P 374100 1 7 ER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. A NEW SPLICE WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE ETCHING OF 374100 1 8 A TEFLON SEAL IS ONLY EFFECTIVE FOR A LIMITED TIME AND THE SEAL REMOVED 374100 1 9 HAD EXCEEDED THE TIME LIMT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS O 374100 1 10 ERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 374230 1 1 THE SUSPECTED "SURFACE CORROSION" OF ITEM 1 WAS AT THE RH #9 PLBD HINGE 374230 1 2 LOCATION (XO = 1100.45). ANY LOOSE MATERIAL WAS WIPED AWAY WITH IPA, LEA 374230 1 3 VING SOME RED-BROWN RESIDUE/DISCOLORATION ON THE HINGE PIN. NO EVIDENCE 374230 1 4 OF CORROSION OR PITTING FOUND FROM 10X MAGNIFICATION INSPECTION. THE REM 374230 1 5 AINING RESIDUE/DISCOLORATION WAS MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OUTGASS 374230 1 6 ING RESIDUE FROM FLIGHT. 374232 1 1 THE SUSPECTED "SURFACE CORROSION" OF ITEM 1 WAS AT THE R/H 5 PAYLOAD BAY 374232 1 2 DOOR HINGE LOCATION, XO 850.60. THIS CONDITION WAS WIPED AWAY WITH IPA, 374232 1 3 LEAVING NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSION, PITTING OR REMAINING RESIDUE. NO DISC 374232 1 4 REPANT CONDITION REMAINS. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OUTGASSING RESIDUE FROM FLI 374232 1 5 GHT. 374376 1 1 ANTENNA COVER V070-320879-001 HAS A PORTION OF COINING PROCESS MISSING F 374376 1 2 ROM ITS MATING SURFACE. THE AREA WHERE THE COINING IS MISSING HAS A COAT 374376 1 3 OF PRIMER WHERE THE DRAWING (V070-320879) CALLS TO HAVE THIS AREA COINE 374376 1 4 D PER (MA0108-307). COVER HAS BEEN ACCEPTED PER MR AND BEEN INSTALLED. P 374376 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR FAILED TO COIN PER DRAWING. DOOR HAS BEEN INSTALLE 374376 1 6 D PER JOB CARD V80-92925, WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. 374727 1 1 INSPECTION OF "CORROSION" IDENTIFIED IN ITEMS 1 AND 2 PAGE 1 WAS DETERMI 374727 1 2 NED BY LSOC SE TO BE SURFACE OXIDATION ONLY. DURING CLOSEOUT OF THE CAVI 374727 1 3 TIES PER V5K22.001 (FWD) AND V522.002 (AFT) THE CAVITIES WERE WIPED DOWN 374727 1 4 WITH IPA PER SEQ 02-007 WHICH REMOVED THE SURFACE OXIDATION. REFERENCE 374727 1 5 CLOSEOUT PHOTOS KSC-392C-1175.10 THRU 13 (FWD) AND KSC-392C-1177.10 THRU 374727 1 6 13 (AFT). PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE SURFACE OXIDATION IS ENVIRONMENTAL. CON 374727 1 7 CLUDE OXIDATION HAS BEEN REMOVED AND NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 374728 1 1 THIS PR WAS TAKEN AFTER THE ET UMBILICAL DOOR FWD AND AFT CENTERLINE LAT 374728 1 2 CHES WERE REMOVED FROM THE ORBITER (PER V5K02) IN ORDER TO GAIN ACCESS T 374728 1 3 O ASSIST IN REMOVAL OF STANDING WATER IN THE AFT COMPARTMENT. JOB CARD V 374728 1 4 31-15109 WAS PERFORMED TO INSPECT THE LATCHES AND IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWI 374728 1 5 NG ITEMS AGAINST THE FWD LATCH ASSEMBLY. ITEM DESCRIBES A 1/8 INCH SEPAR 374728 1 6 ATION BETWEEN "THE MOTRO COVER AND MOTOR HOUSING". THE NOTED SEPARATION 374728 1 7 ACTUALLY BETWEEN THE CAM HOUSING COVER AND ASSEMBLY HOUSING, NOT ASSOCIA 374728 1 8 TED WITH THE MOTOR HOUSING. THE SEPARATION IS A NORMAL RESULT OF PROPERL 374728 1 9 LY RIGGING THE STOW/LOCK LIMIT SWITCHES AND DOES NOT EXPOSE ANY 374728 1 10 ENVIROMENTALLY SEALED COMPARTMENTS. ITEM 2 IDENTIFIED SLIGHT SURFACE 374728 1 11 CORROSION ON THE INTERFACING SURFACES BETWEEN THE HOUSING ASSEMBLY AND 374728 1 12 THE ORBITER MOUNTING SURFACES. THESE AREAS WERE THROUGHLY CLEANED WITH 374728 1 13 IPA MOISTENEED WIPES PER V5K02 AND ALL VISABLE CORROSION WAS REMOVED. 374728 1 14 ITEM 3 WAS AGAINST DISCOLORATION OF THE LATCH BLADE AND SHAFT AND THE 374728 1 15 POCKET THE LATCH STOWS INTO ON THE HOUSING ASSEMBLY. THE DISCOLORATION 374728 1 16 IS DUE TO NORMAL EXPOSURE TO SWIRLING SRB EXHAUST AND ASCENT HEATING AND 374728 1 17 IS TYPICAL ON ALL VEHICLES. ALL LOOSE RESIDUE WAS REMOVED WITH IPA 374728 1 18 MOISTENED WIPES PER V5K02. THIS CONDITION IS CONSIDERED NORMAL. ITEM 4 374728 1 19 DOCUEMTNED A SUSPECT CONDITION OF WATER INTRUSION INTO THE LATCH MOTOR 374728 1 20 HOUSING. THIS WAS THE PRIMARY CONCERN DUE TO LACK OF PRIOR DATA. THE 374728 1 21 LATCH ASSEMBLY WAS SENT TO THE RI LOCAL SERVICE CENTER FOR DETAILED 374728 1 22 INPSECTION. CONTINUITY AND RESISTANCE CHECKS WERE SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED 374728 1 23 TO VERIFY ELECTRICAL INTEGRITY. THE ASSEMBLY WAS PARTIALLY DISASSEMBLED 374728 1 24 TO INSPECT INTERNAL COMPONENTS AND NO SIGNS OF WATER INTRUSION WERE 374728 1 25 IDENTIFIED. THE DRIVE PORTION WAS REMOVED AND DISASSEMBLED BY THE 374728 1 26 HOOVER/TELEFLEX (VENDOR) REPRESENTATIVE AND ALSO FOUND TO BE FREE OF ANY 374728 1 27 SIGNS OF WATER AND A COMPLETE ACCEPTANCE TEST WAS SUCCESSFULLY 374728 1 28 PERFORMED. THE ACTUATOR WAS RETURNED TO KSC READY FOR INSTALLATION. LRU 374728 1 29 OMI V5K02 REINSTALLED THE ASSEMBLY AND WILL PERFORM APPLICABLE RETEST 374728 1 30 FOR LRU REPLACEMENT. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE ET 374728 1 31 UMBILICAL DOOR FWD CENTERLINE LATCH ASSEMBLY. PROBABLE CAUSE: 374728 1 32 ENVIROMENTAL CONTAMINATION. 374731 1 1 THIS PR WAS TAKEN AFTER THE ET UMBILICAL DOOR FWD AND AFT CENTERLINE LAT 374731 1 2 CHES WERE REMOVED FROM THE ORBITER (PER V5K02) IN ORDER TO GAIN ACCESS T 374731 1 3 O ASSIST IN REMOVAL OF STANDING WATER IN THE AFT COMPARTMENT. JOB CARD V 374731 1 4 31-15109 WAS PERFORMED TO INSPECT THE LATCHES AND IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWI 374731 1 5 NG ITEMS AGAINST THE AFT LATCH ASSEMBLY. ITEM DOCUMENTED A SUSPECT CONDI 374731 1 6 TION OF WATER INTRUSION INTO THE LATCH MOTOR HOUSING. THIS WAS THE PRIMA 374731 1 7 RY CONCERN DUE TO LACK OF PRIOR DATA. THE LATCH ASSEMBLY WAS SENT TO THE 374731 1 8 RI LOCAL SERVICE CENTER FOR DETAILED INPECTION. CONTINUITY AND RESISTAN 374731 1 9 CE CHECKS WERE SUCCESSFULLY PER FORMED TO VERIFY ELECTRICAL INTEGRITY. 374731 1 10 THE ASSEMBLY WAS PARTIALLY DISASSEMBLED TO INSPECT INTERNAL COMPONENTS 374731 1 11 AND NO SIGNS OF WATER INTRUSION WERE IDENTIFIED. THE DRIVE PORTION WAS 374731 1 12 REMOVED AND DISASSEMBLED BY THE HOOVER/TELEFLEX (VENDOR) REPRESENTATIVE 374731 1 13 AND ALSO FOUND TO BE FREE OF ANY SIGNS OF WATER INTRUSION. THE ACTUATOR 374731 1 14 WAS THEN REASSEMBLED AND A COMPLETE ACCEPTANCE TEST WAS SUCESSFULLY 374731 1 15 PERFORMED. THE ACTUATOR WAS RETURNED TO KSC READY FOR INSTALLATION. LRU 374731 1 16 OMI V5K02 RESINTALLED THE ASSEMBLY AND WILL PERFORM APPLICABLE RETEST 374731 1 17 FOR LRU REPLACMENT. ITEM 2 IDENTIFIED SLIGHT SURFACE CORROSION ON THE 374731 1 18 INTERFACING SURFACES BETWEEN THE HOUSING ASSEMBLY AND THE ORBITER 374731 1 19 MOUNTING SURFACES. THESE AREAS WERE THOROUGHLY CLEANED WITH IPA 374731 1 20 MOISTENED WIPES PER V5K02 AND ALL VISABLE CORROSION WAS REMOVED. ITEM 3 374731 1 21 WAS AGAINST DISCOLORATION OF THE LATCH BLADE AND SHAFT AND THE POCKET 374731 1 22 THE LATCH STOWS INTO ON THE HOUSING ASSEMBLY. THE DISCOLORATION IS DUE 374731 1 23 TO NORMAL EXPOSURE TO SWIRLING SRB EXHAUST AND ASCENT HEATING AND IS 374731 1 24 TYPICAL ON ALL VEHICLES. ALL LOOSE RESIDUE WAS REMOVED WITH IPA 374731 1 25 MOISTENED WIPES PER V5K02. THIS CONDITION IS CONDISIDERED NORMAL. NO 374731 1 26 FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE ET UMBILICAL DOOR AFT CENTERLINE 374731 1 27 LATCH ASSEMBLY. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION. 374761 1 1 DUE TO A PREVIOUS UNRESTRICTED MR REPAIR, THE V070-293000-027 CARRIER PA 374761 1 2 NEL WAS INSTALLED WITH A MD128-0003-0410 JO-BOLT. IN ORDER TO REMOVE THE 374761 1 3 CARRIER PANEL, THE JO-BOLT HEAD WAS REMOVED AND THE TAIL AND SHANK OF T 374761 1 4 HE FASTENER WERE TAPPED INTO THE RSB/VT. THIS CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED FOR 374761 1 5 UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS PROCEDURAL ERROR. MR JO 374761 1 6 -BOLT INSTL SPECIFIED ON V80-97700. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTIO 374761 1 7 N REQUIRED. 374831 1 1 IT WAS FOUND OUT THAT ONLY BULB SEAL END RING (V070-198704-010) NEEDED T 374831 1 2 O BE REPLACED, AND NOT ENTIRE BULB SEAL (V070-198702-024). NEW BULB SEAL 374831 1 3 END RING WAS ORDERED AND WILL BE INSTALLED PER JOB CARD V80-96010. PROB 374831 1 4 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 374832 1 1 THE NOTED CORROSION WAS EASILY WIPED FROM THE LEFT ET DOOR DRIVE SHAFT U 374832 1 2 SING IPA AND TEXWIPES. THE CONTAMINATION APPEARED TO BE FROM WATER WHICH 374832 1 3 HAD DRIPPED ONTO THE SHAFT AND OXIDIZED ON THE SURFACE. NO ABRASIVE REM 374832 1 4 OVAL WAS NECESSARY AND NO TRACE OF OXIDATION REMAINED AFTER WIPING. DENT 374832 1 5 AL MOLD IMPRESSIONS CONFIRMED THERE WAS NO SURFACE DAMAGE. NO FURTHER DI 374832 1 6 SCREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE LH ET DOOR DRIVE SHAFT. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIR 374832 1 7 ONMENTAL CONTAMINATION. 374933 1 1 THE CRACKED TRAILING EDGE SEAL IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED 374933 1 2 BY GRINDING OUT THE CRACKED (DAMAGED) AREA. THE GROUND SEAL WAS MR ACCE 374933 1 3 PTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS REWORKED. FINAL INSPECTION AFTER GRINDING B 374933 1 4 Y 10X MAGNIFICATION DETERMINED THAT THE CRACK HAD BEEN REMOVED. PROBABLE 374933 1 5 CAUSE FOR THE CRACK IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. CONCLUDE NO FURTHER ACT 374933 1 6 ION IS REQUIRED. 374935 1 1 THE GOUGES ID'D IN ITEMS 1 & 2, PG 1 AND THE INCORRECT COTTER PIN INSTAL 374935 1 2 LATIONS ID'D IN ITEM 3, PG 1A WERE RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE COTTER PINS, 374935 1 3 REINSTALLING THEM PER THE SPEC AND SANDING SMOOTH THE .001" DEEP SCRATC 374935 1 4 HES IN THE ADJACENT STRUCTURE. THE SMOOTHED SCRATCHES WERE MR ACCEPTED F 374935 1 5 OR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEMS 4,5,6,7 & 8 WERE TRANSFERRED TO DR'S STR-3-15 374935 1 6 -0584, 0583, 0587, AND HYD-3-15-0040 RESPECTIVELY. PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITE 374935 1 7 MS 1,2,3 WAS THAT THE COTTER PINS WERE INSTALLED PER THE PREFERRED METHO 374935 1 8 D OF THE SPEC RATHER THAN THE ALTERNATE METHOD. CONCLUDE THAT THE ELEVON 374935 1 9 FLIPPER DOOR BELLCRANKS AND PUSH RODS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO PRING 374935 1 10 REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 374937 1 1 DURING V30-14225, POST-FLIGHT INSPECTION, AND AREA OF DISCOLORATION WAS 374937 1 2 FOUND ON THE UNDERSIDE OF L/H FLIPPER DOOR NO.15. THE DISCOLORATION FOUN 374937 1 3 D IS NOT INDICATIVE OF EXCESSIVE HEATING OF METALLIC SUBSTRATE AND IS AC 374937 1 4 TUALLY DISCOLORATION OF SURFACE DEPOSITS WHICH HAVE ACCUMULATED ON THE D 374937 1 5 OOR. PANEL. SURFACE CONTAMINANTS WERE REMOVED WITH IPA. PROBABLE CAUSE F 374937 1 6 OR THIS DISCREPANCY-WORKMANSHIP (INSUFFICIENT CLEANING). NO FURTHER SHOP 374937 1 7 OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 374954 1 1 TWO DISCREPANT NUT PLATES IDENTIFIED ON PAGE ONE IN BLOCK #17 WERE CLEAN 374954 1 2 ED TO REMOVE LOOSE MATERIAL AND HAD THREE COATS OF KORPON APPLIED FOR EX 374954 1 3 TRA PROTECTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. WORK IS COMPLET 374954 1 4 E WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. 374955 1 1 THE GOUGES IN BHE BELL CRANKS WERE CAUSED BY IMPROPERLY INSTALLED COTTER 374955 1 2 PINS. THE COTTER PINS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PROPERLY AND THE GOUGES 374955 1 3 WERE MEASURED WITH MOLD IMPRESSIONS. BASED ON THE MOLD IMPRESSION DATA 374955 1 4 THE BELL CRANKS WERE TOUCHED UP AND MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED U 374955 1 5 SE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - WORKMANSHIP. 374956 1 1 DURING V30-14202, DISCOLORATION WAS FOUND AT THE YW 387 HING ON THE RHOB 374956 1 2 ELEVON. THE DISCOLORATION IS ATTRIBUTED TO RTV OUTGASSING, A COMMON OCC 374956 1 3 URRENCE DURING FLIGHT. THE DISCOLORED SURFACE WAS CLEANED WITH AN ATTEMP 374956 1 4 T TO REMOVE RTV RESIDUE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OUTGASSING OF RTV 374956 1 5 DURING FLIGHT. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 375096 1 1 DURING V31-13118, IT WAS NOTED THAT WIRE SEGMENT #T1054A26 WAS DAMAGED A 375096 1 2 ND HAD BARE CONDUCTOR EXPOSED. A REQUEST FOR UNRESTRICTED MR USE OF A CL 375096 1 3 AMSHELL REPAIR WAS APPROVED TO HEAT SHRINK INSULATION OVER THE DAMAGED A 375096 1 4 REA. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE DU 375096 1 5 E TO NORMAL PROCESSING. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED PER THIS PR. 375122 1 1 ADHESIVE WAS APPLIED TO THE GOUGE TO SEAL THE FIBERGLASS PREVENTING THE 375122 1 2 FIBERS FROM GETTING INTO THE AIR. THE PANEL WAS TOUCHED UP PER PRINT AND 375122 1 3 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR 375122 1 4 . PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 375124 1 1 THE CRACK WAS PATCHED ON THE BACK OF THE PANEL WITH A FIBERGLASS PATCH. 375124 1 2 THE FRONT WAS SEALED WITH ADHESIVE TO PREVENT FIBERS FROM GETTING INTO T 375124 1 3 HE AIR AND THEN TOUCHED UP. THE DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRI 375124 1 4 CTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMAN 375124 1 5 SHIP. 375130 1 1 DURING TPS-3-15-226, WIRE CONNECTING PARALLEL SPLICE 1E TO 50P503 WAS FO 375130 1 2 UND BROKE. WIRE REPLACEMENT WILL BE PERFORMED PER OEL-3-15-046 STEPS 2-4 375130 1 3 0 THRU 2-46. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORM 375130 1 4 AL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 375132 1 1 DURING V31-13118, WIRE 3T7B20-2 (PIN C) OF CONNECTOR 82P81 WAS FOUND WIT 375132 1 2 H INSULATION DAMAGE EXPOSING THE CONDUCTOR. SRP V-EL-0002-B (SINGLE COND 375132 1 3 UCTOR, UNSHIELDED WIRE REPAIR) WAS USED TO INSTALL KSC SPLICE 495 TO REP 375132 1 4 AIR THE DAMAGED WIRE. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER THIS WAD. TH 375132 1 5 E MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS DISRESPECT TO THE ORBITER'S INTEGRIT 375132 1 6 Y. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED PER THIS PR. 375266 1 1 DURING V30-14225, DISCOLORATION WAS FOUND AT THE YW212 HINGE ON THE LHIB 375266 1 2 ELEVON. THE DISCOLORATION IS ATTRIBUTED TO RTV OUTGASSING, A COMMON OCC 375266 1 3 URRENCE DURING FLIGHT. THE DISCOLORED SURFACE WAS CLEANED WITH IN AN ATT 375266 1 4 EMPT TO REMOVED RTV RESIDUE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OUTGASSING OF 375266 1 5 RTV DURING FLIGHT. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. QC N 375266 1 6 OTE: RED TAG REMOVED. 375277 1 1 TWO NUT PLATES ON SEAL RETAINER V070-198070-006 AND ONE NUT PLATE ON V07 375277 1 2 0-198070-008 WERE CLEANED TO REMOVE LOOSE MATERIAL AND HAD THREE COATS O 375277 1 3 F CORPON APPLIED FOR EXTRA PROTECTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRA 375277 1 4 DATION ALL WORK IS COMPLETE WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED AT THIS TIME. 375278 1 1 BOTH THE INBOARD AND OUTBOARD DRAIN HOLES OF FLIPPER DOOR #8 IN THE RIGH 375278 1 2 T WING WERE OBSERVED TO HAVE BEEN COVERED BY STIFFENERS DURING A WING SP 375278 1 3 AR REWORK (REF DWG B91B15010). MR APPROVAL WAS REQUESTED AND GRANTED TO 375278 1 4 ACCEPT THE COVERED DRAIN HOLES "AS IS" FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BASED ON SUF 375278 1 5 FICIENT NUMBER OF OTHER INSTALLED DRAIN HOLES IN THE RIGHT WING. BOTH HO 375278 1 6 LES HAVE BEEM MR ID'D; A PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. NO RETEST REQUIR 375278 1 7 ED. PROBALBE CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILDUP. CONCLUDE NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGIN 375278 1 8 EERING ACTION REQUIRED. 375278 1 9 EERING ACTION REQUIRED. 375280 1 1 SLIGHT DISCOLORATION WAS FOUND ON THE ELEVON HINGE AT LOCATIONS YW212 AN 375280 1 2 D YW282. THE DISCOLORATION WAS THE RESULTS FROM OUT GASSING IN THE REGIO 375280 1 3 N, A COMMON OCCURRENCE DURING FLIGHT. RESIDUAL SURFACE CONTAMINATION HAS 375280 1 4 BEEN REMOVED. THE DISCOLORATION PRESENT WAS NOT INDICATIVE OF SUBSTRATE 375280 1 5 OVERTEMP AND HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: FL 375280 1 6 IGHT DAMAGE. WORK IS COMPLETE WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. 375281 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A TORN V070-198863-005 WIPER SEAL. THE TFE FACING WAS 375281 1 2 DEBONDED FROM THE INCONEL CLIP. PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION, THE SEA 375281 1 3 L WAS REPAIRED BY BONDING THE TFE FACING TO THE INCONEL CLIP WITH MBO130 375281 1 4 -085 ADHESIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRAD 375281 1 5 ATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OF ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 375283 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED TO DOCUMENT THAT WIRE 3K592B26 WAS BROKEN. PREVIOU 375283 1 2 S DISPO REMOVED AND REPLACED THE DISCREPANT SHIELD JUMPER WIRE. THE JUMP 375283 1 3 ER WIRE'S GROUND LUG WAS RETESTED SUCCESSFULLY BY VERIFYING CONTINUITY B 375283 1 4 ETWEEN 82P412 GROUND LUG TO STRUCTURE GROUND. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUI 375283 1 5 RED BY THIS PR. RETEST OF THE REMOVED CONTACTS WILL BE RETESTED VIA SCAN 375283 1 6 RETEST. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS DISRESPECT FOR ORBITER INTEGR 375283 1 7 ITY. 375301 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING JC V31-15109, ZONEL DETAIL INSPECTION-AFT F 375301 1 2 USELAGE LOWER DECK, WHEN THE V070-565166-002 FWD LH ET DOOR LATCH ROLLER 375301 1 3 ASSEMBLY WAS OBSERVED TO HAVE A DISCERPANT V070-565161-001 BOLT INSTALL 375301 1 4 TION. THE FWD ROLLER ASSY'S V070-565164-002 FITTING HAD WHAT APPEARED TO 375301 1 5 BE A CIRCULAR AREA MACHINED OUT OF THE CENTER PORTION OF ITS RAISED FLA 375301 1 6 T WHICH ALLOWED THE V070-565161-001 BOLT HEAD TO ROTATE. THE RAISED RIDG 375301 1 7 E AREA SHOULD BE INTACT SO THAT IT S SURFACE WILL ENGAGE THE FLAT PORTIO 375301 1 8 N OF THE BOLT HEAD TO PREVENT BOLT'S ROTATION WHILE TORQING THE MD114-10 375301 1 9 02-0003 NUT ON TO THE BOLT. PICTURES OF THE DISCREPANT CONDITION ON THE 375301 1 10 FWD ROLLER AS WELL AS THE PER PRINT CONDITION OF THE V070-565167-002 375301 1 11 INBD ROLLER ASSY WERE FORWARDED WITH THIS PR FOR REFERENCE. MR APPROVAL 375301 1 12 WAS REQUESTED AND GRANTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE FWD ROLLER ASSY AS 375301 1 13 IS. THE FORWARD ROLLER HAS BEEN MR ID'D. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE 375301 1 14 CAUSE: PREVIOUSLY MR'D; MR ID WORN/UNREADABLE OR UNAUTHORIZED 375301 1 15 MODIFICATION. 375339 1 1 THE NOTED CONDITION IS NOT A DISCREPANCY PER V35-50002 INSPECTION CRITER 375339 1 2 IA. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANC 375339 1 3 Y. 375340 1 1 THE SHELL HAD CHIPS IN THE KHARLON SURFACE AND TWO RIVETS HAD BECOME LOO 375340 1 2 SE. A CRACK HAD DEVELOPED IN THE GROUNDING CLIP MATERIAL. AN LRU PR WAS 375340 1 3 INITIATED TO ROUTE THE SALAD BOWL FOR REWORK AT THE HDA. A NEW SHELL WAS 375340 1 4 PROCURED AND WILL BE INSTALLED PER PRINT DURING NORMAL FLOW OPERATIONS. 375340 1 5 NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGR 375340 1 6 ADATION. 375341 1 1 THE BENT STIFFENER WAS STRENGTHENED USING A DOUBLER ON EACH SIDE. THE GA 375341 1 2 PS UNDER THE DOUBLERS WERE FILLED AND THE DOUBLERS WERE BONDED WITH MB01 375341 1 3 20-008 ADHESIVE. THE DOUBLERS WERE ALSO MECHANICALLY FASTENED WITH RIVET 375341 1 4 S. THE BOND FAILED SO A PAGE 1A AND 1B WERE TAKEN. THE SAME PROCEDURE WA 375341 1 5 S REPEATED USING A THICKER DOUBLER AND JO-BOLT INSTEAD OF RIVETS. NO FUR 375341 1 6 THER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 375428 1 1 DURING V34-00018, THE 70B2010-4 STABILIZER STRUT IN BAY 7 L/H SIDE WAS F 375428 1 2 OUND TO BE DENTED. THE DISCREPANT STRUT WAS REMOVED AND MR REPAIRED AT N 375428 1 3 SLD. THE STRUT WAS INSTALLED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FO 375428 1 4 R THIS DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION 375428 1 5 REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 375688 1 1 ANTENNA MATING SURFACE WAS INITIALLY FOUND TO HAVE A PRIMER COATING, WHI 375688 1 2 CH IS NOT PER PRINT. SURFACE HAS HAD PRMIER REMOVED AND TREATED WITH CHE 375688 1 3 M FILM PER DRAWING V070-320128, BRINGING SURFACE BACK TO PRINT. PROBABLE 375688 1 4 CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. PRIMER HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM SURFACE AND CHEM FILM 375688 1 5 ADDED PER MAO608-301. WORK IS COMPLETE WITH NO FURTHER NEEDED. 375779 1 1 DURING V30-14341, 23 HOLES WERE FOUND TO HAVE THREAD MARKS ON THEIR INNE 375779 1 2 R SURFACES. 8 ADDITIONAL HOLES WERE FOUND AFTER SUBSEQUENT REMOVAL OF AD 375779 1 3 DITIONAL PANELS. THE THREAD MARKS ARE SUPERFICIAL IN NATURE AND RESULT F 375779 1 4 ROM THE TIGHT TOLERANCE OF THE HOLES. THE HOLES WERE CLEANED WITH BEHR-T 375779 1 5 EX AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCRE 375779 1 6 PANCIES IS WORKMANSHIP-THREADING OR BOLTS THROUGH STRUCTURE INTO NUTPLAT 375779 1 7 ES. (REF ITEM 3 ON PG 1A) THE DISCREPANT BOND SCREEN WAS MR ACCEPTED AS 375779 1 8 IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEG 375779 1 9 RADATION. REF ITEM 4 ON PG 1B) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTED DAMAGED RTV 375779 1 10 (PEELING/FLAKING) AROUND THE BOLT HOLES. THE DISCREPANT AREAS WERE 375779 1 11 TOUCHED UP USING MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. 375779 1 12 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP 375779 1 13 OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 375843 1 1 THE ITEM 2 DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY INSTALLATION A NEW HI-LOK COLLAR 375843 1 2 OVER THE OLD HI-LOK SCREW. THE ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY WAS INCORRECTLY REPOR 375843 1 3 TED. ACTUALLY RIVETS WERE INSTALLED INSTEAD OF HI-LOKS. THESE WERE MR AC 375843 1 4 CEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE THIS PR. 375889 1 1 ITEM 1: THE SUPPORT WAS TRIMMED TO ALLOW IT TO BE LOCATED PER PRINT. PRO 375889 1 2 BLEM DUE TO TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. ITEM 2: THE SUPPORT WAS OVER-TRIMMED BY 375889 1 3 .02". IT WAS MR ACCEPTED IN THIS CONDITION. PROBLEM DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. 375960 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT YELLOWING OF WHITE TITANIUM OXIDE PANI 375960 1 2 T ON MID-BODY LH WIRE TRAY COVERS. THIS CONDITION HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED ON 375960 1 3 PR TCSS-3-A0037 AND HAS BEEN CORRECTED BY RE-APPLICATION OF COATING ON 375960 1 4 PANELS. THIS PR HAS VERIFIED THAT THE PANELS IN QUESTION HAVE BEEN REPAI 375960 1 5 NTED PER TCS-3-A0037 AND THE PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXIST. NO RETEST REQ 375960 1 6 UIRED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION IS EMVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATIO 375960 1 7 N DUE TO ON-ORBIT EXPOSURE. 375986 1 1 DURING POST REMOVAL INSPECTION "RUST" WAS FOUND TO BE PRESENT ON FOUR CR 375986 1 2 ES HI-LOKS ON THE V070-199205-001 SPAR FITTING. BASED ON THE APPEARANE O 375986 1 3 F THE "RUST" (NO INDICATION OF PITTING) AND THE PHYSICAL COMPOSITION OF 375986 1 4 CRES (DESIGNED FOR CORROSION RESISTANCE) THE "RUST" FOUND IS MERELY SUPE 375986 1 5 RFICIAL SURFACE OXIDATION AND DOES NOT REPRESENT A DISCREPANT CONDITION. 375986 1 6 NO ACTIVE CORROSION OR PITTING OF SUBSTRATE. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION 376004 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1,2,3, AND 4 ON PAGE 1). DURING POST REMOVAL INSPECTION, "RUS 376004 1 2 T" WAS FOUND TO BE PRESENT ON THE CRES FASTENERS ATTACHING THE SPANNER B 376004 1 3 EAMS ON THE V070-199805-030 RCC PANEL, BASED ON THE APPEARANCE OF THE "R 376004 1 4 UST" (NO INDICATION OF PITTING_ AND THE PHYSICAL COMPOSITION OF CRES (DE 376004 1 5 SIGNED FOR CORROSION RESISTANCE) THE "RUST" FOUND IS MERELY SUPERFICIAL 376004 1 6 SURFACE OXIDATION AND DOES NOT REPRESENT A DISCREPANT CONDITION. THIS IS 376004 1 7 NOT A PR CONDITION. 376005 1 1 DISCREPANT SHELF WAS FOUND TO HAVE A SLIGHT AMOUNT OF NONREMOVABLE DISCO 376005 1 2 LORATION DUE TO SOME PREVIOUS CHEM FILMING. THE GOLD COLORED TINT OF ALO 376005 1 3 DINE, WHICH IS THE CHEMICAL USED IN CHEM FILMING, IS NORMAL. THIS GOLD C 376005 1 4 OLORED DISCOLORATION DOES NOT PRESENT ANY PROBLEMS TO THE FORM FIT OR FU 376005 1 5 NCTION OF SHELF. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 376026 1 1 THE V070-340375-009 GAP FILLERS BECAME DISCOLORED DUE TO SOLAR EXPOSURE. 376026 1 2 THEY WERE REMOVED PER THIS PR AND SENT TO LES FOR REWORK IN CONJUNCTION 376026 1 3 WITH PR TCS-3-A0037. THEY WILL BE REINSTALLED PER OMI V5K20 ACCORDING T 376026 1 4 O NORMAL FLOW OPERATIONS. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABL 376026 1 5 E CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 376029 1 1 DURING PANEL REMOVAL, CRACK WERE FOUND ON THE V070-337428-003 PANEL. THE 376029 1 2 CRACKS AROUND THE HOLES IN THE V070-337428-003 PANEL DO NOT PENETRATE A 376029 1 3 LL PLIES OF THE FIBERGLASS FABRIC. THERE ARE NO EXPOSED FIBERS. THERE IS 376029 1 4 NO EVIDENCE OF THE CRACKS ON THE EXTERIOR OF THE PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE 376029 1 5 FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGI 376029 1 6 NEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 376159 1 1 MINOR CORROSION ON THE PLBD AFT BULKHEAD ROLLERS WAS PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENT 376159 1 2 ED AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER PR MEQ-3-09-0418. NO MR ID W 376159 1 3 AS APPLIED AT THAT TIME DUE TO THE DRY LUBRICANT COATING ON THE ROLLERS. 376159 1 4 AFTER THE CORROSION WAS IDENTIFIED PER THIS PR, THE ROLLERS WERE WIPED 376159 1 5 OF ANY FREE OXIDATION AND INSPECTED. PAGE 1A, ITEM 2 IDENTIFIED SLIGHT P 376159 1 6 ITTING ON 6 OF THE 8 ROLLERS BUT WHEN DENTAL MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN 376159 1 7 , THE DEPTH OF THE PITTING WAS UNMEASURABLE. THIS CONDITION FALLS UNDER 376159 1 8 THE EXISTING MR AND WILL NOT BE READDRESSED AT THIS TIME. NO OTHER SURFA 376159 1 9 CE DAMAGE EXISTS. ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1A IDENTIFIED .003 - .008" AXIAL END 376159 1 10 PLAY IN THE SAME 6 ROLLERS. THIS END PLAY IS NORMAL AND RESULTS FROM 376159 1 11 DESIGNED TOLERANCES BETWEEN MOVING PARTS. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST 376159 1 12 WITH THE AFT BULKHEAD ROLLERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 376179 1 1 SHEET 1 OF EO B06 TO DRAWING V070-855397 CALLS OUT EO B05 WHICH GIVES RE 376179 1 2 QUIRED DIMENSION. NO PROBLEM EXISTS. 376216 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) DURING V30-14417, WHITE POWDER WAS FOUND INSIDE TH 376216 1 2 E R/H INBOARD ELEVON. SAMPLES OF THE CONTAMINANTS WERE OBTAINED AND ROUT 376216 1 3 ED TO THE NASA MAB LAB FOR ANALYSIS OF MATERIALS PRESENT. THE ANALYSIS S 376216 1 4 HOWED THE CONTAMINATION WAS COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF RESIDUE (DUST, PAINT, 376216 1 5 AND OTHER PARTICULATE MATTER) NORMALLY FOUND IN THE ELEVON COVE AREA. EX 376216 1 6 CESSIVE AMOUNTS WERE FOUND IN THIS AREA BECAUSE THE INTERNAL SURFACES OF 376216 1 7 THE ELEVONS ARE NOT ACCESSIBLE FOR CLEANING. AN INSPECTION WAS PERFORME 376216 1 8 D TO DETERMINE IF CORROSION WAS PRESENT. NO CORROSION WAS DETECTED. CONC 376216 1 9 LUDE THAT THE CONTAMINATION FOUND IN THE R/H INBOARD ELEVON IS NOT THE 376216 1 10 RESULT OF ACTIVE CORROSION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS ENVIRONMENTAL. 376216 1 11 NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 376551 1 1 THE WIRE T1245A26 DAMAGE DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY CUTTING OUT DAMAGE 376551 1 2 D WIRE, AND SPLICING IN A NEW LENGTH OF WIRE AND JR24 WIRE MR CONCURRENC 376551 1 3 E. THE REPAIR RETURNS THE WIRE HARNESS TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON-DESIGN C 376551 1 4 ONFIGURATION. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF MEASUREMENT V63T1873A, FES H20 FEED 376551 1 5 LINE TEMP 2R, WAS PERFORMED BY ECLSS ENGINEERING VIA SNAPSHOT HARDCOPY O 376551 1 6 N 23 JUNE 92. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON PR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCRE 376551 1 7 PANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. 376561 1 1 THE CRACK AROUND THE HOLE WAS RESTRICTED TO THE BACK PLIES ONLY. THE DIS 376561 1 2 CREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. P 376561 1 3 ROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 376562 1 1 THE GOUGE IN THE 70A2193-3 FRAME CAP (ITEM 1, PG 1) WAS BLENDED SMOOTH T 376562 1 2 O REMOVE STRESS CONCENTRATORS AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE 376562 1 3 GOUGE PROBABLY OCCURRED DURING REMOVAL OF KEEL BEAM (I.E. WORKMANSHIP). 376562 1 4 CONCLUDED THE FRAME CAP HAS BEEN REWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND 376562 1 5 NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. QC NOTE: RED TAG REMOVED. 376571 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN AGAINST RUB MARKS ON THE LH PLBD ACTUATOR LOCATED IN 376571 1 2 BAY 7 AT XO 966. THE MARKS WERE FOUND NEAR THE ACTUATOR STOP BUT NO GOU 376571 1 3 GING OR DISPLACED METAL EXISTS. NO SIGNS OF DEBRIS OR INTERFERENCE WERE 376571 1 4 FOUND IN THE AREA OF THE ACTUATOR. THE PAINT WAS TOUCHED UP PER SPEC AND 376571 1 5 THE DOOR WAS CYCLED THROUGH ITS COMPLETE MOTION PATH WITH NO SIGN OF RU 376571 1 6 BBING. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: DAMAGE DURING GROU 376571 1 7 ND PROCESSING. 376598 1 1 WHITE DISCOLORATION WAS FOUND ON HI-LOKS LOCATED IN THE XO1307 AFT HOIST 376598 1 2 SUPPORT FITTING ZO409. SAMPLES OF THE WHITE DISCOLORATION WERE OBTAINED 376598 1 3 AND SENT TO THE NASA LAB AT THE O&C BUILDING FOR ANALYSIS. HI-LOKS THEN 376598 1 4 WERE CLEANED USING BHERTEX AND IPA, AND INSPECTED FOR PITTING. WITH NO 376598 1 5 EVIDENCE OF PITTING, HI-LOKS WERE THEN TOUCHED UP WITH KORPON PER MA0608 376598 1 6 -301. ALL WORK IS COMPLETE WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE 376598 1 7 : OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 376600 1 1 WHITE DISCOLORATION WAS FOUND ON HI-LOKS LOCATED IN THE XO1307 AFT HOISE 376600 1 2 SUPPORT FITTING ZO409. SAMPLES OF THE WHITE DISCOLORATION WERE OBTAINED 376600 1 3 AND SENT TO THE NASA LAB FOR ANALYSIS. HI-LOKS WERE THEN CLEANED USING 376600 1 4 BHERTEX AND IPA, AND INSPECTED FOR PITTING. WITH NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING, 376600 1 5 HI-LOKS WERE THEN TOUCHED UP WITH KORPON PER MA0608-301. ALL WORK IS CO 376600 1 6 MPLETE WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRAD 376600 1 7 ATION. 376628 1 1 SIDE PLAY EXISTED IN THE V070-335178-001 AND V070-335178-002 STRUT INSTA 376628 1 2 LLATIONS. THIS WAS SOLVED BY AN EO TO DRAWING V070-333701 WHICH CHANGED 376628 1 3 THE STRUT ATTACH HARDWARE. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: V 376628 1 4 ENDOR. 376665 1 1 THE CRACK IN THE V070-326479-001 BEAM WAS CAUSED BY A PRELOAD APPLIED TO 376665 1 2 THE BEAM DURING INITIAL INSTALLATION. THE CRACK WAS STOP DRILLED AT ITS 376665 1 3 VISUAL END, WITH MRB APPROVAL, AND THEN THE AREA BEYOND THE END OF THE 376665 1 4 CRACK WAS INSPECTED WITH DYE PENETRANT. THE CRACK WAS DRILLED FIRST TO A 376665 1 5 VOID GETTING ETCHANT INTO THE CRACK. THE DYE PEN INSPECTION REVEALED THA 376665 1 6 T THE CRACK EXTENDED BEYOND THE ORIGINAL STOP DRILL. THE ACTUAL END OF T 376665 1 7 HE CRACK WAS STOP DRILLED AND THE AREA BETWEEN THE DRILLED HOLES WAS REM 376665 1 8 OVED, WITH MRB APPROVAL, TO PREVENT CORROSION FROM THE ACID ETCH. A PAGE 376665 1 9 1A WAS PICKED UP ON THE ELONGATED RIVET HOLES FOR THE WAVE GUIDE SUPPORT 376665 1 10 . THESE WERE ACCEPTED WITH MRB APPROVAL. THE BEAM WAS REINSTALLED 376665 1 11 WITH SHIMS TO RELIEVE THE PRELOAD AND NEW ENGINEERING WAS RELEASED TO 376665 1 12 V070-326216 TO REFLECT THIS INSTALLATION. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON 376665 1 13 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - DESIGN DEFFICIENCY. 376667 1 1 THE CRACK IN THE V070-326479-002 BEAM WAS CAUSED BY A PRELOAD APPLIED TO 376667 1 2 THE BEAM DURING INITIAL INSTALLATION. THE CRACK WAS STOP DRILLED AT ITS 376667 1 3 VISUAL END, AND THEN THE AREA BEYOND THE END OF THE CRACK WAS INSPECTED 376667 1 4 WITH DYE PENETRANT. THE CRACK WAS DRILLED FIRST TO AVOID GETTING ETCHAN 376667 1 5 T INTO THE CRACK. THE DYE PEN INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE CRACK DID NOT 376667 1 6 EXTEND BEYOND THE ORIGINAL STOP DRILL. THE BEAM WAS REINSTALLED WITH SH 376667 1 7 IMS TO RELIEVE THE PRELOAD AND NEW ENGINEERING (EO) WAS RELEASED TO V070 376667 1 8 -326216 TO REFLECT THIS INSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 376712 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: THE CRACK ON THE V070-335084-001 FIBERGLASS CLOSEOUT PANE 376712 1 2 L WAS REPAIRED WITH FIBERGLASS PATCHES AND MB0120-037 EPOXY ADHESIVE. IT 376712 1 3 EM 2 PAGE 1A: IT WAS FOUND THAT RECOUNTER BORING DOES NOT AFFECT STRUCTU 376712 1 4 RAL INTEGRITY, AND IS PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK IS NECESSARY ON THIS IT 376712 1 5 EM. ITEM 3 PAGE 1B: ANOTHER CRACK WAS FOUND ON PANEL, CAUSED BY DELAMINA 376712 1 6 TING FIBERGLASS. THE REPAIR WAS TO INJECT MB0120-037, TYPE 2 ADHESIVE IN 376712 1 7 TO DELAMINATION. THE PRECEDING WORK WAS TO RESTORE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGR 376712 1 8 ITY OF THE PANEL. ALL WORK IS COMPLETE, WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. 376712 1 9 ITY OF THE PANEL. ALL WORK IS COMPLETE, WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. 376729 1 1 ITEM 2 DAMAGE WAS IN KOROPON ONLY AND WAS TOUCHED UP PER SPEC. ITEM 1 ON 376729 1 2 LY ONE BORON FIBER WAS BROKEN AND DISPLACED. STRUT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR U 376729 1 3 NRESTRICTED USE AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 1 - OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION, 376729 1 4 ITEM 2 - VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. 376905 1 1 THE SUPPORT WAS INSTALLED WITH A MR SHIM ON ITS INBOARD SIDE. THIS SHIMM 376905 1 2 ED IT AWAY FROM THE INTERFERING RIVETS. PROBLEM CAUSED BY TOLERANCE BUIL 376905 1 3 D UP. 376912 1 1 THE FWD MD114-5003-0005 NUTPLATES ON THE V070-199220 FITTING WERE FOUND 376912 1 2 TO HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND 376912 1 3 REPLACED. DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT HARDWARE, ME121-0014-03XX BL 376912 1 4 IND RIVETS WERE USED IN PLACE OF PER PRINT NAS1199-3 RIVETS. THE USE OF 376912 1 5 BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR TH 376912 1 6 ESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1): TH 376912 1 7 E LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199220 FITTING WAS ROUND 376912 1 8 TO HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACE 376912 1 9 D. DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT HARDWARE, MD121-0005-04XX BLIND 376912 1 10 RIVETS WERE USED IN PLACE OF PER PRINT NAS1199-4 RIVETS. THE USE OF 376912 1 11 BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 376912 1 12 THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR 376912 1 13 ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 376913 1 1 THE UPPER FWD INBOARD AND OUTBOARD MD114-5003-0005 NUTPLATES ON THE V070 376913 1 2 -199212 FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTPLATE WERE 376913 1 3 REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT HARDWARE, ME121- 376913 1 4 0014-03XX BLIND RIVETS WERE USED IN PLACE OF PER PRINT NAS1199-3 RIVETS. 376913 1 5 THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE 376913 1 6 CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHO 376913 1 7 P OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 376914 1 1 THE LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199216 SPAR FITTING WAS 376914 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE 376914 1 3 TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE O 376914 1 4 F SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 376914 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 376914 1 6 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 376915 1 1 THE UPPER AFT I/B AND O/B F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUTS ON THE V070-199219 SPA 376915 1 2 R FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE INSUFFICIENT RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTS WERE 376915 1 3 REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, BLIND FASTENERS WERE USED I 376915 1 4 N PLACE OF SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNE 376915 1 5 RSTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL DEG 376915 1 6 RADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 376916 1 1 (REF ITEMS 2 AND 4 ON PAGE 1). THE UPPER FWD O/B AND UPPER AFT O/B NUTPL 376916 1 2 ATE ON THE V070-199209 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE 376916 1 3 . THE FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBAB 376916 1 4 LE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEMS 376916 1 5 3 AND 5 ON PAGE 1). THE UPPER FWD AND AFT I/B NUTPLATES AND LOWER AFT AN 376916 1 6 CHOR NUT ON THE V070-199209 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING T 376916 1 7 ORQUE. THE FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED USING BLIND RIVETS PER UN 376916 1 8 RESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPE 376916 1 9 RATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR 376916 1 10 THIS PR. 376917 1 1 (REF ITEMS 2 AND 3 ON PAGE 1) THE UPPER FWD O/B AND UPPER AFT O/B NUTPLA 376917 1 2 TE ON THE V070-199210 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. 376917 1 3 THE FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABL 376917 1 4 E CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEMS 1 376917 1 5 AND 4 ON PAGE 1): THE UPPER FWD I/B NUTPLATE AND LOWER AFT ANCHOR NUT O 376917 1 6 N THE V070-199210 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE 376917 1 7 FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED SUING BLIND RIVETS PER UNRESTRICTED 376917 1 8 MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL 376917 1 9 DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 376918 1 1 THE LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199221 SPAR FITTING WAS 376918 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE 376918 1 3 TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE O 376918 1 4 F SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 376918 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 376918 1 6 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 376949 1 1 ITEM #1 DURING DETAIL INTERNAL INSPECTION PER JC V30-13333, THE V070-355 376949 1 2 534-001 HIGH POINT COOLANT BLEED COVER WAS REMOVED. THE JC CALLS OUT TO 376949 1 3 REMOVE (2 EA) MD112-1002-0303 SCREWS AND (2 EA) NAS620C10L WASHERS. SHOP 376949 1 4 ACTUALLY REMOVED (3 EA) MD112-1003-0407, (1 EA) MD112-1003-0410 SCREWS 376949 1 5 AND (4 EA) NAS620C10L WASHERS. PER PRINT V070-333500, THE CORRECT HW IS 376949 1 6 (2 EA) MD112-1002-0302, (2 EA) MD112-1002-0303 SCREWS AND (4 EA) NAS620C 376949 1 7 10L WASHERS. THIS CORRECT HW WAS ORDERED NEW AND SUBSTITUTED INTO THE IN 376949 1 8 STALLATION KIT. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 2 THIS DISCREPANCY WAS 376949 1 9 PICKED UP DURING ENG SURV. J/C V30-13333 STEP 29 CALLS OUT TO REMOVE (2 376949 1 10 EA) MD112-1003-0410 SCREWS AND (2 EA) NAS620C10L WASHERS TO REMOVE 376949 1 11 V070-339466-001 DUCT COVER. A QUANTITY OF (4 EA) WAS INSTALLED IN 376949 1 12 VEHICLE. PRINT V070-333500 CALLS OUT A TOTAL OF (6 EA). AN EO WAS 376949 1 13 RELEASED TO CORRECTTHE QUANTITY TO (4 EA) PROBABLE CAUSE DWG ERROR. J/C 376949 1 14 V30-13333 WAS DEV'D TO CORRECT H/W CALLOUT FOR V070-339466-001 AND 376949 1 15 V070-339534-001 COVER REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION. BOTH COVERS WILL BE 376949 1 16 REINSTALLED PER J/C V30-13333. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 376967 1 1 THE BINDING OF THE TRUSS TUBE BOLT (ITEM 1 PG 1) WAS RESOLVED BY HEATING 376967 1 2 UP THE STRUT WITH HEAT BLANKETS TO REDUCE THE PRELOAD IN THE STRUT. THE 376967 1 3 PRELOAD IN THE STRUT IS A NON-PR CONDITION. CONCLUDE THAT THE BOLT HAS 376967 1 4 BEEN SUCCESSFULLY REMOVED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 377054 1 1 DURING DDC-3-J1-040, RECEPTACLE 31V73A2A1J4 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BENT PIN 377054 1 2 ON PANEL L2A1. AND LRU PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST PANEL L2A1. DDC-3-J1-04 377054 1 3 0 WAS SENDING PANEL L2A1 RO RSC FOR MODIFICATION AND WILL BE TRACKED BY 377054 1 4 THE TPS FOR SHIPMENT TO AND FROM RSC. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS 377054 1 5 PR PR. BENT PIN WILL BE REPAIRED ON LRU PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP 377083 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1): DURING POST REMOVAL INSPECTION, "CORROSION" WAS 377083 1 2 FOUND TO BE PRESENT ON THE V070-190266-001 INSULATOR ON THE INCONEL SUPP 377083 1 3 ORT. BASED ON THE APPEARANCE OF THE "CORROSION" AND THE PHYSICAL COMPOSI 377083 1 4 TION OF INCONEL (IOW FE CONTENT NI BASED ALLOY) THE "CORROSION" FOUND IS 377083 1 5 MERELY SUPERFICIAL SURFACE OXIDATION AND DOES NOT REPRESENT A DISCREPAN 377083 1 6 T CONDITION. NO ACTIVE CORROSION OR PITTING OF SUBSTRATE. THIS IS NOT A 377083 1 7 PR CONDITION. 377085 1 1 DURING POST REMOVAL INSPECTION "CORROSION" WAS FOUND TO BE PRESENT ON TH 377085 1 2 E V070-190265-001 INSULATOR ON THE INCONEL SUPPORT. BASED ON THE APPEARA 377085 1 3 NCE OF THE "CORROSION" AND THE PHYSICAL COMPOSITION OF INCONEL (LOW FE C 377085 1 4 ONTENT NI BASED ALLOY) THE "CORROSION" FOUND IS MERELY SUPERFICIAL SURFA 377085 1 5 CE OXIDATION AND DOES NOT REPRESENT A DISCREPANT CONDITION. NO ACTIVE CO 377085 1 6 RROSION OR PITTING OF SUBSTRATE. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. 377116 1 1 THE V070-390004-007 WINDOW PANE ASSY WAS FOUND TO HAVE ITS PROTECTIVE FI 377116 1 2 NISH TO HAVE PEELED OFF. THE PEELED PAINT WAS DUE TO THE STRONG ADHESIVE 377116 1 3 PROPERTIES OF THE ALUMINIZED LT-80 TAPE AND NOT THE RESULT OF POOR PAIN 377116 1 4 T ADHESION. AN EO HAS BEEN RELEASED THAT REVISES THE TYPE OF TAPE TO BE 377116 1 5 USED FROM LT-80 TO A WEAKER ADHESIVE TAPE, MYSTIC 7000. THE PEELED PAINT 377116 1 6 WAS ACCEPTED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS P 377116 1 7 R IS VENDOR. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 377130 1 1 DURING V31-14138, CABLE E621A26 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE EXPOSING SHIELD APPROX 377130 1 2 IMATELY 6 INCHES FROM CONNECTOR 40P9343. THE CABLE WAS REPAIRED USING MY 377130 1 3 STIK 7503 TAPE PER SRP-V-EL-0007-C-O METHOD B (SHIELDED CABLE REPAIR - N 377130 1 4 O SHIELD/CONDUCTOR DAMAGE). NO FURHTER DISPO REQUIRED. NO RETEST REQUIRE 377130 1 5 D. PROBABLE CAUSE IS DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 377131 1 1 THIS PR WAS TAKEN TO DOCUMENT THAT WIRE D63A26 WAS BROKEN AT A KSC SPLIC 377131 1 2 E AND HAD SHIELD DAMAGE. PREVIOUS DISPOSITION REMOVED THE DISCREPANT ARE 377131 1 3 A OF WIRE AND SPLICED ON A NEW LENGTH OF CABLE VIA A KSC SPLICE POINT. T 377131 1 4 HE WIRE WAS THEN RETERMINATED AND REINSERTED BACK INTO CONNECTOR 40P819. 377131 1 5 NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED BY THIS PR, AS A RETEST OF THIS WIRE WILL 377131 1 6 BE PERFORMED PER SCAN RETEST. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS OPERATI 377131 1 7 ONAL DEGRADATION. 377132 1 1 FOAM BLOCK SPACER WAS REINSTALLED TO FUEL CELL #3 O2 SUPPLYLINE. CONFIGU 377132 1 2 RATINO IS NOW AS SPECIFIED IN MR APPROVED PR FCP-3-09-0252. CAUSE: WORKM 377132 1 3 ANSHIP. 377135 1 1 DURING ET UMBILICAL SEAL MOD. THE V070-565323-002 SEAL HAD NUMEROUS CUTS 377135 1 2 AND TEARS. THE SEAL WAS SCRAPPED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW ONE. PROBABLE 377135 1 3 CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 377147 1 1 THE SCRATCHED LOWER SKIN UNDER THE TILE AT APPROXIMATELY XO890, YO130 ID 377147 1 2 ENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS MEASURED AND FOUND TO BE A MAXIMUM OF .00 377147 1 3 25" DEEP. BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL, THE SCRATCHES WERE BLENDED SMOOTH 377147 1 4 BY SANDING AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE SCRATC 377147 1 5 HES IN THE SKIN WERE A RESULT OF TPS TECHNICIANS USING METALLIC TOOLS TO 377147 1 6 REMOVE TPS COMPONENTS. CONCLUDE THAT THE SKINS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO AN 377147 1 7 ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 377149 1 1 DURING POST REMOVAL INSPECTION, THE V070-337421-003 PANEL WAS FOUND TO B 377149 1 2 E PUNCTURED. THE FIBERGLASS PANEL IS A CLOSEOUT "WALLPAPER" PANEL IN CRE 377149 1 3 W COMPARTMENT. THE PANEL WAS REWORKED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION BY 377149 1 4 BONDING FIBERGLASS DOUBLERS TO THE PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCR 377149 1 5 EPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP (FORCEFUL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE PANEL AND SHAR 377149 1 6 P, POINTED OBJECT). NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR T 377149 1 7 HIS PR. 377185 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THE LOWER FWD MD114-5003-0005 NUTPLATE ON THE V0 377185 1 2 70-199206 FITTNIG WAS FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTPLATE WAS 377185 1 3 REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT HARDWARE, ME121- 377185 1 4 0014-03XX BLIND RIVETS WERE USED IN PLACE OF PER PRINT NAS1199-3 RIVETS. 377185 1 5 THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE 377185 1 6 CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHO 377185 1 7 P OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 377187 1 1 THE LOWER AFT AND LOWER FWD F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUTS ON THE V070-199205 S 377187 1 2 PAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNNING TORQUE. THE NOTS 377187 1 3 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS THE NOTS WERE INSTALLE 377187 1 4 D WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE OF SOLID RIVITS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVITS 377187 1 5 WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS OR IS OPE 377187 1 6 RATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 377202 1 1 DURING DDC-3-J1-039, A SCREW ON PANEL R2'S HING WOULD NOT COME OUT. AN L 377202 1 2 RU PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST PANEL R2 TO NOTE DRILLED OUT SCREW WAS STUCK 377202 1 3 IN PANEL. DDC-3-J1-039 WAS SENDING PANEL R2 TO RSC FOR MODIFICATION AND 377202 1 4 WILL BE TRACKED BY THE TPS FOR SHIPMENT TO AND FROM RSC. NO FURTHER ACT 377202 1 5 ION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THIS DISCREPANCY WILL BE REPAIRED BY THE LRU PR 377202 1 6 . PROBABLE CAUSE: INSUFFICIENT DATA. 377211 1 1 THE DENTED RH ME621-0068-0001 TRUSS TUBE LOCATED IN THE FRCS CAVITY IDEN 377211 1 2 TIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS INSPECTED AND DETERMINED TO BE MR ACCEPTAB 377211 1 3 LE AS-IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE TRUSS TUBE WAS MR IDENTIFIED. DIMENSI 377211 1 4 ONS OF DENT ARE 2.0" BY 0.5" AND 0.04" DEEP. THE PRELOAD ON THE TRUSS TU 377211 1 5 BE IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2, PAGE 1A WAS RELIEVED BY HEATING THE TUBE TO 120 377211 1 6 DEG F FOR 40 MINUTES. BY RELIEVING THE PRELOAD, THE ATTACH BOLTS COULD 377211 1 7 BE REMOVED AND THE ATTACH FITTINGS INSPECTED PER THE V30-13305 JOB CARD. 377211 1 8 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 1 IS WORKMANSHIP AND ITEM 2 IS NORMAL INSTALLAT 377211 1 9 ION PRELOAD. CONCLUDE THAT ALL WORK IS COMPLETE AND THIS PR MAY CLOSE. 377212 1 1 DURING PANEL REMOVAL, CRACKS WERE FOUND ON THE V070-337433-008 PANEL. TH 377212 1 2 E CRACKS AROUND THE HOLES IN THE V070-337433-008 PANEL DO NOT PENETRATE 377212 1 3 ALL PLIES OF THE FIBERGLASS FABRIC. THERE ARE NO EXPOSED FIBERS. THERE I 377212 1 4 S NO EVIDENCE OF THE CRACKS ON THE EXTERIOR OF THE PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE 377212 1 5 FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG 377212 1 6 INEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 377228 1 1 DURING POST REMOVAL INSPECTION, THE V070-338759-001 PANEL WAS FOUND TO B 377228 1 2 E CRACKED. THE FIBERGLASS PANEL IS A CLOSEOUT "WALLPAPER" PANEL IN THE C 377228 1 3 REW COMPARTMENT. THE PANEL WAS REWORKED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPO BY STO 377228 1 4 P DRILLING THE END OF THE 1" CRACK AND BONDING FIBERGLASS DOUBLERS TO TH 377228 1 5 E PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 377228 1 6 NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 377236 1 1 THE SMALL BOLT WITH A MISSING NUT IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS MR AC 377236 1 2 CEPTED AS-IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE NUT WAS PROBABLY SHEARED OFF WHEN 377236 1 3 THE FEEDLINE BOLTS WERE TORQUE CHECKED (I.E. WORKMANSHIP). CONCLUDE NO 377236 1 4 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 377268 1 1 THE LOWER AFT AND UPPER AFT I/B AND O/B F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUTS, AND LOW 377268 1 2 NUTPLATES ON THE V070-1992023 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE OUT OF TOL 377268 1 3 ERANCE RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO LIMITE 377268 1 4 D ACCESS, THE NUTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE OF SILID 377268 1 5 RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. P 377268 1 6 ROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR 377268 1 7 ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 377269 1 1 THE LOWER AFT AND UPPER AFT I/B AND O/B F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUTS, AND LOW 377269 1 2 ER FWD MD114-5003-0005 NUTPLATES ONTHE V070-199203 SPAR FITTING WERE FOU 377269 1 3 ND TO HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTS WERE REMOVED AND RE 377269 1 4 PLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTEN 377269 1 5 ERS IN PLACE OF SILID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FO 377269 1 6 R UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 377269 1 7 N. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 377271 1 1 THE LOWER AFT F12046-10-4 ANCHOR NUTS AND FWD MD114-5003-0005 NUTPLATES 377271 1 2 ON THE V070-199204 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNN 377271 1 3 ING TORQUE. THE NITS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, T 377271 1 4 HE NUTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE OF SOLID RIVETS. TH 377271 1 5 E USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAU 377271 1 6 SE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURHTER SHOP OR ENGINEERIN 377271 1 7 G ACTION REQUIRED. 377273 1 1 THE AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUTS ON THE V070-199211 SPAR FITTINGS WERE FO 377273 1 2 UND TO HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTS WERE REMOVED AND R 377273 1 3 EPLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTE 377273 1 4 NERS IN PLACE OF SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED F 377273 1 5 OR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATI 377273 1 6 ON. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 377343 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1: DURING POST REMOVAL INSPECTION, "CORROSION" WAS FO 377343 1 2 UND TO BE PRESENT ON THE V070-190289-001 INSULATOR ON THE INCONEL SUPPOR 377343 1 3 T. BASED ON THE APPEARANCE OF THE "CORROSION" AND THE PHYSICAL COMPOSITI 377343 1 4 ON OF INCONEL (IOW FE CONTENT NI BASED ALLOY) THE "CORROSION" FOUND IS M 377343 1 5 ERELY SUPERFICIAL SURFACE OXIDATION AND DOES NOT REPRESENT A DISCREPANT 377343 1 6 CONDITION. NO ACTIVE CORROSION OR PITTING OF SUBSTRATE. THIS IS NOT A PR 377343 1 7 CONDITION. 377351 1 1 ITEM 1-THE RETAINERS WERE FIT CHECKED AND FOUND TO BE PER PRINT. THEY WE 377351 1 2 RE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. THE OPEN HOLES WERE DUE TO THE OMMISSION OF SOM 377351 1 3 E REQUIRED TCS PARTS. THESE WERE ADDRESSED ON A TCS PR. ITEM 2-THE TEAR 377351 1 4 WAS PATCHED WITH THE SEAL MATERIAL TO ELIMINATE POSSIBLE LOSS OF PURGE P 377351 1 5 RESSURE. ITEM 3-THE OLD MR PATCH WAS SEWN ON AND BONDED AS THE OTHER. IT 377351 1 6 EM 4-THE SCUFFED AREA WAS DETERMINED TO HAVE VISIBLE PENETRATIONS. ITEM 377351 1 7 5 WAS WRITTEN. THESE WERE SEALED BY APPLICATION OF RED RTV. NO FURTHER W 377351 1 8 ORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 377351 1 9 ORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 377378 1 1 THE LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199208 SPAR FITTING WAS 377378 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE 377378 1 3 TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE O 377378 1 4 F SOLID RIVITS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVITS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 377378 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 377378 1 6 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 377408 1 1 THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A DISLOCATED BULB SEAL REPAIR AT XO1184 ON THE LH HI 377408 1 2 NGELINE. THE ACTUAL DISCREPANCY IS A DEBONDED BULB SEAL SPLICE. THE DISC 377408 1 3 REPANT SPLICE WAS REMOVED AND A NEW SPLICE WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT REQUI 377408 1 4 REMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. FER IT 377408 1 5 EM 2 ON PG 1A: THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A PREVIOUS TAPE REPAIR WHICH HAS BECO 377408 1 6 ME DEBONDED. THE PREVIOUS REPAIR WHICH HAS DEGRADED WAS A PARTIAL WRAP R 377408 1 7 EPAIR DUE TO THE SEAL BEING INSTALLED. THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND A FULL W 377408 1 8 RAP REPAIR WAS PERFORMED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. UPON COMPLETIO 377408 1 9 N OF THE FULL WRAP REPAIR, THE SEAL WAS REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 377408 1 10 THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG 377408 1 11 ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 377467 1 1 DURING V30-14659, INTERNAL DETAILED MID FUSELAGE (BAY 1) INSPECTION, "CO 377467 1 2 RROSION" WAS FOUND TO BE PRESENT ON THE CRES FASTENERS OF THE CREW MODUL 377467 1 3 E TO LOWER FORWARD FUSELAGE (XO 576 - XO 582) LING INSTALLATION )REF DWG 377467 1 4 V070-321001). BASED ON THE APPEARANCE OF THE "CORROSION" (NO INDICATION 377467 1 5 OF PITTING) AND THE PHYSICAL COMPOSITION OF CRES (DESIGNED FOR CORROSIO 377467 1 6 N RESISTANCE) THE "CORROSION" FOUND IS MERELY SUPERFICIAL SURFACE OXIDAT 377467 1 7 ION AND DOES NOT REPRESENT A DISCREPANY CONDITION. SURFACE OXIDATION WAS 377467 1 8 REMOVED FROM FASTENER HARDWARE WITH BEHRTEX/BRUSHING AND/OR IPA CLEANIN 377467 1 9 G. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: EXPOSURE TO MOISTURE/HUM 377467 1 10 IDITY FROM NORMAL OPERATIONAL SERVICE. 377485 1 1 DURING TPS OEL-3-J1-018, CONTINUITY STEPS COULD NOT BE PERFORMED ON THE 377485 1 2 SHIELD OF WIRE T2401A26 (40P909) DUE TO THE SHIELD BEING PREPPED AND FLO 377485 1 3 ATED. THE PINS OF WIRE T2401A26 WERE EXTRACTED FROM 40P909, THE FLOAT WA 377485 1 4 S REMOVED, AND THE SHIELD CONTINUITY TEST WAS PERFORMED PER TPS OEL-3-J1 377485 1 5 -018. THE FLOAT ON WIRE T2401A26 WAS ONCE AGAIN INSTALLED AND THE PINS W 377485 1 6 ERE RE-INSERTED IN 40P909. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. TPS OE 377485 1 7 L-3-J1-018 WILL PERFORM CONTINUITY CHECK AND FUNCTIONAL RETEST. PROBABLE 377485 1 8 CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR - TECHNICIAN DID NOT FOLLOW PAPER WORK. 377498 1 1 THE V070-335099-019 CLOSEOUT PANEL BECAME CRACKED AROUND A FASTENER HOLE 377498 1 2 . THE CRACKS DID NOT PENETRATE ALL OF THE FIBERGLASS PLIES. THE CRACKS W 377498 1 3 ERE STOP DRILLED, FILLED WITH ADHESIVE, AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 377498 1 4 USE AS REPAIRED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 377498 1 5 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 377556 1 1 THE HOLE WAS DAMAGED DURING REMOVAL OF PANEL R2. THIS PANEL IS NOT NORMA 377556 1 2 LLY REMOVED. IT WAS REMOVED FOR OMDP. IT WAS REINSTALLED WITH A COUNTERS 377556 1 3 UNK WASHER AND A LONGER SCREW, AND A PROTRUDING HEAD RIVIT WAS REPLACEDD 377556 1 4 WITH A FLUSH HEAD RIBET WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURH 377556 1 5 TER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 377601 1 1 THE LOWER AFT, UPPER AFT I/B AND UPPER AFT O/B F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUTS O 377601 1 2 N THE V070-199214 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNNI 377601 1 3 NG TORQUE. THE NUTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, TH 377601 1 4 E NUTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE OF SOLID RIVETS. THE 377601 1 5 USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUS 377601 1 6 E FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 377601 1 7 ACTION REQUIRED. 377602 1 1 THE UPPER FWD INBOARD MD114-5003-0005 NUTPLATE ON THE V070-199218 FITTIN 377602 1 2 G WAS FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPL 377602 1 3 ACED. DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT HARDWARE, ME121-0014-03XX BLIND 377602 1 4 RIVETS WERE USED IN PLACE OF PER PRINT NAS1199-3 RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIN 377602 1 5 D RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS D 377602 1 6 ISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING AC 377602 1 7 TION REQUIRED. 377609 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A POSITIVE IML STEP FROM THE RH MLG DOOR TO THE 377609 1 2 ADJACENT ORBITER IML. THE POSITIVE STEP DIMENSION WAS NOT RECORDED SINCE 377609 1 3 IT VARIES ALONG THE LENGTH OF THE DOOR. THE MLG DOOR RIGGING PROCESS 377609 1 4 INITIALLY SETS THE IML'S FLUSH TO WITHIN +.-.030" PRIOR TO ENVIRONMENTAL 377609 1 5 SEAL INSTALLATION. ONCE THE ENVIRONMENTAL SEALS ARE INSTALLED, THE 377609 1 6 LANDING GEAR DOOR IS RIGGED TO OBTAIN ADEQUATE SEAL COMPRESSION AS WELL 377609 1 7 AS ACCEPTABLE DOOR HOOK ENGAGEMENT. THE MLG DOOR HOOK SYSTEM DOES NOT 377609 1 8 HAVE ENOUGH ENERGY TO FULLY COMPRESS THE ENVIRONMENTAL SEALS AND THERMAL 377609 1 9 BARRIERS TO MAINTAIN THE ORIGINAL IML DIMENSION. ADDITIONALLY, 377609 1 10 FLEXIBILITY OF THE DOOR ITSELF CAUSES MINOR VARIATIONS IN THE IML FROM 377609 1 11 ONE RETRACTION TO THE NEXT. THE LANDING GEAR RIGGING SPEC, MLO308-0029 377609 1 12 OUTLINES A FIELD PROCEDURE FOR ADJUSTING THE IML USING A TRIAL AND ERROR 377609 1 13 METHOD, BUT STATES "CHECK WITH THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 377609 1 14 FOR MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE MOLDLINE STEP ON VEHICLES ALREADY IN SERVICE". PR 377609 1 15 MEQ-3-11-0476 PERFORMED RIGGING ON THE RIGHT MAIN LANDING GEAR AND 377609 1 16 VERIFIED ADEQUATE ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL COMPRESSION DURING FLIGHT 11 377609 1 17 PROCESSING. THE SAME PR MR ACCEPTED THE IML OFFSET GREATER THAN .030" 377609 1 18 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BUT NO MR ID WAS APPLIED DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE 377609 1 19 CONDITION. THE ONLY DISCREPANCY THAT EXISTS IS THE MODIFIED TPS TILE 377609 1 20 THICKNESS REQUIRED TO SET THE OML'S FLUSH WITH OFFSET IML'S. THIS 377609 1 21 CONDITION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED (REF RWNG-3-15-3688) WITHIN THE THERMAL 377609 1 22 PROTECTION SYSTEM. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL 377609 1 23 RIGGING PROCEDURE. 377611 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A POSITIVE IML STEP FROM THE L/H MLG DOOR TO THE ADJ O 377611 1 2 RBITER IML. THE POSITIVE STEP DIMENSION WAS NOT RECORDED SINCE IT VARIES 377611 1 3 ALONG THE LENGTH OF THE DOOR. THE MLG DOOR RIGGING PROCESS INITIALLY SE 377611 1 4 TS THE IML'S FLUSH TO WITHIN +/- .030" PRIOR TO ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL INSTA 377611 1 5 LLATION. ONCE THE ENVIRONMENTAL SEALS ARE INSTALLED, THE LANDING GEAR DO 377611 1 6 OR IS RIGGED TO OBTAIN ADEQUATE SEAL COMPRESSION AS WELL AS ACCEPTABLE D 377611 1 7 OOR HOOK ENGAGEMENT. THE MLG DOOR HOOK SYSTEM DOES NOT HAVE ENOUGH ENERG 377611 1 8 Y TO FULLY COMPRESS THE ENVIRONMENTAL SEALS AND THERMAL BARRIERS TO MAIN 377611 1 9 TAIN THE ORIGINAL IML DIMENSION. ADDITIONALLY, FLEXIBILITY OF THE DOOR 377611 1 10 ITSELF CAUSES MINOR VARIATIONS IN THE IML FROM ONE RETRACTION TO THE 377611 1 11 NEXT. THE LANDING GEAR RIGGING SPEC, MLO308-0029 OUTLINES A FIELD 377611 1 12 PROCEDURE FOR ADJUSTING THE IML USING A TRIAL AND ERROR METHOD BUT 377611 1 13 STATES "CHECK WITH THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS ENGINEERING FOR MAXIMUM 377611 1 14 ALLOWABLE MOLDLINE STEP ON VEHICLES ALREADY IN SERVICE". PR 377611 1 15 MEQ-3-11-0475 PERFORMED RIGGING ON THE LEFT MAIN LANDING GEAR AND 377611 1 16 VERIFIED ADEQUATE ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL COMPRESSION DURING FLIGHT 11 377611 1 17 PROCESSING. THE SAME PR MR ACCEPTED THE IML OFFSET GREATER THAN .030" 377611 1 18 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BUT NO MR ID WAS APPLIED DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE 377611 1 19 CONDITION. THE ONLY DISCREPANCY THAT EXISTS IS THE MODIFIED TPS TILE 377611 1 20 THICKNESS REQUIRED TO SET THE OML'S FLUSH WITH OFFSET IML'S. THIS 377611 1 21 CONDITION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED WITHIN THE THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM. NO PR 377611 1 22 CONDITION EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL RIGGING PROCEDURE. 377623 1 1 THE TWO MISSING RIVETS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 AND THE INABILITY TO 377623 1 2 INSTALL RIVETS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2, PAGE 1A WERE RESOLVED BY INSTALLIN 377623 1 3 G TWO HI-LOKS PER UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE RIV 377623 1 4 ETS WERE EITHER NEVER INSTALLED OR INSTALLED IMPROPERLY. CONCLUDE THAT T 377623 1 5 HE MINI-BEAM AND CLIP ARE INSTALLED IN AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION FOR FLIGH 377623 1 6 T AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 377650 1 1 THE CRACKING IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS EVALUATED BY LSOC AND NASA 377650 1 2 STRUCTURES ENGINEERING, WITH LSOC QC PRESENT, USING A BOROSCOPE. THE DI 377650 1 3 SCREPANCY OF THE UPSET HEAD OF THE RIVET WAS DETERMINED TO BE WITHIN THE 377650 1 4 MAO101-302 SPECIFICATION ALLOWANCE PER PARAGRAPH 4.3.3.1, PAGE 9 AND FI 377650 1 5 GURE 7, PAGE 10. THEREFORE ITEM 1, PAGE 1 IS NOT A PR CONDITION AND THIS 377650 1 6 PR MAY CLOSE WITH NO ACTION REQUIRED. 377749 1 1 THE LOWER AFT, UPPER AFT I/B AND UPPER AFT O/B F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUTS O 377749 1 2 N THE V070-199203 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNNI 377749 1 3 NG TORQUE. THE NUTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, TH 377749 1 4 E NUTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE OF SOLID RIVITS. THE 377749 1 5 USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUS 377749 1 6 E FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 377749 1 7 ACTION REQUIRED. 377783 1 1 THE GROUNDING CLIP PROBABLY BECAME BENT DURING IN FLIGHT EXPANSION AND C 377783 1 2 ONTRACTION OF THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS. THE BENT CLIP WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS 377783 1 3 . NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEG 377783 1 4 RADATION. 377785 1 1 THE BENT CLIP WAS PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED ON PR STR-3-06-0955. NO FURTHER WO 377785 1 2 RK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WRITTEN IN ERROR. PREVIOUSLY A 377785 1 3 CCEPTED CONDITION. 377795 1 1 WHILE ATTEMPTING TO WORK OEL-3-J1-012, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE WIRE H 377795 1 2 ARNESSES ON THE 863 WERE NOT ROUTED PER PRINT. AN EO WAS TO REVISE DRAWI 377795 1 3 NG V070-794303 ZONES 63 AND 64 TO SHOW HARNESSES AT 863 FRAME AS INSTALL 377795 1 4 ED. REF FIGURE #1 FOR INSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO VENDOR DES 377795 1 5 IGN. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 377798 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-012, ENGINEERING INSPECTION REVEALED THAT HARNESS V070-7 377798 1 2 74328-010 WAS NOT ROUTED PER PRINT ON L/H SIDE OF 1307 BULKHEAD. IT WAS 377798 1 3 ALSO DISCOVERED THAT VARIOUS WIRES ASSOCIATED WITH CONNECTORS 40P462 AND 377798 1 4 40P409 WERE INTERWOVEN AND REQUIRED SEPARATION IN ORDER TO ROUTE CORREC 377798 1 5 TLY. THE INTERWOVEN WIRES WERE EXTRACTED, UNWOVEN AND THEN REINSERTED IN 377798 1 6 TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CONNECTORS. BEFORE THE COMPLETION OF REROUTING HARNE 377798 1 7 SS V070-774328-010, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WIRES T2368A26 AND T1773A26 H 377798 1 8 AD EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF 5 IN AND WIRE DF609B24 WAS TOO SHORT TO RETERMINA 377798 1 9 TE. THE EXCESSIVE LENGTH ON WIRES T2368A26 AND T1773A26 WAS ALLEVIATED 377798 1 10 BY WORKING THE SLACK BACK INTO THE ASSOCIATED HARNESS RUN. WIRE DF609B24 377798 1 11 WAS REROUTED INTO ANOTHER HARNESS RUN THUS CREATING EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF 377798 1 12 APPROX 3 FT. WIRE DF609B24 WAS CUT, PREPPED, A PIN CRIMPED ON, AND A 377798 1 13 SOLDER SLEEVE WAS INSTALLED ON JR24. WIRE DF609B24 WAS THEN TERMINATED 377798 1 14 INTO CONNECTOR 40P462. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. RETEST 377798 1 15 PEFORMED BY SCAN TRACK. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 377815 1 1 FUSELAGE INBOARD ELEVON, AREOTHERMAL SEALS PART (V070-198242), HAD RAISE 377815 1 2 D METAL ON OUTSIDE SURFACE AROUND GUAGES AND ON INSIDE OF CHANNEL SANDED 377815 1 3 DOWN. EXPOSED METAL HAS HAD ONE COAR OF KORPON APPLIED FOR PROTECTION. 377815 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. WORK IS COMPLETE WITH NO FURTHE 377815 1 5 R WORK REQUIRED. 377824 1 1 THE DEBONDED SEAL SPLICE IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY REM 377824 1 2 OVING THE SPLICE AND REBONDING A NEW SPLICE IN PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. A 377824 1 3 NEW SPLICE WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE ETCHING OF A TEFLON SEAL IS ONLY EF 377824 1 4 FECTIVE FOR A LIMITED TIME AND THE SEAL REMOVED HAD EXCEEDED THE TIME LI 377824 1 5 MIT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 377825 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A TORN V070-398501-045 PLBD BULB SEAL. PER UNRESTRICTE 377825 1 2 D MR DISPOSITION, THE DISCREPANT END OF THE SEAL WAS WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 377825 1 3 7502 TAPE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FU 377825 1 4 RTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 377889 1 1 DURING INSPECTION OF THE LH NLG TRUNION ATTACH BOLT HOLES PER V30-13409 377889 1 2 INSPECTION JOB CARD, SOME GALLING WAS VISUALLY NOTED IN THE BORE OF THE 377889 1 3 12:00 O'CLOCK ATTACH BOLT AND THE HOLE FAILED AN EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION 377889 1 4 , HOWEVER, NO DISCONTINUITIES (IE "CRACKS) WERE NOTED. THE GALLING WAS R 377889 1 5 EMOVED USING BEHR-TEX AND THE HOLE WAS RE-INSPECTED. AFTER REMOVAL OF TH 377889 1 6 E GALLING (RAISED METAL) SMALL INDENTATIONS WERE NOTED. THE SMALL INDENT 377889 1 7 ATIONS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS-IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THIS HOLE WAS PREVIO 377889 1 8 USLY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED ON STR-3-07-2322 WITH SMALL INDENTATIONS. 377889 1 9 THE GALLING WAS PROBABLY DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE DURING BOLT REMOVAL D 377889 1 10 UE TO THE FLIGHT TOLERANCE OF THE HOLE. CONCLUDE THAT ALL WORK IS COMPLE 377889 1 11 TE AND THAT THE BOLT MAY BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT PER THE V30-13409 JOB C 377889 1 12 ARD. 377898 1 1 THE CRACK IN THE PANEL COULD NOT BE PATCHED DUE TOTHE PROXIMITY OF A FAS 377898 1 2 TENER HOLE. IT WAS STOP DRILLED AND FILLED WITH ADHESIVE. NO FURTHER WOR 377898 1 3 K TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 377912 1 1 THE SUPPORT WAS POSITIONED PER THE DRAWINGS INTENT OF PARALLEL WITH THE 377912 1 2 FRAME'S FACE. PROBLEM DUE TO UNCLEAR DRAWING. 378050 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A DEBONDED PLBD BULB SEAL SPLICE 378050 1 2 ON THE LH HINGE LINE AT XO590. A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED PE 378050 1 3 R PRINT REQUIRMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS WORKMANSHIP (IMPROP 378050 1 4 ER BONDING DURING INSTALLATION). (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A) PRIOR TO INSTAL 378050 1 5 LATION OF THE NEW SPLICE, A SMALL TEAR WAS FOUND IN THE AFT EDGE OF THE 378050 1 6 V070-398505-013 PLBD BULB SEAL ADJACENT TO THE SPLICE. THE END OF THE SE 378050 1 7 AL WAS REMOVED AND REPAIRED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION USING MYSTIC 378050 1 8 7503 TAPE. THE SEAL WAS REINSTALLED UPON COMPLETION OF WRAP. PROBABLE C 378050 1 9 AUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1B) 378050 1 10 THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS AN UNDERSIZED HOLE IN THE STRUCTURE UNDER THE 378050 1 11 V070-398505-013 SEAL. THE SEAL WAS OPENED TO PRINT DIMENSIONS ALLOWING 378050 1 12 INSTALLATION OF THREADED FASTENER PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE 378050 1 13 FOR THIS ITEM IS VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. 378081 1 1 70W2186-16 BUSHING AT XO1149 FRAME AT YO0.0 WAS FOUND TO HAVE THREAD MAR 378081 1 2 KS. THE THREAD MARKS RAISED AREA WAS SANDED AWAY AND BUSHING WAS ACCEPTE 378081 1 3 D BY MR ACTION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND T 378081 1 4 EAR. 378102 1 1 THE V070-340365-016 WIRE TRAY COVER, R/H BAY 9 UPPER, WAS FOUND TO BE CR 378102 1 2 ACKED. THE CRACK IS LOCATED AT A JUNCTION OF TWO V070-347602 RETAINERS W 378102 1 3 HICH ALLOWED FLEXING OF THE COVER. THIS FLEXTURE RESULTED IN THE FORMATI 378102 1 4 ON AND PROPAGATION OF THE CRACK. THE CRACK AREA WAS REWORKED PER UNRESTR 378102 1 5 ICTED MR DISPOSITION TO STOP-DRILL, FILL WITH MB0120-037 TYPE II ADHESIV 378102 1 6 E, AND INSTALL A DOUBLER. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS VENDOR. NO FURTH 378102 1 7 ER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 378110 1 1 PREVIOUS DISPOSITION REQUESTED AND RECEIVED MR APPROVAL TO INSTALL AN IN 378110 1 2 SULATOR SEALING SLEEVE ONTO WIRES 1B416B20 AND 1H68B20 IN A CLAMSHELL FA 378110 1 3 SHION TO REINSULATE THE NICKED WIRE. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED SUCCESSFULLY 378110 1 4 WITH NO OTHER ANOMALIES NOTED. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED BY THIS PR. M 378110 1 5 OST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION FROM ORDINARY P 378110 1 6 ROCESSING PROCEDURES. 378208 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING AN INSPECTION OF THE PLBD FWD BULKHEAD ROLL 378208 1 2 ERS. ITEM 1 ADDRESSES SUSPECTED CORROSION ON THREE OF THE ROLLERS (LOCAT 378208 1 3 IONS: YO 12.5, XO 495.5; YO -45.27, ZO 488.515; AND YO -74.025, ZO 470.4 378208 1 4 ). PER THIS WAD THE ROLLERS WERE CLEANED WITH IPA AND CLOSELY INSPECTED. 378208 1 5 NO CORROSION OR SURFACE DAMAGE WAS NOTED. ITEM 2 ADDRESSES MISSING DRY 378208 1 6 FILM LUBRICANT ON THE SAME THREE ROLLERS. MRB CONCURRENCE HAS BEEN OBTAI 378208 1 7 NED PER THIS WAD TO ACCEPT THIS CONDITION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTH 378208 1 8 ER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR. 378209 1 1 THE LH PLBD BULKHEAD ROLLER #1 EXHIBITED BINDING ON THE OUTER ROLLER SUR 378209 1 2 FACE DURING INITIAL INSPECTION. THE ROLLER WAS MANUALLY ROTATED (BY HAND 378209 1 3 ) AND WORKED BACK AND FORTH UNTIL ONLY SLIGHT RESISTANCE WAS ENCOUNTERED 378209 1 4 . IT WAS NOTED THAT SQUEEZING THE ROLLER SLEEVE INCREASED ROLLING RESIST 378209 1 5 ANCE. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR THIS SPACER SLEEVE TO ROTATE SINCE THE 378209 1 6 PLBD LATCH HOOK DOES NOT ENGAGE THIS SURFACE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EX 378209 1 7 ISTS AND NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR - DRY LUBRIC 378209 1 8 ANT TENDS TO BUILD UP AND CLUMP ON TIGHTLY TOLERANCED ADJOINING SURFACES 378209 1 9 CAUSING MINOR BINDING. 378336 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2: MR DOUBLERS WERE FABRICATED, AND INSTALLED ON TOP SIDE. T 378336 1 2 HEY ARE SECURED BY ADHESIVE BONDING AND HI-LOKS. THE MR DOUBLERS ARE BAS 378336 1 3 ICALLY THE SAME AS THE REPLACED V070 DOUBLERS EXCEPT THEIR 2.5" WIDER. T 378336 1 4 HIS ALLOWS THEM TO COVER THE MISLOCATED HOLES WITH REQUIRED OVERHANG. MR 378336 1 5 TEE FILLERS AND ANGLE CLIPS WERE FABRICATED, AND INSTALLED ON UNDERSIDE 378336 1 6 . THEY ARE SECURED BY HI-LOKS AND FOUR MR RADIUS BLOCKS. THERE MR PARTS 378336 1 7 ARE DESIGNED TO REPLACE THE MISTAKENLY REMOVED WEBS. PROBLEM DUE TO LAYO 378336 1 8 UT ERROR. ITEM 3: THE LOSS OF VACUUM WAS MR ACCEPTED DUE TO LAP SHEAR TE 378336 1 9 ST PASSING AND DOUBLER INSTALLATIONS PASSING ULTRASONIC INSPECTION. 378336 1 10 PROBLEM DUE TO BONDING TECHNIQUE. ITEM 4: THE INTERFERING LIP WAS MR 378336 1 11 SPOTFACED. THIS RELIEVED INTERFERENCE ALLOWING HI-LOK NUTS A FLAT 378336 1 12 SURFACE TO BEAR AGAINST. PROBLEM DUE TO LAYOUT ERROR. 378337 1 1 THE BROKEN V070-335193-002 STRUT IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS SCRAPP 378337 1 2 ED AND A NEW STRUT WAS OBTAINED AND DRILLED PER DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. THE 378337 1 3 STRUT WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V30-13333. SUSPECT THE STRUT WAS 378337 1 4 BROKEN WHEN THE ON-ORBIT CONSOLE WAS ROTATED OUT OER PYR-3-J1-060. THIS 378337 1 5 STRUT SHOULD BE REMOVED PRIOR TO CONSOLE ROTATION. THE PYR-3-J1-060 TPR 378337 1 6 HAS BEEN CORRECTED FOR RE-INSTALLATION. CONCLUDE NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ 378337 1 7 UIRED AND THIS PR MAY CLOSE. PROB CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 378338 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF INSPECTION JC V31-14154 MOISTURE/FLUID WAS NOTED O 378338 1 2 N THE UNDERSIDE OF H2 MANIFOLD 1 TK 1 VALVE. SWAB SAMPLES WER TAKEN AND 378338 1 3 ROUTED TO THE MAB LAB FOR ANALYSIS. RESULTS SHOWED THAT THE SWABS DUD NO 378338 1 4 T APPEAR TO BE WET WITH ANY LIQUID AND IF PREVIOUSLY WET MAY HAVE BEEN W 378338 1 5 ATER (SEE ATTACHED LAB ANALYSIS) SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN SAMPLES F 378338 1 6 AILED TO FIND NAY MOISTURE/FLUID. THE H2 MANIFOLD 1 TANK 1 VALVE CONTAIN 378338 1 7 S NO FLUID AND PERFORMED NOMINAL DURING ALL STS-53 FLOW PROCESS TESTING. 378338 1 8 PROBABLE CAUSE: MOISTURE INTRUSION FROM RAIN AT DRFC. 378338 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE: MOISTURE INTRUSION FROM RAIN AT DRFC. 378387 1 1 THE ONE PLUGGED MISDRILLED .098 POLOT HOLE WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE 378387 1 2 SKIN PANEL'S STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. THE SKIN PANEL WILL CONTINUE TO FUNC 378387 1 3 TION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. PRIMARY STRUCTU 378387 1 4 RE. TEH MISDRILLED HOLE WAS PLUGGED WITH A DOUBLE FLUSH RIVET PER MR DIS 378387 1 5 POSITION. PROBLEM DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. 378476 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1), THE V070-298112-019 THERMAL BARRIER DOCUMENTED O 378476 1 2 N PAGE 1 OF THIS PR HAS ALREADY BEEN ADDRESSED AS DISCREPANT ON PR STR-3 378476 1 3 -15-3984, ITEM 1 LOCATION 3. STR-3-15-3984 WILL REPAIR OR REPLACE THE DI 378476 1 4 SCREPANT BARRIER. THIS IS A DUPLICATE. 378537 1 1 THE GALLED AREAS OF THE OMS DECK COVERED A SMALL AREA AND WERE OF MINIMA 378537 1 2 L DEPTH. THE RAISED METAL WAS BLENDED AWAY AND THE AREA WAS CORROSION PR 378537 1 3 OTECTED WITH MRB APPROVAL. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBAB 378537 1 4 LE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 378544 1 1 DURING WRPPING AND SHIPPING ON LIGHT ASSEMBLY, ASSEMBLY WAS DROPPED AND 378544 1 2 THE CORNERS BENT. AND LRU PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE DAMAGED LIGHT ASS 378544 1 3 EMBLY, AND A NEW LIGHT ASSEMBLY ORDERED. THE NEW PANEL WILL BE PUT IN BO 378544 1 4 NDED STORAGE FOR REINSTALLATION. NO FURHTER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS P 378544 1 5 R. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. ASSEMBLY WAS DROPP 378544 1 6 ED. 378571 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, WIRE 1D929A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE 378571 1 2 1D929A26 WAS WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURHTER ACT 378571 1 3 ION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER 378571 1 4 DURING PROCESSING. 378605 1 1 THIS PR WAS TAKEN TO DOCUMENT THAT WIRE SEGMENT 3P562B26 WAS NICKED AND 378605 1 2 HAD EXPOSED CONDUCTOR. PREVIOUS DISPOSITION OF THIS PR EXTRACTED THE WI 378605 1 3 RE, CUT OUT THE DAMAGED AREA, RETERMINATED THE WIRE WITH A NEW CONTACT A 378605 1 4 ND REINSERTED THE WIRE INTO ITS ASSOCIATED CONNECTOR (56P14). RETEST OF 378605 1 5 THIS ANOMALY WILL BE PERFORMED VIA SCAN RETEST. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUI 378605 1 6 RED BY THIS PR. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 378605 1 7 N. 378609 1 1 VR70-341152-008 TUBE WAS WRITTEN UP TO HAVE SLIGHT SCUFFING OF PAINT. MO 378609 1 2 LD IMPRESSION TAKEN IN STEP 1-1 PROVES IT IS ONLY PAINT DEEP. THERE IS N 378609 1 3 OT DAMAGE TO STRUT. KOROPON IS APPLIED FOR ADDED PROTECTION IN CASE TUBE 378609 1 4 IS SCUFFED AGAIN. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 378631 1 1 AN EO TO FOLLOW WAS INITIATED TO CHANGE THE 3.43 DIMENSION TO 2.43 IN EO 378631 1 2 G03 OF DWG V070-350055. THE SUPPORT WAS DRILLED TO THIS NEW DIMENSION W 378631 1 3 ITH NO FURTHER PROBLEMS. THE FIVE ORIGINAL PROBLEM HOLES WERE MR FILLED 378631 1 4 WITH ADHESIVE AND THEN WERE REDRILLED CORRECTLY. PROBLEMS DUE TO DESIGN 378631 1 5 ERROR AND WORKMANSHIP. 378641 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, WIRE 1D1146A24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. THE 378641 1 2 SHIELD ON WIRE 1D1146A24 WAS TRIMMED FLUSH AND THE WIRE WRAPPED WITH MY 378641 1 3 STIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROB 378641 1 4 ABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 378655 1 1 DURING TPS OEL-3-J1-037 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRES U339A26, U339B26, A 378655 1 2 ND U339C26 WERE CUT AT DESIGN SPLICE 54SP91 (ITEM 1). WIRES U339A26, U33 378655 1 3 9B26, AND U339C26 WERE PREPPED AND DESIGN SPLICE 54SP91 INSTALLED PER ML 378655 1 4 O303-0031. IT WAS ALSO DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 1J329A26 WAS CUT (ITEM 2). W 378655 1 5 IRE 1J329A26 WAS REPAIRED BY INSTALLING KSC SPLICE KSC-0496 AT DISCREPAN 378655 1 6 T AREA PER SRP V-EL-0002. ENGINEERING INSP DISCOVERED THAT CABLE T2173A2 378655 1 7 4 WAS NOT CAPPED AND STOWED PROPERLY (ITEM 3) CABLE T2173A24 WAS CAPPED 378655 1 8 AND STOWED PER SPEC MLO303-0033. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. 378655 1 9 AND STOWED PER SPEC MLO303-0033. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. 378668 1 1 THE 2 EACH HOLES IN THE V070-852762-001 DOUBLER INSTALLATION WERE DRILLE 378668 1 2 D WITHOUT PROPER EDGE DISTANCE. THIS INSTALLATION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UN 378668 1 3 RESTRICTED USE AS IS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORK 378668 1 4 MANSHIP. 378707 1 1 ITEMS 1,2,& 8: THE V070-856020-006 RETAINER COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE T 378707 1 2 O INTERFERENCE. REF FIGURES 1,2 AND 4 WERE THE LOCATIONS OF INTERFERENCE 378707 1 3 . THE INTERFERENCE WAS ALLEVIATED BY TRIMMING PER MR DISPO. NOFURTHER AC 378707 1 4 TION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. ITEMS 3 & 4: 21 EA .098" DIA AN 378707 1 5 D 2 EA .156" DIA HOLES WERE MISALIGNED. THE 2 EA .156" DIA HOLES ARE USE 378707 1 6 D IN THE RETAINER INSTALLATION TO THE 1307 BULKHEAD AND THE 21 EA .098" 378707 1 7 DIA HOLES ARE USED FOR A PANEL INSTALLATION TO THE 1307 BLKHD. THE PANEL 378707 1 8 FASTENERS PASS THRU THE BLHK AND PICKUP NUTPLATES WHICH ATTACH TO THE R 378707 1 9 ETAINER. THESE HOLES WERE DOUBLE FLUSH PLUGGED AND WERE REDRILLED PER 378707 1 10 STR-3-J1-525. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 378707 1 11 ITEMS 6,7,9: THE V070-856020-005 RETAINER COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO 378707 1 12 INTERFERENCE. REF FIGURES 3 & 5 WERE THE LOCATIONS OF INTERFERENCE. THE 378707 1 13 INTERFERENCE WAS ALLEVIATED BY TRIMMING PER MR DISPO. NO FURTHER ACTION 378707 1 14 REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. ITEM 5: 3 EA HOLES WERE IMPROPERLY 378707 1 15 LOCATED FROM THE 1307 BLKD TO THE V070-856020-005 RETAINER. THESE HOLES 378707 1 16 WERE MR REWORKED BY DOUBLE FLUSH PLUGGING AND THEN REDRILLED PER 378707 1 17 STR-3-J1-525. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS 378707 1 18 WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 10: 1 EA .164 HOLE WAS DRILLED AT AN ANG.E THIS HOLE 378707 1 19 WAS MR REWORKED BY REAMING TO THE NEXT HIGHER HILOK SIZE IN ORDER TO 378707 1 20 OBTAIN A PROPER INSTALLATION. THE HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED PER STR-3-J1-525. 378707 1 21 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 378721 1 1 THE 3 EA HOLES IN THE XCM 289 FRAME WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED US 378721 1 2 E AS IS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 378730 1 1 DURING POST REMOVAL INSPECTION, THE V070-340365-016 COVER WAS FOUND TO H 378730 1 2 AVE A PREVIOUS MR BK2909-000M DOUBLER DEBONDING. MBO120-008 ADHESIVE WAS 378730 1 3 INJECT BETWEEN THE PARTS TO RESTORE THE BONDLINE AND THREE MD121-0002-0 378730 1 4 4 RIVETS WERE INSTALLED TO PREVENT FURTHER DEGRADATION. PROBABLE CAUSE F 378730 1 5 OR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING AC 378730 1 6 TION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 378796 1 1 ITEM 1.0: THE 2 EA EXTRA PILOT HOLES WITH LESS THAN 2D EDGE DISTANCE WER 378796 1 2 E MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH RIVETS A 378796 1 3 ND MR ID'D. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. I 378796 1 4 TEM 2.0: THE 4 EA .190 HOLES THAT WERE DRILLED FOR 06 HI LOKS WERE MR AC 378796 1 5 CEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. 06 HI LOK'S WERE INSTALLED INSTEAD OF 378796 1 6 THE PER PRINT 05 HI LOKS AND THE AREA WAS MR ID'D. THESE HOLES WERE NOT 378796 1 7 ELONGATED BUT JUST DRILLED FOR THE INCORRECT FASTENER. NO FURTHER ACTIO 378796 1 8 N REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. IN REF TO THE 06 HI-LOKS AND 05 HI 378796 1 9 -LOKS. THE 05 AND 06 DOES NOT REFER TO THE QUANTITY OF FASTENERS BUT TO 378796 1 10 THE DIAMETER OF THE FASTENER 05 = 5/32 INCH DIA AND 06 = 3/16 INCH DIA. 378864 1 1 THE ANOMALIES NOTED IN THE PRAPHITE FLANGE OF THE FRAME ON PLBD #3 IDENT 378864 1 2 IFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE DETERMINED TO BE DUE TO ORIGINAL VENDOR DIS 378864 1 3 CREPANCIES DURING ASSY. THE EXPOSED GRAPHITE WAS FILLED WITH MBO120-037 378864 1 4 ADHESIVE WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. AFTER FILLING, THE FINISH WAS TO 378864 1 5 UCHED UP PER THE DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. CONCLUDE THAT THE FRAME FLANGE HA 378864 1 6 S BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIR 378864 1 7 ED. 378947 1 1 THE HEATSINK BECAME DEBONDED DUE TO NORMAL WEAR. THE DISCREPANCIES WERE 378947 1 2 ALL SMALL ENOUGH THAT THEY WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 378947 1 3 NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRA 378947 1 4 DATION. 378948 1 1 THE SCRATCHES WERE PROBABLY CAUSED BY REMOVING THE RTV HEATSINK WITH A S 378948 1 2 HARP TOOL. THE CORROSION PROTECTION WAS TOUCHED UP AND THE STRUCTURE WAS 378948 1 3 MR ID'D AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DON 378948 1 4 E ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 378961 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-020, THE SOLDER SLEEVE INSTALLED ON NEW WIRE D1352AB26 W 378961 1 2 AS NOTED TO HAVE WIRE BRAID PROTRUDING FROM THE SOLDER SLEEVE. PER SPEC 378961 1 3 ML0303-0032 THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE. THE OLD SOLDER SLEEVE AND JR24 WIRE WE 378961 1 4 RE REMOVED AND A NEW INSTALLATION INSTALLED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED 378961 1 5 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP - SLEEVE WAS NOT PROPERLY INSTAL 378961 1 6 LED. 379020 1 1 BULB SEAL V070-198702-004 WAS FOUND TO BE TORN. A NEW BULB SEAL WAS ORDE 379020 1 2 RED IN ITS PLACE WHERE THE OLD BULB SEAL WAS SENT OFF TO MSC, HDA FOR PO 379020 1 3 SSIBLE REFURBISHMENT. ALL REMOVAL AND ISNTALLATION STEPS WHERE TAKEN CAR 379020 1 4 E OF ON PR STR-3-15-3998. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. ALL W 379020 1 5 ORK IS COMPLETE WITH NO FURTHER NEEDED AT THIS TIME. 379060 1 1 ITEM 1: THE 4 EA HOLES IN THE V070-353860-001 AND 861-001 SUPPORTS THAT 379060 1 2 ATTACH THE V070-353858-001 ISOLATOR WERE PLUGGED AND RELOCATED IN ORDER 379060 1 3 TO ALLOW FOR CLEARANCE BETWEEN THE V070-852762-001 DOUBLER AND THE ISOLA 379060 1 4 TOR. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PROPER ISOLATOR POSITIONING ITS LAMINATED SHIM 379060 1 5 WAS PEELED ACCORDINGLY. THIS WAS ACCEPTED FOR MR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO F 379060 1 6 URTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. ITEM 2: THE GAPS BETWE 379060 1 7 EN THE RH 1360 FRAME CAP AND THE V070-353860-001 AND 861-001 SUPPORTS WE 379060 1 8 RE SHIMMED IN ORDER TO ALLOW FOR PROPER FASTENER INSTALLATION. THE PER 379060 1 9 PRINT SHIM WAS NOT THICK ENOUGH (.128" GAPS WERE .230-.255). THIS WAS MR 379060 1 10 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUS 379060 1 11 E IS TOLERANCE BUILD UP. 379061 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING AN INSPECTION WHEN A V070-544908-001 FAIRLE 379061 1 2 AD WAS THOUGHT TO BE MISSING FROM THE XO 1041.75 LOCATION ALONG THE PORT 379061 1 3 MPM DRIVE SHAFT. PER DWG V082-544501 ZN 27C (SEE ATTACHED COPY), THERE 379061 1 4 IS NO FAIRLEAD CALLED OUT AT THIS LOCATION. INSPECTION OF THE AREA HAS N 379061 1 5 OT IDENTIFIED ANY ANOMALY WITH THE DRIVE SHAFT OR ADJ STRUCTURE. THE DES 379061 1 6 CRIBED CONDITION IS PER PRINT AND IS NOT A PR CONDITION. NO RETEST REQUI 379061 1 7 RED. PROBABLE CAUSE: N/A 379089 1 1 AFTER THIS PR WAS TAKENN, AN EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION REVEALED THE STRUT 379089 1 2 TO BE CRACKED. PR STR-3-15-4269 WAS INITIATED AND THE STRUT WAS REMOVED 379089 1 3 AND SENT TO HDA FOR SCRAP. A COPY OF APPLICABLE PAGES OF STR-4269 IS ATT 379089 1 4 ACHED. BECAUSE THE STRUT WILL NOT BE RETURNED FOR USE, THE ABRADED AREA 379089 1 5 WILL NOT BE REPAIRED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE. 379090 1 1 VISUAL INSPECTION UNDER MAGNIFICATION SHOWED NO INDICATIONS OF EXPOSED F 379090 1 2 IBERS OR DAMAGED ALUMINUM. THE SCRATCH PENETRATED THE CORROSION PROTECTI 379090 1 3 ON ONLY. THE CORROSION PROTECTION ON THE BORON STRUT WAS TOUCHED UP PER 379090 1 4 PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHI 379090 1 5 P. 379093 1 1 DURING V30-14168, THE 70C6509-18 RUB STRIP WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED AND 7 379093 1 2 0C6505-1 LOCKING PIN FOR GSE ATTACH POINT WAS FOUND TO BE LOOSE. THE DIS 379093 1 3 CREPANT HARDWARE WAS REMOVED AND REINSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND 379093 1 4 THE DISCREPANT CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS 379093 1 5 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED 379093 1 6 FOR THIS PR. 379142 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 1). THE FWD MD114-5003-0005 NUTPLATES ON THE 379142 1 2 V070-199217 FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNNING TORQUE. 379142 1 3 THE NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACE 379142 1 4 NT HARDWARE, ME121-0014-03XX BLIND RIVETS WERE USED IN PLACE OF PER PRIN 379142 1 5 T NAS1199-3 RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTR 379142 1 6 ICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADA 379142 1 7 TION. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1 AND ITEM 4 ON PAGE 1). THE LOWER AFT AND UPP 379142 1 8 ER AFT I/B F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199217 FITTING WAS FOUND T 379142 1 9 O HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED 379142 1 10 . DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT HARDWARE, MD121-0005-04XX BLIND RIVE 379142 1 11 TS WERE USED IN PLACE OF PER PRINT NAS1199-4 RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RI 379142 1 12 VETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DIS 379142 1 13 CREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING AC 379142 1 14 TION REQUIRED. 379143 1 1 THE LOWER AFT AND UPPER AFT O/B F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUTS, AND LOWER FWD M 379143 1 2 D114-5003-0005 NUTPLATES ON THE V070-199218 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO H 379143 1 3 AVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. 379143 1 4 DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN 379143 1 5 PLACE OF SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRES 379143 1 6 TRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO F 379143 1 7 URTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 379144 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 1) THE FWD MD114-5003-0005 NUTPLATES ON THE V 379144 1 2 070-199219 FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNNING TORQUE. T 379144 1 3 HE NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACEN 379144 1 4 T HARDWARE, ME121-0014-03XX BLIND RIVETS WERE USED IN PLACE OF PER PRINT 379144 1 5 NAS1199-3 RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRIC 379144 1 6 TED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATI 379144 1 7 ON. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1) THE LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V 379144 1 8 070-199219 FITTING WAS FOUND TO HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RUNNING TORQUE. TH 379144 1 9 E NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT 379144 1 10 HARNDWARE, MD121-0005-04XX BLIND RIVETS WERE USED IN PACE OF PER PRINT 379144 1 11 NAS1199-4 RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR 379144 1 12 UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL 379144 1 13 DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 379145 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 1). THE UPPER AFT I/B AND O/T F12056-10-4 ANC 379145 1 2 HOR NUTS ON THE V070-199216 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE INSUFFICIENT 379145 1 3 RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCE 379145 1 4 SS, BLIND FASTENERS WERE USED IN PLACE OF SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND 379145 1 5 RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE D 379145 1 6 ISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 379145 1 7 ACTION REQUIRED. 379183 1 1 AS A RESULT OF THE CONDITION DOCUMENTED AS ITEM 1.0 ON PAGE 1.0 OF THIS 379183 1 2 PR, MPS ENGINEERING LOST VISIBILITY OF THE LO2 #4 LO ECO SENSOR (FUNCTIO 379183 1 3 N DESIGNATOR V41X1558X1). THIS SENSOR IS TRACKED VIA THE SCAN NETWORK, A 379183 1 4 ND RETEST OF CONNECTOR 55P84, PIN J WAS REQUIRED TO SATISFY THIS REPAIR. 379183 1 5 THE RETEST WAS PERFORMED IN OMI S0008, SEQ 24, ET LEVEL SENSOR CALIBRAT 379183 1 6 ION CHECKS. THE TEST WAS COMPLETED WITH NO ERRORS. THIS PR IS READY FOR 379183 1 7 CLOSURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 379185 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-037, THE SHIELD JUMPERS (GROUNDS) GOING TO PARALLEL SPLI 379185 1 2 CES 1E THRU 4E WERE NOT PINNED CORRECTLY AT 50P118. (1E WAS IN 2E POSITI 379185 1 3 ON, 4E WAS IN 1E AND 2E WAS IN 4E). THE CONFIGURATION WAS CORRECTED AND 379185 1 4 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP-SHIEL 379185 1 5 D GROUNDS WERE INCORRECTLY PINNED. 379192 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-012 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT DRAWING V070-794317-032 DID N 379192 1 2 OT REFLECT THE ROUTING FOR THE W88 HARNESS. AN EOTF WAS OBTAINED TO REFL 379192 1 3 ECT THE W88 HARNESS ORIGINATING FROM 40P426, 40P432 AND 40P434 INTO THE 379192 1 4 WIRE TRAY AS DESIGNATED IN FIGURE 1. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. NO R 379192 1 5 ETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY 379192 1 6 . 379286 1 1 DURING V30-14286, THE 70C6504-1 AND 70C6505-1 LOCKING PIN FOR GSE ATTACH 379286 1 2 POINTS WERE FOUND TO BE LOOSE. THE DISCREPANT HARDWARE WAS REMOVED AND 379286 1 3 REINSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND THE DISCREPANT CONDITION NO LONGE 379286 1 4 R EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURT 379286 1 5 HER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 379301 1 1 THE V075-333117-003 DOOR HINGE FAIRING IS CLEAR POLYCARBONATE. IT DEVELO 379301 1 2 PED CRACKS AROUND SEVERAL OF THE SCREW HOLES. IT WAS REPAIREDDD BY BONDI 379301 1 3 NG A LARGE PATCH OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA WITH MRB APPROVAL. NO FURTHER 379301 1 4 WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 379306 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-035 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE CONTACT (ME418-0042-1004) 379306 1 2 REQUIRED TO BE INSTALLED ON WIRE D1816B24 WAS THE WRONG SIZE IN ORDER T 379306 1 3 O INSERT INTO 40TB36. THE CORRECT SIZE CONTACT (ME418-0042-1003) WAS INS 379306 1 4 TALLED ON WIRE D1816B24 UPON E.O.T.F. CONCURRENCE. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED 379306 1 5 . NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIB 379306 1 6 UTED TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 379493 1 1 DURING 53V-0001 T/S WIRE SEGMENT T2318AB22 WAS INADVERTANTLY CUT. THE DI 379493 1 2 SCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY REMOVING/REPLACING DESIGN SPLICE 40SP9453 ON 379493 1 3 WIRE T2318AB22; WITH AN ADDITIONAL LENGTH OF WIRE. THE REPAIR RETURNS TH 379493 1 4 E WIRE HARNESS TO DWG/FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF WIRE 379493 1 5 T2318AB22 AND DESIGN SPLICE 40SP9453 WAS PERFORMED BY LSOC PRSD ENG PER 379493 1 6 OMI V1093 ON 6-11-92. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 379493 1 7 WORKMANSHIP 379565 1 1 DOWNGRADE THIS PR TO A DR. 379566 1 1 AFTER REMOVING THE 8780-100121 PANEL IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ITEM 1 WAS, 379566 1 2 INFACT, CORROSION WHEREAS ITEM 2 WAS MERELY ADHESIVE RESIDUE FROM AN OLD 379566 1 3 BOND. ITEM 1 DISCREPANCIES WERE ETCHED TO REMOVE THE CORROSION WITH MRB 379566 1 4 CONCURRENCE AND THEN CORROSION PROTECTED PER PRINT. THE PANEL WAS REINS 379566 1 5 TALLED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 379566 1 6 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 379572 1 1 THE BOLT PROBABLY BECAME DAMAGED DURING REMOVAL OF THE BODY FLAP. A NEW 379572 1 2 BOLT WAS PROCURED. THE OLD BOLT WAS SCRAPPED LOCALLY. NO FURTHER WORK TO 379572 1 3 BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 379573 1 1 WHILE WORKING TPS OEL-3-J1-029 IT WAS DETECTED THAT THE FUSE CAPS FOR FU 379573 1 2 SES F1 AND F32 DID NOT FIT TIGHT ON MDCA #2. THE MDCA IS BEING ROUTED TO 379573 1 3 RSC FOR MODIFICATION PER TPS OEL-3-J1-029. AN LRU PR WAS INITIATED AGAI 379573 1 4 NST THE LOOSE FUSES CAPS AND ATTACHED WITH THE MDCA FOR REPAIR AT RSC DU 379573 1 5 RING MODIFICATION. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. PROBABLE C 379573 1 6 AUSE FOR THIS PR IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 379630 1 1 THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT SIGNS OF CORROSION ON THE HOLOKS ATTACHING THE LOWE 379630 1 2 R LONGERON TO THE SIDE SKIN. THE CORROSION PROTECTION WAS REMOVED AT THE 379630 1 3 SE LOCATIONS AND THE DISCREPANT FASTENERS WERE INSPECTED FOR SIGNS OF PI 379630 1 4 TTING. NO PITS WERE FOUND INDICATING THAT THERE WAS NO ACTIVE CORROSION 379630 1 5 PRESENT AND NO DISCREPANCY. CORROSION PROTECTION WAS REAPPLIED PER SPEC 379630 1 6 REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS ENVIRONMENTAL. NO FURTHER SH 379630 1 7 OP OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 379633 1 1 THE PITTED AREAS OF THE BULKHEAD WERE BURNISHED OUT AND CORROSION PROTEC 379633 1 2 TED WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE O 379633 1 3 N THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL. 379692 1 1 THIS PR IS A DUPLICATE OF PR STR-3-15-4320. ALL WORK WILL BE DONE ON PR 379692 1 2 STR-3-15-4320, WITH NO FURTHER WORK NEEDED ON THIS PR. THE V070-731776-0 379692 1 3 09 CLOSEOUT PANEL HAD 2 SMALL CRACKS WHICH WERE FOUND TO BE JUST DEBONDI 379692 1 4 NG FROM THE SHROUD. THEY WERE MR REPAIRED WITH ADHESIVE IMPREGNATION. AL 379692 1 5 L WORK IS COMPLETE ON PR STR-3-15-4320, WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. P 379692 1 6 ROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 379695 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-035, TERMINAL BOARD ASSEMBLY 40TB36 WAS FOUND NOT TO HAV 379695 1 2 E MINATURE TERMINAL BOARD "V". A NEW TERMINAL BOARD WAS ORDERED, THE SER 379695 1 3 IAL NUMBER/OCN RECORDED AND INSERTED INTO 40TB36. NO FURTHER ACTION REQU 379695 1 4 IRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSUFFICIENT DATA. 379733 1 1 DURING TPS OEL-3-J1-050 WHILE PERFORMING CONTINUITY CHECKS IT WAS DISCOV 379733 1 2 ERED THAT THE PIN LOCATIONS NOTED ON PAGE 1 EXHIBITED OPEN CIRCUITS. VER 379733 1 3 IFICATIONS OF PIN LOCATIONS REVEALED THAT PINS WERE PINNED INCORRECTLY P 379733 1 4 ER WORK PERFORMED ON TPS OEL-050. THE PIN LOCATIONS WERE CORRECTED ON TP 379733 1 5 S OEL-050 AND CONTINUITY CHECKS REPERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY ON THIS PR. RET 379733 1 6 EST WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO WORKMA 379733 1 7 NSHIP. 379734 1 1 THE MISSING FASTENERS ID'D IN ITEMS 1,2,3,4,5 ON PGS 1, 1A, 1B WERE RESO 379734 1 2 LVED BY INSTALLING PER PRINT FASTENERS IN HOLES 1,2,3 & 6 AS REFERENCED 379734 1 3 IN ATTACH 1, PG 1 AND ALL THE HOLES IN ATTACHMENT 1, PGS 2 & 3. 4 OF THE 379734 1 4 11 MISSING FASTENERS IDENTIFIED IN ITEMS 1,4,5 (REF HOLES 4 & 5 ON ATTA 379734 1 5 CH 1, THE 4TH HOLE IN ITEM 4 AND THE HOLE IN ITEM 5) WERE DETERMINED TO 379734 1 6 ACTUALLY BE OPEN HOLES (NOT PER PRINT). THE OPEN HOLES WERE FILLED WITH 379734 1 7 HI-LOKS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. MR ID WAS APPLIED. IT IS SUSPECTE 379734 1 8 D THAT THE FASTENERS WERE NOT INSTALLED BY THE VENDOR AND THERE IS INSUF 379734 1 9 FICIENT DATA TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE 4 HOLES IN THE TORQUE BOX. 379734 1 10 THE TORQUE BOX ON LH 4 PLBD HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE 379734 1 11 CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. 379735 1 1 THE SUSPECTED CRACK IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2, PG 1 WAS DETERMINED TO BE A SK 379735 1 2 IVE THROUGH THE PAINT ONLY AND WAS RESOLVED BY SCUFF SANDING TO REMOVE T 379735 1 3 HE MARK AND THEN TOUCHING UP THE PRIMER AND PAINT PER THE DWG REQUIREMEN 379735 1 4 TS. THE MISSING FASTENERS IDENTIFIED IN ITEMS 1,3,4 AND 5 PPG 1 AND 1A W 379735 1 5 ERE RESOLVED BY INSTALLING PER PRINT GASTENERS IN HOLES #2,3,6 AS REFERE 379735 1 6 NCED IN ATTACH 1, PG 1 AND ALL THE HOLES IN ATTACH 1, PG 2 & 3. HOLE #1 379735 1 7 ON ATTACH 1 (REF ITEMS 1 & 7, PG 1 & 1A) WAS RESOLVED BY INSTALLING A LA 379735 1 8 RGER DIAMETER HI-LOK WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. TWO OF THE SIX MISSI 379735 1 9 NG FASTENERS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PG 1 (REF HOLES 4 & 5 ON ATTACH 1, PG 379735 1 10 1) WERE DETERMINED TO ACTUALLY BE OPEN HOLES (NOT PER PRINT). THE OPEN 379735 1 11 HOLES WERE FILLED WITH HI-LOKS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. THE 10 379735 1 12 FASTENERS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 6, PG 1B WAS RESOLVED BY CORRECTING THE 379735 1 13 DISPO TO CALL OUT THE CORRECT PER PRINT FASTENER. IT IS SUSPECTED THAT 379735 1 14 THE FASTENERS WERE NOT INSTALLED BY THE VENDOR AND THERE IS INSUFFICIENT 379735 1 15 DATA TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE TWO HOLES ON THE LEADING EDGE OF THE 379735 1 16 TORQUE BOX. THE SUSPECTED CAUSE OF THE SKIVE MARK IS WORKMANSHIP AND THE 379735 1 17 CAUSE OF THE INCORRECT FASTENER CALLOUT IN THE DISPO IS ENG. CONCLUDE 379735 1 18 THAT THE TORQUE BOX ON RH NO 4 PLBD HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE 379735 1 19 CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 379929 1 1 THE OBSTRUCTION IN THE LH DRAIN TUBE WAS REMOVED REVEALING A HOLE IN THE 379929 1 2 SIDEWALL AND A METALLIC PIECE WHICH COULD NOT BE REMOVED. THE DRAIN TUB 379929 1 3 E IS NOW OPEN AS DEMONSTRATED BY WATER FLOWING THROUGH IT. THE METALLIC 379929 1 4 PIECE, THE HOLE IN THE SIDEWALL AND THE SCRATCHES INCURRED DURING THE RE 379929 1 5 MOVAL WERE ALL MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE D 379929 1 6 ONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. 379956 1 1 THE .120 GAP BETWEEN THE V070-338713 PLATE AND V070-338901 DOUBLER WAS F 379956 1 2 ILLED BY FABRICATING A MR SHIM. THIS SHIM WAS INSTALLED PER STR-3-J1-531 379956 1 3 . NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS A BUILDUP OF DESIGN TOLE 379956 1 4 RANCE. 379958 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED TO DOCUMENT THAT WIRE U259B24 WAS BROKEN. PREVIOUS 379958 1 2 DISPO REMOVED AND REPLACED THE DISCREPANT SHIELD JUMPER SIRE. THE JUMPE 379958 1 3 R WIRE'S GROUND LUG WAS RETESTED SUCCESSFULLY BY VERIFYING CONTINUITY BE 379958 1 4 TWEEN 50P296 GROUND LUG TO STRUCTURE GROUND. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIR 379958 1 5 ED BY THIS PR. RETEST OF THE REMOVED CONTACTS WILL BE RETESTED VIA SCAN 379958 1 6 RETEST. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS DISRESPECT FOR ORBITER INTEGRI 379958 1 7 TY. 379966 1 1 THE PG 1 DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY REMOVING AND REPLACING THE APCA #1 379966 1 2 F1 FUSEHOLDER THEREBY RETURNING HARDWARE TO A DESIGN/FLIGHT CONFIGURATI 379966 1 3 ON. REF SCHEMATIC V570-760513; FUSE F1 SUPPORTS ET SEPARATION CAMERA HEA 379966 1 4 TERS, WHEN THE CAMERAS ARE INSTALLED/FLOWN. PRESENTLY, OV-103 IS NOT CON 379966 1 5 FIGURED FOR ET SEPARATION CAMERAS. THESE PARTICULAR CAMERAS ARE FLOWN ON 379966 1 6 OV-102 AND OV-105 ONLY. AS A RESULT, THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBA 379966 1 7 BLE CAUSE: MATERIAL DEFICIENCY. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON PR. 379967 1 1 DURING V31-15105, THE 2ND FASTENER ON THE OUTBOARD SIDE OF APCA #1 WAS F 379967 1 2 OUND TO BE LOOSE. THE FASTENER WAS RE-TORQUED TO SPEC. NO FURTHER ACTION 379967 1 3 REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP - FASTENER WAS NOT TOR 379967 1 4 QUED CORRECTLY. 379969 1 1 IN ORDER TO ALLEVIATE THE EDGE DISTANCE PROBLEM A .125" MR SHIM WILL BE 379969 1 2 INSTALLED PER STR-3-J1-531 BETWEEN THE FITTING AND THE FRAME CAP. THIS W 379969 1 3 ILL GIVE EDGE DISTANCE OF 2D. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE 379969 1 4 IS TOLERANCE BUILD UP. 379986 1 1 WHILE WORKING OEL-3-J1-035, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE ME418-0042-1004 C 379986 1 2 ONTACT, CRIMPED ON WIRE D1816A24 WAS TOO SMALL TO LOCK INTO TB 40TB36. A 379986 1 3 S SUCH AN EO TO FOLLOW WAS GENERATED TO CHANGE THE WIRE LIST TO AUTHORIZ 379986 1 4 E THE USE OF A ME418-0042-1003 CONTACT FOR WIRE D1816A24. THE WORK WAS S 379986 1 5 UCCESSFULLY PERFORMED AND THE EO WAS RECEIVED TO AUTHORIZE SAID CHANGES. 379986 1 6 NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED BY THIS PR. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS P 379986 1 7 R IS VENDOR. 380084 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTED A BURN MARK ON THE UPPER FACESHEET OF THE V070-704063 380084 1 2 -001 AVIONICS SHELF NUMBER 2. INITIAL QC INSPECTION SHOWED AN APPARENT P 380084 1 3 IT, HOWEVER, AFTER THE RESIDUE WAS CLEANED OFF, NO PITS WERE FOUND. VISU 380084 1 4 AL INSPECTION AND COIN TAP REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF FACESHEET DAMAGE AND 380084 1 5 NO DETECTABLE DEFECTS WERE FOUND ON MOLD IMPRESSIONS. PR OEL-3-15-0252 W 380084 1 6 AS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT THE SUSPECT CONDITION OF EXPOSED WIRE RESULTING I 380084 1 7 N THE BURN MARK ON AVIONICS SHELF NO 2. NO STR DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBA 380084 1 8 BLE WILL BE ADDRESSED ON OEL PR. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING OR SHOP ACTION 380084 1 9 REQUIRED. 380129 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V31-14155 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR 45P9 380129 1 2 093 WAS ONLY PARTIALLY MATED. FURTHER ENGINEERING INSPECTION REVEALED TH 380129 1 3 AT CONNECTOR 45P9093 WAS DEMATED (ILLEGALLY). THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRE 380129 1 4 SSED BY OPENING THE BACKSHELL, INSPECTING FOR ANY ANOMALIES, RETORQUING 380129 1 5 THE BACKSHELL AND MATING. UPON REMATING SCAN WAS NOTIFIED OF ILLEGAL DEM 380129 1 6 ATE FOR CONNECTOR TRACEABILITY. THIS RETURNS CONNECTOR 45P9093 TO PRINT 380129 1 7 CONFIGURATION. CONNECTOR RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRACKED WITH NO FURTHER ACT 380129 1 8 ION REQUIRED ON THIS DOCUMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 380129 1 9 ION REQUIRED ON THIS DOCUMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 380216 1 1 THIS PR WAS TAKEN TO DOCUMENT THAT WIRE D1351AC26 WAS A 3 CONDUCTOR SHIE 380216 1 2 LDED WIRE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN A 2 CONDUCTOR SHIELDED WIRE. AS SUCH THE 380216 1 3 WIRE RUN WAS ARMEOVED AND AREPLACED WITH AN A2S TYPE WIRE (2 CONDUCTOR S 380216 1 4 HIELDED 26 AWG). THE NEW WIRE RUN WAS IDNETIFIED APPROPRIATELY AS D1351A 380216 1 5 C26. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED BY THIS PR AS RETEST WILL BE SATISFIE 380216 1 6 D BY SCAN RETEST. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP BY THE V 380216 1 7 ENDOR. 380298 1 1 DURING V31-15105, IT WAS OBSERVED THAT WIRE HARNESS V070-775334 WAS EXPE 380298 1 2 RIENCING CHAFFING FROM NUT AND FRAME OF SHELF 2 ON LOWER L/H SIDE OF AV 380298 1 3 BAY 5. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY INSTALLING EXTRUSION RUBBER TO 380298 1 4 FRAME ANGLE WHICH WILL PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR HARNESS. ALSO, PTFE TAPE W 380298 1 5 AS INSTALLED ON WIRE HARNESS ITSELF TO ELIMINATE CHAFFING CAUSED BY NUT. 380298 1 6 THE INFORMATION REGARDING THE ABOVE ACTION WILL BE ANNOTATED IN THE WIR 380298 1 7 E PROTECTION/DAMAGED DOCUMENTATION LOG. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED FOR T 380298 1 8 HIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO ORBITER PROCESSING. 380384 1 1 DURING CLOSEOUT INSPECTION PER V80-96928, A "CRACK" WAS FOUND TO EXIST I 380384 1 2 N THE V070-199220-004 SPAR FITTING. MR HISTORY ON THE FITTING DOCUMENTED 380384 1 3 THIS DAMAGE AS A TOOL CUTTER MARK ON MR 056763. THE MR ADDRESSED MACHIN 380384 1 4 ING ERRORS IN THE ADJACENT CAVITY AND FABRICATED AND INSTALLED A MRD 056 380384 1 5 763-001 FITTING BUT DID NOT BLEND AWAY THE MATERIAL WHICH WAS DAMAGED BY 380384 1 6 THE CUTTER. PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION, THE TOOL MARK WAS BLENDED 380384 1 7 SMOOTH WITH THE SURROUNDING STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS VEN 380384 1 8 DOR. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 380394 1 1 THE V070-575002-002 BUSHINGS MAY HAVE BEEN DAMAGED BY NORMAL OPERATION O 380394 1 2 R DURING REMOVAL OF THE BODY FLAP. NEW BUSHINGS WERE PROCURED AND WILL B 380394 1 3 E REINSTALLED ON V070-3-J1-163 BODY FLAP REINSTALLATION. NO FURTHER WORK 380394 1 4 TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE-OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION, UNAVOIDA 380394 1 5 BLE DAMAGE. 380400 1 1 WHILE PERFORMING TPS OEL-3-J1-021, IT WAS NOTED THAT RECETPACLE 30J612 H 380400 1 2 AD 3 BENT PINS AND RECEPTACLE 30J615 HAD 8 BENT PINS. A STANDARD REPAIR 380400 1 3 PROCEDURE (SRP) WAS PERFORMED ON BOTH CONNECTORS TO STRAIGHTEN OUT THE B 380400 1 4 ENT PINS. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. THE 380400 1 5 RETEST FOR THIS PR WILL BE TACKED BY SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQIRED 380400 1 6 PER THIS PR. 380401 1 1 THE BOLTS PROBABLY BECAME DAMAGED DURING REMOVAL OF THE BODY FLAP. NEW B 380401 1 2 OLTS WERE PROCURED. OLD BOLTS WERE SCRAPPED LOCALLY. NO FURTHER WORK TO 380401 1 3 BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 380408 1 1 ITEM 1 FIRST PART - THE LARGER TEARS IN THE MONEL MESH WERE PREVIOUSLY M 380408 1 2 R ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE ON PR STR-3-13-3713. SEE ATTACHMENT A FO 380408 1 3 R REFERENCE. THE TEARS HAVE NOT BECOME ANY LARGER. THE PART WAS ID'D TO 380408 1 4 REFLECT THIS MR ACTION. THE SMALLER TEAR (< 1/2") IS ACCEPTABLE PER THE 380408 1 5 INSPECTION PROCEDURE ON THE PRINT V070-565371 - NO DISCREPANCY. ITEM 1 S 380408 1 6 ECOND PART - THE DISCREPANT RIVET WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. NO 380408 1 7 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADA 380408 1 8 TION. 380418 1 1 THE MISTRIMMED V070-334487-005 BRACKET WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 380418 1 2 USE AS IS. THE MISTRIMMING CAUSED 1 EA HOLE TO HAVE LESS THAN DESIGN EDG 380418 1 3 E DISTANCE. THIS WAS ALSO MR ACCEPTED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBA 380418 1 4 BLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 380437 1 1 DURING V5C05.003, PCA #3 COULD NOT BE REMOVE USING RAILS AND ROLLER BOAR 380437 1 2 S. ELECTRICAL HARNESSES ON THE OUTBOARD SIDE PREVENTED THE RAILS FROM BE 380437 1 3 ING INSTALLED. AN MR WAS PROCESSED TO REMOVE THE PCA MANUALLY. AFTER REM 380437 1 4 OVAL, AND ATTEMPT TO MOVE WIRE HARNESSES TO LET THE RAIL FIT WAS UNSUCCE 380437 1 5 SSFUL. A SECOND MR WAS REQUESTED FOR PCA INSTALLATION BY USING AN AIR BA 380437 1 6 G WHICH RAISED THE PCA SMOOTHLY IN PLACE. RETEST OF PCA 3 R&R WILL BE TR 380437 1 7 ACKED BY SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. NOTE: A GSE PR AGA 380437 1 8 INST THE RAILS WAS TAKEN AND EOTF PROCESSED TO ELIMINATE THE USE OF RAIL 380437 1 9 S AND ROLLER BARS FOR PCA 3. KSC ALTERNATE METHOD IS TO BE USED. PROBABL 380437 1 10 E CAUSE: DESIGN PROBLEM WITH RAILS AND ROLLER BARS FOR PCA 3 R&R. 380453 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-032, CONNECTOR 35P7 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL. S 380453 1 2 RP V-EL-0001-C-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO FUR 380453 1 3 THER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 380495 1 1 THIS PR WAS TAKEN TO DOCUMENT THAT SEVEN PINS IN RECEPTACLE 30J692 WERE 380495 1 2 BENT. UPON ENGINEERING INSPECTION, IT WAS NOTED THAT 10 PINS WERE ACTUAL 380495 1 3 LY BENT. THOSE BEING PINS 1,2,4,32,34,42,43,46,47, AND 48. SRP-V-EL-0009 380495 1 4 (A-0) WAS SUCCESSFULLY EMPLOYED TO STRAIGHTEN THE BENT PINS. RETESTOF T 380495 1 5 HIS CONNECTOR WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED PER SCAN TRACKING. NO FURTHER ACTION 380495 1 6 IS REQUIRED BY THIS PR. MOST PROBABEL CAUSE OF THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP. 380667 1 1 THE 4 EACH ELONGATED HOLES WERE DRILLED UP TO THE NEXT LARGER HI LOK SIZ 380667 1 2 E AND .190 HI LOKS WERE INSTALLED IN PLACE OF THE .164 HI,LOKS. 2 EACH O 380667 1 3 F THE 4 EACH HOLES WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE DUE TO LESS THA 380667 1 4 N 2D EDGE DISTANCE. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMA 380667 1 5 NSHIP. 380690 1 1 WIRE U99A24 WAS FOUND TO BE CUT JUST 2 INCHES FROM 55SP247. THE DESIGN S 380690 1 2 PLICE WAS CUT OUT AND REPLACED. THIS WIRE IS FOR THE APU 2 INJECTOR COOL 380690 1 3 COMMAND AND RETEST FOR THIS WIRE/CIRCUIT WAS PER V1019 VL3 SEQ 108. NO 380690 1 4 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 380774 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-035 WHILE PERFORMING CONTINUITY CHECKS IT WAS DISCOVERED 380774 1 2 THAT WIRE D1816A24 WAS NOT PROPERLY TERMINATED INTO PIN N OF CONNECTOR 380774 1 3 40P805. THE WIRE D1816A24 WAS THEN EXTRACTED FROM CONNECTOR AND NOTED TH 380774 1 4 AT CRIMP WAS GOOD. THE WIRE WAS NOT INSERTED PROPERLY INTO GROMMET. THE 380774 1 5 WIRE D1816A24 WAS THEN CORRECTLY INSERTED INTO CONNECTOR 40P805 AND WORK 380774 1 6 CONTINUED ON THE TPS-OEL-035. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. PROBABLE 380774 1 7 CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. 380794 1 1 THE SUPPORTS WERE MR TRIMMED TO FIT AROUND THE TRIMMED WEBBS. PROBLEM DU 380794 1 2 E TO TOLERANCE BUILD UP. 380861 1 1 THIS PR WAS DETECTED DURING J/C V31-14118. THREE ME112-0012-3204 SCREWS 380861 1 2 HOLDING THE T01P31202 SEAL COMPRESSOR TO THE LEFT PLBD DID NOT HAVE THRE 380861 1 3 AD PROTRUSION THROUGH THE NUTPLATES. PER THIS WAD MRB CONCURRENCE WAS OB 380861 1 4 TAINED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE IN THIS CONFIGURATION. MR ID WAS APPLIED PER 380861 1 5 THIS WAD. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING 380861 1 6 DISCREPANCY. 380933 1 1 ITEM 1 WAS ADDRESSED BY FILLING THE HOLE WITH ADHESIVE IMPREGNATED WITH 380933 1 2 FIBERGLASS FIBERS. ITEM 2 WAS ADDRESSED BY REMOVING THE NUTPLATE AND PAT 380933 1 3 CHING THE CRACKED AREA, THE NUTPLATE WAS THEN REINSTALLED 90 DEGREES FRO 380933 1 4 M ITS ORIGINAL POSIITION. BOTH OF THESE REPAIRS WERE MRB APPROVED. NO FU 380933 1 5 RTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE- OEPRATIONAL DEGRADATIO 380933 1 6 N. 380934 1 1 THE PANEL WAS FOUND CRACKED DURING POST FLIGHT INSPECTION. THE PANEL WAS 380934 1 2 REPAIRED WITH UNRESTRICTED MR DISPO BY BONDING A FIBERGLASS PATCH TO TH 380934 1 3 E PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 380934 1 4 NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 380967 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-0218, (1) WIRE S5084A20 WAS FOUND TO HAVE EXPOSED CONDUC 380967 1 2 TOR (2) WIERE U279A24, U280A20 AND 3U28D20 WERE FOUND TO BE TOO SHORT TO 380967 1 3 TERMINATE IN 50P9929 (3) WIRE 3U50E20 WAS FOUND TO BE TOO SHORT TO ROUT 380967 1 4 E PER DRAWING. WIRE S5084A20 WAS SPLICED AND THE OTHER END RETURNED TO P 380967 1 5 RINT BY CAP AND STOWING. WIRES U279A24,U280A20 AND 3U28D20 WERE RE-ROUTE 380967 1 6 D AND THE ROUTING MR;D. 3U50W20 WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW WIRE TOO AND RET 380967 1 7 ERMINATED PER PRINT. A CONTINUITY CHECK WAS PERFORMED ON NEW WIRE AND WA 380967 1 8 S SUCCESSFUL. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: (1) 380967 1 9 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DUIRNG PROCESSING (2 & 3) 380967 1 10 WORKMANSHIP-(VENDOR OR LSOC) WIRES WERE NOT ROUTED PER PRINT AND WERE 380967 1 11 FOUND TO BE SHORT. 381007 1 1 THE HEATSINK BECAME DEBONDED IN NUMEROUS AREAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR. THE D 381007 1 2 EBONDS AND VOIDS OF LESS THAN 4 SQUARE INCHES WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRES 381007 1 3 TRICTED USE. THE DISCREPANCY GREATER THAN FOUR SWUARE INCHES WAS REBONDE 381007 1 4 D PER PRINT. NO FURHTER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPER 381007 1 5 ATIONAL DEGRADATION. 381008 1 1 THE HEATSINK BECAME DEBONDED DUE TO NORMAL WEAR. THE DISCREPANCIES WERE 381008 1 2 ALL SMALL ENOUGH THAT THEY WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 381008 1 3 NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRA 381008 1 4 DATION. 381010 1 1 THE HEATSINK BECAME DEBONDED DUE TO NORMAL WEAR. THE DISCREPANCIES WERE 381010 1 2 ALL SMALL ENOUGH THAT THEY WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 381010 1 3 NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRA 381010 1 4 DATION. 381124 1 1 THE SUPPORT STRIP BECAME PARTIALLY DELAMINATED WHT THE BONDLINE BETWEEN 381124 1 2 THE SUPPORT STRIP AND THE CURTAIN SEAL WAS SCIVED FOR DODY FLAP REMOVAL. 381124 1 3 THE DELAMINATIONS WERE TRIMMED OR PEELED FLUSH AND THEN MR ACCEPTED FOR 381124 1 4 UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE 381124 1 5 UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 381240 1 1 DURING CLOSE OUT INSPECTION PRIOR TO THE RADIATOR INSTALLATION, AREAS OF 381240 1 2 "CHIPPING AND SPLINTERING" WERE FOUND TO EXIST AROUND THE SEVERAL HI-LO 381240 1 3 K ATTACH POINTS WHICH ATTACH THE INTERCOSTALS TO THE FRAMES ON THE R/H P 381240 1 4 LBD #4. THE DISCREPANT AREAS WERE FILLED WITH MBO120-037 TYPE II ADHESIV 381240 1 5 E PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMAN 381240 1 6 SHIP DURING VENDOR MANUFACTURE/ASSEMBLY. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 381240 1 7 ACTION REQUIRED. 381243 1 1 DURING CLOSE OUT INSPECTION PRIOR TO THE RADIATOR INSTALLATION, AREAS OF 381243 1 2 "CHIPPING AND SLINTERING" WERE FOUND TO EXIST AROUND THE SEVERAL HI-LOK 381243 1 3 ATTACH POINTS WHICH ATTACH THE INTERCOSTALS TO THE FRAMES ON THE R/H PL 381243 1 4 BD #3. THE DISCREPANT AREAS WERE FILLED WITH MBO120-037 TYPE II ADHESIVE 381243 1 5 PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANS 381243 1 6 HIP DURING VENDOR MANUFACTURE/ASSEMBLY. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING A 381243 1 7 CTION REQUIRED. 381245 1 1 DURING ROUTING OF CABLE N27C20 IT WAS FOUND THAT THE CABLE WAS TOO SHORT 381245 1 2 . A NEW PIECE OF SUFFICIENT LENGTH CABLE WAS OBTAIN FOR THE REROUTING OF 381245 1 3 WIRE SEGMENT AND THE WORK WAS COMPLETED. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE FOR TH 381245 1 4 IS PR IS DUE TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY IN CALLING OUT THE INCORRECT LENGTH. N 381245 1 5 O FURTHER WROK IS REQUIRED PER THIS PR. 381374 1 1 PR STR-3-15-4147 IS A DUPLICATE OF PR STR-3-15-4104. ITEM ONE AND TWO ON 381374 1 2 PAGE ONE WAS RESOLVED BY ORDERING A NEW BULB SEAL (PART #V070-198702-00 381374 1 3 4) AND OLD BULB SEAL ROUTE TO MSC-HDA FOR POSSIBLE REFURBISHMENT. ALL WO 381374 1 4 RK WAS COMPLETED ON PR STR-3-15-4104 WITH ON FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. 381411 1 1 WHILE WORKING ON OEL-3-J1-020, THE BACKSHELL TANG SET SCREW OF CONNECTOR 381411 1 2 30P29 WAS STRIPPED AND COULD NOT BE LOCKED OUT. DIPOSITION WAS PRODUCED 381411 1 3 TO REMOVE AND REPLACE THE BACK-SHELL ON 30P29. RETEST OF CONNECTOR 30P2 381411 1 4 9 WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS DUE TO 381411 1 5 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED PER THIS PR. 381463 1 1 CABIN ATTACH FITTING 70W3828-5 AND 70W3828-6, AT HUCK BOLT #8, HAD RAISE 381463 1 2 D METAL AROUND GOUGES LIGHTLY SANDED DOWN WITH 220 GRIT OF FINER, PER UN 381463 1 3 RESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. ONCE EDDY CURRENT CHECK WAS COMPLETE, EXPOSED ME 381463 1 4 TAL HAD ONE COAT OF KORPON APPLIED FOR PROTECTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKM 381463 1 5 ANSHIP. WORK IS COMPLETE WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. 381473 1 1 MR HI-LOKS WERE INSTALLED IN PLACE OF THE PER PRINT SOLID RIVETS. PROBLE 381473 1 2 M DUE TO LACK OF TOOLING ACCESS. 381648 1 1 THE RUB PANEL WAS DAMAGED BY HARD CONTACT WITHA FLIPPER DOOR PUSH ROD DU 381648 1 2 RING ELEVON RAISING. THE RUB PANEL WAS REMOVED AND INSPECTED AND THE ARE 381648 1 3 A OF SEVERE DAMAGE WAS CUT OUT TO PROVIDE A SMOOTH EDGE. THE CUT OUT AND 381648 1 4 THE WARP OF THE PANEL WERE ACCEPTED BY MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED US 381648 1 5 E. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 381658 1 1 THE V070-338902-001 FITTING INSTALLATION WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY ADDING A MR 381658 1 2 SHIM IN ORDER TO ALLEVIATE A GAP THAT EXISTED BETWEEN THE FITTING AND T 381658 1 3 HE FRAME CAP. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS A BUILD UP O 381658 1 4 F TOLERANCE. 381766 1 1 ITEM 1.0 WAS WRITTEN UP INCORRECTLY. THE HOLES IN QUESTION WERE THE 8 EA 381766 1 2 HOLES THAT CONNECT THE SUPPORT TO THE FRAME. THESE HOLES WERE NOT ELONG 381766 1 3 ATED; ALL WERE WITHIN HOLE TOLERANCES. HOWEVER THEY WERE ROUGH AND THIS 381766 1 4 PR "CLEANED" THE HOLES AND RE-APPLIED CORROSION PROTECTION. THE 4 EA HOL 381766 1 5 ES THAT ATTACHED 2 EA ANGLES TO THE SUPPORT WERE DISPOSITIONED ON STR-3- 381766 1 6 J1-4153. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 381767 1 1 THE 3EA MISDRILLED RIVET HOLES WERE MR REWORKED BY ENLARGING THEM TO TH 381767 1 2 E NEXT HIGHER RIVET SIZE AND THEN PLUGGED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. ENLARG 381767 1 3 ING THE HOLES DID NOT VIOLATE ANY EDGE DISTANCE REQUIREMENTS. NO FURTHER 381767 1 4 ACTION REQUIRED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANS 381767 1 5 HIP. 381912 1 1 DURING TPS OEL-3-J1-037 STEP 1-179 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLE U148B20 381912 1 2 HAD CONDUCTOR DAMAGE AT 50P9922. WITH MR APPROVAL CABLE U148B20 WAS CUT 381912 1 3 BEYOND THE DAMAGED AREA AND A NEW SECTION OF CABLE SPLICED IN USING KSC 381912 1 4 SPLICES KSC-0507 AND KSC-0508 AND TERMINATED TO 50P9920 (ITEM 1). IT WAS 381912 1 5 ALSO DISCOVERED THAT CABLE U260C20 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE AND NO SHIELD DAMA 381912 1 6 GE. CABLE U260C20 WAS REPAIRED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 381912 1 7 7503 TEFLON TAPE PER SRP V-EL-0007-C METHOD B. THIS RETURNS CABLES U148B 381912 1 8 20 AND U260C20 TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT A 381912 1 9 DVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE OR 381912 1 10 INTERCHANGEABILITY. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. NO FURTHER 381912 1 11 DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. 381915 1 1 WHILE WORKING OEL-3-J1-033, WIRE SEGMENTS 3K555C26 AND 3K580C26 WERE FOU 381915 1 2 ND TO HAVE SHIELD DAMAGE AT CONNECTOR 83P616. WHEN REPAIRS WERE ATTEMPTE 381915 1 3 D ON THE WIRE SEGMENTS, THE TECHNICIAN COULD NOT OBTAIN ENOUGH SLACK TO 381915 1 4 RE-TERMINATE THE WIRES. A MR WAS REQUESTED TO SOLDER ON NEW PIGTAIL LEAD 381915 1 5 S AND RETERMINATE AT THE BACKSHELL OF CONNECTOR. UPON INSPECTION OF THE 381915 1 6 CONNECTOR, PRIOR TO CLOSING THE BACKSHELL, A PG 1A WAS PICKED UP FOR WIR 381915 1 7 E SEGMENTS 3K573C26,03K587C26 AND 3K566C26 HAVING BROKEN PIGTAIL SHIELDS 381915 1 8 . ANOTHER MR WAS REQUESTED FOR THESE WIRE SEGMENTS TO HAVE PIGTAILS SOLD 381915 1 9 ER BACK ON AND RETERMINATED TO THE BACKSHELL. THE CONNECTOR WAS THEN 381915 1 10 REINSPECTED AND MATED. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS DUE TO 381915 1 11 OPERATION DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED PER THIS PR. RETEST 381915 1 12 WILL BE PERFORMED PER TPS OEL-3-J1-033. 381967 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT TWO DINGS ON THE L/H #2 RADIATOR PANEL 381967 1 2 . DENTAL MOLDS OF THE DINGS WERE TAKEN AND ANALYSIS SHOWED THEM TO BE SM 381967 1 3 ALL AND SMOOTH BOTTOMED WITH NO FACE SHEET DAMAGE EVIDENT. THE DINGS WER 381967 1 4 E MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. PROBABLE 381967 1 5 CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS EXPOSURE TO ON-ORBIT DEBRIS AND NORMAL WEAR AND TEA 381967 1 6 R. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 382207 1 1 THIS PR WAS TAKEN TO DOCUMENT THAT WIRES KITTED FOR OEL-3-J1-020, WERE T 382207 1 2 HREE CONDUCTOR WIRE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 2 CONDUCTOR. PREVIOUS DISPOSITI 382207 1 3 ON OBTAINED NEW WIRE, REMOVED THE DISCREPANT WIRE FROM THE SHIP AND RERO 382207 1 4 UTED THE NEW WIRE. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED BY THIS PR. MOST PROBAB 382207 1 5 LE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS THE VENDOR AS THE INCORRECT SUPPLIES WERE KITTED. 382212 1 1 WHILE WORKING OEL-3-J1-020, THE VENDOR KIT WAS FOUND TO CONTAIN WIRE SEG 382212 1 2 MENT D1351AA26, WHICH WAS A THREE CONDUCTOR WIRE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN TW 382212 1 3 O CONDUCTORS. DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO OBTAIN A NEW SEGMENT OF WIRE WITH ONL 382212 1 4 Y TWO CONDUCTORS AND ROUTE PER PRINT. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR 382212 1 5 IS DUE TO VENDOR ERROR. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED PER THIS PR. 382213 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-020 STEP 4-1, WIRES D1352AA26, D1356AA26, D1362AB26 AND 382213 1 2 D1363AC26 WERE FOUND TO BE THREE CONDUCTOR WIRES WHEN OBTAINED FROM THE 382213 1 3 RI KIT. WIRES WERE SUPPOSED TO BE 2 CONDUCTOR. NEW WIRE WAS ORDERED AND 382213 1 4 THE OLD SENT BACK TO LOGISTICS FOR RESTOCK. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRE 382213 1 5 D ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR - WRONG WIRE WAS PUT IN KIT. 382214 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-020 STEP 4-1, WIRES D1363AA26, D1353AA26, AND D1358AA26 382214 1 2 WERE FOUND TO BE THREE CONDUCTOR WIRES WHEN OBTAINED FROM THE RI KIT. WI 382214 1 3 RES WERE SUPPOSED TO BE 2 CONDUCTOR. NEW WIRE WAS ORDERED AND THE OLD SE 382214 1 4 NT BACK TO LOGISTICS FOR RESTOCK. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 382214 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR - WRONG WIRE WAS PUT IN KIT. 382243 1 1 THE THREE HI-LOKS WERE LEFT IN PLACE. TWO OF THE HI-LOKS WERE USED TO PL 382243 1 2 UG THEIR HOLES. THE OTHER ONE WAS USED TO MOUNT THE NEW BRACKET THAT WAS 382243 1 3 TO HAVE A RIVET PICK UP THE HOLE. PROBLEM DUE TO ACCESS PROBLEM. 382245 1 1 THE EDGE FILL BECAME SCORCHED DUE TO HOT AIR FLOWING OVER IT DURING REEN 382245 1 2 TRY. ITEM 1 AND 2 WERE ADDRESSED BY REMOVING THE OLD EDGE FILL AND REFIL 382245 1 3 LING THE EDGE WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE WITH MRB APPROVAL. A TPS PR WAS I 382245 1 4 NITIATED TO ADDRESS ITEM 3 AND TO CONSIDER APPLYING A HEAT RESISTANCE SU 382245 1 5 RFACE TREATMENT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 382245 1 6 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 382296 1 1 DURING V41-10002 IT WAS ANNOTATED THAT THE BACKSHELL TANG OF CONN. 50P61 382296 1 2 9 WAS BROKEN. INITIAL DISPOSITON WAS TO PERFORM SRP-0001 IN ORDER TO INS 382296 1 3 TALL A SPLIT BACKSHELL IN PLACE OF THE BROKEN BACKSHELL. HOWEVER DURING 382296 1 4 THE SRP PROCEDURES IT WAS ANNOTATED IN ITEM 2 PG. 1A THAT LIMITATIONS WE 382296 1 5 RE EXCEEDED. THE SHIELD OF WIRE T269A26 WAS EXPOSED AT THE BACKSHELL OF 382296 1 6 THE CONNECTOR. DISPOSITION WAS THEN WRITTEN TO RETERMINATE THE CABLE T26 382296 1 7 9A26 AT THE CONN. 50P619 TO ELIMINATE THE NOTED WIRE DAMAGE, ITEM 2. ITE 382296 1 8 M 3 NOTED THE CABLE WAS TOO SHORT TO RETERMINATE AFTER DAMAGED AREA WAS 382296 1 9 CUT AWAY IN ORDER TO RETERMINATE. ITEM 3 WAS ADDRESSED BY SPLICING IN 382296 1 10 NEW WIRE LENGTH USING KSC SPLICES UPON MR APPROVAL. ITEM 4 NOTED THAT 382296 1 11 CLAMP COULD NOT BE INSTALLED BECAUSE CLAMP WOULD INTERFERE WITH SOLDER S 382296 1 12 LEEVE. ITEM 4 WAS ADDRESSED BY POSITIONING THE SLACK IN THE WIRE HARNESS 382296 1 13 ELIMINATING THE NOTED CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 1 AND 4 CAN BE 382296 1 14 TTRIBUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 2 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO PROCEDURAL DEGRADA 382296 1 15 ION. ITEM 3 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO PROCEDURAL ERROR. SINCE CONN. 50P619 WA 382296 1 16 DEMATED RETEST WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED 382296 1 17 ON THIS PR. 382309 1 1 WIRE 1R2510AB26 WAS FOUND TO BE CUT IN HALF DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF OE 382309 1 2 L-3-J1-022. THE WIRE WAS REPAIRED BY SRP V-EL-0002-B AND TRANSFERRED TO 382309 1 3 OMS/RCS FOR RETEST. THE RRCS 3/4/5 OX AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVES WERE OPE 382309 1 4 NED PER V1226 ON 09/02/92 AND PROPER LPS OPEN INDICATIONS WERE RECEIVED 382309 1 5 ON THE CONSOLE CRT. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAU 382309 1 6 SE: WORKMANSHIP. 382320 1 1 THE 4 EACH HI LOKS THAT WERE NOT INSTALLED ON THE V070-353602-001, V070- 382320 1 2 851609-008 AND V070-851609-009 ISOLATORS WERE INSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIR 382320 1 3 EMENTS AND THE 1 EACH HILOK THAT WAS NOT TORQUED PER SPEC REQUIREMENTS. 382320 1 4 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 382354 1 1 THE MISDRILLED HOLE WAS MR REWORKED BY ENLARGING IT TO A DIAMETER OF .20 382354 1 2 31" AND SUBSTITUTING AN OVERSIZED HI LOK IN PLACE OF THE PER PRINT RIVET 382354 1 3 . ALSO THE ENGLARGEMENT CAUSED A REDUCTION IN EDGE DISTNACE WHICH WAS AL 382354 1 4 SO MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABL 382354 1 5 E CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 382484 1 1 ITEM 1: THE .250" DIA HI LOK INSTALLATION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICT 382484 1 2 ED USE AS IS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. ITEM 382484 1 3 2: THE V070-332912-002 SHIM CANNOT BE PROPERLY ID'D DUE TO ITS SIZE. TH 382484 1 4 E PART CAN BE VERIFIED BY INSPECTING THE PART AND THE ORBITER DRWG. THIS 382484 1 5 IS AN E-7 PART WHICH CVAS DOES NOT TRACK THEREFORE DOES NOT NEED TO BE 382484 1 6 ID'D AS SUCH. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. NOT A PR CONDITION. NO PROBABL 382484 1 7 E CAUSE. 382522 1 1 THE RIVET THAT WAS INTERFERING WITH THE INSTALLATION OF THE V070-338951- 382522 1 2 001 FITTING WAS REMOVED PER EOTF DISPOSITION. FITTING INSTALLATION WILL 382522 1 3 BE PERFORMED PER STR-3-J1-531. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUS 382522 1 4 E IS WORKMANSHIP. 382523 1 1 THE V070-338952-001 FITTING INSTALLATION WAS MR REWORKED BY ADDING A SHI 382523 1 2 M WHICH ALLEVIATED THE GAP. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE I 382523 1 3 S VENDOR. 382524 1 1 DURING THE REMOVAL OF SPOT TIES PER OEL-3-J1-025, WIRE T1712D20-2 WAS NI 382524 1 2 CKED CAUSING DAMAGE TO INSULATION AND SEVERAL CONDUCTOR STRANDS. WIRE T1 382524 1 3 712D20-2 WAS REPAIRED BY PERFORMING SRP-V-EL-0002-B SINGLE CONDUCTOR UNS 382524 1 4 HIELDED WIRE REPAIR. HOWEVER, AS DAMAGED SECTION OF WIRE WAS REMOVED AND 382524 1 5 WIRES PREPPED, A GAP OF APPROX 0.400" EXISTED BETWEEN WIRE ENDS. SINCE 382524 1 6 WIRE IS OF TWISTED PAIR, ADEQUATE SLACK COULD NOT BE OBTAINED. THEREFORE 382524 1 7 , ADDITIONAL WIRE LENGTH WAS INSTALLED ON WIRE T1712D20-2 VIA A KSC SPLI 382524 1 8 CE POINT AND THEN THE TWO SEGMENTS WERE REJOINED VIA A SECOND KSC SPLICE 382524 1 9 POINTS. WIRES ARE DESIGNATED AS SPARES THEREFORE, NO RETEST REQUIRED. NO 382524 1 10 FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP-WIRE WAS 382524 1 11 DAMAGED WHEN REMOVING SPOT TIES. 382526 1 1 SUPPORT WAS REMOVED WITH FURTHER ATTEMPT AFTER HYDRAULICS INSULATION REM 382526 1 2 OVAL. PROBLEM DUE TO ACCESS. 382587 1 1 THE CORROSION WHICH WAS WRITTEN UP WAS ACTUALLY NOT CORROSION AT ALL BUT 382587 1 2 SUPERFICIAL DEPOSITS DUE TO THE OUTGASSING FROM OTHER MATERIALS. THIS I 382587 1 3 S NOT A PR CONDITION. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CA 382587 1 4 USE: NO DISCREPANCY. 382641 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-022, A SECOND CLAMP COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO AN INT 382641 1 2 ERFERENCE WITH THE STRUCTURE. AN EO TO FOLLOW WAS REQUESTED TO ELIMINATE 382641 1 3 THE REQUIREMENT TO INSTALL THE CLAMP. AT THIS TIME RI DOWNEY FOUND THAT 382641 1 4 THIS CLAMP WAS NOT SUPPOSE TO EXIST IN THE -011 CONFIGURATION AND A NEW 382641 1 5 VIEW WAS CREATED. ALSO, THE CLAMP DID NOT EXIST IN THE -011 PARTS LIST. 382641 1 6 THE EOTF WAS MODIFIED TO NOT ELIMINATE ONE #7 CLAMP. NO FURTHER ACTION 382641 1 7 REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 382668 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY CLEANING THE TAPE RESIDUE AND THEN INSPECT 382668 1 2 ING FOR MEASURABLE SCRATCHES AND GOUGES. THE INSPECTION FOUND NO MEASURA 382668 1 3 BLE SCRATCHES OR GOUGES. THE CHIPPED/PEELED PAINT AND BARE METAL WAS RES 382668 1 4 OLVED BY PRIMING AND PAINTING THE AREAS PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. PROBAB 382668 1 5 LE CAUSE FOR ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON THE FLIGHT DECK F 382668 1 6 LOOR. CONCLUDE THAT THE FLIGHT DECK FLOOR HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT REQ 382668 1 7 UIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 382678 1 1 THE HEATSINK BECAME DEBONDED IN NUMEROUS AREAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR. THE D 382678 1 2 EBONDS AND VOIDS OF LESS THAN 4 SQ IN WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 382678 1 3 USE. THE DISCREPANCIES GREATER THAN 4 SQ IN WERE REBONDED PER PRINT. NO 382678 1 4 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 382678 1 5 ION. 382685 1 1 MISSING HOLES AND NUTPLATES INCORPORATED BY THIS PR. PROBLEM DUE TO VEND 382685 1 2 OR. 382686 1 1 MISSING HOLES AND NUTPLATES INCORPORATED BY THIS PR. PROBLEM DUE TO VEND 382686 1 2 OR. 382702 1 1 THE UPPER FWD I/B AND O/B NUTPLATES ON THE L/H #9 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUN 382702 1 2 D TO BE DEFECTIVE. THE NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED USING BLIND R 382702 1 3 IVETS PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPAN 382702 1 4 CY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQ 382702 1 5 UIRED FOR THIS PR. 382738 1 1 DURING V30 INSPECTION, A SMALL CHIP WAS FOUND IN AN INTERCOSTAL IN BAY 2 382738 1 2 ON THE LH PLBD #2. THE CHIP IS 1/2" X 1/8" DEEP (MAX) AND APPEARS TO HA 382738 1 3 VE BEEN THE RESULT OF DRILLING OPERATIONS ON THE PLBD DURING ASSY. THE D 382738 1 4 ISCREPANT AREAS WERE FILLED WITH MBO120-037 TYPE II ADHESIVE PER UNRESTR 382738 1 5 ICTED MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP DURING V 382738 1 6 ENDOR MANUFACTURE/ASSY. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 382779 1 1 THE L/H #2 RADIATOR DRIVE LINK ROD END WAS FOUND TO HAVE A LOOSE JAM NUT 382779 1 2 . THE ROD END WAS TEMPORARILY TAPED IN PLACE TO MAINTAIN RIGGING. AN EO 382779 1 3 WAS GENERATED TO CLARIFY THE ACTUAL TORQUE VALUE FOR THE JAM NUTS ON THE 382779 1 4 RADIATOR DRIVE LINKS. THE LOOSE NUT AND THE REMAINING 7 ROD END JAM NUT 382779 1 5 S FOR THE DEPLOYABLE RADIATOR SYSTEM WERE ALL TORQUED PER THIS EO. THE S 382779 1 6 YSTEM WAS FUNCTIONALLY RETESTED PER V1015, P/L RADIATOR MECHANICAL FUNCT 382779 1 7 IONAL. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN ERROR - DRA 382779 1 8 WING CALLOUT FOR TORQUE WAS AMBIGUOUS. 382779 1 9 WING CALLOUT FOR TORQUE WAS AMBIGUOUS. 382821 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-025, THE LOCKING TABS ON THE BACK OF CONNECTOR 67P5 WERE 382821 1 2 FOUND TO BE BROKEN OFF. THE BACKSHELL WAS DAMAGED DURING REMOVAL SO A N 382821 1 3 EW CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELL WERE ORDERED FOR INSTALLATION. OEL-3-J1-025 S 382821 1 4 TEPS 1-115 AND 1-116 TO PIN CONNECTOR AND CLOSE BACKSHELL. NO FURTHER AC 382821 1 5 TION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. CONNECTOR WAS INC 382821 1 6 ORRECTLY CLOSED. 382895 1 1 DURING STR-3-J1-527, SPLIT BUSHING INSPECTION, THE GAPS BETWEEN THE UPPE 382895 1 2 R AND LOWER INSULATORS ON THE FWD AND AFT INSULATOR ASSEMBLIES OF LH RCC 382895 1 3 PANEL #9 WERE FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. DURING REASSEMBLY, THE INSU 382895 1 4 LATORS WERE RESHIMMED PER STR-3-J1-527 PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS AS VERIFIE 382895 1 5 D PER STEP 1-1 OF THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS FLIGHT DAMAGE - 382895 1 6 DEFORMATION OF INSULATOR OML FROM HEATING CYCLES DURING RE-ENTRY. NO FU 382895 1 7 RTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 382921 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGES 1 AND 1A). DURING V30-14245, PAINT WAS FOUND 382921 1 2 TO BE PEELING OFF THE GRAPHITE FRAMES AND INTERCOSTALS ON THE LH PLBD # 382921 1 3 1. THE PEELING PAINT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PR 382921 1 4 OBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS POOR SURFACE PREP DURING MANUFACTURING/ASSEM 382921 1 5 BLY. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 382934 1 1 DURING A SURVEILLANCE, THE BACKSHELL ON 84P132 WAS FOUND BROKEN. SRP-V-E 382934 1 2 L-0001 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO FURTHER ACTIO 382934 1 3 N REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER D 382934 1 4 URING PROCESSING. 382935 1 1 THE SUPPORT (STANDOFF) WAS MR REPAIRED BY PATCHING WITH ADHESIVE AND GLA 382935 1 2 SS CLOTH. THE CRACKED AREA WAS WRAPPED WITH TWO LAYERS OF CLOTH. THE SUP 382935 1 3 PORT WAS REINSTALLED. PROBLEM DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 382942 1 1 UPON ENGINEERING INSPECTION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WIRES 3K581B8 AND 3K 382942 1 2 559B8 HAD BLISTERS AND SOME MISSING COATING (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 OF BLOCK 382942 1 3 17). UPON REVIEW OF THE QUALITY ASSURANCE CRITERIA WITH RESPECT TO MBO15 382942 1 4 0-048 AND -061 WIRES, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE DISCREPANCIES NOTED IN 382942 1 5 BLOCK 17 OF THIS PR DO NOT NECESSITATE ANY CORRECTIVE ACTION. THE NOTED 382942 1 6 DISCREPANCIES ARE WITHIN THE GUIDELINE OF PARAGRAPH 5.1.2 OF MLO303-0013 382942 1 7 (ASSY REQUIREMENTS OF ELECTRICAL WIRE HARNESS). THEREFORE NO ACTION IS 382942 1 8 REQUIRED BY THIS PR. THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR AS THERE IS 382942 1 9 NO DISCREPANCY. 382997 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-025 STEP 1-99, 16 GUAGE CONTACTS COULD NOT BE INSTALLED 382997 1 2 ON 22 GUAGE WIRE. AN EOTF WAS REQUESTED TO CHANGE THE WIRE PART NUMBER T 382997 1 3 O 20 GUAGE SO 16 GUAGE CONTACTS COULD BE USED. DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO CHAN 382997 1 4 GE TWO 22 GUAGE WIRES TO 20 GUAGE AND REPIN. RETEST OF NEW WIRE SEGMENTS 382997 1 5 WILL BE TRACKED ON OEL-3-J1-025. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 382997 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY ORIGINAL ENGINEERING WAS INCORRECT. 383046 1 1 ITEM 1 - THE STRUT WAS FOUND PRELOADED UPON ATTEMPTING TO TRMOVE IT. THE 383046 1 2 ADJACENT FRAME WAS MANIPULATED WITH A COME-A-LONG TO RELIEVE THE PRELOA 383046 1 3 D. ITEM 2 THE GALLED AREAS OF THE END FITTING WERE SMOOTHED OUT WITH MRB 383046 1 4 APPROVAL AND CORROSION PROTECTED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR 383046 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 383125 1 1 DURING STR-3-15-527, SPLIT BUSHING INSPECTION, THE V070-199806-032 PANEL 383125 1 2 WAS CHIPPED DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE LOWER FWD, O/B BUSHING. THE DAMAG 383125 1 3 E WAS THROUGH THE COVERSION COAT AND EXPOSED THE CARBON SUBSTRATE. THE P 383125 1 4 ANEL WAS REPAIRED BY THE VENDOR AND UPON RETURN, REINSTALLED PER PRINT R 383125 1 5 EQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP 383125 1 6 OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 383157 1 1 DURING MPS-3-15-232, WIRE T1772A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE 383157 1 2 WAS WRAPPED WTIH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUI 383157 1 3 RED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING P 383157 1 4 ROCESSING. 383158 1 1 DURING MPS-3-15-232, WIRE T1773A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE 383158 1 2 WAS WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUI 383158 1 3 RED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING P 383158 1 4 ROCESSING. 383266 1 1 ITEM 1A: MR APPROVAL WAS GIVEN, FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, TO BOND A DOUBLER 383266 1 2 OVER DENT IN AIR LOCK. A COIN TAP WAS PERFORMED PER STEP 1-3, WITH NO DE 383266 1 3 LAMINATION RECORDED. A EDDY CURRENT WAS PERFORMED PER STEP 1-5, WITH "NO 383266 1 4 INDICATIONS NOTED". REF TABLE 4 FOR DIMENSIONS OF DENT. ITEM 1A: A COSM 383266 1 5 ETIC DING WAS ALSO NOTED WHERE IT ONLY REQUIRED TOUCH UP PAINT PER MAO60 383266 1 6 8-301. A COUN TAP WAS PERFORMED PER STEP 1-3, WITH "NO DELAMINATION RECO 383266 1 7 RDED". AN EDDY CURRENT WAS PERFORMED PER STEP 1-5 WITH "NO INDICATIONS N 383266 1 8 OTED". REF TABLE 5 FOR DESCRIPTION. ITEM 1B: BOTH DINGS ON RIBS 4&6 OF T 383266 1 9 HE B576 BULK HEAD ARE COSMETIC AND HAVE BEEN TOUCHED UP PAINTED PER 383266 1 10 MAO608-301 TO RETURN TO PRINT. ITEM 1C & 2: MIDDECK FLOORING HAS BEEN MR 383266 1 11 ACCEPTED FORUNRESTRICTED USE AS IS WITH DENTS ADDRESSED IN ITEM 1C & 2. 383266 1 12 AN EDDY CURRENT WAS PERFORMED PER STEP 1-4 WITH "NO CRACKS NOTED". REF 383266 1 13 TABLES 2 & 3 FOR SIZE AND LOCATION OF DENTS. BOTH THE AIR-LOCK CHAMBER 383266 1 14 AND MIDDECK FLOORING HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE WITH 383266 1 15 REWORK. ALL WORK IS COMPLETE, WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE 383266 1 16 CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP 383286 1 1 THIS PR WAS ORGINALLY PICKED UP TO DOCUMENT THAT THE ID SHRINK SLEEVE FO 383286 1 2 R SPLICE POINT 5ASP4089 WAS DESTROYED AND COULD NOT BE APPLIED. DISPOSIT 383286 1 3 ION IN THIS PR PROVIDED WORDS TO RESPLICE THE TRJ LEADS OF MEASUREMENT V 383286 1 4 46T1171A. HOWEVER, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THESE STEPS WERE NOT REQUIRED 383286 1 5 AS STEPS PROVIDED IN TPS INS-3-J1-147 PERFORMED THE WORK. THEREFORE, THE 383286 1 6 PREVIOUS DISPOSITION OF THIS PR WILL BE DELETED AND THIS PR WILL BE CLO 383286 1 7 SED AS A DUPLICATE WORK. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED BY THIS PR. MOST 383286 1 8 PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP. 383391 1 1 IN ORDER TO ALLOW FOR THE REINSTALLATION OF THE HYDRAULIC LINE, THE ATTA 383391 1 2 CH POINTS OF THE V070-851124-001 ISOLATOR WERE RELOCATED AND THE OLD HOL 383391 1 3 ES WERE PLUGGED USING ADHESIVE. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAU 383391 1 4 SE IS VENDOR. 383450 1 1 ITEM 1 - A NEW DECAL WAS INSTALLED. PROBLEM DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 383450 1 2 ITEM 2 - THE INTERFERING ACCESS PLATES WERE REMOVED. THIS ALLOWED DECAL 383450 1 3 TO BE INSTALLED. PROBLEM DUE TO SEQUENCING. 383453 1 1 HI-LOKS WERE SUBSTITUTED FOR SOLID RIVETS PER MR DISPOSITION. PROBLEM DU 383453 1 2 E TO LACK OF PROPER TOOLING. 383455 1 1 HI LOKS WERE SUBSTITUTED FOR SOLID RIVETS PER MR DISPOSITION. PROBLEM DU 383455 1 2 E TO LACK OF PROPER TOOLING. 383474 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES ON THE LH RADIATOR #1 WERE ALL SUPERFICIAL TAPE ONLY D 383474 1 2 AMAGE AND DID NOT DAMAGE THE FACESHEET. THEY WERE ALL MR APPROVED FOR UN 383474 1 3 RESTRICTED USE AND RECORDED ON THE DING LOG AND MAP. NO FURHTER WORK TO 383474 1 4 BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION, WORKMANSHI 383474 1 5 P. 383536 1 1 THE FOLLOWING DISPOSITION ADDRESSES ITEM 1.0. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION 383536 1 2 . PER MAO101-302, INSTALLATION OF CONVENTIONAL AND BLIND RIVETS, PROPER 383536 1 3 HOLE SIZE FOR A MD121-0003-05 RIVET IS .160-.164. THEREFORE THE CLIP CAN 383536 1 4 BE INSTALLED PER PRINT, PER THE DOCUMENT THAT REMOVED IT. NO FURTHER AC 383536 1 5 TION REQUIRED. NO PROBABLE CAUSE. 383632 1 1 ITEM 1: THE V070-338905-001, V070-338904-001, V070-338905-002 AND V070-3 REF_RPT_NO TEXT_ SEQ_NO DISPOSITION ---------- ----- ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 383632 1 2 38904-002 FITTINGS WERE MR SHIMMED IN ORDER TO ALLEVIATE THE INTERFERENC 383632 1 3 E WITH THE FRAME RADIUS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS V 383632 1 4 ENDOR. ITEM 2: THE WIRE SUPPORT BRACKET WAS REMOVED AND INSTALLED IN ITS 383632 1 5 PER PRINT LOCATION. THE V070-338920-001 FITTING WAS INSTALLED PER STR-3 383632 1 6 -J1-531. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. ITEM 3: T 383632 1 7 HE V070-338926-002 FITTING INSTALLATION WAS MR REWORKED BY ADDING A SHIM 383632 1 8 WHICH ALLEVIATED THE GAP. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS 383632 1 9 VENDOR. 383644 1 1 SPACER (SHIM) WAS ADJUSTED TO FIT IN PLACE. PROBLEM DUE TO PROCEDURAL ER 383644 1 2 ROR. 383683 1 1 A .055 THICK MR SHIM WAS FABRICATED AND WAS INSTALLED BETWEEN SUPPORT AN 383683 1 2 D BULKHEAD TO FILL GAP. PROBLEM DUE TO VENDOR ERROR IN PART. 383732 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-037 IT WAS NOTED THAT THE BACKSHELL OF 50P9912 COULD NOT 383732 1 2 BE OPENED. THE WIRES ASSOCIATED WITH 50P9912 WERE EXTRACTED WITH BACKSH 383732 1 3 ELL INSTALLED. A NEW CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELL WAS OBTAINED AND ASSOCIATED 383732 1 4 WIRES RE-INSERTED. ITEM 2 NOTED THAT CABLE U256C24 DID NOT HAVE A SOLDE 383732 1 5 R SLEEVE INSTALLED. UPON ENGINEERING EVALUATION IT WAS DETERMINED THAT T 383732 1 6 HE CABLE U256C24 DOES NOT HAVE A JR24 WIRE SPLICED TO IT. PER THE WIRE L 383732 1 7 IST THE CABLE U256C24 HAS A Z FINISH WHICH MEANS THE SHIELD IS PULLED AN 383732 1 8 D TERMINATED INTO THE TAG RING OF THE ASSOCIATED CONNECTOR BACKSHELL. TH 383732 1 9 E JR24 WIRE IS SIMPLY PINNED INTO PIN U AND PULLED BACK, PREPPED AND 383732 1 10 TERMINATED ALSO INTO THE TAG RING OF THE ASSOCIATED CONNECTOR BACKSHELL. 383732 1 11 PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 1 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 383732 1 12 ITEM 2 WAS DETERMINED TO NOT BE A DISCREPANCY. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED 383732 1 13 PER SCAN FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF OEL-3-J1-037. 383733 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED TO DOCUMENT THAT WIRE 3N102A16-2 COULD NOT BE REMO 383733 1 2 VED FROM CONNECTOR 83P146 IN SUPPORT OF OEL-3-J1-019. PREVIOUS DISPOSITI 383733 1 3 ON OF THIS PR CUT WIRE 3N102A16-2 AT THE BACK OF CONNECTOR 83P146 AND RE 383733 1 4 MOVED AND REPLACED THE DISCREPANT 83P146 CONNECTOR. NO FURTHER WORK IS R 383733 1 5 EQUIRED BY THIS PR AS SCAN RETEST WILL SATISFY THE RETEST OF THIS CONNEC 383733 1 6 TOR. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 383762 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-037, CABLE U256C24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE RADIAL KAPTON DAMAG 383762 1 2 E. CABLE WAS REPAIRED BY WRAPPING WITH MYSTIC 7503 TAPE AND INSTALLING C 383762 1 3 ONVOLUTED TUBING FOR CABLE PROTECTION AT CLAMP. THIS REPAIR RETURNS CABL 383762 1 4 E U256C24 TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERS 383762 1 5 ELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE, OR INTERCHANGEA 383762 1 6 BILITY. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WE 383762 1 7 AR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 383796 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTS DISCREPANT PLBD BULB SEAL SPLIC 383796 1 2 ES AT FOUR LOCATIONS ON THE L/H CENTERLINE. THE ACTUAL LOCATIONS HOWEVER 383796 1 3 AND RESOLUTIONS WERE AS FOLLOWS: LOCATION: 1 DOCUMENTED LOCATION: XO726 383796 1 4 , ACTUAL LOCATION: XO715, REWORK PERFORMED: NONE: PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED 383796 1 5 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER STR-3-A0161. LOCATION: 2, DOCUMENTED LOCATION: 383796 1 6 XO940, ACTUAL LOCATION: XO937, REWORK PERFORMED: NONE: PREVIOUSLY MR AC 383796 1 7 CEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER STR-3-A0161. LOCATION: 3, DOCUMENTED LOC 383796 1 8 ATION: XO1212, ACTUAL LOCATION: XO1208, REWORK PERFORMED: REMOVED AND RE 383796 1 9 PLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. LOCATION: 4, DOCUMENTED LOCATION: XO1260, 383796 1 10 ACTUAL LOCATION: XO1253, REWORK PERFORMED: NONE: PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED 383796 1 11 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER STR-3-A0161. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPER 383796 1 12 ATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 383930 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-, WIRE HARNESS V070-774328-011 WAS FOUND TO INTEFERE WIT 383930 1 2 H PVD DUCT. ENGINEERING INSPECTION FOUND TAHT HARNESS COULD NOT BE REMOV 383930 1 3 ED AND THAT THE TRAY WOULD HAVE TO BE MODIFIED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIR 383930 1 4 ED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESING DEFICIENCY. 383933 1 1 WHILE ATTEMPTING TO WORK OEL-3-J1-048, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WIRES T244 383933 1 2 0A26 AND T2041AB26 COULD NOT BE ROUTED INTO THE W16 HARNESS AS SHOWN ON 383933 1 3 V070-794361 ZN 156D. THE W16 HARNESS WAS FOUND TO ACTUALLY RUN ALONG THE 383933 1 4 AFT MOST SECTION OF THE XO=807 FRAME INSTEAD OF THE MIDDLE SECTION OF T 383933 1 5 HE XO=807 FRAME (AS NOTED ON THE DWG). ENG EVALUATION DETERMINED THAT TH 383933 1 6 E PRESENT CONFIGURATION OF THE W16 HARNESS AT THE AFT MOST RUN ALONG THE 383933 1 7 XO=807 FRAME WAS THE AS BUILT CONFIGURATION. HENCE AN EO TO THE V070-79 383933 1 8 4361 DWG WAS REQUESTED TO REFLECT THE W16 HARNESS RUNNING ALONG THE AFT 383933 1 9 MOST SIDE OF THE XO=807 FRAME (REF ZN 156D). NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 383933 1 10 PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 383966 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLE V37A26 HA DWORN KAPTON 383966 1 2 WITH DAMAGED/WORN SHIELD. THE DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY EXTRACTING W 383966 1 3 IRES V37A26-1,-2, -3, AND -4 FROM CONN 81P75 AND CUTTING SPLICE POINT 81 383966 1 4 SP387. WIRES V37A26-1,-2,-3, AND V333AA26 WERE EXTRACTED FROM CONN 81P30 383966 1 5 3. THE ENTIRE CABLE SEGMENT BETWEEN CONNECTORS 81P75 AND 81P303 WERE REM 383966 1 6 OVED FROM THE VEHICLE. NEW CABLES V37A26 AND V333AA26 WERE FABRICATED AN 383966 1 7 D ROUTED BETWEEN CONNECTORS 81P75 AND 81P303 WITH NEW SPLICE 81SP387 INS 383966 1 8 TALLED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. RETEST WILL BE SCAN T 383966 1 9 RACKED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO ORBITER PROCESSING. 384002 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-025 STEP 1-12, WIRES N266C22, N267C22 AND H140AC20-1 AND 384002 1 2 -2 HAD NB-CS-20 SOCKETS INSTALLED PER PRINT. THE CONTACTS WERE TO SMALL 384002 1 3 TO INSTALL IN 40J5. NB-CS-16S WERE INSTALLED ON WIRES H140AC20-1 AND -2 384002 1 4 TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM. AN EOTF WAS WRITTEN TO ESTABLISH 2 NEW SPLICE P 384002 1 5 OINT ON WIRES N266C22 AND N267C22 AND ADD NEW WIRE SEGMENTS, N26CA20 AND 384002 1 6 N267CA20 TO INCREASE THE WIRE DIAMETER SO NB-CS-16 CONTACTS COULD BE IN 384002 1 7 STALLED. ALL WORK WAS PERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY. RETEST OF THIS REPAIR WILL 384002 1 8 BE TRACKED ON OEL-3-J1-025. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROB 384002 1 9 ABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 384007 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3 ON PAGE 1). DURING PRE-INSTALLATION INSPECTION OF 384007 1 2 THE V070-190319-002 INSULATOR, "PIN HOLES" WERE FOUND ON THE ATTACH POI 384007 1 3 NT DOUBLERS. THE "PIN HOLES" WERE ACTUALLY IMPRESSIONS LEFT AS A RESULT 384007 1 4 OF GROUND CLIP ATTACHMENT DURING VENDOR REWORK OF THE INSULATORS. THE IM 384007 1 5 PRESSIONS WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THUS DI 384007 1 6 SCREPANCY IS VENDOR. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR 384007 1 7 THIS PR. 384009 1 1 A MR RADIUS BLOCK WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED. THIS RAISED HI-LOK OFF T 384009 1 2 HE RADIUS. PROBLEM DUE TO ORIGINAL HOLE LOCATION AND ORIGINAL INTERCOAST 384009 1 3 AL NOT HAVING A WEB RADIUS AT THIS LOCATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN. 384024 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF TPS INS-3-J1-147, SPLICE 50SP1302 WAS DISCOVERED 384024 1 2 TO BE BROKEN. DUE TO THE FACT THAT A LIMITED AMOUNT OF WIRE LENGTH WAS 384024 1 3 AVAILABLE BEYOND THE SHIELD SOLDER SLEEVE, ALL DESIGN SPLICES CONSISTING 384024 1 4 OF 50SP1299, 50SP1300, 50SP1301, 50SP1302, AND 50SP1303; ASSOCIATED WITH 384024 1 5 MEASUREMENT REF DES V46T0140A1 WERE CUT AWAY. THE DESIGN SPLICES WERE 384024 1 6 RE-INSTALLED WITH ADDITIONAL WIRE T1742A26 LENGTH AND KSC SPLICES 0515, 384024 1 7 0516, 0517, 0518 AND 0519 WITH MR APPROVAL. THE MR REPAIR RETURNS THE 384024 1 8 WIRE HARNESS TO A CONFIGURATION THAT FULFILLS DESIGN INTENT, BUT DOES 384024 1 9 NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE, OR 384024 1 10 INTERCHANGEABILITY. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF APU MEASUREMENT REF DES 384024 1 11 V46T0140A1 WAS PERFORMED ON 90CT92 VIA OI HARDCOPY. NO FURTHER ACTION 384024 1 12 REQUIRED ON PR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL 384024 1 13 DEGRADATION. 384025 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-022 IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WIRE 1U493A26 WAS BROKEN APPR 384025 1 2 OX 3" FROM CONN 54P319. SLACK WAS OBTAINED ON WIRE 1U493A26, DISCREPANT 384025 1 3 AREA WAS CUT OFF AND WIRE WAS RE-TERMINATED BACK INTO CONN NOTED ABOVE. 384025 1 4 NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. PROBABLE CAUS 384025 1 5 E: UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. THIS PR MAY NOW BE CLOSED. 384026 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-022, RECEPTACLE 50J12 WAS FOUND WITH A MARRED BACKSHELL. 384026 1 2 SRP V-EL-0001-B-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO F 384026 1 3 URTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR 384026 1 4 ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 384075 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED TO DOCUMENT THAT THE LENGTH OF CABLE SUPPLIED WITH 384075 1 2 IN THE MOD KIT FOR TPS PEL-3-J1-022 WAS INSUFFICIENT LENGTH. PREVIOUS DI 384075 1 3 SPOSITION OF THIS PR REMOVED THE SHORT WIRE RUNS AND REPLACED THEM WITH 384075 1 4 CABLES OF SUFFICIENT LENGTH. NO FURTHER ACTION (I.E. RETEST) IS REQUIRED 384075 1 5 BY THIS PR. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. TPS OE 384075 1 6 L-3-J1-022 WILL PERFORM RETEST. 384177 1 1 THE T01P31170-037 INTERCOSTAL ON LH PLBD 2 WAS DETERMINED BY LSOC AND NA 384177 1 2 SA ENGINEERING TO BE CRACKED (REF ITEM 1, PAGE 1). ANOTHER INTERCOSTAL W 384177 1 3 AS OBTAINED FROM STOCK AND IT WAS REWORKED AND INSTALLED WITH UNRESTRICT 384177 1 4 ED MR APPROVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE: IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE INTERCOSTAL WAS 384177 1 5 CRACKED BY A WORKER EITHER STEPPING ON THE INTERCOSTAL OR BY IMPROPER P 384177 1 6 LACEMENT OF A PICKBOARD BY WORKER (I.E. "WORKMANSHIP"). CONCLUDE THAT TH 384177 1 7 E PLBD HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE FLIGHT CONDITION AND NO FURTHE 384177 1 8 R WORK IS REQUIRED. 384177 1 9 R WORK IS REQUIRED. 384199 1 1 THE V070-852786-001 SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE HAD A NUTPLATE INSTALLED FOR A G 384199 1 2 ROUND STRAP ATTACH POINT. IT DID NOT. A GROUND CLIP WAS INSTALLED WITH M 384199 1 3 RB APPROVAL TO PROVIDE A SIMILAR ATTACH POINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DON 384199 1 4 E ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PART WAS OUT OF PRINT CONFIGURATION UPON D 384199 1 5 ELIVERY FROM VENDOR. 384202 1 1 ITEM NUMBER 1: UNABLE TO INSTALL THE V070-120150-007 AND -004 NESTED ANG 384202 1 2 LES DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM THE MR BH9939-000M-001 DOUBLER. THE DOUBLER 384202 1 3 WAS REMOVED AND THE ANGLES INSTALLED. AN MR SHIM WAS FABRICATED AND INS 384202 1 4 TALLED AROUND THE ANGLES AND THE MR BH9939-000M-001 DOUBLKER WAS INSTALL 384202 1 5 ED OVER TOP OF THE ANGLE AND SHIM. ITEM NUMBER 2: THE UPPER HOLE (NUMBER 384202 1 6 3895) FOR THE V070-120150-004 NESTED ANGLE WILL NOT HAVE PROPER EDGE DI 384202 1 7 STANCE. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 384213 1 1 ITEM 1 & 2: THE V070-334072-002 FLOORING WAS FOUND WITH 2 DENTS. BOTH DE 384213 1 2 NTS HAD AN EDDY CURRENT PERFORMED WITH NO INDICATIONS FOUND. MR APPROVAL 384213 1 3 WAS GIVEN TO FABRICATE AND BOND A MR-001 DOUBLER OVER THE 2 DENTS USING 384213 1 4 MBO120-078 TYPE IV PRIMER AND MBO120-53 ADHESIVE PER V9045. PRIOR TO DOU 384213 1 5 BLER INSTALLATION, THE DENTS WERE FILLED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE TO BRI 384213 1 6 NG THE BOND LINE SMOOTHNESS WITHIN SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS F 384213 1 7 ILM ADHESIVE. ITEM 3: AFTER ADHESIVE WAS APPLIED TO FILL AN EXISTING DEP 384213 1 8 RESSION OF .05" IN THE FLOORING, IT WAS THEN SANDED IN PREPARATION FOR A 384213 1 9 DOUBLER. DURING SANDING OPERATION TOO MUCH WAS SANDED OFF LEAVING A 384213 1 10 .01" DEPRESSION IN THE ADHESIVE AND A .008" DEPRESSION IN THE 384213 1 11 SURROUNDING FLOOR. ALL OF THE EXISTING DEPRESSION WAS FILLED IN WITH THE 384213 1 12 ADHESIVE USED TO BOND THE DOUBLER IN PLACE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 384276 1 1 DURING TPS OEL-3-J1-048 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLE T2440A26 LOCATED IN 384276 1 2 BAY 1 RH SIDE WAS ROUTED IN A HO RUN, S/B IN ML RUN. CABLE T244A026 WAS 384276 1 3 EXTRACTED FROM 40V77W16P244 AND ROUTED CORRECTLY IN THE ML WIRE HARNESS 384276 1 4 RUN. THIS RETURNS CABLE TO DWG CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO WOR 384276 1 5 KMANSHIP. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. 384278 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-048, IT WAS OBSERVED THAT CABLES T1869AC26 AND T1870AC26 384278 1 2 HAD DAMAGED BRAIDED SHIELD WITH MORE THAN 3 STRANDS BROKEN. THE SHIELD 384278 1 3 FOR CABLES T1869AC26 AND T1870AC26 WAS PREPPED FOR INSTALLATION OF PIGTA 384278 1 4 IL BRAID THUS ELIMINATING THE DAMAGED AREAS. WIRES WERE PREPPED AND CRIM 384278 1 5 PED WITH CONTACTS. UPON COMPLETION OF THIS ACTION, CONTINUATION OF OEL-3 384278 1 6 -J1-048 IS TO OCCUR. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAU 384278 1 7 SE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DURING FLOW PROCESSING. 384312 1 1 HI-LOKS WERE SUBSTITUTED FOR SOLID RIVETS PER MR DISPOSITION. PROBLEM DU 384312 1 2 E TO LACK OF PROPER TOOLING. 384315 1 1 THE 10 INSERTS IN AVIONICS BAY 5 LOWER SHELF WHERE THE EIU #2 MOUNTS WER 384315 1 2 E FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT WITH A HIGH RUNNING TORQUE. ALL TEN INSERTS WER 384315 1 3 E TAPPED OUT. AFTER TAPPING, FOUR HAD LESS THAN 2 INCH-LBS AND WERE ACCE 384315 1 4 PTED WITH MRB APPROVAL. THE OTHER SIX WERE WITHIN ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FO 384315 1 5 R RUNNING TORQUE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 384427 1 1 THE V070-120150-004 ANGLE INSTALLATION WITH 1 EA FASTENER WITH AN EDGE D 384427 1 2 IDTANCE OF 1D WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. NO FURTHER ACT 384427 1 3 ION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 384471 1 1 DURING STR-3-15-4130, A SUSPECTED BURN MARK WAS FOUND ADJACENT TO THE ED 384471 1 2 GE OF AVIONICS SHELF #2 WHERE THE MID PCA #2 IS INSTALLED. LOCKHEED, NAS 384471 1 3 A AND RI ENGINEERING, ALONG WITH A TECH AND QUALITY, INSPECTED THE HARNE 384471 1 4 SSES AND CONNECTORS IN THE AREA FOR ADDITIONAL SIGNS OF BURN MARKS AND E 384471 1 5 XPOSED CONDUCTORS. NONE WERE FOUND. THE ORIGINAL BURN MARK DISCREPANCY W 384471 1 6 AS ADDRESSED PER STR-3-15-4130. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR AS 384471 1 7 NO APPARENT DISCREPANCY EXISTS PER ITEM 1. 384593 1 1 THE HE131-0101-0001 SPHERICAL BEARINGS AT THE 4 UPPER BODY FLAP ATTACH P 384593 1 2 OINTS APPEARED TO BE LOOSE. INITIAL MEASUREMENTS SEEMED TO CONFIRM THESE 384593 1 3 INDICATIONS; HOWEVER, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE METHOD USED TO MEASURE 384593 1 4 THEM WAS IMPROPER. A METHOD WAS DEVISED TO RESTRAIN THE MOVEMENT OF THE 384593 1 5 BALL TO ONLY ONE PLANE (THE X-Z PLANE). THIS METHOD WAS EMPLOYED AND TH 384593 1 6 E BEARINGS WERE REMEASURED. THESE MEASUREMENTS SHOWED THE RADIAL CLEARAN 384593 1 7 CE TO BE ACCEPTABLE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAU 384593 1 8 SE: NO DISCREPANCY. 384593 1 9 SE: NO DISCREPANCY. 384594 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED USE OF THE MD131 384594 PMRB 2 -6002-0014 BEARING AT THE RIGHT HAND INBOARD LOCATION (YO +30.00) FOR ON 384594 PMRB 3 E FLIGHT. THIS WILL BE THE THIRD FLIGHT SINCE THE DISCREPANCY WAS DETECT 384594 PMRB 4 ED. THIS BEARING WAS FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE IN RADIAL CLEARANCE DU 384594 PMRB 5 RING OMDP. THE PRINT REQUIREMENT IS .002" RADIAL CLEARANCE TO 15 INCH-LB 384594 PMRB 6 S BREAKAWAY TORQUE. THE DISCREPANT BEARING HAS A RADIAL CLEARANCE OF .00 384594 PMRB 7 3". THE AEROSRFACES HAVE BEEN TESTED FOR PROPER FUNCTIONING PER V1292. N 384594 PMRB 8 O ANOMALIES WERE DETECTED IN THE BODY FLAP AREA. THE BODY FLAP INTERFACE 384594 PMRB 9 WILL BE INSPECTED PER SMIS TEST IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING FLIGHT 17 IN 384594 PMRB 10 ACCORDANCE WITH AN APPROVED JSC REQUEST. THE BODYFLAP IS PRIMARY 384594 PMRB 11 STRUCTURE. IT WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 384594 PMRB 12 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS 384594 PMRB 13 FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 384594 PMRB 14 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PRIME BOARD ACTION: PMRB APPROVED FOR 384594 PMRB 15 DEFERRAL TO FLIGHT 18 OF OV-103. 06-16-93. 01/04/94, PMRB APPROVED 384594 PMRB 16 FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTRUE FLT(OMDP) OF OV-103. 384594 1 1 DURING PROCESSING FOR FLIGHT 15, THE MD131-6002-0014 BEARING WAS DETERMI 384594 1 2 NED TO HAVE OUT OF TOLERANCE RADIAL FREEPLAY. THIS CONDITION WAS ACCEPTE 384594 1 3 D FOR FLIGHT AND THE CONDITION WAS REEVALUATED AT THE NEXT SIMS TEST DUR 384594 1 4 ING PROCESSING FOR FLIGHT 18. NO FURTHER LOSS OF STIFFNESS WAS NOTED AT 384594 1 5 THAT TIME AT THE YO+30.00 LOCATION. THE DISCREPANT BEARING WAS ONCE AGAI 384594 1 6 N ACCEPTED FOR FLIGHT UNTIL OMDP. SINCE THAT TIME A STUDY HAS BEEN PERFO 384594 1 7 RMED WHICH DEMONSTRATED THAT THE BEARING FREEPLAY WILL NOT CONTINUE TO W 384594 1 8 ORSEN. THE BEARING WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. PROBABLE CAU 384594 1 9 SE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 384608 1 1 PROBLEM DUE TO LAYOUT ERROR. PART INSTALLED PER PRINT. CAUSE: WORKMANSHI 384608 1 2 P. PART NOT INSTALLED, TPS OUT OF SEQ-PROCEDURE PROBLEM. 384611 1 1 DURING STR-3-J1-514, ENGINEERING INSPECTION REVELAED THAT CABLE 2H96BB16 384611 1 2 HAD DAMAGED INSULATION AND EXPOSED/DAMAGED CONDUCTOR. ALSO, CABLE U12OA 384611 1 3 20 HAD INSULATION DAMAGE AND EXPOSED SHIELD WITH NO DAMAGE TO CONDUCTOR. 384611 1 4 CABLE 2H96BB16 US A 3 CONDUCTOR TWISTED CABLE AND IT WAS LATER DETERMIN 384611 1 5 ED THAT ONLY WIRE 2H96BB12-2 CONTAINED THE ACTUAL DAMAGE. REPAIR WAS COM 384611 1 6 PLETED BY PERFORMING SRP VEL-0002-B "SINGLE CONDUCTOR UNSHIELDED WIRE RE 384611 1 7 PAIR" WHICH INSTALLED A KSC SPLICE. CABLE U1ZOAZO WAS ADDRESSED BY REQUE 384611 1 8 STING MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE TO INSTALL HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING O 384611 1 9 VER THE DISCREPANT AREA IN A CLAMSHEEL CONFIGURATION. FUCTIONAL RETEST 384611 1 10 OF CABLE ZH96BB16-Z (TVC ISO VLV SYS 384611 1 11 2 CLOSE CMD) WAS SATISFIED IF IPR 53V-0046. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING 384611 1 12 ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATION DEGRADATION. 384757 1 1 ITEM 1: THE STIFFENER WAS MR RELOCATED .30 DOWN FROM PRINT LOCATION. THI 384757 1 2 S ALLOWED UPPER HOLE TO CLEAR WEB AND IMPROVED LOWER HOLE'S EDGE DISTANC 384757 1 3 E PROBLEM DUE TO ORIGINAL HOLE BEING MISLOCATED BY VENDOR. ITEM 2: THE S 384757 1 4 TIFFENER WAS FOUND TO BE NOT PER PRINT. ITS END ANGLES ARE AT WRONG ANGL 384757 1 5 E. IT WAS MR INSTALLED AT A NON-PRINT ANGLE. THIS IMPROVED ALL RELATED F 384757 1 6 ASTENER'S EDGE DISTANCE. PROBLEM DUE TO PART NOT BEING PER PRINT AND ORI 384757 1 7 GINAL HOLE BEING MISLOCATED BY VENDOR. ITEM 3: THE STIFFENER WAS MR RELO 384757 1 8 CATED .50 DOWN FROM PRINT LOCATION. IT WAS TRIMMED ON AFT, UPPER CORNER. 384757 1 9 THIS RELIEVED INTERFERENCE WITH TANK SUPPORT STRUT FITTING. PROBLEM DUE 384757 1 10 TO DESIGN OVERSIGHT. ITEM 4: THE INTERFERING PROTRUDING HEAD RIVETS WERE 384757 1 11 MR REPLACED WITH FLUSH HEADS. THE BRACKET WAS MR RELOCATED .40 AFT OF 384757 1 12 PRINT LOCATION. THIS ALLOWED BRACKET TO PICK UP EXISTING HI-LOK WITH 384757 1 13 GOOD EDGE DISTANCE. PROBLEM DUE TO NON-PRINT PLUGGED HOLES AND ORIGINAL 384757 1 14 HI-LOK BEING MISLOCATED BY VENDOR. ITEM 5: THE BRACKET WAS MR RELOCATED 384757 1 15 .20 FORWARD OF PRINT LOCATION. IT WAS TRIMMED ONN AFT, UPPPER CORNER. 384757 1 16 THIS RELIEVED INTERFERENCE WITH ELECTRICAL TERMINAL STRIP. PROBLEM DUE 384757 1 17 TO ELECTRICAL TERMINAL STRIP BEING ORIGINALLY MISLOCATED BY VENDOR. ITEM 384757 1 18 6: THE INTERFERING HI-LOK WAS MR REPLACED WITH A FLUSH HEAD HI-LOK. THE 384757 1 19 SUPPORT WAS COUNTERBORED TO RELIVE INTERFENCE WITH RIVET TAIL. PROBLEM 384757 1 20 DUE TO EXISTING FASTENERS BEING MISLOCATED BY VENDOR. ITEM 7: THE 384757 1 21 SUPPORT WAS MR TRIMMED TO RELIEVE INTERFERENCE WITH PROTRUDING HEAD 384757 1 22 RIVET. PROBLEM DUE TO EXISTING RIVET BEING MISLOCATED BY VENDOR. ITEM 8: 384757 1 23 A MR SPACER BLOCK WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED ON INBOARD SIDE. THIS 384757 1 24 ALLOWED FASTENER A LARGER FOOTPRINT OVER HOLE WITH BAD EDGE DISTANCE. 384757 1 25 PROBLEM DUE TO LAYOUT ERROR. 384758 1 1 ITEMS 1 (GOUGE) AND 2 (MISALIGNMENT), PG 1 WERE RESOLVED BY BLENDING AND 384758 1 2 SANDING THE AREAS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. ITEM 3 (BINDING), PG 1 384758 1 3 WAS RESOLVED BY SANDING THE SEALS TO MINIMUM DWG ALLOWANCE AND MACHININ 384758 1 4 G THE SLOT TO MAX DWG ALLOWANCE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEMS 1 AND 2 IS NORM 384758 1 5 AL WEAR AND TEAR, AND ITEM 3 IS BUILDUP OF TOLERANCES. CONCLUDE THAT THE 384758 1 6 CARRIER PANEL ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN REWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION FOR 384758 1 7 FLIGHT AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 384787 1 1 DURING INSP OF THE LH MLG TRUNION ATTACH BOLT HOLES PER V30-14438 INSP F 384787 1 2 C, 2 DISCREPANCIES WERE NOTED BY EDDY CURRENT AND VISUAL INSPECTION OF T 384787 1 3 HE #5 OUTER BOLT HOLE. THE DISCREPANCIES ARE AT .75" AND 1.37" FROM THE 384787 1 4 INBD EDGE. THE DISCREPANCY AT .75" WAS DETERMINED TO BE DUE TO THE HOLE 384787 1 5 IN THE SHIM THAT WAS LARGER THAN THE BOLT HOLE AND THEREFORE, NOT A DISC 384787 1 6 REPANCY. THE GOUGE WITH RAISED METAL AT 1.37" FROM THE INBD EDGE WAS SAN 384787 1 7 DED TO REMOVE THE RAISED METAL AND RETESTED BY EDDY CURRENT. THE EDDY CU 384787 1 8 RRENT RETEST ACCEPTED THE HOLE AS GOUGED AND NO INDICATION OF A CRACK IN 384787 1 9 THE SUPPORT. THE SUPPORT WAS THEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS-IS 384787 1 10 WITH A GOUGE MEASUREING .015" DEEP BY .264"L X .129"W. THE GOUGE WAS 384787 1 11 SUSPECTED TO BE CAUSED BY TOOLING USED DURING BOLT REMOVAL FOR 384787 1 12 INSPECTION OF THE BOLT HOLE. CONCLUDE THAT ALL WORK IS COMPLETE AND THAT 384787 1 13 THE BOLT MAY BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT PER THE V30-14438 JOB CARD. 384845 1 1 DURING TCS-3-15-0115, A SMALL VOID WAS FOUND IN AN INTERCOSTAL IN BAY 7 384845 1 2 ON THE L/H PLBD #1. THE VOID IS APPROX. 0.02" WIDE BY 3" LONG AND APPEAR 384845 1 3 S TO HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF INITIAL ASSEMBLY/MANUFACTURE OF THE INTERCO 384845 1 4 ASTAL. THE DISCREPANT AREA WAS FILLED WITH MBO120-037 TYPE II ADHESIVE P 384845 1 5 ER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHI 384845 1 6 P DURING VENDOR MANUFACTURE/ASSEMBLY. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACT 384845 1 7 ION REQUIRED. 384849 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-019 IT WAS NOTED THAT NOSE WHEEL STEERING WIRE HARNESS W 384849 1 2 AS NOT OF SUFFICIENT LENGTH TO INSTALL CLAMPS. THE ITEM NOTED IN ITEM 1 384849 1 3 IS NO LONGER A DISCREPANCY DUE TO THE FACT THAT SUFFICIENT LENGTH WAS OB 384849 1 4 TAINED WHILE WORKING THE TPS OEL-019 WHICH INSTALLED THE HARNESS. THE IT 384849 1 5 EM NOTED ON PG. ONE PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF THE HARNESS INSTALLATION. NO 384849 1 6 FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 384880 1 1 THE DISCREPANCIES IN THE HEATSINK WERE BOTH MR ID'D AND ACCEPTED AS IS. 384880 1 2 NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRA 384880 1 3 DATION. 384889 1 1 THE V070-333475-001 & -002 ELECTRICAL GROUNDING SEALS WERE FOUND WITH 10 384889 1 2 -15% OF THE GROUNDING FINGERS MISSING. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FO 384889 1 3 R UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 384991 1 1 THE 70C6486 BRACKET WAS REMOVED AND REINSTALLED IN CORRECT LOCATION. ITS 384991 1 2 ORIGINAL FOUR MOUNT HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH THREE SOLID RIVETS AND ONE 384991 1 3 HI-LOK. THE BRACKET WAS INSTALLED USING FOUR HI LOKS IN PLACE OF PRINT S 384991 1 4 OLID RIVETS. PROBELM DUE TO ORIGINAL INSTALLATION MISLOCATION BY VENDOR. 385016 1 1 THIS PR IS A DUPLICATE OF TES-3-J1-0205,PG 1A. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR, P 385016 1 2 OOR CORROSION PROTECTING. 385031 1 1 PROBLEM DUE TO LAYOUT ERROR. PART INSTALLED PER PRINT. 385032 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). DURING RSI-3-15-207, THE V070-198508-002 SEAL IN 385032 1 2 THE V070-198520-002 SEAL PANEL WAS NOT TRAVELING FREELY. THE SEAL HOUSI 385032 1 3 NG WAS FLUSHED WITH IPA AND FREE TRAVEL WAS RESTORED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 385032 1 4 THIS DISCREPANCY IS FOD. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED 385032 1 5 FOR THIS PR. 385033 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-020 THE WIRES AT DESIGN SPLICES 83SP364 AND 365 WERE FOU 385033 1 2 ND BROKEN. EXISTING SPLICES WERE REMOVED AND NEW SPLICES INSTALLED. RETE 385033 1 3 ST PERFORMED BY ATTACHED HARDCOPY. FC1 STACK O VOLTAGE 3 READING NOMINAL 385033 1 4 . PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 385046 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT SEVERAL RESIDUES FOUND ON AND AROUND T 385046 1 2 HE INGRESS/EGRESS HATCH LATCH MECHANISM (ITEMS 1 THRU 3), DEGRADATION OF 385046 1 3 RTV STRAIN RELIEVING ON HATCH MICROSWITCH WIRING (ITEM 4), AND TEARS IN 385046 1 4 THE HATCH ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL (ITEM 5). THE TEARS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL S 385046 1 5 EAL WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE STRUCTURES ENGINEERING GROUP FOR DISPO ON PR 385046 1 6 STR-3-J1-4216. CORROSION SAMPLES WERE TAKEN AND ANALYZED AND DETERMINED 385046 1 7 TO BE ORDINARY IRON, ALUMINUM, AND COPPER OXIDES (NORMAL CORROSION). TH 385046 1 8 E SUSPECT AREAS WERE WIPED CLEAN WITH IPA AND INSPECTED AGAIN. NO PITTIN 385046 1 9 G OR DEGRADATION OF THE SURFACES WAS DETECTED AND NO PR CONDITION 385046 1 10 EXISTS. THE RTV ON THE MICROSWITCH WIRING HARNESSES WAS INITIALLY 385046 1 11 INSTALLED ON AN MR DURING FLIGHT 9 PROCESSING AND REMOVING LOOSE RTV AND 385046 1 12 REAPPLYING WAS UNRESTRICTED MR ACCEPTED AGAIN PER THIS PR. THE RTV ON 385046 1 13 THE MICROSWITCH WIRING HARNESSES WAS REPAIRED AND NO PR CONDITION 385046 1 14 EXISTS. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION IS 385046 1 15 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR (OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION). 385048 1 1 INTERFERING BANDAID WAS REMOVED PER MOD 003 OF STR-3-J1-511. PROBLEM DUE 385048 1 2 TO WORK AUTHORIZATION SEQUENCING ERROR. 385101 1 1 ITEM 1 DESCRIBES A BOND SCREEN HAVING A CORNER DEBONDED ON RH FRAME XO = 385101 1 2 1244 (BAYS 12/13). AFTER EVALUATION WITH THE ORIGINATING QC AND THE ENG 385101 1 3 INEER PRESENT, NO DEBONDING WAS NOTICED. THIS PR REQUIRES NO ACTION. PRO 385101 1 4 BABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 385102 1 1 ITEM 1 WAS AN ALUMINUM "CAP" (DOUBLER) WHICH CAME DEBONDED FROM OVER TOO 385102 1 2 LING HOLE "E" ON THE RH LONGERON SILL AT XO=1200. THIS CAP WAS REBONDED 385102 1 3 PER PRINT, EXCEPT AN UNRESTRICTED MR WAS NECESSARY TO USE A NON=PRINT AD 385102 1 4 HESIVE. THE GD/CONVAIR ADHESIVE WAS NOT AVAILABLE. THIS SAME PROBLEM OCC 385102 1 5 URRED AT TOOLING HOLE "B" ON STR-3-A0153, AND THE SAME REPAIR WAS USED. 385102 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE WAS MATERIALS DEGRADATION. IT ACTUALLY CAME LOOSE WHILE M 385102 1 7 ASKING THE MIDBODY WITH TAPE DURING TCS-A0037. ITEM 2 IS A 70C3209-3 CAP 385102 1 8 OVER TOOLING HOLE "F". THIS IS DESIGNED TO BE INSTALLED UNDER THE PAYLO 385102 1 9 AD STABILIZER BRACKET PER 70E3801-6, ZONE C9. PROBABLE CAUSE-NO DISCREPA 385102 1 10 NCY. 385157 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-043, ENGINEERING INSPECTION REVEALED THAT WIRE 2H41M16-2 385157 1 2 HAD EXPOSED CONDUCTOR. THE DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY REQUESTING MR A 385157 1 3 PPROVAL TO INSTALL A CLAMSHELL REPAIR ON WIRE 2H41M16-2. THIS ACTION PLA 385157 1 4 CES REPAIR BENEATH A HARNESS CLAMP, HOWEVER, INSTALLATION OF CONCOLUTED 385157 1 5 TUBING WILL BE PERFORMED PER TPS OEL-3-15-043 TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTEC 385157 1 6 TION. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RETEST REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 385157 1 7 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO ORBITER PROCESSING. 385159 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-043, ENGINEERING INSPECTION REVEALED THAT WIRE 1F148R22- 385159 1 2 2 HAD EXPOSED CONDUCTOR AND WIRE 4F46D22 HAD BROKEN STRANDS TO ITS SHIEL 385159 1 3 D. THE DISCREPANCY FOR WIRE 1F148R22-2 WAS ADDRESSED BY REQUESTING MR AP 385159 1 4 PROVAL TO INSTALL A CLAMSHELL REPAIR ON THE DISCREPANT AREA. THE DISCREP 385159 1 5 ANCY FOR WIRE 4F46D22 WAS ADDRESSED BY PERFORMING SRP-V-EL-0007-C-0 "SHI 385159 1 6 ELDED CABLE REPAIR". THESE ACTIONS PLACE BOTH REPAIRS BENEATH HARNESS CL 385159 1 7 AMPS, HOWEVER, INSTALLATION OF CONVOLUTED TUBING WILL BE PERFORMED PER T 385159 1 8 PS OEL-3-15-043 TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RET 385159 1 9 EST REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO 385159 1 10 ORBITER PROCESSING. 385198 1 1 PREVIOUS DISPOSITION OF THIS PR OPENED THE BACKSHELL OF CONNECTOR 30P217 385198 1 2 , INSPECTED IT FOR ANY ANOMALIES (NONE WERE FOUND), RECLOSED THE BACKSHE 385198 1 3 LL AND TORQUED THE SET SCREW TO THE PRESCRIBED LEVEL. NO FURTHER ACTION 385198 1 4 IS REQUIRED BY THIS PR. RETEST OF THE PINS WILL BE PERFORMED PER SCAN RE 385198 1 5 TEST. MOST PROBABLE OF THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGREDATION. 385269 1 1 ITEM 1.0: THE INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE V070-338948-001 SUPPORT AND THE V 385269 1 2 070-334451-004 SUPPORT WAS ALLEVIATED BY TRIMMING. THIS RESULTED IN THE 385269 1 3 "LOSING" OF 1 EA FASTENER ATTACH POINT AND LOWERING THE EDGE DISTANCE OF 385269 1 4 ANOTHER. THIS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER ACTION R 385269 1 5 EQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS A BUILD UP OF TOLERANCES. ITEM 2.0: THE V070- 385269 1 6 338950-002 ANGLE WAS INSTALLED PER STR-3-J1-531 FLUSH WITH THE V070-3389 385269 1 7 48 SUPPORT INSTEAD OF FLUSH WITH THE V070-338949 INTERCOSTAL. THIS RESUL 385269 1 8 TED IN A MISMATCH AT THE LOWER END OF THE V070-338950-002 ANGLE. THIS WA 385269 1 9 S MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE 385269 1 10 CAUSE IS BUILD UP OF TOLERANCES. 385282 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AS A STRUCTURES PR AGAINST THE I/E HATCH AND WAS T 385282 1 2 RANSFERED TO AN MEQ PR AGAINST THE I/E HATCH ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL. THE WIR 385282 1 3 E MESH NET, WHICH WRAPS AROUND THE SEAL TO PROVIDE LIGHTNING PROTECTION, 385282 1 4 WAS TORN AND DEBONDING IN 7 LOCATIONS. ALL DAMAGED AREAS WERE REPAIRED, 385282 1 5 PER UNRESTRICTED MR, BY TRIMMING THE LOOSE WIRE AND APPLYING WHITE RTV 385282 1 6 TO THE EXPOSED MESH. PER DWG V070-332902, THE CONDUCTIVE PROPERTIES OF T 385282 1 7 HE MESH ARE NOT AFFECTED AS LONG AS AT LEAST 50% OF THE CIRCUMFERENCE OF 385282 1 8 THE WIRE MESH IS INTACT. NONE OF THE REPAIRS VIOLATES THIS CRITERIA. NO 385282 1 9 FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE I/E HATCH ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL. NO RE 385282 1 10 TEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR. 385283 1 1 THE V070-198535-001 BLOCK SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE TORN ON ITS LOWER EDGE RE 385283 1 2 SULTING IN A POTENTIAL FLOW PATCH. PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION, MB01 385283 1 3 30-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE WAS INJECTED INTO THE VOID EXPOSED BY THE TORN 385283 1 4 SEAL, ELIMINATING POTENTIAL FLOW PATHS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS 385283 1 5 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED 385283 1 6 FOR THIS PR. 385426 1 1 REF ITEM 1 PG 1: THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DISCREPANT NUTPLATE ON THE LH WING 385426 1 2 SPAR FOR THE SPAR INSULATOR. THE NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER P 385426 1 3 RING REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION 385426 1 4 . REF ITEM 2 PG 1A: THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. THE NUTPLATES WERE ABLE 385426 1 5 TO BE INSTALLED USING PER PRINT HARDWARE. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. NO FURT 385426 1 6 HER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 385439 1 1 FITTING WAS TRIMMED TO ALLOW IT TO FIT PER PRINT. PROBLEM DUE TO TOLERAN 385439 1 2 CE BUILD UP. 385455 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2 WERE DEBONDED STANDOFF SUPPORTS WHICH ARE USED FOR FASTENE 385455 1 2 R LOCATIONS TO HOLD A FIBERGLASS TCS BLANKET SHIELD IN PLACE. THIS SHIEL 385455 1 3 D IS HELD ON BY NINE FASTENERS INTO NONE STANDOFFS BONDED TO THE EXTERNA 385455 1 4 L SURFACE OF THE CREW MODULE. THE SHIELD IS ONLY VISIBLE JUST FWD FROM T 385455 1 5 HE EXTERNAL STAR TRACKER CAVITY. THE STANDOFF OF ITEM 1 WAS REBONDED PER 385455 1 6 PRINT. THE ITEM 2 LOCATION WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS SINCE 8 OF 9 STANDOFFS 385455 1 7 WILL HOLD THE SHIELD AND SINCE ACCESSS TO ITEM 2 IS NEAR IMPOSSIBLE. PR 385455 1 8 OBABLE CAUSE FOR BOTH ITEMS WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 385455 1 9 OBABLE CAUSE FOR BOTH ITEMS WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 385537 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-0176, WIRE T247F26SH-JR24 WAS FOUND BROKEN AND T2000A26S 385537 1 2 H-JR24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A NICK IN WIRE. BOTH WIRES WERE REPAIRED PER SR 385537 1 3 P V-EL-0002 USING KSC SPLICES. A PAGE 1A WAS TAKEN WHEN WIRE T1467A26SH- 385537 1 4 JR24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE WITH A SEVERE BEND AT DAMAGE. THIS 385537 1 5 WIRE WAS ALSO REPAIRED PER SRP V-EL-0002 USING KSC A SPLICE. RETEST OF T 385537 1 6 HESE WIRES IS NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE ALL SHIELDS ARE FLOATED AT THE OTHER 385537 1 7 END. PROBABLE CAUSE: 1 AND 1A) NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING MO 385537 1 8 DIFICATION. 385627 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-046, THE HEAT SHRINK TUBING BEING INSTALLED ON HARNESS A 385627 1 2 T 50P505 AND 50P516 WERE FOUND NOT TO EXTEND 2 INCHES BEYOND TEH 1ST CLA 385627 1 3 MP. CONNECGOR 50P516 WAS DEPINNED AND NEW HEAT SHRINK INSTALLED. AFTER R 385627 1 4 EPINNING, CONNECTOR EXTENSION WAS CLOSED. AFTER CLAMPING OF 50P505, IT W 385627 1 5 AS FOUND TO EXTEND THE 2 INCHES BEYOND THE 1ST CLAMPS AND NO REWORK WAS 385627 1 6 PERFORMED ON THIS CONNECTOR. CONTINUITY CHECK WILL BE PERFORMED ON OEL-3 385627 1 7 -15-046. NO FURTHER ACTION REQURIED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDUR 385627 1 8 AL ERROR: THE MEASUREMENT OF HEAT SHRINK TUBING WAS NOT PERFORMED BECAUS 385627 1 9 E HARNESSES WERE NOT RAEMOVED. 385757 1 1 THE V070-120150-005 ANGLE INSTALLATION WITH 1 EA FASTENER WITH AN EDGE D 385757 1 2 ISTANCE OF 1.8D WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. NO FURTHER A 385757 1 3 CTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 385767 1 1 THE TWO ORIGINAL MISDRILLED HOLES WER MR ACCEPTED AS IS WITH EDGE DISTAN 385767 1 2 CE OF .27 IN PLACE OF .28. PROBLEM DUE TO VENDOR. 385832 1 1 A NEWLY INSTALLED PAYLOAD SUPPORT BRACKET ON WINDOW #7 WAS CHAFFING AGAI 385832 1 2 NST A WATER LINE A .3 X .3 CORNER OF THE SUPPORT BRACKET WAS MR TRIMMED 385832 1 3 TO PROVIDE PROPER CLEARANCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING TOLERANCE BUI 385832 1 4 LD UP. 385844 1 1 THE "SUSPECTED CRACKS" IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE INSPECTED TO DE 385844 1 2 TERMINE WHAT THE DISCREPANCY ACTUALLY WAS. THE INSPECTION DETERMINED THA 385844 1 3 T THE CRACKS WERE ACTUALLY MISSING FIBERS AND THE STRUT WAS REMOVED AND 385844 1 4 PROOF LOADED TO 13.4 KSI TENSION AND 9.4 KSI COMPESSION. AFTER PROOF LOA 385844 1 5 D THE STRUT WAS X-RAYED FOR CRACKS AND/ORVOIDS DUE TO PROOF LOADING AND 385844 1 6 NONE WERE FOUND. THE STRUT WITH MISSING FIBERS WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRES 385844 1 7 TRICTED USE AS-IS AND REINSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE F 385844 1 8 IBERS HAVE BEEN MISSING SINCE ORIGINAL MANUFACTURE BY THE VENDOR. CONCLU 385844 1 9 DE THAT THE STRUT IS ACCEPTABLE AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 385888 1 1 THE HEATSINK WAS DEBONDED IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS. MEASUREMENTS REVEALED TH 385888 1 2 AT NONE OF THE DISCREPANCIES WERE OVER 4 SQUARE INCHES. ALL DISCREPANCIE 385888 1 3 S WERE MR ID'D AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE 385888 1 4 DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 385911 1 1 A SOLID RIVET WAS INSTALLED INPLACE OF PER PRINT HI-LOK. THE SOLID RIVET 385911 1 2 'S SHOP HEAD WAS FORMED INTO THE RADIUS. PROBLEM DUE TO HOLE BEING DRILL 385911 1 3 ED TOO CLOSE TO RADIUS. 385950 1 1 V070-334563-001 SPLICE MEMBER PANEL WAS FOUND TO HAVE A .098 DIAMETER HO 385950 1 2 LE DRILL NEXT TO SECOND NUTPLATE FROM FORWARD SIDE (REF FIGURE 1). THE H 385950 1 3 OLE WAS CORROSION PROTECT AND ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBA 385950 1 4 BLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 386052 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-046, 20 WIRES WERE FOUND TO HAVE EXCESSIVE GAP BETWEEN T 386052 1 2 HE CRIMP BARREL AND THE WIRE INSULATION AT CONNECTOR 50P511. ALSO WIRE 1 386052 1 3 F267C22-2 ON 50P502 HAS THE SAME PROBLEM. ALL WIRES WERE REPINNED. A PAG 386052 1 4 E 1B WAS TAKEN WHEN WIRE 1J127C22-2 WAS FOUND BROKEN APPROX 6 INCHES FRO 386052 1 5 M 50P502. THIS WIRE WAS REPAIRED PER SRP V-EL-0002 USING KSC A SPLICE. R 386052 1 6 ETEST OF THESE WIRES WILL BE PERFORMED ON OEL-3-15-046. PROBABLE CAUSE: 386052 1 7 1 AND 1A) WORKMANSHIP - WIRE WERE NOT PROPERLY TERMINATED 1B) NORMAL WEA 386052 1 8 R AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING MODIFICATION. 386151 1 1 DURING V5C17.004, PIN A ON J12 OF ALCA #1 WAS FOUND TO BE DAMAGE. ENGINE 386151 1 2 ERING INSPECTION CONCLUDED THAT PIN A HAD NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. AN INSPE 386151 1 3 CTION OF CONNECTOR 54P322 WAS PERFORMED AND NO DAMAGE WAS FOUND. A SOFT 386151 1 4 MATE WAS THEN PERFORMED AND CONNECTOR AND RECEPTACLE INSPECTED WITH NO D 386151 1 5 AMAGE FOUND. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORM 386151 1 6 AL WEAR AND TEAR ON CONTACT. PENDING NO FURTHER ANOMALIES, CLOSE THIS PR 386151 1 7 . 386260 1 1 THE V070-351510-005 LOWER STABILIZER STRUT ON THE R/H SIDE INDICATED IN 386260 1 2 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A SCUFF MARK THAT EXPOSED THE BORON FIB 386260 1 3 ERS IN TWO PLACES (1/4" X 1 1/2" AND 1/4" DIAMETER). THE EXPOSED FIBERS 386260 1 4 ON THE STRUT WERE COATED WITH MB0120-008 ADHESIVE PER MA0106-305 WITH UN 386260 1 5 RESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE SCUFF WAS WORKMANSHIP 386260 1 6 DURING PLATFORM REMOVAL. 386261 1 1 THE CRACK ON THE V070-339688-017 OUT PANEL WAS REPAIRED PER THIS DISPO. 386261 1 2 THE CRAKC WAS REPAIRED WITH FIBERGLASS PATCHES AND MB0120-037 EPOXY ADHE 386261 1 3 SIVE TO RESTORE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE PANEL. ALL WORK IS COMPL 386261 1 4 ETE, WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. 386295 1 1 DUIRNG TPS OEL-3-J1-022 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT SOCKET #6 OF 50V77W86J462 386295 1 2 WAS OBSTRUCTED WITH DEBRIS. THE DEBRIS WAS REMOVED BY USING A DENTAL PI 386295 1 3 CK AND ALCOHOL. THIS RETURNS 50J462 TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. PROBAAABLE 386295 1 4 CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUI 386295 1 5 RED. 386322 1 1 FOLLOWING CLOEOUT PANELS V070-337428-003, V070-338761-0059 V070-338760-0 386322 1 2 13 REMOVED TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE DISCREPANT INSERTS. ALL H/W WAS RETAINE 386322 1 3 D FOR REINSTALLATION. 4 DISCREPANT INSERTS WERE REMOVED AND NEW INSERTS 386322 1 4 WERE INSTALLED. CLOSEOUT PANELS WERE REINSTALLED WITH RETAINED H/W. DESI 386322 1 5 GN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY 386322 1 6 REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 386389 1 1 THE LOWER AFT F12056-10-04 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199203 SPAR FITTING WA 386389 1 2 S FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE 386389 1 3 TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED AND BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE O 386389 1 4 F SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 386389 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 386389 1 6 SHOP OF ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 386390 1 1 THE LOWER FWD MD114-5003-0005 NUTPLATE ON THE V070-199204 FITTING WAS FO 386390 1 2 UND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DU 386390 1 3 E TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT HARDWARE. ME121-0014-03XX BLIND RIVETS W 386390 1 4 ERE USED IN PLACE OF PER PRINT NAS1199-3 RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS 386390 1 5 WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPAN 386390 1 6 CY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQ 386390 1 7 UIRED. 386407 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 1ZK626A24 HAD KAPTON DA 386407 1 2 MAGE WITHIN 2 INCHES OF CONNECTOR J21 WITH NO VISIBLE DAMAGE TO THE SHIE 386407 1 3 LD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTOR(S). MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO USE MYSTIK 7503 386407 1 4 ELECTRICAL TAPE TO REPAIR THE DAMAGED AREA ON THE NOTED WIRE. NO RETEST 386407 1 5 IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION 386409 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-043, WIRES 3F74DD22-2 AND 4F74DD22-1 WERE FOUND TO HAVE 386409 1 2 EXPOSED CONDUCTOR. ALSO, HARNESS V070-776902-001 WAS FOUND TO BE "BLISTE 386409 1 3 RED". WIRES 3F74DD22-2 AND 4F74DD22-1 WERE REPAIRED BY AN APPROVED MR BY 386409 1 4 USING HEAT SHRINK MATERIAL OVER DAMAGED AREA AND INSTALLING IT USING A 386409 1 5 CLAMSHELL TOOL. THE "BLISTERED" HARNESS WAS NOT A DISCREPANCY AND WAS CO 386409 1 6 VERED IN SPEC MLO303-0013 PARA 5.1.2.3. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON TH 386409 1 7 IS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING 386447 1 1 DURING AN INSPECTION, JR22 WIRE TO 81P413 WAS FOUND BROKEN FROM GROUND L 386447 1 2 UG. THE WIRE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW JR22 WIRE WHICH WAS INS 386447 1 3 TALLED IN A PARALLEL SPLICE AND THEN HAD A NEW GROUND LUG INSTALLED. A C 386447 1 4 ONTINUITY CHECK ON NEW LUG TO GROUND WAS PERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY. THE JR2 386447 1 5 2 WIRE WAS THEN REINSTALLED TO 81P413. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THI 386447 1 6 S PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 386461 1 1 DUE TO HIGH LOADING ON A STRUCTURAL MATE BOLT, IT COULD NOT BE REMOVED A 386461 1 2 ND TURNED AROUND AS REQUIRED BY TPS STR-3-J1-548. TO PREVENT HOLE DAMAGE 386461 1 3 THE BOLT WILL REMAIN IN PLACE AND THE V724-340035-001 GAS BEAM FITTING 386461 1 4 WAS NOTCHED TO ACCOMODATE THE SKANK OF THE BOLT. THIS MR REWORK WAS APPR 386461 1 5 OVED BY PRMB. PROBABLE CAUSE: FUSELAGE FLEXING AND SETTLING. 386497 1 1 THE V070-338903-001 FITTING WAS INSTALLED PER STR-3-J1-531 AFTER THE ECL 386497 1 2 WATER LINE WAS REROUTED AND A MR SHIM WAS INSTALLED IN ORDER TO ALLEVIA 386497 1 3 TE A GAP BETWEEN THE FITTING AND THE FRAME. ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION RE 386497 1 4 VEALED THAT THERE WAS NO INTERFERENCE DUE TO THE WIRE HARNESS BRACKET OR 386497 1 5 THE PYRO BRACKET. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 386504 1 1 EO E05 WAS RELEASED AGAINST DWG V070-337401 TO CORRECT HARDWARE QUANTITY 386504 1 2 CALLOUT FROM 24 TO 23. PROBLEM DUE TO DWG ERROR. 386520 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN BECAUSE TECHNICIANS HAD DIFFICULTY REMOVING THE QUIC 386520 1 2 K RELEASE PINS FROM THE HATCH HINGES. THILE RESEARCHING THIS ANOMALY IT 386520 1 3 WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE OMI BEING PERFORMED DID NOT FULLY COMPLY WITH TH 386520 1 4 E CHECKOUT SPECS. THE C/O SPEC CALLED FOR THE PINS TO BE REMOVED WHILE T 386520 1 5 HE HATCH WAS CLOSED. STEPS WERE PERFORMED IN AN ATTEMPT TO COMPLY WITH T 386520 1 6 HIS SPEC BUT THE PINS WERE NOT REMOVEABLE WHILE THE HATCH WAS CLOSED. AN 386520 1 7 OTHER ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO PERFORM THE PIN REMOVAL AS INDICATED IN THE OM 386520 1 8 I, WITH THE HATCH OPEN, WHICH WAS SUCCESSFUL. ANOTHER LIKE ANOMALY WAS R 386520 1 9 EPORTED ON MEQ-5-02-0146 DEALING WITH THE D HATCH. DISCUSSION WITH BOTH 386520 1 10 NASA AND RI RESULTED IN A DESIRE TO CHANGE THE HATCH C/O PROCEDURE TO 386520 1 11 ALLOW FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE HINGE PINS WITH THE HATCH IN EITHER THE 386520 1 12 OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. THIS FOLLOWED FROM THE REALIZED DIFFICULTY IN 386520 1 13 THE NEAR PERFECT ALIGNMENT OF THE HATCH DURING CLOSURE IN A 1G 386520 1 14 ENVIRONMENT. WHEN THE HATCH IS IN THE OPEN POSITION ALL OF ITS WEIGHT 386520 1 15 RESTS ON THE FLOOR WHICH MAKES THE HINGE ALIGNMENT MUCH EASIER. AN EO 386520 1 16 WAS RELEASED TO DOCUMENT THIS CHANGE OF PROCEDURE AND STEPS WERE 386520 1 17 PERFORMED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF OMI V5067 S01-085. THE PROBABLE 386520 1 18 CAUSE OF THIS PR WAS TECHNICIAN AND DWG ERROR AS THE HATCH PINS WERE 386520 1 19 REMOVED IN THE PR WITH THE HATCH OPEN AS ORIGINALLY REQUIRED IN V5067. 386520 1 20 NO HARDWARE CHANGES WERE MADE. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 386523 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-022, THE BACKSHELL AND CONNECTOR ON 56P3 WAS FOUND TO BE 386523 1 2 WORN AND UNABLE TO CLOSE CORRECTLY. A NEW CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELL WAS O 386523 1 3 RDERED AND THE CONNECTORS REPINNED. RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRACKED AS CONNE 386523 1 4 CTOR WAS ALREADY DEMATED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. CDR-CM- 386523 1 5 3-1610 WAS ADDRESSED BY RECORDING CORRECT OCN NUMBER IN STEP 1-13.4 FOLL 386523 1 6 OWING CONNECTOR DEMATE. SCAN TO RETEST. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND 386523 1 7 TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 386620 1 1 ONE STUD BROKE OFF OF THE V070-399110-008 CHAIN LINK ASSEMBLY WHEN THE V 386620 1 2 070-399121-001 CLIP WAS REMOVED. THE CHAIN LINK ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED AND 386620 1 3 REPLACED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERAT 386620 1 4 IONAL DEGRADATION. 386640 1 1 A V070-852761-003 DOUBLER WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED. THE SHARP CORNERS 386640 1 2 OF THE SHIMS AND DOUBLERS WERE TRIMMED ON AN UNRESTRICTED MR BASIS AND M 386640 1 3 R ID'D. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMA 386640 1 4 NSHIP. 386656 1 1 DURING AN INSP WIRE L652A20 WAS FOUND TO BE DAMAGED APPROX 1" FROM 30E21 386656 1 2 . WIRE WAS REMOVED AND RETERMINATED AT 30E21. A CONTINUITY CHECK ON NEW 386656 1 3 LUG TO GROUND WAS PERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY. 30E21 WAS BOND CHECKED AND CON 386656 1 4 FORMAL COATED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO 386656 1 5 RMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 386719 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 1) THESE ITEM DOCUMENT TWO (2) DENTS ON THE F 386719 1 2 LOOR OF THE AIRLOCK. THE DENT AT ITEM #1 WAS 0.22" DEEP AND THE DENT AT 386719 1 3 ITEM #2 WAS FOUND TO BE 0.010" DEEP. NDE WAS PERFORMED AND NO EVIDENCE O 386719 1 4 F FACESHEET CRACKING OR DELAMINATION WAS FOUND. THE DENTS WERE REPAIRED 386719 1 5 PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION TO FABRICATION AND INSTALL TWO(2) DOUBL 386719 1 6 ERS USING MBO120-053 ADHESIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS IS WORKMAN 386719 1 7 SHIP. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1A). THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A PROBLEM IN OBTAININ 386719 1 8 G AN ADEQUATE VACUUM DUE TO LEAKS IN SET-UP DURING THE THERMAL EVALUATIO 386719 1 9 N. THIS IS NOT PR CONDITION. THE BOND SET-UP WAS REDONE PER ENGINEERING 386719 1 10 DIRECTION AS ALLOWED PER V9045. ADEQUATE VACUUM WAS OBTAINED WITH NO 386719 1 11 SPECTIFICATION VIOLATION. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. NO FURTHER OR 386719 1 12 ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 386775 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-048, WIRE HARNESS INSTALLED ON V070-341123-001 TRAY INTE 386775 1 2 RFERES WITH THE PVD DUCT. CLAMPS WERE REMOVED AND PTFE TAPE WAS INSTALLE 386775 1 3 D OVER THE CHAFFING AREA ON THE WIRE HARNESS WHERE IT WAS RUBBING THE PV 386775 1 4 D DUCT. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY. NO RETEST IS REQUIR 386775 1 5 ED. 386827 1 1 THE LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199202 SPAR FITTING WAS 386827 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE 386827 1 3 TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE O 386827 1 4 FSOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 386827 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER S 386827 1 6 HOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 386835 1 1 THREE NEW SPRINGS WERE INSTALLED IN THE SEAL ASSY. THE SEAL WAS THEN CHE 386835 1 2 CKED FOR FREE MOVEMENT. PROBLEM DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THE LOOSE P 386835 1 3 INS WERE PEENED PER MR DISPO. THIS PEENING CAUSES THE PINS TO HAVE A TIG 386835 1 4 HT FIT INTO SEAL HOUSING HOLES. PROBLEM CAUSED BY OVERSIZE HOUSING HOLES 386880 1 1 DURING V5C06.002 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE PCA #2 HAD THREE AREAS OF RA 386880 1 2 ISED METAL, REF ITEM 1. THE DISCREPANT AREAS WERE REPAIRED PER MLO303-00 386880 1 3 29. IN ADDITION IT WAS NOTED THAT RECEPTACLE J7 ON THE PCA HAD TWO BENT 386880 1 4 PINS (#5 AND #6), REF ITEM 2. ENGINEERING INSPECTION OF THE NOTED RECEPT 386880 1 5 ACLE REVEALED THAT NO APPARENT PINS WERE BENT. THE ASSOCIATED CONN 40P82 386880 1 6 7 WAS SOFT MATED TO J7 TO VERIFY PROPER PIN ALIGNMENT. UPON COMPLETION O 386880 1 7 F CONN SOFT MATE IT WAS NTOED THAT NO PINS WERE MISALIGNED OR BENT. NO R 386880 1 8 ETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CASUE OF ITEM 1 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO EQUIPME 386880 1 9 NT HANDLING. ITEM 2 WAS VERIFIED TO BE AN EVIDENT DISCREPANCY. 386914 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON OEL-3-J1-024 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE J18 FLI 386914 1 2 GHT CAP LANYARD HAD BROKEN STRANDS ON FPCA #2. IN AN ATTEMPT TO REMOVE A 386914 1 3 ND REPLACE THE LANYARD A PAGE 1A WAS INITIATED BECAUSE THE LANYARD HAD B 386914 1 4 ROKEN LOOSE AND THE SCREW LOOSENED ON THE LRU COULDN'T BE RETORQUED TO S 386914 1 5 PECIFICATION. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE ADDRESSED BY REMOVING FPCA #2 PER 386914 1 6 OMI V5C05.002, SENDING TO ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER FOR REPAIR, AND REINS 386914 1 7 TALLING PER THE SAME OMI ONCE THE BOX WAS REPAIRED. THIS RETURNS FPCA #2 386914 1 8 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. CONNECTOR DEMATES WILL BE SCAN TRACKED. NO RETE 386914 1 9 ST OR FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS DOCUMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMA 386914 1 10 L WEAR AND TEAR. 386933 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-047M CONTINUITY CHECKS INDICATED OPEN CIRCUIT RESISTANCE 386933 1 2 MEASUREMENTS ON PINS M AND -X OF CONN 50P506 TO PINS -B AND -C OF CONN 386933 1 3 50P520 RESPECTIVELY. THE DISCREPANCY WAS DETERMINED TO BE ASSOCIATED WIT 386933 1 4 H CONN 4F264C11-1 (-X) AND 4F264C22-2 (M) FROM CONN 50P506, INSPECT CRIM 386933 1 5 PS, RE-INSERT WIRES, AND PERFORM GENTLE PULL TEST TO VERIFY PROPER SEATI 386933 1 6 NG. A CONTINUITY TEST WAS THEN RE-PERFORMED ON PINS M AND -X OF 50P506 T 386933 1 7 O PINS -B AND -C PF 50P520 RESPECTIVELY WITH NOMINAL (<1 OHM) RESISTANCE 386933 1 8 ACHIEVED. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RETEST IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. PROBABLE 386933 1 9 CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 386996 1 1 THE ACCESS DOORS WERE PAINTED WHITE PER DR'S TCS-3-15-0124 AND -0125 AF 386996 1 2 TER THIS PR WAS GENERATED. THE PROBLEM NO LONGER EXISTS. 387003 1 1 DURING AN INSPECTION, CONNECTOR 50P359 WAS FOUND TO BE DEMATED. PER SCAN 387003 1 2 CONNECTOR SHOWS NO ACTIVITY. THE CONNECTOR AND RECEPTACLE WAS INSPECTE 387003 1 3 D AND NO ANOMALIES FOUND. THE CONNECTOR WAS THEN MATED. NO FURTHER ACTIO 387003 1 4 N REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION. 387141 1 1 DURING V30-15431, THE UPPER AFT THERMAL BARRIER ON THE LH UPPER RUDDER S 387141 1 2 PEED BRAKE WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED. A NEW V070-298120-001 BARRIER WAS OB 387141 1 3 TAINED FROM LOGISTICS AND THE DISCREPANT SEAL WAS SENT TO THE HDA FOR SC 387141 1 4 RAP. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER S 387141 1 5 HOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 387232 1 1 THE UPPER WING HI-LOK FASTENER FOR THE MIDDLE V070-120150-004 ANGLE HAS 387232 1 2 INSUFFICIENT EDGE DISTANCE. THIS PR IS DOCUMENTED PER ITEM 5 ON STR-3-J1 387232 1 3 -4251 AND WILL BE ADDRESSED ON STR-3-J1-4251. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED AC 387232 1 4 CESS. 387400 1 1 THE THREE UNUSED OPEN HOLES WERE PLUGGED. PROBLEM DUE TO VENDOR. 387454 1 1 ITEM 1 IS A METEORITE HIT AND DAMAGED THE FACESHEET TO A DEPTH OF .014". 387454 1 2 THERE IS NO HOLE IN THE FACESHEET, AND THE BOTTOM OF THE KING IS SMOOTH 387454 1 3 AND ROUND. ITEM 2 IS A TAPE SCUFF AND DID NOT DAMAGE THE FACEHSEET. BOT 387454 1 4 H ITEMS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITE 387454 1 5 M 1 IN FLIGHT DAMAGE. ITEM 2: WORKMANSHIP. 387552 1 1 NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. A PR OEL-3-15-0281 WAS GENERAT 387552 1 2 ED NOTING THE HARNESS ECL LINE INTERFERENCE. AN EOTF WILL BE OBTAINED FO 387552 1 3 R OV-103 TO REFLECT THE INSTALLATION OF BUTTERFLIED CLAMPS INSTALLED ON 387552 1 4 THE PCA THE SAME AS INSTALLED ON OV-104. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTE 387552 1 5 D TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 387563 1 1 A DENT WAS FOUND IN THE V070-357330-005 COVER ASSEMBLY. THE DENT AND COV 387563 1 2 ER ASSEMBLY WERE ACCEPTED ON AN MR BASIS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND MR ID' 387563 1 3 D. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THE PR. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 387731 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1,2,3 AND 4 AND 5 ON PAGES 1 AND 1A). THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT CO 387731 1 2 RROSION AND MISSING PAINT ON THE L/H AND R/H LOWER AND UPPER PSB INNER P 387731 1 3 ANELS AS DETECTED DURING V30-15368. ALL DISCREPANT LOCATIONS NOTED ARE D 387731 1 4 UPLICATIONS OF LOCATIONS DOCUMENTED ON STR-3-15-4286, 4288, 4299, AND 43 387731 1 5 00. TABLES 1,2,3 AND 4 DOCUMENT RELATIONSHIP TO DUPLICATE DISCREPANCIES. 387731 1 6 NO NEW PR CONDITION EXISTS FOR THESE ITEMS. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1). THI 387731 1 7 S ITEM DOCUMENTS A "PINHOLE" AND A MISSING RIVET. THE PINHOLE WAS DETERM 387731 1 8 INED BY ENGINEERING TO BY A SMALL BUBBLE IN THE RTV FILL OF THE SPLICE B 387731 1 9 ETWEEN THE RSB PANEL AND THE TRAILING EDGE PANEL. RTV REMAINS INTACT 387731 1 10 UNDERNEATH THE "PINHOLE". NO MISSING RIVETS COULD BE FOUND (EXCEPT THOSE 387731 1 11 T LOCATIONS WHERE THERMAL BARRIERS HAVE BEEN REMOVED). THIS ITEM WILL BE 387731 1 12 RESOLVED ON STR-3-15-4277. THESE DISCREPANCIES ARE NOT PR CONDITIONS. NO 387731 1 13 FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 387804 1 1 ITEM 1: THE TOP 6 HOLES THAT ATTACH THE MIDDLE V070-120150-003 NESTED AN 387804 1 2 GLE TO THE MID-BODY ARE OVERSIZED. HOLES 3955,3954,3953 AND 3952 WERE MR 387804 1 3 ACCEPTED ON MR BG0778-000M AND THE REMAINING TWO HOLES WERE MR ACCEPTED 387804 1 4 PER THIS PR. ITEM 2: FIVE OF THE HOLES THAT ATTACH THE MIDDLE V070-1201 387804 1 5 50-003 NESTED ANGLE TO THE MID BODY ARE NONPERPENDICULIAR. SELF ALIGNING 387804 1 6 HI-LOK COLLARS AND SELF ALIGNING WASHERS WERE MR INSTALLED. (HOLES 3952 387804 1 7 ,3953,3955,3956) THE FIFTH HOLE WAS REAMED UP TO 9/32 TH'S AND A DOUBLER 387804 1 8 OVERSIZED HI0LOK WAS INSTALLED. (HOLES 3954). ITEM 3: THE BOTTOM OF THE 387804 1 9 MIDDLE NESTED ANGLE CAN NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM THE MR 387804 1 10 BG0778-000M-001 DOUBLER. THE MR BG0778-000M-001 DOUBLER WAS REMOVED AND 387804 1 11 THE ANGLE WAS INSTALLED. AN MR SHIM WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED AROUND 387804 1 12 THE ANGLE WITH THE MR BG0778-000M-001 DOUBLER INSTALLED OVER TOP OF THE 387804 1 13 SHIM AND ANGLE. ITEM 4: THE TOP OF THE LOWER MIDDLE -003 NESTED ANGLE 387804 1 14 CAN NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM THE MR BG0778-000M-001 387804 1 15 DOUBLER. THE MR BG0778-000M-001 DOUBLER WAS REMOVED AND THE ANGLE WAS 387804 1 16 INSTALLED. AN MR SHIM WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED AROUND THE ANGLE WITH 387804 1 17 THE MR BG0778-000M-001 DOUBLER INSTALLED OVER TOP OF THE SHIM AND ANGLE. 387804 1 18 ITEM 5: THE TOP FASTENER IN THE -003 NESTED ANGLE LACKS PROPER EDGE 387804 1 19 DISTANCE. HOLE 3950 WAS MR ACCEPTED PER PAGE 11 OF THIS PR. ITEM 6: THE 387804 1 20 SEVEN OUTBOARD FASTENERS FOR THE -003 NESTED ANGLE LACK PROPER EDGE 387804 1 21 DISTANCES. HOLES 4885 THRU 4891 WERE OVERSIZED TO 1/4" FASTENERS PER MR 387804 1 22 BG0778-000M AND THE HOLES IN THE ANGLES WERE MR ACCEPTED PER THIS PR. 387804 1 23 ITEM 7: UNABLE TO OBTAIN THE .5" DIMENSION REQUIRED TO INSTALL THE LOWER 387804 1 24 MIDDLE V070-120150-003 ANGLE DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH A HI-LOK. THE .50" 387804 1 25 DIMENSION IS FOR EDGE DISTANCE WHICH IS DOCUMENTED ON ITEM 5 OF THIS PR. 387804 1 26 THE ANGLE IS INSTALLED. NO INTERFERENCE. ITEM 8: HOLES 3952 THRU 3956 387804 1 27 THAT ATTACH THE MIDDLE -003 NESTED ANGLE TO THE MID-BODY ARE OUT OF 387804 1 28 TOLERANCE. HOLES 3952,3953,3955 AND 3956 WERE MR ACCEPTED TO INSTALL 387804 1 29 .015" OVERSIZE HI-LOK FASTENERS AND HOLE 3954 WAS REAMED UP TO 9/32 TH'S 387804 1 30 AND A DOUBLE OVERSIZE HI-LOK FASTENER WAS INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 387804 1 31 LIMITED ACCESS. 387806 1 1 ITEM 1: AN 'L' SHAPED DOUBLER (MR BG0778-000M-002 DOUBLER AND -003 SHIM) 387806 1 2 INTERFERES WITH THE INSTALLATION OF THE V070-120150-008 NESTED ANGLE. T 387806 1 3 HE 'L' SHAPED DOUBLER WAS INSTALLED PER MR BG0778-000M. THIS DOUBLER WAS 387806 1 4 REMOVED AND THE NESTED ANGLE WAS INSTALLED. A MR SHIM WAS FABRICATED AN 387806 1 5 D INSTALLED AROUND THE ANGLE AND THE MR BG0778-000M DOUBLER WAS REINSTAL 387806 1 6 LED OVER TOP THE ANGLE. ITEM 2: THE BOTTOM FASTENER TO BE REMOVED FOR IN 387806 1 7 STALLATION OF THE V070-120150-008 ANGLE IS A JO-BOLT. THE JO-BOLT IS PER 387806 1 8 PRINT AND WILL NOT BE REMOVED. NOT A PR CONDITION. ITEM 3: THE BOTTOM F 387806 1 9 ASTENER FOR THE V070-120150-008 NESTED ANGLE ALONG THE MID-BODY SIDE IS 387806 1 10 OVERSIZED. PER MR BG0778-000M THIS HOLE WAS OVERSIZED TO .3125" DIA AND 387806 1 11 A NO 10 HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED. THE LOWER HOLE IN THE V070-120150-008 387806 1 12 NESTED ANGLE WAS DRILLED UP TO .3125" DIA AND A NO 10 HI-LOK WAS 387806 1 13 INSTALLED PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 387808 1 1 THE OUTBD ROW OF FASTENERS THAT WILL BE USED TO INSTALL THE V070-120170 387808 1 2 ANGLES ARE 1/4" HI-LOKS AND SHOULD .190" HI-LOKS. MR ACCEPTED "AS-IS". M 387808 1 3 INIMUM EDGE DISTANCE RATIO (E/D) IS 1.64D FOR THE V070-120150 ANGLES. PR 387808 1 4 OBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. 387812 1 1 A WIRE HARNESS SUPPORT BRACKET WAS INSTALLED PER EO TO FOLLOW DISPOSITIO 387812 1 2 N (V070-346048 EO G02). PROBLEM DUE TO VENDOR DWG ERROR. 387814 1 1 THE LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199218 SPAR FITTING WAS 387814 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE 387814 1 3 TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE O 387814 1 4 F SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 387814 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 387814 1 6 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 387816 1 1 THE UPPER FWD O/B MD114-5003-0005 NUTPLATE ON THE V070-199212 FITTING WA 387816 1 2 S FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED 387816 1 3 . DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT HARDWARE, ME121-0014-03XX BLIND RIVE 387816 1 4 TS WERE USED IN PLACE OF PER PRINT NAS1199-3 RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RI 387816 1 5 VETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCR 387816 1 6 EPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION 387816 1 7 REQUIRED. 387817 1 1 THE UPPER AFT O/B F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199209 SPAR FITTING 387817 1 2 WAS FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. 387817 1 3 DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLA 387817 1 4 CE OF SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRI 387817 1 5 CTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURT 387817 1 6 HER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 387818 1 1 THE UPPER AFT OB, UPPER AFT IB, AND LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUTS ON 387818 1 2 THE V070-199210 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE 387818 1 3 NUT WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUTS WERE INST 387818 1 4 ALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE OF SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RI 387818 1 5 VETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE IPR 387818 1 6 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIR 387818 1 7 ED. 387819 1 1 THE LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199213 SPAR FITTING WAS 387819 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE 387819 1 3 TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE O 387819 1 4 F SOLID RIVITS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVITS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 387819 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 387819 1 6 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 387820 1 1 THE UPPER AFT OB, UPPER AFT IB, AND LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 AHCNOR NUTS ON 387820 1 2 THE V070-199211 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE 387820 1 3 NUT WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUTS WERE INST 387820 1 4 ALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE OF SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RI 387820 1 5 VETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE UPPER FWD INBOARD AND OUT 387820 1 6 BOARD MD114-5003-0005 NUTPLATES ON THE V070-199211 FITTING WERE FOUND TO 387820 1 7 HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTPLATE WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO 387820 1 8 INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT HARDWARE, ME121-0014-03XX BLIND RIVETS WERE 387820 1 9 USED IN PLACE OF PER PRINT NAS1199-3 RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS 387820 1 10 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES 387820 1 11 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIR 387820 1 12 ED. 387917 1 1 THE DENT IN THE STRUT IS .0057 INCH. THE BOTTOM OF THE DENT IS SMOOTH AN 387917 1 2 D ROUNDED WITH NO INDICATIONS OF CRACKING OR EXPOSED FIBERS. THE STRUT W 387917 1 3 AS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON 387917 1 4 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 388020 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN 2 GOUGES WERE FOUND ON THE R1 RADIATOR FWD DR 388020 1 2 IVE LINK ATTACH CLEVIS. MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN WITH THE FOLLOWING: 388020 1 3 1) .0581W X .0975L X .0021D. 2) .1469W X .1119L X .0123D. THE DISCREPANC 388020 1 4 Y WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND REPAIRED AND REFINISHED TO DR 388020 1 5 AWING STANDARDS. THIS PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. NO RETEST IS REQUIR 388020 1 6 ED. PROBABLE CAUSE: DAMAGE DURING REMOVAL OF DRIVE LINK CONNECT BOLTS. 388021 1 1 UPON COMPLETION OF INSERT CLEANING AND FIT CHECK OF NEW HARDWARE, NO EXC 388021 1 2 ESSIVE RUNNING TORQUE WAS NOTED. NO DISCREPANT CONDITION EXIST. 388029 1 1 THE MR PART WAS IDENTIFIED TO BE PART OF A V070 SUPPORT. THE CALLOUT FOR 388029 1 2 SOLID RIVETS TO ATTACH THE V070 SUPPORT WAS IN ITS INSTALLATION DRAWING 388029 1 3 . HI-LOKS WERE MR SUBSTITUTED FOR SOLID RIVETS IN ATTACHING V070 SUPPORT 388029 1 4 AND MR PART DUE TO LACK OF ACCESS FOR SOLID RIVET TOOLING. PROBLEM DUE 388029 1 5 TO LACK OF ACCESS. 388141 1 1 AT XW1307 AND YW117, A RIGHT HAND WING SPAR #10 OVERSIZED HI-LOK HOLE IS 388141 1 2 ELONGATED .030". THE HOLE WAS DRILLED UP TO A 1/4" AND AN 1/4" HI-LOK I 388141 1 3 NSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 388143 1 1 ITEM 1: HOLE 4910, THE UPPER MOST HOLE IN THE V070-120150-006 ANGLE HAS 388143 1 2 AN EDGE DISTANCE OF 1.5 DIA AND SHOULD BE 2 DIA. THIS CONDITION WAS MR A 388143 1 3 CCEPTED. ITEM 2: HOLES 3943 THRU 3939, THE OUTBOARD ROW OF FASTENERS FOR 388143 1 4 THE V070-120150-006 ANGLE HAS EDGE DISTANCES OF 1.5 DIA AND SHOULD BE 2 388143 1 5 DIA. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 388148 1 1 THIS PR ADDRESSES A DISCREPANT CONDITION PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED ON STR-3- 388148 1 2 15-3984. NO WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE WILL BE ADDRESSE 388148 1 3 D ON STR-3-15-3984. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 388149 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING V1015 WHEN A WRISTWATCH WAS DROPPED ON RH R 388149 1 2 ADIATOR #1. THE RADIATOR TAPE WAS REMOVED AND THE DAMAGE WAS INSPECTED. 388149 1 3 A SMOOTH BOTTOMED 0.897"L X 0.501" X 0.024"D DENT WAS FOUND IN THE RADIA 388149 1 4 TOR FACESHEET. IT WAS 1.5" FROM THE CLOSEST FREON TUBE. THERE WAS NO EVI 388149 1 5 DENCE OF FACESHEET DELAMINATION OR CRACKING. PER AN MR (P-22) A 2.5" X 3 388149 1 6 " DOUBLER WAS BONDED OVER THE DEFECT. DURING THE BONDING PROCESS, TAPE A 388149 1 7 ROUND THE BOND WAS DAMAGED (ITEM #2 & #3). THE DAMAGED TAPE WAS REMOVED 388149 1 8 AND NEW RADIATOR TAPE WAS BONDED OVER THE ENTIRE AREA (REFERENCE MR'S P. 388149 1 9 25.1 & 34). NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 388149 1 10 NO RETEST REQUIRED. 388152 1 1 THE WINDOW #7 CLOUSEOUT PANEL WAS CRACKED DURING A FITCHECK OF THE PANEL 388152 1 2 OVER THE NEW PAYLOAD SUPPORT BRACKETS. THE CLEARANCE HOLES WERE TRIMMED 388152 1 3 BY MR TO FIT THE SUPPORTS AND THE CRACKED PORTIONS WERE REMOVED. PROBAB 388152 1 4 LE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING TOLERANCE BUILDUP. 388166 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTED DIFFICULTY ENCOUNTERED WHEN DISENGAGING THE ET UMBILI 388166 1 2 CAL DOOR FORWARD CENTERLINE LATCH FROM THE ET DOORS. THE DOORS WERE MANU 388166 1 3 ALLY TAKEN OFF CENTERLINE AND PLACED BACK ON CENTERLINE WITH THE FORWARD 388166 1 4 LATCH SEVERAL TIMES BY A DIFFERENT GROUP OF TECHNICIANS IN ORDER TO REP 388166 1 5 EAT THIS DIFFICULTY BUT THE LATCH OPERATED SMOOTHLY. THE LATCH BLADES AN 388166 1 6 D THE ET DOOR ENGAGEMENT CUPS WERE ALL VISUALLY INSPECTED AND NO ABNORMA 388166 1 7 LITIES WERE NOTED. ADDITIONALLY, MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN FOR THE DOOR OP 388166 1 8 EN SAG, FORCE TO OPEN TO THE DOORS TO CENTERLINE, LATCH ENGAGEMENT AND L 388166 1 9 ATCH TO CUP CLEARANCE AND ALL RESULTS WERE AS SPECIFIED PER THE RIGGING 388166 1 10 SPEC (ML0308-0058). IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE INITIAL DIFFICULTY WAS DUE 388166 1 11 TO OPERATOR ERROR AND THE CUMBERSOME NATURE OF THE OPERATION. NO FURTHER 388166 1 12 DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATOR ERROR. 388167 1 1 THE NOTED CORROSION WAS EASILY WIPED FROM THE V070-575512-006 ROD SPLINE 388167 1 2 WASHERS ON LEFT HAND VENT DOORS 8 & 9 USING IPA AND TEXWIPES. THE CONTA 388167 1 3 MINATION APPEARED TO BE FROM MOISTURE WHICH HAD CONDENSED ONTO THE VENT 388167 1 4 DOOR ADJUSTMENT LINKAGE AREAS OF BOTH VENT DOORS AND OXIDIZED ON THE SUR 388167 1 5 FACE. NO ABRASIVE REMOVAL WAS NECESSARY AND NO TRACE OF OXIDATION REMAIN 388167 1 6 ED AFTER WIPING. DENTAL MOLD IMPRESSIONS CONFIRMED THERE WAS NO SURFACE 388167 1 7 DAMAGE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST WITH LH DOORS 8 & 9'S ADJUSTMENT 388167 1 8 LINKAGE. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION 388325 1 1 DURING V070-3-15-168, THE 70B2010-7 STABILIZER STRUT IN BAY 9 RH SIDE WA 388325 1 2 S FOUND TO HAVE AN EDDY CURRENT INDICATION OF A CRACK. THE DISCREPANT ST 388325 1 3 RUT WAS REMOVED AND ROUTED TO NSLD AND A NEW STRUT WAS FABRICATED. THE N 388325 1 4 EW STRUT WAS INSTALLED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE OLD BORON TUBE WAS 388325 1 5 SENT TO DOWNEY FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY 388325 1 6 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUI 388325 1 7 RED FOR THIS PR. 388328 1 1 TWO MR TAPERED SHIMS WERE BONDED WITH RTV TO THE V070-220006-004 SKIN PA 388328 1 2 NEL. THE MR SHIMS ARE MATCH DRILLED TO THE SKIN PANEL'S FASTENER HOLES. 388328 1 3 THE SHIMS FAIR UP THE STEPS BETWEEN THE STRUCTURAL BEAMS. PROBLEM DUE TO 388328 1 4 VENDOR BUILDUP ERROR. ITEM 2 - A MR TAPERED SHIM WAS BONDED WITH RTV TO 388328 1 5 THE V070-220006-003 SKIN PANEL. THE MR SHIM IS MATCH DRILLED TO THE SKI 388328 1 6 N PANEL'S FASTENER HOLES. THE SHIM FAIR UP THE STEPS BETWEEN THE STRUCTU 388328 1 7 RAL BEAMS. PROBLEM DUE TO VENDOR BUILDUP ERROR. ITEM 3 - THE TWO HOLES W 388328 1 8 ERE COUNTERSUNK TO PRINT CONDITION. PROBLEM DUE TO VENDOR BUILDUP ERROR. 388328 1 9 ERE COUNTERSUNK TO PRINT CONDITION. PROBLEM DUE TO VENDOR BUILDUP ERROR. 388362 1 1 THE 70B2000-40 STRUT WITH EXPOSED FIBERS (ITEMS 1 AND 3) AND SLIGHT INDE 388362 1 2 NTATION (ITEM 2) WAS CORROSION PROTECTED WITH KOROPON AND MR ACCEPTED AS 388362 1 3 IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE WAS INTERFERENCE 388362 1 4 WITH AN MPS LINE (REF MX-3-15-044). CONCLUDE THAT ALL WORK IS COMPLETE A 388362 1 5 ND NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 388384 1 1 THE 4 EA NUTPLATES WERE INSTALLED USING MR SUBSTITUTED ME121-0013-03 BLI 388384 1 2 ND RIVETS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 388394 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT A DISCREPANCY IN THE RH #2 RADIATOR PA 388394 1 2 NEL TAPE. INSPECTIONS SHOWED THAT THIS IS NOT AN AREA OF RAISED TAPE AS 388394 1 3 ORIGINALLY RECORDED BUT IS A SMALL MICRO-METEORITE IMPACT THAT WAS MR AC 388394 1 4 CEPTED AS-IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THERE IS NO LONGER A PR CONDITION AND 388394 1 5 THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS NORMAL EXPOSURE TO ON-ORBIT 388394 1 6 DEBRIS. 388413 1 1 ITEM 1 - E.O.'S A02 AND A03 ADDRESSED THIS PROBLEM. THE TPS REFLECTED TH 388413 1 2 ESE E.O'S PROBLEM WAS WRITTEN IN ERROR. NO PROBLEM EXISTS. ITEM 2 - E.O. 388413 1 3 A04 ADDRESSED THIS PROBLEM FOR OV-102 ONLY. E.O. A05 WAS GENERATED TO M 388413 1 4 AKE A04 EFFECTIVE FOR OV-103. THE E.O. AUTHORIZES STRAP FASTENER HOLES T 388413 1 5 O BE DRILLED UP THROUGH DOUBLER. PROBLEM DUE TO DESIGN CENTER OVERSITE. 388413 1 6 ITEMS 3 AND 4 - THE STRAPS WERE SHIFTED TO CLEAR CHEM-MILLED STEPS IN SR 388413 1 7 RINGERS. PROBLEM DUE TO DESIGN CENTER OVERSITE. ITEM 5- -05 IDA. HI-LOKS 388413 1 8 WERE INSTALLED IN PLACE OF -06 DIA. HI-LOKS IN HOLES 1 THROUGH 6. PROBL 388413 1 9 EM DUE TO ORIGINAL HOLES NOT BEING DRILLED IN LINE BY VENDOR.ITEMS 7 AND 388413 1 10 14 - -05 DIA. HI-LOKS WERE INSTALLED IN PLACE OF -06 DIA. HI-LOKS IN 388413 1 11 HOLES 8 THROUGH15. THE STRAP WAS TRIMMED OFF BETWEEN HOLES 7 AND 8. -05 388413 1 12 SOLID RIVETS WERE INSTALLED IN HOLES 1 THROUGH 7. PROBLEM DUE TO 388413 1 13 ORIGINAL HOLES NOT BEING DRILLED IN LINE BY VENDOR. ITEMS 8 & 9 - THE 388413 1 14 STRAP WAS TRIMMED OFF BETWEEN HOLES 5 AND 6. -05 SOLID RIVETS WERE 388413 1 15 INSTALLED IN HOLES 1 THROUGH 5. PROBLEM DUE TO ORIGNAL HOLES NOT BEING 388413 1 16 DRILLED IN LINE BY VENDOR. ITEM 10 -THE STRAP WAS TRIMMED OFF BETWEEN 388413 1 17 BOLES 5 AND 6. -05 SOLID RIVETS WERE INSTALLED IN HOLES 1 THROUGH 5. 388413 1 18 PROBLEM DUE TO ORIGINAL HOLES NOT BEING DRILLED IN LINE BY VENDOR. ITEM 388413 1 19 11 - -05 DIA. HI-LOKS WERE INSTALLED IN PLACE OF -06 DIA. HI-LOKS IN 388413 1 20 HOLES 2, 6, AND 11. PROBLEM DUE TO ORGINAL HOLES NOT BEING DRILLED IN 388413 1 21 LINE BY VENDOR. ITEM 12- THE E.D. FOR HOLE 4 OF .131 INSTEAD OF .145 388413 1 22 MIN. IS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBLEM DUE TO ORIGINAL HOLE NOT BEING 388413 1 23 DRILLED IN LINE BY VENDOR. ITEM 13 -HOLES 2 AND 11 ARE MR ACCEPTED AS IS 388413 1 24 WITH AN E.D. OF .144 INSTEAD OF .145 MIN. HOLE 17 HAS A NOMINAL E.D. OF 388413 1 25 .146. -06 HI-LOKS WERE INSTALLED IN THESE THREE HOLES. -05 DIA. HI-LOKS 388413 1 26 WERE INSTALLED IN THESE THREE HOLES. -05 DIA. HI-LOKS WERE INSTALLED IN 388413 1 27 PLACE OF -06 DIA. HI-LOKS IN HOLES 1 AND 7. PROBLEM DUE TO ORIGINAL 388413 1 28 HOLES NOT BEING DRILLED IN LINE BY VENDOR. 388423 1 1 THE BORON STRUT WAS DAMAGED BY THE FASTENERS ON AN ADJACENT TCS BRACKET. 388423 1 2 THE BRACKET HAS BEEN TAPED UP PER TCS-3-15-1602 TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMA 388423 1 3 GE. VISUAL INSPECTION UNDER MAGNIFICATION SHOWED NO INDICATIONS OF EXPOS 388423 1 4 ED FIBERS OR DAMAGED ALUMINUM. THE SCRATCHES PENETRATED THE CORROSION PR 388423 1 5 OTECTION ONLY. THE CORROSION PROTECTION ON THE BORON STRUT WAS TOUCHED U 388423 1 6 P PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 388463 1 1 THE APU 3 150 VLV CHASSIS GROUND WIRE WAS FOUND TO BE BROKEN AT VGP E26. 388463 1 2 THE WIRE WAS RE-TERMINATED AND RE-CONNECTED TO E26 BY STEPS 1-1 THRY 1-6 388463 1 3 OF THIS PR. THE TWO INCORRECTLY-ROUTED WIRES AT TB12 WERE REPOSITIONED 388463 1 4 AND RECONNECTED BY STEPS 1-7 THRU 1-10. THE TERMINAL BOARD AND GROUND 388463 1 5 POINT WERE CONFORMAL COATED AND RETURNED TO FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. (WIRES 388463 1 6 ARE SYS 3 150 VLV-B POSITION IND) SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF TEH THREE WIRES 388463 1 7 AFFECTED BY THIS PR WAS COMPLETED BY VERIFYING APU 3 ISO VALVE CYCLE 388463 1 8 (WITH POSITION CHANGE AND TEMP INCREASE OF VALVE BODY) BY TPS 388463 1 9 APU-3-15-117 ON 9-23-92. NO FURTHER WORK REMAINS ON THIS PR. PROBABLE 388463 1 10 CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 388490 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS THE V070-298115-006 THERMAL B 388490 1 2 ARRIER HAVING A DEFORMED RTV SEAL. THE DEFORMED RTV SEAL WAS REMOVED AND 388490 1 3 REPLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS WORKMA 388490 1 4 NSHIP-IMPROPER INSTALLATION. (REF ITEMS 2,19,22, ON PAGES 1,1F, AND 1G) 388490 1 5 THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT MISSING V070-298110-004 AND -003 SPACERS. THE SPACE 388490 1 6 RS WERE NOT REMOVED WHEN THERMAL BARRIERS WERE REMOVED DURING STR-3-15-5 388490 1 7 59. NEW SPACERS WERE OBTAINED PER THIS DOCUMENT AND REINSTALLED PER STR- 388490 1 8 3-15-559. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS WORKMANSHIP-IMPROPER INSTALLAT 388490 1 9 ION. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A MISSING 388490 1 10 V070-298110-004 SPACER. A NEW SPACER WAS OBTAINED PER THIS DOCUMENT AND 388490 1 11 REINSTALLED PER STR-3-15-559. THIS ITEM ALSO DOCUMENTS A DEBONDED END OF 388490 1 12 THE RTV SEAL. THE SEAL WAS TACK BONDED TO THE THERMAL BARRIER PER PRINT 388490 1 13 REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS WORKMANSHIP-IMPROPER 388490 1 14 INSTALLATION. (REF ITEMS 4 ON PAGE 1A AND 24 ON PAGE 1H) THESE ITEMS 388490 1 15 DOCUMENT MULTIPLE DISCREPANCIES ON THE V070-298115-002 THERMAL BARRIER. 388490 1 16 THE THERMAL BARRIER WAS PARTIALLY REWORKED BUT ULTIMATELY SCRAPPED DUE 388490 1 17 TO A MISSING END TAB. A NEW THERMAL BARRIER ASSY WAS OBTAINED AND 388490 1 18 INSTALLED PER STR-3-15-559. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS IS 388490 1 19 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 5 ON PAGE 1A) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS 388490 1 20 RUBBED OFF HIGH EMISSIVITY COATING. IMPROPERLY BONDED RTV SEAL WAS R&R'D 388490 1 21 PER PRINT. HIGH EMISSIVITY COATING REAPPLIED PER UNRESTRICTED MR 388490 1 22 DISPOSITION AND THE EDGE CRACKS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 388490 1 23 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 6 ON 388490 1 24 PAGE 1B) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS MISSING COATING ON THE TABS OF THE 388490 1 25 V070-298116-005 BARRIER. THE CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 388490 1 26 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 7 ON PAGE 1B) 388490 1 27 THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS RUBBED OFF HIGH EMISSIVITY COATING, BROKEN SPOT 388490 1 28 WELD, AND EDGE CRACKS. THE HIGH EMISSIVITY COATING ACCEPTED PER 388490 1 29 UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION AND THE EDGE CRACKS AND BROKEN SPOT WELD 388490 1 30 WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS 388490 1 31 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 8 ON PAGE 1B) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A 388490 1 32 MISSING END TAB ON THE V070-298115-001 THERMAL BARRIER AND EDGE CRACKS. 388490 1 33 THE THERMAL BARRIER WAS SENT TO THE HDA FOR SCRAP AND A NEW BARRIER 388490 1 34 OBTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF 388490 1 35 ITEM 9 ON PAGE 1C) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS THE V070-298115-001 THERMAL 388490 1 36 BARRIER HAVING A IMPROPERLY INSTALLED RTV SEAL. THE DEFORMED RTV SEAL 388490 1 37 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 388490 1 38 ITEM IS WORKMANSHIP-IMPROPER INSTALLATION. 388490 1 39 (REF ITEMS 10,11,12,13,20 ON PAGES 1C,1D, AND 1F) THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT 388490 1 40 THERMAL BARRIERS HAVING EDGE CRACKS. THE CRACKS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS 388490 1 41 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS IS OPERATIONAL 388490 1 42 DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 14 ON PAGE 1D) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A BROKEN SPOT 388490 1 43 WELD ON THE V070-298115-001 THERMAL BARRIER. THE THERMAL BARRIER WAS MR 388490 1 44 ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS 388490 1 45 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 15,17 ON PAGE 1E) THESE ITEMS 388490 1 46 DOCUMENT RSB THERMAL BARRIERS WITH THE HIGH EMMISIVITY COATING WORN OFF 388490 1 47 APPROX 1/3 OF THEIR SURFACE. THE COATING WAS REAPPLIED PER UNRESTRICTED 388490 1 48 MR DISPOSITION TO USE A MODIFIED CURE CYCLE FOR TOUCH UP. PROBABLE CAUSE 388490 1 49 FOR THESE ITEMS IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 16 ON PAGE 1E) 388490 1 50 THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A V070-298115-001 THERMAL BARRIER WITH A DEFORMED 388490 1 51 RTV SEAL. THE SEAL WAS ONLY SLIGHTLY DEFORMED (NOT PERMANENTLY SET) AND 388490 1 52 WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS PER STR-3-15-559. NO DISCREPANT 388490 1 53 CONDITION EXISTS AT THIS LOCATION. (REF 18 ON PAGE 1F) THIS ITEM 388490 1 54 DOCUMENTS THE V070-298115-001 THERMAL BARRIER WITH RUBBED OFF HIGH 388490 1 55 EMISSIVITY COATING, DEFORMED RTV SEAL, AND EDGE CRACKS. THE RTV SEAL WAS 388490 1 56 ACCEPTABLE PER PRINT, HIGH EMISSIVITY COATING REAPPLIED PER UNRESTRICTED 388490 1 57 MR DISPOSITION AND THE EDGE CRACKS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 388490 1 58 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 388490 1 59 21 ON PAGE 1G) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A MISSING END TAB ON THE 388490 1 60 V070-298112-021 THERMAL BARRIER. THE THERMAL BARRIER WAS SENT TO THE HDA 388490 1 61 FOR REWORK AND A NEW BARRIER OBTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS 388490 1 62 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 23 ON PAGE 1G) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A 388490 1 63 BROKEN AND BENT V070-298112-019 THERMAL BARRIER. THIS THERMAL BARRIER 388490 1 64 WAS PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED AND REWORKED ON STR-3-15-3894. THIS ITEM IS A 388490 1 65 DUPLICATE AND NO NEW DISCREPANCY EXISTS. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 388490 1 66 ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 388570 1 1 REFERENCE ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1. THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DISCREPANT V070-298115-0 388570 1 2 20 THERMAL BARRIER ON THE L/H LOWER RSB INNER PANEL. THE DISCREPANT THER 388570 1 3 MAL BARRIER WAS ROUTED TO THE HDA FOR SCRAP. A NEW THERMAL BARRIER WAS O 388570 1 4 BTAINED AND HAS BEEN INSTALLED PER STR-3-15-559. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 388570 1 5 PR IS OEPRATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION RE 388570 1 6 QUIRED. 388580 1 1 V070-731872-019 LUNINOUS PANEL WAS FOUND TO HAVE CRACKS AROUND AFT SECON 388580 1 2 D FROM OUTBOARD SCREW HOLE, CENTER OUTBOARD SCREW HOLE AND CENTER HOLE. 388580 1 3 THE AFT SECOND FROM OUTBOARD SCREW HOLE HAD SEPARATED CRACK AND WAS BOND 388580 1 4 ED BACK TOGETHER. ALL REMAINING AREAS WERE VISUALLY CRACKED WITH NO SIGN 388580 1 5 S OF SEPARATION SO THEY WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAU 388580 1 6 SE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 388715 1 1 DURING V31-15114 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE WIRE 5ZK331A24 HAD KAPTON DA 388715 1 2 MAGE WITH NO SHIELD DAMAGE. THE NOTED DISCREPANT WIRE WAS REPAIRED PER 388715 1 3 SRP-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN B 388715 1 4 E ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 388743 1 1 TROUBLESHOOTING DISCOVERED THAT THE SIGNAL (+) WIRE FOR MEASUREMENT V63T 388743 1 2 1204A (T2401A26-2), WAS MISPINNED AT CONNECTOR 40P909. DISPO OPENED THE 388743 1 3 BACKSHELL OF THE AFOREMENTIONED CONNECTOR, EXTRACTED THE WIRE FROM PIN P 388743 1 4 OSITION 46 AND INSERTED IT INTO PIN POSITION 45. WHEN THIS WAS COMPLETED 388743 1 5 , THE MEASURMENT WAS OBSERVED TO HAVE A "GOOD" AMBIENT RESPONSE (72 DEGF 388743 1 6 ). THE CONNECTOR WAS RECONFIGURED AND THE BOBS WERE EXTRACTED. THE MEASU 388743 1 7 REMENT IS PRESENTLY OPERATING NOMINALLY. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED B 388743 1 8 Y THIS PR. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP. 388743 1 9 Y THIS PR. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP. 388753 1 1 THE UPPER FWD O/B MD114-5003-0005 NUT PLATE ON THE V070-199213 FITTING W 388753 1 2 AS FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT PLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLAC 388753 1 3 ED. DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT HARDWAARE, ME121-0014-03XX BLIND R 388753 1 4 IVETS WERE USED IN PLACE OF PER PRINT NAS1199-3 RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND 388753 1 5 RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE OFR THIS DI 388753 1 6 SCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACT 388753 1 7 ION REQUIRED. 388754 1 1 THE UPPER AFT I/B F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199215 SPAR FITTING 388754 1 2 WAS FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. 388754 1 3 DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLA 388754 1 4 CE OF SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRI 388754 1 5 CTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTH 388754 1 6 ER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 388755 1 1 THE UPPER AFT I/B F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199214 SPAR FITTING 388755 1 2 WAS FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. 388755 1 3 DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLA 388755 1 4 CE OF SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRI 388755 1 5 CTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURT 388755 1 6 HER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 388782 1 1 ITEMS 1-5, AND 7: THE CARRIER PANEL WERE MR TRIMMED TO ACHIEVE GAPS REQU 388782 1 2 RIED BY TPS. PROBLEMS DUE TO CARRIER PANELS NOT HAVING BEEN CORRECTLY LO 388782 1 3 CATED BY VENDOR. ITEM 6: THE NUTPLATE AT PROBLEM LOCATION WAS REPLACED W 388782 1 4 ITH A SHORTER GRIP LENGTH ONE PER MR RATIONALE. THIS ALLOWS PRINT LENGTH 388782 1 5 SCREW TO FIT INSTALLATION. PROBLEM DUE TO TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 388784 1 1 ITEMS 1-5: THE CARRIER PANELS WERE MR TRIMMED TO ACHIEVE GAPS REQUIRED B 388784 1 2 Y TPS. PROBLEMS DUE TO CARRIER PANELS NOT HAVING BEEN CORRECTLY LOCATED 388784 1 3 BY VENDOR. ITEM 6: THE NUTPLATE AT PROBLEM LOCATION WAS REPLACED WITH A 388784 1 4 SHORTER GRIP LENGTH ONE PER MR RATIONALE. THIS ALLOWS PRINT LENGTH SCREW 388784 1 5 TO FIT INSTALLATION. PROBLEM DUE TO TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 388814 1 1 DURING OEL-3-J1-013 IT WAS FOUND THAT WIRE 2H96BB16-3 HAD EXPOSED CONDUC 388814 1 2 TOR. ENG INSPECTION REVEALED THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE PRIMARY CONDUCTO 388814 1 3 R. THE NOTED WIRE WAS REPAIRED USING HEATSHRINK SLEEVING (CLAMSHELL) OVE 388814 1 4 R THE DAMAGED AREA UPON MR APPROVAL. MR PART MARKING WAS INSTALLED TO ID 388814 1 5 ENTIFY REPAIR FUNCTIONAL RETEST WAS SATISFIED PER IPR 53V-0046. NO FURTH 388814 1 6 ER ENG ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 388858 1 1 STR-3-15-559 INSPECTED THE L/H UPPER RSB INNER PANEL OR CORROSION PER 388858 1 2 CHIT J-3880. NINETY-TWO (92) AREAS OF SUSPECT CORROSION WERE FOUND. FIVE 388858 1 3 ADDITIONAL PITS WERE FOUND DURING BOND SURFACE PREPS BRINGING THE TOTAL 388858 1 4 TO NINETY-SEVEN LOCATIONS. AFTER PAINT REMOVAL AND ETCHING, TEN (10) OF 388858 1 5 THE LOCATIONS WERE DEGRADED SUFFICIENTLY TO REQUIRED DOUBLERS TO 388858 1 6 MAINTAIN THE LOCAL INTEGRITY OF THE FACESHEET. TEN (1) ADDITIONAL AREAS 388858 1 7 WERE FOUND TO HAVE MINOR PITS BUT NOT OF SUFFICIENT DEPTH TO DEGRADE THE 388858 1 8 FACESHEET INTEGRITY. NINE OF THE TEN WERE, HOWEVER, COVERED BY ADJACENT 388858 1 9 DOUBLERS. FORTY-ONE (41) OF THE NINETY-SEVEN TOTAL LOCATIONS WERE FOUND 388858 1 10 TO HAVE SURFACE DISCOLORATION BUT NO APPRECIABLE PITTING. THESE AREAS 388858 1 11 WER BLENDED OUT WITH BERH-TEX TO REMOVAL CORROSIVE PRODUCTS. AT THE 388858 1 12 REMAINING LOCATIONS, NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSION WAS FOUND AFTER PAINT 388858 1 13 REMOVAL. ALL AREAS OF CORROSION HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED PER UNRESTRICTED MR 388858 1 14 DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRAD. NO FURTHER SHOP OF 388858 1 15 ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 388859 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THE TWO AREAS WHERE THE WORST CORROSION WAS DOCUMENT 388859 PMRB 2 ED WERE REINSPECTED WITH A BORESCOPE AND VIDEO TAPED. THE TAPES WERE THE 388859 PMRB 3 N COMPARED WITH THE TAPES OF THE PREVIOUS INSPECTION. THERE WAS NO FURTH 388859 PMRB 4 ER DEGRADATION OF THE AREA NOTED. THE CORROSION APPEARED TO BE MINOR SUR 388859 PMRB 5 FACE CORROSION AS PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED. THE RUDDER SPEED BRAKE REMAINS 388859 PMRB 6 STRUCTURALLY SOUND AND WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH 388859 PMRB 7 A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. THIS DEFERRAL IS FOR 388859 PMRB 8 TWO FLIGHTS OR ONE YEAR, WHICHEVER COMES FIRST. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 388859 PMRB 9 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT 388859 PMRB 10 THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PRIME BOARD ACTION: PMRB 388859 PMRB 11 APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (1 YEAR OR FLT 19) OF OV-103. 388859 PMRB 12 06-18-93 388859 1 1 THE SUSPECT CORROSION FOUND INSIDE THE RSB WAS DETERMINED TO BE ACCUMULA 388859 1 2 TION OF DEBRIS ONLY, NO SIGNS OF CORROSION WAS FOUND. MR APPROVAL TO ACC 388859 1 3 EPT THE RSB WITH THE DEBRIS INSIDE WAS APPROVED. THREE SCREEN PREVIOUSLY 388859 1 4 REMOVED FOR ACCESS HAVE BEEN REINSTALLED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. T 388859 1 5 HE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. 388889 1 1 STR-3-15-559 INSPECTED THE RH UPPER RSB INNER PANEL FOR CORROSION PER CH 388889 1 2 IT J-3880. 69 AREAS OF SUSPECT CORROSION WERE FOUND. AFTER PAINT REMOVAL 388889 1 3 AND ETCHING, NO LOCATIONS WERE DEGRADED SUFFICIENTLY TO REQUIRE DOUBLER 388889 1 4 S TO MAINTAIN THE LOCAL INTEGRITY OF THE FACESHEET. 4 AREAS WERE FOUND T 388889 1 5 O HAVE MINOR PITS BUT NOT OF SUFFICIENT DEPTH TO DEGRADE THE FACESHEET I 388889 1 6 NTEGRITY. 37 OF THE 69 TOTAL LOCATIONS WERE FOUND TO HAVE SURFACE DISCOL 388889 1 7 ORATION BUT NO APPRECIABLE PITTING AND WERE BLENDED OUT WITH BERH-TEX TO 388889 1 8 REMOVE CORROSIVE BY PRODUCTS. AT THE REMAINING 28 LOCATIONS, NO EVIDENC 388889 1 9 E OF CORROSION WAS FOUND AFTER PAINT REMOVAL. ALL AREAS OF CORROSION 388889 1 10 HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: 388889 1 11 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 388928 1 1 FOUR DISCREPANCIES WERE RESOLVED AS FOLLOWS: ITEM 1: BRACKETS WERE REMOV 388928 1 2 ED BY A LATTER STEP IN STR-3-J1-528 GIVING ACCESS TO THE SIX BOTTOM RIVE 388928 1 3 TS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO PROBLEM. ITEM 2: SINCE EDGE DISTANCE ON STIFFENER 388928 1 4 FLANGE WAS SUFFICIENT THE RIVETS WERE INSTALLED THROUGH THE STIFFENER, 388928 1 5 INSTEAD OF BENEATH IT. PROTRUDING HEAD FASTENERS ARE THEN ACCEPTABLE. PR 388928 1 6 OBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING TOLERANCE BUILD UP. ITEM 3: SOLID RIVETS WER 388928 1 7 E CHANGED TO BLIND RIVETS SINCE BACKSIDE CLEARANCE WAS INSUFFICIENT. PRO 388928 1 8 BABLE CAUSE: PLANNING ERROR. ITEM 4: ELONGATED HOLE WAS PLUGGED WITH RIV 388928 1 9 ET AND REDRILLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSUFFICIENT CLEARANCE. 388947 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON OEL-3-15-0275 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE NOTED 388947 1 2 HARNESSES COULD NOT BE INSTALLED ON THE REQUIRED BRACKET ASSEMBLY. THE B 388947 1 3 RACKET ASSEMBLY V070-794062-001 IS REQUIRED BY DESIGN TO BE INSTALLED ON 388947 1 4 THE SIDE OF THE MPCS 1 AND THEN THE NOTED HARNESSES INSTALLED IN CLAMPS 388947 1 5 WHICH ARE SECURED TO THE BRACKET. ONCE THE BRACKET WAS INSTALLED THE HA 388947 1 6 RNESSES WERE UNABLE TO BE INSTALLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJ ECL LIN 388947 1 7 ES. UPON EOTF CONCURRENCE THE NOTED BRACKET WAS REMOVED AND DELETED FROM 388947 1 8 THE INSTALLATION DRAWING. THE HARNESSES NOTED WERE THEN "BUTTERFLIED" U 388947 1 9 SING TWO CLAMPS AND ONE SCREW UTILIZING THE EXISTING TOP NUT PLATE WHERE 388947 1 10 THE BRACKET WAS TO BE INSTALLED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS P 388947 1 11 ROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 389018 1 1 ITEM 1: RIVETS WERE INSTALLED IN PLACE OF NUTS AND BOLTS. RIVETS WERE RE 389018 1 2 MOVED AND HOLES WERE REAMED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: MFG 389018 1 3 DEFECT. ITEM 2: EXISTING RIVET INTERFERES WITH THE V070-120169-004 STIFF 389018 1 4 ENER UNRESTRICTED MR HAS REMOVED THE RIVET AND PICKED UP EXISTING HOLE I 389018 1 5 N THE STIFFENER WITH A HILOCK. PROBABLE CAUSE: MFG TOLERANCE BUILD UP. I 389018 1 6 TEM 3: THE V070-120168-003 STIFFENER IS TOO LONG. APPROXIMATELY 1/8" WAS 389018 1 7 TRIMMED OFF EACH END OF THE STIFFENER FOR MR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE 389018 1 8 CAUSE: HMC TOLERANCE BUILD UP. ITEM 4: EXISTING RIVET INTERFERES WITH T 389018 1 9 HE V070-120169-006 STIFFENER. THE RIVET WAS REMOVED AND THE EXISTING 389018 1 10 HOLE WAS PICKED UP IN THE STIFFENER FOR MR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE 389018 1 11 CAUSE: MFG TOLERANCE BUILD UP. ITEM 5: CANNOT HOLD THE .53 DIMENSION ON 389018 1 12 THE V070-120167-001 STIFFENER INSTALLATION. THE STIFFENER WAS RELOCAED 389018 1 13 .100" LOWER TO CLEAR A CHEM MUL LAND FOR MR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE 389018 1 14 CAUSE: MFG TOLERANCE BUILD UP. ITEM 6: EXISTING RIVET INTERFERES WITH 389018 1 15 V070-120169-001 STIFFENER. THE RIVET WAS REMOVED AND THE HOLE WAS PICKED 389018 1 16 UP IN THE STIFFENER FOR MR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: MFG 389018 1 17 TOLERANCE BUILD UP. ITEM 7: NO ACCESS TO DRILL LOWER HOLE IN THE 389018 1 18 V070-120169-003 STIFFENER. SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT WAS FOUND AND 389018 1 19 HOLE WAS DRILLED PER PRIGINAL TPS. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSUFFICIENT TOOLING. 389018 1 20 ITEM 8: HOLE IS TOO CLOSE TO RADIUS IN STIFFENER (V070-120172-001). 389018 1 21 STIFFENER WAS MOVED .150" INBOARD TO PICK UP EXISTING HOLE IN SPAR WITH 389018 1 22 MR APPROVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE: MFG TOLERANCE BUILD UP. ITEM 9: THE 389018 1 23 V070-120168-001 STIFFENER IS TOO LONG TO FIT BETWEEN THE CAP ANGLES. 389018 1 24 STIFFENER WAS TRIMMED ON BOTH ENDS AND (2) PLACES ON ITS SIDE WITH MR 389018 1 25 APPROVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE: MFG TOLERANCE BUILD UP. ITEM 10: NO TOOLING 389018 1 26 CLEARANCE TO INSTALL RIVETS ON THE UPPER AND LOWER ENDS OF THE 389018 1 27 V070-120172-003 STIFFENER TWO JOBOLTS WERE INSTALLED IN PLACE OF THE 389018 1 28 RIVETS WITH MR APPROVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOOLING RESTRICTIONS. ITEM 11: 389018 1 29 CAN'T DRILL PILOT HOLES IN V070-120161-006 STIFFENER DUE TO INSUFFICIENT 389018 1 30 EDGE DISTANCE. NO PROBLEM EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: MISINTERPRETATION. ITEM 389018 1 31 12: UNABLE TO INSTALL (7) UPPER AND (3) LOWER RIVETS ON THE 389018 1 32 V070-120169-004 STIFFENER DUE TO CLEARANCE PROBLEMS (10) JOBOLTS WERE 389018 1 33 INSTALLED IN PLACE OF THE RIVETS WITH MR APPROVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE: 389018 1 34 TOOLING RESTRICTIONS. ITEM 13: V070-120169-004 STIFFENER INTERFERES WITH 389018 1 35 THE INSTALLATION OF THE V070-120168-001 STIFFENER THE -004 STIFFENER WAS 389018 1 36 REMOVED AND THEN REPLACED AFTER THE -001 WAS INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 389018 1 37 THE INSTALLATION SEQUENCES WERE INADVERTENTLY REVERSED. ITEM 14 AND 15: 389018 1 38 PILOT HOLE IS TOO CLOSE TO EXISTING HOLE AND THE V070-120168-001 389018 1 39 STIFFENER WILL NOT SEAT FLUSH. STIFFENER WAS MR TRIMMED ON BOTH ENDS AND 389018 1 40 ONE SIDE SO AS TO POSITION IT CORRECTLY TO RESOLVE BOTH. PROBABLE CAUSE: 389018 1 41 MFG TOLERANCE BUILD UP. ITEM 16: THE V070-120168-003 IS TOO LONG TO FIT 389018 1 42 IN PLACE. STIFFENER WAS MR TRIMMED TO FIT. PROBABLE CAUSE: MFG TOLERANCE 389018 1 43 BUILD UP. ITEM 17: PILOT 389018 1 44 HOLE IN THE V070-120168-003 STIFFENER FALLS ON THE EDGE OF A SHIM. THE 389018 1 45 PILOT HOLE WAS PLUGGED AND RELOCATED .25 LOWER BY MR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 389018 1 46 MFG TOLERANCE BUILD UP. 389059 1 1 DURING AN INS-3-J1-147, WIRES T1966A26 AND T236A26 WERE FOUND TO BE TOO 389059 1 2 SHORT TO RE-SPLICE AT THE MEASUREMENT. ALSO, NO ROUTING WAS PROVIDED. AN 389059 1 3 EOTF WAS REQUESTED TO SHOW ROUTING AND TO ADD ADDITIONAL WIRE LENGTH TO 389059 1 4 WIRES T1966A26 AND T236A26. A MR WAS THEN REQUESTED TO INSTALL KSC SPLI 389059 1 5 CES 0528 THRU 0535 TO EXTEND WIRES TO REACH MEASUREMENTS, RATHER THAN RE 389059 1 6 PLACE 30 FEET OF WIRE. THE INTEGRITY OF THE KSC SPLICES WILL BE VERIFIED 389059 1 7 UPON RETEST OF THE ASSOCIATED MEASUREMENTS V46T0170A AND V46T0308A PER 389059 1 8 INS-3-J1-147. RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE SPLIC 389059 1 9 ES FROM THE SHIPS WIRES TO THE VENDOR LEADS ON INS-3-J1-147. PROBABLE CA 389059 1 10 USE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY, WIRES WERE TOO SHORT AND NO ROUTING WAS PROVIDED 389105 1 1 THE STRIKER PLATE WITH 7/8" BY 1/8" SCARF IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WA 389105 1 2 S MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE SCARF IS 389105 1 3 EITHER FLIGHT DAMAGE OR WORKMANSHIP WHEN THE BLANKET WAS REMOVED. CONCL 389105 1 4 UDE THAT NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 389158 1 1 THE MISLOCATED C/P WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE TPS SYSTEM WILL COMPENSATE 389158 1 2 FOR C/P'S OUT OF PRINT CONDITION. PROBLEM DUE TO MISLOCATION OF C/P BY 389158 1 3 VENDOR. 389188 1 1 V911330004 ELEVON UPPER SKIN HAS A GOUGE AND BARE METAL WHERE FLIPPER DO 389188 1 2 OR #9 ROD ASSEMBLY CONTACTED ELEVON/RIB PANEL. DENTAL MOLD IMPRESSIONS W 389188 1 3 ERE TAKEN AND INDICATE THAT THE GOUGE IS LESS THAN .005" THICK. SINCE TH 389188 1 4 E STRUCTURAL SKIN IN THIS AREA IS .060" THICK, NASA, RI/LSS, AND LSOC EN 389188 1 5 GINEERING AGREED THAT NO REPAIR WAS REQUIRED, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CORR 389188 1 6 OSION PROTECTION OF THE GOUGE AND THE AREA OF BARE METAL. DISCREPANT ARE 389188 1 7 A WAS CORROSION PROTECTED, MR APPROVED, AND MARKED FOR "UNRESTRICTED USE 389188 1 8 " PER THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP DURING ELEVON OPERATIONS. 389188 1 9 " PER THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP DURING ELEVON OPERATIONS. 389336 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2: AT XW1365, YW145 AND YW149 (2 EA) HI-LOK FASTENERS COULD 389336 1 2 NOT BE REMOVED DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH THE B91B10600-18 SUPPORT CHANNEL 389336 1 3 AND B91B10813-14 FITTING. THE NOTED FITTING AND CHANNEL WAS SCALLOPED P 389336 1 4 ER MR, TO PROVIDE ACCESS FOR REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION OF HI-LOKS. ITEM 3 389336 1 5 : AT THE 2ND MOST LOWER FASTENER HOLE OF THE V070-120168-002 AND -004 ST 389336 1 6 IFFENERS (YW145 AND YW149, ZW96, XW1365) A ME112-0014-0605 COUNTERSUNK H 389336 1 7 I-LOK WAS REMOVED INSTEAD OF A PER PRINT ME112-0013-0605 PROTRUDING HI-L 389336 1 8 OK. PER MR ACCEPTANCE, A ME112-0021-0606 OVERSIZE COUNTERSUNK HI-LOK WAS 389336 1 9 INSTALLED. REF V070-120180 ZN 29F. ITEM 4: WITH THE V070-120169-002 389336 1 10 STIFFENER LOCATED PER PRINT, THE OUTBD LIP OF THE STIFFENER OVERLAPS THE 389336 1 11 (9) HOLES THAT WERE USED FOR THE V070-156650-001 AND V070-156651-001 389336 1 12 SUPPORT BRACKETS. PER MR THE OUTBD EDGE OF THE STIFFENER WAS TRIMMED. 389336 1 13 THE (9) OPEN HOLES IN THE SPAR WERE PLUGGED AND (9) ADDITIONAL FASTENER 389336 1 14 HOLES WERE ADDED STIFFENER. ITEMS 5 AND 6: THE V070-120169-005 AND 007 389336 1 15 STIFFENERS INTERFERED WITH THE CENTER RIVET OF THE B91G12153-16 389336 1 16 SUPPORTS. PER MR, A COUNTERSUNK RIVET WAS INSTALLED AT THE CENTER 389336 1 17 LOCATION OF THE B91B12153-16 SUPPORTS TO PROVIDED A FLUSH SURFACE FOR 389336 1 18 THE INSTALLATION OF THE V070-120169 STIFFENERS. ITEMS 7,8 AND 12: WHILE 389336 1 19 FIT CHECKING THE V070-120168-004 AND -002 AND V070-120161-003 389336 1 20 STIFFENERS, INTERFERENCE WAS ENCOUNTERED WITH THE XW1365 SPAR ASSY 389336 1 21 HARDWARE. PER MR, THE STIFFENERS WERE TRIMMED FROM BOTH ENDS TO PROVIDE 389336 1 22 CLEARANCE. ITEM 9: ITEM 9 OF THIS PR WAS TRANSFERRED TO INS-3-J1-0596. 389336 1 23 THEREFORE THIS DISCREPANCY WAS NOT ADDRESSED ON THIS PR. ITEM 10: THE 2 389336 1 24 NEW CENTER HOLES IN (2EA) V070-156411-004 SUPPORTS, WERE MIS DRILLED 389336 1 25 WHILE PICKING UP PILOT HOLE FROM THE STIFFENERS. PER MR ACCEPTANCE, THE 389336 1 26 DISCREPANT HOLES FOR V070-156411-004 SUPPORTS WERE FILLED WITH 389336 1 27 MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. THEN 2 NEW HOLES WERE MATCH DRILLED PER PRINT FOR 389336 1 28 THE INSTALLATION OF ME112-0013-0605 HI-LOKS. ITEM 11: AT THE UPPER 6 AND 389336 1 29 LOWER 4 FASTENER LOCATIONS, THE MD121-0004-0502 BLIND RIVETS COULD NOT 389336 1 30 BE INSTALLED DUE TO LACK OF ACCESS FOR THE RIVET GUN. PER MR ACCEPTANCE 389336 1 31 (10EA) MD128-0002-0202 JO-BOLTS WERE INSTALLED IN THEIR PLACE. ITEM 12: 389336 1 32 WHILE FIT CHECKING THE V070-120166-002 STIFFENER, INTERFERENCE WAS 389336 1 33 ENCOUNTERED WITH THE XW1249 SPAR ASSY HARDWARE. PER MR ACCEPTANCE THE 389336 1 34 STIFFENERS WAS RELOCATED .300" INBD AND .200" UPWARD FROM ITS PER PRINT 389336 1 35 LOCATION. THIS ELIMINATED THE INTERFERENCE AND EDGE DISTANCE PROBLEM. 389336 1 36 ITEM 14: A SMALL AMOUNT OF FRAYING OCCURRED WHILE DRILLING FASTENER HOLE 389336 1 37 IN THE XW1249 SPAR. PER MR ACCEPTANCE MBO120-008 ADHESIVE WAS APPLIED 389336 1 38 AROUND THE FRAYED AREA TO PREVENT ADDITIONAL FIBERS FROM FRAYING. ITEM 389336 1 39 15: THE LOWER FASTENER HOLE IN THE V070-120164-003 STIFFENER, INTERFERES 389336 1 40 WITH AN EXISTING SPAR SUPPORT BRACKET. PER MR ACCEPTANCE, THE STIFFENER 389336 1 41 HOLE WAS PLUGGED AND A NEW HOLE WAS RE-DRILL A 1/2" UPWARD TO ELIMINATE 389336 1 42 THE INTERFERENCE, AND STILL MAINTAIN PROPER EDGE DISTANCE. PROBABLE 389336 1 43 CAUSES: ITEMS 1,2,4 389336 1 44 5,6,7,8,12,13 AND 15-DESIGN DEFICIENCY. ITEMS 10 AND 14-WORKMANSHIP. 389336 1 45 ITEM 3-VENDOR DISCREPANCY. ITEM 11-LIMITED ACCESS. 389348 1 1 AN MD112-1003-0407 SCREW ON V070-730401-004 PANEL F3 BOTTOM OTBD CORNER 389348 1 2 LH SIDE WOULD NOT TIGHTEN TO TORQUE REQUIREMENTS. THE SCREW WAS REMOVED 389348 1 3 AND A TAP WAS RUN INTO THE INSERT TO CLEAR ANY OBSTRUCTION. WITHOUT ANY 389348 1 4 RUNNING TORQUE DURING SCREW INSTALLATION OR ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO ALLOW 389348 1 5 USE OF THE SCREW INSTALLED WITH LOC-TITE UNTIL PANEL F3 REMOVAL AT OMDP 389348 1 6 . AT OMDP THE PANEL WAS REMOVED, THE INSERT WAS MREMOVEDD AND REPLACED A 389348 1 7 ND THE PANEL WAS REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 389459 1 1 DURING SPAR INSULATOR INSTALLATION, A NUTPLATE WAS FOUND TO HAVE DAMAGED 389459 1 2 THREADS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NUTPLAT 389459 1 3 ES WERE INSTALLED WITH PER PRINT HARDWARE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERIN 389459 1 4 G ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 389460 1 1 TWO BUSHINGS WERE WRITTEN UP TO BE GALLED ON AFT LO2 SIDE STRUT FITTING 389460 1 2 IN LO2 UMBILICAL AREA. THE BUSHING DAMAGE WAS RECORDED IN ATTACHMENT "A" 389460 1 3 PER PAGE 4 DISPO WHICH REVEALED ONLY THE FWD BUSHING HAD ANY DAMAGE. TH 389460 1 4 E FWD BUSHING WAS THEN REPLACED WITH A NEW BUSHING. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NO 389460 1 5 RMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 389461 1 1 THE INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE WINDOW 10 CLOSEOUT PANEL AND THE ECL DUCT I 389461 1 2 DENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY INSTALLING A SHIM BETWEEN TH 389461 1 3 E DUCT AND ITS SUPPORT WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. THE LACK OF ACCESS 389461 1 4 TO BOND THE SHIM IN PLACE WITH MBO120-008 (HIGH TEMP CURE) ADHESIVE, ID 389461 1 5 ENTIFIED IN ITEM 2, PAGE 1A WAS RESOLVED BY USING MBO120-119 (AMBIENT TE 389461 1 6 MP CURE) RTV ADHESIVE WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE OF I 389461 1 7 TEM 1 INTERFERENCE WAS A SLIGHT MISLOCATION OF THE DUCT INSTALLATION AND 389461 1 8 THE CAUSE OF ITEM 2 WAS LACK OF ACCESS. CONCLUDE THAT THE INTERFERENCE 389461 1 9 HAS BEEN ALLEVIATED AND THE DUCT AND CLOSEOUT PANEL HAVE BEEN INSTALLED 389461 1 10 IN AN ACCEPTABLE CONFIGURATION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 389464 1 1 STR-3-15-559 INSPECTED THE R/H LOWER PANEL FOR CORROSION PER CHIT J3880. 389464 1 2 ONE HUNDRED-TWENT-SIX (126) AREAS OF SUSPECT CORROSION WERE FOUND. AFTE 389464 1 3 R PAINT REMOVAL AND ETCHING, NO LOCATIONS WERE DEGRADED SUFFICIENTLY TO 389464 1 4 REQUIRE DOUBLERS TO MAINTAIN THE LOCAL INTEGRITY. FORTY-THREE (43) OF TH 389464 1 5 E ONE-HUNDRED-TWENTY-SIX TOTAL LOCATIONS WERE FOUND TO HAVE SURFACE DISC 389464 1 6 OLORATION BU TNO APPRECIABLE PITTING AND WERE BLENDED OUT WITH BERH-TEX 389464 1 7 TO REMOVE CORROSIVE BY-PRODUCTS. AT THE REMAINING SIXTY-FIVE(65) LOCATIO 389464 1 8 NS, NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSION HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DIS 389464 1 9 POSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGIN 389464 1 10 EERING ACTION REQUIRED. 389465 1 1 STR-3-15-559 INSPECTED THE LH LOWER RSB INNER PANEL FOR CORROSION PER CH 389465 1 2 IT J-3880. EIGHTY-SEIX (86) AREAS OF SUSPECT CORROSION WERE FOUND. TWO A 389465 1 3 DDITIONAL PITS AND TWO ADDITIONAL DENTS WERE FOUND DURING BOND SURFACE P 389465 1 4 REPS BRINGING THE TOTAL TO EIGHTY-EIGHT SUSPECT CORROSION LOCATIONS. AFT 389465 1 5 ER PAINT REMOVAL AND ETCHING, TWO (2) OF THE LOCATIONS WERE DEGRADED SUF 389465 1 6 FICIENTLY TO REQUIRE DOUBLERS TO MAINTAIN THE LOCAL INTEGRITY OF THE FAC 389465 1 7 ESHEET. TWENTY-SIX (26) ADDITIONAL AREAS WERE FOUND TO HAVE MINOR PITS B 389465 1 8 UT NOT OF SUFFICIENT DEPTH TO DEGRADE THE FACESHEET INTEGRITY. TWO OF TH 389465 1 9 E TWENTY-SIX (26) ADDITIONAL AREAS WERE FOUND TO HAVE MINOR PITS BUT NOT 389465 1 10 OF SUFFICIENT DEPTH TO DEGRADE THE FACESHEET INTEGRITY. TWO FO THE 389465 1 11 TWENTY-SIX AND THE TWO DENTS WERE, HOWEVER, COVERED BY ADJACENT 389465 1 12 DOUBLEERS. TEN (10) OF THE EIGHTY-EIGHT TOTAL LOCATIONS WERE FOUND TO 389465 1 13 HAVE SURFACE DISCOLORATION BUT NO APPRECIABLE PITTING. THESE AREAS WERE 389465 1 14 BLENDED OUT WITH BERH-TEX TO REMOVE CORROSIVE BY-PRODUCTS. AT THE 389465 1 15 REMAINING LOCATIONS, NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSION WAS FOUND AFTER PAINT 389465 1 16 REMOVAL. ALL AREAS OF CORROSION HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED PER UNRESTRICTED MR 389465 1 17 DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR 389465 1 18 ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 389575 1 1 THE RUB PANEL CORROSION WAS CAUSED BY THE MOISTURE GETTING TO THE ALMINU 389575 1 2 M IN THE AREAS WHERE THE HARD ANODIZED SURFACE WAS CHIPPED OR WORN OFF B 389575 1 3 Y THE CHAIN SEAL. THE CORRODED AREAS WERE ETCHED AND THEN BURNISHED DOWN 389575 1 4 TO BARE METAL. THE DISCREPANT AREA WERE THEN POTTED UP TO FLUSH WITH -0 389575 1 5 08 ADHESIVE TO PROVIDE AN EVEN RUB SURFACE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE O 389575 1 6 N THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION. 389577 1 1 THE RUB PANEL CORROSION WAS CAUSED BY THE MOISTURE GETTING TO THE ALUMIN 389577 1 2 UM IN THE AREAS WHERE THE HARD ANODIZED SURFACE WAS CHIPPED OR WORN OFF 389577 1 3 BY THE CHAIN SEAL. THE CORRODED AREAS WERE ETCHED AND THEN BUTNISHED DOW 389577 1 4 N TO BARE METAL. THE DISCREPANT AREAS WERE THEN POTTED UP TO FLUSH WITH 389577 1 5 -008 ADHESIVE TO PROFICE AN EVEN RUB SURFACE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE 389577 1 6 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION. 389729 1 1 DURING THE FC2 J1 CONNECTOR MATE A SMALL CHIP IN THE PHENOLIC INSULATION 389729 1 2 ON THE FC END WAS FOUND. THIS CHIP WAS MEASURED AND MAPPED PER STEP 1. 389729 1 3 PER SPEC MLO303-0016 PARA 5.1.2.1 & FIG 6. THIS IS AN ACCEPTABLE DEFECT. 389729 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 389890 1 1 THE CRACK ON THE V070-335084-001 FIBERGLASS CLOSEOUT PANEL WAS REPAIRED 389890 1 2 PER THIS DISPO. THE CRACK WAS REPAIRED WITH FIBERGLASS PATCHES AND MB012 389890 1 3 0-037 EPOXY ADHESIVE TO RESTORE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE PANEL. A 389890 1 4 LL WORK IS COMPLETE, WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORM 389890 1 5 AL WEAR AND TEAR. 389904 1 1 V070-198071-012 CURTAIN SEAL HAD A NICK 0.17" X 0.10" THROUGH OUTER COAT 389904 1 2 ING EXPOSING FIBERS. NICK WAS LOCATED 7.7" FROM I/B END OF CURTAIN ASSEM 389904 1 3 BLY. CURTAIN ASSEMBLY IS LOCATED IN THE R/H I/B ELEVON COVE, BETWEEN YW2 389904 1 4 82 AND YW305, AND XW1387/ZW100. THE NICK WAS REPAIRED AND APPROVED FOR " 389904 1 5 UNRESTRICTED USE" PER THIS MR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 389949 1 1 ITEMS 1,2 AND 3-STRAPS WERE SHIFTED TO CLEAR CHEM-MILLED STEP IN STRINGE 389949 1 2 RS. PROBLEM DUE TO DESIGN CENTER OVERSIGHT. ITEMS 4 AND 6-A SHIM WAS FAB 389949 1 3 RICATED AND INSTALLED UNDER STRAP TO ALLOW IT TO CLEAR CHEMMILLED STEP I 389949 1 4 N STRINGER. PROBLEM DUE TO DESIGN CENTER OVERSIGHT. ITEM 5-PROBLEM REFER 389949 1 5 ENCED .400. DWG CALLS OUT .30. PROBLEM WRITTEN IN ERROR. NO PROBLEM EXIS 389949 1 6 TS. ITEM 7-EDGE DISTANCE WAS VERIFIED TO BE .200. THIS GIVES .105 EDGE M 389949 1 7 ATERIAL WITH A .190 HOLE. PROBLEM WRITTEN IN ERROR. NO PROBLEM EXISTS. I 389949 1 8 TEM 8-EO'S A02 AND A03 ADDRESSED THIS PROBLEM. THE TPS REFLECTS THESE EO 389949 1 9 'S. PROBLEM WRITTEN IN ERROR. NO PROBLEM EXISTS. ITEM 9-EO A04 ADDRESSED 389949 1 10 THIS PROBLEM FOR OV-102 ONLY. EO WAS GENERATED TO MAKE EO A04 EFFECTIVE 389949 1 11 TO OV-103. THE EO AUTHORIZED STRAP FASTENER HOLES TO BE DRILLED UP 389949 1 12 THROUGH DOULBER. PROBLEM DUE TO DESIGN CENTER OVERSIGHT. ITEM 10-THE 389949 1 13 -004 STRAP WAS TRIMMED OFF BETWEEN HOLES 3 AND 4. -08 SOLID RIVETS WERE 389949 1 14 INSTALLED IN HOLES 1-3. -06 SOLID RIVETS WERE INSTALLED IN HOLES 4 AND 389949 1 15 5. THE -005 STRAP WAS TRIMMED OFF BETWEEN HOLES 3 AND 4. -08 SOLID 389949 1 16 RIVETS WERE RETAINED IN HOLES 1-3. -06 SOLID RIVETS WERE INSTALLED IN 389949 1 17 HOLES 4,5 AND 6. ITEM 11-THE DRAG ANGLES LOWER DOUBLER ON THE TOP SIDE 389949 1 18 OF UPPER WING SKIN WAS SCALLOPED TO CLEAR HI-LOK INSTALLATION IN HOLE 389949 1 19 12. PROBLEM DUE TO DESIGN CENTER OVERSIGHT. ITEM 12-THE EDGE DISTANCE 389949 1 20 REQUIREMENT WAS CHANGED FROM .173 TO .145 MINIMUM. HOLES 8 AND 10 MEET 389949 1 21 THIS REQUIREMENT. HOLES 1,2,6 AND 7 WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS WITH BELOW 389949 1 22 MINIMUM EDGE DISTANCE. ITEM 13-THE DRAG ANGLES UPPER DOULBER ON THE TOP 389949 1 23 SIDE OF UPPER WING SKIN WAS SCALLOPED TO CLEAR HI-LOK INSTALLATION IN 389949 1 24 HOLE 4. A PROTRUDING HEAD HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED IN PLACE OF A COUNTERSINK 389949 1 25 HEAD HI-LOK. ITEM 14-THE STRAP WAS TRIMMED OFF .25 FROM OUTBOARD END TO 389949 1 26 RELIEVE INTERFERENCE WITH CHEMMILLED SDTEP IN STRINGER. PROBLEM DUE TO 389949 1 27 DESIGN CENTER OVERSIGHT. ITEM 15-THE STRAP WAS TRIMMED OFF BETWEEN 389949 1 28 ORIGINAL HOLES 4 AND 5. A -06 SOLID RIVET WAS INSTALLED IN HOLE 4. 389949 1 29 PROBLEM DUE TO ORIGINAL HOLES NOT BEING PER PRINT BY VENDOR. ITEM 16--05 389949 1 30 HI LOKS WERE INSTALLED IN PLACE OF -06 HI-LOKS IN OUTBOARD TWO MOST 389949 1 31 HOLES. PROBLEM DUE TO ORIGINAL HOLES NOT BEING PER PRINT BY VENDOR. ITEM 389949 1 32 17-THE DRAG ANGLES UPPER DOULBER ON THE TOP SIDE OF UPPWER WING SKIN WAS 389949 1 33 SCALLOPED TO CLEAR HI-LOK INSTALLATION IN HOLE 7. A PROTRUDING HEAD 389949 1 34 HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED IN PLACE OF A COUNTERSINK HEAD HI-LOK. ITEM 18--05 389949 1 35 DIA HI-LOKS WERE INSTALLED IN PLACE OF -06 HI-LOKS IN HOLES 1,7,11 AND 389949 1 36 15. 390125 1 1 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF OMI V1093 THE PANEL F9 FC ROTARY SWITCH WAS FO 390125 1 2 UND IN THE FC3 POSITION. THE SWITCH WAS IN THE FC3 POSITION FOR APPROXIM 390125 1 3 ATELY 2 1/2 HOURS WITH REACTANT GAS (O2 AND H2) IN THE FUEL CELL. V45 FI 390125 1 4 LE III GENERAL REQUIREMENT 3.2.20 STATES THE DISPLAY SELECT SWITCH S-2, 390125 1 5 ON PANEL F9 SHALL NOT BE LEFT IN THE FUEL CELL 1, 2 OR 3 POSITION. THE C 390125 1 6 ONCERN WITH THE PANEL F9 SWITCH IN ANY FC POSITION WITH REACTANTS IN THE 390125 1 7 FC IS THE LOAD CREATED BY THE SWITCH CAUSES H2O TO BE GENERATED. REMAIN 390125 1 8 ING IN THIS CONFIGURATION FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME COULD LEAD TO 390125 1 9 FC FLOODING. DUE TO THE SMALL LOAD GENERATED BY THE 9 SWITCH 390125 1 10 (APPROXIMATELY 5 MA) AND THE SHORT PERIOD OF TIME IT WAS PRESENT WITH 390125 1 11 REACTANT IN THE FC, (APPROXIMATELY 2 1/2 HOURS), THE AMOUNT OF H2O 390125 1 12 GENERATED INTERNAL TO THE FC IS NEGILIBLE. THIS PROBLEM WAS IN NO WAY 390125 1 13 DETRIMENTAL TO THE FC HARDWARE OR TO FC PERFORMANE. SUFFICIENT LOAD 390125 1 14 REQUIRED TO POTENTIALLY FLOOD A NON-OPERATIONS FUEL CELL IS ON THE ORDER 390125 1 15 OF 40 AMP HOURS. PROBABLE CAUSE: V1003, ORBITER POWER SYSTEM VALIDATION 390125 1 16 WAS PERFORMED 2 DAYS PRIOR TO V1093. RESEARCHING THIS PROCEDURE FOUND 390125 1 17 THE FINAL POSITIONING OF THE PANEL F9 SWITCH WAS TO THE FC3 POSITION. 390125 1 18 (STEP 11-140). V1003 WAS CORRECTED VIA ICR 50/150-206 ADDING A STEP IN 390125 1 19 POST-OP INSTRUCTION TO POSITION THE F9 ROTARY SWITCH TO MN B. CLOSE THIS 390125 1 20 PR UPON RECEIPT OF APPROVED WAIVER WK02632. 390291 1 1 ITEMS 1 STR DAMAGE ON/BEHIND BELLCRANK HOUSING -YW147.5, XW1395 APP LH, 390291 1 2 AND #2 INCORRECT COTTER KEY INSTALLATION ON BELLCRANK ASSEMBLY 8 LOCATIO 390291 1 3 NS -YW149 THRU YW290 LH ELEVON, ARE ALREADY COVERED ON PR STR-3-15-3999. 390291 1 4 THIS PR CAN BE CLOSED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 390358 1 1 THE V070-338958-002 DOUBLER WILL NOT SEAT FLUSH ON AV BAY 3A TRAY 1A DUE 390358 1 2 TO A SLIGHT BEND IN THE TRAY. THE DOUBLER WAS MR INSTALLED WITH THREE E 390358 1 3 XTRA RIVETS AND THE BEND MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 390405 1 1 THE ADDITIONAL HOLES IN THE STARTRACKER BARRIER IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PA 390405 1 2 GE 1, WERE MR ACCEPTED AS-IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE ADDITIONAL HOLES 390405 1 3 WERE PROBABLY CAUSED DURING ORIGINAL ASSEMBLY BY VENDOR (RI). CONCLUDE T 390405 1 4 HAT THE BARRIER HAS BEEN INSTALLED IN AN ACCEPTABLE CONFIGURATION AND NO 390405 1 5 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 390491 1 1 (REF ITEN 1 ON PAGE 1) V070-198071-001 CURTAIN SEAL HAD A SMALL NICK APP 390491 1 2 ROX 2" OUTBD OF CURTAIN SEAL INBD EDGE RIB ELEVON COVE UNDER F/D 8. (REF 390491 1 3 ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1) SMALL NICK IN ELEVON COVE CURTAIN SEAL APPROX 6.25" O 390491 1 4 UTBD OF CURTAIN SEALS INBD EDGE, RIB ELEVON COVE UNDER F/D 8. NICKS WERE 390491 1 5 MR REPAIRED PER THIS PR BY APPLYING MBO130-119 TYPE III RTV ADHESIVE TO 390491 1 6 THEM. PROBABLE CUASE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1)RT 390491 1 7 V DEBONDED FROM ELEVON COVE CURTAIN SEAL, RIB UNDER F/D 6. LOOSE/FILMSY 390491 1 8 RTV WAS TRIMMED (EXCESS). PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 390491 1 9 RTV WAS TRIMMED (EXCESS). PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 390493 1 1 ITEM 1, V070-198874-002 CURTAIN SEAL HAD A NICK APPROX 1/8" IN DIAMETER 390493 1 2 WITH EXPOSED FIBERS. NICK WAS LOCATED 2.5" FROM CURTAIN SEAL INBOARD EDG 390493 1 3 E. THE NICK WAS REPAIRED AND APPROVED FOR "UNRESTRICTED USE" PER THIS MR 390493 1 4 . ITEM 2, V070-198874-002 CURTAIN SEAL HAD A SMALL SLICE APPROX 1/4" LON 390493 1 5 G WITH NO EXPOSED FIBERS. SLICE WAS 5.75" FROM SEAL INBOARD EDGE. THE SL 390493 1 6 ICE WAS REPAIRED AND APPROVED FOR "UNRESTRICTED USE" PER THIS MR. ITEM 3 390493 1 7 , V070-198874-002 CURTAIN SEAL HAD A SMALL NICK APPROX 3/16" DIAMETER. N 390493 1 8 ICK WAS 13.25" FROM SEAL INBOARD EDGE. THE NICK WAS REPAIRED AND APPROVE 390493 1 9 D FOR "UNRESTRICTED USE" PER THIS MR. PROBABLE CAUSE (FOR ITEMS 1,2 AND 390493 1 10 3): OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 390611 1 1 DURING V1086.001 SEQ 01-038, CONNECTORS 50P816, 814, 808 NOR 806 WOULD M 390611 1 2 ATE TO PYRO HARNESSES. PROBLEM WAS FOUND TO BE A TYPO IN V1086.001. A DE 390611 1 3 V WAS WRITTEN TO CORRECT PROBLEM. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 390611 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR IN V1086 BOOK. 390696 1 1 THE ONE EXTRA HOLE THAT WAS ADDED TO THE SKIN PANEL WA MR ACCEPTED. V070 390696 1 2 -797021 EO E12 S/B E19 AUTHORIZED INSTALLATION OF A PLATE OVER HOLE PER 390696 1 3 V070-3-J1-160 MOD 016 STEP 1-10. PROBLEM CAUSED BY EO A09 TO V070-853122 390696 1 4 NOT BEING DELIVERED TO LSOC STR ENG BY LSOC PE. 390840 1 1 AFTER INSTALLATION OF THE V070-390006-011 WINDOW ASSEMBLY, IT WAS DISCOV 390840 1 2 ERED THAT THE FRAME OF THE WINDOW HAD 52 FASTENER HOLES. ONLY 50 FASTENE 390840 1 3 R HOLES ARE REQUIRED. THE TWO OPEN HOLES WERE FILLED WITH RTV ON AN UNRE 390840 1 4 STRICTED BASIS AND MR ID'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: WINDOW BUILT BEFORE RELEASE 390840 1 5 OF EO. 390841 1 1 AFTER INSTALLATION OF THE V070-390006-013 WINDOW ASSEMBLY, IT WAS DISCOV 390841 1 2 ERED THAT THE FRAME OF THE WINDOW HAD 56 FASTENER HOLES. ONLY 52 FASTENE 390841 1 3 R HOLES ARE REQUIRED. THE FOUR OPEN HOLES WERE FILLED WITH RTV ON AN UNR 390841 1 4 ESTRICTED BASIS AND MR ID'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: WINDOW BUILT BEFORE RELEASE 390841 1 5 OF EO. 390842 1 1 AFTER INSTALLATION OF THE V070-390004-007 WINDOW ASSEMBLY, IT WAS DISCOV 390842 1 2 ERED THAT THE FRAME OF THE WINDOW HAD 47 FASTENER HOLES. ONLY 45 FASTENE 390842 1 3 R HOLES ARE REQUIRED. THE TWO OPEN HOLES WERE FILLED WITH RTV ON AN UNRE 390842 1 4 STRICTED BASIS AND MR ID'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: WINDOW BUILT BEFORE RELEASE 390842 1 5 OF EO. 390876 1 1 V070-291431-002 SUPPORT UPPER HOLES AND V070-291403-001 CHANNEL WERE ELO 390876 1 2 NGATED WHILE DRILLING OUT UPPER HUCK BLIND RIVETS. THE DISCREPANT UPPER 390876 1 3 HOLES FOR V070-291431 SUPPORT WERE FILLED WITH ADHESIVE 2 NEW HOLES WERE 390876 1 4 DRILLED FOR PER PRINT BLIND RIVETS BY MR ACTION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. P 390876 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP 390908 1 1 THE V070-346192-004 BRACKET WAS INSTALLED UPSIDE DOWN. TWO MISLOCATED HO 390908 1 2 LES WERE FILLED WITH MB0120-008 ADHESIVE AND THEN REDRILLED IN THE CORRE 390908 1 3 CT LOCATION. THIS WAS DONE ON AN UNRESTRICTED MR BASIS AND THE BRACKET W 390908 1 4 AS MR ID'D. THE BRACKET WAS THEN INSTALLED IN THE CORRECT ORIENTATION. N 390908 1 5 O FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 391018 1 1 THE V070-731776-009 CLOSEOUT PANEL HAD (2) SMALL CRACKS WHICH WERE FOUND 391018 1 2 TO BE JUST DEBONDING FROM THE SHROUD. THEY WERE MR REPAIRED WITH ADHESI 391018 1 3 VE IMPREGNATION. ALL WORK IS COMPLETE WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. PRO 391018 1 4 BABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 391205 1 1 ITEM 1-THE RUB MARKS WERE LIGHTLY SANDED AND THEN PAINTED OVER WITH PYRO 391205 1 2 MARK PAINT. THIS REPAIR WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBLEM DU 391205 1 3 E TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 2-THE ROD END BOLT WAS RE-SAFETY WIRED P 391205 1 4 ER SPEC. PROBLEM DUE TO IMPROPER SAFETY WIRING. ITEM 3-THE LIGHT SURFACE 391205 1 5 OXIDATION WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBLEM DUE TO NO 391205 1 6 RMAL WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 4-THE PROTRUDING BLIND RIVET HEADS AND STEMS WE 391205 1 7 RE SHAVED FLUSH PER SPEC. PROBLEM DUE TO VENDOR ERROR. ITEM 5- SEAL WEAR 391205 1 8 IS NORMAL. NO PROBLEM EXISTS. 391205 1 9 IS NORMAL. NO PROBLEM EXISTS. 391332 1 1 THE BRACKET WAS REMOVED AND REINSTALLED CORRECTLY. PROBLEM DUE TO VENDOR 391332 1 2 ERROR. 391434 1 1 THE MISMATCH BETWEEN RH FLIPPER DOORS 14 AND 15 IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PA 391434 1 2 GE 1 WAS SUSPECTED TO BE DUE TO A PREVIOUS PR. THE ROD ASSEMBLIES FOR TH 391434 1 3 E LH AND RH FLIPPER DOOR 15'S WERE REVERSED AND THE DOORS CLOSED FOR INS 391434 1 4 PECTION OF ALIGNMENT. BY REVERSING THE RODS TO THE OPPOSITE SIDES, PROPE 391434 1 5 R ALIGNMENT WAS OBTAINED BETWEEN THE DOORS. THE REASON THE ROD ASSEMBLIE 391434 1 6 S WERE KITTED INCORRECTLY WAS THAT ENGINEERING DIRECTIONS ON STR-3-A0184 391434 1 7 WAS WRONG. CONCLUDE THAT THE ROD ASSEMBLIES HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO THEIR 391434 1 8 CORRECT LOCATION AND WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT PER THEIR RESPECTIVE 391434 1 9 JOB CARDS. 391505 1 1 PG 1.0: DURING PERFORMANCE OF V1009.007,S05, MPS GH2 FCV AUTOCHECKOUT, I 391505 1 2 T WAS NOTED THAT WHEN THE COMMANDS ARE SET ON TO SIMULATE LH3 ULLAGE PRE 391505 1 3 SSURE IN ORDER TO CYCLE THE GH2 FCV'S THAT NO CORRESPONDING PRESSURE INC 391505 1 4 REASE (MDM) OCCURRED. AN MPS IPR WAS INITIATED TO T/S THIS (IPR 53V-0034 391505 1 5 ), AND A BENT PIN TO CONNECTOR 56J36 WAS FOUND. ALSO, A BLOWN FUSE IN AF 391505 1 6 T LCA #3 WAS LOCATED. THESE ITEMS WERE CORRECTED AND MPS RETEST OF THE G 391505 1 7 H2 FCV'S WAS SUCCESSFUL IN FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. PG 1A: THIS DOCUMENTS A 391505 1 8 0 VOLTAGE READING ON BREAKOUT BOX #1, PIN V TO VGP. THIS ITEMS DOESN'T 391505 1 9 AFFECT THE PROBLEM NOTED ON PG 1.0 AND WILL BE ADDRESSED PER 391505 1 10 OEL-3-15-0292. NO ACTION REQUIRED. PG 1B: THIS DOCUMENTS A FAILURE TO 391505 1 11 INCREASE OF THE E-2 ULLAGE PRESSURE DURING THE INITIAL RETEST ATTEMPT. 391505 1 12 THIS WAS REMOVED DOWN TO A CONNECTOR (50P33L) NOT BEING NOTED. THE 391505 1 13 CONNECTOR WAS MATED AND THE RETEST REPERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY. PROBABLE 391505 1 14 CAUSE: BENT PIN (WORKMANSHIP). 391532 1 1 THE CRACKS ON THE V070-3-15-4325 FIBERGLASS CLOSE OUT PANEL WAS REPAIRED 391532 1 2 PER THIS DISPO. ITEM 1 AND 2: CRACKS ADDRESSED BY ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 391532 1 3 1 WERE REPAIRED WITH FIBERGLASS PATCHES AND MB0120-037 EPOXY ADHESIVE. 391532 1 4 ITEM 3: CRACK ADDRESSED BY ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1 WAS REPAIRED BY INJECTING MB 391532 1 5 0120-037 EPOXY ADHESIVE INTO DELAMINATING FIBERGLASS. ITEM 4: CRACK ADDR 391532 1 6 ESSED BY ITEM 4 ON PAGE 1A WAS REPAIRED WITH FIBERGLASS PATCHES AND MB01 391532 1 7 20-037 EPOXY ADHESIVE. THIS REPAIRS RESTORE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TO PANE 391532 1 8 L. ALL WORK IS COMPLETE WITH NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: W 391532 1 9 ORKMANSHIP. 391792 1 1 A GAP BETWEEN V070-339915-001 SUPPORT AND V070-339913-001 BRACKET WAS FO 391792 1 2 UND. THE GAP WAS CORRECTED BY PLACING MR ALUMINUM WASHERS BETWEEN V070-3 391792 1 3 39915-001 SUPPORT AND YO-33.45 STRINGER TO CORRECT FOR GAP BY MR ACTION. 391792 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE IS TOLERANCE BUILDUP. 391847 1 1 THE LACK OF THREAD PROTRUSION ON THE PANEL FASTENERS AS NOTED IN ITEM 1, 391847 1 2 PAGE 1 WAS FOUND TO PERTAIN TO ONLY THE LOWER FORWARD FASTENER. ENGINEE 391847 1 3 RING INSPECTED THE NUTPLATE AT THIS LOCATION AND DETERMINED THAT THE NUT 391847 1 4 PLATE WAS NOT PER PRINT. THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND A NEW P 391847 1 5 ER PRINT NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A WAS RESOLVED BY INCORP 391847 1 6 ORATING MR STR-3-J1-0295 INTO THE V80-00456 JOB CARD. AFTER INSTALLING N 391847 1 7 THE PANEL PER V80-00456 JOB CARD THE LOWER FORWARE NUTPLATE WAS INSPECTE 391847 1 8 D PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND NO DISCREPANCIES NOTED. THE DISCREP 391847 1 9 ANT NUTPLATE (ITEM 1, PAGE 10 WAS INSTALLED EITHER BY THE VENDOR AT 391847 1 10 INITIAL BUILD-UP OR DURING PROCESSING. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A WAS DUE TO A 391847 1 11 PREVIOUS MR THAT WAS NOT INCORPORATED ON THE JOB CARD. CONCLUDE THAT THE 391847 1 12 PANEL HAS BEEN INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 391848 1 1 DURING V1022.002,S19-019, WIRE 1D1293B22 WAS FOUND TO HAVE EXPOSED CONDU 391848 1 2 CTOR AND A TIGHT 90 DEGREE BEND IN THE WIRE AT 40SP8090. THE DAMAGED SEC 391848 1 3 TION WAS REMOVED ALONG WITH THE DESIGN SPLICE AND A NEW DESIGN SPLICE IN 391848 1 4 STALLED. RETEST WAS SUCCESSFULLY PERFOMRED BY ENGERGIZING WIRE 1D1293B22 391848 1 5 AND THEN MEASURING CURRENT. CURRENT WAS 0.75 AMP WHICH IS WITHIN 0.65-0 391848 1 6 .95 AMP ACCEPTABLE RANGE. CONFIGURATION IS NOW PER DRAWING SPECIFICATION 391848 1 7 . THIS SATISFIES PROBLEM DESCRIPTION ITEMS #1 & 2. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMA 391848 1 8 L WEAR AND TEAR. 391848 1 9 L WEAR AND TEAR. 391998 1 1 WHILE REMOVING THE 24 170D411512 SCREEN ASSEMBLIES PER STR-3-J1-526, 18 391998 1 2 OF THE SCREENS WERE DAMAGED. THE SCREENS WERE STRAIGHTENED OUT AND RE-KO 391998 1 3 ROPONED. THERE WAS ONLY ONE NEW 170D411512-11 SCREEN IN STOCK. IT REPLAC 391998 1 4 ED THE WORST CASE SCREEN. THE 17 REMAINING SCREENS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR 391998 1 5 UNRESTRICTED USE. 392052 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 1). THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT CORRODED FASTENERS O 392052 1 2 N THE LH AND RH UPPER AND LOWER 170D442610 COVER PLATES. THE DISCREPANT 392052 1 3 FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. (REF ITEMS 3 392052 1 4 , 4, 5, AND 6 ON PAGES 1 AND 1A) THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT CORROSION ON THE I 392052 1 5 NTERNAL FASTENERS ON THE RSB CONICAL SEAL ASSEMBLY. ACCESSIBLE FASTENERS 392052 1 6 WERE CLEANED WITH IPA AND BEHR-TEX. REMAINING "CORROSION" (SUPERFICIAL 392052 1 7 SURFACE OXIDATION) WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE 392052 1 8 CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE. 392052 1 9 CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE. 392148 1 1 ITEM 1 OF THIS PR WAS PICKED UP ON J/C V30-15428 BECAUSE THE BUILT IN ST 392148 1 2 RAIN GAGES IN THE FORWARD VERTICAL ATTACH BOLTS WERE GIVING A LOW READIN 392148 1 3 G. THE TEST WAS PERFORMED ON THIS PR AND THE READINGS WERE CONFIRMED. TH 392148 1 4 E BOLTS WERE THEN DETORQUED AND RETORQUED ONE AT A TIME. IT WAS DISCOVER 392148 1 5 ED THAT THE LEFT HAND STRAIN GAGE HAD UNDERGONE A SIGNIFICANT ZERO SHIFT 392148 1 6 . THAT IS, WHEN THE PRELOAD WAS REMOVED FROM THE BOLT, THE STRAIN GAGE W 392148 1 7 AS READING NEGATIVE. A PAGE 1A WAS TAKEN. ITEM 3 WAS NOT A PR CONDITION. 392148 1 8 ITEM 2 WAS ADDRESSED BY USING ULTRASONIC TESTING TO TRY TO MEASURE THE 392148 1 9 STRETCH IN THE BOLTS. THE FINAL LOADS ON THE BOLTS WERE DETERMINED BY 392148 1 10 THIS STRETCH. A CHECK WAS DONE AFTER 24 HOURS AND SOME UNUSUAL READINGS 392148 1 11 WERE TAKEN LENDING SOME UNCERTAINTY TO THE RESULTS OBTAINED. ONCE AGAIN 392148 1 12 THE BOLTS WERE EACH DETORQUED AND RETORQUED AND ULTRASONIC READINGS WERE 392148 1 13 TAKEN BEFORE DETORQUE, AFTER DETORQUE AND AFTER RETORQUE. THIS TIME THE 392148 1 14 ULTRASONIC TRANSDUCER WAS TEMPORARILY BONDED TO THE HEAD OF EACH BOLT 392148 1 15 DURING THE DETORQUE AND RETORQUE CYCLE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCING THE ROOM 392148 1 16 FOR ERROR. THE BOLTS WERE TORQUED UP TO ACHIEVE A PREDETERMINED 392148 1 17 ULTRASONIC READING TO APPLU A PRELOAD WITHIN THE RANGE SPECIFIED ON THE 392148 1 18 DRAWING. A CHECK WAS DONE AFTER 18 HOURS AND THE READINGS SHOWED MINIMAL 392148 1 19 RELAXATION OF PRELOAD. ULTRASONIC READINGS SHOW THAT A PER PRINT LOAD OF 392148 1 20 38,000 +/- 760 LBS WAS APPLIED TO EACH BOLT IN ADDITION TO ANY RESIDUAL 392148 1 21 PRELOAD AFTER DETORQUING. THIS RESIDUAL PRELOAD IS AN UNKNOWN, BUT 392148 1 22 PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT IT IS PROBABLY IN THE RANGE OF 5,000 TO 392148 1 23 7,000 LBS. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. AN EO TO FOLLOW TO 392148 1 24 V070-200003 WILL DELETE FLAG NOTE 15, WHICH LIMITS THESE BOLTS/NUTS TO 392148 1 25 ONLY ONE TORQUE CYCLE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 392171 1 1 THE SCUFFED AREAS OF THE VERTICAL TAIL WERE OF MINIMAL DEPTH. THE RAISED 392171 1 2 METAL WAS SMOOTHED AWAY AND THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED WITH MRB A 392171 1 3 PPROVAL. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 392234 1 1 THE INTERFERENCE WAS ALLEVIATED BY SUBSTITUTING A MD121-0003-06 RIVET IN 392234 1 2 PLACE OF A ME112-0013-06 HI-LOK. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE C 392234 1 3 AUSE IS VENDOR. 392446 1 1 THE KOROPON WAS REMOVED BY MECHANICAL MEANS. AS A RESULT, THE DRY FILM L 392446 1 2 UBE MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN MOVED WITH MRB APPROVAL. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DO 392446 1 3 NE ON THIS PR. CAUSE: VENDOR. 392448 1 1 ITEM 1.0: THE V070-338908-001 AND V070-338916-001 SUPPORTS COULD NOT BE 392448 1 2 INSTALLED DUE TO GAPS BETWEEN THE SUPPORTS AND THE TOOLING JIG. THESE GA 392448 1 3 PS WERE ALLEVIATED BY FABRICATING AND INSTALLING 2 EA MR SHIMS. NO FURTH 392448 1 4 ER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS A BUILD UP OF TOLERANCES BOTH ON T 392448 1 5 HE ORBITER AND THE TOOLING JIG AND A COMBINATION OF USING THE TOOLING IN 392448 1 6 CONJUNCTION WITH THE ORBITER. ITEM 2.0: THE LOWER CENTER HILOK THAT ATT 392448 1 7 ACHES THE V070-338914-002 FITTING TO THE V070-338913-001 BRIDGE INTERFER 392448 1 8 ED WITH THE FITTING RADIUS. A SMALLER DIAMETER HI LOK (159) WAS INSTALLE 392448 1 9 D PER MR DISPO. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS A BUILD UP 392448 1 10 OF TOLERANCES BOTH ON THE ORBITER AND THE TOOLING JIG AND A COMBINATION 392448 1 11 OF USING THE TOOLING IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ORBITER. THIS BUILD UP 392448 1 12 CAUSED THE FITTING TO "LAY" HIGHER ON THE BRIDGE THAN THE OPTIMAL 392448 1 13 LOCATION. ITEM 3.0: THIS IS A DUPLICATE OF STR-3-J1-4342. NO ACTION 392448 1 14 REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS LACK OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SHOP AND ENG. 392475 1 1 ITEM 1: THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EDGE DISTANCE IN THE UPPER THREE HOLES IN 392475 1 2 THE LOWER V070-120150-003 ANGLE. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED "AS IS". 392475 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. ITEM 2: IS DOCUMENTED AND ADDRESSED ON 392475 1 4 STR-3-J1-4251 ITEM 7. THIS DISCREPANCY GOES WITH THE MIDDLE V070-120150- 392475 1 5 003 ANGLE. 392524 1 1 THE LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199213 SPAR FITTING WAS 392524 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE 392524 1 3 TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE O 392524 1 4 F SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 392524 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 392524 1 6 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 392603 1 1 DURING CLOSE OUT INSPECTION PRIOR TO THE RADIATOR INSTALLATION, A CRACK 392603 1 2 AND DEPRESSION WAS FOUND ADJACENT TO A HI-LOK AT CO720. THE DISCREPANT C 392603 1 3 ONDITION APPEARS TO BE A PREVIOUS VENDOR REPAIR WHICH HAD FALLEN OUT. TH 392603 1 4 E DAMAGE APPEARS TO BE THE RESULT OF MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS IN WHICH T 392603 1 5 HE HOLES WERE DRILLED WITH INSUFFICIENT "BACKING-UP" OF MATERIAL. PER UN 392603 1 6 RESTRICTED MR DISPO, THE AREA WAS FILLED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. REF I 392603 1 7 TEM 2 ON PG 1: CURING CLOSEOUT INSP PRIOR TO THE RADIATOR INSTALLATION, 392603 1 8 CRACKS ELIMINATING FROM HI-LOK HEADS WERE FOUND ADJACENT TO TWO HI-LOKS 392603 1 9 AT XO856. THE DAMAGE APPEARS TO BE THE RESULT OF EITHER MANUFACTURING 392603 1 10 OPERATIONS IN WHICH THE HOLES WERE DRILLED WITH INSUFFICIENT 392603 1 11 "BACKING-UP" OF MATERIAL OR IMPORPER REMOVAL/REPLACEMENTOF HARDWARE. PER 392603 1 12 UNRESTRICTED MR DISPO, THE AREA WAS COATED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. 392603 1 13 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP DURING VENDOR 392603 1 14 MANUFACTURE/ASSY. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED. 392626 1 1 V070-311049-001 SEAL FOR V070-311020-001 DOOR WAS WRITTEN UP TO HAVE EXC 392626 1 2 ESS RTV BUILDUP ON SEAL AND TO BE GOUGED IN 2 PLACES. THE SEAL WAS REMOV 392626 1 3 ED AND REPLACED RETURNING SEAL INSTALLATION TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROB 392626 1 4 ABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR & TEAR. 392783 1 1 TROUBLESHOOTING PERFORMED ON ORIGINAL IPR 53V-0037 DRAG CHUTE SYSTEM DIS 392783 1 2 CREPANCY REVEALED A RECESSED SOCKET M IN CONNECTOR 40P403. THE SOCKET WA 392783 1 3 S SUCCESSFULLY RESEATED AND PULL TESTED IN CONNECTOR 40P403. (REFERENCE 392783 1 4 STEPS 63 THRU 66) HOWEVER, WHILE SOCKET M WAS BEING RESEATED, SOCKETS X 392783 1 5 AND Y BECAME RECESSED; BUT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RESEATED SUCCESSFULLY. IN A 392783 1 6 DDITION, SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY CHECKS WERE PERFORMED ON CONNECTOR 40P403 392783 1 7 SOCKETS M,X,Y. ALL BREAK-OUT-BOXES AND ADAPTER CABLES WERE REMOVED AND 392783 1 8 CONNECTORS MATED FOR FLIGHT. THE WIRE HARNESS WAS RETURNED TO DRAWING/FL 392783 1 9 IGHT CONFIGURATION BY RESEATING AND PULL TESTING CONNECTOR 40P403 392783 1 10 SOCKETS M,X, AND Y. FINALLY, A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF CONNECTOR 40P403 392783 1 11 SOCKETS M, X, AND Y WAS PERFORMED VIA OMI V1086.009 SEQUENCE 4 DRAG 392783 1 12 CHUTE F1 VERIFICATION ON 26 JUNE 92. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON PR. 392783 1 13 PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. 392832 1 1 DURING ENGINEERING INSPECTION, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE MASTER KEYWAYS 392832 1 2 FOR RECEPTACLES 90J1, 90J2, AND 90J4 WERE ORIENTED 45 DEGREES COUNTER-C 392832 1 3 LOCKWISE FROM 12 O'CLOCK POSITION. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY REM 392832 1 4 OVING THE EXISTING CONNECTOR PLATE ASSEMBLIES AND INSTALLING NEW ASSEMBL 392832 1 5 IES. AN ELECTRICAL BOND TEST WAS SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED TO VERIFY INTEGR 392832 1 6 ITY OF PLATE ASSEMBLIES. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. PROB 392832 1 7 ABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 392944 1 1 V070-339464-005 COVER & V070-339533-001 MASK WAS WRITTEN UP TO HAVE HOLE 392944 1 2 S NOT ALIGNING WITH HOLES IN SHIP/PVD DUCT. THE COVER WAS MATCH DRILLED 392944 1 3 TO EXISTING NUTPLATE AND OLD HOLES WERE FILLED WITH ADHESIVE BY MR ACTIO 392944 1 4 N FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 392948 1 1 ITEM 1: UNABLE TO LOCATE THE V070-338597 WINDOW SHADE FRAME SUPPORTS PER 392948 1 2 THE 19.47" DIMENSION ON V070-338551 EO B03, PAGE 3 DUE TO INTERFERENCE 392948 1 3 BETWEEN THE FRAME AND LOCKERS ON AV BAY 3A. PER MR THE SUPPORTS WERE MOV 392948 1 4 ED UP APPROXIMATELY 0.1". PROBABLE CAUSE: A BUILDUP OF TOLERANCES. 393017 1 1 THE 13 CLOSEOUTS WERE REBONDED BY SEWING THEM TO RTV-COATED FABRIC AND T 393017 1 2 HEN BONDING THE ASSEMBLY TO THE STRUCTURE. THIS WAS DONE BECAUSE THE ETC 393017 1 3 H ON THE TEFLON COATING WAS EXPIRED PREVENTING GOOD ADHESION. THE REPAIR 393017 1 4 WAS ACCEPTED BY THE MRB FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DON 393017 1 5 E ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 393019 1 1 THE 2 EA NUTPLATES WERE INSTALLED USING MR SUBSTITUTED ME121-0014-03 BLI 393019 1 2 ND RIVETS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 393041 1 1 DURING V30-13335, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 2YC330B24 HAD A 1/4" OF KA 393041 1 2 PTON MISSING. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY PERFORMING SRP-V-EL-0007 393041 1 3 -C-0 WHICH WILL INSTALL PROTECTIVE TAPE OVER DISCREPANCY DISCREPANT AREA 393041 1 4 OF WIRE 2YC330B24. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RETEST IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 393041 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO ORBITER PROCESSING. 393043 1 1 DURING V3013.335, WIRE SEGMENT 1M1916B12-2 WAS DISCOVERED TO HAVE KAPTON 393043 1 2 AND SHIELD DAMAGE WITH NO APPARENT DAMAGE TO ITS CONDUCTOR. STEPS WERE I 393043 1 3 NITIALLY WRITTEN TO PERFORM A CLAMSHELL REPAIR, HOWEVER, FURTHER INSPECT 393043 1 4 ION UTILIZING A 10X MAGNIFYING GLASS REVEALED THAT THERE WAS ACTUAL COND 393043 1 5 UCTOR DAMAGE TO WIRE SEGMENT 1M1916B12-2. THE INITIAL DISPO WAS DELETED 393043 1 6 AND NEW DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO ADDRESS THE DISCREPANCY BY PERFORMING SRP-V 393043 1 7 -EO-0002 "SINGLE CONDUCTOR UNSHIELDED WIRE REPAIR" ON WIRE SEGMENT 1M191 393043 1 8 6B12-2. RETEST IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THISPR AS THERE IS NO RMS INSTALLED T 393043 1 9 HIS FLIGHT. HOWEVER, WHEN RMS IS RE-INSTALLED FOR FUTURE FLIGHT, RETEST 393043 1 10 WILL BE PERFORMED/SATISFIED BY STANDARD RMS TESTING. NO FURTHER ACTION 393043 1 11 REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 393188 1 1 ITEM 1- TWO NUTPLATES WERE REPLACED. HOLES WITH CORROSION WERE CLEANED U 393188 1 2 P WITH BEHRTEX AND THEN CORROSION PROTECTED. PROBLEM DUE TO NORMAL WEAR 393188 1 3 AND TEAR. ITEM 2- OVERSIZE HOLES AND FASTENERS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FO 393188 1 4 R UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBLEM DUE TO VENDOR. 393190 1 1 DURING LTE REMOVAL PER TPS V070-3-J1-160 IT WAS REQUIRED TO TEMPORARILY 393190 1 2 REMOVE WIRES 1H55D22 AND 1H44C12 FROM TERMINAL BOARD 70TB2. UPON INSTALL 393190 1 3 ATION OF THE LTE AND RSB PDU THE WIRE HARNESS WAS REROUTED PER PRINT AND 393190 1 4 WIRES WERE RE-INSTALLED TO 70TB2. HYDRAULIC RETEST PER V1010,S64 WAS CO 393190 1 5 MPLETE AND RESULTS WERE SATISFACTORY. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING ACTION REQU 393190 1 6 IRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSUFFICIENT DATA. 393192 1 1 DURING MPS-3-15-235 IT WAS DETECTED THAT WIRES 1P1081C20 AND P1080B20 HA 393192 1 2 D EXPOSED CONDUCTOR AT 50P699. CONNECTOR 50P699 WAS ALREADY DEMATED PER 393192 1 3 MPS-3-15-235 STEP 1-35 (SCAN NUMBER 3-15-2004). THE WIRES 1P1081C20 AND 393192 1 4 P1080B20 WERE RETERMINATED AT 50P699 ELIMINATING THE DAMAGED AREAS. CONN 393192 1 5 ECTOR 50P699 WILL BE REMATED PER MPS-3-15-235 STEP 1-45. RETEST OF 50P69 393192 1 6 9 WILL PER SCAN TRACKED BY THE SCAN LOG NUMBER BE RECORDED ON MPS-3-15-2 393192 1 7 35 STEP 1-45. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 393308 1 1 THE V070-220078-013 SUPPORT ASSEMBLIES THAT ARE CALLED OUT ON V070-22007 393308 1 2 8 WERE EFFECTIVE FOR OV-105 ONLY. THE SUPPORTS WERE INSTALLED ON OV-103 393308 1 3 WITH EO-TO-FOLLOW. NEW ENGINEERING WAS RELEASED TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE. 393308 1 4 NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR OVERSIGHT. 393383 1 1 DAMAGED SEAL RETAINER CHANNEL WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 393383 1 2 . 393492 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTED A SUSPECTED INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE RH MLG UPLOCK AC 393492 1 2 TUATOR HARDWARE AND THE OUTBOARD BUNGEE SPRING CYLINDER AS SUGGESTED BY 393492 1 3 CHIPPPED PAINT ON THE CYLINDER. CLOSER INSPECTIONS INDICATED THE PAINT W 393492 1 4 AS PROBABLY CHIPPED DURING INITIAL HARDWARE INSTALLATION AND NO INTERFER 393492 1 5 ENCE EXISTS. THERE WAS NO METAL DISPLACEMENT BUT A PART MARKING WAS PART 393492 1 6 IALLY REMOVED WITH THE CHIPPED PAINT. THE BUNGEE CYLINDER WAS TOUCHED UP 393492 1 7 FOR CORROSION PROTECTION AND THE PART MARKING WAS REAPPLIED. AS RETEST, 393492 1 8 THE RH MAIN LANDING GEAR WAS CYCLED (RETRACTED AND EXTENDED) DURING HYD 393492 1 9 OPS AND SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION SHOWED NO SIGNS OF CONTACT. NO FURTHER 393492 1 10 DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: PAINT WAS DISTURBED DURING HARDWARE 393492 1 11 INSTALLATION. 393516 1 1 A NUT FOR THE 62-01 AEROTHERMAL CARRIER PANEL WAS MISSING FROM ITS NUTPL 393516 1 2 ATE. THE NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED AND THE MISSING NUT WAS FOUND 393516 1 3 . PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 393579 1 1 THE MISSING PART WAS FOUND AFTER THIS PR WAS DOCUMENTED. NO FURTHER ACTI 393579 1 2 ON REQUIRED. NO DISCREPANCY. 393586 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-0289, ALCA NUMBER 3 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BLOWN FUSE IN DR 393586 1 2 IVER A62U4. THE LCA WAS REMOVED PER THIS PR AND REPLACED WITH A NEW LCA. 393586 1 3 RETEST OF LCA WAS TRACKED PER SCAN. OEL-3-15-0289 FIXED THE SHORT AT 56 393586 1 4 J36 AND VERIFIED NO ADDITIONAL ANOMALIES. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON 393586 1 5 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: SHORTED PIN AT 56J36 BLEW THE LCA FUSE. 393665 1 1 ITEM 1: THE SUPPORTS WERE MR RELOCATED TO INBOARD SIDE OF WEBS. MR DOUBL 393665 1 2 ER PLATES WERE ATTACHED TO LOWER SIDE OF SUPPORTS TO REESTABLISH SUPPORT 393665 1 3 'S FOOTPRINT. PROBLEM DUE TO ORIGINAL HOLES IN STRUCTURE BEING MISLOCATE 393665 1 4 D BY VENDOR. ITEMS 2 AND 5: NEW SUPPORTS WERE OBTAINED LESS THE .312 HOL 393665 1 5 E. THIS HOLE WAS MATCH DRILLED UPON INSTALLATION. PROBLEM DUE TO ORIGINA 393665 1 6 L HOLES IN STRUCTURE BEING MISLOCATED BY VENDOR. ITEM 3: THE SUPPORT WAS 393665 1 7 LOCATED BY CENTERING ABOUT EXISTING HOLES IN STRUCTURE IN PLACE OF USIN 393665 1 8 G PRINT DIMENSION. THIS MAINTAINED PRINT LOCATION. PROBLEM DUE TO EXISTI 393665 1 9 NG STRUCTURE HAVING BEEN MODIFIED. ITEM 4: THE DOOR STOP SHIM WAS REPLAC 393665 1 10 ED BY A PER PRINT SHIM. TYE MR ID WAS REMOVED DUE TO MR PART BEING 393665 1 11 REPLACED. PROBLEM DUE TO PREVIOUS MR. ITEM 6: A MR SCREW WAS CREATED BY 393665 1 12 GRINDING AN EDGE OF SCREW HEAD. THIS ALLOWS SCREW TO CLEAR NUTPLATE. A 393665 1 13 SMALLER DIAMETER WASHER WAS SUBSTITUED TO CLEAR NUTPLATE AND SUPPORT 393665 1 14 FILLET RADIUS. PROBLEM DUE TO DESIGN ERROR. 393674 1 1 THE HOLE IN THE SIDEWALL WAS ENLARGED BECAUSE THE STRUCTURE WAS INADVERT 393674 1 2 ENTLY SPOTFACED DURING INITIAL INSTALLATION OF THE CAPTIVE FASTENER. THI 393674 1 3 S WEAKENED THE THIN ALUMINUM AND ALLOWED IT TO BREAK OUT. A WASHER WAS B 393674 1 4 ONDED OVER THE ENLARGED HOLE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE FASTENER WITH MR 393674 1 5 B APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 393761 1 1 WHILE WORKING V5K20.004, WIRE SEGMENT DF278G24-1 WAS FOUND TO BE SEVERED 393761 1 2 . A STANDARD REPAIR PROCEDURE WAS PERFORMED TO RESPLICE THE WIRE. UPON E 393761 1 3 NG RESEARCH, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE WIRE IS NO LONGER USED THER 393761 1 4 EFORE NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED PER THIS PR. 393761 1 5 THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DURI 393761 1 6 NG ORBITER PROCESSING. 393765 1 1 THE DISCREPANT SUPPORT, V070-334585-005, WAS RESTORED TO APPROX ORIGINAL 393765 1 2 CONFIGURATION BY COLD BENDING. ABSENCE OF CRACKING ALONG THE BEND LINE 393765 1 3 WAS CONFIRMED BY DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE LOWER AFT 393765 1 4 CORNER OFFSET DESCRIBED IN BLOCK 17 MAY HAVE BEEN DONE DURING REMOVAL O 393765 1 5 R POSSIBLY THE CONDITION SIMPLY WENT UNNOTICED HERE TOFORE. (MR ACCEPTED 393765 1 6 ). 393771 1 1 THE INTERFERENCE FIT BETWEEN LOCKING PIN V070-332700-001 AND RECEPTACLE 393771 1 2 FITTING V070-332710-002 WAS RELIEVED BY REAMING THE UPPER RADIUS OF THE 393771 1 3 HOLE SO ATHAT THE LOCKING PIN COULD SLIDE FREELY. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFA 393771 1 4 CTURING TOLERANCES EMPLOYED IN THE FABRICATION OF FITTING V070-332710-00 393771 1 5 2 NECESSITATED FIELD FIT OF THE PART TO RECEIVE THE LOCKING PN 393799 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGES 1 AND 1A). THIS PR DOCUMENTS A STRIPPED FAST 393799 1 2 ENER ATTACHING THE V070-191052-001 CARRIER PANEL TO THE R/H WING STUB. T 393799 1 3 HE HEAD OF THE FASTENER STRIPPED OUT DURING CARRIER PANEL REMOVAL AND TH 393799 1 4 E NUT ELEMENT BROKE OFF THE NUTPLATE AFTER THE CARRIER PANEL WAS REMOVED 393799 1 5 . THE NUT AND REMAINING PORTION OF THE SCREW WAS RETRIEVED FROM THE VEHI 393799 1 6 CLE AND A NEW NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. ALL OTHER N 393799 1 7 UTPLATE WERE VERIFIED TOP BE ACCEPTABLE (NO EXCESSIVE PREVAILING TORQUE) 393799 1 8 . PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP 393799 1 9 OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 393825 1 1 REPLACEMENT PARTS WERE OBTAINED AND INSTALLED PER STR-3-J1-531. NO FURTH 393825 1 2 ER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 393885 1 1 THE WRONG HI-LOKS WERE INSTALLED ON TPS STR-3-J1-563. THIS PR INSTALLED 393885 1 2 THE PROPER HARDWARE CALLED OUT ON APPROVED RWK EO M106873 RETURNING INST 393885 1 3 ALLATION TO REQUIRED CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. HI-LO 393885 1 4 KS ARE APPROVED BY RWK EO M106873, WHICH IS ONLY AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED. 393901 1 1 DURING VKD20-006 IT WAS DETECTED THAT THE WIRE TRAY COVER FOR BAY 3 RIGH 393901 1 2 T-HAND LOWER WOULD NOT FIT DUE TO THE ADDITIONAL WIRING ADDED BY MCR 141 393901 1 3 04. A STRUCTURES PR WAS INITIATED IN ORDER TO PERFORM THE REQUIRED MODIF 393901 1 4 ICATION. CLAMPS AND SPOT TIES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED IN SUPPORT OF TH 393901 1 5 E STRUCTURES PR. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 393921 1 1 THE MISALIGNMENT OF THE CARRIER PANELS AROUND WINDOW #7 IDENTIFIED IN IT 393921 1 2 EM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY RE-IDENTIFYING THE CARRIER PANELS TO THEIR 393921 1 3 "AS-BUILT" CONFIGURATION. CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCY WAS DUE TO AN ORIGINA 393921 1 4 L MR FROM VENDOR. CONCLUDE NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED AND THE CARRIER P 393921 1 5 ANELS AS RE-IDENTIFIED WILL BE INSTALLED PER JOB CARD V80-93105. 393990 1 1 DURING POST REMOVAL INSPECTION OF THE V070-199804-021 RCC TEE #4, A CHIP 393990 1 2 WAS FOUND IN THE OML OF THE TEE. THE CHIP WAS DAMAGED TO THE 'A' COATIN 393990 1 3 G AND CONVERSION COATING ONLY. NO CARBON SUBSTRATE WAS EXPOSED. THE CHIP 393990 1 4 WAS FILLED WITH SIC POWDER AND SERMABOND 487 PER MLO601-9026 PER UNREST 393990 1 5 RICTED MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 393990 1 6 ITEM 2, PG 1A WAS NOT A PR CONDITION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQU 393990 1 7 IRED. 393996 1 1 THE AFT MOST PORTION OF THE WIRE TRAY BARRIER WAS CUT OUT AND LINED WITH 393996 1 2 RTV TO ALLOW THE WIRES TO LAY FLAT IN THE TRAY WITHOUT CHAFING. MRB APP 393996 1 3 ROVAL WAS GIVEN FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS 393996 1 4 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 394012 1 1 DURING V5K20.008 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE WIRE TDF236B24 HAD KAPTON AN 394012 1 2 D SHIELD DAMAGE, REF ITEM 1. THE WIRE YDF236B24 WAS REPAIRED PER SRP-000 394012 1 3 7 METHOD A (TRIMMING OF DAMAGED SHIELD AND TAPE WRAP). SINCE REPAIR METH 394012 1 4 OD REWORKED THE SHIELD OF THE WIRE YDF236B24; CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND 394012 1 5 HIPOT TESTING WERE PERFORMED ON THE CABLE TO VERIFY CABLE INTEGRITY. ITE 394012 1 6 M 2 NOTED THAT THE WIRE YDF249B24 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE ONLY. THE IWRE YDF24 394012 1 7 9B24 WAS REPAIRED PER SRP-0007 (TAPE WRAP ONLY). NO FURTHER ACTION IS RE 394012 1 8 QUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEMS 1 AND 2 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO 394012 1 9 WORKMANSHIP. CONNECTOR DEMATE/MATES WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. 394040 1 1 THIS PROBLEM WAS TRANSFERRED TO PR STR-3-J1-4306. 394171 1 1 ITEM 1: V070-73875-048 LUMINOIS PANEL WAS FOUND TO HAVE CRACKS IN TWO PL 394171 1 2 ACES NEAR THE AFT CORNER. CRACKS WERE BONDED BACK TOGETHER SO AS TO REST 394171 1 3 ORE PANEL INTEGRITY. REPAIR WORK WAS DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH MR APPROVED 394171 1 4 PROCEDURE. ITEM 2: THE FIFTH FASTENER SNAP STUD FROM THE AFTERMOST CORN 394171 1 5 ER EXHIBITED A DENTED SURFACE SUFFICIENT TO IMPEDE ITS FUNCTION. THE DAM 394171 1 6 AGED SNAP STUD WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE BONDED ONTO THE PANEL IN ITS PL 394171 1 7 ACE. PROBABLE CAUSE (BOTH ITEMS): NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 394174 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2: THE V070-731784-037 LIGHT PANEL (OCN J31382) HAS MULTIPLE 394174 1 2 CRACKED AND CHIPPED AREAS. THE LIGHT PANEL WAS REMOVED AND SENT TO HDA 394174 1 3 TO BE SCRAPPED. A NEW PANEL WAS INSTALLED. ITEM 3: THE NEW LIGHT PANEL H 394174 1 4 AD SEVERAL SMALL STRESS CRACKS FROM MACHINING. PER MR THE CRACKS WERE BO 394174 1 5 NDED TOGETHER RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PART. ITEM 4: THE MULTIPLE 394174 1 6 HEADSET ADAPTOR DOES NOT FIT WITH THE NEW PANEL INSTALLED. THE NEW LIGHT 394174 1 7 PANEL WAS MR TRIMMED TO ALLOW FOR INSTALLATION . ITEM 5: DURING FITCHEC 394174 1 8 K OF THE MHA IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE MHA HOLES IN THE LIGHT PANEL NEE 394174 1 9 D TO BE PULLED APPROX 1/8" FWD/OUTBD. PER MR THE HOLES WERE PULLED. ITEM 394174 1 10 6: UNABLE TO INSTALL THE AIRLOCK DEBRIS NET TO THE 3RD AFT OUTBD SNAP ON 394174 1 11 THE LIGHT PANEL. THE SNAP WAS REMOVED AND REBONDED TO ALLOW FOR THE 394174 1 12 DEBRIS NET TO BE INSTALLED. ITEM 7: LAP SHEARS FAILED ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. 394174 1 13 PULLED AT 1851 PSI AVG AND SHOULD BE 2000. THE BOND WAS MR ACCEPTED 394174 1 14 "AS-IS". PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL PROCESSING WEAR. 394296 1 1 THE MS25083-5BB12 BOND JUMPER ATTACHED TO THE AFT SIDE OF THE AFT MPM PE 394296 1 2 DESTAL WAS FOUND TO CROSS A NEARBY WIRE HARNESS. ONE END OF THE JUMPER W 394296 1 3 AS DISCONNECTED AND RE-ROUTED TO RUN PARALLEL TO THE HARNESS. THE FREE E 394296 1 4 ND WAS THEN REATTACHED, TESTED FOR CONTINUITY AND RE-POTTED WITH SILICON 394296 1 5 E ADHESIVE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS WITH THE JUMPER OR THE WIRE HA 394296 1 6 RNESS. PROBABLE CAUSE: JUMPER NOT INSTALLED PER PRINT. 394297 1 1 INABILITY TO SUPPORT HYDRAULIC LINE NOTED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS RESOLVE 394297 1 2 D BY FLIPPING THE BRACKET OVER WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. INCORRECT 394297 1 3 SPACING OF CLAMP ATTACH HOLES NOTED IN ITEM 2, PAGE 1A, WAS RESOLVED BY 394297 1 4 FILLING ONE EXISTING HOLE AND RELOCATING IT .125" CLOSER WITH UNRESTRICT 394297 1 5 ED MR APPROVAL. SUSPECT CAUSE OF ITEMS 1 AND 2, WAS BUILD-UP OF TOLERANC 394297 1 6 ES IN HYDRAULIC LINE BENDS. CONCLUDE THAT THE INSTALLATION IS COMPLETE A 394297 1 7 ND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBLEM ITEMS 3 & 4 WERE PROCEDURAL ERRO 394297 1 8 RS. SHORE "D" OF 75 MINIMUM WAS ACHIEVED. 394297 1 9 RS. SHORE "D" OF 75 MINIMUM WAS ACHIEVED. 394461 1 1 THE "MISALIGNMENT" IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS DETERMINED TO ACTUALL 394461 1 2 Y BE AN INTERFERENCE PROBLEM. THE INTERFERENCE WAS RESOLVED BY TRIMMING 394461 1 3 THE CCTV SUPPORT BRACKET AND INSTALLING IT TO THE CCTV WITH A SLIGHTLY R 394461 1 4 EDUCED FLUSH SCREW AND COUNTERSUNK WASHER. THIS INSTALLATION WAS MR APPR 394461 1 5 OVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE INTERFERENCE WAS DUE TO A BUILD UP OF TOL 394461 1 6 ERANCES. CONCLUDE THAT THE CCTV MAY BE INSTALLED PER COM-3-J1-210 AND NO 394461 1 7 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 394486 1 1 THE DISCREPANT AREA WAS INSPECTED AND FOUND TO BE ONLY DAMAGE PAINT WHIC 394486 1 2 H IS TOUCHED UP AND SCUFF MARKS WHICH WERE CLEANED UP. PROBABLE CAUSE IS 394486 1 3 UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE DUE TO COLOR MONITOR INSTALLATION. 394843 1 1 CARRIER PANEL MIS-ALIGNMENT IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY 394843 1 2 MANIPULATING THE PANEL TO ALIGN WITH THE ATTACH HOLES IN THE WINDOW FRA 394843 1 3 ME. CONCLUDE THAT ITEM 1 IS AN INVALID DISCREPANCY AND NO FURTHER WORK I 394843 1 4 S REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 394896 1 1 DURING ECL-3-15-324 IT WAS DETECTED THAT THE BACKSHELL ON CONN. 90P19 WA 394896 1 2 S CLOCKED INCORRECTLY. THE CONN. 90P19 WAS DEMATED AND BACKSHELL RECLOCK 394896 1 3 ED. THE CONN. DEMATE/MATE WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION IS 394896 1 4 REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 395030 1 1 THE INTERFERENCE CAUSED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE V070-338927 STRUT WAS ALL 395030 1 2 EVIATED BY AN EO TO DRWG V070-338900. THE FACING OF THE BOLT HEAD WAS RE 395030 1 3 VERSED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 395087 1 1 ITEM #1: THE NUTPLATES ON THE 70C6378-1 STANDOFF ARE NOT PROPERLY SPACED 395087 1 2 TO INSTALL HYDRAULICS CLAMP. A NUTPLATE WAS MOVED AND THE EXISTING HOLE 395087 1 3 S PATCHED PER MR. ITEM #2: THE 70C6378-1 STANDOFF IS CRACKED. THE CRACK 395087 1 4 WAS STOPDRILLED AND PATCHED PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. 395182 1 1 THE UPPER AFT INBOARD AND OUT BOARD F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUTS ON THE V070- 395182 1 2 199215 SPAR FITTING WERE FOUND TO BE GALLED BEYOND THE POINT OF SERVICEA 395182 1 3 BILITY. THE NUTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE N 395182 1 4 UTS WERE INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE OF SOLID RIVETS. THE US 395182 1 5 E OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE F 395182 1 6 OR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING AC 395182 1 7 TION REQUIRED. 395183 1 1 THE UPPER FWD INBOARD MD114-5004-0005 NUTPLATE ON THE V070-199205 FITTIN 395183 1 2 G WAS FOUND TO GALLED BEYOND THE POINT OF SERVICEABILITY. THE NUTPLATE W 395183 1 3 AS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ADJACENT HARDWARE, ME1 395183 1 4 21-0014-03XX BLIND RIVETS WERE USED IN PLACE OF PER PRINT NAS1199-3 RIVE 395183 1 5 TS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBAB 395183 1 6 LE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHO 395183 1 7 P OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 395209 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON OEL-2-J1-034, SENSORS V58K0197X AND V58K0195X W 395209 1 2 ERE MISWIRED RESULTING IN IPR 053V-0043. FURTHER RESEARCH SHOWS THAT THE 395209 1 3 ENGINEERING RELEASED ON MCR 13411, UNCOMMANDED BRAKE PRESSURE, WAS IN E 395209 1 4 RROR. AN EO WAS REQUIRED TO CORRECT IMPROPRIETIES IN THE ORIGINAL WIRING 395209 1 5 CONFIGURATION RELEASED FOR THIS PACKAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO VEND 395209 1 6 OR. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN 3-15-2391. 395226 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF V1010,S25-017 LANDING GEAR STRUT ACTUATORS FAILED 395226 1 2 TO RETRACT WHEN COMMANDED. SUBSEQUENT TROUBLESHOOTING FOUND A BLOWN FUSE 395226 1 3 IN FWD PCA NUMBER 1. THE CAUSE OF THE FAILED FUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE 395226 1 4 A SHORT IN WIRE CIRC SEGMENT IN64B16. THE DEFECTIVE WIRE HAS BEEN REPLAC 395226 1 5 ED. ELECTRICAL RETEST OF LANDING GEAR RETRACT CIRCUIT HAS BEEN PERFORMED 395226 1 6 WITH ACCEPTABLE RESULTS. ADDITIONALLY THE LANDING GEAR HAS BEEN SUCCESS 395226 1 7 FULLY RETRACTED USING PROCEDURE V9002.01. THE BLOWN FUSE AND DEFECTIVE W 395226 1 8 IRE SEGMENT HAVE BEEN REPLACED, AND LANDING GEAR RETRACT CIRCUIT IS FUNC 395226 1 9 TIONAL. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DEFECTIVE 395226 1 10 HARDWARE. 395244 1 1 THE CARRIER PANEL WAS MR TRIMMED TO FIT. TRIMMING WAS REQUIRED TO ACHIEV 395244 1 2 E TPS GAP REQUIREMENTS. PROBLEM DUE TO CARRIER PANEL LOCATING AND MATCHD 395244 1 3 RILLING BY VENDOR. 395302 1 1 T/S BY HYD AND OEL ENG REVEALED THAT THE DISCREPANCY NOTED ON PG 1 THIS 395302 1 2 IPR/PR WAS DUE TO A WIRING PROBLEM WITH CONNECTOR 50P106. THIS PROBLEM W 395302 1 3 AS CORRECTED ON PR OEL-3-15-0299. SUBSEQUENT TO THE REPAIR ON THAT WAD, 395302 1 4 HYD ENG PERFORMED A FUNCTIONAL RETEST ON THIS IPR/PR AND VERIFIED PROPER 395302 1 5 OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM 1 MPS/TVC ISO VALVE. IPR 53-0045 WAS UPGRADED T 395302 1 6 O THIS OEL PR. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD SINCE ALL REWOR 395302 1 7 K WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON OEL-3-15-0299. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP 395307 1 1 TROUBLESHOOTING BY HYDRAULIC AND OEL ENGINEERING REVEALED THAT THE DISCR 395307 1 2 EPANCY NOTED ON PAGE 1 THIS IPR/PR WAS DUE TO A WIRING PROBLEM WITH CONN 395307 1 3 ECTOR 50P106. THIS PROBLEM WAS CORRECTED ON PR OEL-3-15-0299. SUBSEQUENT 395307 1 4 TO THE REPAIR ON THAT WAD, HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING PERFORMED A FUNCTIONAL 395307 1 5 RETEST ON THIS IPR/PR AND VERIFIED PROPER OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM 2 MPS 395307 1 6 /TVC ISOLATION VALVE. IPR 053V-0046 WAS UPGRADED TO THIS OEL PR. NO FURT 395307 1 7 HER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD SINCE ALL REWORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON 395307 1 8 OEL-3-15-0299. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 395307 1 9 OEL-3-15-0299. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 395314 1 1 DURING V070-3-J1-160 MOD 016, WIRE HARNESS 70P27 AND ASSOCIATED WIRING W 395314 1 2 IRE LOST FROM THE AFT SHOP AREA. A NEW CONNECTOR AND ASSOCIATED WIRING W 395314 1 3 RE ROUTED INTO ORBITER TO REPLACE THE LOST ITEMS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQU 395314 1 4 IRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP, WIRE HARNESS WAS LOST FROM 395314 1 5 SHOP AREA. 395457 1 1 THE UPPER HOLE IN THE UPPER V070-120150-004 NESTED ANGLE HAS IMPROPER ED 395457 1 2 GE DISTANCE (HOLE #3881) THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED "AS-IS". PROBABL 395457 1 3 E CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 395948 1 1 ITEM 1: METAL APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN COMPRESSED BETWEEN THE BOLT ANDHOLE W 395948 1 2 ALL, HOLE #3810, XO1307 WING CARRYTHRU, LH WING. THE COMPRESSED METAL WA 395948 1 3 S POLISHED OUT AND MR ACCEPTED. ITEM 2: THE LH OMS POD WAS REMOVED WITH 395948 1 4 THE XO1307 WING CARRY-THRU BOLT REMOVED IN VIOLATION OF STR-3-J1-564 SEC 395948 1 5 TION 1.7 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. THERE WAS CONCERNS ABOUT THE HOLE SHIFTIN 395948 1 6 G DURING A POD INSTALLATION/REMOVAL THAT WOULD NOT ALLOW FOR INSTALLATIO 395948 1 7 N OF A BOLT. A NEW BOLT WAS INSTALLED. ITEM #2 IS NOT A CONCERN. PROBABL 395948 1 8 E CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 395948 1 9 E CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 395979 1 1 AN ADDITIONAL ATTACH POINT WAS PROVIDED FOR THE V070-337417-007 CLOSEOUT 395979 1 2 PANEL INSTALLATION. 1EA EXISTING POINT COULD NOT BE USED DUE TO INTERFE 395979 1 3 RENCE FROM THE AFT WATER TANK SUPPORT. THE OPEN HOLE IN THE CLOSEOUT PAN 395979 1 4 EL WAS PLUGGED AND THE EXTRA ATTACH POINT IN THE STRUCTURE WAS LEFT AS I 395979 1 5 S. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 395997 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING IPR 53V-0045 TO DOCUMENT CONNECTOR 50P106 B 395997 1 2 EING PINNED INCORRECTLY. THIS CONFIGURATION CAUSED MPS/TVC ISOLATION VAL 395997 1 3 VES SYSTEM 1 AND 2 TO NOT FUNCTION PROPERLY (IPR'S 53V-0046 AND -0046). 395997 1 4 STEPS ON THIS PR RE-PINNED THE CONNECTOR AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ISO VA 395997 1 5 LVES WAS VERIFIED CORRECT PER THEIR RESPECTIVE IPR'S (EACH IPR WAS UPGRA 395997 1 6 DED TO A SEPARATE OEL PR AND CLOSED BASED ON THE WORK PERFORMED ON THIS 395997 1 7 PR). NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED AT THIS TIME. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKM 395997 1 8 ANSHIP. 395997 1 9 ANSHIP. 396199 1 1 THE 5TH AND 6TH HOLES DOWN FROM THE TOP ON THE YO 105 SIDEWALL FOR THE V 396199 1 2 070-120150-003 UPPER ANGLE ARE OVERSIZED. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED 396199 1 3 AND OVERSIZED HI-LOKS INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 396200 1 1 A REPLACEMENT STRUT AND STRUT END WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED PER STR-3-J 396200 1 2 1-531. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 396252 PMRB 1 DEFERREL RATIONALE: RESTRICTED ONE FLIGHT MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR C 396252 PMRB 2 ONTINUED USE OF THE PRECAST RTV RAMP INSTALLED BY MR DURING FLIGHT 15 PR 396252 PMRB 3 OCESSING (REF PLBD-3-15-0841). IN AS MUCH AS THE SURFACE CONTOUR HAS BEE 396252 PMRB 4 N RESTORED AND THERE IS NO DEGRADATION TO THE ORIGINAL MR REPAIR, THE DE 396252 PMRB 5 SIGN INTENT OF THE SEALING SURFACES IS MAINTAINED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 396252 PMRB 6 IS UNAFFECTED AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. THE SEAL DEPRES 396252 PMRB 7 SOR AND SUPPORT ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURE. NO MR-ID IS REQUIRED. THIS MR D 396252 PMRB 8 OES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT 396252 PMRB 9 THE CIL RETENTION RATIONAL OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PMRB UPDATE: PMRB APPROVE 396252 PMRB 10 D FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 10 OF OV-103. 5/25/93 396252 1 1 THERE WAS A MAXIMUM MISMATCH BETWEEN THE SEAL DEPRESSOR AND THE DEPRESSO 396252 1 2 R SEAL ON THE AFT FACE OF THE LEFT HAND PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OF 0.070". HEAT 396252 1 3 SINK WAS BONDED OVER THE DEPRESSOR SEAL ELIMINATING THE MISMATCH PER MR. 396252 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. 396253 1 1 THE GAP THAT EXISTED BETWEEN SEAL DEPRESSORS ON AFT, RH PLB DOOR HAS BEE 396253 1 2 N FILLED WITH MB130-085, RESTORING THE SEALING SURFACE TO PER-PRINT COND 396253 1 3 ITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION OF SEALING SURFACES. 396380 1 1 DURING V1240, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE GROUND LUG WAS BROKEN FROM E-GN 396380 1 2 D 50E65. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY REMOVING AND REPLACING THE BR 396380 1 3 OKEN GND LUG. A CONTINUITY CHECK WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY ELECTRICAL INTE 396380 1 4 GRITY OF NEW LUG. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE 396380 1 5 : NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO ORBITER PROCESSING. 396391 1 1 THE NEW V070-120168-004 STIFFENER HAD BEEN ORIGINALLY FABRICATED WITH AN 396391 1 2 INCORRECT BEND ON THE LOWER PORTION. THEREFORE THE V070-120180-012 SHIM 396391 1 3 COULD NOT BE LOCATED IN THE ANGLED AREA AND STILL PROVIDE A FLUSH SPAR 396391 1 4 MATING SURFACE. A MR SHIM WAS INSTALLED TO FILL THE GAP THAT WAS CAUSED 396391 1 5 BY THIS DISCREPANCY. THIS WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CA 396391 1 6 USE: INCORRECT FABRICATION OF STIFFENER. 396392 1 1 THE GAP BETWEEN THE V070-338932-001 CLOSEOUT PANEL AND THE V070-334562-0 396392 1 2 07 SUPPORT WAS ALLEVIATED BY INSTALLING A MR SHIM TO THE PANEL. NO FURTH 396392 1 3 ER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS BUILD UP OF TOLERANCE. 396421 1 1 THE LOWER OUTBD PAN HEAD SCREW INTERFERS WITH THE INSTALLATION OF THE PA 396421 1 2 YLOAD STA L-10 CONTAINER. THE SCREW AND WASHER WAS REMOVED PER MR, UNRES 396421 1 3 TRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: BUILD UP OF TOLERANCES. THE V070-333164-001 396421 1 4 PANEL IS INSTALLED WITH 6 OF 7 SCREWS. 396448 1 1 THE INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE V070-338950-002 ANGLE AND THE MUP ASSY WAS 396448 1 2 ALLEVIATED BY MR REWORK PER FIG 1. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE 396448 1 3 CAUSE IS BUILD UP OF TOLERANCES. 396565 1 1 UNABLE TO INSTALL THE V070-120150-007 NESTED ANGLE DUE TO INTERFERENCE F 396565 1 2 ROM A JO-BOLT. APPROXIMATELY 0.03" WAS TRIMMED FROM THE ANGLE. PROBABLE 396565 1 3 CAUSE: A COMBINATION OF LIMITED ACCESS AND A BUILD UP OF TOLERANCES. 396629 1 1 THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. THE RIVETS THAT WERE REQUIRED, MS20426A3, WE 396629 1 2 RE IN STOCK AND OBTAINED PER SHO PAND INSTALLED PER STR-3-J1-531. NO FUR 396629 1 3 THER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS MISCUMMUNICATION BETWEEN SHOP AN 396629 1 4 D LOGISTICS. 396751 1 1 DURING IPR 53V-0054 IT WAS DETECTED THAT THE COMSEC #3 RCV INDICATOR WAS 396751 1 2 OFF AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON. UPON FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING IT WAS DISCOV 396751 1 3 ERED THAT WIRE C2732A24-3 AT CONN. 83P11 HAD CONDUCTOR EXPOSED APPROX. 2 396751 1 4 IN. FROM THE TAG RING. THE CABLE C2732A24 WAS RETERMINATED WITH NEW CON 396751 1 5 TACTS UPON REMOVAL OF THE DAMAGED AREA. RETEST WAS PERFORMED BY COMM ENG 396751 1 6 . PER RT OMI LCC-3-08-20-92-005 AND RETEST WAS SUCCESSFUL. NO FURTHER AC 396751 1 7 TION IS REQ'D ON THIS PR. 396755 1 1 WIRE SEGMENT 1N64B16 ROUTED FROM CONNECTOR 90P129 TO 90J713 WAS SHORTED 396755 1 2 TO GROUND. BLOWN FUSE WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SHORT. REPAIR CONSISTED OF 396755 1 3 ROUTING A NEW WIRE SEGMENT, PERFORMED PER PR OEL-3-15-0303. NEW FUSE WAS 396755 1 4 INSTALLED PER THIS DOCUMENT. FUNCTIONAL RETEST WAS COMPLETED PER V1010 396755 1 5 SEQ 25 AND RESULTS WERE SATISFACTORY. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING ACTION REQU 396755 1 6 IRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS HARDWARE FAILURE. 396761 1 1 THIS PR ADDRESSED THE DISCREPANCIES NOTED IN ITEM 1 ON PG 1 OF THIS PR A 396761 1 2 ND ITEM 1 ON PG 1 OF PR STR-3-15-4384. THE FASTENERS CALLED OUT ON V070- 396761 1 3 356009 FOR THE GROUND STRAPS ON AV BAYS 4 AND 5 WERE TOO SHORT TO PROVID 396761 1 4 E PROPER THREAD PROTRUSION. THE SHORT FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACE 396761 1 5 D WITH LONGER FASTENERS WITH EOTF. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR 396761 1 6 . PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY 396763 1 1 AFTER A REVIEW OF THE ENGINEERING DRAWINGS AND AN EVALUATION OF THE ACTU 396763 1 2 AL HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IT WAS RESOLVED THAT THE PER PRINT GRIP LENGTH 396763 1 3 IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE PROPER THREAD PROTRUSION. AN EO WILL BE RELE 396763 1 4 ASED TO THE DRAWING PER PR STR-3-15-4383 TO INCORPORATE THIS CHANGE. NO 396763 1 5 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE-DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 397023 1 1 DURING V5011.001, LEFT POD INSTALLATION, CONNECTOR SAVERS AND PROTECTIVE 397023 1 2 COVERS ON RECEPTACLES 51J303 AND 51J304 WERE DAMAGED. NEW CONNECTOR SAV 397023 1 3 ERS WERE INSTALLED LESS THE PROTECTIVE PLASTIC CAPS SINCE CONNECTORS ARE 397023 1 4 TO BE MATER AFTER THIS PR IS COMPLETE. THE DAMAGED PROTECTIVE CAPS WERE 397023 1 5 SCRAPPED AND THE CONNECTOR SAVERS WERE SENT TO THE HDA FOR POSSIBLE REF 397023 1 6 URBISHMENT. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DAMAG 397023 1 7 ED DUE TO ORBITER PROCESSING. 397364 1 1 THE V070-338931-001 CLOSEOUT PANEL WAS FITTED IMPROPERLY AND HAD SEVERAL 397364 1 2 MISDRILLED HOLES. THIS PANEL WAS SENT TO NLSD FOR REWORK AND A NEW PANE 397364 1 3 L WAS OBTAINED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHI 397364 1 4 P. 397366 1 1 WHILE REMOVING RIVETS FOR THE STRINGER STRAP MOD AN ADJACENT RIVET WAS R 397366 1 2 EMOVED BY MISTAKE. THE RIVET WAS REPLACED AND THE INSTALLATION WAS RETUR 397366 1 3 NED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE WORKMANSHIP. 397404 1 1 DURING MPS-3-15-1050 STEP 2-16, THE BACKSHELL ON 50P903 WAS FOUND BROKEN 397404 1 2 . SRP-V-EL-0001 WS USED TO INSTALL SPLIT BACKSHELL. A PAGE 1A WAS INITIA 397404 1 3 TED WHEN WIRES 3P1228C20 AND 3P1229A20 WERE FOUND DAMAGED WHERE TAP WAS 397404 1 4 BROKEN. THE WIRES WERE RETERMINATED INTO A CONNECTOR. PAGE 1B WAS TAKEN 397404 1 5 WHEN THE CONNECTOR GROMMET SPLIT BETWEEN A AND C. THE CONNECTOR WAS REPL 397404 1 6 ACED BEFORE REPINNING OF DISCREPANCY NUMBER 2. RETEST OF 50P903 WILL BE 397404 1 7 TRACKED BY SCAN 3-15-2651. NO FURTEHR ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBAB 397404 1 8 LE CAUSE: 1,1A, 1B) NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 397404 1 9 LE CAUSE: 1,1A, 1B) NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 397565 1 1 A MR SHIM WAS ADDED TO THE V070-338938-001 BRACKET INSTALLATION IN ORDER 397565 1 2 TO ALLEVIATE A GAP BETWEEN THE BRACKET AND THE V070-338931-001 CLOSEOUT 397565 1 3 PANEL. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS BUILDUP OF TOLERAN 397565 1 4 CE. 397592 1 1 DURING OEL-045, CABLES 2ZK324G24 & 2ZK493A24 WERE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON D 397592 1 2 AMAGE WITH THE BRAIDED SHIELD STRANDS OPENED/SEPARATED REVEALING INSULAT 397592 1 3 ION OF TWISTED PAIR, REF ITEMS 1&2. CABLE 5ZK293L24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KA 397592 1 4 PTON DAMAGE WITH NO VISIBLE DAMAGE TO SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUCTORS AT A 397592 1 5 LOCATIONS WITHIN 2.5" ON CONN 90P80, REF ITEM 4. DUE TO THE LOCATION OF 397592 1 6 THIS DISCREPANCY, SRP-V-EL-0007 COULD NOT BE PERFORMED. MR APPROVAL WAS 397592 1 7 REQUESTED FOR THE UNRESTRICTED USE FOR THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF REPAIRS. 397592 1 8 1) CABLES 2ZK324G24 & 2ZK493A24: THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE ADDRESSED BY I 397592 1 9 NSTALLING A MODIFIED Z SPLICE UTILIZING SOLDER SLEEVES AND JUMPER BRAID 397592 1 10 (ITEMS 1,2). 2) CABLE 5ZK293L24: THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY 397592 1 11 INSTALLING MYSTIK 7503 OVER THE AREA POSSESSING DAMAGED KAPTON. CABLE 397592 1 12 2ZK507J24 WAS NOTED AS HAVING BROKEN KAPTON REF ITEM 3. CABLE 2ZK293LL24 397592 1 13 WAS NOTED AS HAVING 2 AREAS WITH SHIELD EXPOSED, REF ITEM 5, ITEMS 3 & 5 397592 1 14 WERE REPAIRED PER SRP-0007 WHICH VERIFIED NO CONDUCTOR OR SHIELD DAMAGE 397592 1 15 AND INSTALLED MYSTIK 7503 TAPE OVER THE DAMAGED AREAS. CABLES 2ZK293L24, 397592 1 16 2ZK293LL24, (ADDITIONAL DAMAGE) 2ZK334H24, AND 2ZK312A24 HAD KAPTON AND 397592 1 17 SHIELD DAMAGE, REF ITEMS 4,5,6 AND 7. ALL THREE CABLES WERE RETERMINATED 397592 1 18 UPON REMOVAL OF DAMAGED AREA INTO CONN'S 90P51 AND 90P57 (2ZK334H24), 397592 1 19 CABLES 2ZK293L24, 2ZK293LL24, 2ZK334H24, 2ZK324G24, 2ZK493A24 AND 397592 1 20 2ZK312A24 HAD CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT TESTS PERFORMED DUE TO 397592 1 21 RETERMINATION OF THE NOTED CABLES. RETEST OF THE NOTED RETERMINATED 397592 1 22 CABLES WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER V1161. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS 397592 1 23 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEMS 1-8 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. 397593 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-045, WIRE 5ZK422A24 WAS FOUND WITH BROKEN SHIELD AND POS 397593 1 2 SIBLE CONDUCTOR DAMAGE AND WIRE 5ZK325F24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAG 397593 1 3 E WITHIN 2 INCHES OF CONNECTOR BACKSHELL. BOTH WIRES WERE RETERMINATED A 397593 1 4 T THEIR RESPECTED CONNECTORS, 90P74 AND 90P78. AFTER RETERMINATION, CONT 397593 1 5 INUITY, ISOLATION, AND HI-POT CHECKS WERE PERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY ON BOTH 397593 1 6 WIRES. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WE 397593 1 7 AR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 397594 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-045, WIRE 1ZK535A24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE SHILED EXPOSED AT 397594 1 2 THE TANG OF 90P54. WIRE 1ZK535A24 WAS RETERMINATED AT 90P54. SUBSEQUENTL 397594 1 3 Y, CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT WAS PERFORMED ON WIRE. PAGE 1A WAS TA 397594 1 4 KEN FOR AN ILLEGAL DEMATE WHEN PAPER CLEANUP FOUND CONNECTOR WAS DEMATED 397594 1 5 ONCE, BUT MATED TWICE. SCAN WAS CONTACTED AND UPDATED. NO FURTHER ACTIO 397594 1 6 N REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER D 397594 1 7 URING PROCESSING. 1A) WORKMANSHIP. 397682 1 1 THE INTERFERING PROTRUDING HEAD HI-LOK SCREW WAS REPLACED BY A FLUSH HEA 397682 1 2 D HI-LOK SCREW PER MR DISPO. PROBLEM DUE TO MR REPAIR STR-3-J1-4088 DESI 397682 1 3 GN ERROR. 397691 1 1 DURING IPR 53V-0058 IT WAS DETERMINE THAT THE GROMMET IN CONNECTOR 81P38 397691 1 2 9 WAS DEFECTIVE ON ONE SIDE. CONNECTOR 81P389 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED W 397691 1 3 ITH A NEW CONNECTOR. WIRES THAT WERE EXTRACTED FROM DISCREPANT CONNECTOR 397691 1 4 AND RE-INSERTED INTO NEW CONNECTOR 81P389 ARE DATA BUS WIRE WHICH REQUI 397691 1 5 RE HYPOT TESTING; THE HYPOT WILL BE PERFORMED ON IPR 53V-0058. NO FURTHE 397691 1 6 R DISPO IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: MATERIAL DEFICIENCY. RETEST WILL BE 397691 1 7 TRACKED BY SCAN. THIS PR MAY NOW BE CLOSED. 397724 1 1 HOLES 3944 AND 4901 HAVE INSUFFICIENT EDGE DISTANCES. HOLE 3944 HAS AN E 397724 1 2 DGE DISTANCE OF 1.57 IN THE FWD/AFT DIRECTION AND GREATER THAN 2 IN THE 397724 1 3 Z DIRECTION. HOLE 4901 IS ADDRESSED PER STR-3-J1-4253 WHICH DUE TO MR B 397724 1 4 G0778-000M INSTALLED 1/4" HI-LOKS. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED "AS-IS 397724 1 5 ". PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 397828 1 1 ITEM 1: V070-120150-003 UPPER ANGLE IS INSTALLED WITH 1 EXTRA HI-LOK FAS 397828 1 2 TENER. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED (RH WING). ITEM 2: PER DWG V070-12 397828 1 3 0170 SECTION B-B THE MIDDLE V070-120150-003 NESTED ANGLE S/B INSTALLED W 397828 1 4 ITH 7 HI-LOK FASTENERS. NO PR CONDITION. ITEM 3: V070-120150-003 LOWER A 397828 1 5 NGLE IS INSTALLED WITH 1 EXTRA HI-LOK FASTENER. THIS CONDITION WAS MR AC 397828 1 6 CEPTED (RH WING). ITEM 4: V070-120150-008 ANGLE IS INSTALLED LESS 1 HI-L 397828 1 7 OK FASTENER. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED (RH WING). ITEM 5: V070-1201 397828 1 8 50-005 IS INSTALLED WITH 1 EXTRA HI-LOK FASTENER. THIS CONDITION WAS MR 397828 1 9 ACCEPTED (LH WING). ITEM 6: V070-120150-004 UPPER ANGLE IS INSTALLED 397828 1 10 WITH 1 EXTRA HI-LOK FASTENER. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED (LH WING). 397828 1 11 ITEM 7: V070-120150-007 ANGLE IS INSTALLED LESS 1 HI-LOK FASTENER. THIS 397828 1 12 CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED (LH WING). ITEM 8: PER DWG V070-120170 SECTION 397828 1 13 C-C HI-LOK COLLAR S/B ON THE AFT SIDE OF THE B91B12257 FRAME. THIS IS 397828 1 14 NOT A PR CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. 397845 1 1 DURING OEL-J1-029, FUSE F-34 IN MOCA #2 WAS FOUND TO BE BROKEN. THE FUSE 397845 1 2 WAS EXTERNAL AND REPLACED WITH A NEW P/N: ME451-0009-1007. EPO RETEST W 397845 1 3 AS SUCCESSFUL OF FUSE F-34 IN MDCA #2 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 397916 1 1 THE TWO SKIN PANELS WERE REMOVED AND THEN REINSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. ALL AT 397916 1 2 TACH SCREWS WERE CORROSION PROTECTED. PROBLEM DUE TO CONSTRAINTS ERROR. 398032 1 1 THE GOUGES NOTED ON ITEM 1.0 WERE SUPERFICIAL AND COSMETIC IN NATURE. TH 398032 1 2 E AREA WAS SMOOTHED OUT AND RECORROSION PROTECTED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQ 398032 1 3 UIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 398170 1 1 THE DAMAGED (SPUN) NUTPLATE'S NUT RETAINERS WERE RECLOCKED AND THEIR HOL 398170 1 2 DING FINGERS WERE RESET. A TORQUE CHECK WAS PERFORMED ON EACH NUTPLATE W 398170 1 3 ITH NO PROBLEMS NOTED. THE NUTPLATES ARE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED US 398170 1 4 E. PROBLEM DUE TO INCORRECT QUANTITY OF WASHERS USED DURING BOLT INSTALL 398170 1 5 ATIONS ALLOWED BOLTS TO SHANK OUT. 398171 1 1 NUTPLATES WERE REPLACED. PROBLEM DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 398200 1 1 REFERENCE OEL'S INTERIM SUMMARY. ECL TESTING OF THE NEWLY REPAIRED WIRE 398200 1 2 PROVED TAHT THE CIRCUIT IS, ONCE AGAIN, OPERATING PROPERLY. CAUSE: WORKM 398200 1 3 ANSHIP. 398275 1 1 ITEM #1: FWD UPPER NUTPLATE ON BRIDGE SUPPORT INTERFERES WITH THE INSTAL 398275 1 2 LATION OF THE V070-338931-002 CLOSEOUT PANEL. PER INSTALLATION DRAWING V 398275 1 3 070-337401 NOTES, TRIMMING OF THE CLOSEOUT PANEL IS PERMITTED IN THIS AR 398275 1 4 EA. PANEL INSTALLED AND PANEL TRIMMED PER STR-3-J1-531. ITEM #2: THERE A 398275 1 5 RE MINOR GAPS BETWEEN THE V070-338931-002 CLOSEOUT PANEL AND V070-338954 398275 1 6 AND 953 SUPPORTS. THE GAPS WERE SHIMMED PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ML86B P 398275 1 7 ANEL IS INSTALLED AT A SLIGHT ANGLE PER PREVIOUS MR FROM DOWNEY. 398372 1 1 ITEM 1: THE V070-338534-002 CLOSEOUT PANEL IS NOT CONFIGURED FOR THE FIR 398372 1 2 EX PORT INSTALLATION PER V070-338500 VIEW AT ZONE 163G. THE PANEL WAS CO 398372 1 3 NFIGURED FOR THE FIREX PORT INSTALLATION PER V070-338500. ITEM 2: DURING 398372 1 4 FITCHECK OF THE FIREX PORT, THE LOWER NUTPLATE WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR T 398372 1 5 HE INSTALLATION. THE NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED, ITS HOLES PLUGGED, AND RELOCA 398372 1 6 TED. ITEM 3: WHEN THE NO 7 HOLE WAS LOCATED AND DRILLED WHILE MOVING THE 398372 1 7 NUTPLATE, IT MADE SLIGHT CONTACT WITH A PLUGGED MD121-0002-03XX RIVET. 398372 1 8 THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE: BUILD UP OF TOLERA 398372 1 9 NCES. 398384 1 1 ITEM 1: METAL IS SCORED IN SEVERAL PLACES ON AFT EDGE OF CLOSEOUT PANEL. 398384 1 2 SCORED MATERIAL WAS WIPED CLEAN USING IPA AND WIPES. ITEM 2: THE ENVIRO 398384 1 3 NMENTAL SEAL IS CUT. THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH THE DISCREPA 398384 1 4 NT SEAL BEING SCRAPPED. ITEM 3: CENTER HOLE ON THE V070-316051-001 RETAI 398384 1 5 NER IS ELONGATED. THE HOLE WAS ENLARGED TO A .191" DIA WHICH ROUNDED THE 398384 1 6 HOLE. ITEM 4: SECOND HOLE INBOARD ON PANEL V070-316210 FOR THE 316051-0 398384 1 7 01 RETAINER IS ELONGATED. THIS HOLE WAS ENLARGED TO A .191" DIA WHICH RO 398384 1 8 UNDED THE HOLE. ITEM 5: HOLES IN THE SEAL DO NOT LINE UP WITH THEIR MATC 398384 1 9 HING HOLES IN THE RETAINER. ALL HOLES LINED UP. ITEM 6: ONE HOLE IN THE 398384 1 10 V070-316051-003 RETAINER IS ELONGATED. THIS HOLE WAS ENLARGED TO A .191" 398384 1 11 DIA WHICH ROUNDED THE HOLE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 398488 1 1 THE OCN FOR THE V070-311049-001 SEAL ON THE V070-311020-001 PANEL WAS IN 398488 1 2 CORRECTLY RECORDED ON STR-3-J1-4339 (REF ITEM 1, PAGE 1). THE PANEL WAS 398488 1 3 REMOVED AND THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND SCRAPPED. A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED A 398488 1 4 ND ISNTALLED PER THE DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE INC 398488 1 5 ORRECT OCN BEING RECORDED IS WORKMANSHIP. CONCLUDE THAT A TRACEABLE OCN 398488 1 6 SEAL HAS BEEN INSTALLED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 398524 1 1 ITEM NUMBER 1: THE EXISTING CUTOUT IN THE V070-339529-005 CLOSEOUT PANEL 398524 1 2 PROVIDES INTERFERENCE WITH THE ECL DUCT. THIS CUTOUT WAS PER MRBJ 6231- 398524 1 3 000M WHICH RELOCATED THE CUTOUT. DURING MAJOR MOD J1 THE DUCT WAS REWORK 398524 1 4 ED AND RETURNED TO PRINT PER MRBJ 6231-000M CUTOUT WAS PATCHED AND A NEW 398524 1 5 CUTOUT WAS LOCATED. ITEM NUMBER 2: THE TWO NUTPLATES FOR THE V070-33985 398524 1 6 1-001 CLOSEOUT PANEL ARE LOCATED HIGH. THE PANEL WAS INSTALLED AND MR AC 398524 1 7 CEPTED. ITEM NUMBER 3: THE EDGE DISTANCE FOR THE OUTBD HOLE IS 1 AND SHO 398524 1 8 ULD BE 2. THIS DISCREPANT CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ORI 398524 1 9 GINAL MRBJ 6231-000M WORK ON THE V070-339529-005 CLOSEOUT PANEL. 398583 1 1 THE V070-338934-002 CLOSEOUT PANEL ON THE LH SIDE OF THE MIDDECK HAD A 1 398583 1 2 " LONG CRACK. THIS WAS MR REPAIRED BY BONDING TWO FIBERGLASS PATCHES USI 398583 1 3 NG MBO120-079, TYPE 2, EPOXY ADHESIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS TO 398583 1 4 THE WATER LINES BEHIND THE PANEL. 398604 1 1 DURING OE-3-15-0286 IT WAS ANNOTATED THAT THE RECEPTACLE PLATE NOTED IN 398604 1 2 ITEM 1 WAS INSTALLED INCORRECTLY. INITIAL DISPO WAS TO REMOVE THE RECEPT 398604 1 3 PLATE AND INSTALL THE PLATE PER THE INSTALLATION DWG V070-793611. DURIN 398604 1 4 G INSTALLATION PROCEDURES IT WAS THEN FURTHER DISCOVERED THAT THE RECEPT 398604 1 5 PLATE AS INSTALLED PER OEL-0286 WAS INSTALLED CORRECTLY BUT THE THE INS 398604 1 6 TALLATION DWG WAS INCORRECT. AN EOTF WAS OBATINED TO REFLECT THE CORRECT 398604 1 7 CONFIGURATION. NOFURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE 398604 1 8 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY 398604 1 9 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY 398605 1 1 VOID THIS PR DUPLICATE OF STR-3-J1-4270 398737 1 1 ITEM 1-THE SUPPORTS WERE NOT DAMAGED BY THE FLEXING. THE APPLIED TORQUE 398737 1 2 HAS BEEN LOWERED PER EO A06 OF M072-355002. PROBLEM DUE TO DESIGN ERROR. 398737 1 3 EO A06 WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO V9022 BY MEQ ENG AND CVR'D IN S5022. I 398737 1 4 TEM 2-NEW RUBBER WASHERS WERE OBTAINED TO REPLACE DEFORMED ONES. THE APP 398737 1 5 LIED TORQUE HAS BEEN LOWERED PER EO A06 OF M072-355002. PROBLEM DUE TO D 398737 1 6 ESIGN ERROR. ITEM 3-NEW NYLON CAPS HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO REPLACE DEFORMED 398737 1 7 ONES. THE APPLIED TORQUE HAS BEEN LOWERED PER EO A06 OF M072-355002. PR 398737 1 8 OBLEM DUE TO DESIGN ERROR. ITEM 4-A NEW THREADED BLOCK WAS OBTAINED AND 398737 1 9 INSTALLED TO REPLACE DAMAGED ONE. A NEW BOLT WAS OBTAINED TO REPLACE 398737 1 10 DAMAGED ONE. PROBLEM DUE TO DESIGN ERROR. NOTE: ITEMS 1-4 DUE TO 398737 1 11 EXCESSIVE TORQUE REQUIREMENTS. LOWERED TORQUE VALUES WERE TESTED PER 398737 1 12 THIS PR. THE LOWERED TORQUE FIXED ALL PROBLEMS. PR MEQ-3-J1-0669 WAS 398737 1 13 GENERATED AGAINST NYLON CAP THREADS BECOMING DEFORMED AND STRIPPED. ITEM 398737 1 14 5-TWO JO-BOLTS WERE MR SUBSTITUTED FOR HI-LOKS. PROBLEM DUE TO LACK OF 398737 1 15 ACCESS. 400353 1 1 ITEMS 1 & 2 - 2 CONICAL WASHERS WERE FABRICATED AND BONDED IN PLACE WITH 400353 1 2 MRB APPROVAL. THEY DID NOT ADHERE, SO ITEM 3 WAS TAKEN ON A PAGE 1A. IT 400353 1 3 EM 3 - CONICAL WASHERS WERE SURFACE PREPPED AND REBONDED WITH MRB APPROV 400353 1 4 AL. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - VENDOR WORKM 400353 1 5 ANSHIP. 400389 1 1 INSTALLATION FASTENERS FOR V070-395217-006 BODY FLAP STUB PANEL HAVE IMP 400389 1 2 ROPER THREAD PROTRUSION. THE FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND REINSTALLED PLUS 400389 1 3 ONE GRIP. THIS IS PER MAO101-301 WHICH ALLOWS FOR +/-1 GRIP. LSOC/STR E 400389 1 4 NGINEERING VERIFIED THAT THERE IS PROPER THREAD PROTRUSION. PROBABLE CAU 400389 1 5 SE: WORKMANSHIP. 400437 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2: THERE ARE TWO MINOR DENTS IN THE UPPER AVIONICS BAY 6 DOO 400437 1 2 R ASSEMBLY. THE TWO DENTS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE: DENTS 400437 1 3 APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED FROM OBJECTS BUMPING INTO THE DOORS. 400439 1 1 ITEM 1: THERE ARE SEVEN MINOR DENTS IN THE UPPER CENTER AVIONICS BAY 6 D 400439 1 2 OOR ASSY. THE SEVEN DENTS WERE MR ACCEPTED "AS-IS". PROBABLE CAUSE: DENT 400439 1 3 S APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED FROM OBJECTS BUMPING INTO THE DOORS. 400440 1 1 ITEM #1: THERE ARE FOUR MINOR DENTS IN THE UPPER, UPPER CENTER, LOWER CE 400440 1 2 NTER, AND LOWER AVIONICES BAY 4 DOOR ASSEMBLY. THE FOUR DENTS WERE MR AC 400440 1 3 CEPTED "AS-IS". PROBABLE CAUSE: DENTS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED FROM OB 400440 1 4 JECTS BUMPING INTO THE DOORS. 400441 1 1 ITEM 1: THERE ARE TWO MINOR DENTS IN THE LOWER AVOINICS BAY 5 DOOR ASSEM 400441 1 2 BLY. THE TWO DENTS WERE MR ACCEPTED "AS-IS". ITEM 2: THERE IS ONE MINOR 400441 1 3 DENT IN THE LOWER CENTER AVIONICS BAY 5 DOOR ASSEMBLY. THE DENT WAS MR A 400441 1 4 CCEPTED "AS-IS". PROBABLE CAUSE: DENTS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED FROM O 400441 1 5 BJECTS BUMPING INTO THE DOORS. 400579 1 1 THE LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199203 SPAR FITTING WAS 400579 1 2 FOUND TO BE BROKEN LOOSE FROM ITS RIVET AND SPINNING. THE DISCREPANT RI 400579 1 3 VET WAS REMOVED. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE BLIND RIVET WAS REINSTALLED 400579 1 4 IN LIEU OF SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNR 400579 1 5 ESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHO 400579 1 6 P OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 400642 1 1 DURING A SURVEILLANCE, THE GROUND LUG ON 50P718 WAS FOUND BROKEN. AN MR 400642 1 2 WAS REQUESTED TO INSTALL SPLICE KSC 0541 AND ADDITIONAL WIRE ON EXISTING 400642 1 3 SEGMENT TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT LENGTH TO RETREMINATE LUG. A CONTINUITY C 400642 1 4 HECK ON THE NEW LUG WAS SUCCESSFUL. THE LUG WAS THEN INSTALL TO 50P718 B 400642 1 5 ACKSHELL. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL 400642 1 6 WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 400745 1 1 ITEM 1: HOLE MISDRILLED ON BOTTOM EDGE OF V070-338931-002 PANEL. THE MIS 400745 1 2 DRILLED HOLE WAS FIBERGLASS PATCHED AND REDRILLED PER MR. ITEM 2: THE V0 400745 1 3 70-338931-002 CLOSEOUT PANEL HAD A SMALL CRACK. THE CRACK WAS STOPDRILLE 400745 1 4 D AND FIBERGLASS PATCHED. ITEM 3: TWO HOLES WERE MISDRILLED ON THE LOWER 400745 1 5 AFT CORNER OF THE V070-338931-002 PANEL. THE MISDRILLED HOLES WERE FIBE 400745 1 6 RGLASS PATCHED AND REDRILLED PER MR. ITEM 4: HOLE MISDRILLED ON BOTTOM E 400745 1 7 DGE OF PANEL. THE PANEL WAS INSTALLED PER STR-3-J1-531 FOR FLIGHT WITH T 400745 1 8 HIS HOLE INSTALLED FIRST. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: LI 400745 1 9 MITED ACCESS AROUND THE MUP ASSY. 400760 1 1 V070-334487-007 BRACKET HOLE WAS MISDRILLED (ELONGATED) AND THE NUTPLATE 400760 1 2 WAS DAMAGED. THE ELONGATED HOLE WAS DRILLED UP TO .2130 DIAMETER, AND A 400760 1 3 CCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE PR WAS DEFERRED TO OMDP IN ORDER TO RE 400760 1 4 MOVE AND REPLACE THE NUTPLATE. NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. INSTAL 400760 1 5 LATION WAS MR ID'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: SPC WORKMANSHIP. 400845 1 1 THIS PR ADDRESSES A DISCREPANT CONDITION PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED ON STR-3- 400845 1 2 15-4410. NO WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE WILL BE ADDRESSE 400845 1 3 D ON STR-3-15-4410. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 400872 1 1 DURING MEQ-3-A0053, THE LH MLG BUNGEE INDICATOR ASSEMBLY (P/N V070-51039 400872 1 2 5-004) OCN ANO779 WAS REMOVED FROM THE ORBITER DUE TO A DEFECTIVE SWITCH 400872 1 3 IN THE ASSEMBLY. DURING REWORK OF THE INDICATOR ASSY (P/N -0395) IN THE 400872 1 4 OPS, THE MLG BUNGEE HARNESS ASSY (P/N V070-510397) WHICH CONTAINS THE S 400872 1 5 WITCH AND IS A SUBASSEMBLY OF THE INDICATOR ASSY WAS REMOVED AND REPLACE 400872 1 6 D. THE INDICATOR ASSY (P/N-0395) OCN ANO779 WAS REINSTALLED IN THE VEHIC 400872 1 7 LE AND RECORDED AS SUCH ON PR MEQ-3-A0053. THE REMOVED HARNESS ASSY (P/N 400872 1 8 -0397) WAS SENT TO HDA TO REPAIR OR SCRAP. THE HARNESS ASSY HAD BEEN 400872 1 9 MARKED WITH THE INDICATOR ASSY P/N AND OCN (PROBABLY AFTER THE INDICATOR 400872 1 10 ASSEMBLED) WHICH CREATED CONFUSION. THE HDA, THINKING THEY HAD AN 400872 1 11 INDICATOR ASSY (0395) AND NOT A HARNESS ASSY (0397), SCRAPPED THE PART 400872 1 12 AND THE INDICATOR ASSY (0395) OCN IN THE CVAS DATABASE. WHEN MEQ-3-A0053 400872 1 13 CLOSED, CVAS WROTE A CDR CONCERNING THE INDICATOR ASSY (-0395) AND OCN 400872 1 14 ANO779 BEING INSTALLED WHEN THEIR DATABASE SHOWED IT BEING SCRAPPED. 400872 1 15 THIS PR IS A RESULT OF THE CDR. THIS PR WAS DEFERRED TO A FUTURE FLIGHT 400872 1 16 WHEN THE INDICATOR ASSY IS REMOVED AND THE OCN CAN BE REVERIFIED. DURING 400872 1 17 FLIGHT 19 PROCESSING, PR MEQ-3-19-0799 WAS INTIATED TO DOCUMENT A FAILED 400872 1 18 SWITCH WITHIN THE LH MLG BUNGEE INDICATOR ASSEMBLY. THE V070-510395-004 400872 1 19 BUNGEE INDICATOR ASSEMBLY (OCN ANO779) WAS REMOVED PER TPS MEQ-3-19-219 400872 1 20 WHICH REPLACED THE -004 ASSY WITH A -006 ASSY PER MODICIATION EO. THE 400872 1 21 -004 INDICATOR ASSY WAS REMOVED, VERIFIED TO BE OCN ANO779 AND ROUTED TO 400872 1 22 HDA ON AN LRU PR PER MEQ-3-19-0799 TO FORWARD TO NSLD FOR REPAIR AND 400872 1 23 UPGRADE TO THE -006 CONFIGURATION. THIS PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. 400872 1 24 THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS MISUNDERSTANDING OF MARKINGS ON PART. 400872 1 25 NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT OTHER SERIAL 400872 1 26 NUMBERS OF LIKE END ITEM PARTS. 400961 1 1 WHILE WORKING OEL-3-15-045, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WIRE DF277B24 HAD DAM 400961 1 2 AGED INSULATION WITH CONDUCTOR SHOWING. SRP V-EL-0002 SINGLE CONDUCTOR U 400961 1 3 NSHIELDED WIRE REPAIR WAS UTILIZED TO REPAIR THE WIRE VIA A KSC SPLICE ( 400961 1 4 KSC 0542). A PCM SNAPSHOT OF THE STRAIN GAGES ON 091792 SHOWED THAT THE 400961 1 5 MEASUREMENTS WERE READING NOMINAL. SINCE WIRE DF277B24 SUPPLIES POWER TO 400961 1 6 THE RPC, THAT PATCHES MAIN B TO THE PDA, WHICH IN TURN SUPPLIES POWER T 400961 1 7 O THE STRAIN GAGE SIGNAL CONDITIONERS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE WIRE W 400961 1 8 AS REPAIRED SUCCESSFULLY. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED BY THIS PR. MOST 400961 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP. 401075 1 1 DURING CONSONE MONITORING, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WIRE DF563A12 HAD 401075 1 2 DAMAGED KAPTON INSULATION WITH CONDUCTOR SHOWING. AN MR REPAIR WAS 401075 1 3 PERFORMED BY APPLYING HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING OVER THE EXPOSED CONDUCTOR 401075 1 4 (CLAM SHELL REPAIR). A PCM SNAPSHOT OF THE STRAIN GAGES ON 9-17-92 401075 1 5 SHOWED THAT THE MEASUREMENTS WERE READING NOMINAL. SINCE WIRE DF563A12 401075 1 6 SUPPLIES POWER TO THE PDA, WHICH IN TURN SUPPLIES POWER TO THE STRAIN 401075 1 7 GAGE SIGNAL CONDITIONERS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE WIRE WAS REPAIRED 401075 1 8 SUCCESSFULLY. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED BY THIS PR. MOST PROBABLE 401075 1 9 CAUSE OF THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP. 401102 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS THREAD MARKS INSIDE THE WING CARRY THRU ATTACH POINT H 401102 1 2 OLE NO. 3846 AT XO1308.158, YO105. THE THREAD MARKS WERE SMOOTHED OUT US 401102 1 3 ING KROCUS CLOTH PER MR DISPOSITION. THE CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR O 401102 1 4 NE FLIGHT PENDING JSC ANALYSIS OF HOLE AND DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 16. DURING 401102 1 5 FLIGHT 16, THE ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT THE DAMAGE WAS NOT A FLIGHT SAFETY 401102 1 6 CONCERN AND THE SLIGHTLY OVERSIZED HOLE WAS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED 401102 1 7 USE. SINCE NO ACCESS WAS AVAILABLE TO MR IDENTIFY THE STRUCTURE ADJACENT 401102 1 8 TO THE HOLE, THE PR WAS DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 17. DURING FLIGHT 17, THE 401102 1 9 STRUCTURE WAS IDENTIFIED AS "MR STR-3-A0197". NO FURTHER WORK IS 401102 1 10 REQUIRED FOR THIS PR AND ALL ENGINEERING CONCERNS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED. 401102 1 11 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DURING FASTENER 401102 1 12 INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL. 401207 1 1 SEPARATED DOUBLER WAS BONDED IN PLACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PRO 401207 1 2 CEDURES FOR BONDING AGENT MBO130-119, TYPE II AND MR ACCEPTED AS REPAIRE 401207 1 3 D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAU 401207 1 4 SE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. 401291 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT A SLIGHT LOOSENSES OF THE PISTON HOUSI 401291 1 2 NG ASSY (ITEM 32, FIG. 1) RELATIVE TO THE TORQUE TUBE/PLATE ASSY (ITEMS 401291 1 3 8 & 49, FIG. 1) ON THE LOB MLG BRAKE ASSY (S/N -0022). ROTATIONAL PLAY W 401291 1 4 AS APPROXIMATELY 2 OR 3 DEGREES AND AXIAL PLAY APPROXIMATELY 1/16TH INCH 401291 1 5 . THIS WAS NOT CONSIDERED UNUSUAL, BUT ONE OF THE OTHER THREE BRAKE ASSE 401291 1 6 MBLIES INSTALLED EXHIBITED THIS CONDITION. DURING BRAKE BUILDUP, THE PIS 401291 1 7 TON HOUSING ASSY IS SECURED IN PLACE WITH TWO LOCATING SCREWS (ITEM 7, F 401291 1 8 IG. 1). THESE SCREWS DO NOT BEAR ANY DYNAMIC BRAKING LOADS. NONE OF THE 401291 1 9 ABOVE ITEMS ARE MOVING PARTS. DURING BRAKE ACTUATION THE PISTON HOUSING 401291 1 10 ASSY IS SHOULDERED AGAINST THE FLANGE OF THE TORQUE TUBE IN CAPTIVE 401291 1 11 DESIGN. THE CONDITION DOCUMENTED HERE IS DUE TO MACHINING TOLERANCES OF 401291 1 12 THE TWO LOCATING SCREWS AND ASSOCIATED HOLES IN THE TORQUE TUBE. BRAKE 401291 1 13 INSPECTION BY LOCKHEED, NASA AND ROCKWELL MEQ ENGINEERING, AND TELEPHONE 401291 1 14 DISCUSSION WITH BFGOODRICH SR. BRAKE DESIGN ENGINEER DALE HENNING, 401291 1 15 CONFIRMED THAT THIS CONDITION WAS ACCEPTABLE AND NOT A PROBLEM. NO PR 401291 1 16 CONDITION EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: MACHING TOLERANCES OF THE TWO LOCATING 401291 1 17 SCREWS AND ASSOCIATED HOLES IN THE TORQUE TUBE. 401334 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE DISCOVERED DURING V5011.008 HAS BEEN REMOVED AND 401334 1 2 REPLACED PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 401404 1 1 DURING TROUBLESHOOTING ON IPR 053V-0083 IT WAS DISCOVERED VIA CONTINUITY 401404 1 2 TESTING THAT CONNECTOR 85J651 WAS MISPINNED. THE MISPINNED CONNECTOR WA 401404 1 3 S REPINNED AND CIRCUIT WAS CONTINUITY TESTED PER THIS PR. TPS EPD-3-15-3 401404 1 4 46 PERFORMED A SUCCESSFULL TEST OF THE MLP PANEL ML85E AC OUTLETS THEREB 401404 1 5 Y SATISFYING RETEST FOR THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 401410 1 1 UNABLE TO BREAK THE TORQUE OF THE L/H WING CARRY THRU BOLT ON THE NUT SI 401410 1 2 DE, XO 1307 AFT BOLT. THE TORQUE WAS BROKEN BY VIBRATING A 3/4" BREAKER 401410 1 3 BAR. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 401601 1 1 THE REQUIRED SIZE AND CONFIGURATION OF THE MISSING BUSHING WERE DETERMIN 401601 1 2 ED BY MOLD IMPRESSIONS AND REFERENCE TO APPROPRIATE DRAWINGS. WITH MR AP 401601 1 3 PROVAL, A SNUG CLASS OF FIT WAS DEEMED APPROPRIATE TO FACILITATE FIELD I 401601 1 4 NSTALLATION WHILE MAINTAINING THE INTENT OF THE ORIGINAL. SECURITY OF TH 401601 1 5 E AFT BUSHING WAS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION, AND THE HEAT SHIELD DOME SPLIC 401601 1 6 E COMPLETED. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMAN 401601 1 7 SHIP. 401645 1 1 ITEM #1: THE 70B2000-2 STRUT HAS A INDENTATION 8" ABOVE THE LWR ATTACH P 401645 1 2 OINT ON THE AFT SIDE OF THE STRUT. (LENGTH 1.47, WIDTH .188, DEPTH .025" 401645 1 3 ) THE STRUT WAS REMOVED AND SENT TO VENDOR FOR REWORK. A NEW STRUT WAS O 401645 1 4 BTAINED AND INSTALLED. ITEM #2: UNABLE TO REMOVE THE DISCREPANT STRUT DU 401645 1 5 E TO ADJACENT STRUT HARDWARE. THE ADJACENT LOWER STRUT HARDWARE WAS REOV 401645 1 6 ED TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO REMOVE DISCREPANT STRUT. THE HARDWARE WAS REINST 401645 1 7 ALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE STRUT WAS PROBABLY DAMAGED DURING INSTALLATIO 401645 1 8 N OR REMOVAL OF THE GSE MIDBODY ACCESS PLATFORMS. 401645 1 9 N OR REMOVAL OF THE GSE MIDBODY ACCESS PLATFORMS. 401717 1 1 DURING HYD-3-J1-108 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CONNECTOR 50P636 HAD A BROKEN B 401717 1 2 ACKSHELL STRAIN RELIEF. DISPOSITION WAS WRITTEN TO REMOVE THE DAMAGED BA 401717 1 3 CKSHELL AND INSTALL A SPLIT BACKSHELL. FURTHER INSPECTION ALSO REVEALED 401717 1 4 THAT WIRE T176A26-1 HAD EXPOSED CONDUCTOR AT THE BACKSHELL STRAIN RELIEF 401717 1 5 (REFERENCE PAGE 1A ITEM 2). DUE TO THE DAMAGE OF WIRE T176A26-1, THE WI 401717 1 6 RES T176A26-1 AND T176A26-2 WERE RETERMINATED AT 50P636 AND THE NEW SPLI 401717 1 7 T BACKSHELL WAS INSTALLED. DURING PAPER REVIEW FOR CLOSURE IT WAS DISCOV 401717 1 8 ERED THAT A "PULL TEST" WAS NOT PERFORMED ON THE NOTED WIRES THAT WERE 401717 1 9 RE-INSERTED INTO 50P636. DISPOSITION WAS WRITTEN TO "PULL TEST" WIRE 401717 1 10 T176A26-1 AND ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS WILL "PULL TEST" WIRE T176A26-2. 401717 1 11 HOWEVER DURING PROCEDURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE INITIAL "PULL TEST" IT WAS 401717 1 12 DISCOVERED THAT THE "SPLIT TYPE" BACKSHELL INSTALLED WITH DISCREPANT, 401717 1 13 REF ITEM 3 PG 1B. THE SPLIT TYPE BACKSHELL WAS REPLACED PER ADDITIONAL 401717 1 14 SRP-0001 INSTRUCTIONS. RETEST OF CONNECTOR 50P636 WILL BE TRACKED PER 401717 1 15 SCAN. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEMS 1 AND 2 WERE DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 401717 1 16 3 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO MANUFACTURING ERROR. 401834 1 1 DURING CLOSE OUT INSPECTION, THE V070-197126-002 INSULATOR ATTACHED TO R 401834 1 2 H FLIPPER DOOR NUMBER 14 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A TEAR APPROXIMATELY 1.5" LON 401834 1 3 G ALONG THE EDGE OF ONE CORNER. THE INSUALTOR WAS REPAIRED USING MBO130- 401834 1 4 119 TYPE III ADHESIVE, THE REPAIR PROCEDURE MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED 401834 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. 401835 1 1 BULB SEAL V070-198702-004 WAS FOUND TO BE TORN AND DEFORMED. A NEW BULB 401835 1 2 SEAL WAS ORDERED AND INSTALLED PER JOB CARD V80-96114. THE DISCREPANT BU 401835 1 3 LB SEAL WAS SENT TO MSC - HDA FOR POSSIBLE REFURBISHMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE 401835 1 4 : OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED AT THIS TIME. 401889 1 1 DURING AN INS-3-J1-147 MOD 001, SENSOR V46T0284A WAS RELOCATED AND NO PR 401889 1 2 OVISIONS TO ROUTE SHIPS WIRING TO NEW SENSOR LOCATION. AN EOTF WAS REQUE 401889 1 3 STED TO SHOW ROUTING AND CLAMPING TO NEW SENSOR LOCATION, FIGURE 2. NO F 401889 1 4 URTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY, NO 401889 1 5 ROUTING PROVIDED WITH RELOCATION OF SENSOR. 401912 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF JC V80-00456, WIRE T238A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE EXPOS 401912 1 2 ED CONDUCTOR AT SPLICE. THE DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY CUTTING OUT AND 401912 1 3 RE-INSTALLING DESIGN SPLICES 50SP7801, 50SP7802, 50SP7803, AND 50SP7804 401912 1 4 AS WELL AS THE SOLDER SLEEVE AND JUMPER WIRE. THE REPAIR RETURNS THE WI 401912 1 5 RE HARNESS TO FLIGHT/DWG CONFIGURATION. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF THE SPLIC 401912 1 6 ES/SOLDER SLEEVE/JUMPER WIRE (APU SYSTEMS MEAS REF DES V46T0304A1) WAS P 401912 1 7 ERFORMED ON 100992 VIA OI HARDCOPY. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON PR. PR 401912 1 8 OBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREPANCY IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. PROBABLE CAUSE: MAT 401912 1 9 ERIALS DEFICIENCY/DEGRADATION. 401936 1 1 UNABLE TO INSTALL THE V070-339850-001 END COVER DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM 401936 1 2 THE ECL DUCT BEHIND THE CCTV MOUNT. THE COVER WAS MR TRIMMED AND INSTAL 401936 1 3 LED PER PYR-3-J1-060 MOD -004 STEP 3.1.1. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS 401966 1 1 ITEM 1: LOOSE BOLT ON SECONDARY SEAL, OUTBD AFT END UNDER FLIPPER DOOR # 401966 1 2 15, LEFT HAND. THE BOLT WAS REMOVED AND A NAS1003-2A BOLT WAS INSTALLED. 401966 1 3 ITEM 2: PER V070-198500 ZN.42F THE BOLT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AN NAS1003-4A 401966 1 4 +/- 1 GRIP. THIS CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED PER MR FOR RESTRICTED USE WITH P 401966 1 5 OST DISPO TO CHANGE TO BOLT TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS. ITEM 3: THERE WAS NOT 401966 1 6 ACCESS TO REMOVE THE -2A BOLT. THE ADJACENT FASTENER WAS REMOVED TO PRO 401966 1 7 VIDE ACCESS TO THE BOLT. THE ADJACENT FASTENER WAS REINSTALLED AFTER THE 401966 1 8 BOLT WAS REPLACED. ITEM 4: UNABLE TO WORK STEP 3-5, FASTENER REMOVAL DU 401966 1 9 E TO AN ADJACENT MR FASTENER. A HI-LOK WAS REMOVED PER STEP 4-3 THAT 401966 1 10 PROVIDED PROPER ACCESS. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 401967 1 1 THE V070-338934-002 PANEL WAS REMOVED AND THE NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED. BECA 401967 1 2 USE THE NEW NUTPLATE WAS SLIGHTLY LARGER THAN THE OLD NUTPLATE, IT HAD T 401967 1 3 O BE ROTATED 90 DEGREES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE PROPER EDGE DISTANCE FOR THE 401967 1 4 RIVET HOLES. THE NEW NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED IN THIS ORIENTATION WITH MR 401967 1 5 B APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE PANEL WAS THEN REINSTALLED PER PRIN 401967 1 6 T. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - WORKMANSHIP. 402142 1 1 DURING V1065,S04-12.2, REDUNDANT WOW NUL FAILED TO COME ON WHEN POWER WA 402142 1 2 S APPLIED. TROUBLESHOOTING FOUND PIN 2 ON 90J618 WAS BENT 90 DEGREES. TH 402142 1 3 E PIN WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. ALSO DURING TROUBLESHOOTING, WIRE V36C24 402142 1 4 WAS CUT FOR A CONTUNITY CHECK DUE TO ACCESS TO 90J618 FOR REPAIR, FPCA 402142 1 5 #3 WAS REMOVED. AFTER REPAIR WAS COMPLETE, FPCA WAS REINSTALLED AND RETE 402142 1 6 ST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. RETEST OF REDUNDANT WOW NULL WAS PERFORMED O 402142 1 7 N THIS PR SUCCESSFULLY BY GNC. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PR 402142 1 8 OBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. PIN WAS BENT DURING MATING. 402142 1 9 OBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. PIN WAS BENT DURING MATING. 402196 1 1 DURING AN IPR 53V-0074, CONN 83P47 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A LOOSE BACKSHELL. 402196 1 2 THE BACKSHELL WAS OPENED AND INSPECTED. NO ANOMALIES WERE FOUND. THE BAC 402196 1 3 KSHELL WAS THEN TORQUED AND THE CONN MATED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQ'D O 402196 1 4 N THIS PR. CONN RETEST WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE A 402196 1 5 TTRIBUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. 402306 1 1 REFERENCE OEL INTERIM SUMMARY. THE RETEST CONSISTED OF TAKING A HARCOPY 402306 1 2 OF PROGRAM VAG55 TO VERIFY THAT TEMPERATURE FD V62T0519A (WASTE H20 DUMP 402306 1 3 NOZZLE TEMP B) WAS READING AMBIENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 402307 1 1 REFERENCE OEL INTERIM SUMMARY. THIS LUG GROUNDS THE WCS CONTROLLER. OMI 402307 1 2 V1026.004 PERFORMED A WCS FUNCTIONAL TEST. NO ANOMALIES OCCURRED DURING 402307 1 3 THIS TEST, WHICH VERIFIES CIRCUIT INTEGRITY. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE 402307 1 4 DAMAGE. 402318 1 1 MCR 12335 ISSUED FOR C/P ACCESS AT THE VERTICAL TAIL FOR MODAL TEST POIN 402318 1 2 T. C/P WAS TO BE SECURED TO FOUR BONDED STUDS. ITEM ONE: 1 OF 4 STUDS FA 402318 1 3 ILED PULL TEST AND WAS REBONDED. SURFACE PREP ORIGINALLY SUSPECTED. ITEM 402318 1 4 TWO: 1 OF 4 LAP SHEAR COUPONS FAILED LOW AND WAS MR ACCEPTED. MISALIGNM 402318 1 5 ENT SUSPECTED. ITEM THREE: NON-PARALLEL BONDLINE PREVENTED FLUSH INSTALL 402318 1 6 ATION OF PANEL. BY MR, COUTERBORES WERE DELETED AND THE CAVITY SCREEDED. 402318 1 7 WHEN THE MOD WAS DEFERRED, SCREED WAS REMOVED AND TILE INSTALLED. ITEM 402318 1 8 FOUR: STUD BONDS FAILED WHEN PULL TEST VALUE WAS INCREASED TO SIMULATE F 402318 1 9 LIGHT LOADS. SUSPECT THAT MB0120-008 ADHESIVE COMBINED WITH THE 402318 1 10 V070-390892 STUDS IS AN INADEQUATE DESIGN FOR THIS APPLICATION. LAB 402318 1 11 TESTING HAS VERIFIED ADHESIVE STRENGTH AND HAS ALSO DUPLICATED STUD 402318 1 12 FAILURE WHICH ELIMINATES SURFACE DEEP CONCERNS. THE STUD BOND FAILS DUE 402318 1 13 TO PEEL CAUSED BY CONING OF THE THIN STUD BASE. MBO120-008 HAS LOW PEEL 402318 1 14 STRENGTH. MCR HAS BEEN DEFERRED FOR PROBABLE REDESIGN OR CANCELLATION. 402318 1 15 NO FURTHER DISPOSITION REQUIRED. NOTE: ALL MR REWORK PERFORMED BY THIS 402318 1 16 PR HAS BEEN BACKOUT BY MOD TO TPS VERT-3-J1-024. NO STUDS C/P PNL 402318 1 17 INSTALLED. 402426 1 1 RH MAIN LANDING GEAR TRUNION FITTING AT YO 105, BOLT HOLE #2 OUTER HAS A 402426 1 2 N EXCESSIVE EDDY CURRENT INDICATION. THE EXCESSIVE INDICATION IS FROM A 402426 1 3 SCRAPE INSIDE THE HOLE. RAISED METAL WAS REMOVED AND THE DISCREPANY WAS 402426 1 4 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 402426 1 5 N. 402443 1 1 THE THREE LOWER HOLES FOR INSTALLING THE V070-120150-007 NESTED ANGLE AR 402443 1 2 E OUT OF TOLERANCE ALONG THE MIDBODY. THE LOWEST HOLE WAS DRILLED UP TO 402443 1 3 .3125" DIA. AND A NUMBER 10 HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED. THE OTHER TWO HOLES WE 402443 1 4 RE OVERSIZED AND .015" OVERSIZED HI-LOK'S WERE INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE 402443 1 5 : LIMITED ACCESS. 402458 1 1 HOLES IN THE UPPER MIDDLE NESTED ANGLE FOR R/H WING ARE OUT OF TOLERANCE 402458 1 2 ALONG THE MIDBODY SIDE. HOLES 3945 AND 3947 ARE PER PRINT. HOLE 3949 WA 402458 1 3 S OVERSIZED PER MR STR-3-J1-4375. HOLES 3944, 3946, 3950 WERE MR OVERSIZ 402458 1 4 ED PER THIS PR. HOLE 3948 WAS DOUBLE OVERSIZED PER THIS PR. PROBABLE CAU 402458 1 5 SE: LIMITED ACCESS. 402522 1 1 THE BONDED STUD ON THE 28-12 DOOR WAS DEBONDED DURING REMOVAL OF THE CAR 402522 1 2 RIER PANEL. THE RTV RESIDUE WAS REMOVED AND A NEW, PER PRINT STUD WAS BO 402522 1 3 NDED IN PLACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES FOR BONDING AGEN 402522 1 4 T MBO130-119, TYPE II. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUS 402522 1 5 E: NORMAL BOND DEGRADATION DURING OPERATIONS. 402624 1 1 SIX 3/16 DIAMETER HOLES WERE DRILLED IN LINER PER PRINT. PROBLEM DUE TO 402624 1 2 VENDOR ERROR. 402644 1 1 THIS PR WAS TAKEN WHEN THE I/E HATCH OPENING DROP TEST FAILED DUE TO LAC 402644 1 2 K OF DAMPENING BY THE ATTENUATOR. THE ATTENUATOR WAS REMOVED AND REPLACE 402644 1 3 D WITH A SPARE. THE OLD ATTENUATOR SHOWED NO VISUAL SIGNS OF LEAKAGE BUT 402644 1 4 HAD VERY LITTLE IF ANY RETURN PRESSURE. THE FAILED ATTENUATOR WAS ROUTE 402644 1 5 D FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS PER LRU PR. THE RC ACTION BLOCK FOR THIS PR WAS C 402644 1 6 HECKED 'YES' TO INVESTIGATE A POSSIBLE LIMITED LIFE FOR THE ATTENUATOR S 402644 1 7 INCE OV-102 HAD A SIMILAR FAILURE. THE NEW ATTENUATOR HAS BEEN INSTALLED 402644 1 8 AND ADJUSTED FOR CORRECT HATCH OPEN POSITION AND WAS SUCCESSFULLY RETES 402644 1 9 TED BY THE DROP TEST PER THIS PR. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBAB 402644 1 10 LE CAUSE: DAMPENING ATTENUATOR FAILED DUE TO NORMAL WEAR. 402648 1 1 ITEM 1: THE UPPER HOLE IN THE LOWER MIDDLE V070-120150-003 NESTED ANGLE 402648 1 2 HAS INSUFFICIENT EDGE DISTANCE. THE DISCREPANT EDGE DISTANCE WAS MR ACCE 402648 1 3 PTED. ITEM 2: 2ND AND 4TH HOLES FROM THE TOP OF THE -003 NESTED ANGLE MA 402648 1 4 Y BE TO CLOSE TO THE RADIUS. MEASUREMENTS INDICATED THAT THERE WILL BE N 402648 1 5 O INTERFERENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 402828 1 1 THE 70B2000-54 STRUT WITH EXPOSED ALUMINUM IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 402828 1 2 WAS MR ACCEPTED AFTER CORROSION PROTECTION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABL 402828 1 3 E CAUSE IS SUSPECTED THAT THE KOROPON WAS SCRAPPED OFF DURING TRACK PAN 402828 1 4 INSTALLATION OR REMOVAL (I.E. WORKMANSHIP). CONCLUDE THAT THE STRUT IS A 402828 1 5 CCEPTABLE AS IS FOR FLIGHT AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 402848 1 1 A FIT CHECK OF THE SEAL V070-198702-004 INTO THE FLIPPER DOOR ASSEMBLY H 402848 1 2 AS DISCOLORED THAT THE REPLACEMENT BULB SEAL WILL FIT WITHOUT ALTERATION 402848 1 3 . THE APPARENT INTERFERENCE RESULTED FROM THE FACT THAT THE REPLACEMENT 402848 1 4 SEAL IS 0.35 INCHES LONGER THAN THE DISCREPANT PART; THE REPLACEMENT PAR 402848 1 5 T IS, HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO PRINT. THERE IS NO RECORD IN THE CVAS SYSTEM 402848 1 6 OF MR ACTION TO TRIM THE SEAL TO A SHORTER LENGTH. ENGINEERING EVALUATI 402848 1 7 ON (SEE APPENDIX A) HAS REVEALED NO DIFFERENCES IN THE INDIVIDUAL OR CUM 402848 1 8 ULATIVE LENGTHS OF THE BULB SEAL ASSEMBLIES IN DOORS 12,13,14 AND 15 OF 402848 1 9 EITHER WING SUFFICIENT TO SUBSTANTIATE THE PROBLEM AS REPORTED. CONSEQUE 402848 1 10 NTLY, THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. 402864 1 1 THE NUTPLATE EVIDENTLY BECAME GALLED DURING INSTALLATION OF THE CARRIER 402864 1 2 PANEL. THE DISCREPANT PORTION WAS TAPPED TO LEAVE A RUNNING TORQUE OF 12 402864 1 3 TO 13 INCH LBS. THIS IS PER SPEC. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR 402864 1 4 . PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 403019 1 1 THIS PR WAS DETECTED DURING V1165.006 BRAKE ASSY INSTALLATION. HYDRAULIC 403019 1 2 FLUID WAS LEAKING AT THE BLEEDER ASSEMBLY ON THE RIB BRAKE. A NEW BLEED 403019 1 3 ER WAS INSTALLED, BUT THE LEAK CONTINUED. PER THIS WAD THE V070-510497 P 403019 1 4 RESSURE TRANSDUCER "Y" FITTING WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. A NEW BLEEDER A 403019 1 5 SSEMBLY WAS INSTALLED IN THE "Y" FITTING, AND THE LEAK WAS ELIMINATED. A 403019 1 6 N LRU PR WAS GENERATED WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO SCRAP THE OLD "Y" FITTING 403019 1 7 . INSPECTION OF THE FITTING INDICATED THE SEAT IN THE BLEEDER PORT WAS I 403019 1 8 NCORRECTLY MACHINED. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: VEN 403019 1 9 DOR MANUFACTURING DISCREPANCY. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 403043 1 1 E.O. NUMBER 071357 HAS BEEN RELEASED AGASINT DRAWING V070-587701 DELETIN 403043 1 2 G 16 MD112-1003-0106 SCREWS, AND ADDING 16 MD112-3003-0106 SCREWS. THE S 403043 1 3 CREW INSTALLATION HAS BEEN CONMPLETED ON TPS VHYD-3-J1-109 STEP 136 AND 403043 1 4 MOD 7. THE RELEASED ENGINEERING REFLECTS WORK PERFORMED. THIS CHANGE COR 403043 1 5 RECTS THE INITIAL PROBLEM ENCOUNTERED. VEHICLE IS PER PRINT. NO FURTHER 403043 1 6 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 403162 1 1 DURING AN HYD-3-J1-109, INSTRUCTIONS TO ROUTE SHIPS WIRES TO 70V58MT128, 403162 1 2 80V58MT129 AND 70V58MT40 WAS NOT INCLUDED. REVIEW OF PAPERWORK SHOWED V 403162 1 3 070-3J1-160 MOD 016 SHOULD HAVE PERFORMED THIS WORK (EO WAS SECIB'D ON T 403162 1 4 HIS MOD). MOD 018 TO V070-160 WAS WRITTEN TO SHOW ROUTING AND CLAMPING O 403162 1 5 F THESE WIRES. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR, NO WORDS TO PERFORM THE 403162 1 6 NECESSARY TASK. 403165 1 1 UNABLE TO DRILL THROUGH WING SPAR WHERE THE UPPER FASTENER IN THE V070-1 403165 1 2 20166-001 STIFFENER IS DUE TO AN EXISTING LATERAL BRACKET. MR TO PLUG UP 403165 1 3 PER HOLE IN STIFFENER AND MOVE FASTENER LOCATION DOWN 1/2". PROBABLE CAU 403165 1 4 SE: LIMITED ACCESS. 403166 1 1 UNABLE TO INSTALL THE V070-120161-003 STIFFENER DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH 403166 1 2 AN EXISTING BRACKET. THE STIFFENER WAS TRIMMED PER MR ELIMINATING THE I 403166 1 3 NTERFERENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 403169 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THAT THE V070-398558-035 BULB SEAL SPL 403169 1 2 ICE HAD BECOME DEBONDED FROM PLBD C/L BULB SEAL AT XO761. A NEW BULB SEA 403169 1 3 L SPLICE WAS OBTAINED AND SUCCESSFULLY BONDED PER PRINT. PAGE 1A DOCUMEN 403169 1 4 TS THAT THE V070-398501-043 SEAL HAD A SMALL CRACK IN IT AT APPROXIMATEL 403169 1 5 Y XO795. THIS AREA WAS MR UNRESTRICTED REPAIRED BY WRAPPING WITH TEFLON 403169 1 6 TAPE PRIOR TO REINSTALLATION OF THE SEAL. PAGE 1B DOCUMENTS THAT THE V07 403169 1 7 0-398522-010 SEAL AFT FEMALE END AT XO760 MR TAPE REPAIR HAS BECOME STRE 403169 1 8 TCHED OUT OF ROUND. THE OLD TEFLON TAPE REPAIR WAS REMOVED AND MR UNREST 403169 1 9 RICTED REPAIRED USING NEW TEFLON TAPE. PAGE 1C DOCUMENTS THAT THE 403169 1 10 V070-398558-050 PLBD BULB SEAL SPLICE AT XO800 HAD BECOME DEBONDED. A 403169 1 11 NEW BULB SEAL SPLICE WAS OBTAINED AND SUCCESSFULLY BONDED PER PRINT. 403169 1 12 PAGE 1D DOCUMENTS THAT THE V070-398501-039 SELA MALE FOOT AT XO800 WAS 403169 1 13 NOT BONDED TO THE PLBD SEAL RETAINER. THE SEAL WAS PULLED UP AND CLEANED 403169 1 14 AND REBONDED PER PRINT. PAGE 1E DOCUMENTS THAT THE AFT FEMALE END OF THE 403169 1 15 V070-398522-010 SEAL IS NOT BONDED TO THE RETAINER IN A 4" AREA. THIS 403169 1 16 CONDITION WAS UNRESTRICTED MR ACCEPTED IN ORDER TO APPLY THE TAPE REPAIR 403169 1 17 FROM ITEM 1B. THIS IS THE SAME CONFIGURATION AS THE PREVIOUS MR AND WILL 403169 1 18 NOT AFFECT THE FIT, FORM OR FUNCTION OF THE SEAL. THE MALE FOOT OF THE 403169 1 19 V070-398501-043 SEAL WAS BROKEN AT THE FASTENER JOINT AND WAS 403169 1 20 UNRESTRICTED MR REPAIRED USING RTV AND QUARTZ FABRIC AS A DOUBLER. THIS 403169 1 21 SEAL WAS SUCCESSFULLY REBONDED TO THE RETAINER PER PRINT. THE BULB SEALS 403169 1 22 HAVE BEEN REPAIRED AND REBONDED AND NEW SPLICES BONDED IN PLACE AND THE 403169 1 23 INTEGRITY OF THE SEAL SYSTEM IS RESTORED. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. 403169 1 24 SUCCESSFUL RETEST WILL BE VERIFIED BY V5018 AND V9023.001 PLBD CYCLES. 403169 1 25 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION AND LACK OF 403169 1 26 SPARES AVAILABILITY. 403226 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF OMI V1019, THE APU 1 MAGNETIC PICK UP UNIT NO. 3 S 403226 1 2 HOWED A RESISTANCE INDICATING AN OPEN CIRCUIT. TROUBLESHOOTING ON THE IP 403226 1 3 R 53V-0099 REVEALED WIRE U256C24-2 WAS TERMINATED INTO 50P9912 PIN K SHO 403226 1 4 ULD BE PIN L, AND WIRE U256C24-1 WAS TERMINATED IN 50P9912 PIN L, SHOULD 403226 1 5 BE PIN M. THE IPR WAS SUBSEQUENTLY UPGRADED AND THE WIRES U256C24-1 AND 403226 1 6 U256C24-2 WERE TERMINATED INTO THE CONNECTOR 50P9912 CORRECT PIN LOCATI 403226 1 7 ONS. AS A RESULT THE REPAIR RETURNS THE WIRE HARNESS TO DRAWING/FLIGHT C 403226 1 8 ONFIGURATION. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF THE WIRES, MAGNETIC PICKUP UNIT NO. 403226 1 9 3 WAS PERFORMED IN TPS APU-3-15-117 01 OCT 92 BY LSOC APU ENGINEERING. 403226 1 10 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON PR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREPANCY IS SHOP 403226 1 11 WORKMANSHIP. 403369 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY ON PG 1 HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 403369 1 2 USE ON BM 1197-000M. THIS "STR" PR HAS MR MARKED THE DENT FOR FUTURE ID 403369 1 3 ENTIFICATION. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMA 403369 1 4 NSHIP. 403620 1 1 DURING V63-50007 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE L554C12 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE W 403620 1 2 ITH NO SHIELD DAMAGE. WIRE L554C12 WAS REPAIRED PER SRP-0007, MET B. PRO 403620 1 3 BABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 403742 1 1 THE DISCREPANT FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND THE HOLES WERE GRIPPED. ALL OF 403742 1 2 THE GRIP LENGTHS WERE WITHIN 1 GRIP LENGTH OF THE PRINT CALL OUT. THIS 403742 1 3 IS ALLOWED PER SPEC. THE PROPER GRIP LENGTH FASTENERS WERE INSTALLED. NO 403742 1 4 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. ITEM 3 WAS NO PR CONDITION. PROBABL 403742 1 5 CE CAUSE- NO DISCREPANCY. 403793 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-045, WIRES T564B26, T1924C26, T570B26 AND 2M359B16 WERE 403793 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRES E384A26, 2N143B12, 2E252B26, 2E318B26 403793 1 3 AND 2M359B16 HAD KAPTON AND SHIELD DAMAGE. WIRES T56B26, T1924C26, T570 403793 1 4 B26 USED SRB-V-EL-0007 METHOD B TO TAPE WIRES AND E384A26, 2N143V12, 2E2 403793 1 5 52B26, 2E318B26 USED METHOD A TO TRIM SHIELD AND TAPE WIRES. WIRE 2M359B 403793 1 6 16 WAS A PYRO WIRE THAT WAS REPLACED AND CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT 403793 1 7 CHECK WAS DONE. PG 1A WAS WIRE S9007B26 THAT WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON A 403793 1 8 ND SHIELD DAMAGE. SRP-V-EL-0007 METHOD A WAS USED TO FIX DISCREPANCY. DU 403793 1 9 RING 2M359B16 WIRE REPLACEMENT, A 1B ON CONNECTOR 90J744 HAD THE LOCKING 403793 1 10 TEETH ROUNDED OFF DURING BACKSHELL REMOVAL. THE CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELL 403793 1 11 WERE REPLACED. WIRE 3N181B16 WAS WRITTEN ON PG 1C. THIS WIRE WAS 403793 1 12 REPAIRED USING SRP-V-EL-0007 METHOD A TO TRIM 1 SHIELD SOTWED AND TAPE 403793 1 13 REPAIR. THE PYRO FIRING LINE WAS CHECKED OUT WITH A CONTINUITY, 403793 1 14 ISOLATION AND HIPOT CHECK. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 403793 1 15 CONNECTOR MATE DEMATES PERFORMED PER SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE: 1, 1A, 1B, 1C 403793 1 16 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 403924 1 1 DURING IPR 056V-0099 IT WAS ANNOTATED THAT THE GND STUD ON 50TB32 WAS BR 403924 1 2 OKEN. UPON ENGINEERING EVALUATION IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE GND STUD HA 403924 1 3 D PULLED OUT OF THE TB. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO REBOND STUD INTO 50T 403924 1 4 B32 USING MB0120-037 TYPE II EPOXY. UPON SUCCESSFUL INSTALLATION OF THE 403924 1 5 GND STUD THE RESPECTIVE WIRES WERE REINSTALLED PER IPR 053V-0099. CONTIN 403924 1 6 UITY TESTING WILL BE PERFORMED PER OEL-3-15-0336 (PR -0099 UPGRADED) TO 403924 1 7 VERIFY THE CIRCUIT INTEGRITY. IN ADDITION CONFORMAL COATING WILL BE INST 403924 1 8 ALLED PER OEL-0336. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. FUNCTIONAL 403924 1 9 RETEST OF 50TB32 AND ASSOCIATED CIRCUITRY WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED VIA 403924 1 10 OEL-0336 BY APU ENGINEERING. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO 403924 1 11 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 403981 1 1 THE CLIP WAS EVIDENTLY NEVER INSTALLED BY THE VENDOR IN THIS LOCATION. A 403981 1 2 NEW CLIP WAS PROCURED AND INSTALLED USING HI-LOKS INSTEAD OF RIVETS WIT 403981 1 3 H MRB APPROVAL. THIS WAS DONE BECAUSE OF LACK OF ACCESS TO INSTALL RIVET 403981 1 4 S. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR OMMISSI 403981 1 5 ON. 404333 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT DISCREPANCIES IN THE LH 4 RADIATOR PAN 404333 1 2 EL TAPE. INSPECTIONS INDICATE THAT THE 12 NOTED "BUBBLES" ARE ACTUALLY S 404333 1 3 OLID PIECES OF DEBRIS TRAPPED UNDER THE TAPE. SINCE THE DEBRIS IS COMPLE 404333 1 4 TELY CONTAINED AND POSES NO THREAT, THE ITEMS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRES 404333 1 5 TRICTED USE AND ENTERED IN THE RADIATOR DAMAGE LOG. THERE IS NO LONGER A 404333 1 6 PR CONDITION AND THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS MANUFACTURI 404333 1 7 NG DEFECT - DEBRIS TRAPPED DURING INITIAL TAPE INSTALLATION. NO RETEST R 404333 1 8 EQUIRED. 404333 1 9 EQUIRD. 404359 1 1 DURING V1171, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE GND LUG AT THE BACKSHELL OF 50P 404359 1 2 901 WAS BROKEN. THE GND LUG OF P1231C22 WAS REPLACED PER DISPOSITION INS 404359 1 3 TRUCTIONS. A CONTINUITY TEST WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY THE INTEGRITY OF TH 404359 1 4 E INSTALLED LUG. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. THE CONNECTOR 50P901 DEMATE/MATE 404359 1 5 WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATION 404359 1 6 AL DEGRADATION. 404618 1 1 THE RH AFT NLG DOOR HINGE BOOT WAS DAMAGED BY ABRASION WITH THE V070-326 404618 1 2 161-001 BOOT CLAMP. THIS INTERFERENCE IS ADDRESSED ON PAGE 1, BLOCK 37 A 404618 1 3 S A RECURRING CONDITION. THE BOOT WAS ARMEOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW B 404618 1 4 OOT PER THIS PR. DURING REMOVAL, THE P/N OF THE 16 EA FLAT WASHERS, USED 404618 1 5 TO MOUNT THE BOOT TO THE SIDEWALL, WAS FOUND TO BE INCORRECT IN THE INS 404618 1 6 TALLATION DRAWING (V070-326143 AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN THE DISPOSITION TO RE 404618 1 7 MOVE AND REINSTALL THE BOOT.PAGE 1A WAS TAKEN TO ADDRESS THE WRONG P/N A 404618 1 8 ND THE BOOT WAS INSTALLED USING THE CORRECT WASHERS PER EO TO FOLLOW. TH 404618 1 9 E DRAWING HAS BEEN UPDATED TO REFLECT CURRENT CONFIGURATION. THE BOOT 404618 1 10 HAS BEEN REPLACED AND NO FURTHER PR CONDITION EXISTS. NO RETEST REQ'D. 404618 1 11 PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR ACCELLERATED BY DESIGN WHICH ALLOWS ABRASIVE 404618 1 12 INTERFERENCE. UPON VERIFICATION OF EO TO FOLLOW, CLOSE THIS PR. 404742 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DUE TO NO REFERENCE DESIGNATOR MARKINGS NEAR THE E 404742 1 2 ND LATCHES AS SPECIFIED IN DRAWING V070-332502 ZN 40B. THE REF DES MARKI 404742 1 3 NG WERE APPLIED PER STEP 1-3. THIS PR ALSO OBTAINED AN EO TO DRAWING V07 404742 1 4 0-593201 TO ALSO APPLY LATCH NUMBER MARKINGS WERE APPLIED PER STEP 1-2. 404742 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE IS MARKINGS WERE NOT APPLIED DURING INITIAL ASSEMBLY OF T 404742 1 6 HE HATCH. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 404863 1 1 THE BUSHING PROBABLY FELL OUT DUE TO A POOR FIT WITH THE PARENT MATERIAL 404863 1 2 . A NEW MR BUSHING WAS MADE AND PASSIVATED AND INSTALLED. THE STRUT WAS 404863 1 3 FIT CHECKED AND THE BUSHINGS WERE LINE REAMED TO PROVIDE A GOOD FIT. NO 404863 1 4 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE; OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 404863 1 5 ION. 404864 1 1 THE BUSHINGS PROBABLY BECAME GALLED AND OUT OF ROUND DUR TO A POOR INSTA 404864 1 2 LLATION OF THE PSA STRUT AND REPEATED INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF THE ST 404864 1 3 RUT. THE HOLES WERE MEASURED. THE FITTING WAS REMOVED. THE HOLES AWERE R 404864 1 4 EAMED AND MR BUSHINGS WERE FABRICATED TO FIT. THESE BUSHINGS WERE PASSIV 404864 1 5 ATED THEN INSTALLED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAU 404864 1 6 SE: OPERATINAL DEGRADATION. 404985 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-045, THE W8 WIRE HARNESS DID NOT CONFORM TO THE DWG. A V 404985 1 2 IEW IN SECTION AW REFLECTED SHIP INSTALLATION BUT WAS NOT EFFECTIVE FOR 404985 1 3 CURRENT CONFIGURATION. AN EOTF WAS PROCESSED TO INCLUDE SECTION AW AND B 404985 1 4 F-BF TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CURRENT CONFIGURATION AND SUBS. NO WORK WAS D 404985 1 5 ONE, THE DWG WAS CHANGED TO REFLECT ORBITER. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED 404985 1 6 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY VIEW WAS NOT EFFECTIVE FOR 404985 1 7 CURRENT CONFIGURATION. 405041 1 1 DURING STR-3-15-559, THE V070-298120-001 THERMAL BARRIER WAS FOUND TO BE 405041 1 2 CRACKED. A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND DURING INSTALLATION, IT WAS FOUND 405041 1 3 THAT THE LOCATOR HOLE DID NOT LINE UP WITH THE HOLE IN THE STRUCTURE. TH 405041 1 4 E HOLE WAS ELONGATED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION AND A MD153-0018-00 405041 1 5 03 WASHER WAS INSTALLED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE BEARING SURFACE. PROBABLE CA 405041 1 6 USE FOR THIS PR IS VENDOR. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRE 405041 1 7 D. 405388 1 1 DUE TO THE REMOVAL OF LP04 AND THEN INSTALLATION OF LP01 THE WIRE 1R2191 405388 1 2 C22-2 ASSOCIATED WITH RCS/OME AC-1 PHASE 'B' CIRCUITRY WAS CAP AND STOWE 405388 1 3 D. AN EO WAS REQUESTED TO CAP & STOW WIRE 1R2191C22-2 AT CONN 50P479. 03 405388 1 4 7V-0075 ON OV-104 WAS ISOLATED TO AN OPEN CIRCUIT BETWEEN PIN 90 OF RECE 405388 1 5 PTACLE 51J306 & PIN -F OF RECEPTACLE 51J314. THE IPR WAS UPGRADED TO PR 405388 1 6 LP01-14-0461 AND THEN DEFERRED TO LP01-14-A0032. LP01 WAS INSTALLED ON O 405388 1 7 V-103 DUE TO AN 1R2191C22-2 AT CONN 50P479 WAS DONE TO PREVENT AN INADVE 405388 1 8 RTENT SHORT TO GROUND FOR THE PHASE 'B' CIRCUITRY OF VALVE 51V42LV227. D 405388 1 9 UE TO AN ANOMALY THAT NOW EXISTS WITH LP01 THE POD WAS REMOVED AND 405388 1 10 REPLACED WITH LP04. THE SAME CONDITION DOES NOT EXIST ON LP04 AS WAS THE 405388 1 11 CASE ON LP01 THEREFORE REQUIRING THE RE-ACTIVATION OF THE CIRCUIT 405388 1 12 ASSOCIATED WITH WIRE 1R2191C22-2. AN EO TO FOLLOW WAS REQUESTED TO 405388 1 13 REINSERT WIRE 1R2191C22-2 INTO 50P479 PIN 90 THAT WAS CAPPED AND STOWED 405388 1 14 PER THIS PR DUE TO THE OPEN THAT EXISTED FROM 51J314 PIN F ON 037V-0075 405388 1 15 OF LP01. THE WIRE WAS CAPPED AND STOWED IN ORDER TO PREVENT AN 405388 1 16 INADVERTENT SHORT TO GROUND FOR PHASE 'B' CIRCUITRY FOR VALVE 51V42LV227 405388 1 17 ON LP01. DURING CONTACT REINSTALLATION, THE NEWLY INSTALLED CONTACTS DID 405388 1 18 NOT PASS INSPECTION. THEY APPEARED TO BE CORRODED. NEW CONTACTS WERE 405388 1 19 INSTALLED AND REPINNING OF CONNECTOR CONTINUED. THE INITIAL DISCREPANCY 405388 1 20 COULD NOT BE REPAIRED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT ACCESS TO THE CONNECTORS ON 405388 1 21 LP01 DURING NORMAL ORBITER PROCESSING. ITEM 2 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE 405388 1 22 REINSTALLATION OF LP04. ITEM 3 WAS A MATERIAL DEFICIENCY. 405480 1 1 ITEM 1: THREADS ARE GALLED IN V070-305003-004 BOLT. THE BOLT WAS SENT TO 405480 1 2 HDA, RECOMMENDED SCRAP. ITEM 2: THERE IS RAISED METAL IN LEFT HAND POD 405480 1 3 ATTACH POINT 2 MR BUSHING. THE RAISED METAL WAS BLENDED INTO THE ADJ MAT 405480 1 4 ERIAL AND THE DISCREPANT CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE 405480 1 5 POD WAS SLIGHTLY RACKED DURING REMOVAL. 405516 1 1 DURING THERMAL BARRIER INSTALLATION, AN OPEN HOLE WAS FOUND IN THE ;H UP 405516 1 2 PER RSB INNER PANEL. THE HOLE WAS FOUND TO COINCIDE WITH ADDITIONAL HOLE 405516 1 3 S DRILLED THROUGH THE THERMAL BARRIER INSTALLED AT THE LOCATION. VENDOR 405516 1 4 MR BK0001-000M ADDRESSES THE EXCESS HOLES IN THE V070-298115-006 BARRIER 405516 1 5 AND THE HOLES IN THE 170D441311 PANEL. THE UNREWORKED HOLE IN THE 170D4 405516 1 6 41311 PANEL WAS FILLED WITH MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE PER UNRESTRICTED 405516 1 7 MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS VENDOR. NO FURTHER SHOP O 405516 1 8 R ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 405516 1 9 R ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 406072 1 1 THE FRAME WAS DAMAGED DURING NUMEROUS INSTALLATIONS AND REMOVALS OF THE 406072 1 2 PSA. THE DAMAGED AREA WAS BURNISHED REMOVED THE RAISED METAL AND THEN CO 406072 1 3 RROSION PROTECTED WITH MRB APPROVAL. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS 406072 1 4 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRAD. 406482 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTED INSULATION DAMAGE ON WIRE 1N139B22. THE WIRE AND SHIE 406482 1 2 LD WERE REPAIRED USING SPLICES PER SRP-V-EL-0004-B-0. THE RETEST WAS SUC 406482 1 3 CESSFULLY PERFORMED PER THIS PR IN OPERATION 3. THE PR CONDITION NO LONG 406482 1 4 ER EXISTS AND THE SYSTEM IS RESTORED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CONDIT 406482 1 5 ION IS NORMAL DAMAGE DURING HANDLING/PROCESSING IN THE ECLSS BAY. 406578 1 1 DURING OEL-3-15-056, WIRE HARNESS V070-775990-005 WAS SUBJECTED TO CHAFF 406578 1 2 ING. THE HARNESS WAS INSPECTED, THEN CONVOLUTED TUBING WAS INSTALLED FRO 406578 1 3 EXTRA WIRE PROTECTION. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY. NO 406578 1 4 RETEST IS REQUIRED. 406582 1 1 DURING MPS-3-15-242 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT GND LUG WIRE P986B22 HAD A BR 406582 1 2 OKEN LUG AT BACKSHELL OF CONN 50P779 AND GND WIRE P986D22 HAD A BROKEN L 406582 1 3 UG AT BACKSHELL OF CONN 50P780. IT WAS ALSO DETERMINED THAT BOTH WIRES P 406582 1 4 986B22 AND P986D22 DID NOT POSSES ENOUGH LENGTH TO RE-TERMINATE. MR APPR 406582 1 5 OVAL WAS OBTAINED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE THAT INSTALLED ADDITIONAL WIRE LE 406582 1 6 NGTH BY UTILIZING KSC SPLICE KSC-0586 AND KSC-0587. NO FURTHER DISPO IS 406582 1 7 REQUIRED. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THIS 406582 1 8 PR MAY NOW BE CLOSED. 406582 1 9 PR MAY NOW BE CLOSED. 407002 1 1 SPACER DOES NOT SIT FLUSH ON THE MR BONDED STUD ASSY. THE INTENT OF THEM 407002 1 2 R INSTALLATION IS ACCOMPLISHED. THIS IS A PREVIOUS MR, BK7743-000M, STR- 407002 1 3 3-02-0584, AND STR-3-04-0707. PROBABLE CAUSE: OMS POD MANUFACTURER DID N 407002 1 4 OT INSTALL A CAPTIVE RETAINER AT THIS LOCATION. 407132 1 1 DURING V80-00456 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLE 1ZK326A24 HAD SEVERAL BREAKS 407132 1 2 IN THE SHIELD JACKET INSULATION (KAPTON). CABLE 1ZK326A24 WAS REMOVED A 407132 1 3 ND REPLACED WITH A NEW SECTION OF CABLE. A CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HYP 407132 1 4 OT CHECK WAS PERFORMED ON THE NEW CABLE AFTER INSTALLATION. RETEST OF CO 407132 1 5 NNECTORS 55P9 AND 55P70 DEMATED/REMATED ON THIS PR WILL BE RETESTED PER 407132 1 6 THE SCAN LOG NUMBERS RECORDED ON PAGE 27 STEP 1-79. THE PROBABLE CAUSE F 407132 1 7 OR THIS PR WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 407133 1 1 DURING V80-00456, CABLE 2R2542C26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE WITH N 407133 1 2 O SHIELD OR CONDUCTOR DAMAGE. WIRE WAS WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP 407133 1 3 V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL 407133 1 4 WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO ORBITER PROCESSING. 407135 1 1 DURING V80-00456, WIRE 2ZK365B24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE W 407135 1 2 AS WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRE 407135 1 3 D ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PRO 407135 1 4 CESSING. 407136 1 1 TWO WIRES AT AVIONICS BAY 4 CONNECTOR 54P311 WERE FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT 407136 1 2 DURING BAY CLOSEOUT. THE ONE SEVERED WIRE WAS REPAIRED USING SRP V-EL-0 407136 1 3 002-B AND A KSC SPLICE (PRE-APPROVED). THE SECOND WIRE WITH EXPOSED COND 407136 1 4 UCTOR WAS ALSO REPAIRED USING SRP-0002. THE FIRST WIRE (NO: U16A26 APU 1 407136 1 5 SPD SEL HIGH B) WAS RETESTED BY TPS APU-3-15-117 MOD 2. THE SECOND WIRE 407136 1 6 WAS FOUND TO BE CAPPED AND STOWED AT 54P575, WITH NO RETEST REQUIRED. C 407136 1 7 ONNECTOR 54P311 HAS BEEN RETURNED TO FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUS 407136 1 8 E: WORKMANSHIP. 407136 1 9 E: WORKMANSHIP. 407138 1 1 DURING V80-00456 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLE 4ZK326B24 HAD SEVERAL BREAKS 407138 1 2 IN THE SHIELD JACKET INSULATION (KAPTON). CABLE 4ZK326B24 WAS REMOVED A 407138 1 3 ND REPLACED WITH A NEW SECTION OF CABLE. A CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HYP 407138 1 4 OT CHECK WAS PERFOMRED ON THE NEW CABLE AFTER INSTALLATION. RETEST OF CO 407138 1 5 NNECTOS 55P12 AND 50P256 DEMATED/REMATED ON THIS PR WILL BE RETESTED PER 407138 1 6 THE SCAN LOG NUMBERS RECORDED ON PAGE 29 STEP 1-81. THE PROBABLE CAUSE 407138 1 7 FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 407145 1 1 DURING IPR 053V-0116 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CONNECTOR SAVER AT 50J61 WAS D 407145 1 2 ISCREPANT (CLOCKING MISALIGNED). THE DISCREPANT CONNECTOR SAVER WAS REPL 407145 1 3 ACED WITH NEW CONNECTOR SAVER. INTEGRITY OF NEW CONNECTOR SAVER WILL BE 407145 1 4 ACCOMPLISHED VIA IPR -0116. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 407359 1 1 DURING V80-90123, CONNECTORS 81P28,39 AND WERE FOUND TO HAVE LOOSE BACKS 407359 1 2 HELLS. THE CONNECTORS WERE DEMATED AND THE BACKSHELLS OPENED AND INSPECT 407359 1 3 ED FOR ANOMALIES. TAHE BACKSHELLS WERE THEN RE-INSTALLED, TORQUED AND CO 407359 1 4 NNECTOS MATED. RETEST OF CONNECTOS WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. NO FURTHER A 407359 1 5 CTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP, CONNECTORS WERE 407359 1 6 NOT PROPERLY TORQUED AFTER REWORK. 407407 1 1 WIRE 2P250C20 WAS FOUND TO BE BROKEN. DISCREPANT WIRE WAS REMOVED AND RE 407407 1 2 SPLICED. (SEE INTERIM SUMMARY P-11). MPS RETEST IS COMPLETE. PROBABLE CA 407407 1 3 USE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 407450 1 1 DUIRNG V80-90123, CONNECTOR 82P3001 WAS FOUND TO HVAE A LOOSE BACKSHELL. 407450 1 2 THE BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND INSPECTED FOR ANOMALIES. THE BACKSHELL WA 407450 1 3 S THEN RE-INSTALLED AND TORQUE TO SPEC. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON TH 407450 1 4 IS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP, BACKSHELL WAS NOT PROPERLY CLOSED AF 407450 1 5 TER REWORK. 407496 1 1 THIS WAD WAS GENERATED TO DOCUMENT INSULATION DAMAGE AND BROKEN CONDUCTO 407496 1 2 R STANDS ON WIRE 2T8C20-2 IN THE VICINITY OF CONNECTOR 83P53. THIS WIRE 407496 1 3 IS THE RETURN PATH FOR THE POWER SUPPLY TO DSC OF3. SRP V-EL-0002-B WAS 407496 1 4 PERFORMED ON THE DISCREPANT WIRE. RETEST OF THIS WIRE WAS PERFORMED DUE 407496 1 5 ING STANDARD POWER UP (V9001) ON 10/21/92. HAD THE PATH NOT BEEN REPAIRE 407496 1 6 D, AN ANOMALY WOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN DURING POWER UP. NO ANOMALIES WERE DE 407496 1 7 TECTED. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED BY THIS WAD. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF 407496 1 8 THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 407496 1 9 THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 407604 1 1 DURING V1032.003 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE CONNECTORS 50P779 AND 50P780 407604 1 2 HAD BACKSHELLS THAT WERE CLOCKED IMPROPERLY. THE CONN BACKSHELL OF 50P7 407604 1 3 80 WAS LOOSENED AND BACKSHELL RECLOCKED TO ELIMINATE STRESS ON HARNESS A 407604 1 4 ND INTERFERENCE WITH 50P799. NO REWORK WAS REQUIRED FOR 50P779. CON DEMA 407604 1 5 TE/MATE FOR 50P780 WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRI 407604 1 6 BUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. 407654 1 1 THE DAMAGE TO THE FITTING WAS DETECTED FOLLOWING REMOVAL OF THE GSE WHIC 407654 1 2 H IS NORMALLY INSTALLED AT THIS LOCATION FOR JACKING AND HOISTING OPERAT 407654 1 3 IONS. MOLDS WERE TAKEN AND AN EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED INDI 407654 1 4 CATING NO EVIDENCE OF CRACKING. THE FITTING WAS MR ID'D AND ACCEPTED AS 407654 1 5 IS NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 407796 1 1 DURING V76-10002 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE FOLLOWING DISCREPANCIES EXIS 407796 1 2 TED. ITEM 1 NOTED THAT THE RED RTV SPACE ASSOCIATED WITH CONN. 50P502 WA 407796 1 3 S DAMAGED. THE DAMAGED SPACER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW SPACER WAS INSTALLED 407796 1 4 . ITEM 2 NOTED THAT THE RED RTV SPACER ASSOCIATED WITH 50P523 HAD MINOR 407796 1 5 CRACKS OR NICKS. THE CRACKS WERE EVALUATED BY ENGINEERING AND ACCPETED A 407796 1 6 S IS UPON MR APPROVAL. ITEM 3 NOTED THAT THE GROUND WIRE AT 50P516 HAD T 407796 1 7 HE GND LUG MISSING. A NEW GND LUG WAS CRIMPED ON THE JR24 AND CONTINUITY 407796 1 8 TESTING WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY LUG/WIRE CRIMP INTEGRITY. NO RETEST IS 407796 1 9 REQUIRED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 407796 1 10 ITEMS 1 AND 2 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. ITEMS 3 CAN 407796 1 11 BE ATTRIBUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. 407832 1 1 DURING JC V80-00456, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BACKSHELL ON 56P14 WAS L 407832 1 2 OOSE. THE BACKSHELL WAS OPEN, INSPECTED AND CLOSED PER MLO303-0040. PROB 407832 1 3 ABLE CAUSE: DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. THIS RETURNS ASSEMBLY TO DRAWING CONFIGU 407832 1 4 RATION. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 407850 1 1 INCORRECT SCREW CALLOUT CHANGED PER EO E06. PROBLEM DUE TO WORK AUTHORIZ 407850 1 2 ATION ERROR. 407851 1 1 INCORRECT SCREW CALLOUT CHANGED PER EO E06. PROBLEM DUE TO WORK AUTHORIZ 407851 1 2 ATION ERROR. 407897 1 1 THE VENDOR LEAD WIRES FROM APU THERMOSTATS 50V46518A/B WERE FOUND TO BE 407897 1 2 4' TOO SHORT TO BE CORRECTLY ROUTED IN THE WIRE HARNESS. MR APPROVAL WAS 407897 1 3 GIVEN TO INSTALL KSC SPLICES AND ADDITIONAL WIRE TO THE VENDOR LEADS. T 407897 1 4 HIS REPAIR WAS APPROVED FOR UN-RESTRICTED USE. THE APU THERMOSTATS S18A/ 407897 1 5 B HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF S18A 407897 1 6 /B AND THE ASSOCIATED LINE HEATERS WAS COMPLETED ON APU TPS APU-3-15-117 407897 1 7 MOD 1. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN D 407897 1 8 ISCREPANCY/DEFICIENCY. 407897 1 9 ISCREPANCY/DEFICIENCY. 408054 1 1 THE STUD WHICH WAS BONDED IN PLACE ON THE ORIGINAL MR BROKE OFF DURING I 408054 1 2 NSTALLATION OF THE CARRIER PANEL. THE BASE OF THE OLD STUD WAS REMOVED A 408054 1 3 ND A NEW STUD WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED IN PLACE WITH MRB APPROVAL. NO F 408054 1 4 URTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATI 408054 1 5 ON. 408154 1 1 DUE TO WORK SEQUENCING, THE OMRSD DOOR/PANEL CONFIGURATION WAS NOT ABLE 408154 1 2 TO BE MET AT TEST TIME ITEMS ONE AND THREE: THE NON INSTALLATION OF THE 408154 1 3 59-01 AND 59-02 DOORS, AS WELL AS SUBSTITUTION OF THE GSE DOOR FOR THE F 408154 1 4 LIGHT DOOR AT THE MIDBODY EGRESS LOCATION, WAS APPROVED BY WAIVER WK0267 408154 1 5 0. ITEM TWO: THE INSTALLATION OF THE 58-51 AND 58-53 DOORS AND PANELS WA 408154 1 6 S APPROVED BY EXCEPTION EK 02650. RCN KV-11353 IS BEING PROCESSED TO MAK 408154 1 7 E THESE CHANGES PERMANENT. THE TECHNICAL COMMUNITY APPROVED THE OUT OF C 408154 1 8 ONFIGURATION CONDITION AND CONCURS WITH THE RCN. 408154 1 9 ONFIGURATION CONDITION AND CONCURS WITH THE RCN. 408323 1 1 A BROKEN WIRE WAS FOUND AT TB32 DURING V1019 TESTING. THE DISCREPANT WIR 408323 1 2 E WAS RETERMINATED WITH A NEW GROUND LUG AND RECONNECTED TO TB32. CLOSEO 408323 1 3 UT OF TB32 WAS COMPLETED IN OPERATION 1 OF THIS PR. FUNCTIONAL RETEST OF 408323 1 4 WIRE 2U354BB22 (50V46LV23 POWER) WAS COMPLETED IN OMI V1019,S108, WITH 408323 1 5 LV23 CYCLE OPEN/CLOSED VERIFICATION. NO FURTHER WORK REMAINS ON THIS PR. 408323 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 408327 1 1 THE BENT PANEL CORNER WAS EXAMINED BY ENGINEERING AND A CONSENSUS OBTAIN 408327 1 2 ED TO ACCEPT IT AS-IS FOR UNRESTRICTEDUSE. MR APPROVAL IS RECORED HEREIN 408327 1 3 AND MR APPROVAL STAMP WAS PLACED IN THE VICINITY OF THE BENT CARRIER PA 408327 1 4 NEL CORNER. PROBABLE CAUSE: INCIDENTAL DAMAGE INCURRED DURING HANDLING. 408444 1 1 ALL HARDWARE QUANTITY PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED BY VENDOR MR'S FA 080 408444 1 2 7-000M, FA 0808-000M, AND FA 0840-000M. PER MR FA 0840-000M AN EO WILL F 408444 1 3 OLLOW TO CHANGE DRAWING TO REFLECT AS BUILT CONDITION. PROBLEMS DUE TO V 408444 1 4 ENDOR MR'S. 408494 1 1 THE 2 MD111-4020-0616 BOLTS ARE NORMALLY INSTALLED WITH THE V070-395975- 408494 1 2 004 CARRIER PANEL AS PART OF THE STACK. WHEN THE C/P IS REMOVED AND NOTH 408494 1 3 ING IS INSTALLED IN ITS PLACE THE BOLTS ARE NATURALLY TOO LONG. THE V80- 408494 1 4 05803 JC FAILED TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN REINSTALLING THE HARDWARE 408494 1 5 WITHOUT THE C/P. A DEV WAS WRITTEN TO THE JC TO ADD FLAT WASHERS UNDER 408494 1 6 THE HEAD OF THE BOLTS TO PREVENT THEM FROM SHANKING OUT WHENTHE CARRIER 408494 1 7 PANEL IS NOT INSTALLED. WHEN THE C/P IS INSTALLED THE BOLTS MAY REQUIRE 408494 1 8 ADDITION OF 1 OR 2 FLAT WASHERS AND/OR USING A BOLT 1 GRIP SHORTER (ALLO 408494 1 9 WED PER SPEC). THE MD111-4020-0616 BOLTS MAY ALSO REQUIRE ADDITION OF 1 408494 1 10 OR 2 FLAT WASHERS AND/OR GOING DOWN 1 GRIP LENGTH. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE 408494 1 11 DONE ON THIS PR. PROABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY 408575 1 1 DURING V1098.001, LANDING GEAR FUNCTIONAL TEST, THE V51X0077E1 NLG NWS H 408575 1 2 YDRAULIC SWITCHING VALVE INDICATOR "ON". OMRSD V51AA0.010 INCORRECTLY SP 408575 1 3 ECIFIES THIS INDICATION S/B "OFF". THIS VALVE WAS ADDED AS PART OF THE U 408575 1 4 PDATED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM MOD BUT THE OMRSD WAS RELEASED WITH THIS ERROR. 408575 1 5 RCN KV11204M WAS APPROVED TO CORRECT THE OMRSD BUT THE EFFECTIVITY FOR O 408575 1 6 V-103 IS FOR FLIGHT 16. WAIVER WK02661 WAS PROCESSED AND APPROVED TO ACC 408575 1 7 EPT THIS OMRSD VIOLATION FOR ONE FLIGHT (OV-103, FLIGHT 16) UNTIL THE NE 408575 1 8 W REVISION OF THE OMRSD IS EFFECTIVE. NO HARDWARE PROBLEM EXISTS AND NO 408575 1 9 RETEST IS REQUIRED.PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR-OMRSD WAS 408575 1 10 INCORRECTLY CODED. 408578 1 1 THE FASTENER CALLOUT ON V070-397519- E.O. B03 (PARTIAL) VIEW W IS INCORR 408578 1 2 ECT. THE TWO HOLES THAT WERE IN QUESTION WAS GRIPPED AND IT WAS DETERMIN 408578 1 3 ED THAT THEY REFLECT E.O. B03. THE DRAWING IS CORRECT. THIS IS NOT A PR 408578 1 4 CONDITION. 408579 1 1 THE DWG DISCREPANCY IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PG 1 WAS RESOLVED TO EO-TO-FOL 408579 1 2 LOW (REF V070-397519; EO B09). THE ELIMINATION OF THE LOCKING FEATURE FR 408579 1 3 OM THE NUTPLATE AT HOLE #5 IDENTIFIED IN TIEM 2, PG 1A WAS RESOLVED FOR 408579 1 4 STS-053 WITH RESTRICTED MR APPROVAL TO INSTALL THE FASTENER WITH LOC-TI 408579 1 5 TE. POST STE-053 FLIGHT, THE NUT ELEMENT AT HOLE #5 WAS REPLACED WITH A 408579 1 6 NEW ELEMENT WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE AT HO 408579 1 7 LE #4 IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 3, PG 1A WAS DETERMINED TO BE WITHIN PRINT AND 408579 1 8 SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND IS THEREFORE NOT A PR CONDITION (REF NOTE 408579 1 9 AT TOP OF PG 6). ITEM 1 WAS DUE TO INCORRECT INCORPORATION OF PREVIOUS 408579 1 10 EO. ITEM 2 WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AND ITEM 3 IS NOT A PR 408579 1 11 CONDITION. CONCLUDE THAT THE HARDWARE IS ACCEPTABLE PER DESIGN INTENT 408579 1 12 AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 408598 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTED A SUSPECT UNDERSIZED ET LINER ASSY (SALAD BOWL). THE 408598 1 2 LINER DIAMETER WAS MEASURED BY LSOC SHOP AND QC, VERIFIED BY ENGINEERING 408598 1 3 , AND FOUND TO BE WITHIN ALLOWABLE TOLERANCE. THE DIFFERENCE IN MEASUREM 408598 1 4 ENTS OBTAINED IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE SUBJECTIVITY OF THE MEASURING PROCESS 408598 1 5 . NO OUT OF TOLERANCE CONDITION EXISTS. 408599 1 1 (RE F ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR SDDRESSES AN OVERSIZED ET LINER (SALAD B 408599 1 2 OWL) AT THE LH2 ATTACH POINT. THE DISCREPANT LINER WAS REMOVED AND ROUTE 408599 1 3 D ON AN LRU-PR TO THE VENDOR FOR EVALUATION. A NEW LINER WAS OBTAINED AN 408599 1 4 D INSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS UNKN 408599 1 5 OWN HOWEVER BUIL UP OF TOLERANCE AND OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION ARE SUSPECT 408599 1 6 ED. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 408680 1 1 ONE OCN WAS RECORDED FOR 2 PARTS IN THE JOB CARD. IN ORDER TO VERIFY THE 408680 1 2 OCN'S, THE DEBRIS PANELS WERE REMOVED, OCN'S RECORDED, AND PANELS REINS 408680 1 3 TALLED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: RECORDING 408680 1 4 ERROR/WORKMANSHIP. 408873 1 1 DURING A SURVEILLANCE, CONNECTOR 62J90 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL 408873 1 2 . SRP V-EL-0001-B-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO 408873 1 3 RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEA 408873 1 4 R AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 408968 1 1 DURING APU-3-15-0353, TWO WIRES WERE FOUND WITH EXPOSED/DAMAGED CONDUCTO 408968 1 2 RS. THE DISCREPANT SECTION OF THE WIRES WAS REMOVED AND THE WIRES WERE S 408968 1 3 UBSEQUENTLY RETERMINATED. THE WIRES HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT. RETEST 408968 1 4 WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN LOG NUMBERS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS 408968 1 5 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 409018 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1 IS NOT A PR CONDITION. THE BOLT IS A "SHOULDER" TYPE FASTENE 409018 1 2 R WITH A .002" GAP UNDER THE HEAD PER THE V070-200003 DRAWING. THE HOLE 409018 1 3 DIAMETER IS .8750 +.0040/.0005 INCHES AND THE BOLT DIAMETER IS .8725/.87 409018 1 4 40 INCHES. COMPARISON OF THESE DIAMETERS BY DESIGN PROVES THAT THE BOLT 409018 1 5 IS .0005 TO .0065 INCHES SMALL THAN THE HOLE. SINCE THERE IS, BY DESIGN 409018 1 6 A GAP UNDER THE HEAD AND THE HOLE IS LARGER THAN THE BOLT, A "LOOSE" BOL 409018 1 7 T IS PROBABLE AND ACCEPTABLE. 409254 1 1 DURING A SURVEILLANCE, CONNECTOR 50P726 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BROKEN BACKS 409254 1 2 HELL WAS INSTALLED PER SRP-V-EL-0001. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS 409254 1 3 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 409272 1 1 DURING V1240, CONNECTOR 50P430 WAS FOUND NOT FULLY MATED, LOC KING BAYON 409272 1 2 ETS NOT VISIBLE IN INSPECTION HOLES. THE CONNECTOR WAS DEMATED AND THE C 409272 1 3 ONNECTOR AND RECEPTACLE INSPECTED WITH NO ANOMALIES FOUND. CONNECTOR WAS 409272 1 4 THEN REMATED. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRE 409272 1 5 D ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: CONNECTOR MAY HAVE BEEN HIT/BUMPED DURING 409272 1 6 PROCESSING. 409353 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF PR APU-3-15-0351 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE VEHICL 409353 1 2 E WIRES 2U31B26-1 AND -2 WERE APPROXIMATELY 1 FOOT TOO SHORT TO REACH TH 409353 1 3 E APU SWITCH 50V56S26A; THEREFORE, MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO INSTALL A 409353 1 4 DDITIONAL WIRE LENGHT USING KSC SPLICES. THE APU FIEL TEST LINE THERMOST 409353 1 5 AT, 50V46S26A, HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED PER TPS APU-3-15-117. NO F 409353 1 6 URTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. NO RC ACTION IS REQUESTED. PROBABLE 409353 1 7 CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 409524 1 1 THERE IS NO THREAD PROTRUDING THROUGH NUTPLATES AT THE LH ATTACH POINTS 409524 1 2 6, 8. DISPOSITION WAS TO REMOVE THE BOLTS AND VERIFY GRIP LENGTH THEN RE 409524 1 3 INSTALL BOLTS PER DRAWING AND VERIFY THREAD PROTRUDING THROUGH NUTPLATE. 409524 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 409559 1 1 DURING V35-10010, THE VENDOR LEADS FOR V46T0394A WERE FOUND HANGING FROM 409559 1 2 SHIPS WIRE T1686A26. RESEARCH FOUND THAT WIRES T1688A26 AND T1686A26 WE 409559 1 3 RE TO BE REMOVED ON OEL-3-J1-037. A PG 1A WAS TAKEN ON WIRE T1688A26. CL 409559 1 4 AMPS AND SPOT TIES WERE REMOVED SO WIRES COULD BE REMOVED AND SCRAPED. C 409559 1 5 LAMPS AND SPOT TIES WERE THEN RE-INSTALLED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED O 409559 1 6 N THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 1 * 1A, WORKMANSHIP WIRES SHOULD HAVE BEEN RE 409559 1 7 MOVED ON OEL-3-J1-037. 409705 1 1 DURING JC V35-10010, THE GND LUG ON WIRE P948A22 GOING TO CONN 50P737 WA 409705 1 2 S FOUND BROKEN, THE WIRE WAS FOUND TOO SHORT TO RETERMINATE. MR APPROVAL 409705 1 3 WAS REQUESTED FOR ADDING ADDITIONAL WIRE TO CABLE P948A22 USING KSC SPL 409705 1 4 ICE (KSC-0601) DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK TO RETERMINALE THE WIRE AND NE 409705 1 5 W GND LUG P/N ME416-0028-2206 AT THE BACKSHELL OF 50P737. PROBABLE CAUSE 409705 1 6 WAS DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 409808 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS TWO WASHERS (VISUALLY DIFFERENT) WITH SAME PART #'S. T 409808 1 2 HE DISCREPANT WASHER WAS MR ACCEPTED BY RI/LSS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE ON M 409808 1 3 R 974441. NO DISCREPANT CONDITION EXISTS. ALL MD153-5006-0003 WASHERS AR 409808 1 4 E ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT INSTALLATION. 409828 1 1 DURING V35-10010, KAPTON DAMAGE WAS FOUND ON CABLE 2J111B16 THAT IS TERM 409828 1 2 INATED IN 50J827. THE CABLE WAS REPAIRED BY CUTTING OUT THE DAMAGED AREA 409828 1 3 , AND THEN RETERMINATED IT. SUBSEQUENTLY, CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HI-P 409828 1 4 OTENTIAL CHECKS WERE PERFORMED. THIS REPAIR ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 409828 1 5 RETEST WAS PERFORMED BY EPD ENGINEERING PER TPS EPD-3-15-0347 MOD 005. P 409828 1 6 ROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 409829 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF JOB CARD V35-10010, WIRE 3P508B26 WAS FOUND TO HAV 409829 1 2 E DAMAGED INSULATION AND EXPOSED/DAMAGED CONDUCTOR. THE DISCREPANCY WAS 409829 1 3 ADDRESSED BY REMOVING THE DAMAGED WIRE AND INSTALLING KSC SPLICE NUMBER 409829 1 4 0602 PER SRP-V-EL-0002B VIA MR APPROVAL. THE REPAIR RETURNS WIRE HARNESS 409829 1 5 TO A CONFIGURATION THAT FULFILLS DESIGN INTENT. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF 409829 1 6 WIRE 3P508B26 (MPS LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD DUMP VALVE 50V41PV18-CLOSED ME 409829 1 7 ASUREMENT V41X1919X1) WAS PERFORMED BY LSOC MPS ENGINEERING ON 10NOV92 V 409829 1 8 IA PVO HARDCOPY. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON PR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DIS 409829 1 9 CREPANCY IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 409938 1 1 MISSED OMRSD V09AL0.040-B WAS WAIVED FOR OMDP/FLIGHT 15 PROCESSING FOR O 409938 1 2 V-103 PER PERB APPROVED WAIVER WK02660R1 ON 11/5/92 (SEE ATTACHED COPY). 409938 1 3 THE INSPECTION OF THE NOSE CAP SEAL WAS MISSED WHILE THE FRCS WAS REMOV 409938 1 4 ED BECAUSE ENGINEERING WAS UNAWARE OF THE REQUIREMENT. A DEVIATION WAS W 409938 1 5 RITTEN TO V42-10003 JOB CARD TO PRECLUDE RECURRENCE OF THIS PR. CONCLUDE 409938 1 6 THAT OMRSD V09AL0.040-B HAS BEEN WAIVED AND NO FURTHER WORK OR INSPECTI 409938 1 7 ON IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 410170 1 1 DURING V1032.003 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BACKSHELL TANG OF 50P88 WAS 410170 1 2 BROKEN. THE BROKEN BACKSHELL OF 50P88 WAS REPALCED WITH A NEW SPLIT TYPE 410170 1 3 BACKSHELL PER SRP-0001. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE AT 410170 1 4 TRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 410856 1 1 UNABLE TO VERIFY THAT FIVE SCREWS WERE REINSTALLED PER V33-90001 PRIOR T 410856 1 2 O OV-103 FLIGHT 15. THE DISCREPANT CONDITION WAS DEFERRED ONE FLIGHT UNT 410856 1 3 IL ACCESS IS AVAILABLE. PER STEP 2-1 ALL THE SCREWS WERE VERIFIED AS BEI 410856 1 4 NG INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURE PROBLEM. 411279 1 1 DURING S0004, WIRE 2M18C24 WAS FOUND BROKEN FROM TERMINAL 7 OF 50TB47. A 411279 1 2 N ADDITIONAL LENGTH OF WIRE WAS SPLICED TO 2M18C24, BY AN APPROVED MR, S 411279 1 3 O A NEW LUG COULD BE INSTALLED AT 50TB47. THE WIRE SEGMENT WAS THEN RE-I 411279 1 4 NSTALLED TO 50TB47 AND RETESTED SUCCESSFULLY BY MEQ ENGINEERING. PROBABL 411279 1 5 E CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 411294 1 1 THE OPEN PANEL, IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1 PAGE 1, WAS RESOLVED BY INSTALLING 411294 1 2 THE PANEL PER DRAWING AND SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS 411294 1 3 WORKMANSHIP. CONCLUDED PANEL IS INSTALLED PER THIS PR AND NO FURTHER WOR 411294 1 4 K IS REQUIRED. 411295 1 1 DURING S0004, THE JR24 WIRE AT 50P512 WAS FOUND TO HAVE THE GROUND LUG B 411295 1 2 ROKEN. THE WIRE WAS PREPPED AND A NEW LUG INSTALLED. A CONTUNITY CHECK O 411295 1 3 N NEW LUG TO GROUND WAS PERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIR 411295 1 4 ED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 411432 1 1 DURING STARTRACKER LIGHT SHADE COVER REMOVAL IN THE VAB, A PIECE OF 411432 1 2 ORANGE PLASTIC SHIM STOCK WAS SEEN TO FALL ONTO THE -Z STARTRACKER DOOR. 411432 1 3 UPON FURTHER INSPECTION IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE SHIM WAS LODGED IN 411432 1 4 THE GROOVED METAL TRACK WHICH FRAMES THE DOOR. THE DOOR WAS POSITIONED 411432 1 5 PARTIALLY OPEN AND A DENTAL PICK WAS USED TO REMOVE THE SHIM WITH THE 411432 1 6 AID OF A VIDEO BOROSCOPE. THE SHIM WAS 3" LONG, 0.27" WIDE AND .030" 411432 1 7 THICK. SOME SMALL TILE DEBRIS WAS ALSO SEEN IN THE TRACK WITH THE 411432 1 8 BOROSCOPE AND WAS VACUUMED OUT. A FINAL INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED WITH 411432 1 9 THE BOROSCOPE AND NO DEBRIS WAS FOUND. THE STARTRACKER CAVITY WAS 411432 1 10 INSPECTED FOR CLOSEOUT AND THE DOOR WAS CYCLED TO VERIFY SMOOTH 411432 1 11 OPERATION. NO DAMAGE OCCURED AS A RESULT OF THE DROPPED SHIM OR IT'S 411432 1 12 REMOVAL. THE PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: HUMAN ERROR 411432 1 13 - SHIM WAS PROBABLE LEFT BETWEEN 2 ADJACENT TILES FROM PREVIOUS TILE 411432 1 14 OPERATION. 411806 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF OMI V1040,V1 T-O SYSTEM TESTING THE GH2 T-0 AHC FA 411806 1 2 ILED LEAK CHECK WITH A LEAK RATE OF APPROX 11,000 SCCMS. MAX ALLOWABLE I 411806 1 3 S 900 SCCMS. THE FAULTY AHC WAS R&R'D WITH A SUCCESSFUL RETEST. LEAK RAT 411806 1 4 E OF THE NEW AHC WAS LESS THAN 50 SCCM/ PROBABLE CAUSE: CONTAMINATION ON 411806 1 5 THE SEALING SURFACE OF THE AHC. 413329 1 1 DURING S1287, WIRE P1042A20 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN GROUND LUG. SUBSEQUE 413329 1 2 NTLY, A NEW LUG WAS INSTALLED, THE LUG ATTACHED TO 55E6 AND A CONTINUITY 413329 1 3 AND E-BOND CHECKS WERE PERFORMED. DURING RE-ATTACHMENT OF NEW LUG, WIRE 413329 1 4 1R60A16 WAS REMOVED. ENGINEERING RESEARCH FOUND THAT, DURING SUBSEQUENT 413329 1 5 S9001 POWER UP, RETEST OF WIRE 1T60A16 WAS SUCCESSFUL AND NO ANOMALIES 413329 1 6 NOTED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEA 413329 1 7 R AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 413354 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT TEARS IN THE V070-851042 LO2 ET UMBILI 413354 1 2 CAL PURGE CURTAIN (BAGGIE) INSTALLTION. THE CURTAIN WAS TORN BEYOND REPA 413354 1 3 IR AND WAS REMOVED AND SCRAPPED. NEW CURTAINS WERE INSTALLED AND THE RET 413354 1 4 AINERS RE-INSTALLED AND THE INSTALLATION IS NOW PER PRINT AND NO PR COND 413354 1 5 TION EXISTS. AN INSPECTION AND WIPE-DOWN OF THE CAVITY WAS PERFORMED AND 413354 1 6 CLOSE-OUT PHOTOS TAKEN. NO RETEST REQUIRED AND THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS DA 413354 1 7 MAGE DUE TO HIGH WIND CONDITIONS WITH RSS RETRACT DURING S0024. 413361 1 1 ITEM 1: THE FOUR MOUNTING FASTENERS FOR THE LPOD ATTACH POINT 8 NUT RETA 413361 1 2 INER ARE NOT PROTRUDING THRU THEIR RESPECTIVE LOCK NUTS. THE NUT RETAINE 413361 1 3 R WAS REMOVED AND ONE GRIP LENGTH LONGER SCREWS WERE INSTALLED PER MAO10 413361 1 4 1-301, PER PRINT FASTENERS. ITEM 2: LOCK TAB ON NUT RETAINER FOR THE LPO 413361 1 5 D ATTACH POINT 7 ARE BENT. THE DISCREPANT NUT RETAINER WAS REMOVED AND R 413361 1 6 EPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 413573 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2: THE V070-338551-012 ASSY AND -013 COVER WAS MISIDENTIFIED 413573 1 2 AS A -010 ASSY AND A -009 COVER. THE CLOSEOUT COVER WAS REMOVED AND REI 413573 1 3 DENTIFIED AS A -012 ASSY AND A -013 COVER. PROBABLE CAUSE: PAPER ERROR. 413600 1 1 INBOARD BAY 5 SHROUD, V070-354541-010, OCN AD0815 DOES NOT LINE UP WITH 413600 1 2 INSTALLATION HOLES FOR OV-103. THE SHROUD WAS REMOVED AND OV-103'S SHROU 413600 1 3 D WAS INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE SHROUDS ARE MATCHDRILLED TO A PARTI 413600 1 4 CULAR AV BAY AND DUE TO TOLERANCE BUILD-UP WILL NOT FIT FLEET WIDE. 413626 1 1 THE MISSING FASTENERS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 3, PAGE 1 WERE TRANSFERRED TO C 413626 1 2 OM-3-15-0207. THE DEBONDED DECAL IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2 PAGE 1 WAS TRANSFE 413626 1 3 RRED TO FCS-3-15-0467. THE MISSING PAINT ABOVE THE WCS IDENTIFIED IN ITE 413626 1 4 M 1, PAGE 1 WAS REAPPLIED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE MISSING PAINT 24 413626 1 5 " IN FRONT OF THE WCS WAS DEFERRED TO NEXT FLIGHT BY PMRB DUE TO FOOT RE 413626 1 6 STRAINT BEING INSTALLED. POST FLIGHT 15, THE FOOT RESTRAINT WAS REMOVED 413626 1 7 AND THE TOPCOAT WAS TOUCHED UP PER THE DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE CHIPPED 413626 1 8 PAINT WAS DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE DURING FOOT RESTRAINT REMOVAL AND WO 413626 1 9 RKMANSHIP WAS THE CAUSE FOR DEFERRAL. CONCLUDE THE PAINT HAS BEEN 413626 1 10 TOUCHED UP PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS AND THIS PR MAY CLOSE. 413877 1 1 THIS PR WAS INTIATED TO DOCUMENT THE G070-006200-037 (S/N -004) WINDOW C 413877 1 2 OVER WAS STILL INSTALLED ON THE AIRLOCK "A" HATCH AFTER THE AIRLOCK HAD 413877 1 3 BEEN CLOSED OUT FOR FLIGHT PER OMI V1103.02. TO CORRECT THE DISCREPANCY, 413877 1 4 THE "A" HATCH WAS RE-OPENED AND THE GSE WINDOW COVER WAS REMOVED. NO AD 413877 1 5 DITIONAL NON-FLIGHT ITEMS WERE FOUND AND THE HATCH WAS CLOSED FOR FLIGHT 413877 1 6 . THE FINAL "A" HATCH SEAL LIEAK CHECK WAS PERFORMED WITH A ZERO LEAK RA 413877 1 7 TE. THE PR DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP ERR 413877 1 8 OR. 413877 1 9 OR. 414296 1 1 THE LOOSE STRAP IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY REINSTALLIN 414296 1 2 G A PER PRINT GORMMET AND THEN INSTALLING THE STRAP TO THE DOOR WITH A P 414296 1 3 ER PRINT BLIND RIVET. THE INSTALLATION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 414296 1 4 USE OF: 1) THE STRAP WITH SLIGHT FRAYING AROUND THE GROMMET; 2) MISSING 414296 1 5 PAINT AROUND THE RIVET; AND 3) ACCEPTANCE OF THE ENTRAPPED RIVET TAIL AN 414296 1 6 D SHANK IN THE DOOR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRAD/WEAR OUT. CONCLU 414296 1 7 DE THAT THE STRAP AND DOOR ARE ACCEPTABLE AS REPAIRED AND NO FURTHER WOR 414296 1 8 K IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 414296 1 9 K IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 414334 1 1 DURING S0007 OF STS-53, O2 TANK 2 VENT POPPET FAILED ITS LEAK CHECK. REC 414334 1 2 ORDED LEAK WAS 24 PSIG IN 10 MINUTES (S/B NO MORE THAN 22 PSI IN 10 MINU 414334 1 3 TES) WAIVER WK02694 WAS WRITTEN AND APPROVED FOR ONE FLIGHT. TROUBLESHOO 414334 1 4 TING REVEALED THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM TO BE A DEFECTIVE AIRBORNE HALF 414334 1 5 COUPLING. THE AHC WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED AND SUCCESSFULLY LEAK CHECKED 414334 1 6 . AN EO TO FOLLOW WAS GENERATED TO ALLOW THE USE OF 4 SHIMS IN LIEU OF B 414334 1 7 USHINGS IN THE MOUNTING HARDWARE. THIS EO HAS BEEN APPROVED AND RELEASED 414334 1 8 . NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DEFECTIVE AIRBO 414334 1 9 RNE HALF COUPLING. 414354 1 1 ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF ITEM 1 INDICATES THE V082-774017-002 HARNESS I 414354 1 2 S NOT INSTALLED AND IS NOT REQUIRED FOR FLIGHT 16 OF IV-103. CVAS HAS BE 414354 1 3 EN UPDATED. NO ADDITIONAL DISCREPANCIES WERE DETECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: T 414354 1 4 RACKING ERROR. 415460 1 1 DURING ASCENT OF STS-53 THE SPEEDBRAKE CHANNEL 3 POSITION WENT TO 44 415460 1 2 DEGREES (ZERO VOLTS AT MDM) FOR APPROXIMATELY 48 MINUTES. INITIAL 415460 1 3 TROUBLESHOOTING CONSISTED OF TURNING THE ASA 3 ON AND MONITORING FOR 415460 1 4 DROPOUTS. CABLE 70P38/50P38 WAS WIGGLED AND THE SBK CHANNEL 3 POSITIONS 415460 1 5 DROPPED OUT. THE CONNECTOR AND JACK WERE THEN INSPECTED. WIRE 3F62B22-2 415460 1 6 AT 50J38 WAS NOT SECURELY CRIMPED AND PULLED LOOSE FROM THE CONTACT 415460 1 7 DURING INSPECTION. REPAIR OF THE CONNECTOR WAS COMPLETED ON THIS 415460 1 8 DOCUMENT AND THE CONNECTOR HAS BEEN RETERMINATED. RETEST PER V9002.05 415460 1 9 SEQ 01-051 IS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR JAN 20. RETEST WILL BE ANNOTATED 415460 1 10 IN THE MARGIN OF OMI V9002.05. NO FURTHER DISPOSITION IS REQUIRED AND 415460 1 11 THIS PR CAN BE CLOSED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 416001 1 1 THE V070-340508-002 (45-00) DOOR WAS FOUND TO HAVE 8 DENTS ON THE IML (R 416001 1 2 EF ITEMS 1-6). THE DENTS WERE ANALYZED AND DETERMINED TO BE FROM .0017" 416001 1 3 TO .0286" DEEP. DENT #2 (.0286" DEEP) WAS UNRESTRICTED MR REPAIRED WITH 416001 1 4 A 3.00" DIA X .020" THICK DOUBLER THAT WAS BONDED TO THE DOOR WITH MBO12 416001 1 5 0-048 ADHESIVE. THE OTHER SIX DENTS (.0017" TO .0055" DEEP) WERE UNRESTR 416001 1 6 ICTED MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DENTS IS MIS HANDLING 416001 1 7 OF THE DOOR DURING AND AFTER REMOVAL. CONCLUDE NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUI 416001 1 8 RED AND THIS PR MAY CLOSE. 416001 1 9 RED AND THIS PR MAY CLOSE. 416021 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUT RETAINER IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PG 1 WAS MR ACCEPTED A 416021 1 2 S INSTALLED FOR FERRY FLIGHT. POST FERRY FLIGHT THE DISCREPANT NUT RETAI 416021 1 3 NER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW PER PRINT RETAINER WAS INSTALLED THEREBY RETUR 416021 1 4 NING THE INSTALLATION TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS. CONCLUDE NO FURTHER WORK IS 416021 1 5 REQUIRED AND THIS PR MAY CLOSE. THE NUT RETAINER WAS BROKEN DUE TO NORM 416021 1 6 AL WEAR AND TEAR. 416049 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AT EAFB AFTER LANDING TO DOCUMENT A SMALL NICK IN 416049 1 2 THE "A" HATCH HATCH SEAL AT APPROXIMATELY 10 O'CLOCK POSITION LOOKING FO 416049 1 3 RWARD WITH HATCH OPEN AND ON SUPPORTS. THE HATCH WAS SUCCESSFULLY LEAK C 416049 1 4 HECKED AND PASSED ALL V1058.002 HATCH FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND THE DI 416049 1 5 SCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. 416049 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION IS NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION (WEA 416049 1 7 R AND TEAR). 416050 1 1 REF ITEMS 1 AND 2: THIS PR DOCUMENTS BROKEN SPRINGS CLIPS ON THE V070-85 416050 1 2 5059-001 (OCN/SN S04624) SHELL ASSEMBLY AND THAT THE SHELL IS OUT OF ROU 416050 1 3 ND APPROX 1/8". AFTER REMOVAL PER V35-50002, THE SHELL ASSY WAS ROUTED T 416050 1 4 O THE VENDOR FOR REPAIR. UPON COMPLETION OF THE REPAIR, THE SHELL ASSEMB 416050 1 5 LY WILL BE RETURNED TO STOCK. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL 416050 1 6 DEGRADATION. 416096 1 1 28-13 CARRIER PANEL IS MISSING ONE MD263-0008-0106 PLUG. THIS CONDITION 416096 1 2 WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR FERRY FLIGHT AND A "FWD-3-16-XXXX" PR WAS GENERATED. 416096 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE: THIS IS NOT A STR PR. 416125 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON OEL-5-03-0763, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ONE RECEP 416125 1 2 TABLE MOUNTING SCREW FOR 56J42 WAS LOOSE. THE DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED 416125 1 3 BY RETORQUING THE SCREW TO SPECIFICATION AND PERFORMING AN ELECTRICAL BO 416125 1 4 ND TEST TO VERIFY ELECTRICAL INTEGRITY OF THE RECEPTABLE TO MOUNTING SUR 416125 1 5 FACE. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE 416125 1 6 : WORKMANSHIP. 416196 1 1 ITEM 1: RIGHT HAND FLIPPER DOOR 4 V070-146068-002 BOLT HAD AN APEX TIP B 416196 1 2 REAK OFF IN THE HEAD. THE DISCREPANT BOLT WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE WAS 416196 1 3 OBTAINED. THE BOLT NUTPLATE'S RUNNING TORQUE WAS MEASURED AT 15 IN LBS. 416196 1 4 WHICH IS PER SPECIFICATION. ITEM 2: THE DISCREPANT BOLT WAS LOST AFTER R 416196 1 5 EMOVAL FROMTHE VEHICLE. THE BOLT'S HEAD WAS DAMAGED NOTICEBLY DURING REM 416196 1 6 OVAL AND IT'S THREADS WERE SHOT. THIS BOLT CANNOT BE REUSED AND THERE IS 416196 1 7 NO POSSIBILITY OF IT GETTING BACK INTO LOGISTICS. 416238 1 1 DURING S5022 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE JR24 GND WIRE AT 67P163 HAD EXPO 416238 1 2 SED CONDUCTOR WITH SEVERAL DAMAGED STRANDS. THE DAMAGED PORTION OF WIRE 416238 1 3 WAS REMOVED AND A NEW GND LUG WAS CRIMPED ON THE JR24 WIRE. A CONTINUITY 416238 1 4 CHECK WAS PERFORMED FROM THE LUG AT 67P163 TO 67P137 TERM 11 TO VERIFY 416238 1 5 THE INTEGRITY OF THE LUG INSTALLATION. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON 416238 1 6 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATION DEGRADATION. 416246 1 1 DURING S5022, CLAMP, P/N ME127-0070-0001 AT XO=1307, YO=82, WHICH WAS TO 416246 1 2 BE REMOVED WAS FOUND NOT INSTALLED. ENGINEERING RESEARCH FOUND THAT JC 416246 1 3 V76-40003, FERRY FLIGHT HARNESS REMOVAL, DID NOT HAVE PROVISIONS TO RE-I 416246 1 4 NSTALL CLAMP FROM LAST FLIGHT. A DEV WAS WRITTEN TO V76-40003 TO INSTALL 416246 1 5 AND TORQUE CLAMP. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE 416246 1 6 : PROCEDURAL ERROR. 416810 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: RESTRICTED-NON FLIGHT. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE H70-0728 L 416810 PMRB 2 /H PLBD STRONGBACK INSTALLATION BE MR ACCEPTED FOR ONE INSTALLATION WITH 416810 PMRB 3 OUT THE XO 624 HINGELINE G070-542977-002 AND G070-542883-003 INTERFACE B 416810 PMRB 4 RACKET AND PAD INSTALLED. THIS HARDWARE IS ONE OF EIGHT INTERFACE POINTS 416810 PMRB 5 FOR THE L/H FORWARD STRONGBACK. THE OMISSION AT THIS LOCATION IS NECESS 416810 PMRB 6 ARY TO ALLOW ACCESS TO REPLACE THE ATTACH POINT NUTPLATES. THIS CONDITIO 416810 PMRB 7 N HAS BEEN ANALYZED BY RI DOWNEY AND DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THIS I 416810 PMRB 8 NSTALLATION WILL NOT AFFECT THE FIT, FORM, OR FUNCTION OF THE STRONGBACK 416810 PMRB 9 FOR ITS INTENDED PURPOSE. THIS RESTRICTED MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE 416810 PMRB 10 THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION OR IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST OR HAZRD 416810 PMRB 11 CONTROLS. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 2/15/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR RESTRICTED INSTA 416810 PMRB 12 LLATION. 416810 1 1 (REFERENCE ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGES 1 AND 1A). THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DISCREP 416810 1 2 ANT NUTPLATE FOR THE STRONG BACK ATTACH POINT CARRIER PANEL AT XO 624.8 416810 1 3 NEAR THE HINGE LINE. DUE TO ACCESS REQUIREMENTS (STRONGBACK PAD WAS INST 416810 1 4 ALLED (REFERENCE ITEM 2), THE INSTALLATION OF THE CARRIER PANEL WITH 7 O 416810 1 5 F 8 FASTENERS WAS APPROVED FOR RESTRICTED USE AND THIS WAD WAS DEFERRED 416810 1 6 TO OV-103 FUTURE FLIGHT TAIR. DURING FLIGHT 19 PROCESSING. THE NUTPLATE 416810 1 7 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED USING REPLACEABLE NUT ELEMENT NUTPLATES AND BLI 416810 1 8 ND RIVETS PER DWG: V070-370008 EO A18. ALL EIGHT NUTPLATES HAVE BEEN REP 416810 1 9 LACED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF 416810 1 10 ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1B): THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS IPROPER RIVET INSTALLATION FOR 416810 1 11 THE EIGHT NUTPLATES. THE NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED BY DRILLING OUT THE 416810 1 12 RIVETS AND REINSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 416810 1 13 PR IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 416811 1 1 LEFT HAND CARRIER PANEL #5 (XO895) HAS A BROKEN NUTPLATE. PER MR THE NUT 416811 1 2 ELEMENT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 416978 1 1 DURING POST-FLIGHT ELEVON COVE INSPECTION, SEVERAL NICKS WERE FOUND IN T 416978 1 2 HE V070-198071-046 CURTAIN SEAL. THESE NICKS WERE REPAIRED PER MR DISPOS 416978 1 3 ITION USING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED U 416978 1 4 SE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHO 416978 1 5 P OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 417062 1 1 ITEM 1: UNABLE TO REMOVE AFT OUTBD SCREW FROM 66-04 CARRIER PANEL. THE S 417062 1 2 CREW HEAD WAS DRILLED OFF AND THE CARRIER PANEL WAS REMOVED PER THE JOBC 417062 1 3 ARD. ITEM 2: UNABLE TO INSTALL THE LESS CARRIER PANEL NUTPLATE WITH SOLI 417062 1 4 D CONVENTIONAL RIVETS. THE NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER 417062 1 5 MR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AND LIMITED ACCESS. 417074 1 1 DURING V3540004 STEP 16 IT WAS NOTICED THAT THE UPPER MONOBALL SEAL V070 417074 1 2 -565411-001 HAD A PERFORATION IN A PREVIOUS REPAIR (ITEM 1). IN ADDITION 417074 1 3 IN TEAR IN CONN. COLLAR WAS EVIDENT (ITEM 2). THE NOTED DISCREPANT MONO 417074 1 4 BALL SEAL WAS ROUTED TO THE VENDOR VIA HDA FOR POSSIBLE REFURBISHMENT. A 417074 1 5 NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED TO REPLACE THE DISCREPANT SEAL. PROBABLE CAUSE OF 417074 1 6 ITEMS 1 AND 2 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 417074 1 7 ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 417379 1 1 FOLLOWING WIRE/CONNECTOR REPAIR BY OEL, MEASUREMENTS V41P1160A WAS VERIF 417379 1 2 IED TO BE READING CORRECTLY. 417730 1 1 ITEM 1 #20 LEFT HAND LOWER LESS CARRIER PANEL ATTACH BOLT'S HEAD IS STRI 417730 1 2 PPED AND CANNOT BE REMOVED FROM THE NUTPLATE. THE HEAD OF THE SCREW WAS 417730 1 3 DRILLED OUT AND THE CARRIER PANEL WAS REMOVED PER THE JOBCARD. ITEM 2: U 417730 1 4 NABLE TO INSTALL THE LESS NUTPLATE WITH SOLID CONVENTIONAL PER PRINT RIV 417730 1 5 ETS DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS. THE NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS 417730 1 6 PER MR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AND LIMITED ACCESS. 417785 1 1 THE LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199201 SPAR FITTING WAS 417785 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE 417785 1 3 TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE O 417785 1 4 F SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 417785 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 417785 1 6 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 417822 1 1 ROUTINE MONITORING SHOWED THAT O2 TK 2 WAS LOSING PRESSURE. THE CAUSE OF 417822 1 2 THIS PRESSURE DECAY WAS TRACED TO A LEAKING FLIGHT CAP AT THE O2 TANK 2 417822 1 3 VENT INTERFACE ON DOOR 45 (40V45PD411). THE FLIGHT CAP SEAL WAS REMOVED 417822 1 4 AND REPLACED. SUBSEQUENT FLIGHT CAP LEAK CHECK WAS SUCCESSFUL. MONITORI 417822 1 5 NG OF THE O2 TANK PRESSURE SHOWS THE DECAY HAS STOPPED. PROBABLE CAUSE O 417822 1 6 F THE PROBLEM: FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OF THE SEAL. 417850 1 1 ITEM 1- THE TEFLON COATING BECAME OVERHEATED DURING RE-ENTRY. THE OVERHE 417850 1 2 ATED AREAS WERE NOT ON THE CONTACT SURFACE AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT DEGRA 417850 1 3 DE THE FRICTION LIMITING CAPABILITY. THE COATING WAS MR ID'D AND ACCEPTE 417850 1 4 D AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2- THIS ITEM WAS ADDRESSED ON PR STR- 417850 1 5 3-13-3721. A COPY IS ATTACHED FOR REFERENCE ONLY. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE 417850 1 6 DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE- FLIGHT DAMAGE. 417851 1 1 THE DISCREPANT CONDITION NOTED AS ITEM 1 ON PG 1, TEFLON COATING DEGRADA 417851 1 2 TION FROM OVERTEMP..., ON THE RH OB ELEVON IS AN ANTICIPATED RESULT OF H 417851 1 3 OT HAS FLOW DURING RE-ENTRY. PARTIAL CHARRING OF HINGE SEALS WAS DOCUMEN 417851 1 4 TED AND MR ACCEPTED PER STR-3-12-3500 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER D 417851 1 5 EGRADATION OF THE SEAL WAS NOTED. DISCOLORED KOROPON WAS REMOVED AND FRE 417851 1 6 SH KOROPON APPLIED. RTV OUTGASSING WAS CLEANED WITH WIPES DAMPENED WITH 417851 1 7 IPA. PROBABLE CAUSE: FLIGHT DAMAGE. 417874 1 1 THE V070-396430-018 CARRIER PANEL DOES NOT FIT BETWEEN THE -008 AND -004 417874 1 2 CARRIER PANELS. THE -018 CARRIER PANEL WAS TRIMMED PER MR FOR UNRESTRIC 417874 1 3 TED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: BUILD UP OF TOLERANCE DUE TO MATCH DRILLING OF 417874 1 4 EXISTING CARRIER PANELS TO THE PAD. 417894 1 1 DURING V6028, THE V070-298115-020 THERMAL BARRIER WAS FOUND TO BE BENT F 417894 1 2 LAT ON ITS FORWARD END. THE THERMAL BARRIER WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UN 417894 1 3 RESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS BUILD UP OF TOLERANCE. NO 417894 1 4 FURTHER ENG OR SHOP ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 417895 1 1 ITEM 1: TAB BROKEN OFF THERMAL BARRIER (V070-298112-017) ADJACENT TO TIL 417895 1 2 E V070-293103-031, F/N 45. THE DISCREPANT THERMAL BARRIER WAS REMOVED AN 417895 1 3 D REPLACED. ITEM 2: TAB BROKEN OFF THERMAL BARRIER (V070-298112-017) ADJ 417895 1 4 ACENT TO TILE V070-293102-087, F/N 47. THE DISCREPANT THERMAL BARRIER WA 417895 1 5 S REMOVED AND REPLACED. ITEM 3: TAB BROKEN OFF THERMAL BARRIER (V070-293 417895 1 6 112-017) ADJACENT TO TILE V070-293102-031, F/N 48. THE DISCREPANT THERMA 417895 1 7 L BARRIER WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 418114 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN A SMALL NICK AT THE 12 O'CLOCK POSITION ON TH 418114 1 2 E B-HATCH COLLAR SEAL WAS DETECTED. DENTAL MOLDS WERE TAKEN, B HATCH CLO 418114 1 3 SURE/LEAK CHECK SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED AND THE B HATCH FUNCTIONAL TEST C 418114 1 4 OMPLETED. THE DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO 418114 1 5 PR CONDITION EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE-NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. RETEST COMPLE 418114 1 6 TE PER V1058.001. 418206 1 1 THE FOLLOWING DISPO ADDRESSES ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1. THE ADJACENT TILE (P/N V 418206 1 2 070-292005-029) IS DAMAGED, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE V07 418206 1 3 0-298120-001 THERMAL BARRIER MADE CONTACT WTIH THE TILE AS A RESULT OF F 418206 1 4 LIGHT OPERATIONS. THE THERMAL BARRIER IS ALSO LOCATED PER PRINT ON THE L 418206 1 5 /H UPPER RSB TRAILING EDGE PANEL. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS WITH THE V070-29 418206 1 6 8120-001 THERMAL BARRIER. TPS PR MVERT-3-16-0560 WILL REPAIR THE DAMAGED 418206 1 7 TILE. NO SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 418220 1 1 DURING A SURVEILLANCE, CONNECTOR 50P634 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHEL 418220 1 2 L. SRP V-EL-0001-B-O WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO 418220 1 3 FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEA 418220 1 4 R ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 418313 1 1 DURING V35-40007, V35-40004, AND V1086, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WHEN DEMA 418313 1 2 TING THE MONOBALL HARNESSES AND POSITIONING THEM OUT OF THE WAY FOR WORK 418313 1 3 ACCESS, THE RISK OF HARNESS CHAFFING EXISTED. IT HAS BECOME A COMMON PR 418313 1 4 ACTICE TO PLACE THE DEMATED HARNESSES THRU THE OPENING ON LH SIDE OF 136 418313 1 5 5 FRAME LOCATED DIRECTLY BEHIND MONOBALL ASSY. TO PREVENT THE POSSIBILIT 418313 1 6 Y OF HARNESS CHAFFING. EXTRUSION RUBBER WILL BE INSTALLED OVER THE LIP O 418313 1 7 F OPENING IN 1365 FRAME. THIS ACTION WILL ENSURE PROPER PROTECTION FOR M 418313 1 8 ONOBALL HARNESSES AND PREVENT CHAFFING FROM OCCURRING. NO FURTHER ACTION 418313 1 9 REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO 418313 1 10 ORBITER PROCESSING. 418314 1 1 DURING V35-40007,V35-40004, AND V1086, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WHEN DEMAT 418314 1 2 ING THE MONOBALL HARNESSES AND POSITIONING THEM OUT OF THE WAY FOR WORK 418314 1 3 ACCESS, THE RISK OF HARNESS CHAFFING EXISTED. IT HAS BECOME A COMMON PRA 418314 1 4 CTICE TO PLACE THE DEMATED HARNESSES THRU THE OPENING ON RH SIDE OF 1365 418314 1 5 FRAME LOCATED DIRECTLY BEHIND MONOBALL ASSEMBLY. TO PREVENT THE POSSIBI 418314 1 6 LITY OF HARNESS CHAFFING, EXTRUSION RUBBER WILL BE INSTALLED OVER THE LI 418314 1 7 P OF OPENING IN 1365 FRAME. THIS ACTION WILL ENSURE PROPER PROTECTION FO 418314 1 8 R MONOBALL HARNESSES AND PREVENT CHAFFING FROM OCCURRING. NO FURTHER ACT 418314 1 9 ION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO 418314 1 10 ORBITER PROCESSING. 418404 1 1 WHEN F/D 14 & 15 (RH) WERE OPENED A BENT RING AND A CRUSHED, MISLOCATED 418404 1 2 SEAL WERE FOUND. THE DISCREPANT PARTS WERE REPLACED AND THE INSTALLATION 418404 1 3 WAS RETURNED TO PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 418543 1 1 DURIING V31-15101, WIRE T1255C26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE, SRP-V- 418543 1 2 EL-0007 METHOD B WAS USED TO TAP THE DAMAGE AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503. NO FU 418543 1 3 RTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR O 418543 1 4 N ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 418550 1 1 REF ITEMS 1 AND 2: THIS PR DOCUMENTS BROKEN SPRING CLIPS ON THE V070-855 418550 1 2 059-001 (OCN SN EK1892) SHELL ASSY AND THAT THE SHELL IS OUT OF ROUND .0 418550 1 3 53". AFTER REMOVAL PER V35-50002, THE SHELL ASSY WAS ROUTED TO THE VENDO 418550 1 4 R FOR REPAIR. UPON COMPLETION OF THE REPAIR, THE SHELL ASSY WILL BE RETU 418550 1 5 RNED TO STOCK. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 418614 1 1 THE V070-337421-006 PANEL BECAME DEBONDED FROM THE V070-337421-005 PANEL 418614 1 2 DURING REMOVAL OF THE ASSEMBLY FROM THE SHIP. THE PANELS WERE REBONDED 418614 1 3 PER PRINT. THE ASSEMBLY WILL BE REINSTALLED ON PR STR-3-A0204. NO FURTHE 418614 1 4 R WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE-WORKMANSHIP. 418787 1 1 DURING ECL-3-A0045 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE FLIGHT CAP TETHER FOR RECE 418787 1 2 PTABLE J18 WAS BROKEN. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED PER EPD 418787 1 3 -3-11-1317 TO ACCEPT AS IS (REF ATTACHED COPY). RECEPTACLE J18 WAS INSPE 418787 1 4 CTED AND THE FLIGHT CAP REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR A 418787 1 5 ND TEAR WHILE PROCESSING THE VEHICLE. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 418926 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING J/C V30-15358, EXTERNAL DETAIL INSPECTION, 418926 1 2 AFT LOWER DECK, TO DOCUMENT NUMEROUS ET DOOR SEAL DISCREPANCIES. ITEMS 1 418926 1 3 -6: PAGE 1 AND 1A RECORD ITEMS 1-6 WHEREIN 5 SEAL SECTIONS (ITEM 1,5 AND 418926 1 4 6) ON THE LH SIDE WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED, ONCE ON THE RH SIDE (ITEM 418926 1 5 3) WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED AND TWO ITEMS (2 AND 4) ON THE RH SIDE WERE 418926 1 6 MR'D. TWO MINOR SURFACE DEFECTS (ITEM 2) IN THE RH FWD SEAL AND THE REPA 418926 1 7 IR OF AN EXCESSIVE GAP (APPROX 5/32", S/B 1/16" MAX) BETWEEN ADJACENT SE 418926 1 8 ALS IN THE AFT INBD CORNER (ITEM 4) WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED US 418926 1 9 E. ITEM 2 AND 4 MR ID. LRU PR'S INITIATED AGAINST ALL SEALS WHICH WERE 418926 1 10 R&R'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. ITEM 6 V070-351992-002 418926 1 11 SEAL WAS R&R'D AS PART OF ITEM 1C DISPO. REF P.4 TABLE 1-1 AND P.8 SEAL 418926 1 12 R/R MATRIX RUN 3. ITEM 7: PAGE 1B DOCUMENTS A REPLACEMENT 418926 1 13 V070-351992-002 SEAL WHICH WAS FOUND TO BE 4 INCHES TOO SHORT WHEN 418926 1 14 OBTAINED FROM LOGISTICS AND A FLIGHT EQUIPMENT SPARES (FES) PR WAS 418926 1 15 INITIATED. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. ITEM 8: WHILE REPLACING SEALS ON LH 418926 1 16 SIDE, THE INSTALLED V070-352992-003 SEAL WAS DISCOVERED TO BE APPROX 1" 418926 1 17 TOO SHORT (MEASURED 40.5" S/B 41.40") AND A PAGE 1C WAS WRITTEN. THIS 418926 1 18 SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED AND AN LRU PR TAKEN AGAINST THE DISCREPANT 418926 1 19 SEAL RECOMMENDING IT BE SCRAPPED. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. ITEM 9: PAGE 418926 1 20 1D WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT SEAL VENT HOLES WERE INSTALLED IN THE 418926 1 21 INVERTED POSITION. THE V070-351992-002 ON THE LH ET DOOR CAVITY WAS 418926 1 22 REMOVED AND REBONDED WITH THE VENT HOLES ORIENTED TO THE CORRECT 418926 1 23 EXTERIOR/OUTBOARD POSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 10: WHILE 418926 1 24 REMOVING THE SEAL IN ITEM 9, THE V070-351993-001 SEAL ADJACENT TO IT WAS 418926 1 25 TORN. PAGE 1E WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT THIS DISCREPANCY. THIS SEAL WAS 418926 1 26 REMOVED AND REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 11: THE JOINT 418926 1 27 BETWEEN THE V070-351992-002 AND -001 SEALS WAS REMOVED BECAUSE IT WAS 418926 1 28 FLAT AND NON-PLIABLE. PAGE 1F TAKEN. APPARENTLY THIS OCCURRED DURING 418926 1 29 CURE WHILE THE ET DOOR WAS CLOSED. THE V070-351992-001 SEAL, WHICH WAS 418926 1 30 SPLIT AT THE INBD END, WAS ALSO REPLACED AND ALL JOINTS BETWEEN THE 418926 1 31 VARIOUS SEALS ON THE LH SIDE WERE FILLED IN TO COMPLETE PREVIOUS SEAL 418926 1 32 INSTALLATIONS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATING ERROR-THE ET DOOR WAS CLOSED 418926 1 33 BEFORE THE SEAL REPAIR HAD CURED. RETEST: A LIGHT COAT OF FINGER PRINT 418926 1 34 INK WAS APPLIED TO ALL SEALS AND THE OUTER PERIMETER OF THE ET DOORS 418926 1 35 WERE TAPED. ALSO ALL 15 STOP BOLT GAPS ON BOTH DOORS HAD DENTAL MOLD 418926 1 36 MATERIAL APPLIED. A RETEST WAS THEN PERFORMED PER V9048 AND THIS PR TO 418926 1 37 CYCLE BOTH ET DOORS CLOSED TO CHECK SEAL COMPRESSION FROM THE INK 418926 1 38 IMPRESSIONS AND STOP BOLT GAP MEASUREMENTS WITH THE THERMAL BARRIER 418926 1 39 INSTALLED. THE SEAL COMPRESSION RESULTS WERE SATISFACTORY. AFTER THE 418926 1 40 FIRST CYCLE, TWO ADDITIONAL DOOR CYCLES/STOP BOLT GAP ADJUSTMENTS WERE 418926 1 41 MADE TO THE LH SIDE TO GET THE GAP MEASUREMENTS INTO AN MR ACCEPTABLE 418926 1 42 RANGE OF MEASUREMENTS. PR MEQ-3-16-0698 WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE 418926 1 43 FINAL STOP BOLT GAP MEASUREMENTS WHICH WERE M 418926 1 44 R ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 418961 1 1 THE TEFLON COATING BECAME OVERHEATED DURING RE-ENTRY. THE OVERHEATED ARE 418961 1 2 AS WERE NOT ON THE CONTACT SURFCE AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT DEGRADE THE FR 418961 1 3 ICTION LIMITING CAPABILITY. THE COATING WAS MR ID'D AND ACCEPTED AS IS F 418961 1 4 OR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAU 418961 1 5 SE-FLIGHT DAMAGE. 419054 1 1 R/H FLIPPER DOOR 12 V070-146068-002 BOLT HAS GALLED THREADS. THE BOLT WA 419054 1 2 S SCRAPPED AND A NEW BOLT WAS OBTAINED. THE INSTALLATION NUTPLATE'S RUNN 419054 1 3 ING TORQUE WAS CHECKED AND IS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE SPECIFICATIONS. PROBABLE 419054 1 4 CAUSE: DAMAGE PROBABLY HAPPENED DURING BOLT INSTALLATION AT DFRF. 419168 1 1 STR-3-16-572 INSPECTED THE 56-01 CAVITY FOR EVIDENCE OF CORROSION ON THE 419168 1 2 STRUCTURE WITHIN THE CAVITY. CORROSION WAS FOUND ON THE RIVETS IN THE X 419168 1 3 O1421 FRAME AND ON THE FWD SURFACE OF THE XO1421 FRAME. NO CORROSION WAS 419168 1 4 NOTED BETWEENT HE APU SERVICING PANEL AND THE FRAME. 38 PITS WERE NOTED 419168 1 5 AND WERE ETCHED USING TURCO METAL GLO #6 TO REMOVE RESIDUAL CORROSION. 419168 1 6 THE MAX PIT DEPTH WAS FOUND TO BE 0.037: DEPTH AFTER ETCHING. THESE ITEM 419168 1 7 S HAVE BEEN MR ACCEPTED AS REWORKED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE 419168 1 8 IS ENVIRONMENTAL AND CHEMICAL EXPOSURE. THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT PROBLEMS W 419168 1 9 HICH RESULTED DURING THE REWORK OF THE CORROSION. DURING RIVET REMOVAL, 419168 1 10 ONE HOLE WAS MISDRILLED. THE HOLE WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED 419168 1 11 USE WITH THE SHANK OF THE RIVET HELD CAPTIVE BY THE HI-LOK INSTALLED TO 419168 1 12 SATISFY ITEM 4. HI-LOKS WERE USED INSTEAD OF RIVETS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT 419168 1 13 ACCESS TO INSTALL RIVETS. THESE ITEMS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS REWORKED FOR 419168 1 14 UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS IS INSUFFICIENT ACCESS. 419168 1 15 NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED. 419339 1 1 ITEM 1: THE UPPER INBD AFT AND FWD ANCHOR NUTS ON THE V070-199201 SPAR F 419339 1 2 ITTING WAS FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUTS WERE REMOVED AND RE 419339 1 3 PLACED. ITEM 2: DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE ANCHOR NUTS WERE INSTALLED WI 419339 1 4 TH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE OF SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS 419339 1 5 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATI 419339 1 6 ONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 419814 1 1 THE V070-198702-003 TRAILING EDGE BULB SEAL IS PER PRINT. THE "PROBLEM" 419814 1 2 AROSE DUE TO UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE SYSTEM. NO WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS P 419814 1 3 R. PROBABLE CAUSE-NO DISCREPANCY. 419815 1 1 THE V070-198702-004 TRAILING EDGE BULB SEAL IS PER PRINT. THE "PROBLEM" 419815 1 2 AROSE DUE TO UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE SYSTEM. NO WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS P 419815 1 3 R. PROBABLE CAUSE-NO DISCREPANCY. 419901 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 1 DISCREPANCY WAS FOUND ON THE UPPER SU 419901 1 2 RFACE OF RH RADIATOR 3. ITEM 1 IS A MICRO-METEORITE STRIKE WHICH PENETRA 419901 1 3 TED THE TAPE. THE DEFECT HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO F 419901 1 4 URTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIO 419901 1 5 NAL DEGRADATION. 419905 1 1 THIS PR WAS DETECTED DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195. TWO DEFECTS WERE F 419905 1 2 OUND ON THE UPPER SURFACE OF LH RADIATOR PANEL NO. 2. ITEM 1 IS A RAISED 419905 1 3 /SCUFFED AREA OF TAPE WHICH HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. I 419905 1 4 TEM 2 WAS A SHARP BOTTOMED DENT. MR CONCURRENCE WAS OBTAINED AND A 2.5" 419905 1 5 DIAMETER DOULBER WAS BONDED OVER THE DEFECT. SILVER TEFLON TAPE WAS RE-A 419905 1 6 PPLIED OVER THE DOUBLER. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST REQUI 419905 1 7 RED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 419907 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 1 DISCREPANCY WAS FOUND ON THE HINGELIN 419907 1 2 E EDGE OF RH RADIATOR NO. 2. ITEM 1 IS TWO SMALL HOLES IN THE UPPER LAYE 419907 1 3 RS OF TAPE. THE DEFECT HAS BEEN MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FUR 419907 1 4 THER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONA 419907 1 5 L DEGRADATION. 419953 1 1 DURING V31-13115 IT WAS NOTED THAT CABLES 1YC1901B24 AND 2ZK459B24 HAD K 419953 1 2 APTON DAMAGE WITH NO SHIELD, REF ITEM 1 AND 2 PAGE 1. IN ADDITION JR22 W 419953 1 3 IRE FROM T944A20SH WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BROKEN GND LUG AT 81P88, REF ITEM 419953 1 4 3 PAGE 1A. THE CABLE 1YC1901B24 AND 2ZK459B24 WERE REPAIRED PER SRP-000 419953 1 5 7 USING MYSTIK 7503 TAPE. CONNECTOR 81P88 WAS DEMATED AND CABLE T844A20 419953 1 6 WAS PREPPED AND NEW JR22 WIRE WAS INSTALLED WITH NEW GND LUG. NO FURTHER 419953 1 7 ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. CONNECTOR DEMATE/MATE WILL BE TRACKED PE 419953 1 8 R SCAN. 419953 1 9 R SCAN. 420067 1 1 REFERENCE INTERIM SUMMARY FOR OEL WIRE REPAIR. THE RETEST CONSISTED OF S 420067 1 2 IMPLY POWER THE SUPPLY H2O DUMP NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT AND OBSERVING A TE 420067 1 3 MPERATURE INCREASE. THE WASTE H2O DUMP NOZZLE HEATER WAS ALSO TESTED TO 420067 1 4 VERIFY PROPER OPERATION AND ALLOW BAY CLOSEOUT. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIO 420067 1 5 NAL DEGRADATION. 420209 1 1 DURING V1086, 50J822 WAS FOUND TO HAVE NO ID ON BRACKET. A NEW DECAL WAS 420209 1 2 FABRICATED AT THE LES SHOP AND INSTALLED BY AFT PERSONNEL. NO FURTHER A 420209 1 3 CTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 420690 1 1 DURING V6053, A HI0LOK WAS FOUND TO FAIL FLUSHNESS REQUIREMENTS PER MAO1 420690 1 2 01-301. THE DISCREPANT ME112-0014-1032 HI-LOK WAS FOUND TO PROTRUDE APPR 420690 1 3 OX 0.020" (0.010" MORE THAN ALLOWED PER SPEC). THE GAP UNDER ONE SIDE OF 420690 1 4 THE HEAD WAS DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SP 420690 1 5 ECIFICATION. THE GAP RESULTS FROM THE FASTENER HOLE NOT BEING DRILLED NO 420690 1 6 RMAL TO THE STRUCTURE. THE INSTALLATION OF THE HI-LOK WAS MR ACCEPTED AS 420690 1 7 IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS VENDOR WORKMANSH 420690 1 8 IP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 420690 1 9 IP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 420732 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS TRANSFERRED TO TES-3-16-0255, ITEM 5. CONCLUDE THAT IT 420732 1 2 EM 1, PAGE 1 WILL BE RESOLVED ON TES-3-16-0255 AND NO FURTHER WORK IS RE 420732 1 3 QUIRED ON THIS PR. 420733 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS TRANSFERRED TO TES-3-16-0255, ITEM 6. CONCLUDE THAT IT 420733 1 2 EM 1 PAGE 1 WILL BE RESOLVED ON TES-3-16-0255 AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ 420733 1 3 UIRED ON THIS PR. 420735 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS TRANSFERRED TO TES-3-16-0255 ITEM 3. CONCLUDE THAT ITE 420735 1 2 M 1 PAGE 1 WILL BE RESOLVED ON TES-3-16-0255 AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQU 420735 1 3 IRED ON THIS PR. 420736 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS TRANSFERRED TO TES-3-16-0255, ITEM 4. CONCLUDE THAT IT 420736 1 2 EM 1 PAGE 1 WILL BE RESOLVED ON TES-3-16-0255 AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ 420736 1 3 UIRED ON THIS PR. 420737 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS TRANSFERRED TO TES-3-16-0255, ITEM 1. CONCLUDE THAT IT 420737 1 2 EM 1 PAGE 1 WILL BE RESOLVED ON TES-3-16-0255 AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ 420737 1 3 UIRED ON THIS PR. 420857 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WAS TRANSFERRED TO TES-3-16-0255, ITEM 2. CONCLUDE THAT IT 420857 1 2 EM 1 PAGE 1 WILL BE RESOLVED ON TES-3-16-0255 AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ 420857 1 3 UIRED ON THIS PR. 421007 1 1 DURING ECL-3-16-0333 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 1M1731B20 HAD KATPON DA 421007 1 2 MAGE WITH NO SHIELD DAMAGE. THE NOTED WIRE WAS REPAIRED USING MYSTIK 750 421007 1 3 3 TAPE PER SRP-0007. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRE 421007 1 4 D ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 421007 1 5 N. 421323 1 1 ITEM 1: L/H VERTICAL STABILIZER ATTACH BOLT, NUT WASHER HAS GOUGED FILLE 421323 1 2 T RADIUS OF FITTING INBOARD OF BOLT HOLE. XO1309, YO-3.9, ZO499. TE DEFE 421323 1 3 CT WAS BURNISHED SMOOTH AND ACCEPTED PER MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBAB 421323 1 4 LE CAUSE: THE DEFECT WAS CAUSED BY THE BOLT HOLE LOCATION WHICH ALLOWED 421323 1 5 THE WASHER TO CONTACT THE FILLET RADIUS. 421426 1 1 DURING V31-15109 IT WAS NOTED THAT WIRES EXTENDING FROM 50P881 WERE DETE 421426 1 2 RIORATING. DISPOSITION WAS WRITTEN TO INSPECT THE NOTED WIRES UPON REMOV 421426 1 3 AL OF CONVOLUTED TUBING. ONCE TUBING WAS REMOVED EXPOSED CONDUCTOR WAS N 421426 1 4 OTED TO BE ON WIRE 1M6B24-4 NEAR BACKSHELL OF 50P881. ALSO CABLES 1M3C26 421426 1 5 , 1M4C26, 1M5C24 WERE NOTED TO BE OF EXCESSIVE LENGTH. DISPOSITION WAS T 421426 1 6 HEN WRITTEN OT RETERMINATE THE 1M6B24 CABLE AT EQUAL LENGTH TO ELIMINATE 421426 1 7 THE EXPOSED CONDUCTOR AREA. THE CABLES 1M3C26, 1M4C26, AND 1M5C24 WERE 421426 1 8 ALSO CUT TO EQUAL LENGTH SO THAT ALL CABLES GOING TO 50P881 WERE OF THE 421426 1 9 SAME LENGTH. THE AREAS NOTED AS BEING DETERIORATING OTHER THAN THE WIRE 421426 1 10 WITH EXPOSED CONDUCTOR WERE WIRES WITH PAINT SCRAPED OFF AND NOT WIRE 421426 1 11 INSULATION DAMAGE. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE 421426 1 12 CONNECTOR DEMATES/MATES WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE 421426 1 13 ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 421476 1 1 SOME VOIDS IN THE EDGE FILL WERE DETECTED IN THE V070-109631-025 CARRIER 421476 1 2 PANEL. THE PER PRINT ADHESIVE IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE SO THE VOIDS WERE 421476 1 3 FILLED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 421476 1 4 NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. RC A 421476 1 5 CTION: CAE TO INTERACT WITH ROCKWELL ON WHY MBO120-098 ADHESIVE IS NOT A 421476 1 6 VAILABLE. 421720 1 1 DURING ROUTINE MONITORING IT WAS NOTED THAT 02 TANK 2 WAS LOOSING PRESSU 421720 1 2 RE. USING THE OXYGEN MANIFOLD VALVES TROUBLESHOOTING WAS ABLE TO ISOLATE 421720 1 3 THE LEAK TO FUEL CELL #1. THE EXACT CAUSE OF THE LEAK WITHIN THE FUEL C 421720 1 4 ELL #1. THE EXACT CAUSE OF THE LEAK WITHIN THE FUEL CELL WAS NOT DETERMI 421720 1 5 NED. FUEL CELL 1, S/N 114, WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH S/N 104 PER OMI 421720 1 6 V5R01. POST INSTALLATION DECAY CHECKS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULL. THE DISCRE 421720 1 7 PANT FUEL CELL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO THE VENDOR FOR ANALYSIS AND REPAIR. 421720 1 8 PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM IS AN EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FROM A MECHANICAL F 421720 1 9 ITTING ON THE FUEL CELL. 421739 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT UNDERTORQUED FASTENERS SECURING ET DOO 421739 1 2 R RH AFT LATCH ASSEMBLY HOUSING TO THE VEHICLE STRUCTURE. PR MEQ-3-A0054 421739 1 3 (FLT 15/OMDP) REQUIRED REMOVAL AND RE-INSTALLATION OF RH AFT HOUSING PE 421739 1 4 R V5S03.017. THIS OMI CALLS OUT CLASS 1 TORQUE, BUT DWG V070-565000 GENE 421739 1 5 RAL NOTE 2 STATES TO TORQUE ALL UNCODED FASTENERS TO CLASS 2. ALL AFFECT 421739 1 6 ED OMI'S HAVE BEEN CORRECTED AND ALL RELATED DISCREPANCIES ON OV-103 HAV 421739 1 7 E BEEN RESOLVED. ET DOOR SYSTEM IS NOW PER PRINT. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PR 421739 1 8 OBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR. 421739 1 9 OBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR. 421807 1 1 THE ORIENTATION OF THE UPPER AND LOWER V766-340103-001 SUPPORT BEAMS 421807 1 2 WOULD NOT ALLOW FOR PROPER INSTALLATION OF THE V426-754110-001 421807 1 3 TRANSDUCER MOUNTING BRACKET (REF PAGE 1 DISCREPANCY). THE FASTENERS 421807 1 4 SECURING THE UPPER AND LOWER BEAMS WERE LOOSENED AND THE BEAMS 421807 1 5 REPOSITIONED, TO ALLOW FOR INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSDUCER MOUNTING 421807 1 6 BRACKET. ALL FASTENERS PREVIOUSLY LOOSENED BY THIS PR HAVE BEEN PROPERLY 421807 1 7 TORQUED. THE TRANSDUCER MOUNTING BRACKET HAS BEEN INSTALLED PER TPS 421807 1 8 INS-3-16-168. ITEM 1: BUILD UP OF TOLERANCE. ITEM 2: NOT A PR CONDITION, 421807 1 9 INS DRAWING IS "REF ONLY". 421916 1 1 DURING V31-13117 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE K720C26 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE W 421916 1 2 ITH NO SHIELD DAMAGE. THE NOTED WIRE WAS REPAIRED PER SRP-0007 USING MYS 421916 1 3 TIK 7503 TAPE. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED T 421916 1 4 O OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 422020 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN SEVERAL PLBD BULB SEAL DISCREPANCIES WERE FOU 422020 1 2 ND. ITEM 1 WAS INITIATED AGAINST A PREVIOUS TAPE REPAIR AT XO758 WHICH D 422020 1 3 EBONDED FROM ITS SEAL NEAR THE SPLICE JOINT. THE END OF THE V070-398522- 422020 1 4 009 SEAL WITH THE DEBONDED TAPE REPAIR HAD SUFFICIENTLY DEGRADED THAT IT 422020 1 5 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW SEAL. ITEMS 2 AND 3 WERE INITIATED 422020 1 6 AGAINST A GAP BETWEEN A TAPE REPAIR AT XO802 AND XO1202 SPLICE JOINTS AN 422020 1 7 D THE ADJACENT SEAL. DEBONDED SPLICES CREATED THE GAPS SO THE V070-39855 422020 1 8 8-050 AND V070-398558-052 SEAL SPLICES WERE REMOVED REPLACED WITH NEW SP 422020 1 9 LICES. ITEMS 4,6,8,9,13 AND 20 WERE INITIATED AGAINST DEBONDED 422020 1 10 V070-398558-051, V070-398558-050, V070-398558-050, V070-398558-052, 422020 1 11 V070-398558-050 AND V070-398558-050 SEAL SPLICES AT 422020 1 12 XO754,1253,1281,1289,625 AND 710 RESPECTIVELY. THE SPLICES WERE REMOVED 422020 1 13 AND REPLACED. ITEMS 5 AND 10 WERE INITIATED AGAINST THE DEBONDED MALE 422020 1 14 FOOT OF THE V070-398501-045 AND V070-398501-042 SEALS AT THE XO754 AND 422020 1 15 1281 LOCATIONS RESPECTIVELY. BOTH FEET WERE REBONDED TO THEIR SEAL 422020 1 16 RETAINERS. ITEM 7 WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE TORN AND DEBONDED 422020 1 17 V070-398522-010 SEAL AT XO1285. THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. ITEM 422020 1 18 11 WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE DEBONDED BASE OF THE V070-398539-003 SEAL 422020 1 19 AT XO1289. THE BASE OF THE SEAL AND MALE FOOT WERE REBONDED TO THE 422020 1 20 RETAINER. ITEM 12 WAS INITIATED AGAINST A DESIGN CONCERN WHICH PREVENTS 422020 1 21 THE MD112-3002-0313 SCREW FROM BEING PROPERLY SEATED. EO TO FOLLOW 422020 1 22 RATIONALE HAS BEEN ADDED TO ALLEVIATE THIS PROBLEM. ITEMS 422020 1 23 14,15,16,17,18,19 AND 21 ARE PLBD HINGELINE BULB SEAL DISCREPANCIES AND 422020 1 24 ARE IN THE V070-398500-010 ASSEMBLY DRAWING INSTEAD OF THE 422020 1 25 V070-398520-016 PLBD CENTERLINE BULB SEAL ASSEMBLY DRAWING. THEREFORE, 422020 1 26 THESE ITEMS WILL BE ADDRESSED IN ANOTHER PR (REF PR MEQ-3-16-0394 FOR 422020 1 27 ITEMS 14,15,17,18,19 AND 21 AND PR MEQ-3-16-0395 FOR ITEM 16). NO 422020 1 28 FURTHER RETEST IS REQUIRED FOR ANY OF THE ABOVE LISTED DISCREPANCIES. 422020 1 29 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 422021 1 1 THE 70C3850 SUPPORT AT XO 1214.25 IS, IN FACT, NOT MISSING ANY HOLES. TH 422021 1 2 E INSTALLATION DRAWING 70E2971 STATES IN ZONE 7F WITH REGARD TO THE HOLE 422021 1 3 CALLOUTS "EXCEPT AT XO1214.25". NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 422021 1 4 THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 422022 1 1 UNABLE TO OBTAIN MS24665-1013 COTTER PINS FOR PAYLOAD BAY DOOR SHEAR TUB 422022 1 2 E INSTALLATION. 5/16" LONGER COTTER PINS WERE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE -1013 422022 1 3 PINS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OV-102 AND OV-105 PLBD SHEAR TUBE INSPECTIONS. 422023 1 1 UNABLE TO OBTAIN MS24665-1013 COTTER PINS FOR PAYLOAD BAY DOOR SHEAR TUB 422023 1 2 E INSTALLATION. 5/16" LONGER COTTER PINS WERE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE -1013 422023 1 3 PINS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OV-102 AND OV-105 PLBD SHEAR TUBE INSPECTIONS. 422074 1 1 DURING V3570 - RADIATOR OPS, 2 DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND ON THE BOTTOM SU 422074 1 2 RFACE OF LH RADIATOR 1. ITEM 1 WAS A DING IN THE RADIATOR FACESHEET CAUS 422074 1 3 ED BY IMPACT WITH THE RADIATOR SUPPORT STAND. THE DAMAGE WAS MR ACCEPTED 422074 1 4 OF UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHE 422074 1 5 R DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 422075 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS TWO IMPACTS (ITEMS 1 AND 4) WHERE RADIATOR SUPPORTS CO 422075 1 2 NTACTED RADIATOR DURING INSTALLATION. THESE ITEMS WERE INSPECTED AND FOU 422075 1 3 ND TO BE MINOR TAPE DAMAGE AND WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. IT 422075 1 4 EM 2 WAS A METEOR IMPACT WHICH WAS SMOOTH BOTTOMED AND MR ACCEPTED AS IS 422075 1 5 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 3 WAS AN AREA OF DISCOLORATION WHICH WAS CLE 422075 1 6 ANED OFF SURFACE WITH IPA WIPE DOWN. ALL ITEMS HAVE BEEN REPAIRED OR MR 422075 1 7 ACCEPTED AND NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEMS 1 AND 4 WORKM 422075 1 8 ANSHIP, ITEMS 2 NORMAL EXPOSURE TO ON ORBIT DEBRIS. ITEM 3 IS MOST LIKEL 422075 1 9 Y OVERSTPRAYED DRY LUBE FROM RADIATOR HARDWARE. 422082 1 1 REF ITEM 2, AFTER REMOVAL OF THE LH JOINT 2 PIN 5, THE INSPECTION PER TP 422082 1 2 S STR-3-16-576 SHOWED THE BEARINGS TO BE IN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. THE DR 422082 1 3 Y FILM LUBE COATING IS STILL INTACT ON THESE BEARING SURFACES. THE PIN R 422082 1 4 EQUIRED A TOUCH UP OF THE DRY FILM ON THE LARGER DIAMETER. THIS WAS PERF 422082 1 5 ORMED PER MRB APPROVAL. REF ITEM 1, THE PIN COULD NOT BE INSTALLED WITHO 422082 1 6 UT FORCE. LSOC SE, NASA SE, AND RI LSS SE EVALUATED THIS CONDITION AND D 422082 1 7 ETERMINED THAT IT IS DUE TO A MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN THE THREE ATTACH POIN 422082 1 8 TS. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION BUT IS DUE TO THE DOORS BEING SUPPORTED B 422082 1 9 Y DIFFERENT STRONG BACKS. THE DOORS ARE NORMALLY ALIGNED WHEN THEY ARE 422082 1 10 CLOSED. IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM THE PIN WILL BE REINSTALLED 422082 1 11 WITH SLIGHT FORCE (IE A RUBBER MALLET) PER TPS STR-3-16-576. NO FURTHER 422082 1 12 WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 422089 1 1 ITEM 1: THE T01P31236 SHEAR PIN (#2) AT LEFT HAND JOINT #2 HAS AREAS OF 422089 1 2 WORN DRY FILM LUBE. A NEW SHEAR PIN WAS OBTAINED AND THE DISCREPANT ONE 422089 1 3 WAS ROUTED TO HDA. ITEM 2: THE PIN CAN NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO PRELOAD. 422089 1 4 THE PIN WAS INSTALLED, THIS IS A NORMAL PRELOAD CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUS 422089 1 5 E: NORMAL OPERATIONAL WEAR. 422090 1 1 ITEM 1: THE T01P31236 SHEAR PIN HAS AREAS OF WORN DRY LUBE. PER MR, DRY 422090 1 2 LUBE WAS APPLIED. ITEM 2: THE AFT BEARING AT EXPANSION JOINT 2, PIN 2 DO 422090 1 3 ES NOT ROTATE FREELY. THE BEARING WAS FLUSHED WITH IPA AND ROTATES WITH 422090 1 4 MANUAL PRESSURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 422091 1 1 ITEM 1: RIGHT HAND JOINT #1, PIN #2 BEARING HAS A SMALL GROOVE ALONG THE 422091 1 2 FWD EDGE. DRY LUBE WAS APPLIED OVER THE GROOVE PER MR FOR UNRESTRICTED 422091 1 3 USE. ITEM 2: DRY LUBE WAS MISTAKENLY APPLIED TO THE SHEAR TUBE. THIS WAS 422091 1 4 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM #: THERE IS INTERFERENCE BETWEEN 422091 1 5 THE SHEAR TUBE AND THE BEARING. EXCESS DRY LUBE WAS REMOVED FROM THE FW 422091 1 6 D AND AFT BEARING AND NEW SHEAR TUBE WAS INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORM 422091 1 7 AL OPERATIONAL WEAR AND WORKMANSHIP. 422092 1 1 THE PIN WAS REMOVED AND INSPECTED PER STR-3-16-576. THIS PR WAS PICKED U 422092 1 2 P TO ADDRESS THE AREAS OF WORN DRY FILM LUBE. A SPRAY ON DRY FILM LUBE W 422092 1 3 AS USED WITH MRB APPROVAL. THE PIN WAS REINSTALLED BUT WAS TOO TIGHT BEC 422092 1 4 AUSE OF THE EXTRA THICK LAYER OF DRY FILM. IT WAS REMOVED AGAIN AND WIPE 422092 1 5 D DOWN WITH IPA TO A THINNER LAYER. IT WAS REINSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON THI 422092 1 6 S PR. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 422092 1 7 DEGRADATION. 422237 1 1 LOCKER "F" WAS DETERMINED TO BE NOT COUNTER BORED ON BACK SIDE OF UPPER 422237 1 2 FRAME FOR LOCKER "F" ON FLIGHT 16. THE RETAINING RINGS WERE REMOVED AND 422237 1 3 LOCKER WAS INSTALLED FOR RESTRICTED USE UNTIL LOCKER "F" WAS REMOVED AGA 422237 1 4 IN. THE LOCKER WAS REMOVED ON FLIGHT 20 PROCESSING AND HOLES WERE PROPER 422237 1 5 LY COUNTER BORED AND RETAINING RINGS INSTALLED. LOCKER IS NOW PER PRINT. 422237 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 422248 1 1 THE "TOO LONG" FLIPPER DOOR SPRING TUBE THAT WAS INDICATED IN ITEM 1, PA 422248 1 2 GE 1 WAS ACTUALLY PER PRINT. THE DISCREPANCY WAS DETERMINED TO BE THAT T 422248 1 3 HE SPRING TUBES ON FLIPPER DOORS 9, 10, AND 11 WERE NOT INSTALLED FULLY 422248 1 4 INBOARD. THE SPRING TUBES WERE RELOCATED INBOARD PER PRINT AND NO FURTHE 422248 1 5 R DISCREPANCIES NOTED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS WORKMANSHIP. 422360 1 1 THIS PR WAS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT A TORN SEAL ON THE AFT CENERL 422360 1 2 INE OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR CAVITY (REF ITEM 1). UPON FURTHER INSPECTIO 422360 1 3 N, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A RIVET IN THE FWD L/H PLATE WAS INCORRECTLY I 422360 1 4 NSTALLED AND ELONGATED HOLES WERE FOUND IN THE SHIP STRUCTURE WHERE THE 422360 1 5 RETAINER IS MOUNTED (REF ITEM 2). UNRESTRICTED MRB APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED 422360 1 6 TO ACCEPT ALL 4 OVERSIZED/ELONGATED HOLES IN THE SHIP STRUCTURE. ENGINE 422360 1 7 ERING EVALUATION INDICATES THAT THE RIVETS WILL COMPLETELY FILL THEIR RE 422360 1 8 SPECTIVE HOLES (REF ITEM 3). AN OVERSIZED FLUSH MOUNTED RIVET WAS INSTAL 422360 1 9 LED IN THE L/H FWD HOLE LOCATION OF THE RETAINER. INSTALLATION OF THIS 422360 1 10 RIVET WILL NOT COMPROMISE THE INTEGRITY OF THE SEAL INSTALLATION. 422360 1 11 UNRESTRICTED MRB APPROVAL OF THIS INSTALLATION WAS OBTAINED (REF ITEM 422360 1 12 2). THE AFT CENTERLINE SEAL WAS REPLACED. HOWEVER, DURING A RETEST TO 422360 1 13 VERIFY CORRECT CONTACT WITH NLG DOORS, THE SEAL WAS FOUND TO INTERFERE 422360 1 14 WITH THE R/H NLGD DOULBER CAUSING THE CENTERLINE SEAL TO ROLL UP. AN EO 422360 1 15 TO FOLLOWING WAS REQUESTED FOR DRAWING V070-326881 ADDING A PROVISION TO 422360 1 16 TRIM THE V070-326875 SEAL ANY AS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN THE PROPER 422360 1 17 COMPRESSION BETWEEN THE NLG DOOR AND SHIP STRUCTURE. UNRESTRICTED MRB 422360 1 18 APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED BASED ON THE EO TO FOLLOW DISPOSITION AND THE SEAL 422360 1 19 WAS TRIMMED TO FIT. THE NLG DOORS WERE MANUALLY CYCLED TO RETEST THE 422360 1 20 INSTALLATION AND MODIFICATION OF THE AFT SEAL AND ALL COMPRESSION 422360 1 21 MEASUREMENTS WERE WITHIN SPECIFICATION (REF ITEM 4). THE PROBABLE CAUSE 422360 1 22 OF THE TORN SEAL WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE 422360 1 23 OVERSIZED/ELONGATED HOLES AND THE INCORRECT INSTALLATION OF THE RIVET 422360 1 24 WERE DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. 422422 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: DURING FLIGHT 16 PROCESSING, THE LH V070-302017-001 422422 PMRB 2 VERTICAL TAIL FWD ATTACH BOLT, S/N 10148-A-001, WAS PRELOADED TO APPROX 422422 PMRB 3 52,959 POUNDS BASED ON STRAIN GAGE OUTPUT 72 HOURS AFTER TORQUE APPLICAT 422422 PMRB 4 ION AND A PREVIOUSLY MEASURED ZERO TORQUE (NO LOAD) READING. THE RH V070 422422 PMRB 5 -302017-001 VERTICAL TAIL FWD ATTACH BOLT, S/N 10148-A-002, WAS PRELOADE 422422 PMRB 6 D TO APPROX 49,855. THE DESIGN REQUIREMENT IS 49,000 (+/- 1000) POUNDS P 422422 PMRB 7 RELOAD. THE 52,959 POUND PRELOAD ON THE LH BOLT WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FO 422422 PMRB 8 R ONE FLIGHT TO MEASURE POST FLIGHT LOADS. POST FLIGHT 17, THE STRAIN GA 422422 PMRB 9 GE OUTPUT WAS REMEASURED. A LOSS OF 1201 POUNDS WAS INDICATED ON THE LH 422422 PMRB 10 BOLT AND A LOSS OF 1083 POUNDS WAS INDICATED ON THE RH BOLT. THE CAUSE 422422 PMRB 11 OF THE INDICATED LOSS IS NOT DEFINABLE. THEREFORE, ADDITIONAL 422422 PMRB 12 MEASUREMENTS ARE REQUIRED FOR TREND ANALYSIS. IF CONTINUED LOSS OCCURS 422422 PMRB 13 AND THE INDICATED PRELOAD DROPS BELOW MINIMUM ALLOWABLE PER PRINT, THE 422422 PMRB 14 NUTS WILL BE REMOVED AND BOLTS RELOADED TO PRINT REQUIREMENTS. THE 422422 PMRB 15 INDICATED PRELOAD OF 51,758 POUNDS (1758 OVER MAX) ON THE LH BOLT DOES 422422 PMRB 16 NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE STRUCTURAL JOINT AT THIS 422422 PMRB 17 ATTACH POINT. MARGIN OF SAFETY FOR THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE REMAINS 422422 PMRB 18 POSITIVE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 422422 PMRB 19 BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION IS RESTRICTED TO ONE FLIGHT 422422 PMRB 20 (FLIGHT 17) OF OV-103. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 422422 PMRB 21 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 422422 PMRB 22 ON 6-11-93, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEWFERRAL TO FLT 18 OF OV-103. 422422 1 1 (REF ITEM 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS PROBLEMS INCREASING THE PRELOAD ON THE 422422 1 2 V070-320017-001 VERTICAL TAIL TO AFT FUSELAGE FWD ATTACH BOLTS. PER MCR 422422 1 3 17177R7, THE PRELOAD ON THE BOLTS WAS TO BE INCREASED FROM 38,000 LBS TO 422422 1 4 49,000 LBS. ULTRASONIC INSP, TORQUE TENSION RELATIONSHIPS AND BOLT STRA 422422 1 5 IN GAGE OUTPUT ALL SHOWED DIFFERENT PRELOAD VALUES. AFTER LAB TESTING, A 422422 1 6 PROCEDURE WAS DEVELOPED TO INSTALL THE NUTS USING BRAYCOTE TO REDUCE RU 422422 1 7 NNING TORQUE. THE BOLTS WERE PRELOADED TO A VALUE BASED ON STRAIN GAGE O 422422 1 8 UTPUT WITH ADJUSTMENTS MADE FOR RESIDUAL LOAD AND STRAIN GAGE ZERO SHIFT 422422 1 9 (REF ITEM 2: THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS AN OUT OF TOLERANCE PRELOAD ON THE L/H 422422 1 10 V070-320017-001 BOLT. THE BOLT WAS PRELOADED TO A INDICATED 52,950 LBS. 422422 1 11 PRINT ALLOWABLE WAS 49,000 (+/- 1000) LBS. THIS ITEM WAS ACCEPTED AND 422422 1 12 THE PR WAS DEFERRED FOR ONE FLIGHT TO DETERMINE LOAD LOSS/GAIN. AN EO 422422 1 13 HAS BEEN RELEASED OT THE V070-200003 DRAWING TO INCREASE THE TOLERANC 422422 1 14 E ON THE FASTENER PRELOADS. THE PRELOAD IS WITHIN THE 49,000 (+/- 3.000) 422422 1 15 POUND RANGE REQUIRED. 422422 1 16 (REF ITEM 3) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS AN INDICATED 1201 POUNDS LOSS ON THE 422422 1 17 L/H BOLT AND AN INDICATED 1083 POUND LOSS ON THE RH BOLT. THE LOAD LOSS 422422 1 18 AFTER FLIGHT 16 WAS ATTRIBUTED TO LOAD TRANSFER WITHIN THE VERTICAL TAIL 422422 1 19 ATTACH POINTS. THIS PR WAS DEFERRED FOR ONE ADDITIONAL FLIGHT FOR FURTHE 422422 1 20 TREND ANALYSIS. 422422 1 21 (REF ITEM 4)THE LOAD LOSS AFTER FLIGHT 17 WAS 302 POUNDS ON THE L/H BOLT 422422 1 22 AND 293.8 POUNDS ON THE R/H BOLT. THE INDICATED PRELOAD ON THE L/H BOLT 422422 1 23 IS 51,456 POUNDS AND THE R/H BOLT SHOWS 48,478 POUNDS. THESE VALUES ARE 422422 1 24 ACCEPTABLE PER DRQWING REQUIREMENTS. V30-15428 WILL PERFORM VERTICAL TAI 422422 1 25 PRELOAD CHECKS EACH FLIGHT PER OMRS REQUIREMENT. THIS PR IS NO LONGER RE 422422 1 26 QUIRED FOR TRACKING OF FASTENER PRELOAD. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 422422 1 27 ACTION IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORK AUTHORIZED ERROR. 422422 1 28 CLOSE THIS PR. 422955 1 1 THERE ARE TWO MINOR DINGS ON THE V070-853120-001 OMS POD SKIN. PER MR AN 422955 1 2 Y RAISED METAL WAS BLENDED INTO THE ADJACENT MATERIAL AND THE TWO DINGS 422955 1 3 WERE MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 422979 1 1 DURING JOB CARD V31-15114 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT SHIELD JUMPER E596E26SH 422979 1 2 -JR22 GOING TO 56J6 BACKSHELL WAS BROKEN AT THE GROUND LUG. A NEW GROUND 422979 1 3 LUG WAS CRIMPED ON AND WIRE E596E26SH-JR22 RETERMINATED TO 56J6 BACKSHE 422979 1 4 LL. A CONTINUITY CHECK WAS PERFORMED AND PASSED. THIS RETURNS ASSEMBLY T 422979 1 5 O DRAWING CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE WHILE 422979 1 6 PROCESSING THE VEHICLE. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 422983 1 1 DURING CLOSING OF FLIPPER DOOR 4, A SMALL VOID (SCRATCH) WAS FOUND IN TH 422983 1 2 E V070-198071-004 CURTAIN SEAL. THE VOID WAS REPAIRED PER MR DISPOSITION 422983 1 3 USING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. P 422983 1 4 ROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR 422983 1 5 ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 423045 1 1 FASTENER HOLDING ET DOOR EDGE MEMBER IS LOOSE ON THE LH2 SIDE. FASTENER 423045 1 2 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 423047 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING V9028.003, NLG DOOR ROLLER INSTALLATION, TO 423047 1 2 DOCUMENT INCORRECT WASHER RIGGING OF THE FORWARD ROLLER ASSEMBLY. THE A 423047 1 3 SSEMBLY WAS NOT CENTERED IN THE DOOR BRACKET AND HAD A TIGHT FIT. ONE WA 423047 1 4 SHER WAS REMOVED FROM THE FWD INBD ATTACH POINT TO ALLEVIATE THE TIGHT F 423047 1 5 IT AND CORRECT THE ALIGNMENT OFFSET. THE FORWARD ROLLER WAS CORRECTLY IN 423047 1 6 STALLED PER V9028.003. ITEM 2 PAGE 1A DOCUMENTS AN OUT OF SPEC WASHER RI 423047 1 7 GGING ON THE NLG DOOR AFT ROLLER WHICH REQUIRED THE ADDITION OF WASHERS 423047 1 8 TO FILL EXCESSIVE GAPS. 2 SHIMMING WASHERS WERE ADDED TO BOTH THE FWD AN 423047 1 9 D AFT OTBD ATTACH POINTS TO FILL THE GAPS AND MAINTAIN ALIGNMENT. THE 423047 1 10 AFT ROLLER WAS CORRECTLY INSTALLED PER V9028.003. THE REMOVAL AND 423047 1 11 REINSTALLATION OF THE NLG DOOR ROLLERS PER V9028.003 WILL BE RETESTED 423047 1 12 PER V1098.001. NO OTHER RETEST IS REQUIRED AND NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY 423047 1 13 EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: LOSS OF RIGGING DURING PREVIOUS ROLLER REMOVAL 423047 1 14 AND REINSTALLATION. 423090 PMRB 1 REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED USE FOR TWO (2) FLIGHTS OF THE AFT R 423090 PMRB 2 ING COVER AS IS UNTIL IT CAN BE REPLACED DURING FLIGHT 19 PROCESSING. DE 423090 PMRB 3 FERRAL RATIONALE: THE V070-351928-001 AND -002 AFT RING COVERS HAVE NUME 423090 PMRB 4 ROUS CRACKS AROUND THE FASTENER HOLES. ONLY TWO OF THESE CRACKS WERE VIS 423090 PMRB 5 IBLE ON THE SURFACE. THESE TWO WERE REPAIRED BY STOP DRILLING AND INSTAL 423090 PMRB 6 LING DOUBLERS WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE REMAINDER OF T 423090 PMRB 7 HE CRACKS ARE NOT VISIBLE ON THE SURFACE OF THE PART. THEY WERE DETECTED 423090 PMRB 8 ORIGINALLY BY X-RAY INSPECTION AND WERE MRB ACCEPTED FOR RESTRICTED USE 423090 PMRB 9 FOR ONE FLIGHT. POST FLIGHT DISPO INCLUDED ANOTHER X-RAY INSPECTION OF 423090 PMRB 10 THE CRACKED AREAS. THIS INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE CRACKS HAD NOT 423090 PMRB 11 PROPAGATED AND ARE STILL ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. THESE PARTS WILL BE 423090 PMRB 12 SCHEDULED FOR REPLACEMENT DURING FLIGHT 19 PROCESSING. THE AFT RING 423090 PMRB 13 COVER WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN 423090 PMRB 14 OF SAFETY. NO MR ID IS REQURED. THE AFT RING COVER IS SECONDARY 423090 PMRB 15 STRUCTURE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 423090 PMRB 16 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 423090 PMRB 17 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 423090 PMRB 18 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED USE FOR ONE 423090 PMRB 19 FLIGHT OF THE V070-351928-001 AND -002 AFT RING COVERS. THIS PR HAD BEEN 423090 PMRB 20 PREVIOUSLY DEFERED TO NEXT FLIGHT. IT WAS PULLED IN TO THIS FLIGHT IN 423090 PMRB 21 ORDER TO TAKE CARE OF SOME SURFACE CORROSION. THE PARTS WERE PASSIVATED 423090 PMRB 22 TO REMOVE THE CORROSION AND THIS IS NO LONGER AN ISSUE. BECAUSE THE AREA 423090 PMRB 23 WAS EASILY ACCESSIBLE DURING THIS TIME, X-RAYS WERE TAKEN OF THE DAMAGED 423090 PMRB 24 AREAS AS A SIMPLE PRECAUTION. THERE WAS NO GROWTH OF THE CRACKS NOTED. 423090 PMRB 25 ONE NEW CRACK WAS NOTED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS NEW CRACK WAS NOT 423090 PMRB 26 DETECTED ON THE INITIAL X-RAYS DUE TO THE ANGLE OF THE EXPOSURE. ALL OF 423090 PMRB 27 THE CRACKS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN REPAIRED ARE INVISIBLE ON THE SURFACE OF 423090 PMRB 28 THE PART. THE REPLACEMENT AFT RING COVERS ARE CURRENTLY IN STOCK AND 423090 PMRB 29 WILL BE INSTALLED DURING FLIGHT 19 PROCESSING. THE AFT RING COVERS ARE 423090 PMRB 30 SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH 423090 PMRB 31 A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES 423090 PMRB 32 NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 423090 PMRB 33 IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 11-23-93, PRIME 423090 PMRB 34 BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 19 OF OV-103. 423090 PMRB 35 423090 PMRB 36 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: HOLE 16 ON "X-RAY INSPECTION". REQUEST MRB APPROVAL 423090 PMRB 37 FOR RESTRICTED USE FOR ONE FLIGHT OF THE V070-351928-001 AND -002 AFT 423090 PMRB 38 RING COVERS. X-RAYS WERE TAKEN OF THE DAMAGED AREAS. THERE WERE NO NEW 423090 PMRB 39 CRACKS DETECTED. THE CRACK AT HOLE LOCATION 16 WAS FOUND TO HAVE GROWN 423090 PMRB 40 FROM 0.250" TO 0.300" INCH. THIS CRACK IS UNDER THE STR-3-16-4544-17 423090 PMRB 41 DOUBLER. THE DOUBLER WAS REMOVED TO INSPECT THE CRACK AND REINSTALLED AS 423090 PMRB 42 BEFORE (REFERENCE MR RATIONALE ON PAGE 21 OF THIS PR). THIS CRACK IS NOT 423090 PMRB 43 VISIBLE UNDER 10X MAGNIFICATION. THE REPLACEMENT AFT RING COVERS ARE 423090 PMRB 44 CURRENTLY IN STOCK AND WERE TO BE INSTALLED DURING FLIGHT 19 PROCESSING. 423090 PMRB 45 DUE TO DIFFICULTIES INSTALLING THE ENGINE 1 RING COVERS, HOWEVER, THE 423090 PMRB 46 ENGINE 3 RING COVERS WERE NOT REPLACED. THE REPLACEMENT RING COVERS ARE 423090 PMRB 47 ANTICIPATED TO BE INSTALLED DURING FLIGHT 20 PROCESSING. THE AFT RING 423090 PMRB 48 COVERS ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN 423090 PMRB 49 INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. THIS MR 423090 PMRB 50 ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION 423090 PMRB 51 DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 423090 PMRB 52 07/06/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 423090 PMRB 53 423090 PMRB 54 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED LIFE FOR ONE 423090 PMRB 55 FLIGHT OFTHE V070-351928-001 AND -002 AFT RING COVERS. THE BLANKET WAS 423090 PMRB 56 REMOVED, AND X-RAYS WERE TAKEN OF THE DAMAGED AREAS. THERE WERE NO NEW 423090 PMRB 57 CRACKS DETECTED. THERE WAS NO GROWTH OF EXISTING CRACKS NOTED. THE 423090 PMRB 58 CRACKS ARE NOT VISIBLE UNDER 10X MAGNIFICATION. THE BLANKET WAS 423090 PMRB 59 REINSTALLED PER HSS-3-20-0461. THE REPLACEMENT AFT RING COVERS ARE 423090 PMRB 60 SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH 423090 PMRB 61 A POSTIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES 423090 PMRB 62 NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTON DOES NOT 423090 PMRB 63 IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 12/06/94, PMRB 423090 PMRB 64 APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF OV-103. 423090 PMRB 65 423090 PMRB 66 MR/DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED LIFE FOR ONE 423090 PMRB 67 FLIGHT OF THE V070-351928-001 AND -002 AFT RING COVERS. THE BLANKET WAS 423090 PMRB 68 REMOVED, AND X-RAYS WERE TAKEN OF THE DAMAGED AREAS. THERE WERE NO NEW 423090 PMRB 69 CRACKS DETECTED. THERE WAS NO GROWTH OF EXISTING CRACKS NOTED. THE 423090 PMRB 70 CRACKS ARE NOT VISIBLE UNDER 10X MAGNIFICATION. THE BLANKET WILL BE 423090 PMRB 71 REINSTALLED PER HSS-3-22-0490. THE REPLACEMENT AFT RING COVERS ARE 423090 PMRB 72 CURRENTLY IN STOCK AND WILL BE INSTALLED DURING FLIGHT 22 OMDP 2 423090 PMRB 73 PROCESSING. THE AFT RING COVERS ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURE AND WILL 423090 PMRB 74 CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF 423090 PMRB 75 SAFETY. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 423090 PMRB 76 BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL 423090 PMRB 77 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 4/4/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR 423090 PMRB 78 DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. 423090 1 1 ITEMS 1-7: A CRACK WAS DETECTED AROUND ONE FASTENER HOLE IN THE AFT 423090 1 2 DOME RING COVER. IT WAS X-RAYED TO FIND THE END. THE X-RAY REVEALED AN 423090 1 3 ADDITIONAL CRACK THAT WAS NOT VISIBLE TO THE NAKED EYE. THE ENTIRE 423090 1 4 SECTION WAS X-RAYED AND NUMEROUS CRACKS WERE FOUND AROUND FASTENER 423090 1 5 HOLES. MOST WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. SOME WERE 423090 1 6 REPAIRED BY STOP DRILLING AND INSTALLING DOUBLERS. SOME CORROSION WAS 423090 1 7 DETECTED UNDER THE HEADS OF SOME OF THE FASTENERS WHICH COULD HAVE 423090 1 8 CONTRIBUTED TO THE STRESS CORROSION CRACKING. THE CORROSION WAS TREATED 423090 1 9 AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CURRENT RESEARCH INDICATES THAT 423090 1 10 17-4 PH CRES IS HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO STRESS CORROSION CRACKING; 423090 1 11 THEREFORE AN EO WAS RELEASED TO REPLACE THE V070-351928-001 THROUGH 423090 1 12 V070-351928-004 WITH THE V070-351928-005 THROUGH V070-351928-008 WHICH 423090 1 13 ARE MANUFACTURED FROM INCONEL 718 INSTEAD OF 17-4 PH CRES. ALL OF THE 423090 1 14 OLD V070-351928 AFT DOME RING COVERS FOR ENGINE NUMBER 3 HAVE BEEN 423090 1 15 REPLACED THIS FLOW PER STR-3-22-697 WITH THE NEW INCONEL AFT DOME RING 423090 1 16 COVERS. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 423090 1 17 MATERIALS DEFIFIENCY/DEGRADATION. 423133 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF V5005,S08-010 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE T1885A26 423133 1 2 , T1887A26, T1888A26 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE PRIMARY CON 423133 1 3 DUCTOR(S). THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA W 423133 1 4 ITH MYSTIK 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED 423133 1 5 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HA 423133 1 6 RDWARE. 423223 1 1 THE FORWARD INBOARD CORNER OF THE V070-199706-078 CARRIER PANEL WAS FOUN 423223 1 2 D TO BE DAMAGED. DISPLACED MATERIAL IS EVIDENT ON THE EDGES OF THE ALUMI 423223 1 3 NUM EXTRUSION AND THE ADJACENT STIFFENER IS BENT OVER APPROX 0.10". THE 423223 1 4 DISPLACED MATERIAL WAS REMOVED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. THE BENT 423223 1 5 PIECE WAS ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 423223 1 6 PR IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 423449 1 1 THE V070-851640-002 SEAL SUPPORT RING WAS SUSPECTED TO HAVE SEVERAL CRAC 423449 1 2 KS. THESE INDICATIONS WERE DETERMINED BY X-RAY TO SURFACE IMPERFECTIONS 423449 1 3 ONLY AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY BURNISHED OUT WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRIC 423449 1 4 TED USE. HOWEVER, ONE ACTUAL CRACK WAS FOUND BY THE X-RAYS AND DOCUMENTE 423449 1 5 D ON A PG 1B. THE CRACKED SECTION OF THE SEAL SUPPORT RING WAS REMOVED A 423449 1 6 ND SENT OUT TO DOWNEY FOR ANALYSIS. A DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALL 423449 1 7 ED WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON 423449 1 8 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION/DESIGN DIFICIENCY. 423449 1 9 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION/DESIGN DIFICIENCY. 423489 1 1 WRITTEN IN WRONG CATEGORY. 423548 1 1 S5022,S21-035 REMOVED FROM OV-103 AT DFRF ON 12/13/93 A V070-355066-002 423548 1 2 PANEL WITH AN OCN OF 2670091. THIS PANEL WAS INSTALLED ON OV-102 ON 1/15 423548 1 3 /93 PER V5S03.017. AS FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO FIND THE V070-355066-002 PAN 423548 1 4 EL WITH AN OCN OF N00871 THIS IS NOT A STRUCTURES PR CONDITION BUT IS A 423548 1 5 LOGISTICS CONCERN. 423577 1 1 DURING V31-13119, WIRE HARNESS V070-778334 WAS FOUND TO BE CHAFFING AGAI 423577 1 2 NST A WATER LINE AND WIRE 1YC1149A24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON AND SHIELD 423577 1 3 DAMAGE. SPOT TIES WERE TIED IN A DIFFERENT CONFIGURATION TO ELIMINATE C 423577 1 4 HAFFING ON THE SMOOTH WATER LINE. WIRE 1YC1149A24 WAS REPLACED CONTINUIT 423577 1 5 Y, ISOLATION AND HIPOT PERFORMED. DURING R&R OF WIRE, A PAGE 1B WAS TAKE 423577 1 6 N WHEN THE CONNECTOR LOCKING TABS WERE FOUND TO BE BROKEN. THE CONNECTOR 423577 1 7 WAS REPLACED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. CONNECTOR MATE/DEM 423577 1 8 ATE WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE 1 & 1B) WORKMANSHIP AND 1A) 423577 1 9 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 423623 1 1 ITEM 1: A GAP OF .010 EXISTED BETWEEN THE FRCS AND THE STRUCTURE AT ATTA 423623 1 2 CH POINT 12. THERE WAS A TCS BLANKET PINCHED AT THIS LOCATION. DISPO'D T 423623 1 3 O REMOVE PINCHED PORTION OF THE TCS BLANKET. ITEM 2: UNABLE TO REMOVE TH 423623 1 4 E PINCHED PORTION OF THE TCS BLANKET. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR 423623 1 5 RESTRICTED FLIGHT. POST FLIGHT 16, THE FRCS WAS REMOVED AND THE BLANKET 423623 1 6 INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE. NO DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMI 423623 1 7 TED ACCESS. 423660 1 1 ALL RETEST ON FUEL CELL 1 ELECTRICAL CONTROL UNIT (ECU) IS NOW COMPLETE. 423660 1 2 FUEL CELL 1 START WAS SUCCESSFUL. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM IS A BA 423660 1 3 D TIMING RELAY INTERNAL TO THE ECU. 423752 1 1 THE LOWER AFT F12056-10-4 ANCHOR NUT ON THE V070-199202 SPAR FITTING WAS 423752 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE NO RUNNING TORQUE. THE NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DUE 423752 1 3 TO LIMITED ACCESS, THE NUT WAS INSTALLED WITH BLIND FASTENERS IN PLACE O 423752 1 4 F SOLID RIVETS. THE USE OF BLIND RIVETS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 423752 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 423752 1 6 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 423763 1 1 THE NLG DOOR ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL HAD A 1" CUT RUNNING ALONG THE LENGTH OF 423763 1 2 THE SEAL. THE CUT WAS VERY CLEAN WITH NO LOOSE OR MISSING MATERIAL AND 423763 1 3 DID NOT CROSS THE SEALING SURFACE. THE DAMAGED AREA WAS SUCCESSFULLY MR 423763 1 4 REPAIRED USING RTV AND WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. LSOC, RI LSS A 423763 1 5 ND NASA MEQ ENG AGREE THAT NO RETEST IS REQUIRED SINCE THE REPAIR WAS VE 423763 1 6 RY NEAT AND DID NOT NOTICABLY CHANGE THE PLIABILITY OF THE SEAL. NO OTHE 423763 1 7 R DISCREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE NLG DOOR ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL. PROBABLE CAU 423763 1 8 SE: WORKMANSHIP. 423763 1 9 SE: WORKMANSHIP. 423836 1 1 THE O2 PURGE FLIGHT FITTING SUFFERED MINOR DAMAGE DURING REMOVAL. THE FI 423836 1 2 TTING WAS DETERMINED TO BE USEABLE AND AN MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE HAS BE 423836 1 3 EN APPROVED. THE FITTING HAS BEEN REINSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. THE CAUSE OF T 423836 1 4 HE DAMAGE IS FROM NOT FULLY INSERTING THE REMOVAL TOOL INTO THE FLIGHT F 423836 1 5 ITTING DURING REMOVAL. 423850 1 1 THE PER PRINT FASTENERS WERE TOO SHORT TO PICK UP THE FIRST THREADS OF T 423850 1 2 HE NUTPLATES BECAUSE THE NUT ELEMENTS HAVE EVEDENTLY BECOME LOOSE IN THE 423850 1 3 IR RETAINERS. THE PER PRINT MD112-3002-04XX FASTENERS WERE REPLACED WITH 423850 1 4 ME111-3002-04XX FASTENERS WITH MRB APPROVAL. A NUTPLATE BECAME GAULED A 423850 1 5 ND WAS TAPPED OUT AND THE FASTENER WAS INSTALLED WITH LOCKTITE WITH MRB 423850 1 6 APPROVAL. NO FURHTER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATI 423850 1 7 ONAL DEGRADATION. 423873 1 1 WIRE #T178A26 REPAIRED PER SRP-V-EL-0007-O (LI) METHOD B. KAPTON REPAIR 423873 1 2 ONLY NO SHIELD DAMAGE FOUND. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 424283 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DEBONDED CARRIER PANEL STUD ON THE FRCS. THE DISCREP 424283 1 2 ANT V070-390392-001 STUD WAS UNDER THE V070-390317-005 CARRIER PANEL. A 424283 1 3 NEW STUD WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAU 424283 1 4 SE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERIN 424283 1 5 G ACTION REQUIRED. 424296 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT SEVERAL CLAMP SCREWS WERE EXT 424296 1 2 ENDING THROUGH WIRE TRAY V070-853259-004 AND INTO WIRE HARNESS V070-7759 424296 1 3 82. THE WIRE WAS INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE AND NONE NOTED. CONVOLUTED TUBING 424296 1 4 P/N: MBO150-064 TYPE 1A WAS THEN INSTALLED OVER THE HARNESS FOR PROTECT 424296 1 5 ION AGAINST POSSIBLE CHAFING DAMAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. 424296 1 6 NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 424335 1 1 DURING JOB CARD V80-00456, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE SHIELD JUMPER E596 424335 1 2 E26SH-JR22 GOING TO 56J6 BACKSHELL WAS BROKEN AT THE GROUND LUG. A NEW G 424335 1 3 ROUND LUG WAS CRIMPED ON AND WIRE E596E26SH-JR22 RETERMINATED TO 56J6 BA 424335 1 4 CKSHELL. A CONTINUITY CHECK WAS PERFORMED AND PASSED. THEIS RETURNS ASSE 424335 1 5 MBLY TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE DU TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE W 424335 1 6 HILE PROCESSING THE VEHICLE. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 424582 1 1 DURING ROUTINE V1292 RUDDER INDIVIDUAL CHANNEL TESTING, THE RUDDER CH 3 424582 1 2 SECONDARY DELTA PRESSURE (2DP) DID NOT INCREASE AS EXPECTED. BOTH POSITI 424582 1 3 VE AND NEGATIVE TESTS WERE RUN AND DATA REVIEW SHOWED THAT THE 2DP WAS R 424582 1 4 ESPONDING BY ONLY 2 TO 3 BIT TOGGLES. IPR 056V-0056 WAS TAKEN TO DOCUMEN 424582 1 5 T THIS ANOMALY. AN OPEN OR POSSIBLE SHORT WAS SUSPECTED AND A BREAK-THRO 424582 1 6 UGH BOX WAS INSTALLED AT THE RUDDER SBK PDU. CONTINUITY AND VLOTAGE READ 424582 1 7 INGS TAKEN AT THE PDU VERIFIED AN OPEN BETWEEN THE ASA AND THE ACTUATOR. 424582 1 8 AT THIS TIME RECEPTACLE 50J38 WAS SUSPECTED DUE TO A PREVIOUS PR (REF O 424582 1 9 EL-3-16-0377) AGAINST A BAD CRIMP. DURING WIRE EXTRACTION FOR IPR 424582 1 10 056V-0056 WIRE 3F57B22-2 PULLED OUT OF THE PIN 36 COTACT AT 50J38. THE 424582 1 11 WIRE WAS REPAIRED ALONG WITH ALL OTHER WIRES ON RECEPTACLE 50J38 PER 424582 1 12 THIS PR. RETEST WAS COMPLETED ON THIS PR PER STEP 2-9. NO FURTHER 424582 1 13 DISPOSITION IS REQUIRED AND THIS PR CAN BE CLOSED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS 424582 1 14 WORKMANSHIP. 424928 1 1 DURING COM-3-16-0212, WIRES YC277B24 AND YC907B24 WERE FOUND TO HAVE KAP 424928 1 2 TON DAMAGE AT THE BACKSHELL. AN MR WAS REQUESTED AND APPROVED TO TAPE DA 424928 1 3 MAGED WIRE USING MYSTIC 7503 TAPE. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR 424928 1 4 . PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 424942 1 1 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF JC V80-90123, WIRE 1V116B26-1 WAS DISCOVERED T 424942 1 2 O HAVE CONDUCTOR DAMAGE TWO INCHES FROM CONNECTOR 90P104. THE DISCREPANC 424942 1 3 Y WAS ADDRESSED BY CUTTING AWAY DAMAGED WIRE, AND INSTALLING A KSC SPLIC 424942 1 4 E (0606), PER MR APPROVAL. THE REPAIR RETURNS WIRE HARNESS TO AN ACCEPTA 424942 1 5 BLE BUT NON-DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELI 424942 1 6 ABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE, OR INTERCHAGEABILITY. A SUCCESSFUL RET 424942 1 7 EST OF WIRE 1V116B26-1 (KSC SPLICE 0606) WAS PERFORMED VIA TPS GNC 3-16- 424942 1 8 124 MOD 001 ON 23FEB93 BY GNC ENGINEERING. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREPANCY 424942 1 9 WAS DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO FURTHER 424942 1 10 ACTION REQUIRED ON PR. 424943 1 1 DURING V80-00123 STEP 59 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLE 5ZK293L24 HAD A RADI 424943 1 2 AL SEPARATION OF THE KAPTON EXPOSING THE SHIELD. NO SHIELD DAMAGE WAS DE 424943 1 3 TECTED. THE DAMAGED AREA WAS WRAPPED WITH MYSTIK 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE WI 424943 1 4 TH MR APPROVAL. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. THE PROBABLE CA 424943 1 5 USE FOR THIS PR WAS WORKMANSHIP. 424956 1 1 V070-355066-002 ET ACCESS DOOR RH WAS FOUND TO NOT FIT PROPERLY. THE DOO 424956 1 2 R FOR OV-103 WAS DETERMINED TO BE LOST. THE DOOR THAT WAS FIT CHECK WAS 424956 1 3 FOR ANOTHER ORBITER. A NEW DOOR WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED PER JOB CARD. 424956 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE IS LOST DOOR. 424961 1 1 TIEM 1- SEVERAL INDICATIONS OF CRACKING WERE PICKED UP DURING THE VISUAL 424961 1 2 INSPECTION PER OMRSD V30EDO.025. AN X-RAY INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED AND 424961 1 3 REVEALED THAT NO CRACKS EXIST IN THE SUSPECT AREAS. THESE IRREGULARITIES 424961 1 4 ARE STRICTLY SUPERFICIAL AND NOT A PR CONDITION. ITEM 2- THE "HEAT DAMA 424961 1 5 GE" IS ACTUALLY ONLY SURFACE DISCOLORATION. IT DOES NOT DEGRADE THE BRAC 424961 1 6 KET. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 424961 1 7 PROBABLE CAUSE-NO DISCREPANCY. 424962 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: THE CRACK AT HOLE #11 IS .30" LONG AND TRAVELS IN FROM THE 424962 PMRB 2 OUTER EDGE OF THE PART. IT HAS BEEN STOP DRILLED TO PREVENT PROPOGATION 424962 PMRB 3 . THE OTHER CRACK RADIATES OUT FROM FASTENER HOLE #39 AND IS .20" L. IT 424962 PMRB 4 WAS NOT REWORKED. A POST FLIGHT X-RAY INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THERE WAS 424962 PMRB 5 NO PROPOGATION OF THE CRACKS. THE CRACKS ARE CAUSED BY STRESS CORROSION 424962 PMRB 6 CRACKING. SINCE THE CRACKS HAVE RELIEVED THE STRESS, THEY WILL NOT PROP 424962 PMRB 7 OGATE. THE CRACKS WILL BE REINSPECTED FOLLOWING FLIGHT 17 USING VISUAL A 424962 PMRB 8 ND X-RAY INSPECTION TECHNIQUES. THE AFT RING COVER WILL CONTINUE TO FUNC 424962 PMRB 9 TION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE AFT RING 424962 PMRB 10 COVER IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 424962 PMRB 11 INVALIDATE THE BASSIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT AFFECT 424962 PMRB 12 THE CIL RETENTION. ON 6-29-93, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 18 OF 424962 PMRB 13 OV-103. 424962 1 1 SUSPECT CRACKS WERE X-RAYED PRIOR TO FLIGHT 16 TO DETERMINE THEIR EXTENT 424962 1 2 . CRACKS WERE FOUND AROUND ONLY TWO FASTNER HOLES. ONE WAS .30" LONG. TH 424962 1 3 E OTEHR WAS .20" LONG. THE REMAINING AREAS WERE NOT CRACKED. THE .3" LON 424962 1 4 G CRACK WAS STOP DRILLED AND THE PR WAS DEFERED TO FLIGHT 17. POST FLIGH 424962 1 5 T X-RAYS REVEALED NO PROPOGATION. THE PR WAS DEFERED TO FLIGHT 18. FOLLO 424962 1 6 WING FLIGHT 17 THE .2" CRACK WAS STOP DRILLED TO PREVENT PROPOGATION AND 424962 1 7 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR 424962 1 8 . PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 424971 PMRB 1 ON 3-30-93 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 17 OF OV-103. 424971 1 1 THE ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY WAS DISCOLORED BUT NO CHAFFING WAS EVIDENT. ALTHO 424971 1 2 UGH THE DISCREPANCY WAS IN THE VICINITY OF THE CAMERA WITH THE PLBD'S WE 424971 1 3 RE CLOSED, IT WAS DETERMINED THE CAMERA WAS NOT RUBBING AGAINST THE RADI 424971 1 4 ATOR AND DID NOT CAUSE THE DISCREPANCY. THE DAMGAED AREA WAS RESTRICTED 424971 1 5 FOR ONE FLIGHT AND REPAIRED POST FLIGHT 16 PER SRP-V-ST-0021-0-0. PROBAB 424971 1 6 LE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 424972 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V00-10072, 3 MINOR DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND ON THE 424972 1 2 UPPER SURFACE OF RH RADIATOR 2. NO REPAIRS WERE REQUIRED. NO RETESTS RE 424972 1 3 QUIRED. ITEM 1 IS A PTRTRUSION CAUSED BY DEBRIS UNDER THE TAPE WHICH WAS 424972 1 4 MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING DEFECT. ITEMS 2 AND 3 WERE D 424972 1 5 EPOSITS/DEBRIS WHICH WERE REMOVED FROM THE RADIATOR BY CLEANING WITH A 6 424972 1 6 0-40 PERCENT IPA-FREON SOLUTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION 424972 1 7 . 424973 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V00-00072, 2 MINOR DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND ON THE 424973 1 2 UPPER SURFACE AND ONE REQUIRING REPAIR ON THE FWD EDGE OF RH RADIATOR 1 424973 1 3 . NO REPAIRS WERE REQUIRED ON ITEMS 1 OR 2. ITEM 3 IS A CHAFFED/DELAMINA 424973 1 4 TED EDGE WHICH WAS REPAIRED PER SRP-V-ST-0020-0-0. ALL DEFECTS WERE MR A 424973 1 5 CCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST 424973 1 6 REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 425045 1 1 THE DISCREPANT GROUNDING CLIP IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS MR ACCEPT 425045 1 2 ED AS-IS UNTIL ACCESS COULD BE OBTAINED TO INSTALL A GROUNDING STRAP. AF 425045 1 3 TER ACCESS WAS OBTAINED (RH 1 AND 2 RADIATOR DEPLOYED), A GROUNDING STRA 425045 1 4 P WAS INSTALLED PER UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPOSITON. THE PROBABLE CA 425045 1 5 USE OF THE FINGERS OUT OF THE TRACK IS DOOR FLEXURE. CONCLUDE THAT THE D 425045 1 6 OOR HAS BEEN REWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS 425045 1 7 REQUIRED. 425098 1 1 THE ME128-0026-5009 FASTENER WOULD NOT FULLY SEAT. IT WAS REMOVED AND RE 425098 1 2 INSTALLED AND SEATED PROPERLY WITHOUT A PROBLEM. PANEL WAS INSTALLED FOR 425098 1 3 FLIGHT PER J/C V80-95963. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. THIS I 425098 1 4 S NOT A PR CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 425133 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED AS A DUPLICATE OF PR MEQ-3-16-0685 PAGES 1F,1G, AD 425133 1 2 N 1I, WHICH WERE MISTAKENLY WRITTEN AGAINST THE CENTERLINE BULB SEAL ASS 425133 1 3 Y PART NUMBER. DISPO WAS ADDED AND WORK PERFORMED PER PR MEQ-3-16-0685 B 425133 1 4 EFORE THE MISTAKE WAS NOTED. THIS PR WAS GENERATED TO ALLOW TRACKING OF 425133 1 5 THE DISCREPANCIES AGAINST THE CORRECT PART NUMBER, SERIAL NUMBER, AND NE 425133 1 6 XT HIGHER ASSEMBLY PART NUMBER. ITEMS 1,5, AND 7 WERE MR REPAIRED, ITEMS 425133 1 7 2 AND 4 WERE REPAIRED TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION, ITEM 3 WAS MR ACCEPTED 425133 1 8 AS IS RESTRICTED 1 FLIGHT AND ITEM 6 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. PROBABLE 425133 1 9 CAUSE FOR ALL ITEMS WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION, RETEST PERFORMED PER 425133 1 10 V9023.001 AND/OR V5006 PLBD OPERATIONS/FUNCTIONAL. 425167 1 1 FORWARD CAPTIVE FASTENER FOR V070-396356-001 CARRIER PANEL WS FOUND TO B 425167 1 2 OTTOM OUT/SHANK OUT. THE FASTENER WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED AND THEN WAS 425167 1 3 FIT CHECK AND FOUND TO INSTALL PROPERLY. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR A 425167 1 4 ND TEAR. 425316 PMRB 1 ON 5-11-93 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 18 OF OV-103. 425316 PMRB 2 MR RATIONALE/DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THIS PR WAS DEFERRED FROM THE PREVIOUS 425316 PMRB 3 MISSION BECAUSE A REPLACEMENT SEAL (V070-398503-012) WAS NOT IN STOCK AN 425316 PMRB 4 D COULD NOT BE OBTAINED BEFORE FLIGHT. THIS PART IS STILL NOT IN STOCK A 425316 PMRB 5 ND THE EDD IS UNACCEPTABLE FOR REPLACEMENT DURING THE FLOW. INSPECTION S 425316 PMRB 6 HOWS THAT THE TEAR DIMENSIONS DID NOT INCREASE DURING THE LAST FLIGHT. A 425316 PMRB 7 PPROXIMATELY 1/8" OVERLAP STILL EXISTS BETWEEN THE V070-398558-056 SPLIC 425316 PMRB 8 E AND THE TORN V070-398503-012 SEAL. THIS TEAR IS NEAR THE BASE OF THE 425316 PMRB 9 SEAL ASSEMBLY AND DOES NOT TRAVERSE THE SEALING SURFACE. THE SEAL WILL 425316 PMRB 10 BE TRIMMED AROUND THE TEAR TO CREATE A SMOOTH EDGE TO AVOID THE 425316 PMRB 11 POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL PROPAGATION. REQUEST MRB CONCURRENCE TO ACCEPT 425316 PMRB 12 THE TORN SEAL TUBE AS REPAIRED FOR RESTRICTED USE OF ONE FLIGHT. THIS MR 425316 PMRB 13 ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION 425316 PMRB 14 DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THE 425316 PMRB 15 REQUESTED MR WILL NOT ADVERSLY AFFECT THE FIT, FORM, OR FUNCTION OF THE 425316 PMRB 16 SEAL ASSEMBLY FOR ITS INTENDED USE. POST FLIGHT, THE SEAL WILL BE 425316 PMRB 17 REPLACED. NO MR ID REQUIRED. MR RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR 425316 PMRB 18 UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE REPAIRED V070-398503-013 SEAL. THIS SEAL WAS 425316 PMRB 19 REPAIRED BY NSLD AT THE FEMALE END AND UNRESTRICTED MR CONCURRENCE IS 425316 PMRB 20 REQUESTED TO ACCEPT A REPAIR TO THE MALE END. REF: PGS. 8,9 FOR PREVIOUS 425316 PMRB 21 MR. THIS REPAIR IS NEAR THE BASE OF THE SEAL ASSEMBLY AND DOES NOT 425316 PMRB 22 TRAVERSE THE SEALING SURFACE. THE SEAL WAS MR TRIMMED AROUND THE TEAR TO 425316 PMRB 23 CREATE A SMOOTH EDGE AND AVOID THE POSSIBLITY OF ADDITIONAL PROPEAGATION 425316 PMRB 24 DURING FLIGHT 17 PROCESSING. INSPECTION SHOWS THAT THE TEAR DIMENSIONS 425316 PMRB 25 DID NOT INCREASE DURING THE LAST FLIGHT. APPROXIMATELY 1/8" OVERLAP 425316 PMRB 26 STILL EXISTS BETWEEN THE V070-398558-056 SPLICE AND THE TORN 425316 PMRB 27 V070-398503-013 SEAL. REQUEST MRB CONCURRENCE TO ACCEP THE TRIMMED SEAL 425316 PMRB 28 TUBE AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 425316 PMRB 29 BASIS FOR CERITIFICATION. THIS PR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL 425316 PMRB 30 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THE REQUEST MR WILL BE ADVERSLY 425316 PMRB 31 AFFECT THE FIT, FORM, OR FUNCTION OF THE SEAL ASSEMBLY FOR ITS INTENDED 425316 PMRB 32 USE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. PMRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED "USE AS IS". 425316 PMRB 33 425316 PMRB 34 ON 01/28/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED "USE AS IS". 425316 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING FLIGHT 16 PROCESSING TO DOCUMENT A SMALL 425316 1 2 TUBE TEAR AT THE MALE END OF THE BULB SEAL AT XO1183. THE PR WAS 425316 1 3 INITIALLY WRITTEN UP AGAINST THE V070-398503-012 SEAL WHEN IN FACT THE 425316 1 4 SEAL IN QUESTION IS A -013 SEAL. THE TEAR IN THE SEAL WAS MR ACCEPTED 425316 1 5 FOR ONE FLIGHT WHILE A PMR FOR A -012 WAS TO BE FILLED. DURING FLIGHT 17 425316 1 6 PROCESSING, NO -012 SEAL WAS YET AVAILABLE, SO THIS PR WAS RE-DEFERRED 425316 1 7 FOR ONE MORE FLIGHT. DURING FLIGHT 18 PROCESSING, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE 425316 1 8 SEAL WAS A -013 NOT A -012 AND THERE WERE NO SPARE -013 SEALS AVAILABLE. 425316 1 9 AFTER REMOVAL FROM THE SHIP, THE ORIGINAL -013 SEAL BASE HAD BECOME 425316 1 10 DEBONDED FROM THE SEAL TUBE AT THE FEMALE END. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS 425316 1 11 REPAIRED AT THE NSLD AND THE SEAL RETURNED TO KSC AND RE-INSTALLED. ITEM 425316 1 12 2.0 REFERES TO THE MALE FOOT OF THE ADJACENT SEAL BEING DEBONDED. THIS 425316 1 13 SEAL FOOT WAS REMOVED, CLEANED AND RE-BONDED TO PER PRINT CONDITION. 425316 1 14 ITEM 3.0 REFERES TO THE V070-398503-012 SEAL HAVING A SPLICE NOT 425316 1 15 CENTERED CORRECTLY. THIS CONDITION OCCURRED WHILE FIT CHECKING A -012 425316 1 16 SEAL FROM STOCK WHICH WAS LONGER THAN -012 SPEC AS A POSSIBLE 425316 1 17 SUBSTITUTION FOR THE DISCREPANT -013 SEAL. THIS CONDITION IS NOT AN 425316 1 18 AS-INSTALLED CONDITION AND NO LONGER EXISTS. THE ORIGINAL -013 SEAL WAS 425316 1 19 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND INSTALLED ALONG WITH TWO NEW 425316 1 20 SPLICES AND THE INSTALLATION IS NOW PER PRINT WITH MR APPROVAL. THE 425316 1 21 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEMS 1 AND 2 IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THE PROBABLE 425316 1 22 CAUSE FOR ITEM 3 IS MISUNDERSTANDING OF TEMPORARY FIT CHECK 425316 1 23 INSTALLATION. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE INSTALLATIONS OF OTHER 425316 1 24 SERIAL NUMBES. RETEST COMPLETED PER V9023.001 PLBD CLOSING/OPENING. 425507 1 1 DURING PRELIMINARY CLOSE-OUT INSPECTIONS OF THE LH MLG WHEEL WELL, A WEA 425507 1 2 R MARK WAS IDENTIFIED ON THE ME1162-0009-0011 LINK. THE MARK APPEARS TO 425507 1 3 HVE BEEN CAUSED BY RUBBING AGAINST A NEARBY HI-LOCK DUIRNG A PREVIOUS FL 425507 1 4 OW WHEN THE LINKAGE WAS DISCONNECTED FOR RIGGING CHECKS. THE LINK DOES N 425507 1 5 OT PASS BY ANY FASTENERS DURING ITS MOTION PATH ONCE INSTALLED FOR FLIGH 425507 1 6 T. DAMAGE TO THE LINK WAS ISOLATED TO A SMALL PAINT CHIP (APPROX .25" X 425507 1 7 .25" OR LESS) WITH NO METAL DISPLACEMENT AND CORROSION PROTECTION WAS RE 425507 1 8 APPLIED. AS RETEST, THE LANDING GEAR WAS CYCLED UP AND DOWN PER V1098.00 425507 1 9 1 AND REINSPECTED WITH NO INDICTION OF CONTACT. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY 425507 1 10 EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 425512 1 1 DURING DATA PACK REVIEW, FUSES F18,F19,F20 AND F22 IN FPCA 1 WERE SUSPEC 425512 1 2 TED OF HAVING THE WRONG AMP FUSE INSTALLED. THE FUSE CAPS WERE REMOVED A 425512 1 3 ND THE 4 FUSES WERE INSPECTED AND VERIFIED CORRECT WITHOUT REMOVING THE 425512 1 4 FUSES. THE FUSE CAPS WERE THEN RE-INSTALLED AND SAFETY WIRED. NO FURTHER 425512 1 5 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR WAS UNSURE OF CONFIG 425512 1 6 URATION OF DELIVERED LRU. 425604 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT A STICKY RH FWD READY TO LATCH (RTL) P 425604 1 2 ADDLE WHICH WAS DISCOVERED DURING THE ET DOOR FUNCTIONAL (V1097) FOR OV- 425604 1 3 103 FLT 16. THE PROBLEM WAS DEFFERED FOR ONE FLIGHT. DURING FLT 17 PROCE 425604 1 4 SSING THE RTL PADDLE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. AFTER WORK WAS COMPLETE T 425604 1 5 HE RH FWD OUTBOARD AND RH FWD INBOARD LATCH HOOKS (DISCREPANCIES 2 AND 3 425604 1 6 ) WERE DISCOVERED PROTRUDING BEYOND THE HOUSING 0.10 IN AND 0.080 IN RES 425604 1 7 PECTFULLY. MLO308-0058 ALLOWED A PROTRUSION OF +/- 0.030 IN. AN EO TO FO 425604 1 8 LLOW WAS INITIATED AND MLO308-0058 EO D03 WAS RELEASED TO ALLOW PROTRUSI 425604 1 9 ON OF THE HOOK TIP UP TO 0.100 IN PROVIDED DOOR ROLLER CLEARS HOOK TIP 425604 1 10 BY 0.250 IN. THE LATCH HOOK TIP TO DOOR ROLLER CLEARANCE WAS MEASURED TO 425604 1 11 BE 0.345 IN FOR THE FWD INBD HOOK AND 0.332 IN FOR THE FWD OUTBD HOOK. 425604 1 12 THE LATCH HOOKS ARE THEREFORE WITHIN TOLERANCE OF THE REVISED SPEC. THIS 425604 1 13 PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. THE RTL PADDLE AND THE LATCH HOOKS WERE 425604 1 14 RETESTED PER V1097. NO ADDITIONAL RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 425604 1 15 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR FOR ITEM 1. RIGGING TOLERANCE BUILDUP FOR ITEMS 2 425604 1 16 AND 3. 425657 1 1 THE TWO SCREWS THAT DID NOT PROTRUDE THROUGH THEIR NUTPLATES IDENTIFIED 425657 1 2 IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS MR ACCEPTED AS-IS FOR FLIGHT 16 (STS-056) DUE TO L 425657 1 3 ACK OF ACCESS TO THE SCREW HEADS INSIDE THE MIDBODY. POST FLIGHT 16 (FLI 425657 1 4 GHT 17 PROCESSING) THE SCREWS WERE REMOVED AND THE HOLE DEPTH MEASURED. 425657 1 5 AFTER MEASURING THE GRIP LENGTH REQUIRED, ENGINEERING DETERMINED THAT A 425657 1 6 SCREW THAT WAS ONE GRIP LENGTH LONGER THAN THE PRINT CALLOUT WOULD PROVI 425657 1 7 DE THE PROPER INSTALLATION. A LONGER SCREW WAS INSTALLED PER MA0101-301 425657 1 8 AND PROPER THREAD PROTRUSION WAS VISUALLY VERIFIED. PROBABLE CAUSE OF TH 425657 1 9 IS PR IS WORKMANSHIP. CONCLUDE THE INSTALLATION HAS BEEN RETUNRED TO 425657 1 10 PRINT REQUIREMENTS AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 425691 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE LH AND RH ET DOOR STOP BOLT GAPS B 425691 1 2 EING OUT OF SPEC. THE DOOR STOPS SHOULD BE 0.000-0.002 INCH BUT HAVE INC 425691 1 3 REASED DUE TO THERMAL BARRIER INSTALLATION. THIS CONDITION WAS DETECTED 425691 1 4 DURING RETEST OF PR MEQ-3-16-0680 WHEN THE STOP BOLT GAPS WERE CHECKED A 425691 1 5 FTER INSTALLATION OF NEW PRESSURE SEALS. TWO LH DOOR HINGE LINE STOP BOL 425691 1 6 TS WERE ADJUSTED IN ON THAT WAD TO RELIEVE SOME PRELOAD AND ALLOW THE LH 425691 1 7 DOOR TO MOVE CLOSER TO THE REMAINING STOPS. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEP 425691 1 8 TED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK OR RETEST IS REQUIRED ON THIS 425691 1 9 WAD. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSTALLATION OF THERMAL BARRIER. 425745 1 1 DURNIG SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DETECTED THAT A SHIELD JUMPER WIRE AT PARALLE 425745 1 2 L SPLICE REF DES 1E HAD EXPOSED CONDUCTOR. THE DISCREPANT SPLICE WAS CUT 425745 1 3 OUT AND REPLACED WITH A NEW PARALLEL SPLICE. A CONTINUITY CHECK WAS PER 425745 1 4 FORMED TO VERIFY THE SPLICE CRIMP. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR THIS 425745 1 5 PR. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF ORBITER P 425745 1 6 ROCESSING. 425780 1 1 DURING S0004 IT WAS DETECTED THAT LOWER ROD END P/N V070-565309-002 HAD 425780 1 2 DAMAGED THREADS. A NEW ROD END WAS OBTAINED BY THIS PR. THE DAMAGED ROD 425780 1 3 END WAS SENT TO HDA FOR POSSIBLE REFURBISHMENT. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR T 425780 1 4 HIS PR WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 425783 1 1 ROD END V070-565309-001 WAS DISCOVERED AS HAVING A CRACK ACROSS THE FACE 425783 1 2 OF ITS THREDED END. ENGINEERING EVALUATION REVEALED THAT CONDITION WAS 425783 1 3 THAT OF A SCRATCH AND NOT A CRACK. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO ACCEPT TH 425783 1 4 E SCRATCH AS IS FOR ROD END V070-565309-001. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRI 425783 1 5 BUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 425863 1 1 THE DOOR WAS COUNTERSUNK IN THE WRONG LOCATION. A CONICAL WASHER WAS BON 425863 1 2 DED INTO THE COUNTERSINK TO BRING IT UP TO FLUSH. MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRES 425863 1 3 TRICTED USE WAS OBTAINED. NO FURTHER WROK TO BE DONW ON THIS PR. PROBABL 425863 1 4 E CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 425901 1 1 A BROKEN SCREW WAS REMOVED FROM ANUT ON THE RH WINDOW 7. THE SCREW WAS F 425901 1 2 OR A WINDOW COVER FASTENER. THE NUT IS REQUIRED DURING FLIGHT FOR A CARR 425901 1 3 IER PANEL WHICH IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCY WAS O 425901 1 4 PERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 425926 1 1 INSPECTION BY A TECHNICIAN NOTED THAT THE SHIM UNDER THE BOLTS SECURING 425926 1 2 THE NLG UPLOCK THRUSTER ASSEMBLY WAS IMPROPERLY INSTALLED. WORKSTEPS PER 425926 1 3 THIS PR LOOSENED THE BOLTS AND REPOSITIONED THE SHIM, TORQUED, AND BOND 425926 1 4 CHECKED. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP, SHIM WAS IM 425926 1 5 PROPERLY INSTALLED PER V5012VL1 SEQ 13 DURING THIS FLOW (FLT 16). 426408 1 1 DURING S0004, IT WAS NOTICED THAT LH2 UPPER MONOBALL SEAL HAD A TEAR AND 426408 1 2 SOFT SPOT. A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED TO INSTALL PER S0004 AND THE DISCREP 426408 1 3 ANT SEAL WAS SENT TO VENDOR FOR REFURBISHMENT. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RETE 426408 1 4 ST REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 426426 1 1 DURING TSM MATES ON V2094, SEQUENCE 05 IN THE VAB IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT 426426 1 2 CONNECTOR SAVER 50J74 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A LOCKING PIN SHEARED. THE CONN 426426 1 3 ECTOR SAVER WAS REPLACED AND THE DISCREPANT CONNECTOR SAVER WAS SENT FOR 426426 1 4 FAILURE ANALYSIS. THIS RETURNS THE CONNECTOR SAVER TO PRINT CONFIGURATI 426426 1 5 ON. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WOR 426426 1 6 KMANSHIP. 426583 1 1 DURING S0004,S24-003, LH2 MONOBALL SEAL WAS FOUND TO HAVE A SURFACE TEAR 426583 1 2 AT THE ONE O'CLOCK POSITION APPROXIMATELY 3/4 INCH LONG. THE TEAR DID N 426583 1 3 OT EXTEND THROUGH THE SEAL AND WAS REPAIRED USING RTV 577 WHICH WAS PAIN 426583 1 4 TED OVER DAMAGED AREA. AN MR WAS REQUESTED FOR USE OF THE RTV 577. NO FU 426583 1 5 RTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND ATEAR 426583 1 6 ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 426607 1 1 THE DAMAGE TO THIS CARRIER PANEL WAS ADDRESSED AS ITEM 1 ON PR STR-3-08- 426607 1 2 2814 DATED 11-23-88. THIS IS AN MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS REP 426607 1 3 AIRED. A COPY OF THE OLD PR IS ATTACHED FOR REFERENCE ONLY. NO FURTHER W 426607 1 4 ORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED DAMAGE. 427170 1 1 THE NUTPLATE COULD NOT BE REPLACED WHEN IT BROKE DURING DOME HEAT SHIELD 427170 1 2 INSTALLATION BECAUSE THE DOME HEAT SHIELD WAS INSTALLED. A SELF LOCKING 427170 1 3 NUT WAS USED FOR ONE FLIGHT WITH PMRB APPROVAL. FOLLOWING THAT FLIGHT, 427170 1 4 THE NUT ELEMENT WAS REPLACED RETURNING THE NUTPLATE TO A PER PRINT CONDI 427170 1 5 TION. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 427170 1 6 DEGRADATION. 427645 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PG 1 WERE RE 427645 1 2 WORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPO. THE 427645 1 3 OUT-OF-ROUND FORWARD ATTACH POINT IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2 PG 1 WAS ACCEPTE 427645 1 4 D AS-IS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. ITEMS 1 & 2 WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL 427645 1 5 WEAR AND TEAR. COUCLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTAB 427645 1 6 LE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE PANEL WILL 427645 1 7 BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V80-95001 JOB CARD. 427646 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PG 1 WERE RE 427646 1 2 WORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPO. THE 427646 1 3 DEFORMED COUNTERBORES WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THA 427646 1 4 T THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER 427646 1 5 WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V 427646 1 6 80-95001 JOB CARD. 427647 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PG 1 WERE RE 427647 1 2 WORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPO. THE 427647 1 3 OVERSIZE AND OUT-OF-ROUND UPPER ATTACH POINT IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2 PG 1 427647 1 4 WAS ACCEPTED AS-IS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. ITEMS 1 & 2 WERE CAUSE 427647 1 5 D BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO 427647 1 6 AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE 427647 1 7 PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V80-95001 JOB CARD. 427648 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERER 427648 1 2 REWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPOSI 427648 1 3 TION. THE DEFORMED COUNTERBORES WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CON 427648 1 4 CLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO 427648 1 5 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FL 427648 1 6 IGHT ON V80-95001 JOB CARD. 427649 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PG 1 WERE RE 427649 1 2 WORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPO. THE 427649 1 3 DEFORMED COUNTERBORES WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THA 427649 1 4 T THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER 427649 1 5 WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V 427649 1 6 80-95001 JOB CARD. 427650 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE 427650 1 2 REWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPOSIT 427650 1 3 ION. THE OVERSIZE AND OUT OF ROUND LOWER ATTACH POINT IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 427650 1 4 2 PAGE 1 WAS ACCEPTED AS IS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. ITEMS 1 AND 427650 1 5 2 WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN 427650 1 6 RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON T 427650 1 7 HIS PR. THE PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V80-95001 JOB CARD. 427651 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1 PAGE 1 WERE R 427651 1 2 EWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPOSITI 427651 1 3 ON. THE OVERSIZE ATTACH POINTS IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2 PAGE 1 WAS ACCEPTED 427651 1 4 AS IS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. ITEMS 1 AND 2 WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL 427651 1 5 WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTAB 427651 1 6 LE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE PANEL WILL 427651 1 7 BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V80-95001 JOB CARD. 427652 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE 427652 1 2 REWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPOSIT 427652 1 3 ION. THE DEFORMED COUNTERBORES WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONC 427652 1 4 LUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO 427652 1 5 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLI 427652 1 6 GHT ON V80-95001 JOB CARD. 427654 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PG 1 WERE RE 427654 1 2 WORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPO. THE 427654 1 3 DEFORMED COUNTERBORES WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THA 427654 1 4 T THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER 427654 1 5 WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V 427654 1 6 80-95002 JC. 427664 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE 427664 1 2 REWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPOSIT 427664 1 3 ION. THE OVERSIZE MIDDLE ATTACH POINT IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2 PAGE 1 WAS AC 427664 1 4 CEPTED AS-IS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. ITEMS 1 AND 2 WERE CAUSED BY 427664 1 5 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN A 427664 1 6 CCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE PANE 427664 1 7 L WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V80-95002 JOB CARD. 427665 1 1 THE DEFOREMD ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE 427665 1 2 REWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPOSIT 427665 1 3 ION. THE DEFORMED COUNTERBORES WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONC 427665 1 4 LUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO 427665 1 5 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLI 427665 1 6 GHT ON V80-95001 JOB CARD. 427666 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE 427666 1 2 REWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPOSIT 427666 1 3 ION. THE OUT-OF-ROUND AND OVERSIZE LOWER ATTACH POINT IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 427666 1 4 2 PAGE 1 WAS ACCEPTED AS-IS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. ITEMS 1 AND 427666 1 5 2 WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN 427666 1 6 RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITON AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON TH 427666 1 7 IS PR. THE PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V80-95001 JOB CARD. 427668 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE 427668 1 2 REWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPOSIT 427668 1 3 ION. THE OVERSIZE UPPER ATTACH POINT IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2 PAGE 1 WAS ACC 427668 1 4 EPTED AS-IS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. ITEMS 1 AND 2 WERER CAUSED BY 427668 1 5 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN A 427668 1 6 CCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHE WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE PANLE 427668 1 7 WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V80-95002 JOB CARD. 427670 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE 427670 1 2 REWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPOSIT 427670 1 3 ION. THE OVERSIZE UPPER, MIDDLE AND LOWER ATTACH POINTS IDENTIFIED IN IT 427670 1 4 EM 2 PAGE 1 WERE ACCEPTED AS-IS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. ITEMS 1 A 427670 1 5 ND 2 WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BE 427670 1 6 EN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED O 427670 1 7 N THIS PR. THE PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V80-95002 JOB CARD. 427671 1 1 THE DEFORMED ATTACH HOLE COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE 427671 1 2 REWORKED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPOSIT 427671 1 3 ION. THE OVERSIZE AND OUT-OF-ROUND FORWARD AND AFT ATTACHED POINTS IDENT 427671 1 4 IFIED IN ITEM 2 PAGE 1 WAS ACCEPTED AS-IS WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. 427671 1 5 ITEMS 1 AND 2 WERE CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THAT THE PA 427671 1 6 NEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS 427671 1 7 REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V80-95001 427671 1 8 JOB CARD. 427673 1 1 THE MISSING COUNTERBORES IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WERE ACCEPTED AS-I 427673 1 2 S BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVED DISPOSITION. THE OUT-OF-ROUND AND OVERSIZE 427673 1 3 ATTACH POINT HOLES INDENTIFIED IN ITEM 2 PAGE 1 WAS ACCEPTED AS-IS WITH 427673 1 4 UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. ITEM 1 WAS DUE TO THE VENDOR (RI) NOT MACHING 427673 1 5 ING THE PANLE PER DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND ITEM 2 WAS CAUSED BY NORMAL WE 427673 1 6 AR AND TEAR. CONCLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE 427673 1 7 CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. THE PANEL WILL BE 427673 1 8 INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT ON V80-95002 JOB CARD. 427817 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DETECTED THAT RECEPTABLE 50J47 HAD A BROKEN B 427817 1 2 ACKSHELL STRAIN RELIEF. THE DISCREPANT BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACE 427817 1 3 D WITH A NEW SPLIT BACKSHELL PER SRP V-EL-0001-C-0. RETEST OF RECEPTACLE 427817 1 4 50J47 IS NOT REQUIRED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS WORKMANSHIP. 428138 1 1 THIS PR WAS DETECTED DURING S0017 HATCH CLOSURE WHEN DIRT/DEBRIS WAS FOU 428138 1 2 ND IN THE I/E HATCH SEAL GROOVE. THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND THE GROOVE WAS 428138 1 3 CLEANED AND INSPECTED. NO DIRT OR DEBRIS WAS FOUND, BUT ODIXATION OF TH 428138 1 4 E ALUMINUM SURFACE WAS NOTED DURING CLEANING BY A SMALL AMOUNT OF BLACK 428138 1 5 RESIDUE ON THE CLOTH. THE OXIDATION WAS REMOVED BY WIPING THE GROOVE WIT 428138 1 6 H A CLOTH DAMPENED WITH IPA. THE SEAL WAS REINSTALLED, BUT THE LEAK CHEC 428138 1 7 K DURING V1058.004 RUN 2 INDICATED THE SEAL WAS LEAKING. THE HATCH SEAL 428138 1 8 WAS REMOVED, REPLACED AND SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED PER V5087 AND V1047 (SUB 428138 1 9 TASKED TO V5K17). NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: 428138 1 10 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 428829 1 1 DURING V1046.002 IT WAS DETECTED THAT RECEPTACLE 50J43 HAD A BROKEN BACK 428829 1 2 SHELL STRAIN RELIEF. THE DISCREPANT BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED W 428829 1 3 ITH A NEW SPLIT BACKSHELL PER SRP V-EL-0001-C-0. RETEST OF RECEPTACLE 50 428829 1 4 J43 IS NOT REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 429276 1 1 DURING SURV ON 056V-0086 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE YC1449B24 HAD KAPTO 429276 1 2 N AND SHIELD DAMAGE WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE PRIMARY CONDUCTORS. THIS DISCR 429276 1 3 EPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER S 429276 1 4 RP V-EL-0007 AND INSTALLING PTFE TAPE TO PROTECT THE DAMAGED AREA. NO RE 429276 1 5 TEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR 429276 1 6 AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 429512 PMRB 1 ON 4-5-93 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLIGHT 17 OF OV-103. 429512 1 1 DURING SURV IT WAS DETECTED THAT CONNECTOR 50P818 HAD A LOOSE BACKSHELL. 429512 1 2 SINCE THE BACKSHELL COULD NOT BE TORQUED IN PLACE TEFLON TAPE WAS WRAPP 429512 1 3 ED AROUND THE CONNECTOR FOR 1 FLT SINCE DEMATE WOULD HAVE REQUIRED EXTEN 429512 1 4 SIVE WORK. DURING FLT 17 PROCESSING THE CONNECTOR BACKSHELL WAS OPENED A 429512 1 5 ND THE ASSY WAS INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE. THE THREE LOCKING TABS ON CONNECTO 429512 1 6 R 50P818 WERE FOUND SHEARED OFF (REF PG 1A). DISPO WAS TO DEPIN THE WIRE 429512 1 7 S AT 50P818 AND INSERT THE WIRES INTO A NEW CONNECTOR. DURING EXTRACTION 429512 1 8 OF THE WIRES IT WAS DETECTED THAT WIRE 1J114C20-1 HAD EXPOSED CONDUCTOR 429512 1 9 (REF PG 1B). THE DAMAGED AREA WAS REMOVED AND THE WIRES WERE 429512 1 10 RETERMINATED AT 50P818. THE BACKSHELL WAS CLOSED PER SPEC. THE CONNECTOR 429512 1 11 WILL BE MATED PER S5009. RETEST OF CONN 50P818 WILL BE PERFORMED PER 429512 1 12 V1086.001. 429531 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF OMI S1287 WIRE 1B400B20 WAS FOUND TO HAVE EXPOSED 429531 1 2 CONDUCTOR AND BROKEN STRANDS. DUE TO THE RETEST IMPACT AT THE TIME OF TH 429531 1 3 E FLOW, THE DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED VIA CLAMSHELL REPAIR PER MR APPROV 429531 1 4 AL FOR ONE FLIGHT RESTRICTED USE. THE PR WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DEFERRED UNTIL 429531 1 5 NEXT OPF FLOW (FLT 17) FOR SPLICE REPAIR. UPON RETURN FROM FLIGHT DURIN 429531 1 6 G THE OPF FLOW (FLT 17) THE CLAMSHELL WAS REMOVED AND A KSC SPLICE (0613 429531 1 7 ) WAS INSTALLED. AS A RESULT THE REPAIR RETURNS WIRE HARNESS TO A CONFIG 429531 1 8 URATION THAT FULFILLS DESIGN INTENT. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF WIRE 1B400B2 429531 1 9 0 WAS PERFORMED VIA OMI V1278.001 SEQ29 ON 18 MAY 93 BY LSOC OMS/RCS 429531 1 10 ENGINEERING (RIGHT OMS POD HEATERS 28,32,226 GROUP 2). NO FURTHER ACTION 429531 1 11 REQUIRED ON PR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. 429535 1 1 WIRE T147A26 WAS DETECTED AS DAMAGED DURING S1287. SRP V-EL-0004-B-0 WAS 429535 1 2 USED TO REPAIR/SPLICE THE WIRE. DUE TO THE LOCATION OF THE SPLICE, CONV 429535 1 3 OLUTED TUBING WAS INSTALLED BETWEEN CLAMPS TO PREVENT WIRE CHAFFING. AN 429535 1 4 MR WAS ACCEPTED FOR UN-RESTRICTED USE OF TUBING. RETEST OF WIRE WAS SATI 429535 1 5 SFACTORY. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 429541 1 1 DURING SURV, IT WAS FOUND THAT WIRE T167A26 GOING TO CONNECTOR 50P647 HA 429541 1 2 D EXPOSED CONDUCTOR DAMAGE AT THE BACKSHELL TANG. THE WIRE WAS EXTRACTED 429541 1 3 FROM CONNECTOR 50P647, CUT BEHIND THE DAMAGED AREA NEW CONTACTS WERE TH 429541 1 4 EN INSTALLED. THE WIRE WAS THEN RETERMINATED ITO 50P647. PROBABLE CAUSE 429541 1 5 WAS DUE TO WEAR AND TEAR. RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRACKED. 429573 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: THE 45 DOOR WAS REMOVED AFTER THE THIRD LAUNCH ATTEMPT OF 429573 PMRB 2 OV-103 FLIGHT 17. NO ADDITIONAL DISCREPANCIES WERE NOTED DURING DOOR REM 429573 PMRB 3 OVAL. A DEVIATION TO THE V80-94500 JOB CARD WAS WRITTEN TO ALLOW REINSTA 429573 PMRB 4 LLATION OF THE DOOR USING LOCKING COMPOUND PER THE PREVIOUS STEPS. PRELO 429573 PMRB 5 AD IS THE PRIMARY LOCKING FEATURE FOR THE FASTENERS. LOCKING COMPOUND WI 429573 PMRB 6 LL PROVIDE LIGHT LOCKING FORCE TO PREVENT SPINNING OF NUTPLATES DURING R 429573 PMRB 7 EMOVAL. THE REWORK PERFORMED WILL ALLOW THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATES TO FUNC 429573 PMRB 8 TION PER DESIGN. INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS MR ACTION 429573 PMRB 9 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 429573 PMRB 10 IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACITON IS 429573 PMRB 11 FOR ONE FLIGHT RESTRICTED USE. PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVED FOR 429573 PMRB 12 DEFERRAL TO FLT 18 OF OV-103. 09/12/93. MR RATIONALE: FOR ITEMS 3.0 & 4. 429573 PMRB 13 0 PAGE 1B. THREE OF THE THIRTY-EIGHT NUTPLATES AROUND THE PERIMETER OF T 429573 PMRB 14 HE 45 DOOR DO NOT HAVE ACCEPTABLE RUNNING TORQUE. ANOTHER FIVE WERE TAPP 429573 PMRB 15 ED TO REDUCE RUNNING TORQUE TO AN ACCEPTABLE RANGE. MIL-S-22473 GRADE H 429573 PMRB 16 LOCKING COMPOUND WILL BE USED TO RESTORE THE SECONDARY LOCKING DEVICE AT 429573 PMRB 17 LOCATIONS 1,20, AND 24. THIS WILL PREVENT THE FASTENERS FROM BACKING OU 429573 PMRB 18 T IN THE EVENT OF PRELOAD LOSS. PRELOAD IS THE PRIMARY LOCKING FEATURE F 429573 PMRB 19 OR THE ASTENERS. LOCKING COMPOUNT WILL PROVIDE LIGHT LOCKING FORCE TO PR 429573 PMRB 20 EVENT SPINNING OF NUTPLATES DURING REMOVAL. A PERMANENT DEVIATION OF THE 429573 PMRB 21 V80-94500 JOB CARD WAS WRITTEN TO ALLOW THE APPLICATION OF LOCKING COMP 429573 PMRB 22 OUND TO THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATES IN THE EVENT OF DOOR REMOVAL AFTER FLIG 429573 PMRB 23 HT INSTALLATIONS (EG. SCRUB TURNAROUNDS). POST FLIGHT THE LOCKING COMP 429573 PMRB 24 OUND STEPS WILL BE DEVIATED OUT OF THE JOB CARD. MR I.D. NOT REQUIRED 429573 PMRB 25 PER TELECON DOVE SMITH. THE REWORK PERFORMED WILL ALLOW THE DISCREPANT 429573 PMRB 26 NUTPLATES TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY 429573 PMRB 27 THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR 429573 PMRB 28 ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 429573 PMRB 29 THIS MR ACTION IS FOR ONE FLIGHT RESTRICTED USE. 12/10/93 PMRB APPROVED 429573 PMRB 30 FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 19 OF OV-103. 429573 PMRB 31 429573 PMRB 32 MR RATIONALE: UNABLE TO INSTALL THE 70W3160-14 PLATE WITH ITS PER PRINT 429573 PMRB 33 RIVET AND HI-LOK. THE INSTALLED RIVET CANNOT BE REMOVED BECAUSE THE 429573 PMRB 34 FLUSH HEAD OF THE RIVET IS MECHANICALLY TRAPPED BETWEEN THE 70W3113 429573 PMRB 35 SIDEWALL AND 70A3161-3 45 DOOR PAN. THIS MR ACTION IS FOR RESTRICTED 429573 PMRB 36 INSTALLATION TO INSTALL AN MR RETAINER USING THE PER PRINT HI-LOK AND A 429573 PMRB 37 FORWARD HI-LOK AS THE INSTALLATION FASTENERS. MR FIX WILL ALLOW THE INST 429573 PMRB 38 ALLATION TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS 429573 PMRB 39 POSITIVE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED IN THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE 429573 PMRB 40 . THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS M 429573 PMRB 41 R ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONA 429573 PMRB 42 LE OR HAZARDS CONTROL. 03/29/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR RESTRICTED INSTALLATI 429573 PMRB 43 ON, OV-103, DOOR 45 PAN. 429573 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A SPINNING NUTPLATE AT THE UP 429573 1 2 PER ALIGNMENT SCREW FOR FOR THE 45 DOOR. THE CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED 429573 1 3 AS IS FOR ONE FLIGHT AND THE PR WAS DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 17 PROCESSING, TH 429573 1 4 E FASTENER WAS BONDED IN PLACE BECAUSE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT ACCESS TO 429573 1 5 REMOVE AND REPLACE THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE. THE PR WAS DEFERRED TO FLIGH 429573 1 6 T 18 PROCESSING. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION 429573 1 7 . (REF ITEMS 2, 3, AND 4 ON PAGES 1A AND 1B). THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT ADDIT 429573 1 8 IONAL NUTPLATE DEGRADATION AT THE REMAINING FASTENER LOCATIONS AROUND TH 429573 1 9 E PERIMETER OF THE 45 DOOR. FOURTEEN OF THE FASTENERS HAD EXCESSIVE 429573 1 10 RUNNING TORQUE AND WERE TAPPED TO CLEAN THE THREADS. TWELVE FASTENERS 429573 1 11 HAD INSUFFICIENT RUNNING TORQUE. MIL-C 22473 LOCKTITE WAS USED AT THE 429573 1 12 FASTENER LOCATIONS WITH LOW RUNNING TORQUE PER MR DISPOSITION. THESE 429573 1 13 CONDITIONS WERE THEN DEFERRED FOR ONE FLIGHT (TO FLIGHT 18 PROCESSING) 429573 1 14 FOR NUTPLATE R&R. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES IS OPERATIONAL 429573 1 15 DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 5 ON PAGE 1C): THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A FAILED BOND. 429573 1 16 THE BOND WAS TO BE USED TO SECURE THE THE UPPER ALIGNMENT PIN IN PLACE 429573 1 17 AS PART OF THE DEFERRAL TO FLIGHT 18 PROCESSING. THE PROCESS WAS CHANGED 429573 1 18 TO ALLOW THE USE OF KAPTON TAPE TO HOLD THE FASTENER IN PLACE. THIS WAS 429573 1 19 ALLOWED PER RESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS 429573 1 20 INSUFFICIENT SURFACE AREA TO SECURE FASTENER. (REF ITEMS 6 AND 7 ON PAGE 429573 1 21 1D): THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE V070-362070-001 TCS 429573 1 22 CLIPS AND THE REMOVAL OF THE NUTPLATE RETAINERS. TWO OF THE RETAINERS 429573 1 23 WERE BROKEN AND WERE REPLACED WITH NEW CLIPS. THE REMAINING CLIPS WERE 429573 1 24 REMOVED. PER MR DISPOSITION, THE SHANK AND TAIL OF THE RIVET WILL BE 429573 1 25 USED TO INDEX THE NUT PLATE RETAINER. NO ADDITIONAL REWORK WAS REQUIRED. 429573 1 26 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS VENDOR. (REF ITEM 9 ON PAGE 1E): THIS 429573 1 27 ITEM DOCUMENTS A MIS-DRILLED HOLE IN THE 70A3164-16 FRAME. THE HOLE WAS 429573 1 28 MIS-DRILLED DURING MANUFACTURING. THE USE OF A SELF ALIGNING COLLAR WAS 429573 1 29 APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR DISPOSITION AT THE LOCATION OF THE 429573 1 30 MISDRILLED HOLE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS VENDOR. (REF ITEM 10 ON 429573 1 31 PAGE 1F): THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS THE INABILITY TO REMOVE THE 429573 1 32 MD121-0001-0610 RIVET AT THE LOWER AFT RETAINER LOCATION. THE RIVET WAS 429573 1 33 COVERED BY THE UMBILICAL PAN. BASED ON THE BUILD PROCESS, THIS RIVET 429573 1 34 CANNOT BE REMOVED. PER MR DISPOSITION, THE SHANK AND TAIL OF THE RIVET 429573 1 35 WAS LEFT IN PLACE, A NEW MR RETAINER WAS FABRICATED TO PICK UP AN 429573 1 36 ADJACENT FASTENER FOR INDEXING. NO ADDITIONAL REWORK WAS REQUIRED. 429573 1 37 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS VENDOR. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 429573 1 38 ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. ALL NUT PLATES HAVE BEEN REPLACED PER 429573 1 39 DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. 429857 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CER 429857 PMRB 2 TIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) 429857 PMRB 3 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. MR RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPRO 429857 PMRB 4 VAL FOR RESTRICTED USE FOR ONE FLIGHT TO FLY WITH THE V070-339775-011 FL 429857 PMRB 5 OODLIGHT COVER NOT INSTALLED. THE COVER HAS NOT YET BEEN LOCATED. A NEW 429857 PMRB 6 COVER IS UNAVAILABLE. BECAUSE THE COVER IS MATCH DRILLED, A COVER FROM A 429857 PMRB 7 NOTHER VEHICLE WILL NOT FIT. THIS COVER IS USED TO CLOSEOUT THE PIN CONN 429857 PMRB 8 ECTOR AND THE OPENING WHERE IT TIES INTO THE WIRE HARNESS. THE AREA IS 429857 PMRB 9 TAPED OVER WITH APPROVED TAPE. THE TAPE WILL PERFORM THE SAME FUNCTION 429857 PMRB 10 AS THE PER PRINT COVER. THE VERIFIED COPY (103 FLT 15) OF JC V30-13333 429857 PMRB 11 WAS REVIEWED. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF V070-339775-011 COVER, ALL OTHER 429857 PMRB 12 PARTS THAT WERE REMOVED WERE PROPERLY DOCUMENTED AS HAVING BEEN 429857 PMRB 13 REINSTALLED. THIS INSTALLATION WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN 429857 PMRB 14 INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE COVER AND INSTALLATION ARE 429857 PMRB 15 SECONDARY STRUCTURE. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. ON 4-7-93 PMRB APPROVED FOR 429857 PMRB 16 DEFERRAL TO FLT 17 OF OV-103. DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST PROGRAM 429857 PMRB 17 MATERIAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED USE, FUTURE FLIGHT TO FLY 429857 PMRB 18 WITH THE V070-339775-011 COVER NOT INSTALLED. A NEW COVER HAS BEEN 429857 PMRB 19 OBTAINED FROM THE VENDOR WHICH NEEDS TO BE MATCH DRILLED FROM THE 429857 PMRB 20 EXISTING SUPPORTS. THERE IS NO ACCESS TO PERFORM THIS OPERATION WITH THE 429857 PMRB 21 CCTV MONITOR INSTALLED. THE FIBERGLASS COVER GOES OVER TOP OF THE 429857 PMRB 22 FLOODLIGHT PIN CONNECTOR AND A SMALL OPENING WHERE IT TIES INTO THE WIRE 429857 PMRB 23 HARNESS. THIS AREA WILL BE TAPED UP WITH 528-41798-6 2" WIDE GENERAL 429857 PMRB 24 PURPOSE TAPE. THIS INSTALLATION WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN 429857 PMRB 25 INTENT. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 429857 PMRB 26 BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL 429857 PMRB 27 ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARDS CONTROLS. ON 07/13/93 429857 PMRB 28 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLIGHT (CCTV MONITOR REMOVAL) OF 429857 PMRB 29 OV-103. 429857 1 1 THE MISSING V070-339775-011 COVER INDENTIFED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WAS FOUN 429857 1 2 D MISSING DURING FLIGHT 16 (STS-056) PROCESSING. A NEW COVER WAS NOT AVA 429857 1 3 ILABLE UNTIL AFTER LAUNCH AND THEREFORE, THE OPENING WAS COVERED WITH TA 429857 1 4 PE AND THIS PR DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 17 (STS-051) WITH PMRB APPROVAL. DURIN 429857 1 5 G FLIGHT 17 PROCESSING ACCESS TO DRILL ATTACH HOLES IN THE NEW COVER WAS 429857 1 6 NOT AVAILABLE (REQUIRED CCTV REMOVAL). THIS PR WAS DEFERRED UNTIL THIS 429857 1 7 FLOW FLIGHT 18 (STS-060). ACCESS WAS MADE AVAILABLE AND THE NEW COVER WA 429857 1 8 S INSTALLED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. RC ACTION WAS TAKEN TO DETERMINE 429857 1 9 LOSS OF ORIGINAL PANEL AND THEY DETERMINED THAT THE V30-13333 JC WAS 429857 1 10 INADVERTENTLY CLOSED PRIOR TO PANEL INSTALLATION. CAUSE OF LOST PANEL IS 429857 1 11 WORKMANSHIP DURING V30-13333 JC. CONCLUDE THAT THE PANEL HAS BEEN 429857 1 12 INSTALLED PER PRINT AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 430964 1 1 DURING V75-40001, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT LH T-0 CONNECTOR SAVER 50J59 WA 430964 1 2 S MISSING. RECEPTACLE 50J59 WAS INSPECTED FOR ANOMALIES WHICH NONE WERE 430964 1 3 FOUND. A NEW CONNECTOR SAVER WAS INSTALLED. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RETEST 430964 1 4 IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURE ERROR/WORKMANSHIP. 431011 1 1 WHEN FUEL CELL 3 WAS RECONNECTED TO MAIN BUS C DURING S0028 AC 3 PHASE A 431011 1 2 INVERTER TRIPPED OFF DUE TO AN RC BUS OVERLOAD. DATA RETRIEVALS REVEALE 431011 1 3 D NO OVERLOAD AND SUBSEQUENT T/S ISOLATED THE PROBLEM TO THE INVERTER. T 431011 1 4 HE INVERTER WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. THE OLD INVERTER WAS SENT TO RSC F 431011 1 5 OR REPAIR. A FUNCTIONAL RETEST OF THE NEW INVERTER WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER 431011 1 6 OMI V1003 INCLUDING A DEV TO VERIFY THE INVERTER OVERLOAD CIRCUIT. PROBA 431011 1 7 BLE CAUSE IS ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 431080 1 1 DURING V31-14177, WIRE HARNESS W68 HAS FOUND TO BE PULLING HARD AGAINST 431080 1 2 SECURING BANDAID. EXCESS WIRE WAS FOUND TO BE COILED UNDER BANDAID. THE 431080 1 3 BANDAID WAS REMOPVED AND SOME OF THE EXCESS WIRE WAS REMOVED TO PREVENT 431080 1 4 STRAIN IN WIRE. A NEW BANDAID WAS THEN RE-INSTALLED. NO FURTHER ACTION R 431080 1 5 EQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ORIGINAL BANDAID WAS INSTALLED INCOR 431080 1 6 RECTLY. 431083 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING J/C V31-14177, ZONAL DETAIL INSPECTION INTE 431083 1 2 RNAL RH WHEEL WELL. ITEM 1: MR APPROVAL WAS REQUESTED AND GRANTED TO MR 431083 1 3 BLEND THE RAISED METAL EDGES OF THE RH MLG DOOR CLEVIS WHICH INTERFACES 431083 1 4 WITH THE V070-510452 MLG DOOR RETRACT MECHANISM LINK ASSY. AFTER REPAIR, 431083 1 5 THE CLEVIS WAS THEN CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR ID'S. DISCREPANT CONDITI 431083 1 6 ON NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. ITE 431083 1 7 M 2-GOUGES DETERMINED TO BE SCRATCHES IN PROTECTIVE COATING WHICH DID NO 431083 1 8 T PRODUCE ROUGH METAL EDGES ON THE AFT SIDE OF THE V070-510452 DOOR RETR 431083 1 9 ACT LINK ASSY. DISCREPANT AREA WAS CLEANED AND CORROSION PROTECTED. MLG 431083 1 10 RETRACT/EXTEND RETEST CYCLE INDICATED NO METAL TO METAL CONTACT BETWEEN 431083 1 11 DOOR CLEVIS AND RETRACT LINKE ASSY. DISCREPANT CONDITION NO LONGER 431083 1 12 EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. RETEST FOR ITEM 431083 1 13 1 WILL BE PERFORMED PER STEP 2-6. NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR ITEM 2. 431110 1 1 AFTER DOOR REMOVAL, EVIDENCE OF INTERFERENCE WAS FOUND ON THE 70W3402-2 431110 1 2 DOOR 44 PLATE AND THE 70W2102-5 XO750 FRAME ASSY. CONTACT WAS EVIDENT ON 431110 1 3 BOTH THE FWD AND AFT ENDS OF THE DOOR INDICATING THIS IS A FIT PROBLEM 431110 1 4 AND NOT A POSITIONING PROBLEM. BY CHAMFERING THE FWD OTBD EDGE OF THE XO 431110 1 5 750 FRAME PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPO, THE INTERFERENCE WAS ALLEVIATED WHI 431110 1 6 CH WILL PROPER DOOR INSTALLATION. KOROPON WAS APPLIED TO AREAS OF BARE M 431110 1 7 ETAL. CONTACT NOTED ON THE FWD END OF THE DOOR WAS MINOR AND RESULTED IN 431110 1 8 NO METAL DISPLACEMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS BUILD UP OF TOLERA 431110 1 9 NCE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED. 431229 1 1 CONNECTOR 56P573 PIN D HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER SRP-002 AND WAS RETESTED PE 431229 1 2 R V9002.05 ON 07 MAY 1993. THIS PR MAY NOW BE CLOSED. PROBABLE CAUSE: MA 431229 1 3 TERIAL DEGRADATION. 431342 1 1 THE CARRIER PANEL WAS BENT. AS A REPAIR, THE FIB WAS PARTIALLY REMOVED. 431342 1 2 THE PANEL WAS THEN BENT BACK WITH MRB APPROVAL AND INSPECTED WITH DYE PE 431342 1 3 NETRANT. NO CRACKS WERE FOUND, SO THE CARRIER PANEL WAS CORROSION PROTEC 431342 1 4 TED AND THE FIB WAS REBONDED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PRO 431342 1 5 BABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 431593 1 1 TEH FWD/UPPER CARRIER PANEL HOLE IN THE 28-01 DOOR IS ELONGATED. THIS CO 431593 1 2 NDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: DISCREPANC 431593 1 3 Y WAS PICKED DURING CARRIER PANEL REMOVAL DUE TO DRILLING OUT A CAPTIVE 431593 1 4 FASTENER WITH A BROKEN SPINNING RECEPTACLE. 431690 1 1 DURING FLT 16 STS-56 FUEL CELL 1 SUB STACK 3 DELTA VOLTAGE WOULD INCREAS 431690 1 2 E DURING A FUEL CELL PURGE AND THEN GRADUALLY DECREASE BETWEEN PURGES. T 431690 1 3 HE INCREASE DURING EACH PURGE WAS A FEW MILLIVOLTS LARGER WITH EACH SUCC 431690 1 4 EEDING PURGE. THIS ANOMALY IS INDICATIVE OF OXYGEN PURGE PORT PLUGGING I 431690 1 5 N ONE OR MORE CELLS IN SUBSTACK 3. THIS PROBLEM IS DOCUMENTED AS IFA STS 431690 1 6 56-V-12. REPAIR OF THE FUEL CELL COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED AT KSC. AS A 431690 1 7 RESULT FUEL CELL 1 S/N 104 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH S/N 106. ALL R 431690 1 8 ETEST HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULL AND THE SYSTEM HAS BEEN RETURNED TO FLIGHT CO 431690 1 9 FIGURATION. S/N 104 HAS BEEN RETURNED TO THE VENDOR (INTERNATIONAL FUEL 431690 1 10 CELLS) FOR REPAIR. THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM IS DUE TO A CORROSION 431690 1 11 BUILDUP WHICH RESTRICTS OR BLOCKS THE OXYGEN PORTS ON INDIVIDUAL CELLS 431690 1 12 WITHIN THE FUEL CELL STACK. THE RESTRICTION PREVENTS INERT REMOVAL 431690 1 13 DURING FUEL CELL PURGING OPERATIONS AND EVENTUALLY CAUSES THE POWSER 431690 1 14 OUTPUT OF THE FUEL CELL TO DEGRADE. THE CORROSION IS THE PRODUCT OF A 431690 1 15 REACTION BETWEEN THE CATALYST (KOH) AND THE CELL FRAME. SINCE OXYGEN IS 431690 1 16 AN OXIDIZER THE CORROSION IS USUALLY FOUND ON THE OXYGEN SIDE OF THE 431690 1 17 CELL 431691 1 1 ITEM 1: UNABLE TO REMOVE THE FWD/OUTBD WCS FASTENER. THE FLOATING NUTPLA 431691 1 2 TE IS DISCREPANT. THE FASTENER HEAD WAS GROUND OFF AND THE NUTPLATE WAS 431691 1 3 REMOVED AND REPLACED. ITEM 2: THERE WAS NO ACCESS TO REMOVE THE OUTBD NU 431691 1 4 TPLATE INSTALLATION RIVET DUE TO THE V070-334463-008 RETAINER LAYING OVE 431691 1 5 RTOP. THE PORTION OF THE RETAINER OVER THE RIVET WAS NOTCHED OUT, PROVID 431691 1 6 ING ACCESS TO REMOVE THE RIVET. PER MR SECTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL O 431691 1 7 PERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 431774 1 1 DURING SURV IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BACKSHELL ON 50V77W31P715 WAS LOO 431774 1 2 SE. THE BACKSHELL WAS OPENED AND INSPECTION FOUND THAT THE LOCKING TEETH 431774 1 3 HAD MODERATE WEAR. THE DISCREPANT BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND A NEW BACKS 431774 1 4 HELL (OCN # D7-09126-04) INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AN 431774 1 5 D TEAR. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. 431822 1 1 DURING 051V-0002 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRES P947A26, P943A26, AND P946 431822 1 2 A26 AT CONN 50P796 HAD EXPOSED CONDUCTOR. THE WIRES GOING 50P796 WERE CU 431822 1 3 T BEYOND THE DAMAGED AREA AND THE WIRE SEGMENTS ALONG WITH CONNECTOR 50P 431822 1 4 796 WERE BAGGED AND ATTACHED TO MPS-3-17-1131. APPROX 12" OF NEW WIRE SE 431822 1 5 GMENT WAS SPLICED ONTO WIRES P947A26, P946A26, P943B26 AND P942C22 USING 431822 1 6 SPLICES KSC-0614 THRU KSC-0618 AND TERMINATED TO NEW CONN 50P796 99447- 431822 1 7 0000589. THIS RETURNS HARNESS ASSY TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON DESIGN CONDI 431822 1 8 TION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PER 431822 1 9 FORMANCE OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND 431822 1 10 TEAR. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. 432008 1 1 AS AN ENHANCEMENT TO A PREVIOUS MR REPAIR, A ROSAN THREADED INSERT WAS I 432008 1 2 NSTALLED TO REPLACE A DAMAGED. INACCESSIBLE NUTPLATE. THIS REPAIR ELIMIN 432008 1 3 ATES THE NEED TO DRILL OUT A BLIND BOLT EVERY TIME PANEL REMOVAL IS REQU 432008 1 4 IRED. CONCLUDE THAT THIS INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. 432067 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) DURING V6028, THE V070-298112-019 THERMAL BARRIER 432067 1 2 SPRING SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED. THE SEAL WAS REPLACED PER PRINT RE 432067 1 3 QUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO 432067 1 4 FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 432095 1 1 DURING V35-40007, IT WAS DETECTED THAT RETAINER V070-565318 WOULD NOT SC 432095 1 2 REW FROM THE INNER MONOBALL PLATE. THE WIRES AT 50P537 WERE DEPINNED IN 432095 1 3 ORDER TO REMOVE THE MONOBALL PLATE FROM THE ORBITER IN ORDER TO REMOVE T 432095 1 4 HE RETAINER. DURING EXTRACTION, 3 WIRES COULD NOT BE EXTRACTED AND A PAG 432095 1 5 E 1A GENERATED. DISPO WAS ADDED TO CUT CONTACTS AND INSTALL NEW ONES. A 432095 1 6 DIFFERENT SHIFT TECH FOUND THE WRONG EXTRACTION TOOL WAS BEING USED AND 432095 1 7 EXGTRACTED THE WIRES BUT THE CONNECTOR WAS DAMAGED. THE DAMAGED CONNECTO 432095 1 8 R WAS REPLACED IN THE ORIGINAL 1A DISPO. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON T 432095 1 9 HIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING 432095 1 10 PROCESSING. 432152 1 1 THE NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED ON STR-3-15-4337 USING BLIND RIVETS WITH MRB 432152 1 2 APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. UPON REMOVAL OF THE SPAR FITTING IT WAS D 432152 1 3 ISCOVERED THAT ONE OF THESE RIVETS HAD BEEN INSTALLED INCORRECTLY. BOTH 432152 1 4 RIVETS WERE REMOVED AND PER PRINT RIVETS WERE INSTALLED RETURNING THE IN 432152 1 5 STALLATION TO PRINT CONDITION. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PR 432152 1 6 OBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 432350 1 1 THE PAINT PEELED OFF DUE TO IMPROPER CORROSION PROTECTION BY THE VENDOR. 432350 1 2 THE KOROPON FAILED TO ADHERE TO THE UNDERLYING SURFACE. THE AREA WAS SA 432350 1 3 NDED TO BARE METAL THEN CHEMFILMED, KOROPONED AND COATED WITH A WHITE TO 432350 1 4 P COAT. A PAGE 1A WAS INITIATED WHEN SOME ADDITIONAL PAINT WAS REMOVED W 432350 1 5 ITH THE MASKING TAPE. THIS AREA WAS ALSO TOUCHED UP AS BEFORE. THIS IS A 432350 1 6 RETURN TO PRINT REPAIR. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE 432350 1 7 CAUSE: VENDOR. 432353 1 1 DURING V31-15106 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRES 1G134A26 AND 1G129A26 HAD 432353 1 2 KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO SHIELD DAMAGE. INITIAL DISPOSITION WAS WRITTEN TO 432353 1 3 RETERMINATE THE TWO NOTED CABLES INTO CONN 50P486. HOWEVER DURING THE 432353 1 4 PERFORMANCE OF THE NOTED PROCEDURE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE WIRES WERE 432353 1 5 OF INSUFFICCIENT LENGTH TO RETERMINATE (ITEM 2 PAGE 1A). THE TWO NOTED 432353 1 6 WIRES WERE THEN REPAIRED PER SRP-0007 BY INSTALLING MYSTIK 7503 TAPE. 432353 1 7 PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 432353 1 8 ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. RETEST OF CONN 50P486 WILL BE PER SCAN. 432414 1 1 THIS PR IS A DUPLICATE OF STR-3-17-4587. NO NEW DISCREPANCY EXISTS. REF 432414 1 2 ATTACHED COPY OF STR-3-17-4587 PAGE1. PROBABLE CAUSE: FLIGHT. 432472 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING ROUTING SURV OF THE INTERNAL LH WHEEL WELL. 432472 1 2 MR APPROVAL WAS REQUESTED AND GRANTED TO MR BLEND THE RAISED METAL EDGE 432472 1 3 S OF THE LH MLG DOOR CLEVIS WHICH INTERFACES WITH THE V070-510452 MLG DO 432472 1 4 OR RETRACT MECHANISM LINK ASSY. AFTER REPAIR, THE CLEVIS WAS CORROSION P 432472 1 5 ROTECTED AND MR ID'D. MLG RETRACT/EXTEND RETEST CYCLE INDICATED NO METAL 432472 1 6 -TO-METAL CONTACT BETWEEN DOOR CLEVIS AND RETRACT LINK ASSY. DISCREPANT 432472 1 7 CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATI 432472 1 8 ON. 432472 1 9 ON. 432599 1 1 DURING V3115114, CABLE 4F246A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE WA 432599 1 2 S WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED 432599 1 3 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO ORBITER PROCESS 432599 1 4 ING. 432600 1 1 DURING V31-15105 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLES 1YK260A24 AND 1YK259A24 HAD 432600 1 2 KAPTON DAMAGE AT THE BACKSHELL OF CONNECTOR 54P32. CABLE 1ZK361B24 ALSO 432600 1 3 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA. THE DAMAGED CABLES WERE REM 432600 1 4 OVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW CABLES. CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HYPOT CHECK 432600 1 5 S WERE PERFORMED ON THE NEW CABLES. RETEST OF THE CONNECTORS DEMATED ON 432600 1 6 THIS PR WILL BE RETESTED PER SCAN TRACK. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR 432600 1 7 WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 432621 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT CRUSHING OF THE V070-351993 SEALS BY T 432621 1 2 HE ET DOOR HINGES ON THE RH AND LH ET DOOR CAVITIES. THE SEALS WERE REMO 432621 1 3 VED AND REPLACED. THE NEW SEALS WERE SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED PER INK IMPRE 432621 1 4 SSIONS AND STOP BOLT GAP CHECKS. INITIAL CHECK OF LH ET DOOR STOP BOLTS 432621 1 5 WERE HIGH IN THE FWD OUTBOARD CORNER, BUT WERE REDUCED TO WITHIN ALLOWED 432621 1 6 SPECIFICATIONS AFTER THE TPS GROUP MADE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE THERMAL BARR 432621 1 7 IERS IN THAT REGION (REFERENCE OPERATION 4). NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. PRO 432621 1 8 BABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. REPLACED LH (LH2) INBD AND RH (L 432621 1 9 O2) INBD SELAS, BOTH P/N V070-351993-003. 432636 1 1 DURING V31-13115 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTORS 81V77W8P3001 AND 81V7 432636 1 2 7W8P3002 MATED TO 81V52A31J1 & J2 HAD SIDE TO SIDE MOVEMENT. THIS CONDIT 432636 1 3 ION IS NORMAL FOR CONNECTORS 81P3001 AND 81P3002. THE SIDE TO SIDE MOVEM 432636 1 4 ENT IS A FACTOR OF THE CONNECTOR'S COUPLING RING (WHICH LOCKS THE CONNEC 432636 1 5 TOR ONTO IT'S MATE), BEING HELD IN PLACE BY A "WAVE WASHER", AND THE EXT 432636 1 6 ENSIVE AMOUNT OF HARDWARE ATTACHED TO THE CONNECTOR. IN ORDER FOR THIS C 432636 1 7 ONNECTOR TO LOCK IN THE MATED CONDITION THE COUPLING RING HAS TO HAVE SO 432636 1 8 ME PLAY, A CONDITION THAT CAN AND DOES VARY FROM CONNECTOR TO CONNECTOR 432636 1 9 DUE TO FABRICATION TOLERANCES. NO HARDWARE NONCONFORMANCE EXISTS. 432636 1 10 PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 432647 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF JC V31-15101, WIRE T1257A26-2 WAS FOUND TO HAVE IN 432647 1 2 SULATION DAMAGE. THE DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY REMOVING AND RESPLICIN 432647 1 3 G NEW DESIGN SPLICES 50SP901, 50SP902, AND 50SP903; AND CUTTING AWAY DAM 432647 1 4 AGED SECTION OF WIRE T1257A26-2. AS A RESULT, THE WIRE HARNESS ASSY WAS 432647 1 5 RETURNED TO DRAWING/FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. THE SPLICES AND WIRE T1257A26 432647 1 6 SUPPORT OMS MEASUREMENT REF DES V43T6239A1. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST WAS PERF 432647 1 7 OMRED VIA FIRING ROOM HARDCOPY, ON 20 MAY 1993. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIR 432647 1 8 ED ON PR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. 432648 1 1 DURING V31-15101-AR01 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLE T1990A26 EXPOSED CONDUC 432648 1 2 TOR. FURTHER INSPECTION REVEALED THERE WAS NO EXPOSED CONDUCTOR BY ONLY 432648 1 3 DAMAGED SHIELD JACKET INSULATION EXPOSING THE SHIELD. THE DAMAGED WAS RE 432648 1 4 PAIRED BY WRAPPING THE AREA WITH MYSTIK 7503 TAPE PER SRP-V-EL-0007-C-0. 432648 1 5 THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO RETEST IS R 432648 1 6 EQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 432704 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS FOUR AREAS OF CORROSION ON TH 432704 1 2 E R/H WING LEADING EDGE SPAR BEHIND RCC PANEL 13. THE CORROSION FOUND IS 432704 1 3 SUPERFICIAL. LOCATION 1 WAS FOUND TO HAVE THE MOST SEVERE CORROSION AT 432704 1 4 SEVEN THOUSANDS TOTAL DEPTH. ALL LOCATIONS SHOWING EVIDENCE OF CORROSION 432704 1 5 WERE ETCHED WITH TURCO METAL GLO NO 6 AND BLENDED OUT. CORROSION PROTEC 432704 1 6 TIVE FINISHES WERE APPLIED. ALL WORK PERFORMED PER THIS PR WAS COVERED B 432704 1 7 Y UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. (REF ITEM 2 PAGE 1A) THE RIVETS REMOVED T 432704 1 8 O REWORK CORROSION COULD NOT BE REINSTALLED DUE TO ACCESS REQUIREMENTS F 432704 1 9 OR INSTALLATION TOOL. AT THESE LOCATIONS, THE FASTENER HOLES WERE 432704 1 10 ENLARGED TO ACCEPT MD128-0002-0203 JO-BOLTS. THIS SUBSTITUTION WAS 432704 1 11 PERFORMED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1A) THIS 432704 1 12 ITEM DOCUMENTS A MISHAP DURING RIVET REMOVAL FOR CORROSION REWORK. THE 432704 1 13 CENTER PUNCH USED DURING REMOVAL IMPACTED THE SPAR STRUCTURE AND LEFT AN 432704 1 14 IMPRESSION. THE IMPRESSION MEASURED 0.018 DEEP 0.08" FROM THE EDGE OF 432704 1 15 THE FASTENER HOLE. THE DEFECT WAS BLENDED OUT TO REMOVE STRESS RISERS 432704 1 16 AND FILLED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. A MODIFIED MD153-0018-0001 WASHER 432704 1 17 WAS INSTALLED TO RESTORE FASTENER BEARING SURFACE. THIS WORK WAS 432704 1 18 PERFORMED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM 432704 1 19 ONLY IS WORKMANSHIP. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEMS 1 AND 2 IS ENVIRONMENTAL 432704 1 20 CONTAMINATION AND NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 432704 1 21 ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 432706 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGES 1 AND 1A). THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS ELEVEN AREAS 432706 1 2 OF CORROSION ON THE R/H WING LEADING EDGE SPAR BEHIND RCC PANEL 12. NO E 432706 1 3 VIDENCE OF CORROSION WAS FOUND AT LOCATION 11 AND MINOR CORROSION WAS FO 432706 1 4 UND AT THE OTHER TEN LOCATIONS. LOCATION 10 WAS FOUND TO HAVE THE MOST S 432706 1 5 EVERE CORROSION AT 15.4 THOUSANDTHS TOTAL DEPTH. ALL LOCATIONS SHOWING E 432706 1 6 VIDENCE OF CORROSION WERE ETCHED WITH TURCO METAL GLO 6 AND BLENDED OUT. 432706 1 7 AT LOCATION 10 A 0.094 HOLE WAS DRILLED THROUGH THE SPAR AND PLUGGED WI 432706 1 8 TH A MD121-0003-03 RIVET. CORROSION PROTECTIVE FINISHES WERE APPLIED. AL 432706 1 9 L WORK PERFORMED PER THIS PR WAS COVERED BY UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. 432706 1 10 PROBABLE CAUSE IS ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION AND NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 432706 1 11 NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 432897 1 1 THE V070-856782-002 BRACKET COULD NOT BE INSTALLED AS ORIGINALLY DESIGNE 432897 1 2 D DUE TO TWO PREVIOUS MR CONDITIONS: A) A POTTED INSERT, AND B) A MISLOC 432897 1 3 ATED BRACKET ALREADY INSTALLED. THE POTTED INSERT PREVENTED FO-BOLT INST 432897 1 4 ALLATION THROUGH THE FACESHEET SO THE JO-BOLT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE WITH MR 432897 1 5 B APPROVAL. THIS RESOLVED THE FIRST ISSUE. THE V070-356490-002 BRACKET I 432897 1 6 S USED AS A REF FOR LOCATING THE V070-856782-002 BRACKET. THE -490 BRACK 432897 1 7 ET, HOWEVER, WAS MOVED PER MR YY5899-000M CAUSING THE NEW -782 BRACKET T 432897 1 8 O BE MISLOCATED BY THE SAME AMOUNT. MRB APPROVAL WAS USED TO CHANGE THE 432897 1 9 LOCATING DIMENSION TO KEEP THE -782 BRACKET WHERE IT WAS DESIGNED TO BE. 432897 1 10 THIS MRB ACTION WAS FOR DOCUMENTATION ONLY. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DNOE 432897 1 11 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR RESPONSIBILITY. 432898 1 1 THE V070-856782-001 BRACKET WAS LOCATED AND HOLES WERE MATCH DRILLED 1.3 432898 1 2 " FARTHER FWD THAN INTENDED BY THE DESIGN. THIS ERROR OCCURED BECAUSE TH 432898 1 3 E BRACKET WHICH THIS BRACKET IS LOCATED BY ON THE EO WAS ALSO LOCATED TO 432898 1 4 O FAR FWD. NO DOCUMENTATION WAS FOUND DOCUMENTING THE CHANGE IN THE LOCA 432898 1 5 TION OF THE ORIGINAL BRACKET. BECAUSE THE BRACKET LOCATION WITH RESPECT 432898 1 6 TO A STIFFENER BEHIND THE HONEYCOMB FACESHEET WAS CHANGED, THE LOCATION 432898 1 7 OF THE LONGER GRIP JO-BOLT ALSO CHANGED. THIS WAS PERFORMED WITH MRB APP 432898 1 8 ROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBA 432898 1 9 BLE CAUSE: VENDOR RESPONSIBILITY. 432900 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: FRCS ATTACH POINT 1: THERE IS MINOR PITTING WITH 432900 PMRB 2 SIGNS OF CORROSION AROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE HOLE AND THERE SHOULD NOT 432900 PMRB 3 BE. THE PITTING IS LOCATED FROM 1 TO 6 O'CLOCK. ALL VISIBLE CORROSION 432900 PMRB 4 WAS REMOFED AND EXPOSED METAL WILL BE CORROSION PROTECTED. THIS WILL 432900 PMRB 5 RETARD FUTURE PITTING GROWTH. THE VISIBLE PITS ACCOUNT FOR LESS THAN 1% 432900 PMRB 6 OF THE TOTAL BEARING SURFACE. MR FIX WILL ALLOW THE INSTALLATION TO 432900 PMRB 7 FUNCTION PER DESING INTENT AND DOES NOT COMPROMISE THE SAGETY OF THE 432900 PMRB 8 INSTALLATION. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY REMAINS POSITIVE. POST FLIGHT DISPO 432900 PMRB 9 WILL BE BASED ON BUSHING REMOVAL. REMOVAL OF THE BUSHING WILL REQUIRE 432900 PMRB 10 TILE REMOCVAL. PRIMRAY STRUCTURE. THIS PR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL 432900 PMRB 11 RETENTION RATIONAL OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 432900 PMRB 12 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. MR PART MARKING ON PG 6. PMRB 432900 PMRB 13 UPDATE: 05/25/93 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (FRCS REMOVAL) 432900 PMRB 14 OF OV-103. 432900 1 1 ITEM 1: FRCS ATTACH POINT 1 BOLT HOLE IS GALLED AND HAS THREAD MARKS. TH 432900 1 2 E SHARP EDGES OF THE THREAD MARKS WERE SMOOTHED OUT AND MR ACCEPTED FOR 432900 1 3 UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2: FRCS ATTACH POINT 2 BOLT HOLE IS GALLED AND HA 432900 1 4 S THREAD MARKS. THE SHARP EDGES OF THE THREAD MARKS WERE SMOOTHED OUT AN 432900 1 5 D MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 3: FRCS ATTACH POINT 1 HAS PITT 432900 1 6 ING CORROSION AROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE V070-311063-002 BUSHING. THE B 432900 1 7 USHING WAS REMOVED AND THE PITTING/CORROSION WAS BLENDED INTO THE ADJACE 432900 1 8 NT MATERIAL ELIMINATING ACTIVE CORROSION PER MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. A 432900 1 9 NEW BUSHING WAS INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 432901 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: FRCS ATTACH PIONT 13 RETAINER HAS SEPARATED FROM THE 432901 PMRB 2 BARREL NUT. THE RETAINER CAN NOT BE RETRIEVED. LAF-3-17-0347 DOCUMENTS 432901 PMRB 3 THIS DISCREPANCY. THE RETAINER PUTS THE BARREL NUT IN SLIGHT TENSION AND 432901 PMRB 4 RETARDS THE BARREL NUT'S MOVEMENT. FRCS ATTACH POINT 13 HARDWARE WAS TE 432901 PMRB 5 MPORARILY INSTALLED TO FLIGHT TORQUE AND THEN REMOVED WITH THE RETAINER 432901 PMRB 6 MISSING. ACCESS TO R&R THE BARREL NUT AND RETAINER REQUIRES REMOVAL OF T 432901 PMRB 7 WO TILE. MR ACCEPTING THIS CONDITION FOR RESTRICTED USE WILL ALLOW THE I 432901 PMRB 8 NSTALLATION TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT. THIS IS NOT A SAFETY OF FLIGH 432901 PMRB 9 T CONCERN. POST FLIGHT DISPO WILL R&R THE BARREL NUT AND RETAINER. THIS 432901 PMRB 10 MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION 432901 PMRB 11 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 432901 PMRB 12 BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. PRIMARY STRUCTURE. MR PART MARKED ON PAGE 2. 432901 PMRB 13 PRIME BOARD ACTION: PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLIGHT (FRCS 432901 PMRB 14 REMOVAL) OF OV-103 06/08/93. 432901 1 1 ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3: GALLING AND THREAD MARKS AT ATTACH POINTS 13, 14 AND 432901 1 2 15 WERE REPAIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MR APPROVED PROCEDURE. PROBABLE CAUS 432901 1 3 E: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION AND NORMAL WEAR. ITEM 4, RETAINING THE CLIP B 432901 1 4 REAKAGE AT FRCS ATTACH POINT 13: NEW RETAINING CLIP AND BARREL NUT WERE 432901 1 5 INSTALLED, RETURNING INSTALLATION TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAU 432901 1 6 SE: MATERIAL DEGRADATION AND FAILURE. ITEM 5, LOSS OF NEWLY INSTALLED RE 432901 1 7 TAINING CLIP AT FRCS ATTACH POINT 13: NEW RETAINER AND BARREL NUT HAVE B 432901 1 8 EEN INSTALLED, RETURNING THE INSTALLATION TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. PROB 432901 1 9 ABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 432902 1 1 THE CORROSION IN ITEM 1 WAS RESTRICTED TO SURFACE CORROSION AND MR ACCEP 432902 1 2 TED AS IS WITH MRB APPROVAL. THE RTV WHICH IS DEGRADING COULD NOT BE FOU 432902 1 3 ND ON ANY ASSOCIATED DRAWING AND WAS ACCEPTED AS IS WITH MRB APPROVAL. N 432902 1 4 O FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRAD 432902 1 5 ATION. 432903 1 1 THE CORROSION IN ITEM 1 WAS RESTRICTED TO SURFACE CORROSION AND MR ACCEP 432903 1 2 TED AS IS WITH MRB APPROVAL. THE RTV WHICH IS DEGRADING (ITEM 2) COULD N 432903 1 3 OT BE FOUND ON ANY ASSOCIATED DRAWING AND WAS ACCEPTED AS IS WITH MRB AP 432903 1 4 PROVAL. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATION 432903 1 5 AL DEGRADATION. 432904 1 1 THE CORROSION IN ITEM 1 WAS RESTRICTED TO SURFACE CORROSION AND MR ACCEP 432904 1 2 TED AS IS WITH MRB APPROVAL. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROB 432904 1 3 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 432905 1 1 THE CORROSION IN ITEM 1 WAS RESTRICTED TO SURFACE CORROSION AND MR ACCEP 432905 1 2 TED AS IS WITH MRB APPROVAL. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROB 432905 1 3 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 432906 1 1 THE "SCORCHED" AREA WAS ACTUALLY A BUILD UP OF RTV DEPOSITS. THE DEFORME 432906 1 2 D RETAINER WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 432906 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 432953 1 1 THE V070-351683-001 BRACKET WAS BADLY CRACKED. IT WAS REMOVED AND REPLAC 432953 1 2 ED. LONGER FASTENERS WERE USED FOR REINSTALLATION WITH EO TO FOLLOW. THE 432953 1 3 OLD BRACKET WAS SENT TO HDA FOR SCRAP. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON TH 432953 1 4 IS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEMS 1-3 WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 4 DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 433017 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT CHIPPED CARBON BRAKE COMPONENT ON R/H 433017 1 2 OUTBD MLG NOTED DURING POST-FLIGHT BRAKE INSPECTION. PHOTOS AND MOLD IMP 433017 1 3 RESSIONS CONFIRMED THAT CHIP DIMENSIONS ON EDGE OF CARBON PRESSURE PLATE 433017 1 4 EXCEED ACCEPTABLE CRITIERIA AS SET FORTH BY MLO308-0029, MLG INSTL & RI 433017 1 5 GGING SPEC., EO #F07. DISCREPANT BRAKE ASSY WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. DI 433017 1 6 SCREPANT BARKE ASSY WAS ROUTED FOR INSPECTION BY NSLD/BFG. NO PR CONDITI 433017 1 7 ON EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: DURING MLG WHEEL/TIRE INSTALLATION THE BRAKE 433017 1 8 ROTORS MUST BE CENTERED ABOUT THE AXLE BY HAND TO ALLOW WHEEL ALIGNMENT 433017 1 9 . WHEN WHEEL ENGAGES A BRAKE ROTOR, IT TENDS TO MOVE FORWARD AND IMPACT 433017 1 10 THE NEXT BRAKE DISC (ROTOR OR PRESSURE PLATE), WHICH COULD RESULT IN 433017 1 11 DAMAGE TO CARBON MATERIAL. A WHEEL/BRAKE ROTOR ALIGNMENT TOOL DESIGN IS 433017 1 12 CURRENTLY IN WORK BY RI (MCR 17412 TO ELIMINATE THIS OCCURANCE. NO 433017 1 13 RETEST REQUIRED. 433021 1 1 (ITEMS 1,2 AND 3) THERE WERE BLACK DEPOSITS LOCATED ON THE PERIMETER OF 433021 1 2 THE NOSE CAP BULKHEAD DOOR, FWD BULKHEAD AND ON THE NOSECAP BULKHEAD. A 433021 1 3 WIPE WAS TAKEN AND SENT TO THE MAB LAB FOR ANALYSIS. THE ANALYSIS INDICA 433021 1 4 TES EVIDENCE OF TILE MATERIAL AND SOME OUTGASSING, PROBABLY FROM RTV AND 433021 1 5 PAINT (CORROSION PROTECTION). ORGANICS INDICATE COMMON MATERIAL LEFT EI 433021 1 6 THER BY GLOVES OR WIPES. NO ACTIVE SUBSTANCES ARE PRESENT. THE DEPOSITS 433021 1 7 WERE REMOVED WITH IPA AND BEHR-TEX. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR AND 433021 1 8 TEAR. 433036 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGES 1 AND 1A). THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT A TOTAL OF F 433036 1 2 IVE AREAS OF CORROSION ON THE L/H WING LEADING EDGE SPAR BEHIND RCC PANE 433036 1 3 L 13. THE CORROSION FOUND IS SUPERFICIAL. LOCATION 1 WAS FOUND TO HAVE T 433036 1 4 HE MOST SEVERE CORROSION AT ELEVON THOUSANDTHS TOTAL DEPTH. ALL LOCATION 433036 1 5 S SHOWING EVIDENCE OF CORROSION WERE ETCHED WITH TURCO METAL GLO 6 AND B 433036 1 6 LENDED OUT. CORROSION PROTECTIVE FINISHES WERE APPLIED. (REF ITEM 3 PAGE 433036 1 7 1B) THE RIVET REMOVED TO REWORK CORRISION AT LOCATION 1 COULD NOT BE RE 433036 1 8 INSTALLED DUE TO ACCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INSTALLATION TOOL. AT THIS 433036 1 9 LOCATION, THE FASTENER HOLE WAS ENLARGED TO ACCEPT A MD128-0002-0203 433036 1 10 JO-BOLT. THIS SUBSTITUTION WAS PERFORMED PER UNRESTRICTED MR 433036 1 11 DISPOSITION. ALL WORK PERFORMED PER THIS PR WAS COVERED BY UNRESTRICTED 433036 1 12 MR DISPOSTION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEMS 1 AND 2 IS ENVIRONMENTAL 433036 1 13 CONTAMINATION AND NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 433036 1 14 ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 433399 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING POST FLIGHT INSPECTION PER V31-15109 WHEN A 433399 1 2 CUT WAS FOUND IN V070-351992-002 LO2 ET DOOR ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL (FWD SI 433399 1 3 DE OF CAVITY - SEE FIGURE 1-1). NOTED SEAL DAMAGE WAS PREVIOUSLY MR'D FO 433399 1 4 R UNRESTRICTED USE ON MEQ-3-16-0680. ENGINEERING RE-INSPECTED DISCREPANC 433399 1 5 Y AND FOUND SEAL TO STILL BE ACCEPTABLE; MR STILL APPLIES. NO FURTHER WO 433399 1 6 RK IS REQURIED. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 433399 1 7 ION. 433402 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A TOTAL OF FOUR AREAS OF CORR 433402 1 2 OSION ON THE L/H WING LEADING EDGE SPAR BEHIND RCC PANEL 12. THE CORROSI 433402 1 3 ON FOUND IS SUPERFICIAL. LOCATIONS 3 AND 4 WERE FOUND TO HAVE THE MOST S 433402 1 4 EVERE CORROSION AT NINE THOUSANDTHS TOTAL DEPTH. ALL LOCATIONS SHOWING E 433402 1 5 VIDENCE OF CORRISION WERE ETCHED WITH TURCO METAL GLO 6 AND BLENDED OUT. 433402 1 6 CORROSION PROTECTIVE FINISHES WERE APPLIED. FASTENERS REMOVED PER THIS 433402 1 7 PR WERE REINSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. ALL WORK PERFORMED PER THIS 433402 1 8 PR WAS COVERED BY UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEMS 433402 1 9 1 AND 2 IS ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION AND NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO 433402 1 10 FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 433425 1 1 WHILE WORKING TPS OEL-3-17-057, A TECH REVEALED THAT TERMINATION OF WIRE 433425 1 2 U320F24 PER STEP 1-20 COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT WIR 433425 1 3 E LENGTH. THEREFORE, THE EXISTING WIRE WAS REPLACED BY A NEW WIRE AND SU 433425 1 4 BSEQUENTLY SPLICED PER THE TPS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. P 433425 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE: INSUFFICIENT WIRE LENGTH. 433541 1 1 WHILE WORKING TPS OEL-3-17-057, A TECHNICIAN REVEALED THAT TERMINATION O 433541 1 2 F WIRES U323B24 AND U293F24 PER STEP 1-57 COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED DUE 433541 1 3 TO INSUFFICIENT WIRE LENGTH. THEREFORE, THE EXISTING WIRES WERE REPLACED 433541 1 4 BY NEW WIRES AND SUBSEQUENTLY SPLICED PER THIS TPS. NO FURTHER ACTION R 433541 1 5 EQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSUFFICIENT WIRE LENGTH. 433561 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN SEVERAL BULB SEAL DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND ON 433561 1 2 THE PLBD HINGELINE AND CENTERLINE EDGES. ITEMS 1 AND 2 WERE CENTERLINE 433561 1 3 BULB SEAL DISCREPANCIES WHICH WERE TRANSFERRED AND ADDRESSED ON PR MEQ-3 433561 1 4 -17-0720 (SINCE THEY DID NOT SHARE THE SAME PART NUMBER AS THE HINGELINE 433561 1 5 BULB SEALS). A DEBONDED V070-398558-056 BULB SEAL SPLICE WAS FOUND ON T 433561 1 6 HE LH PLBD HINGELINE AT XO1084 (ITEM 3). WHEN THE SPLICE WAS REMOVED, TH 433561 1 7 E MALE FOOT ON THE V070-398503-012 BULB SEAL FWD OF XO 1084 SPLICE WAS F 433561 1 8 OUND DEBONDED AND TWISTED (ITEM 6). THE FOOT WAS TWISTED BECAUSE THE TAP 433561 1 9 E REPAIR ON THE V070-398503-012 BULB SEAL AFT OF XO 1084 HAD DEBONDED 433561 1 10 AND PREVENTED PROPER MATING OF FOOT IN SEAL (ITEM 5). WHILE REMOVING THE 433561 1 11 MALE FOOT FROM THE SEAL RETAINER, THE FASTENER GROMMET DEBONDED FROM THE 433561 1 12 SEAL (ITEM 7). UNRESTRICTED MRB CONCURRENCE WAS OBTAINED TO REBOND THE 433561 1 13 GROMMET TO THE V070-398503-012 SEAL MALE FOOT (ITEM 7). UNRESTRICTED MRB 433561 1 14 CONCURRENCE WAS OBTAINED TO REMOVE AND REAPPLY TAPE REPAIR (ITEM 5). THE 433561 1 15 V070-398503-012 SEAL MALE V070-398558-056 BULB SEAL SPLICE WAS THEN 433561 1 16 REBONDED TO THE V070-398503-012 SEAL MALE FOOT (ITEM 3). A 433561 1 17 V070-398558-056 SPLICE JOINT AT XO 886 ON THE RH PLBD HINGELINE WAS NOT 433561 1 18 PROVIDING SUFFICIENT OVERLAP WITH THE V070-398503-012 SEAL SEGMENT AFT 433561 1 19 OF THE SPLICE (ITEM 4). FURTHERMORE, THE SPLICE WAS BONDED TO THE 433561 1 20 RETAINER ON ITS INBD SIDE AND THE SPRING INSIDE THE V070-398503-012 WAS 433561 1 21 RECESSED IN ITS TUBE. THE DISCREPANT SPLICE WAS REMOVED, THE SPRING 433561 1 22 REPOSITIONED, AND A REPLACEMENT V070-398558-056 SPLICE BONDED BACK IN 433561 1 23 PLACE AND PROPER OVERLAP VERIFIED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ABOVE 433561 1 24 DISCREPACIES ARE: INCORRECT DOCUMENTATION OF PROBLEM (ITEMS 1 AND 2); 433561 1 25 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION ITEMS 3,5,6, AND 7); AND WORKMANSHIP (ITEM 4). 433561 1 26 ALL DISCREPANT BULB SEALS/SPLICES HAVE BEEN CORRECTED/ADDRESSED. REPAIRS 433561 1 27 WILL BE RETESTED PER OMI V5018. 433602 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: RESTRICTED MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR (1) FLIGHT ( 433602 PMRB 2 17, STS-51) TO USE DISCREPANT TAILCONE ATTACH POINT NUTPLATES ON THE BAS 433602 PMRB 3 E HEATSHIELD. THE BOLTS ARE FULLY TORQUED AND WERE VERIFIED NOT TO BE SH 433602 PMRB 4 ANKED OUT. THE ONLY DISCREPANCY IS THAT THE NUT RETENTION PLATES HAVE RO 433602 PMRB 5 TATED BUT ARE STILL ADEQUATELY RETAINED IN THEIR CAGES. THE BOLTS AND NU 433602 PMRB 6 TS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFE 433602 PMRB 7 TY. DEFERRAL OF THE REPLACEMENT OF THESE NUTPLATES IS ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE 433602 PMRB 8 ALL THE HARDWARE IS INSTALLED TO DESIGN REQUIREMENTS (TORQUED TO 187-21 433602 PMRB 9 3 IN/LBS). NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 433602 PMRB 10 BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE "CIL" 433602 PMRB 11 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS RESTRICTED (1) 433602 PMRB 12 FLIGHT, TO FLIGHT 17 (STS-51). PRIME BOARD ACTION: PMRB APPROVED FOR 433602 PMRB 13 DEFERRAL TO FLIGHT 18 OF OV-103. 06-16-93. 433602 1 1 ITEM 1: THREE NUTPLATES FOR THE ATTACHING HARDWARE OF THE R/H BASE HEAT 433602 1 2 SHIELD, LOWER TAILCONE FITTING HAVE TURNED IN THEIR RETAINER. THE MD114- 433602 1 3 5014-0006 NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. ITEM 2: FIVE NUTPLATES FO 433602 1 4 R THE ATTACHING HARDWARE OF THE L/H BASE HEAT SHIELD, LOWER TAILCONE FIT 433602 1 5 TING HAVE TURNED IN THEIR RETAINER. THE MD114-5014-0006 NUTPLATES WERE R 433602 1 6 EMOVED AND REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 433603 1 1 ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO STR-3-17-4609 ITEM 2. THE DIS 433603 1 2 CREPANT NUTPLATES WILL BE REMOVED AND REPLACED ON STR-3-17-4609. PROBABL 433603 1 3 E CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 433604 1 1 DURING OEL-3-17-057 STEP 1-39 IT WAS FOUND THAT THE SPLICE P/N: ME416-00 433604 1 2 31-1004 WAS NOT THE PROPER SIZE SPLICE FOR 50SP257 (REFERENCE V070-77535 433604 1 3 1 D19). PER SPECIFICATION MLO303-0031 THE REQUIRED SPLICE WAS P/N: ME416 433604 1 4 -0031-1005. AN EOTF WAS INITIATED TO CORRECT THE DESIGN SPLICE FOR 50SP2 433604 1 5 57. SPLICE 50SP257 WAS INSTALLED PER THIS PR USING SPLICE P/N: ME416-003 433604 1 6 1-1005. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 433605 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL MR RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED USE FOR ONE 433605 PMRB 2 FLIGHT OF THE DRAG CHUTE RISER AS INSTALLED AND FOR THE KEVLAR LINER 433605 PMRB 3 WITH A 1/2" CUT AT THE LEFT CENTER HOLE. THE KEVLAR LINER WAS CUT BY THE 433605 PMRB 4 KEVLAR CORD WHICH NORMALLLY PASSED DOWN THROUGHT THE LEFT CENTER HOLE 433605 PMRB 5 AND UP THROUGH THE LEFT AFT HOLE TO SECURE THE CHUTE RISER. BY 433605 PMRB 6 INSTALLING THE RISER USING DIFFERENT HOLES THE CORD CANNOT BECOME LODGED 433605 PMRB 7 IN THE SAME CUT AND THE CUT WILL NOT GET ANY WORSE. THE CUT WILL NOT 433605 PMRB 8 PROPEGATE DUE TO THE COMPOSITE COMPOSITION OF THE KEVLAR LINER. THE 433605 PMRB 9 LINER AND CHUTE RISER INSTALLATION WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN 433605 PMRB 10 INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE LINER AND RISER ARE 433605 PMRB 11 SECONDARY STRUCTURE. RIC STILL EVALUATING A PERMANENT FIX. THIS MR 433605 PMRB 12 ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. NO MR 433605 PMRB 13 IDENTIFICATION REQUIRED AT THIS TIME THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE 433605 PMRB 14 CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PMRB UPDATE: 05/25/93 - PMRB 433605 PMRB 15 APPROVAL FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 18 OF OV-103. 433605 PMRB 16 433605 PMRB 17 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB REDEFERRAL APPORVAL FOR RESTRICTED USE 433605 PMRB 18 FOR ONE FLIGHT OF THE DRAG CHUTE RISER AS INSTALLED AND FOR THE KEVLAR 433605 PMRB 19 LINER WITH A 1/2" CUT AT THE LEFT CENTER HOLE. THE KEVLAR LINER WAS CUT 433605 PMRB 20 BY THE KEVLAR CORD WHICH NORMALLY PASSES DOWN THROUGH THE LEFT CENTER 433605 PMRB 21 HOLE AND UP THROUGH THE LEFT AFT HOLE TO SECURE THE CHUTE RISER. BY 433605 PMRB 22 INSTALLING THE RISER USING DIFFERENT HOLES THE CORD CANNOT BECOME LODGED 433605 PMRB 23 IN THE SAME CUT AND THE CUT WILL NOT GET ANY WORSE. THE CUT WILL NOT 433605 PMRB 24 PROPAGATE DUE TO THE COMPOSITE COMPOSITION OF THE KEVLAR LINER. KEVLAR 433605 PMRB 25 LINER WAS REINSPECTED THIS FLOW (FLT 18) AND FOUND THAT NO FURTHER 433605 PMRB 26 TEARING WAS EVIDENT AT AT THE LEFT AFT HOLE. WITH PR REDEFERRED THE 433605 PMRB 27 KEVLAR LINER WILL BE REINSPECTED AGAIN NEXT FLOW (FLT 19). IF NO FURTHER 433605 PMRB 28 TEARING HAS HAPPENED BY NEXT INSPECTION THIS PR WILL BE MR ACCEPTED 433605 PMRB 29 "UNRESTRICTED USE" AND CLOSED. THE LINER AND CHUTE RISER INSTALLATION 433605 PMRB 30 WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF 433605 PMRB 31 SAFETY. THE LINER AND RISER ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURE. A DEV HAS BEEN 433605 PMRB 32 WRITTEN TO OMI V5138.001 TO SPECIFY PROPER HOLES TO USE ON KEVLAR LINER 433605 PMRB 33 WHEN THREADING WITH KEVLAR CORD. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 433605 PMRB 34 BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL 433605 PMRB 35 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. ON 11/09/93 PMRB APPROVED FOR 433605 PMRB 36 DEFERRAL TO FLT 19 OF OV-103. 433605 PMRB 37 ON 05/10/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 433605 PMRB 38 433605 PMRB 39 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB DEFERRAL APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED USE 433605 PMRB 40 THROUGH J2 OF THE DRAG CHUTE RISER AS INSTALLED AND FOR THE KEVLAR LINER 433605 PMRB 41 WITH A 1/2" CUT AT THE LEFT CENTER HOLE. THE KEVLAR LINER WAS CUT BY THE 433605 PMRB 42 KEVLAR CORD WHICH NORMALLY PASSES DOWN THROUGH THE LEFT CENTER HOLE AND 433605 PMRB 43 UP THROUGH THE LEFT AFT HOLE TO SECURE THE CHUTE RISER. BY INSTALLING 433605 PMRB 44 THE RISER USING DIFFERENT HOLES THE CORD CANNOT BECOME LODGED IN THE 433605 PMRB 45 SAME CUT AND THE CUT WILL NOT GET ANY WORSE. THE CUT WILL NOT PROPAGATE 433605 PMRB 46 DUE TO THE COMPOSITE NATURE OF THE KEVLAR LINER. A DEV HAS BEEN WRITTEN 433605 PMRB 47 TO OMI V5138.001 TO SPECIFY PROPER HOLES TO USE ON KEVLAR LINER WHEN 433605 PMRB 48 THREADING WITH KEVLAR CORD. A PERMANENT FIX WILL BE IMPLEMENTED AT OMDP. 433605 PMRB 49 KEVLAR LINER WAS REINSPECTED THIS FLOW (FLT 20) AND FOUND THAT NO 433605 PMRB 50 FURTHER TEARING WAS EVIDENT AT THE HOLE. THE LINER AND CHUTE RISER 433605 PMRB 51 INSTALLATION WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE 433605 PMRB 52 MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE LINER AND RISER ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR 433605 PMRB 53 ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION 433605 PMRB 54 DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 433605 PMRB 55 11/15/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (OMDP) OF OV-103. 433605 1 1 THE KEVLAR LINER WAS GOUGED DUE TO THE DRAG CHUTE ATTACH/JETTISON MECHAN 433605 1 2 ISM SUPPORT TRUNION ASSY COMING IN CONTACT WITH IT. THE KEVLAR LINER ALS 433605 1 3 O HAD A 1/2" CUT ALL THE WAY THROUGH RADIATING AFT FROM THE LEFT CENTER 433605 1 4 HOLE. FOR A TEMPORARY FIX FOR ONE FLIGHT (FLT 18) WITH PMRB APPROVAL, IN 433605 1 5 ORDER TO PREVENT THE KEVLAR CORD FROM BECOMING CAUGHT IN THE CUT, THE D 433605 1 6 RAG CHUTE RISER WAS INSTALLED USING EITHER THE FWD OR ART HOLES OR THE F 433605 1 7 WD AND CENTER HOLES IN THE LINER. POST FLIGHT EVALUATION OF THE DAMAGED 433605 1 8 AREA OF THE KEVLAR WERE PERFORMED WITH NO EVIDENCE OF DEGRADATION. PMRB 433605 1 9 ACTION WAS REQUIRED AGAIN FOR FLIGHT 19 AND 20 AND AGAIN POST FLIGHT 433605 1 10 EVALUATIONS DETECTED NO EVIDENCE OF DEGRADATION. OMDP POST FLIGHT 433605 1 11 EVALUATION DETECTED NO FURTHER DAMAGE. ENG WAS RELEASED TO BOND A 433605 1 12 STAINLESS STEEL SCUFF PLATE OVER THE GAUGED AREA, THE WORK WAS 433605 1 13 PERFORMED PER TPS STR-3-J2-660. MR ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO REPAIR THE 433605 1 14 CUT IN THE KEVLAR LINER BY FILLING THE HOLE WITH EPOXY ADHESIVE AND A 433605 1 15 GROMMET WAS INSTALLED IN THE CENTER AND AFT HOLES TO PREVEBNT LINER 433605 1 16 TEAR PER RELEASED ENG AND WORKED PER TPS STR-3-J2-660. PROBABLE CAUSE: 433605 1 17 UNUSUAL WEAR AND TEAR. 433606 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING POST FLIGHT RADIATOR INSPECTION ON RADIATOR 433606 1 2 PANEL LH 2 (REF JC V31-14195). SIX DISCREPANCIES WERE IDENTIFIED ON PAG 433606 1 3 ES 1 AND 1A. ENGINEERING INSPECTION OF THESE RADIATOR DEFECTS UNDER 30X 433606 1 4 MAGNIFICATION SHOWED ALL DEFECTS TO BE MINOR TAPE DAMAGE ONLY. MRB CONCU 433606 1 5 RRENCE WAS OBTAINED TO ACCEPT ALL SIX TAPE DAMAGES FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 433606 1 6 AS IS. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. RADIATOR DING LOG HAS BEEN UPDATED TO REFL 433606 1 7 ECT DAMAGES FOUND AND ACTION TAKEN. 433607 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS TWO ON-ORBIT DEBRIS IMPACTS TO THE L/H 1 RADIATOR PANE 433607 1 2 L. ITEM 1 WAS AN IMPACT THAT DID NOT PENETRATE THE SILVER TEFLON TAPE OU 433607 1 3 TER LAYER AND WAS MR ACCEPTED AS-OS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2 HAD SIL 433607 1 4 VER TEFLON TAPE REMOVED AND THE FACESHEET INSPECTED. THE DAMAGE TO THE F 433607 1 5 ACESHEET WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND NEW TAPE WAS BONDED OV 433607 1 6 ER THE DISCREPANCY. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED AND TH 433607 1 7 E PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION IS NORMAL EXPOSURE TO ON-ORBIT DEBRI 433607 1 8 S. 433608 1 1 ITEM 1 OF THIS PR DESCRIBED A SCRATCH/SCRAPE IN THE RADIATOR TAPE MEASUR 433608 1 2 ING .348"L X .045"W X .004"D. NOT THRU TO FACESHEET. ITEM 2 DESCRIBED A 433608 1 3 DING MEASURING .02365"L X .00175"D. ITEM 3 DESCRIBES A SCRAPE IN THE TAP 433608 1 4 E. THE NOTED DISCREPANCY MEASURED LESS THAN .00005"D AND IN DIAMETER. TH 433608 1 5 IS DISCREPANCY DOES NOT DAMAGE THE FACESHEET. ITEM 4 DESCRIBES A DING ME 433608 1 6 ASURING .02985"W X .00475"D. ITEM 5 DESCRIBES A DING MEASURING .05395"L 433608 1 7 X .01050"D. NOT THRU TO FACESHEET. ITEM 6 IS DESCRIBED AS A GOUGE IN THE 433608 1 8 TAPE. NO MEASURABLE DIMENSIONS WERE OBTAINABLE. ITEM 7 IS DESCRIBED AS 433608 1 9 A METEORITE STRIKE MEASURING .117"L X .112"W X .0174"D. NOTED 433608 1 10 DISCREPANCY NOT THRU TO FACESHEET. ITEM 8 IS DESCRIBED AS A DEBRIS 433608 1 11 IMPACT MEASURING LESS THAN .00005"D AND DIAMETER. NOTED DISCREPANCY IS 433608 1 12 COSMETIC. ITEM 9 IS DESCRIBED AS A DING MEASURING .05405"L X .0067"D. 433608 1 13 ITEM 10 DESCRIBES MISSING TAPE AND 2 DINGS MEASURING LESS THAN .00005"D 433608 1 14 AND DIAMETER. THE NOTED MISSING TAPE ARE MINOR NICKS IN THE TOP LAYER OF 433608 1 15 TAPE. ALL OF THE ABOVE NOTED DISCREPANCIES WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR 433608 1 16 UNRESTRICTED USE. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INFLIGHT DAMAGE, 433608 1 17 PROCESSING DAMAGE AND OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION 433609 1 1 ITEM 1 OF THIS PR IS DESCRIBED AS TAPE DAMAGE MEASURING LESS THAN .00005 433609 1 2 " IN DIAMETER AND DEPTH. THIS DISCREPANCY IS TAPE DAMAGE ONLY. THIS DISC 433609 1 3 REPANCT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2 DESCRIBES A DEBRIS 433609 1 4 IMPACT MEASURING .0069"D X .047" DIAMETER. AN ATTEMPT TO REMOVE DEBRIS W 433609 1 5 AS MADE ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT ANY MATERIAL WAS REMOVED. THE SA 433609 1 6 MPLE WAS ROUTED TO NASA JSC FOR INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS. THE NOTED DISCREPA 433609 1 7 NCY WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE REMOVED TAPE WAS REPLACED 433609 1 8 WITH THERMAL CHEMGLAZE COATING PER SRP-V-ST-0021-0-0. ITEM 3 OF THIS PR 433609 1 9 DESCRIBES A DING MEASURING .006"D X .055" DIAMETER. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS 433609 1 10 MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 4 OF THIS PR IS DESCRIBED AS A 433609 1 11 DING MEASURING .110"L X .113"W X .0072"D. MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED 433609 1 12 USE. ITEM 5 IS DESCRIBED AS A TEAR IN TAPE MEASURING .001"W X .0002"D. 433609 1 13 THE NOTED DISCREPANCY IS TAPE DAMAGE ONLY. MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED 433609 1 14 USE. ITEM 6 DESCRIBED A TAPE DELAMINATION. DURING AN ENGINEERING 433609 1 15 INSPECTION OF THIS DISCREPANCY NO TAPE DELAMINATION COULD BE LOCATD IN 433609 1 16 THE VACINITY WERE THE DISCREPANCY WAS REPORTED. THERE WAS A SLIGHT 433609 1 17 DISCOLORATION OF RADIATOR TAPE. MR APPROVAL WAS GRANTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 433609 1 18 USE. ITEM 7 DESCRIBES A DING MEASURING LESS THAN .00005"D IN DIAMETER. 433609 1 19 THIS DISCREPANCY IS TAPE DAMAGE ONLY. MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 433609 1 20 ITEM 8 DESCRIBED A TAPE DELAMINATIONS ALONG THE RADIATORS CENTERLINE 433609 1 21 EDGE. THE DELAMINATED TAPE WAS REBONDED AT LATCH 13 AND 16 PER 433609 1 22 SRP-V-ST-0020-0-0 RADIATOR EDGE TAPE REPAIR. THE DEBONDED TAPE AT 433609 1 23 LATCHES 14 AND 15 WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 9 433609 1 24 DESCRIBED SMALL WHITE STREAKS OVER 80% OF THE RADIATOR PANEL. IPA WAS 433609 1 25 USED TO REMOVE WHITE DEBRIS THAT WAS VISIBLE ON THE RADIATOR PANEL. ALL 433609 1 26 NOTED DISCREPANCIES NOTED ON THIS PR HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED. NO RETEST 433609 1 27 REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INFLIGHT DAMAGE, PROCESSING AND OPERATIONAL 433609 1 28 DEGRADATION. 433610 1 1 REF ITEM 1: THE NOTED TEARS ARE EITHER ACCEPTABLE ACCORDING TO DWG REQUI 433610 1 2 REMENT OR HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED AS EVIDENCED BY ADJACENT MR M 433610 1 3 ARKINGS. CONCLUDE THAT THIS "DISCREPANCY" SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN. 433610 1 4 REF ITEM 2: THROUGH-HOLES IN THE PERIMETER LIGHTNING SHIELD HAVE MINOR E 433610 1 5 LONGATION DUE TO REPEATED FASTENER INSTALLATIONS OVER SEVENTEEN FLOWS. T 433610 1 6 HIS TYPE OF WEAR IS CONSIDERED NOMINAL AND HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTR 433610 1 7 ICTED USE AS IS WITH MRB CONCURRENCE. 433615 1 1 ITEM 1 THROUGH 4 DESCRIBE SMALL METEORITE DINGS. THE NOTED DISCREPANCIES 433615 1 2 WERE MR ACCEPTED 'AS IS' FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO MR ID WAS REQUIRED. A 433615 1 3 LL 4 ITEMS WERE ADDED TO THE RADIATOR PANEL DAMAGE LOH. NO RETEST REQUIR 433615 1 4 ED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INFLIGHT DAMAGE. 433627 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP DURING JC V31-14195, POST FLIGHT INSPECTIONS. ITEM 433627 1 2 S 1 AND 3 THRU 18 WERE MINOR DISCREPANCIES AND ALL WERE MR ACCEPTED AS I 433627 1 3 S, REF MR'S PAGES 4,5 AND 6. ITEM 2 REQUIRED TAPE REMOVAL FOR INSPECTION 433627 1 4 AND WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS, REF MR PAGE 14. THE TAPE WAS REMOVED AND REA 433627 1 5 PPLIED PER SRP-V-ST-0022-0-0. ITEMS 19 AND 20 WERE DIRT/DEBRIS ON THE RA 433627 1 6 DIATOR SURFACE WHICH WERE CLEANED OFF. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ALL DISCREPANC 433627 1 7 IES IS FLIGHT/HANDLING DAMAGE. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 433629 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 24 DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND ON THE UPPE 433629 1 2 R SURFACE OF RH RADIATOR 1. ITEMS 1 AND 2 WERE DEBRIS ON THE SURFACE OF 433629 1 3 THE RADIATOR TAPE. BOTH ITEMS WERE CLEANED USING IPA. ITEMS 3,4,5,6,7,8, 433629 1 4 10,11,12,13,22 AND 23 WERE NICKS, SCRATCHES, SCUFFS OR CUTS IN THE RADIA 433629 1 5 TOR TAPE WHICH WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEMS 9 AND 18 WER 433629 1 6 E TAPE DELAMINATIONS. THE DELAMINATED AREA FOR ITEM 9 WAS TRIMMED AND BO 433629 1 7 TH ITEMS 9 AND 18 WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEMS 14,15,16, 433629 1 8 17,19,20,21 AND 24 WERE CAUSED BY MICRO-METEORITE IMPACTS. THE WORST DEF 433629 1 9 ECT PENETRATED THE TAPE, LEAVING A SMOOTH BOTTOMED DEPRESSION IN THE 433629 1 10 ALUMINUM FACESHEET. ALL THE IMPACTS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 433629 1 11 USE AS IS. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE 433629 1 12 CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 433638 1 1 WHILE WORKING TPS OEL-3-17-057, A TECH REVEALED THAT TERMINATION OF WIRE 433638 1 2 U282F24 PER STEP 1-39 COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT WIR 433638 1 3 E LENGTH. THEREFORE, THE EXISTING WIRE WAS REPLACED BY A NEW WIRE AND SU 433638 1 4 BSEQUENTLY SPLICED PER THE TPS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. P 433638 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE: INSUFFICIENT WIRE LENGTH. 433645 1 1 THE V070-194118-004 FILLER BAR SUPPORT TAB THAT DEBONDED FROM THE PRIMAR 433645 1 2 Y SEAL PANEL AT YW 437 WAS REBONDED PER V9045. THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN RETU 433645 1 3 RNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS POOR SURF 433645 1 4 ACE PREPARATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 433648 1 1 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF OEL-3-17-057 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THERE WAS 433648 1 2 DAMAGE TO TWO WIRES, 2P403DA26 AND 2P1182A26. BOTH THESE WIRES WERE SUBS 433648 1 3 EQUENTLY REPAIRED AND RETURNED TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. THE PR WAS THEN 433648 1 4 ROUTED TO MPS FOR RETEST ON THE LO2 INBOARD FILL/DRAIN VALVE OP A AND T 433648 1 5 HE LH2 OUTBOARD FILL/DRAIN OPEN COMMANDS. BOTH SPLICES HAVE BEEN RETESTE 433648 1 6 D PER V1009.002, MPS ELECTRICAL RETEST AND V1161 CONTROL BUS DROPS. THE 433648 1 7 INDICATIONS WERE NOMINAL AND THERE IS NO LONGER A PR CONDITION AND THIS 433648 1 8 PAPER MAY CLOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 433687 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS DISCREPANCIES ON THE V070-198535-001 BLOCK SEAL AT THE 433687 1 2 RH IB ELEVON CENTER HINGE. THE SEAL WAS PARTIALLY DEBONDED FROM ITS BAS 433687 1 3 E AND CUT ACROSS THE MIDDLE OF THE SEAL. THE SEAL WAS REPAIRED PER UNRES 433687 1 4 TRICTED MR DISPOSITION USING MBO130-085 ADHESIVE APPLIED PER MAO106-330. 433687 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURT 433687 1 6 HER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 433688 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DISCREPANCY ON THE V070-19853 433688 1 2 5-001 BLOCK SEAL AT THE LH IB ELEVON CENTER HINGE. THE SEAL WAS PARTIALL 433688 1 3 Y DEBONDED FROM ITS BASE. THE SEAL WAS REPAIRED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISP 433688 1 4 OSITION USING MBO130-085 ADHESIVE APPLIED PER MAO106-330. PROBABLE CAUSE 433688 1 5 FOR THIS DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1) 433688 1 6 THIS ITEM WAS WRITTEN ERROR. THIS DISCREPANCY APPLIES TO THE BLOCK SEAL 433688 1 7 AT YW212. REF PR STR-3-17-4613 ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A. NO FURTHER SHOP OR EN 433688 1 8 GINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 433688 1 9 GINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 433767 1 1 THE DOME HEAT SHIELD WAS DISCREPANT IN THREE LOCATIONS. ALL WERE REPAIRE 433767 1 2 D WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 1- THIS WAS A REWORK OF A 433767 1 3 N OLD MR STR-3-11-3350. THE DOUBLER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW SPACER WAS INS 433767 1 4 TALLED WHICH MORE ACURATELY FIT THE CUTOUT. THE DOUBLER WAS REINSTALLED 433767 1 5 AND THE GAPS WERE FILLED WITH RTV. ITEM 2 AND ITEM 3 - BOTH OF THE AREA 433767 1 6 S OF DELAMINATION WERE REPAIRED BY BONDING WITH MBO120-079 TYPE 2. NO FU 433767 1 7 RTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - OPERATIONAL DEGRADATI 433767 1 8 ON. 433871 1 1 THE CARRIER PANEL WAS BENT. AS A REPAIR THE FIB WAS PARTIALLY REMOVED. T 433871 1 2 HE PANEL WAS THEN BENT BACK WITH MRB APPROVAL AND INSPECTED WITH DYE PEN 433871 1 3 ETRANT. NO CRACKS WERE FOUND, SO THE CARRIER PANEL WAS CORROSION PROTECT 433871 1 4 ED AND THE FIB WAS REBONDED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROB 433871 1 5 ABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 433920 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS FASTENER TAILS INSIDE THE CAVITIES OF THE RSB. PER THE 433920 1 2 RSB ASSEMBLY DRAWINGS BLIND FASTENERS ARE ACCEPTABLE INSIDE THE RSB AFT 433920 1 3 ER ASSEMBLY PROVIDED THAT ATTEMPTS ARE MADE TO RETRIEVE THEM. ANY REMAIN 433920 1 4 ING FASTENERS AFTER REMOVAL ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE ARE ACCEPTABLE PER P 433920 1 5 RINT. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUI 433920 1 6 RED FOR THIS PR. 433927 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT A DEFECT IN THE V070-332504-003 INGRES 433927 1 2 S/EGRESS HATCH SEAL. THE DEFECT WAS LARGER THAN THE ALLOWABLE CRITERIA A 433927 1 3 ND THE HATCH LEAK RATE JUMPED FROM 0.0 PSIG/MIN TO 0.8 PSIG/MIN AFTER TH 433927 1 4 E DEFECT WAS DETECTED. THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED AND SUCCESSFULL 433927 1 5 Y RETESTED. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS AND THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL 433927 1 6 DEGRADATION (NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR). 434029 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DISCREPANCY ON THE V070-198535-001 BLOCK SEAL AT THE 434029 1 2 RH OB ELEVON CENTER HINGE. THE SEAL WAS PARTIALLY CUT ACROSS THE LEADIN 434029 1 3 G EDGE. THE SEAL WAS REPAIRED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION USING MBO1 434029 1 4 30-085 ADHESIVE APPLIED PER MAO106-330. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPA 434029 1 5 NCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION RE 434029 1 6 QUIRED. 434030 1 1 THE OUTBOARD HINGE SEAL AT YW 387.5 ON THE RIGHT OUTBOARD LOWER ELEVON C 434030 1 2 OVE WHICH HAS MISSING TEFLON ON THE LOWER SURFACE (ITEM 1, PAGE 1) WAS M 434030 1 3 R ACCEPTED AS-IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE PRIMARY SEAL PANEL WAS MR ID' 434030 1 4 D IN CLOSE PROXIMITY OF HTE TEFLON SEAL. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE MISSI 434030 1 5 NG TEFLON IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION (NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR). CONCLUDE TH 434030 1 6 AT THE SEAL IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. 434035 1 1 FOLLOWING FUEL CELL 1 (S/N 106) INSTALLATION A LEAK OF 2.2 X 10 -6 SCCS 434035 1 2 WAS DETECTED AT THE FUEL CELL 02 SUPPLY LINE INTERFACE. THE MAX ALLOWABL 434035 1 3 E LEAK RATE IS 1 X 10-7 SCCS PER OMRSD V45CCO.020AB-1R. THE DYNATUBE CON 434035 1 4 NECTION WAS DEMATED AND INSPECTED WITH NO OBVIOUS DEFECTS NOTED. THE LIN 434035 1 5 E WAS REMATED AND TORQUED TO THE UPPER END OF THE RANGE, 250 "/LBS. A SU 434035 1 6 BSEQUENT LEAK CHECK FOUND THAT THE LEAK RATE HAD IMPROVED TO 2.34 X 10 - 434035 1 7 7 SCCS. ALTHOUGH STILL OUT OF TOLERANCE THIS LEAK RATE IS ACCEPTABLE TO 434035 1 8 THE ENG COMMUNITY. ANY FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM COULD LEA 434035 1 9 D TO FURTHER DEGRADATION OF THE DYNATUBE SEALING SURFACE. A BUBBLE LEAK 434035 1 10 CHECK WAS PERFORMED WITH NO LEAKS NOTED. AN O2 QUANTITY LOSS OF THIS 434035 1 11 MAGNITUDE IS INDISTINGUISHABLE ON THE O2 QUANTITY GAGING SYSTEM AND 434035 1 12 WOULD HAVE NO IMPACT ON MISSION DURATION OR SAFETY OF FLIGHT. THE 434035 1 13 SUBJECT DYNATUBE IS SAFETY WIRED WHICH ELIMINATES CONCERNS OF INCREASED 434035 1 14 LEAKAGE DUE TO FITTING ROTATION. SAIVER WK02815R1 HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR 434035 1 15 ALL SUBSEQUENT FLIGHTS. 434060 1 1 DURING OEL-3-17-057, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE SPLICE SPECIFIED (P/N ME416-0 434060 1 2 031-1004 PER DRAWING V070-775341-D19) WAS NOT THE PROPER SIZE SPLICE FOR 434060 1 3 54SP285 PER SPECIFICATION MLO303-0031 (THE REQUIRED SPLICE KIT SHOULD B 434060 1 4 E P/N ME416-0031-1005); THEREFORE, EOTF RATIONALE WAS INITIATED TO CORRE 434060 1 5 CT THE DESIGN DEFICIENCY FOR SPLICE 54SP285. SPLICE 54SP285 HAS BEEN COR 434060 1 6 RECTLY INSTALLED PER THIS PR USING SPLICE P/N ME416-0031-1005 (REF ATTAC 434060 1 7 HED EO D23 TO DRAWING V070-775341) AND SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED PER TPS APU 434060 1 8 -3-17-123, BASIC. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED IN THIS PR. NO RC ACTION I 434060 1 9 S REQUESTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 434065 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DISCREPANT ROSAN INSERT. THE DISCREPANT INSERT WAS R 434065 1 2 EMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR I 434065 1 3 S OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRE 434065 1 4 D. 434068 PMRB 1 A GROUND BOLT IN THE XO1140 FRAME, PORT SIDE, ZO388 SHEARED OFF IN AN MD 434068 PMRB 2 114-5011-0005 NUTPLATE. THE BOLT WAS USED AS A PAYLOAD GROUND POINT FOR 434068 PMRB 3 STS-056 (FLIGHT 16). THIS LOCATION IS NOT REQUIRED AND WILL NOT BE USED 434068 PMRB 4 FOR STS-051 (FLIGHT 17). THE BOLT IS FLUSH WITH THE FRAME. THE SHEARED O 434068 PMRB 5 FF BOLT FILLS THE HOLE AND DOES NOT ALLOW ANY DEBRIS TO PASS FROM THE PA 434068 PMRB 6 YLOAD BAY TO UNDERNEATH THE WIRE TRAY. THIS IS NOT A SAFETY OR FLIGHT CO 434068 PMRB 7 NCERN. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR RESTRICTED USE/FLIGHT. THIS MR A 434068 PMRB 8 CTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DO 434068 PMRB 9 ES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR 434068 PMRB 10 HAZARD CONTROLS. POST FLIGHT DISPO WILL OPEN MIDBODY BAY 10, REMOVE THE 434068 PMRB 11 SHEARED OFF BOLT AND REPLACE THE NUTPLATE. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. THIS IS 434068 PMRB 12 SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 434068 1 1 A FASTENER WAS SIEZED IN THE THREADED PLATE. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO REMO 434068 1 2 VED THE FASTENER WITH AN EZ-OUT AND THE EZ-OUT BROKE. THE PLATE WAS REMO 434068 1 3 VED FOR REPLACEMENT AND THE HOLES IN THE FRAME CAP WERE FOUND TO BE ELON 434068 1 4 GATED. THE HOLES WERE ENLARGED AND THE PLATE WAS INSTALLED WITH LARGER J 434068 1 5 O-BOLTS. THESE JO-BOLTS WERE TOO LONG SO THE PLATE WAS REMOVED AND REINS 434068 1 6 TALLED WITH SHORTER JO-BOLTS. THIS INSTALLATION WAS PERFORMED PER MRB AP 434068 1 7 PRVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBA 434068 1 8 BLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 434115 1 1 THE GOUGE IN THE LEADING EDGE OF THE L/H INBOARD ELEVON 9 RUB PANEL (ITE 434115 1 2 M 1, PAGE 1) WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING THE DAMAGED PORTION (FACESHEETS AN 434115 1 3 D HONEYCOMB) WITH UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE 434115 1 4 IS WORKMANSHIP DURING DOOR CLOSURE (DROPPING OF TOOL OR STRUTS ON RUB P 434115 1 5 ANEL). CONCLUDE THAT THE RUB PANEL IS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT AS REPAIRED 434115 1 6 NAD NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 434116 1 1 THE DENT IN THE L/H OUTBOARD ELEVON RUB PANEL 10 (ITEM 1.A, PAGE 1) AND 434116 1 2 THE DENT IN THE L/H OUTBOARD ELEVON RUB PANEL 11 (ITEM 1.B, PAGE 1) WERE 434116 1 3 ACCEPTED AS-IS BY UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL. THE DENTS WERE CORROSION PR 434116 1 4 OTECTED WITH HIGH TEMPERATURE COATING AND MR IDENTIFIED. PROBABLE CAUSE 434116 1 5 OF THE TWO DENTS IS WORKMANSHIP (TOOLS OR HARDWARE IMPACTING THE UPPER F 434116 1 6 ACESHEET OF THE RUB PANELS DURING ROUTINE MAINTENANCE). CONCLUDE THAT TH 434116 1 7 E RUB PANELS ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED O 434116 1 8 N THIS PR. 434140 1 1 THE DISCREPANT AREA OF THE GASKET WAS TRIMMED AWAY AND RED RTV WAS BONDE 434140 1 2 D TO THE ALUMINUM TO FORM A REPLACEMENT GASKET. THIS WAS ACCEPTED FOR UN 434140 1 3 RESTRICTED USE BY MRB ACTION. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PRO 434140 1 4 BABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 434240 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A BROKEN GROUND STRAP ON THE RH FLIPPER DOOR 3. THE DI 434240 1 2 SCREPANT STRAP WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE 434240 1 3 CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG AC 434240 1 4 TION REQUIRED. 434444 1 1 MR STR-3-11-3435 DOCUMENTS THAT THE RIGHT HAND WING TRAILING EDGE SEALS 434444 1 2 FOR RH FLIPPER DOORS 1-8 ARE BENT. THE SEAL IS SLIGHTLY DEFORMED WHICH H 434444 1 3 AS BEEN OBSERVED ON OTHER FLIGHTS. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT GAPS TO ALLO 434444 1 4 W FOR HEAT FLOW. THE TRAILING EDGE SEAL IS MR-ID'D AS STR-3-11-3435 AND 434444 1 5 NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. (SEE ATTACHED). 434546 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN SURFACE CORROSION WAS FOUND ON THE INGRESS/EG 434546 1 2 RESS HATCH LATCHING MECHANISM. CORROSION WAS VISIBLE ON LATCHES AND JOIN 434546 1 3 TS AT LATCH ASSY'S NO. 1,2,6,7,8,9,10,12,13,15,16,17,18. MICROSWITCHES 1 434546 1 4 AND 18 ALSO HAD VISIBLE SURFACE CORROSION. THE DISCREPANT AREAS WERE CL 434546 1 5 EANED WITH IPA. AN INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED AFTER THE CLEANING AND NO PI 434546 1 6 TTING OF SURFACE METAL WAS VISIBLE. ALL SUSPECT CORROSION WAS REMOVED. P 434546 1 7 R CONDITION NO LONGER EXIST. HATCH MICROSWITCHES AND LATCHING MECHANISM 434546 1 8 WILL BE RETESTED PER V1058.003. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. 434546 1 9 WILL BE RETESTED PER V1058.003. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. 434640 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE FILLER BAR SUPPORT TAB AND TH 434640 1 2 E ADJACENT CARRIER PANEL. APPROX 0.020" OF MATERIAL WAS REMOVED PER MR A 434640 1 3 CTION TO ALLEVIATE THE INTERFERENCE. MISSING KOROPON WAS TOUCHED UP PER 434640 1 4 SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS BUILD UP OF TO 434640 1 5 LERANCE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 434642 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE FILLER BAR SUPPORT TAB AND TH 434642 1 2 E ADJACENT CARRIER PANEL. STR-3-17-4628 ADDRESSES THE SAME DISCREPANCY A 434642 1 3 ND WILL REWORK THE PANEL TO ALLEVIATE THE INTERFERENCE. MISSING KOROPON 434642 1 4 WAS TOUCHED UP PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS P 434642 1 5 R IS BUILD UP OF TOLERANCE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIR 434642 1 6 ED. 434739 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS SCRATCHED PAINT ON THE R/H FLIPPER DOOR #5. THE DOOR S 434739 1 2 TRUCTURE WAS NOT DAMAGED. THE HIGH EMMISSIVITY COATING WAS TOUCHED UP PE 434739 1 3 R UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS NORMAL WEAR 434739 1 4 AND TEAR. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING OR SHOP ACTION REQUIRED. 434954 1 1 DURING APU-3-17-123, THE APU 1 FUEL ISLN VLV-B OPEN POSITION INDICATION 434954 1 2 WAS READING "OFF" AND S/B "ON". IPR 51V-0027 WAS INITIATE AND TROUBLESHO 434954 1 3 OTING FOUND PIN 127 AT CONNECTOR 55P140 BENT 90 DEGREES. THE IPR WAS UPG 434954 1 4 RADED AND SRP-V-EL-0009-A-0 WAS USED TO STRAIGHTEN THE BENT PIN AND RECO 434954 1 5 RD THE INFORMATION IN THE BENT PIN INDEX. THE PR WAS RETURNED TO APU FOR 434954 1 6 RETEST WHICH WAS SUCCESSFUL. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PRO 434954 1 7 BABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP, CONNECTOR WAS IMPROPERLY MATED. 435572 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP DURING SURVEILLANCE WHEN IT WAS NOTED THAT THE RIG 435572 1 2 HT MAIN GEAR NO WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSOR, MC452-0124-0005, WAS INSTALLED 435572 1 3 BACKWARDS. THE SENSOR WAS REMOVED AND REINSTALLED PER DWG, V070-510001. 435572 1 4 THE RIGGING WAS THEN CHECKED AND VERIFIED PER SPEC, MLO308-0029. RETEST 435572 1 5 WAS PERFORMED DURING VERIFICATION OF RIGGING. THE STRUT WAS LEFT COLLAPS 435572 1 6 ED AND WILL BE EXTENDED PER V9028.002. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY IS 435572 1 7 THAT SENSOR WAS INSTALLED CORRECTLY DURING MANUFACTURE. 435596 1 1 THERE ARE 6 FASTENERS INSTALLED IN RECEPTACLES ON THE V070-339086 AND V0 435596 1 2 70-339088 FITTINGS WHICH SHOULD NOT BE INSTALLED. THE FASTENERS WERE REM 435596 1 3 OVED AND SCREPPED. PROBABLE CAUSE: THERE IS INSUFFICIENT DATA TO DETERMI 435596 1 4 NE WHY, WHEN OR WHERE THE FASTENERS WERE INSTALLED. 435663 1 1 DURING V1240, CONNECTOR 50P646 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BROKEN BACKSHELL. SRP 435663 1 2 -V-EL-0001 WAS USED TO INSTALL A SPLIT TYPE BACKSHELL. NO FURTHER ACTION 435663 1 3 REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DU 435663 1 4 RING PROCESSING. 435736 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTS A GAP BETWEEN THE POLYIMIDE SEA 435736 1 2 L HOUSING AND THE EDGE OF THE SEAL AT THE CENTER HINGE. THE DESIGN OF TH 435736 1 3 E SEAL MUST ACCOMMODATE DIMENSIONAL VARIATIONS UNIQUE TO EACH HINGE POIN 435736 1 4 T. THESE VARIATIONS PERMIT A GAP BETWEEN TEH POLYIMIDE SEAL HOUSING AND 435736 1 5 THE SEAL. THE MAXIMUM DIMENSION OF THE GAP IS EQUAL TO THE SPACING BETWE 435736 1 6 EN THE VERTICAL CUTS ON THE SEAL. THE SEAL ASSEMBLY DESIGN MEETS REQUIRE 435736 1 7 MENTS ESTABLISHED FOR FLIGHT PROFILES RESTRICTED BY THE SHUTTLE OPERATIO 435736 1 8 NS DATA BOOK (MAX ELEVON DEFLICTION APPROX +/- 8.5 DEGREES). THE GAP BET 435736 1 9 WEEN THE SEAL AND THE HOUSING IS AN KNOWN DESIGN CONDITION RESULTING 435736 1 10 FROM A BUILDUP OF TOLERANCE. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. NO FURTHER SHOP 435736 1 11 OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 436267 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2: THERE ARE TWO CRACKS ON THE V070-337853-002 FIBERGLASS CL 436267 1 2 OSEOUT PANEL. THE PANEL WAS REPAIRED PER STANDARD REPAIR SRP-V-ST-0015-0 436267 1 3 -0. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 436320 1 1 ITEM 1: L/H OUTBD ELEVON: THERE IS A DING ON THE SECOND FROM THE INBD RU 436320 1 2 B PANEL. THIS CONDITION WAS DOCUMENTED PER STR-3-17-4623. ITEM 2: L/H OU 436320 1 3 TBD ELEVON: THERE IS A DING ON THE RUB PANEL UNDER FLIPPER DOOR 9. THE D 436320 1 4 ING WAS REPAIRED PER STANDARD REPAIR SRP-V-ST-0024-0. ITEM 3: L/H OUTBD 436320 1 5 ELEVON: THERE IS A DING ON THE RUB PANEL UNDER FLIPPER DOOR 11. THE DING 436320 1 6 WAS REPAIRED PER STANDARD REPAIR SRP-V-ST-0024-0. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMIT 436320 1 7 ED ACCESS TO THE UPPER ELEVON COVE AREA BELOW OPENED FLIPPER DOORS. 436777 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN AS A SPIN-OFF OF PR MEQ-3-17-0715 TO DOCUMENT TWO DI 436777 1 2 SCREPANCIES ON THE PLBD CENTERLINE BULB SEAL INSTALLATION. ITEM 1 WAS RE 436777 1 3 CORDED AS A DEBONDED SPLICE, BUT WAS A TEAR IN A PREVIOUSLY MR APPLIED T 436777 1 4 APE REPAIR AT THE FEMALE END OF A SEAL SEGMENT. THE SEAL END WAS REMOVED 436777 1 5 FROM THE RETAINER, OLD TAPE REMOVED, NEW TAPE APPLIED, AND THE SEAL REI 436777 1 6 NSTALLED. THIS REPAIR WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2 WAS A 436777 1 7 SMALL TEAR IN THE FEMALE END OF THE SEAL APPROX 0.125"L. THE SEAL END W 436777 1 8 AS REMOVED FROM THE RETAINER, REPAIRED WITH TEFLON TAPE WRAP AND REINSTA 436777 1 9 LLED. THIS REPAIR WAS ALSO MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO PR 436777 1 10 CONDITION EXISTS. NO MR ID REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION 436777 1 11 IS NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. RETEST WILL BE PER V5018 FINAL PLBD 436777 1 12 CLOSURE FOR ROLL TO VAB. 437170 1 1 DURING HYD-3-A0021 IT WAS DETECTED THAT WIRE H66D20-1 WAS BROKEN AT CONN 437170 1 2 ECTOR 50P9016. DURING ENGINEERING INSPECTION OF WIRE H66D20-1 IT WAS ALS 437170 1 3 O DETECTED THAT WIRE 2H68E20-2 HAD EXPOSED CONDUCTOR AT 50P9016 (REFEREN 437170 1 4 CE PAGE 1A). DURING THE REPAIR OF WIRES H66D20-1 AND 2H68E20-2 EXPOSED C 437170 1 5 ONDUCTOR TO WIRE 2H68E20-1 WAS FOUND (REFERENCE PAGE 1B). DUE TO EXTENSI 437170 1 6 VE WIRE DAMAGE AT 50P9016, NEW SECTIONS OF WIRES H66D20-1, H66D20-2, 2H6 437170 1 7 8E20-1, 2H68E20-2, AND H350A20 WERE SPLICED IN USING KSC SPLICES KSC-062 437170 1 8 1 THRU KSC-0625. THE NEW WIRE SEGMENTS WERE TERMINATED AT 50P9016. RETES 437170 1 9 T OF CONNECTOR 50P9016 WILL BE SCAN TRACKED FOR CONNECTOR DEMATE/MATE ON 437170 1 10 HYD-3-A0021. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF 437170 1 11 ORBITER PROCESSING. 437171 1 1 DURING FCS-3-17-547, THE JR24 WIRES ON CONNECTORS 30P351 AND 30P353 WERE 437171 1 2 FOUND TO BE BROKEN. ALSO GROUND WIRE F641A20 WAS FOUND TO BE BROKEN FRO 437171 1 3 M 30E87. THE JR 24 WIRES ON BOTH CONNECTORS WERE REPLACED WITH LONGER SE 437171 1 4 GMENTS AT THE 1E PARALLEL SPLICE AND NEW LUGS INSTALLED. WIRE F651A20 HA 437171 1 5 D ADDITIONAL LENGTH ADDED BY USING SPLICE KSC 0620 WITH AN APPROVED MR. 437171 1 6 ALL REPAIRS HAD CONTINUITY CHECKS AND WERE SUCCESSFUL. GROUND LUG TO 30E 437171 1 7 87 WAS INSTALLED ON FCS-3-17-547. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 437171 1 8 PROBABLE CAUSE: ALL PROBLEMS FALL UNDER THE NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORB 437171 1 9 ITER DURING PROCESSING CATEGORY. 437312 1 1 DURING FRCS INSTALLATION THE ATTACH PT 14 BOLT WAS UNABLE TO START INTO 437312 1 2 IT'S BARREL NUT DUE TO A MISSING BARREL NUT RETAINER. AN LAF PR WAS GENE 437312 1 3 RATED AGAINST THE MISSING RETAINER. A NEW NUT AND RETAINER WERE INSTALLE 437312 1 4 D. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 437402 1 1 THE FRAMED WAS DAMAGED BY THE GSE STANDS. THE DAMAGED AREA WAS INSPECTIO 437402 1 2 N BY DYE PENETRANT WITH NO EVIDENCE OF CRACKING. THE AREA WAS CORROSION 437402 1 3 PROTECTED AND MR ID'D. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE C 437402 1 4 AUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 437471 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A CHIP IN THE MID LOWER DOOR ON AVIONICS BAY 5. THE DA 437471 1 2 MAGED FACESHEET WAS REMOVED AND AREA POTTED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. TH 437471 1 3 E REWORKED AREA WAS THEN PAINTED PER DWG REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FO 437471 1 4 R THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQU 437471 1 5 IRED. 437655 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS THREAD MARKS IN THE R/H WING SPAR AT THE SPAR INSULATO 437655 1 2 R ATTACH POINTS FOR INSULATORS 12 THROUGH 14. THE THREAD IMPRESSIONS MEA 437655 1 3 SURED 0.004 INCH DEEP MAXIMUM. THE THREAD MARKS WERE FOUND ON THE LOWER 437655 1 4 SURFACE OF HTE HOLES ONLY. THE HOLES WERE CLEANED UP WITH BEHR-TEX AND M 437655 1 5 R ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS PROCEDURA 437655 1 6 L ERROR (NOT SUPPORTING INSULATOR DURING FASTENER TORQUING). NO FURTHER 437655 1 7 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 437676 1 1 DURING IPR 051V-0004, WIRE 4F278A16-2 WAS FOUND TO BE DAMAGED APPROX 1/2 437676 1 2 " FROM 56P122 BUT WAS NOT THOUGHT TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE IPR CONDITION. 437676 1 3 WIRES 4F278A16-1 AND -2 WERE DEPINNED AND RETERMINATED AT 56P122. THE CO 437676 1 4 NNECTOR WAS DEMATED PER THE IPR BUT REMATED PER THIS WAD. RETEST WILL BE 437676 1 5 TRACKED BY SCAN 3-17-0943. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBA 437676 1 6 BLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 437951 1 1 DURING V1161 SEQ 02-023 IT WAS DETECTED THAT WIRE P904E22 HAD A BROKEN G 437951 1 2 OUND LUG AT 50P775. INSPECTION REVEALED THE WIRE WOULD BE TOO SHORT TO R 437951 1 3 ETERMINATE. THE DISCREPANT WIRE WAS DEPINNED FROM CONNECTOR 50P775 AND R 437951 1 4 EMOVED FROM GROUND POINT 50E211. A NEW SEGMENT OF WIRE P904E22 WAS TERMI 437951 1 5 NATED AT 50E211 AND 50P775. THE RETEST OF CONNECTOR 50P775 AND GROUND PO 437951 1 6 INT 50E211 WILL BE PERFORMED PER SCAN TRACK. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 437951 1 7 PR WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF ORBITER PROCESSING. 438127 1 1 DURING V63-50018 STEP 03 ITEM 09, WIRE 2H1035B12-2 WAS FOUND TO BE DAMAG 438127 1 2 ED APPROX 1" FROM 50P9022. WIRES 2H1035B12-1 AND -2 AND 2H1035BB12 WERE 438127 1 3 EXTRACTED AND RETERMINATED. THE RETEST OF THE CONNECTOR WILL BE TRACKED 438127 1 4 BY SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL W 438127 1 5 EAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 438301 1 1 DURING V1240 IT WAS DICSOVERED THAT WIRE U47C26-1 HAD EXPOSED CONDUCTOR 438301 1 2 APPROX 1" FROM DESIGN SPLICE 50SP990; THEREFORE, THE DAMAGED SECTION OF 438301 1 3 CABLE U47C26 WAS CUT OUT ALONG WITH SPLICES 50SP989 AND 50SP990. THE DES 438301 1 4 IGN SPLICES 50SP989 AND 50SP990 WERE REINSTALLED AND SUCCESSFULLY RETEST 438301 1 5 ED PER THIS PR (REF PREVIOUS S19B RETEST). THE APU LINE HEATER ASSY (WIT 438301 1 6 H THERMOSTAT, 50V46S19B) HAS BEEN RETURNED TO A NOMINAL CONFIGURATION. N 438301 1 7 O FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. NO RC ACTION IS REQUESTED. PROBAB 438301 1 8 LE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 438334 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THIS MRB APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED USE FO 438334 PMRB 2 R ONE FLIGHT OF HTE V070-339685-009 PANEL AS REWORKED. THE PANEL IS CRAC 438334 PMRB 3 KED AT ONE FASTENER HOLE. THE PANEL IS STILL HELD ON BY 15 OTHER FASTENE 438334 PMRB 4 RS. THE CRACK DOES NOT GO THROUGH ALL PLIES OF THE FIBERGLASS. THE TAPE 438334 PMRB 5 WHICH IS APPLIED OVER THE CRACK WILL PREVENT ANY FIBERGLASS PARTICLES FR 438334 PMRB 6 OM BECOMING AIRBORNE. THE PANEL WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INT 438334 PMRB 7 ENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE PANEL IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 438334 PMRB 8 NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. FASTENER AT DISCREPANT LOCATION WILL CONTINUE TO F 438334 PMRB 9 UNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS 438334 PMRB 10 FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 438334 PMRB 11 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PRIME BOARD ACTION: PMRB APPROVED FOR 438334 PMRB 12 DEFERRAL TO FLIGHT 18 OF OV-103, 06/15/93. 438334 1 1 IN THE PROCESS OF REPAIRING THE MOST OBVIOUS CRACK, (PAGE 1) OTHER CRACK 438334 1 2 S WERE DISCOVERED AND RECORDED ON PAGES 1A, 1C, AND 1D. PAGE 1D ALSO REV 438334 1 3 EALED SEVERAL DEBONDED AREAS, AND 1E REVEALED SEVERAL SUBSURFACE STRESS 438334 1 4 CRACKS AROUND A FASTENER ATTACHMENT. PAGES 1B AND 1F RECORDED THE IMPROP 438334 1 5 ERLY FITTED NUTPLATE. THIS DOCUMENT INVOLVED ONE MR DEFERRAL (OPERATION 438334 1 6 3) AND TWO MR APPROVALS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE (OPERATIONS 13 AND 14). FIV 438334 1 7 E STANDARD REPAIR PROCEDURES WERE ISSUED ON THIS WAD. THE REPAIRED PANEL 438334 1 8 HAS BEEN INSTALLED WITH IMPROVED FIT AND FREE OF CRACKS. NO FURTHER 438334 1 9 ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE (PAGES 1, 1A, 1C, 1D, 1E): 438334 1 10 OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. PROBABLE CAUSE (PAGE 1B AND 1F): MANUFACTURIN 438334 1 11 G DEFECT. 438449 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS DIFFICULTY CLOSING THE RH INBD FLIPPER DOOR #1. THE BL 438449 1 2 ADE SEAL HOUSING WAS FOUND TO MAKE HARD CONTACT WITH ADJACENT STRUCTURE 438449 1 3 THUS LIMITING DOOR TRAVEL. THE DOOR CAN NOT BE RAISED HIGH ENOUGH TO ROT 438449 1 4 ATE THE ROD ASSY (LINKAGE) PAST THE RUB PANEL. THIS IS A KNOWN DESIGN CO 438449 1 5 NDITION. A DEV WAS WRITTEN TO THE V80-96009 JC TO ALLOW LINKAGE REMOVAL 438449 1 6 AND REINSTALLATION. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG A 438449 1 7 CTION REQUIRED. 438665 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THE MR-3-15-4448 BUSHING INSTALLED IN THE 70A2523-3 438665 PMRB 2 FITTING PULLED OUTBOARD APPROX 0.050-.060" DURING INSTALLATION OF THE AF 438665 PMRB 3 T 70B2010-1 STABILIZER STRUT BOLT. AN ATTEMPT TO REMOVE THE BOLT AND MR 438665 PMRB 4 BUSHING REVEALED THAT THEY ARE STUCK TOGETHER. THE STABILIZER STRUT IS D 438665 PMRB 5 ESIGNED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE FRAME CAPS FOR MAX LOADS INDUCED WHEN 438665 PMRB 6 PAYLOADS INSTALLED IN BAYS 1 AND 2 FOR OV-103 FLIGHT 17. ACCEPTING THIS 438665 PMRB 7 DISCREPANT CONDITION FOR FLIGHT 17 WILL ALLOW THE INSTALLATION TO FUNCTI 438665 PMRB 8 ON PER DESIGN INTENT. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND MARGIN OF SAFETY OF T 438665 PMRB 9 HE STABILIZER STRUT INSTALLATION REMAINS POSITIVE. THIS MR IS FOR 438665 PMRB 10 RESTRICTED USE, ONE FLIGHT. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS 438665 PMRB 11 FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS 438665 PMRB 12 LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. POST FLIGHT DISPO 438665 PMRB 13 WILL RESEAT THE MR BUSHING AND CHANGE OUT THE HARDWARE. 438665 PMRB 14 ON 11/02/93, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 18 OF OV-103. 438665 1 1 DURING PSA INSTALLATION THE UPPER AFT BOLT BECAME GALLED IN ITS HOLE. TH 438665 1 2 IS CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED FOR TWO FLIGHTS BY MRB APPROVAL. THE STRUT WAS 438665 1 3 THEN REMOVED BY REMOVING THE FITTING AND STRUT TOGETHER. THE BOLT WAS R 438665 1 4 EMOVED ON THE BENCH AND THE FITTING WAS REPAIRED BY REAMING THE HOLES AN 438665 1 5 D INSTALLING THE BUSHINGS PROPERLY. THE HOLES IN THE FITTING WERE REAMED 438665 1 6 TO WITHIN TOLERANCE. THE STRUT WAS FOUND TO HAVE DISCREPANT HOLES. THES 438665 1 7 E WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS 438665 1 8 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS MR, OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 438700 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DISCREPANT NUTPLATE ON THE L/H FLIPPER DOOR #5. THE 438700 1 2 NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. ALL HARDWARE R 438700 1 3 EMOVED FOR ACCESS HAS BEEN REINSTALLED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. PROBABL 438700 1 4 E CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGIN 438700 1 5 EERING ACTION REQUIRED. 439005 PMRB 1 ON 7-8-93 PMRB CHAIRMAN APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLIGHT 18 OF OV-103. AP 439005 PMRB 2 PROVED WAIVER WK02833R1. 439005 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT AN INCONSISTENCY IN PST TEST DATA. THE D 439005 1 2 ATA INDICATED THAT THE INSTRUMENTATION MEASURING THE PUCK PRESSURES AT R 439005 1 3 OB2 AND ROB4 WERE REVERSED. TROUBLESHOOTING REVEALED THAT THE PRESSURE T 439005 1 4 RANSDUCERS AT PORTS A AND C WERE REVERSED. A PR ON THE RIGHT OUTBOARD BR 439005 1 5 AKE DURING FLIGHT 17 PROCESSING REQUIRED THAT THE BRAKE BE REPLACED. THI 439005 1 6 S ANOMALY MOST LIKELY STEMS FROM THE FLIGHT 17 INSTALLATION. STEPS WERE 439005 1 7 PERFORMED IN THIS PR TO RETURN THE BRAKE INSTRUMENTATION TO PRINT CONFIG 439005 1 8 URATION. RETEST WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED PER V1065, SEQUENCE 12. THE 439005 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR WAS TECHNICIAN ERROR. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT 439005 1 10 LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 439086 1 1 THE INBOARD INSULATOR ON THE L/H FLIPPER DOOR #5 WAS FOUND TO BE CRUSHED 439086 1 2 SLIGHTLY. THE DEFORMATION DOES NOT RESULT IN ANY INTERFERENCE WITH THE 439086 1 3 ADJACENT HARDWARE AND WILL NOT IMPAIR THE INSULATING PROPERTIES OF THE I 439086 1 4 NSULATOR. NO CRACKS IN THE INCONEL FACESHEET WERE NOTED. THE DISCREPANT 439086 1 5 INSULATOR WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER ENGINEE 439086 1 6 RING OR SHOP ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 439169 1 1 THE NUTPLATE WAS DISCREPANT. IT WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE WAS REINSTALLE 439169 1 2 D WITH BLIND RIVETS PER SRP. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROB 439169 1 3 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 439170 1 1 THE NUTPLATE WAS DISCREPANT. IT WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE WAS REINSTALLE 439170 1 2 D WITH BLIND RIVETS PER SRP. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROB 439170 1 3 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 439588 1 1 ON WINDOW 7, THE FWD/INBD CARRIER PANEL HAD A FASTENER THAT WAS INSTALLE 439588 1 2 D CROSSTHREADED. THE FASTENER WAS REMOVED AND THE INSERT WAS CLEANED WIT 439588 1 3 H IPA. A NEW FASTENER WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCESS TO 439588 1 4 WINDOWS 7 AND 8 IS LIMITED. 439629 1 1 DURING V00-10072, A KOROPON PAINT SPLASH WAS FOUND ON THE UPPER SURFACE 439629 1 2 OF LH RADIATOR 2. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. N 439629 1 3 O FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERA 439629 1 4 TIONAL DEGRADATION. 439687 1 1 DURING S0004 SEQ 02-454, SPARE RETAINER FIT CHECK OF EACH CONNECTOR HOLE 439687 1 2 FOUND P506 LOCATION BINDING. INSPECTION FOUND DAMAGE TO THE THREADS. TH 439687 1 3 E ASSEMBLY WAS SENT TO NSLD FOR REPAIR. THE PLATE WAS THEN RETURNED AND 439687 1 4 INSTALLED PER S0004. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAU 439687 1 5 SE: UNKNOWN. 439814 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN WHEN THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS WERE CLOSED AND THE R/H M 439814 1 2 OTOR 2 CLOSED INDICATION WAS NOT RECEIVED. TROUBLE-SHOOTING STEPS IN THI 439814 1 3 S PR REVEALED THAT THE LIMIT SWITCH (V070-594222-013) WAS OUT OF RIG PER 439814 1 4 THE RIGGING SPECIFICATION (MLO308-0173). A SIMILAR CONDITION WAS FOUND 439814 1 5 ON THE L/H SIDE (REFERENCE 060V-0017). STEPS WERE SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED 439814 1 6 IN THIS PR TO RE-RIG THE LIMIT SWITCH. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR WAS 439814 1 7 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS P 439814 1 8 R. RETEST WAS PERFORMED BY PLBD CYCLES PER V9023.01. 439902 1 1 THE DISCREPANT GROUND CLIP WAS REMOVED AND IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE HO 439902 1 2 LES IN THE UNDERLYING STRUCTURE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ELONGATED. THESE HOL 439902 1 3 ES WERE DRILLED UP TO .257 AND THE BRACKET WAS INSTALLED WITH .250" RIVE 439902 1 4 T PER MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO DONE ON THIS 439902 1 5 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 440021 1 1 UNABLE TO CLOSE FLIPPER DOOR R/H 12 DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM ADJACENT TU 440021 1 2 BE SEALS. THE ADJACENT TUBE SEALS WERE MOVED OUTBOARD AND INBOARD FROM R 440021 1 3 /H FLIPPER DOOR 12. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 440219 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP DURING FINAL CLOSE OUT INSPECTION BEFORE FINAL GEA 440219 1 2 R RETRACTION. THE PROBLEM AS DESCRIBED ON PAGE 1, WAS A DRIP OF HYDRAULI 440219 1 3 C FOUID AT THE HYD FILL PORT. THE RESOLUTION OF THIS ANOMALY WAS TO VERI 440219 1 4 FY / TORQUE THIS FITTING TO ITS MAX TORQUE VALVE. THIS RETORQUING RESULT 440219 1 5 ED IN 1/6 TURN MOVEMENT OF THE FITTING. THE FITTING WAS WIPED CLEAN AND 440219 1 6 MONITORED FOR 1 HR, AT 15 MIN INTERVALS. NO FURTHER LEAKAGE WAS OBSERVED 440219 1 7 . THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR WAS LOW RANGE OF TORQUE NOT SUFFICIENT T 440219 1 8 O PREVENT LEAKAGE. RETEST PERFORMED PER 1 HR DECAY CHECK. 440282 PMRB 1 ON 7-8-93 PMRB CHAIRMAN APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLIGHT 18 OF OV-103, UA 440282 PMRB 2 BD APPROVED. 440282 PMRB 3 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THE RH MLG BUNGEE SWITCH INDICATION INITIALLY FAILED 440282 PMRB 4 TO VERIFY THE BUNGEE WAS ARMED WHEN THE LANDING GEAR WAS RETRACTED FOR 440282 PMRB 5 FLIGHT. SUBSEQUENT TROUBLESHOOTING VERIFIED THE BUNGEE WAS, IN FACT, 440282 PMRB 6 ARMED BUT WAS STILL UNABLE TO ISOLATE THE CAUSE OF THE INITIAL FAILURE. 440282 PMRB 7 UNEXPLAINED ANOMALY RATIONALE WAS WRITTEN AND APPROVED. PROBABLE CAUSE 440282 PMRB 8 IS LISTED IN THE UA DISPOSITION, PAGE 75. REQUEST DEFERRAL OF THIS PR TO 440282 PMRB 9 OV-103 FLIGHT 19, FOR FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING TO ISOLATE THE CAUSE OF 440282 PMRB 10 THE ANOMALY. THIS NONCONFORMANCE DOES NOT EFFECT THE SAFETY, FIT OR 440282 PMRB 11 FUNCTION AND HAS NO IMPACT ON THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST RETENTION RATIONAL 440282 PMRB 12 OR HAZARD CONTROLS NOR DOES IT HAVE ANY IMPACT ON THE CERTIFICATION AND 440282 PMRB 13 ASSOCIATED RATIONAL. MR RATIONALE: DURING AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION IT 440282 PMRB 14 WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE LH2 CURTAIN ATTACH PLATE (CAP) WAS NOT PER PRINT 440282 PMRB 15 (V070-415321). THE 4" DISCONNECT "CUTOUT" IS NOT PER THE DRAWING 440282 PMRB 16 REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED AS MODIFIED PER EO B01. DUE TO THE FAILURE TO 440282 PMRB 17 INCORPORATE THE MODIFICATION AS REQUIRED PER E.O. B01, THE EXISTING 440282 PMRB 18 CUTOUT ON OV-103 IS NOT THE PROPER SHAPE AND CONFIGURATION PER THE 440282 PMRB 19 DRAWING (REF FIGURE 1). THEREFORE IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO MODIFY THE 440282 PMRB 20 PLATE TO MEET SPECIFIED DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. THE NEXT POSSIBLE 440282 PMRB 21 OPPORTUNITY FOR MODIFICATION OF THE LH2 CAP WILL BE NEXT FLOW, FLIGHT 440282 PMRB 22 19. THE PLATE WILL BE REMOVED IN ORDER TO SUPPORT V1009.001 17" 440282 PMRB 23 DISCONNECT INSPECTIONS. AT THIS TIME THE PLATE WILL BE SENT TO RI-NSLD 440282 PMRB 24 FOR MODIFICATION. THE REASON FOR THE MODIFICATION IS TO REMOVE A 440282 PMRB 25 POTENTIAL FOR FOAM DAMAGE ON THE LH2 4" DISCONNECT. THE MODIFICATION OF 440282 PMRB 26 THE 4" CUTOUT IS DESIGNED TO AVOID POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE OF THE 4" 440282 PMRB 27 DISCONNECT BY INCREASING THE CLEARANCE FOR THE FOAM INSULATION AROUND 440282 PMRB 28 THE DISCONNECT. THE EXISTING CONDITION ON OV-103 WILL BE MR ACCEPTED FOR 440282 PMRB 29 ONE FLIGHT ONLY. THE EXISTING 4" CUTOUT CONFIGURATION HAS FLOWN 3 440282 PMRB 30 MISSIONS SUCCESSFULLY AND HAS NOT BEEN DETRIMENTAL TO THE OPERATION OF 440282 PMRB 31 THE 4" DISCONNECT, NOR HAS THE 4" DISCONNECT FOAM NEEDED REPAIR DUE TO 440282 PMRB 32 DAMAGE FROM THE CAP. THERE IS NO CONCERN THAT THE CURRENT CUTOUT WILL 440282 PMRB 33 EFFECT THE FORM, FIT OR FUNCTION OF THE 4" DISCONNECT OR THE FOAM 440282 PMRB 34 INSULATION SURROUNDING THE DISCONNECT, NOR DOES IT INVALIDATE THE BASIS 440282 PMRB 35 FOR CERTIFICATION OF THE DISCONNECT. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE 440282 PMRB 36 CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS AND 440282 PMRB 37 WILL BE ACCEPTED FOR RESTRICTED USE FOR ONE FLIGHT ONLY. THIS PR WILL BE 440282 PMRB 38 ACCEPTED FOR RESTRICTED USE FOR ONE FLIGHT ONLY. THIS PR WILL BE 440282 PMRB 39 DEFERRED TO OV-103 FLOW 19 WHERE UPON ARRIVAL IN THE OPF THE PLATE WILL 440282 PMRB 40 BE REMOVED AND MODIFIED. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 01/14/94 PRIME BOARD 440282 PMRB 41 ACTIONS: PMRB CHRM APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 19 OF OV-103, UA BD 440282 PMRB 42 APPROVED. 440282 1 1 THE RMG BUNGEE LIGHT ANOMALY WAS INITIALLY PICKED UP DURING FLT 15 RETR 440282 1 2 ACT FOR FLIGHT PER IPR 053V-00136. THIS WAS DEFERRED TO FLT 16 AS A UA A 440282 1 3 ND CLOSD. 051V-0068 WAS PICKED UP DURING FLT 16 AND 051V-0053 (UA-A0032) 440282 1 4 WAS PICKED UP DURING FLT 17. DURING THE THREE FLOWS OF T/S, VEHICLE POW 440282 1 5 ER, HYDRAULICS AND JACK CONFIGURATION WERE DETERMINED TO HAVE NO AFFECT 440282 1 6 ON THE ANOMALY. T/S DURING GLT 19 DETERMINED THE CAUSE OF THE ANOMALY TO 440282 1 7 BE THE BUNGEE PLUNGER NOT EXTENDING DUE TO BINDING BETWEEN ARMING ROLLE 440282 1 8 R AND BACK OF PLUNGER. THE BINDING WAS DUE TO RMG DOOR LATCHES NOT GOING 440282 1 9 COMPLETELY LATCHED. THE RMG WAS RIGGED DURING FLT 11 WITH A LATCH NEAR 440282 1 10 CENTER GAP OF .076" (MRB S./B .00) THIS WAS AN INDICATION THAT THE 440282 1 11 LATCHES WERE NOT GOINGCOMPLETELY LATCHED, BUT THE SYSTEM FUNCTIONED 440282 1 12 NORMALLY UNTIL FLT 15. IT WAS FOUND THAT THE RMG WING AND MIDBODY ACCESS 440282 1 13 DOORS NEEDED TO BE INSTALLED TO REPEAT THE ANOMALY. DUE EITHER TO 440282 1 14 INCREASED AIR PRESSURE OR STRUCTURAL STIFFNESS. DURING FLT 15 BOTH THE 440282 1 15 HYDRAULIC AND MLG THERMAL BARRIER MOD WERE PERFORMED. THE THERMAL 440282 1 16 BARRIER MOD REPLACED ALL DOOR AND WHEEL WELL PERIMETER TILE AND MAY HAVE 440282 1 17 ADDED ENOUGH RESISTANCE TO PRODUCE THE ANOMALY. THE V070-510452 LINK WAS 440282 1 18 SHORTENED 1 TURN (MRB) TO PULL THE DOOR CLOSED FARTHER AND REDUCE 440282 1 19 REQUIRED LATCHING LOADS, ALSO DOOR LATCH PRELOAD WAS INCREASED 1.5 440282 1 20 TURNS. THESE ADJUSTMENTS RESULTED IN A NEAR CENTER DIMENSION OF ZERO AND 440282 1 21 ELIMINATED THE ORIGINAL UA DISCREPANCY. THE INCREASE IN LATCH PRELOAD 440282 1 22 CAUSED THE INBD/FWD DOOR HOOK TIP TO CONTACT ITS CORRESPONDING ROLLER. 440282 1 23 THIS MINOR CONTACT WAS MRB ACCEPTED OK AS IS. RIGGING MEASUREMENTS WERE 440282 1 24 TAKEN AFTER ADJUSTMENTS WERE MADE. THESE MEASUREMENTS WERE COMPARED TO 440282 1 25 PREVIOUS (MRB ACCEPTED) DATA AND MRB ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THIS 440282 1 26 PR DOES NOT AFFECT OTHER VEHICLES. PROBABLE CAUSE: MARGINAL RIGGING 440282 1 27 DURING FLT 11 AGGRAVATED BY MLG THERMAL BARRIER MODIFICATION DURING FLT 440282 1 28 15. 440401 1 1 DURING V2093 SEQ 05-015, THE CONNECTOR SAVER ON 50J59 WAS FOUND TO BE MI 440401 1 2 SSING ON LOCKING PIN. THE CONNECTOR SAVER WAS REPLACED BY DEMATING THE G 440401 1 3 SE CABLE, INSTALLING A NEW CONNECTOR SAVER AND THEN REMATING THE GSE. RE 440401 1 4 TEST ON THE REPAIR WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED O 440401 1 5 N THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCES 440401 1 6 SING. 440915 1 1 DURING SURV IT WAS DETECTED THAT GND LUG ON WIRE P942B22 WAS BROKEN AT 5 440915 1 2 0P795. THE DISCREPANT LUG WAS REMOVED AND A NEW LUG WAS CRIMPPED ON WIRE 440915 1 3 P942B22. A CONTINUITY CHECK WAS PERFORMED ON THE WOIRE TO VERIFY A GOOD 440915 1 4 CRIMP. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF ORBIT 440915 1 5 ER PROCESSING.THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 441546 1 1 DURING WORK ON OEL-3-17-0117 IT WAS DETECTED THAT THE GROUND LUGS FOR WI 441546 1 2 RES U261B20SH-JR22 AND U260B20SH-JR22 WERE BROKEN OFF AT 50P296. DUE TO 441546 1 3 INSUFFICIENT SLACK TO RETERMINATE THE GROUND LUGS, NEW SECTIONS OF WIRES 441546 1 4 U261B20SH-JR22 AND U260B20SH-JR22 WERE SPLICED TO THE EXISTING WIRE SEG 441546 1 5 MENT USING KSC SPLICES KSC-0628 AND KSC-0629. NEW GROUND LUGS WERE INSTA 441546 1 6 LLED ON THE WIRES AND TERMINATED AT 50P296. ITEM 2 OF THIS PR IS NOT A D 441546 1 7 ISCREPANCY SINCE THE SHIELDS ARE FLOATED DOWNLINE AND A CONTINUITY CHECK 441546 1 8 WILL SHOW AN OPEN. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 1 IS WORKMANSHIP. THE PRO 441546 1 9 BABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 2 WAS NO DISCREPANCY. 441864 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: DURING PAPER REVIEW OF JC V76-40002 BY CVAS, IT WAS 441864 PMRB 2 DISCOVERED THAT THE SERIAL NUMBER RECORDED FOR CONNECTOR SAVER P/N: ME41 441864 PMRB 3 4-0630-1009 (50J72) 79B635-2501 WAS INCORRECT. THIS DISCREPANCY IS NOTED 441864 PMRB 4 PER CDR CM3-1803. THE CONNECTOR SAVER AT 50J72 WAS REMOVED IN THE OPF, 441864 PMRB 5 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FLOW, AND THE OCN 79B635-2501 RECORDED. A NEW CO 441864 PMRB 6 NNECTOR SAVER WAS INSTALLED AND THE SAME OCN (79B635-2501) WAS RECORDED 441864 PMRB 7 ON V76-40002. UPON VERIFICATION OF THE SAID OCN/CONNECTOR SAVER, IT WAS 441864 PMRB 8 DISCOVERED THAT IT'S PRESENT LOCATION IS AT THE NSLD (ROCKWELL SERVICE C 441864 PMRB 9 ENTER). THE OCN NUMBER IS USED ONLY FOR TRACKING AND TRACEABILITY. NO 441864 PMRB 10 TECHNICAL CONCERN OF THE CONNECTOR SAVER HARDWARE IS IN QUESTION. 50J72 441864 PMRB 11 HAS (2) ACTIVE PINS, BOTH FUNCTIONS HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY TESTED. THE 441864 PMRB 12 FUNCTIONS ARE (A) MTU OUTPUT AND (B) FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR OUTPUT. THESE 441864 PMRB 13 CIRCUITS ARE DISCONNECTED AT T-0 AND ARE NOT USED IN FIT. BASED ON THIS, 441864 PMRB 14 ENGINEERING RECOMMENDS THAT THIS PR BE DEFERRED TO THE NEXT FLOW AT 441864 PMRB 15 WHICH TIME THE CORRECT SERIAL NUMBER WILL BE RECORDED. THIS MR ACTION 441864 PMRB 16 DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR 441864 PMRB 17 HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS RESTRICTED TO "RESTRICTED LIFE" (ONE 441864 PMRB 18 FLIGHT ONLY FOR OV-103). PRIME BOARD ACTION: PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL 441864 PMRB 19 TO FLIGHT 18 OF OV-103 07/13/93. 441864 1 1 DURING PAPER REVIEW BY RI CVAS, CONNECTOR SAVER P/N: ME414-0630-1009 WAS 441864 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE THE INCORRECT S/N 79B635-2501 RECORDED. CDR CM3-1803 WAS 441864 1 3 INITIATED. THE PR WAS DEFERRED UNTIL FLIGHT 18. AFTER THE CONNECTOR SAVE 441864 1 4 R WAS REMOVED, THE S/N WAS RECORDED. THE SERIAL NUMBER WAS FOUND TO BE T 441864 1 5 HE SAME. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR, 441864 1 6 CORRECT INFO WAS RECORDED BY LSOC. RI DATA BASE INCORRECT. 442926 1 1 THE BOLTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE V070-357214-001 LINK ARE LOOSE. PER PRINT 442926 1 2 THERE IS A .005 TO .010" GAP BETWEEN THE PART AND THE WASHER. THE NUT O 442926 1 3 N THE V070-357214-001 LINK WHERE IT ATTACHES TO THE V070-357105-003 BEAM 442926 1 4 WAS REMOVED AND REINSTALLED PER PRINT. THE OTHER BOLT WAS MEASURED AS P 442926 1 5 ER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 442944 1 1 DURING S1287,W107 WIRE HARNESS WAS FOUND TO HAVE BROKEN BANDAIDS SECURIN 442944 1 2 G IT. UPON INSPECTION OF THE INSTALLATION DRAWING, WIRE HARNESS WAS SUPP 442944 1 3 OSE TO BE SECURED USING MBO135-050 TYPE 5 TAPE. THE REMAINING INTACKED B 442944 1 4 ANDAIDS WERE REMOVED AND THE MBO135 TYPE TAPE WAS INSTALLED AND HARNESS 442944 1 5 INSTALLATION RETURNED TO PRINT. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. P 442944 1 6 ROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING AND WOR 442944 1 7 KMANSHIP, INSTALLATION OF BANDAIDS WAS NOT PER PRINT NOR MR. 443051 1 1 DURING S1287, CONNECTOR 50P16 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL. SRP V-E 443051 1 2 L-0001-E-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO FURTHER A 443051 1 3 CTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBIT 443051 1 4 ER DURING PROCESSING. 443530 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THE 2ND NUTPLATE FROM THE INBD SIDE ALONG THE FORWAR 443530 PMRB 2 D ROW USED FOR INSTALLATION OF THE V070-397517-103 CARRIER PANEL IS DISC 443530 PMRB 3 REPANT. THE NUT ELEMENT OF MD114-5003-0004 NUTPLATE HAS SEPARATED FROM T 443530 PMRB 4 HE BASE PLATE. THE CARRIER PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED WITH 7 OF THE 8 FASTE 443530 PMRB 5 NERS. THIS REPAIR WILL RETAIN A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY AND STRUCTURAL 443530 PMRB 6 INTEGRITY WILL BE MAINTAINED. THE HOLE WILL BE PLUGGED WITH RTV, A FRSI 443530 PMRB 7 PLUG AND KAPTON TAPE WILL BE INSTALLED IN THE HOLE TO PREVENT CONTAMINA 443530 PMRB 8 TION INTO THE PAYLOAD BAY. THIS IS FOR RESTRICTED USE, ONE FLIGHT. POST 443530 PMRB 9 FLIGHT DISPO WILL R&R THE NUTPLATE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE 443530 PMRB 10 THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL 443530 PMRB 11 ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. SECONDARY 443530 PMRB 12 STRUCTURE. PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 18 OF 443530 PMRB 13 OV-103, 07/16/93. 443530 1 1 ONE OF THE PLBD STRONGBACK ATTACH POINT NUTPLATES WERE DISCREPANT. AN EO 443530 1 2 WAS RELEASED TO THE MAKEWORK DRAWING TO ALLOW SUBSTITUTION OF REPLACEAB 443530 1 3 LE NUT ELEMENT NUTPLATES. ALL EIGHT NUTPLATES AT THE XO895.3 LH LOCATION 443530 1 4 WERE REPLACED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: O 443530 1 5 PERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 443772 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE/DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THE V070-332612-001 I/E HATCH ECL LEAK 443772 PMRB 2 CHECK FITTING WAS FOUND TO HAVE THREE THREADS GALLED DURING PERLIMINARY 443772 PMRB 3 SAFETY WIRING OF THE V070-332629-001 FITTING CAP IN PREPARATION FOR FINA 443772 PMRB 4 L INSTALLATION DURING S0007. AN MR WAS WRITTEN/APPROVED TO REWORK THE DE 443772 PMRB 5 FECTIVE THREADS, AND THIS REWORK ENABLED THE CAP TO BE INSTALLED; ONE OF 443772 PMRB 6 THE CABIN PRESSURIZATION PROBES WAS ALSO SUCCESSFULLY FIT-CHECKED. ENGI 443772 PMRB 7 NEERING HAS WITNESSED AND VERIFIED SATISFACTORY INSTALLATIONS OF THE CAP 443772 PMRB 8 AND THE PROBE AND ARE CONFIDENT OF THE REWORK; STEPS HAVE ALSO BEEN WRIT 443772 PMRB 9 TEN AND HAVE BEEN WORKED BY CLOSEOUT CREW FOR A "CONFIDENCE RUN" OF THE 443772 PMRB 10 PROBE AND CAP INSTALLATION. DURING FIT CHECKS OF THE CAPS, THE REMOVAL 443772 PMRB 11 OF THE CAP REQUIRED CONSIDERABLE TORQUE (DUE TO THE GALLED FITTING 443772 PMRB 12 THREADS), WHICH CAUSED THE HEX NUT PORTION OF THE FITTING (ON INSIDE OF 443772 PMRB 13 THE HATCH) TO TURN SLIGHTLY BEFORE IT HIT THE V070-334016 STOP. ECL HAS 443772 PMRB 14 REPORTED THAT THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY ABNORMAL, SINCE INSTALLATION/REMOV 443772 PMRB 15 AL OF THE PROBE DURING CABIN LEAK CHECKS IN THE OPF REQUIRES A TORQUE OF 443772 PMRB 16 50 FT-LBS (PROBE IS SECURED ONLY HAND TIGHT FOR CABIN CHECKS DURING S00 443772 PMRB 17 07). A TORQUE OF THIS VALUE WILL THEREFORE CAUSE ROTATION OF THE FITTING 443772 PMRB 18 UNTIL IT CONTACTS THE V070-334016 STOP. SINCE THIS IS A ROUTINE PROCEDU 443772 PMRB 19 RE FOR OPF CABIN LEAK CHECKS AND NO ABNORMALITIES (DUE TO ROTATED FITTIN 443772 PMRB 20 G) HAVE BEEN NOTED DURING PREVIOUS FLIGHTS, THERE IS NO CONCERN FOR BROK 443772 PMRB 21 EN PRESSURE SEAL AT THE CABIN LEAK CHECK FITTING. THE PROBE WILL BE CONN 443772 PMRB 22 ECTED DURING STANDARD CABIN PRESSURIZATION DP/DT CHECK IN S0007,V4,S45, 443772 PMRB 23 FOLLOWED WITH STANDARD FLIGHT INSTALLATION OF THE CAP. REQUEST RESTRICTE 443772 PMRB 24 D MR ACCEPTANCE OF THE GALLED FITTING FOR ONE FLIGHT. THE DEFECTIVE THRE 443772 PMRB 25 ADS WILL NOT AFFECT THE FIT, FORM, FUNCTION OR SAFETY OF THE FITTING/CAP 443772 PMRB 26 FOR THEIR INTENDED USE. THIS DEFERRAL DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 443772 PMRB 27 CERTIFICATION. THIS DEFERRAL DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONAL 443772 PMRB 28 E OR HAZARDS CONTROL. THIS DEFERRAL IS RESTRICTED LIFE FOR FLIGHT 17 OF 443772 PMRB 29 OV-103. THE FITTING WILL BE REPLACED AND RETESTED DURING FLIGHT 18 PROCE 443772 PMRB 30 SSING. PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 18 OF OV-1 443772 PMRB 31 03. 07/16/93. 443772 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN 3-4 THREADS ON THE V070-332612-001 I/E HATCH 443772 1 2 ECL TEST PORT WERE FOUND DAMAGED. THE DAMAGE APPEARED TO BE CAUSED BY AN 443772 1 3 IMPACT AND NOT DUE TO CROSS-THREADING. THE DAMAGED THREADS WERE MR REPA 443772 1 4 IRED USING A THREAD BRUSH, LAPPING COMPOUND, AND A SPARE CAP. THIS REPAI 443772 1 5 R ALLOWED THE ECL CABIN LEAK PROBE AND THE FLIGHT CAP TO BE NOMINALLY IN 443772 1 6 STALLED. THE REPAIRED CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR ONE FLIGHT, AND THIS 443772 1 7 WAD WAS DEFERRED. DURING FLIGHT 18 PROCESSING, THE V070-332612-001 ECL 443772 1 8 TEST PORT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. A PORTION OF THE I/E HATCH LINKAGE 443772 1 9 AND SEAL LAK CHECK FITTING WERE REMOVED TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE ECL TEST 443772 1 10 PORT. ALL HARDWARE HAS BEEN REINSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. THE ECL TEST PORT 443772 1 11 WAS SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED FOR LEAKAGE PER V1052.004 CREW MODULE WITH 443772 1 12 SPACEHAB LEAKAGE TEST. THE I/E HATCH LATCH LINKAGE WAS SUCCESSFULLY 443772 1 13 RETESTED DURING V1058.003 I/E HATCH FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION, OPF. THE 443772 1 14 I/E HATCH SEAL LEAK CHECK FITTING WAS SUCCESSFULLY BUBBLE LEAK CHECKED 443772 1 15 DURING V1047, HATCH SEAL LEAK CHECK. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. 443772 1 16 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 443964 1 1 V5029, RECEPTACLE 50J827 WAS FOUND TO BE BROKEN AWAY FROM THE MOUNTING F 443964 1 2 LANGE. THE RECEPTACLE WAS REPLACED AND REMOUNTED. A CONTINUITY ISOLATION 443964 1 3 AND HIPOT CHECK WERE PERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY. THE INBOARD AVIONICS BAY 5 443964 1 4 SHROUD AND ASSOCIATED BLANKETS WERE REMOVED FOR ACCESS, THEN REINSTALLE 443964 1 5 D TO COMPLETE THESE CHECKS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. RETES 443964 1 6 T COMPLETED PER S5009 RUN 2, DEV 15/03 TEMP. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR 443964 1 7 AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 446020 1 1 THE 4 FASTENERS THAT SECURE THE V070-395978-002 CARRIER PANEL AND V070-3 446020 1 2 57257-003 DOOR TO THE BASE HEAT SHIELD THAT WERE TORQUED TO 20-30 INCH-P 446020 1 3 OUNDS INSTEAD OF THE PER SPECIFICATION 40-50 INCH-POUNDS WERE MR ACCEPTE 446020 1 4 D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. DURING FLIGHT 18 PROCESSING (STS-60) THE CARRIER 446020 1 5 PANEL AND FASTENERS WILL BE REMOVED TO ALLOW FOR ENGINES 2 AND 3 REMOVA 446020 1 6 L. THE CARRIER PANEL AND FASTENERS WILL THEN BE REINSTALLED PER PRINT AN 446020 1 7 D TORQUED TO PER SPECIFICATION 40-50 INCH-POUNDS FOR FLIGHT PER ONE OF T 446020 1 8 HREE J/C'S. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR INSTALLING THE FASTENERS WITH BELOW S 446020 1 9 PECIFICATION TORQUE WAS INCORRECT CALLOUT ON THE V80-95935 J/C. CONCLUDE 446020 1 10 THAT THE DEV WRITTEN TO THE V80-95935 J/C WILL PRECLUDE FUTURE 446020 1 11 OCCURRENCES AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 447143 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MR ACCEPTANCE AND ONE FLIGHT DEFERRAL OF 447143 PMRB 2 PAGE 1A ITEM 2 DISCREPANCY, PINS C AND D GOING TO THE SWITCH ON LATCH 1 447143 PMRB 3 INSTEAD OF LATCH 18 AS SPECIFIED PER MLO308-0003 EO D04. THE LIMIT 447143 PMRB 4 SWITCHES ARE CHECKED DURING LAUNCH COUNTDOWN ONLY TO VERIFY THE I/E 447143 PMRB 5 HATCH LATCHES ARE LATCHED OVERCENTER. THE WIRING IS UNDERSTOOD AND 447143 PMRB 6 FUNCTIONAL AS IS, AND WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE TEST IN THEIR CURRENT 447143 PMRB 7 CONFIGURATION. DURING FLIGHT 18 PROCESSING FLOW, THE WIRES WILL BE 447143 PMRB 8 SPLICED AND REF DESIGNATORS CHANGED TO MEET THE CONFIGURATION REFERENCED 447143 PMRB 9 IN SPEC. MLO308-0003 EO D04. THIS MR DOES NOT AFFECT THE FIT, FORM, 447143 PMRB 10 FUNCTION, OR SAFETY OF THE SWITCH WIRING FOR ITS INTENDED PURPOSE. THIS 447143 PMRB 11 MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION, DOES NOT 447143 PMRB 12 IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS, AND IS FOR 447143 PMRB 13 RESTRICTED USE ONE FLIGHT. NO MR ID REQUIRED. PRIME BOARD ACTION: PMRB A 447143 PMRB 14 PPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 18 OF OV-103, 09/07/93. 447143 1 1 THIS PR WAS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT FAILURE TO PASS CONTINUITY TE 447143 1 2 STING OF THE LIMIT SWITCH ASSOCIATED WIHT HATCH LATCH 18. THIS LIMIT SWI 447143 1 3 TCH IS REFERRED TO AS LIMIT SWITCH 2. DURING TROUBLESHOOTING IT WAS DETE 447143 1 4 RMINED THAT THE WIRING TO LIMIT SWITCHES AT LATCHES 1 AND 18 WERE REVERS 447143 1 5 ED. THIS INDICATED THAT THE LACK OF CONTINUITY WAS AT THE LATCH 1 LIMIT 447143 1 6 SWITCH RATHER THAN 18. DISPO WAS PERFORMED TO RE-RIG THE 1 LIMIT SWITCH. 447143 1 7 AN E.O. WAS WRITTEN TO THE RIGGING SPEC MLO308-0003 TO ALLOW LIMIT SWIT 447143 1 8 CH RIGGING WITHOUT DISCONNECTING THE DRIVELINK FROM THE BELLCRANK. ITEM 447143 1 9 3, LATCH 18 LIMIT SWITCH INTERMITTENLY STICKING, WAS DISCOVERED DURING 447143 1 10 TROUBLESHOOTING BEFORE THE CROSSED WIRING WAS DISCOVERED (STILL LOOKING 447143 1 11 FOR A PROBLEM AT LATCH 18). THE LATCH 18 LIMIT SWITCH WAS DIS-ASSEMBLED 447143 1 12 AND CLEANED, AND THE SPRING REPLACED. THE LIMIT SWITCH AT LATCH 18 WAS 447143 1 13 THEN RIGGED PER MLO308-0003. OEL ADDED DISPO TO REWIRE THE LIMIT 447143 1 14 SWITCHES TO RETURN TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. WHILE REWIRING THE SWITCHES 447143 1 15 TECHNICIANS FOUND THAT WIRES M1A22-1 AND M1A22-2 WERE TOO SHORT (ITEM 4 447143 1 16 PG 1B). AN UNRESTRICTED MR WAS APPROVED TO ADD SPLICES INCREASING THE 447143 1 17 LENGTH OF THE WIRING. TECHNICIANS THEN COMPLETED THE REWIRING. A 447143 1 18 FUNCTIONAL CHANELIZATION WAS SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED VERIFYING THAT BOTH 447143 1 19 THE LATCH 1 AND 18 LIMIT SWITCHES WERE WIRED CORRECTLY. THIS ANOMALY 447143 1 20 DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEMS 1 AND 3 447143 1 21 WERE OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 2 WAS VENDOR 447143 1 22 ERROR. RETEST OF LATCH LIMIT SWITCH RIGGING WAS PERFORMED PER SUCCESSFUL 447143 1 23 HATCH CLOSURE PER S0007. 447425 1 1 DURING V35-00002, CONNECTOR 50P636 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL. SR 447425 1 2 P V-EL-0001-E-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE THE BROKEN BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TY 447425 1 3 PE. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR A 447425 1 4 ND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 448490 1 1 THE BROKEN ANGLE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO 448490 1 2 BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 448619 1 1 DURING A SURVEILLANCE, CONNECTOR 50J45 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL 448619 1 2 . SRP V-EL-0001-E-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO 448619 1 3 FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR 448619 1 4 ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 448626 1 1 DURING A SURV, CONNECTOR 50J43 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL. SRP V- 448626 1 2 EL-0001-E-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO FURTHER 448626 1 3 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBI 448626 1 4 TER DURING PROCESSING. 448630 1 1 DURING A SURVEILLANCE, CONNECTOR 50P727 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHEL 448630 1 2 L. SRP V-EL-0001-E-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. DU 448630 1 3 RING THIS REPAIR, ENGINEERING FOUND WIRE P309A26 TO HAVE SPLIT KAPTON WI 448630 1 4 TH EXPOSED CONDUCTOR AT THE BACKSHELL TANK. THE CONNECTOR WAS DEMATED AN 448630 1 5 D DAMAGED WIRE DEPINNED. THE WIRE WAS CUT BEYOND THE DAMAGE AND A NEW SE 448630 1 6 GMENT OF WIRE WAS SPLICED IN USING AN APPROVED MR REQUEST TO INSTALL KSC 448630 1 7 SPLICE 0630. A PAGE 1A WAS TAKEN WHEN THE CONNECTOR LOCKING TEETH WERE 448630 1 8 FOUND TO BE SHEARED OFF. THE REMAINING 4 WIRE WERE DEPINNED AND A NEW CO 448630 1 9 NNECTOR WAS INSTALLED. THE DAMAGED CONNECTOR WAS SENT TO THE HDA FOR POS 448630 1 10 SIBLE REFURBISHMENT. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST WAS PERFORMED BY MPS. NO FURTHE 448630 1 11 R ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON OR 448630 1 12 BITER DURING PROCESSING. 1A) WORKMANSHIP, BACKSHELL WAS INCORRECTLY CLOS 448630 1 13 ED. 448815 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT A TEAR IN THE LH ET DOOR PURGE CURTAIN 448815 1 2 ASSEMBLY (BAGGIE). THE TEAR WAS FOUND DURING INSPECTIONS PERFORMED AFTE 448815 1 3 R MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN OF S0007 RUN 3. THE BAGGIE WAS REPAIRED PER SRP V 448815 1 4 -ST-0009-0 PER THIS PR. AN INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED BY ENGINEERING AND T 448815 1 5 HE PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS ENVI 448815 1 6 RONMENTAL DEGRADATION. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBER 448815 1 7 ASSEMBLIES OF OTHER END ITEMS. 448915 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT AN OVER-TORQUE CONDITION WHEN CLOSING 448915 1 2 AND LATCHING THE I/E HATCH. THE HATCH WAS BEING CLOSED PER RTOMI V5067 T 448915 1 3 O RETEST A REPAIR TO THE TPS THERMAL BARRIER WHEN THE LATCHING TORQUE RE 448915 1 4 CORDED WAS 390 IN-LBS (S/B 350 IN-LBS MAX). MEQ AND TPS ENGINEERS INSPEC 448915 1 5 TED THE HATCH, LATCHES, AND THERMAL BARRIER AND DETERMINED THAT THE STIF 448915 1 6 F THERMAL BARRIER REPAIR COULD BE THE SOURCE OF ADDED RESISTANCE. THE TH 448915 1 7 ERMAL BARRIER WAS MASSAGED AND THE HATCH CLOSED AGAIN PER V5067 PER THIS 448915 1 8 PR AND THE LATCHING TORQUE WAS 350 IN-LBS. THIS TORQUE IS THE SAME AS T 448915 1 9 HAT RECORDED IN OMI V1058.004 I/E HATCH FUNCTIONAL PERFORMED IN THE VAB 448915 1 10 IN JUNE. THE HATCH LATCHING SYSTEM MICRO SWITCHES OPERATED NOMINALLY AND 448915 1 11 THE LEAK RATE FOR BOTH CLOSURES WAS 0.0 PSIG/MIN. THE TORQUE MEASUREMENT 448915 1 12 IS DEPENDENT ON THERMAL BARRIER STIFFNESS AS WELL AS TECHNIQUE AND THE 448915 1 13 390 IN-LBS READING CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO BOTH OF THESE AS PROBABLE 448915 1 14 CAUSES. THE HATCH LATCHING SYSTEM IS OPERATING NOMINALLY AND NO PR 448915 1 15 CONDITION EXISTS. RETEST PERFORMED PER STEP 1-2. 449041 1 1 THE V070-395969-004 CARRIER PANEL HAD TWO ELONGATED HOLES PER STR-3-01-0 449041 1 2 427. THE V070-396284-009 WASHERS CALLED OUT ON THE PRINT WERE TOO SMALL 449041 1 3 TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE BEARING SURFACE. TWO NEW MR WASHERS WERE DESIGNED AN 449041 1 4 D FABRICATED AND INSTALLED IN PLACE OF THE PER PRINT WASHERS. THIS INSTA 449041 1 5 LLATION WAS MRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DON 449041 1 6 E ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS MR (THE HOLES WERE ORIGINALLY ELO 449041 1 7 NGATED BECAUSE THEY DID NOT LINE UP WITH THE HOLES IN THE STRUCTURE) 449079 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTS A CONDITION WHERE THE V070-3964 449079 1 2 03-001 CARRIER PANEL COULD NOT BE INSTALLED. THE PANEL WAS REPORTED TO N 449079 1 3 OT SEAT PROPERLY. THE CARRIER PANEL WAS FIT CHECKED IN THE PRESENCE OF E 449079 1 4 NGINEERING AND NO ANOMALIES WERE NOTED. THE CARRIER PANEL WAS REMOVED FO 449079 1 5 LLOWING THE FIT CHECK AND WILL BE REINSTALLED PER TLP01-20-1380. PROBABL 449079 1 6 E CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS PROCEDURAL ERROR. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 449079 1 7 ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 449135 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: PROBLEM DISCRIPTION: THE PRSD SYSTEM ISOLATION 449135 PMRB 2 VALVES HAVE EXPERIENCED A NUMBER OF FAILURES IN WHICH THE ISOLATION 449135 PMRB 3 VLV FAILS TO CLOSE WHEN COMMANDED. A SUMMARY OF THESE FAILURES AS FO 449135 PMRB 4 LLOWS. TABLE 1-1. PRSD VALVE FAILURES: VEHICLE - 104, FLT - 05, ISOL 449135 PMRB 5 ATION VLV - 02 MANF 2, VLV S/N 0028. VEHICLE - 104, FLT - 08, ISOLA 449135 PMRB 6 TION VLV - 02 MANF 2, VLV S/N - 0028. VEHICLE - 104, FLT - 09, ISOL 449135 PMRB 7 ATION VLV - H2 MANF 1, VLV S/N 0008. VEHICLE - 105, FLT - 01, ISOLA 449135 PMRB 8 TION VLV - 02 MANF 1, VLV S/N 0029. VEHICLE - 105, FLT - 03, ISOLAT 449135 PMRB 9 ION VLV - 02 MANF 1, VLV S/N 0029. VEHCILE - 105, FLT - 04, ISOLATI 449135 PMRB 10 ON VLV - 02 MANF 1, VLV S/N - 0029. VEHICLE - 105, FLT - 04, ISOLAT 449135 PMRB 11 ION VLV - FC3 H2 REAC, VLV S/N - 0084. ALL FAILURES LISTED ABOVE HAV 449135 PMRB 12 E OCCURRED DURING FLIGHT. ALL EFFORTS TO DUPLICATE THESE FAILURES ON 449135 PMRB 13 THE GROUND HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL, RESULTING IN DEFERRED UNEXPLAINED 449135 PMRB 14 ANOMALIES AND/OR COMPONENT REPLACEMENT. RECENT FAILURE ANALYSIS TEST 449135 PMRB 15 ING ON 02 MANIFOLD 2 VLV (S/N 0028) DID DUPLICATE THE FAILURE. PREL 449135 PMRB 16 IMINARY TEST RESULTS INDICATE THE FAILURE MODE IS TEMPERATURE RELA 449135 PMRB 17 TED IN THAT THE VLV'S ABILITY TO CLOSE DEGRADES AS TEMPERATURE DECRE 449135 PMRB 18 ASES. TESTING CONTINUTES TO DETERMINE THE EXACT CAUSE OF DEGRADTION. 449135 PMRB 19 THIS FAILURE MODE ASSOCIATED WITH PRSD ISOLATION VLVS WAS NOT APPAR 449135 PMRB 20 ENT UNTIL STS-26 WHEN FLIGHT PROCEDURES WERE CHANGED TO CLOSE ONE OF 449135 PMRB 21 TWO MANIFOLD VLVS DURING CREW SLEEP PERIODS. PRIOR TO STS-26, THE ONLY 449135 PMRB 22 ISOLATION VALVE CLOSURE WAS DURING STS-2 OV-102 FUEL CELL 1 SHUTDOWN 449135 PMRB 23 DUE TO FLOODING WITH NOMINAL VLV PERFORMANCE. THE PRSD SYSTEM CONTAIN 449135 PMRB 24 S 14 SOLENOID ISOLATION VLVS OF SIMILAR DESIGN ALL MANUFACTURED BY 449135 PMRB 25 THE SAME SUPPLIER. * SIX FUEL CELL REACTANT VLVS. * FOUR MANIFOLD ISO 449135 PMRB 26 LATION VALVES. * TWO ECLSS SUPPLY VALVES. * TWO T-O GAS SUPPLY VALVES. 449135 PMRB 27 THESE VALVE ARE CONTAINED IN FOUR MANIFOLD PANEL ASSEMBLIES (TWO H2 AND 449135 PMRB 28 TWO O2). MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLV DESCRIPTION/IMPACT. MANIFOLD ISOLATION 449135 PMRB 29 VLVS CLOSURE FUNCTION IS DESIGNED TO ISOLATION PORTIONS OF THE FUEL CELL 449135 PMRB 30 /PRSD SYSTEM IN THE EVENT OF A LEAK. MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VALVE ISOLAT 449135 PMRB 31 ES FUEL CELL 1 AND TANK 1. MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVE ISOLATES FUEL CEL 449135 PMRB 32 L 2 AND TANK 2. FUEL CELL 3 AND REMAINING TANKS ARE COMMON TO MANIFOLD 449135 PMRB 33 1 AND MANIFOLD 2. BOTH O2 AND H2 SYSTEMS ARE FUNCTIONALLY EQUAL. IN THE 449135 PMRB 34 EVENT OF A LEAK, CLOSURE OF MANIFOLD 1 OR MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVES 449135 PMRB 35 WOULD ENSURE AT LEAST ONE FUEL CELL AND ONE TANK REMAIN ISOLATED AND 449135 PMRB 36 OPERATIVE. CLOSURE OF ONE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE IS ALSO STANDARD 449135 PMRB 37 CONFIGURATION FOR CREW SLEEP PERIODS. FAILURE OF ONE MANIFOLD VALVE IS 449135 PMRB 38 OLATION VALVE TO CLOSE DURING NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION DOES NOT IMPACT 449135 PMRB 39 THE MISSION. FAILURE OF ONE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE TO CLOSE IN CONJ 449135 PMRB 40 UNCTION WITH A LEAK COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ALL BUT ONE FUEL CELL AND 449135 PMRB 41 ONE TANK. FAILURE OF BOTH MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVES TO CLOSE IN CONJU 449135 PMRB 42 NCTION WITH A LEAK COULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE LEAK 449135 PMRB 43 AND POSSIBLE TOTAL SYSTEM FAILURE. MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLV FAILURE TO 449135 PMRB 44 CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/2 DURING ASCENT AND CRIT 1R/3 DURING REMAINDER OF FL 449135 PMRB 45 IGHT. MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLV DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THREE MANIFOLD ISOLAT 449135 PMRB 46 ION VALVES HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR SIX IN-FLIGHT FAILURES AND HAVE BEEN REM 449135 PMRB 47 OVED FROM SERVICE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF OV-104 H2 MANIFOLD 1. ALTHOUGH 449135 PMRB 48 THE PROBABILITY OF A MANIFOLD VALVE FAILING TO CLOSE IS HIGHER THAN 449135 PMRB 49 DESIRABLE, THE PROBABILITY OF ONE OR BOTH MANIFOLD VLVS FAILING TO CLO 449135 PMRB 50 SE IN CONJUCTION WITH A LEAK IS EXTREMELY SMALL. THE PRSD SYSTEM HAVE 449135 PMRB 51 NEVER EXPERIENCED MAJOR LEAKAGE IN-FLIGHT. THE PRSD SYSTEM IN CONTINUO 449135 PMRB 52 USLY MONITORED FOR DECAY DURING PROCESSING AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY IS REV 449135 PMRB 53 ERIFIED POST CRYO SERVICING AND THROUGH LAUNCH BY HAZ GAS DETECTION 449135 PMRB 54 SYSTEM. FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV DESCRIPTION/IMPACT: FUEL CELL REACTANT 449135 PMRB 55 VLVS CLOSURE FUNCTION IS DESIGNED TO ISOLATE FUEL CELL REACTANT SUPPL 449135 PMRB 56 Y (ONE O2 AND ONE H2 VLV) IN THE EVENT OF A FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN/FAILURE. 449135 PMRB 57 FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV CLOSURES HAVE OCCURRED IN-FLIGHT ON THREE OCCA 449135 PMRB 58 SIONS. STS-2 (OV-102) FCP 1 SHUTDOWN DUE TO FLOODING STS-54 (OV-105) 449135 PMRB 59 FCP 2 SHUTDOWN/RESTART FOR DTO STS-57 (OV-105) FCP 3 SHUTDOWN/RESTART 449135 PMRB 60 FOR DTO. FAILURE OF A REACTANT VLV TO CLOSE IN SUPPORT OF DTO WOULD RE 449135 PMRB 61 SULT IN DTO ABORT (AS OCCURRED ON OV-105 FLT 4). FAILURE OF A REACTANT 449135 PMRB 62 VLV TO CLOSE IN CONJUCTION WITH A FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN (NON-CASTASTROPHIC) 449135 PMRB 63 WOULD NOT AFFECT THE MISSION (CRIT 1R/3). FAILURE OF A REACTANT VLV TO 449135 PMRB 64 CLOSE IN CONJUNCTION WITH A FUEL CELL FIRE OR LEAK COULD RESULT IN THE 449135 PMRB 65 INABILITY TO ISOLATE AT LEAST ONE TANK FROM THE FUEL CELL/FAILURE. FUEL 449135 PMRB 66 CELL REACTANT VLV FAILING TO CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/2. FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV 449135 PMRB 67 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: ONE FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV (OF SIX CYCLED) HAS FAILE 449135 PMRB 68 D VALVE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM SERVICE AND IS SCHEDULED FOR FAILURE ANALY 449135 PMRB 69 SIS. A FUEL CELL FIRE OR LEAK WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR IN CONJUNCTION WITH TH 449135 PMRB 70 E INABILITY TO CLOSE THE FUEL CELL REACTANT VLVS IN ORDER TO IMPACT FLIG 449135 PMRB 71 HT SAFETY. IF THE H2 REACTANT VLV FAILS TO CLOSE, THE REACTANT SUPPLY 449135 PMRB 72 CAN STILL BE ISOLATED FROM THE FUEL CELL POWER SECTION BY DEPRESSURIZING 449135 PMRB 73 THE FUEL CELL. THIS WOULD OCCUR AS A RESULT OF THE FUEL CELL COUPLED 449135 PMRB 74 REACTANT REGULATOR LOCKING UP AND TERMINATING THE H2 SUPPLY TO THE FUEL 449135 PMRB 75 CELL POWER SECTION. IF THE O2 REACTANT VLV FAILS TO CLOSE, THE O2 SUPPLY 449135 PMRB 76 PRESSURE TO THE FUEL CELL CANNOT BE ISOLATED BUT COULD BE REDUCED BY OP 449135 PMRB 77 ENING THE PURGE VLV AND DEPRESSURIZING THE FUEL CELL. AT LEAST ONE O2 449135 PMRB 78 TANK COULD NOT BE ISOLATED. THE PROBABILITY OF FUEL CELL FIRE OR LEAK 449135 PMRB 79 AGE IS EXTREMELY LOW. FUEL CELL INSTRUMENTATION (CELL PERFORMANCE MON 449135 PMRB 80 ITOR PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE) WOULD INDICATE AN IMPENDING FAILURE IN 449135 PMRB 81 WHICH CASE THE FUEL CELL WOULD BE SHUTDOWN. IN ADDITION, GROUND TEST 449135 PMRB 82 ING (FCP DIAGNOSTIC TEST) IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE EARLY DETECTION OF 449135 PMRB 83 FUEL CELL DEGRADATION AND IS PERFORMED EACH FLOW. ECLSS SUPPLY VLV 449135 PMRB 84 DESCRIPTION/IMPACT: ECLSS SUPPLY VLVS (PRIMARY AND SECONDARY) CLOSU 449135 PMRB 85 RE FUNCTION IS DESIGNED TO ISOLATE O2 SUPPLY FROM PRSD MANIFOLDS TO 449135 PMRB 86 CLSS O2 SYSTEM. ECLSS O2 SUPPLY VLVS ARE NORMALLY NOT CYCLED IN FLIGHT. 449135 PMRB 87 FAILURE OF AN ECLSS O2 SUPPLY VLV TO CYCLE CLOSED IN RESPONSE TO A LEAK 449135 PMRB 88 IN THE ECLSS SYSTEM WOULD REQUIRED ISOLATION USING ECLSS O2 CROSSOVER 449135 PMRB 89 VLV OR ECLSS O2 REG INLET VLV. IF THE LEAK OCCURRED UPSTREAM OF THE ECL 449135 PMRB 90 SS ISOLATION VLVS THE LEAK COULD BE ISOLATED USING PRSD MANIFOLD ISOLAT 449135 PMRB 91 ION VALVES RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE FUEL CELL AND ONE O2 TANK. ECLSS 449135 PMRB 92 O2 SUPPLY VLV FAILING TO CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/3. ECLSS SUPPLY VLV DEFERRAL 449135 PMRB 93 RATIONALE: ECLSS SUPPLY VLVS HAVE NO HISTORY OF FAILURE TO CLOSE IN FLI 449135 PMRB 94 GHT SINCE THEY ARE ONLY CYCLED IN RESPONSE TO LEAK ISOLATION. IF A FAIL 449135 PMRB 95 URE TO CLOSE DOES OCCUR IN RESPONSE TO A LEAK ISOLOATION ATTEMPT, ECLSS 449135 PMRB 96 O2 CROSSOVER, ECLSS O2 REF INLET OR PRSD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLVS CAN BE 449135 PMRB 97 USED TO ISOLATE THE LEAK. PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLV DESCRIPTION/IMPACT: 449135 PMRB 98 PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLVS (ONE O2 AND ONE H2) CLOSURE FUNCITON ISOLATES 449135 PMRB 99 PRSD SYSTEM FROM T-O DISCONNECT AND GROUND GAS SUPPLIES. THESE VLVS ARE 449135 PMRB 100 POWERED BY PRE-FLT BUSES AND ARE CYCLED DURING GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY. 449135 PMRB 101 THE LAST VLV CYCLE OCCURS AT T- 2:35 AND IS VERIFIED BY GLS. FAILURE OF 449135 PMRB 102 A T-O GAS SUPPLY VLV TO CLOSE WOULD RESULT IN A LAUNCH SCRUB. PRSD T-O 449135 PMRB 103 GAS SUPPLY VLV FAILING TO CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/2. PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLV 449135 PMRB 104 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLVS HAVE NO HISTORY OF FAILURE 449135 PMRB 105 DURING GROUND OPERATIONS AND ARE NOT FUNCTIONAL DURING FLT. T-O GAS SU 449135 PMRB 106 PPLY VLVS ARE VERIFIED CLOSED BY GLS AT T- 2:30 PRIOR TO LAUNCH. T-O 449135 PMRB 107 GAS SUPPLY VLVS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LOW TEMPERATURES OF OTHER PRSD 449135 PMRB 108 ISOLATION VLVS IN THAT AMBIENT REACTANT GAS IS BEING SUPPLIED FROM 449135 PMRB 109 THE GROUND AND THROUGH THE VLV DURING ITS FINAL CYCLE. IN CONCLUSION, 449135 PMRB 110 ALTHOUGH THE PROBABILITY OF PRSD ISLOATION VLVS FAILING TO CLOSE WHEN 449135 PMRB 111 COMMANDED IN-FLIGHT IS HIGHER THAN DESIRABLE, THE PROBABLITY OF THAT 449135 PMRB 112 FAILURE OCCURRING IN CONJUNCTION WITH A FIRE OR LEAK WHICH COULD IMPACT 449135 PMRB 113 MISSION SAFETY IS REMOTE. IN ADDITION, ALL MANIFOLD ISLOATION VLVS IN 449135 PMRB 114 STALLED IN OV-103 HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CYCLED IN FLIGHT WITH THE EX 449135 PMRB 115 CEPTION OF O2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV (NEWLY INSTALLED VLV). OV-103 449135 PMRB 116 HAS NOT EXPERIENCED ANY IN-FLIGHT ISLOATION VLV FAILURES TO DATE. THIS 449135 PMRB 117 PR SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL OMDP TO ENABLE EXISTING VLVLS AND RECOMMEND 449135 PMRB 118 CORRECTIVE ACTION. IN THE INTERIM, ALL REPLACEMENT VLV PANELS ARE UND 449135 PMRB 119 ERGOING CRYO SCREENING VERIFICATION AS PART OF CORRECTIVE ACTION. THIS 449135 PMRB 120 INCREASES THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE VLV TO CLOSE 449135 PMRB 121 AT CRYO TEMPERATURES IN FLIGHT. DEFERRAL RATIONALE: AT PRESENT IT IS UN 449135 PMRB 122 KNOWN OF THE MANIFOLD PANEL WILL REQUIRE FURTHER ACTION. AS DETAILED AB 449135 PMRB 123 OVE THIS WILL NOT BE DETERMINED UNTIL FAILURE ANALYSIS IS COMPLETED. IT 449135 PMRB 124 IS REQUESTED THAT THIS PR BE APPROVED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE USE AND BE 449135 PMRB 125 DEFERRED TO OMDP2 TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR EVALUATION. DURING OMDP 449135 PMRB 126 PANELS WILL BE REMOVED AND CRYO-FLOWED. THE FORM AND FIT OF THE MANIFOL 449135 PMRB 127 D PANEL HAS NOT BEEN COMPROMISED. THE POSSIBLE FUNCTION/SAFETY IMPACT IS 449135 PMRB 128 AS DESCRIBED PREVIOUSLY. THIS DEFERRAL DOES NOT EFFECT THE CRITCAL ITEMS 449135 PMRB 129 LIST RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS, AND HAS NO IMPACT ON CERT- 449135 PMRB 130 IFICATION AND ASSOCIATED RATIONALE. PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVED 449135 PMRB 131 FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT)OMDP-2) OF OV-103. 09/09/93. 449135 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED AS A SUSPECT PR DUE TO THE FAILURE OF SEVERAL MANI 449135 1 2 FOLD VALVES TO CLOSE DURING FLIGHT. THE FOUR VALVES THAT HAVE FAILED TO 449135 1 3 CLOSE IN FLIGHT WERE ON PANELS OV-104 AND OV-105. BECAUSE OF THOSE FAILU 449135 1 4 RES, SUSPECT PR'S WERE GENERATED ON ALL MANIFOLD PANELS IN ALL ORBITERS. 449135 1 5 THE PLAN WAS TO REMOVE THE PANELS DURING OMDP AND CRYO SCREEN THEM AT T 449135 1 6 HE RI/LSS SERVICE CENTER. HOWEVER, ALL OF THE VALVES IN THIS PANEL HAVE 449135 1 7 BEEN CYCLED CLOSED AND OPENED DURING FLIGHT (CRYO SCREENED). A SUMMARY O 449135 1 8 F THESE VALVE CYCLES ARE LISTED BELOW. H2 FCP 1 REACT VLV: CRYO SCREENED 449135 1 9 D DURING STS-51 (FCP1 SHUTDOWN/RESTART DTO) ON 9-19-93. H2 MANF1 VLV: 449135 1 10 CRYO SCREEND DURING STS-60 ON 2-3-94 AS WELL AS DURING NUMEROUS OTHER 449135 1 11 FLIGHTS. SUCCESSFUL CRYO SCREENING OF THESE VALVES IN FLIGHT VALIDATES 449135 1 12 THIS PANEL. THIS PANEL WILL NOT BE REMOVED FOR FURTHER CRYO SCREENING. 449137 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: PROBLEM DISCRIPTION: THE PRSD SYSTEM ISOLATION 449137 PMRB 2 VALVES HAVE EXPERIENCED A NUMBER OF FAILURES IN WHICH THE ISOLATION 449137 PMRB 3 VLV FAILS TO CLOSE WHEN COMMANDED. A SUMMARY OF THESE FAILURES AS FO 449137 PMRB 4 LLOWS. TABLE 1-1. PRSD VALVE FAILURES: VEHICLE - 104, FLT - 05, ISOL 449137 PMRB 5 ATION VLV - 02 MANF 2, VLV S/N 0028. VEHICLE - 104, FLT - 08, ISOLA 449137 PMRB 6 TION VLV - 02 MANF 2, VLV S/N - 0028. VEHICLE - 104, FLT - 09, ISOL 449137 PMRB 7 ATION VLV - H2 MANF 1, VLV S/N 0008. VEHICLE - 105, FLT - 01, ISOLA 449137 PMRB 8 TION VLV - 02 MANF 1, VLV S/N 0029. VEHICLE - 105, FLT - 03, ISOLAT 449137 PMRB 9 ION VLV - 02 MANF 1, VLV S/N 0029. VEHCILE - 105, FLT - 04, ISOLATI 449137 PMRB 10 ON VLV - 02 MANF 1, VLV S/N - 0029. VEHICLE - 105, FLT - 04, ISOLAT 449137 PMRB 11 ION VLV - FC3 H2 REAC, VLV S/N - 0084. ALL FAILURES LISTED ABOVE HAV 449137 PMRB 12 E OCCURRED DURING FLIGHT. ALL EFFORTS TO DUPLICATE THESE FAILURES ON 449137 PMRB 13 THE GROUND HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL, RESULTING IN DEFERRED UNEXPLAINED 449137 PMRB 14 ANOMALIES AND/OR COMPONENT REPLACEMENT. RECENT FAILURE ANALYSIS TEST 449137 PMRB 15 ING ON 02 MANIFOLD 2 VLV (S/N 0028) DID DUPLICATE THE FAILURE. PREL 449137 PMRB 16 IMINARY TEST RESULTS INDICATE THE FAILURE MODE IS TEMPERATURE RELA 449137 PMRB 17 TED IN THAT THE VLV'S ABILITY TO CLOSE DEGRADES AS TEMPERATURE DECRE 449137 PMRB 18 ASES. TESTING CONTINUTES TO DETERMINE THE EXACT CAUSE OF DEGRADTION. 449137 PMRB 19 THIS FAILURE MODE ASSOCIATED WITH PRSD ISOLATION VLVS WAS NOT APPAR 449137 PMRB 20 ENT UNTIL STS-26 WHEN FLIGHT PROCEDURES WERE CHANGED TO CLOSE ONE OF 449137 PMRB 21 TWO MANIFOLD VLVS DURING CREW SLEEP PERIODS. PRIOR TO STS-26, THE ONLY 449137 PMRB 22 ISOLATION VALVE CLOSURE WAS DURING STS-2 OV-102 FUEL CELL 1 SHUTDOWN 449137 PMRB 23 DUE TO FLOODING WITH NOMINAL VLV PERFORMANCE. THE PRSD SYSTEM CONTAIN 449137 PMRB 24 S 14 SOLENOID ISOLATION VLVS OF SIMILAR DESIGN ALL MANUFACTURED BY 449137 PMRB 25 THE SAME SUPPLIER. * SIX FUEL CELL REACTANT VLVS. * FOUR MANIFOLD ISO 449137 PMRB 26 LATION VALVES. * TWO ECLSS SUPPLY VALVES. * TWO T-O GAS SUPPLY VALVES. 449137 PMRB 27 THESE VALVE ARE CONTAINED IN FOUR MANIFOLD PANEL ASSEMBLIES (TWO H2 AND 449137 PMRB 28 TWO O2). MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLV DESCRIPTION/IMPACT. MANIFOLD ISOLATION 449137 PMRB 29 VLVS CLOSURE FUNCTION IS DESIGNED TO ISOLATION PORTIONS OF THE FUEL CELL 449137 PMRB 30 /PRSD SYSTEM IN THE EVENT OF A LEAK. MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VALVE ISOLAT 449137 PMRB 31 ES FUEL CELL 1 AND TANK 1. MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVE ISOLATES FUEL CEL 449137 PMRB 32 L 2 AND TANK 2. FUEL CELL 3 AND REMAINING TANKS ARE COMMON TO MANIFOLD 449137 PMRB 33 1 AND MANIFOLD 2. BOTH O2 AND H2 SYSTEMS ARE FUNCTIONALLY EQUAL. IN THE 449137 PMRB 34 EVENT OF A LEAK, CLOSURE OF MANIFOLD 1 OR MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVES 449137 PMRB 35 WOULD ENSURE AT LEAST ONE FUEL CELL AND ONE TANK REMAIN ISOLATED AND 449137 PMRB 36 OPERATIVE. CLOSURE OF ONE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE IS ALSO STANDARD 449137 PMRB 37 CONFIGURATION FOR CREW SLEEP PERIODS. FAILURE OF ONE MANIFOLD VALVE IS 449137 PMRB 38 OLATION VALVE TO CLOSE DURING NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION DOES NOT IMPACT 449137 PMRB 39 THE MISSION. FAILURE OF ONE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE TO CLOSE IN CONJ 449137 PMRB 40 UNCTION WITH A LEAK COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ALL BUT ONE FUEL CELL AND 449137 PMRB 41 ONE TANK. FAILURE OF BOTH MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVES TO CLOSE IN CONJU 449137 PMRB 42 NCTION WITH A LEAK COULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE LEAK 449137 PMRB 43 AND POSSIBLE TOTAL SYSTEM FAILURE. MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLV FAILURE TO 449137 PMRB 44 CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/2 DURING ASCENT AND CRIT 1R/3 DURING REMAINDER OF FL 449137 PMRB 45 IGHT. MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLV DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THREE MANIFOLD ISOLAT 449137 PMRB 46 ION VALVES HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR SIX IN-FLIGHT FAILURES AND HAVE BEEN REM 449137 PMRB 47 OVED FROM SERVICE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF OV-104 H2 MANIFOLD 1. ALTHOUGH 449137 PMRB 48 THE PROBABILITY OF A MANIFOLD VALVE FAILING TO CLOSE IS HIGHER THAN 449137 PMRB 49 DESIRABLE, THE PROBABILITY OF ONE OR BOTH MANIFOLD VLVS FAILING TO CLO 449137 PMRB 50 SE IN CONJUCTION WITH A LEAK IS EXTREMELY SMALL. THE PRSD SYSTEM HAVE 449137 PMRB 51 NEVER EXPERIENCED MAJOR LEAKAGE IN-FLIGHT. THE PRSD SYSTEM IN CONTINUO 449137 PMRB 52 USLY MONITORED FOR DECAY DURING PROCESSING AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY IS REV 449137 PMRB 53 ERIFIED POST CRYO SERVICING AND THROUGH LAUNCH BY HAZ GAS DETECTION 449137 PMRB 54 SYSTEM. FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV DESCRIPTION/IMPACT: FUEL CELL REACTANT 449137 PMRB 55 VLVS CLOSURE FUNCTION IS DESIGNED TO ISOLATEF FUEL CELL REACTANT SUPPL 449137 PMRB 56 Y (ONE O2 AND ONE H2 VLV) IN THE EVENT OF A FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN/FAILURE. 449137 PMRB 57 FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV CLOSURES HAVE OCCURRED IN-FLIGHT ON THREE OCCA 449137 PMRB 58 SIONS. STS-2 (OV-102) FCP 1 SHUTDOWN DUE TO FLOODING STS-54 (OV-105) 449137 PMRB 59 FCP 2 SHUTDOWN/RESTART FOR DTO STS-57 (OV-105) FCP 3 SHUTDOWN/RESTART 449137 PMRB 60 FOR DTO. FAILURE OF A REACTANT VLV TO CLOSE IN SUPPORT OF DTO WOULD RE 449137 PMRB 61 SULT IN DTO ABORT (AS OCCURRED ON OV-105 FLT 4). FAILURE OF A REACTANT 449137 PMRB 62 VLV TO CLOSE IN CONJUCTION WITH A FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN (NON-CASTASTROPHIC) 449137 PMRB 63 WOULD NOT AFFECT THE MISSION (CRIT 1R/3). FAILURE OF A REACTANT VLV TO 449137 PMRB 64 CLOSE IN CONJUNCTION WITH A FUEL CELL FIRE OR LEAK COULD RESULT IN THE 449137 PMRB 65 INABILITY TO ISOLATE AT LEAST ONE TANK FROM THE FUEL CELL/FAILURE. FUEL 449137 PMRB 66 CELL REACTANT VLV FAILING TO CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/2. FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV 449137 PMRB 67 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: ONE FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV (OF SIX CYCLED) HAS FAILE 449137 PMRB 68 D VALVE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM SERVICE AND IS SCHEDULED FOR FAILURE ANALY 449137 PMRB 69 SIS. A FUEL CELL FIRE OR LEAK WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR IN CONJUNCTION WITH TH 449137 PMRB 70 E INABILITY TO CLOSE THE FUEL CELL REACTANT VLVS IN ORDER TO IMPACT FLIG 449137 PMRB 71 T SAFETY. IF THE H2 REACTANT VLV FAILS TO CLOSE, THE REACTANT SUPPLY 449137 PMRB 72 CAN STILL BE ISOLATED FROM THE FUEL CELL POWER SECTION BY DEPRESSURIZING 449137 PMRB 73 THE FUEL CELL. THIS WOULD OCCUR AS A RESULT OF THE FUEL CELL COUPLED 449137 PMRB 74 REACTANT REGULATOR LOCKING UP AND TERMINATING THE H2 SUPPLY TO THE FUEL 449137 PMRB 75 CELL POWER SECTION. IF THE O2 REACTANT VLV FAILS TO CLOSE, THE O2 SUPPLY 449137 PMRB 76 PRESSURE TO THE FUEL CELL CANNOT BE ISOLATED BUT COULD BE REDUCED BY OP 449137 PMRB 77 ENING THE PURGE VLV AND DEPRESSURIZING THE FUEL CELL. AT LEAST ONE O2 449137 PMRB 78 TANK COULD NOT BE ISOLATED. THE PROBABILITY OF FUEL CELL FIRE OR LEAK 449137 PMRB 79 AGE IS EXTREMELY LOW. FUEL CELL INSTRUMENTATION (CELL PERFORMANCE MON 449137 PMRB 80 ITOR PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE) WOULD INDICATE AN IMPENDING FAILURE IN 449137 PMRB 81 WHICH CASE THE FUEL CELL WOULD BE SHUTDOWN. IN ADDITION, GROUND TEST 449137 PMRB 82 ING (FCP DIAGNOSTIC TEST) IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE EARLY DETECTION OF 449137 PMRB 83 FUEL CELL DEGRADATION AND IS PERFORMED EACH FLOW. ECLSS SUPPLY VLV 449137 PMRB 84 DESCRIPTION/IMPACT: ECLSS SUPPLY VLVS (PRIMARY AND SECONDARY) CLOSU 449137 PMRB 85 RE FUNCTION IS DESIGNED TO ISOLATE O2 SUPPLY FROM PRSD MANIFOLDS TO 449137 PMRB 86 CLSS O2 SYSTEM. ECLSS O2 SUPPLY VLVS ARE NORMALLY NOT CYCLED IN FLIGHT. 449137 PMRB 87 FAILURE OF AN ECLSS O2 SUPPLY VLV TO CYCLE CLOSED IN RESPONSE TO A LEAK 449137 PMRB 88 IN THE ECLSS SYSTEM WOULD REQUIRED ISOLATION USING ECLSS O2 CROSSOVER 449137 PMRB 89 VLV OR ECLSS O2 REG INLET VLV. IF THE LEAK OCCURRED UPSTREAM OF THE ECL 449137 PMRB 90 SS ISOLATION VLVS THE LEAK COULD BE ISOLATED USING PRSD MANIFOLD ISOLAT 449137 PMRB 91 ION VALVES RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE FUEL CELL AND ONE O2 TANK. ECLSS 449137 PMRB 92 O2 SUPPLY VLV FAILING TO CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/3. ECLSS SUPPLY VLV DEFERRAL 449137 PMRB 93 RATIONALE: ECLSS SUPPLY VLVS HAVE NO HISTORY OF FAILURE TO CLOSE IN FLI 449137 PMRB 94 GHT SINCE THEY ARE ONLY CYCLED IN RESPONSE TO LEAK ISOLATION. IF A FAIL 449137 PMRB 95 URE TO CLOSE DOES OCCUR IN RESPONSE TO A LEAK ISOLOATION ATTEMPT, ECLSS 449137 PMRB 96 O2 CROSSOVER, ECLSS O2 REF INLET OR PRSD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLVS CAN BE 449137 PMRB 97 USED TO ISOLATE THE LEAK. PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLV DESCRIPTION/IMPACT: 449137 PMRB 98 PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLVS (ONE O2 AND ONE H2) CLOSURE FUNCITON ISOLATES 449137 PMRB 99 PRSD SYSTEM FROM T-O DISCONNECT AND GROUND GAS SUPPLIES. THESE VLVS ARE 449137 PMRB 100 POWERED BY PRE-FLT BUSES AND ARE CYCLED DURING GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY. 449137 PMRB 101 THE LAST VLV CYCLE OCCURS AT T- 2:35 AND IS VERIFIED BY GLS. FAILURE OF 449137 PMRB 102 A T-O GAS SUPPLY VLV TO CLOSE WOULD RESULT IN A LAUNCH SCRUB. PRSD T-O 449137 PMRB 103 GAS SUPPLY VLV FAILING TO CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/2. PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLV 449137 PMRB 104 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLVS HAVE NO HISTORY OF FAILURE 449137 PMRB 105 DURING GROUND OPERATIONS AND ARE NOT FUNCTIONAL DURING FLT. T-O GAS SU 449137 PMRB 106 PPLY VLVS ARE VERIFIED CLOSED BY GLS AT T- 2:30 PRIOR TO LAUNCH. T-O 449137 PMRB 107 GAS SUPPLY VLVS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LOW TEMPERATURES OF OTHER PRSD 449137 PMRB 108 ISOLATION VLVS IN THAT AMBIENT REACTANT GAS IS BEING SUPPLIED FROM 449137 PMRB 109 THE GROUND AND THROUGH THE VLV DURING ITS FINAL CYCLE. IN CONCLUSION, 449137 PMRB 110 ALTHOUGH THE PROBABILITY OF PRSD ISLOATION VLVS FAILING TO CLOSE WHEN 449137 PMRB 111 COMMANDED IN-FLIGHT IS HIGHER THAN DESIRABLE, THE PROBABLITY OF THAT 449137 PMRB 112 FAILURE OCCURRING IN CONJUNCTION WITH A FIRE OR LEAK WHICH COULD IMPACT 449137 PMRB 113 MISSION SAFETY IS REMOTE. IN ADDITION, ALL MANIFOLD ISLOATION VLVS IN 449137 PMRB 114 STALLED IN OV-103 HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CYCLED IN FLIGHT WITH THE EX 449137 PMRB 115 CEPTION OF O2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV (NEWLY INSTALLED VLV). OV-103 449137 PMRB 116 HAS NOT EXPERIENCED ANY IN-FLIGHT ISLOATION VLV FAILURES TO DATE. THIS 449137 PMRB 117 PR SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL OMDP TO ENABLE EXISTING VLVLS AND RECOMMEND 449137 PMRB 118 CORRECTIVE ACTION. IN THE INTERIM, ALL REPLACEMENT VLV PANELS ARE UND 449137 PMRB 119 ERGOING CRYO SCREENING VERIFICATION AS PART OF CORRECTIVE ACTION. THIS 449137 PMRB 120 INCREASES THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE VLV TO CLOSE 449137 PMRB 121 AT CRYO TEMPERATURES IN FLIGHT. DEFERRAL RATIONALE: AT PRESENT IT IS UN 449137 PMRB 122 KNOWN OF THE MANIFOLD PANEL WILL REQUIRE FURTHER ACTION. AS DETAILED AB 449137 PMRB 123 OVE THIS WILL NOT BE DETERMINED UNTIL FAILURE ANALYSIS IS COMPLETED. IT 449137 PMRB 124 IS REQUESTED THAT THIS PR BE APPROVED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE USE AND BE 449137 PMRB 125 DEFERRED TO OMDP2 TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR EVALUATION. DURING OMDP 449137 PMRB 126 PANELS WILL BE REMOVED AND CRYO-FLOWED. THE FORM AND FIT OF THE MANIFOL 449137 PMRB 127 D PANEL HAS NOT BEEN COMPROMISED. THE POSSIBLE FUNCTION/SAFETY IMPACT IS 449137 PMRB 128 AS DESCRIBED PREVIOUSLY. THIS DEFERRAL DOES NOT EFFECT THE CRITCAL ITEMS 449137 PMRB 129 LIST RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS, AND HAS NO IMPACT ON CERT- 449137 PMRB 130 IFICATION AND ASSOCIATED RATIONALE. PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVED 449137 PMRB 131 FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT)OMDP-2) OF OV-103. 09/09/93. 449137 1 1 PRSD MANIFOLD ISO VALVES HAVE A HISTORY OF IN-FLIGHT ANOMALIES (FAILS TO 449137 1 2 ACTUATE UPON COMMAND). CRYOGENIC SCREENING OF MANIFOLD VALVE PANELS WAS 449137 1 3 DEVELOPED AS A MEASURE TO SIMULATE FLIGHT CONDITIONS IN AN ATTEMPT TO R 449137 1 4 EPEAT THE ANOMALY IN A LABORATORY ENVIRONMENT AT THE NSLD. 2 RECENT REPE 449137 1 5 TED FAILURES ON ORBIT OF VALVES THAT HAVE PREVIOUSLY PASSED CRYO SCREENI 449137 1 6 NG HAS RENDERED THE SCREEN TEST UNRELIABLE AS A METHOD OF VALIDATING THE 449137 1 7 VALVES. A PROGRAM DECISION TO CANCEL ANY FURTHER CRYO SCREENING OF VALV 449137 1 8 E PANELS NOT YET SCREENED HAS BEEN INITIATED (REF ATTACHED IL CRG-95-072 449137 1 9 ) THUS THE CANCELLATION OF THIS PR TO REMOVE AND SCREEN THE PRSD 02 449137 1 10 VALVE PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE: VALVE FAILURE IS AN UNEXPLAINED ANOMALY. 449138 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: PROBLEM DISCRIPTION: THE PRSD SYSTEM ISOLATION REF_RPT_NO TEXT_ SEQ_NO DISPOSITION ---------- ----- ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 449138 PMRB 2 VALVES HAVE EXPERIENCED A NUMBER OF FAILURES IN WHICH THE ISOLATION 449138 PMRB 3 VLV FAILS TO CLOSE WHEN COMMANDED. A SUMMARY OF THESE FAILURES AS FO 449138 PMRB 4 LLOWS. TABLE 1-1. PRSD VALVE FAILURES: VEHICLE - 104, FLT - 05, ISOL 449138 PMRB 5 ATION VLV - 02 MANF 2, VLV S/N 0028. VEHICLE - 104, FLT - 08, ISOLA 449138 PMRB 6 TION VLV - 02 MANF 2, VLV S/N - 0028. VEHICLE - 104, FLT - 09, ISOL 449138 PMRB 7 ATION VLV - H2 MANF 1, VLV S/N 0008. VEHICLE - 105, FLT - 01, ISOLA 449138 PMRB 8 TION VLV - 02 MANF 1, VLV S/N 0029. VEHICLE - 105, FLT - 03, ISOLAT 449138 PMRB 9 ION VLV - 02 MANF 1, VLV S/N 0029. VEHCILE - 105, FLT - 04, ISOLATI 449138 PMRB 10 ON VLV - 02 MANF 1, VLV S/N - 0029. VEHICLE - 105, FLT - 04, ISOLAT 449138 PMRB 11 ION VLV - FC3 H2 REAC, VLV S/N - 0084. ALL FAILURES LISTED ABOVE HAV 449138 PMRB 12 E OCCURRED DURING FLIGHT. ALL EFFORTS TO DUPLICATE THESE FAILURES ON 449138 PMRB 13 THE GROUND HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL, RESULTING IN DEFERRED UNEXPLAINED 449138 PMRB 14 ANOMALIES AND/OR COMPONENT REPLACEMENT. RECENT FAILURE ANALYSIS TEST 449138 PMRB 15 ING ON 02 MANIFOLD 2 VLV (S/N 0028) DID DUPLICATE THE FAILURE. PREL 449138 PMRB 16 IMINARY TEST RESULTS INDICATE THE FAILURE MODE IS TEMPERATURE RELA 449138 PMRB 17 TED IN THAT THE VLV'S ABILITY TO CLOSE DEGRADES AS TEMPERATURE DECRE 449138 PMRB 18 ASES. TESTING CONTINUTES TO DETERMINE THE EXACT CAUSE OF DEGRADTION. 449138 PMRB 19 THIS FAILURE MODE ASSOCIATED WITH PRSD ISOLATION VLVS WAS NOT APPAR 449138 PMRB 20 ENT UNTIL STS-26 WHEN FLIGHT PROCEDURES WERE CHANGED TO CLOSE ONE OF 449138 PMRB 21 TWO MANIFOLD VLVS DURING CREW SLEEP PERIODS. PRIOR TO STS-26, THE ONLY 449138 PMRB 22 ISOLATION VALVE CLOSURE WAS DURING STS-2 OV-102 FUEL CELL 1 SHUTDOWN 449138 PMRB 23 DUE TO FLOODING WITH NOMINAL VLV PERFORMANCE. THE PRSD SYSTEM CONTAIN 449138 PMRB 24 S 14 SOLENOID ISOLATION VLVS OF SIMILAR DESIGN ALL MANUFACTURED BY 449138 PMRB 25 THE SAME SUPPLIER. * SIX FUEL CELL REACTANT VLVS. * FOUR MANIFOLD ISO 449138 PMRB 26 LATION VALVES. * TWO ECLSS SUPPLY VALVES. * TWO T-O GAS SUPPLY VALVES. 449138 PMRB 27 THESE VALVE ARE CONTAINED IN FOUR MANIFOLD PANEL ASSEMBLIES (TWO H2 AND 449138 PMRB 28 TWO O2). MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLV DESCRIPTION/IMPACT. MANIFOLD ISOLATION 449138 PMRB 29 VLVS CLOSURE FUNCTION IS DESIGNED TO ISOLATION PORTIONS OF THE FUEL CELL 449138 PMRB 30 /PRSD SYSTEM IN THE EVENT OF A LEAK. MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VALVE ISOLAT 449138 PMRB 31 ES FUEL CELL 1 AND TANK 1. MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVE ISOLATES FUEL CEL 449138 PMRB 32 L 2 AND TANK 2. FUEL CELL 3 AND REMAINING TANKS ARE COMMON TO MANIFOLD 449138 PMRB 33 1 AND MANIFOLD 2. BOTH O2 AND H2 SYSTEMS ARE FUNCTIONALLY EQUAL. IN THE 449138 PMRB 34 EVENT OF A LEAK, CLOSURE OF MANIFOLD 1 OR MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVES 449138 PMRB 35 WOULD ENSURE AT LEAST ONE FUEL CELL AND ONE TANK REMAIN ISOLATED AND 449138 PMRB 36 OPERATIVE. CLOSURE OF ONE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE IS ALSO STANDARD 449138 PMRB 37 CONFIGURATION FOR CREW SLEEP PERIODS. FAILURE OF ONE MANIFOLD VALVE IS 449138 PMRB 38 OLATION VALVE TO CLOSE DURING NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION DOES NOT IMPACT 449138 PMRB 39 THE MISSION. FAILURE OF ONE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE TO CLOSE IN CONJ 449138 PMRB 40 UNCTION WITH A LEAK COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ALL BUT ONE FUEL CELL AND 449138 PMRB 41 ONE TANK. FAILURE OF BOTH MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVES TO CLOSE IN CONJU 449138 PMRB 42 NCTION WITH A LEAK COULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE LEAK 449138 PMRB 43 AND POSSIBLE TOTAL SYSTEM FAILURE. MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLV FAILURE TO 449138 PMRB 44 CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/2 DURING ASCENT AND CRIT 1R/3 DURING REMAINDER OF FL 449138 PMRB 45 IGHT. MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLV DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THREE MANIFOLD ISOLAT 449138 PMRB 46 ION VALVES HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR SIX IN-FLIGHT FAILURES AND HAVE BEEN REM 449138 PMRB 47 OVED FROM SERVICE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF OV-104 H2 MANIFOLD 1. ALTHOUGH 449138 PMRB 48 THE PROBABILITY OF A MANIFOLD VALVE FAILING TO CLOSE IS HIGHER THAN 449138 PMRB 49 DESIRABLE, THE PROBABILITY OF ONE OR BOTH MANIFOLD VLVS FAILING TO CLO 449138 PMRB 50 SE IN CONJUCTION WITH A LEAK IS EXTREMELY SMALL. THE PRSD SYSTEM HAVE 449138 PMRB 51 NEVER EXPERIENCED MAJOR LEAKAGE IN-FLIGHT. THE PRSD SYSTEM IN CONTINUO 449138 PMRB 52 USLY MONITORED FOR DECAY DURING PROCESSING AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY IS REV 449138 PMRB 53 ERIFIED POST CRYO SERVICING AND THROUGH LAUNCH BY HAZ GAS DETECTION 449138 PMRB 54 SYSTEM. FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV DESCRIPTION/IMPACT: FUEL CELL REACTANT 449138 PMRB 55 VLVS CLOSURE FUNCTION IS DESIGNED TO ISOLATEF FUEL CELL REACTANT SUPPL 449138 PMRB 56 Y (ONE O2 AND ONE H2 VLV) IN THE EVENT OF A FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN/FAILURE. 449138 PMRB 57 FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV CLOSURES HAVE OCCURRED IN-FLIGHT ON THREE OCCA 449138 PMRB 58 SIONS. STS-2 (OV-102) FCP 1 SHUTDOWN DUE TO FLOODING STS-54 (OV-105) 449138 PMRB 59 FCP 2 SHUTDOWN/RESTART FOR DTO STS-57 (OV-105) FCP 3 SHUTDOWN/RESTART 449138 PMRB 60 FOR DTO. FAILURE OF A REACTANT VLV TO CLOSE IN SUPPORT OF DTO WOULD RE 449138 PMRB 61 SULT IN DTO ABORT (AS OCCURRED ON OV-105 FLT 4). FAILURE OF A REACTANT 449138 PMRB 62 VLV TO CLOSE IN CONJUCTION WITH A FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN (NON-CASTASTROPHIC) 449138 PMRB 63 WOULD NOT AFFECT THE MISSION (CRIT 1R/3). FAILURE OF A REACTANT VLV TO 449138 PMRB 64 CLOSE IN CONJUNCTION WITH A FUEL CELL FIRE OR LEAK COULD RESULT IN THE 449138 PMRB 65 INABILITY TO ISOLATE AT LEAST ONE TANK FROM THE FUEL CELL/FAILURE. FUEL 449138 PMRB 66 CELL REACTANT VLV FAILING TO CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/2. FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV 449138 PMRB 67 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: ONE FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV (OF SIX CYCLED) HAS FAILE 449138 PMRB 68 D VALVE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM SERVICE AND IS SCHEDULED FOR FAILURE ANALY 449138 PMRB 69 SIS. A FUEL CELL FIRE OR LEAK WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR IN CONJUCTION WITH TH 449138 PMRB 70 E INABILITY TO CLOSE THE FUEL CELL REACTANT VLVS IN ORDER TO IMPACT FLI 449138 PMRB 71 GHT SAFETY. IF THE H2 REACTANT VLV FAILS TO CLOSE, THE REACTANT SUPPLY 449138 PMRB 72 CAN STILL BE ISOLATED FROM THE FUEL CELL POWER SECTION BY DEPRESSURIZING 449138 PMRB 73 THE FUEL CELL. THIS WOULD OCCUR AS A RESULT OF THE FUEL CELL COUPLED 449138 PMRB 74 REACTANT REGULATOR LOCKING UP AND TERMINATING THE H2 SUPPLY TO THE FUEL 449138 PMRB 75 CELL POWER SECTION. IF THE O2 REACTANT VLV FAILS TO CLOSE, THE O2 SUPPLY 449138 PMRB 76 PRESSURE TO THE FUEL CELL CANNOT BE ISOLATED BUT COULD BE REDUCED BY OP 449138 PMRB 77 ENING THE PURGE VLV AND DEPRESSURIZING THE FUEL CELL. AT LEAST ONE O2 449138 PMRB 78 TANK COULD NOT BE ISOLATED. THE PROBABILITY OF FUEL CELL FIRE OR LEAK 449138 PMRB 79 AGE IS EXTREMELY LOW. FUEL CELL INSTRUMENTATION (CELL PERFORMANCE MON 449138 PMRB 80 ITOR PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE) WOULD INDICATE AN IMPENDING FAILURE IN 449138 PMRB 81 WHICH CASE THE FUEL CELL WOULD BE SHUTDOWN. IN ADDITION, GROUND TEST 449138 PMRB 82 ING (FCP DIAGNOSTIC TEST) IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE EARLY DETECTION OF 449138 PMRB 83 FUEL CELL DEGRADATION AND IS PERFORMED EACH FLOW. ECLSS SUPPLY VLV 449138 PMRB 84 DESCRIPTION/IMPACT: ECLSS SUPPLY VLVS (PRIMARY AND SECONDARY) CLOSU 449138 PMRB 85 RE FUNCTION IS DESIGNED TO ISOLATE O2 SUPPLY FROM PRSD MANIFOLDS TO 449138 PMRB 86 CLSS O2 SYSTEM. ECLSS O2 SUPPLY VLVS ARE NORMALLY NOT CYCLED IN FLIGHT. 449138 PMRB 87 FAILURE OF AN ECLSS O2 SUPPLY VLV TO CYCLE CLOSED IN RESPONSE TO A LEAK 449138 PMRB 88 IN THE ECLSS SYSTEM WOULD REQUIRED ISOLATION USING ECLSS O2 CROSSOVER 449138 PMRB 89 VLV OR ECLSS O2 REG INLET VLV. IF THE LEAK OCCURRED UPSTREAM OF THE ECL 449138 PMRB 90 SS ISOLATION VLVS THE LEAK COULD BE ISOLATED USING PRSD MANIFOLD ISOLAT 449138 PMRB 91 ION VALVES RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE FUEL CELL AND ONE O2 TANK. ECLSS 449138 PMRB 92 O2 SUPPLY VLV FAILING TO CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/3. ECLSS SUPPLY VLV DEFERRAL 449138 PMRB 93 RATIONALE: ECLSS SUPPLY VLVS HAVE NO HISTORY OF FAILURE TO CLOSE IN FLI 449138 PMRB 94 GHT SINCE THEY ARE ONLY CYCLED IN RESPONSE TO LEAK ISOLATION. IF A FAIL 449138 PMRB 95 URE TO CLOSE DOES OCCUR IN RESPONSE TO A LEAK ISOLOATION ATTEMPT, ECLSS 449138 PMRB 96 O2 CROSSOVER, ECLSS O2 REF INLET OR PRSD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLVS CAN BE 449138 PMRB 97 USED TO ISOLATE THE LEAK. PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLV DESCRIPTION/IMPACT: 449138 PMRB 98 PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLVS (ONE O2 AND ONE H2) CLOSURE FUNCITON ISOLATES 449138 PMRB 99 PRSD SYSTEM FROM T-O DISCONNECT AND GROUND GAS SUPPLIES. THESE VLVS ARE 449138 PMRB 100 POWERED BY PRE-FLT BUSES AND ARE CYCLED DURING GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY. 449138 PMRB 101 THE LAST VLV CYCLE OCCURS AT T- 2:35 AND IS VERIFIED BY GLS. FAILURE OF 449138 PMRB 102 A T-O GAS SUPPLY VLV TO CLOSE WOULD RESULT IN A LAUNCH SCRUB. PRSD T-O 449138 PMRB 103 GAS SUPPLY VLV FAILING TO CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/2. PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLV 449138 PMRB 104 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLVS HAVE NO HISTORY OF FAILURE 449138 PMRB 105 DURING GROUND OPERATIONS AND ARE NOT FUNCTIONAL DURING FLT. T-O GAS SU 449138 PMRB 106 PPLY VLVS ARE VERIFIED CLOSED BY GLS AT T- 2:30 PRIOR TO LAUNCH. T-O 449138 PMRB 107 GAS SUPPLY VLVS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LOW TEMPERATURES OF OTHER PRSD 449138 PMRB 108 ISOLATION VLVS IN THAT AMBIENT REACTANT GAS IS BEING SUPPLIED FROM 449138 PMRB 109 THE GROUND AND THROUGH THE VLV DURING ITS FINAL CYCLE. IN CONCLUSION, 449138 PMRB 110 ALTHOUGH THE PROBABILITY OF PRSD ISLOATION VLVS FAILING TO CLOSE WHEN 449138 PMRB 111 COMMANDED IN-FLIGHT IS HIGHER THAN DESIRABLE, THE PROBABLITY OF THAT 449138 PMRB 112 FAILURE OCCURRING IN CONJUNCTION WITH A FIRE OR LEAK WHICH COULD IMPACT 449138 PMRB 113 MISSION SAFETY IS REMOTE. IN ADDITION, ALL MANIFOLD ISLOATION VLVS IN 449138 PMRB 114 STALLED IN OV-103 HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CYCLED IN FLIGHT WITH THE EX 449138 PMRB 115 CEPTION OF O2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV (NEWLY INSTALLED VLV). OV-103 449138 PMRB 116 HAS NOT EXPERIENCED ANY IN-FLIGHT ISLOATION VLV FAILURES TO DATE. THIS 449138 PMRB 117 PR SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL OMDP TO ENABLE EXISTING VLVLS AND RECOMMEND 449138 PMRB 118 CORRECTIVE ACTION. IN THE INTERIM, ALL REPLACEMENT VLV PANELS ARE UND 449138 PMRB 119 ERGOING CRYO SCREENING VERIFICATION AS PART OF CORRECTIVE ACTION. THIS 449138 PMRB 120 INCREASES THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE VLV TO CLOSE 449138 PMRB 121 AT CRYO TEMPERATURES IN FLIGHT. DEFERRAL RATIONALE: AT PRESENT IT IS UN 449138 PMRB 122 KNOWN OF THE MANIFOLD PANEL WILL REQUIRE FURTHER ACTION. AS DETAILED AB 449138 PMRB 123 OVE THIS WILL NOT BE DETERMINED UNTIL FAILURE ANALYSIS IS COMPLETED. IT 449138 PMRB 124 IS REQUESTED THAT THIS PR BE APPROVED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE USE AND BE 449138 PMRB 125 DEFERRED TO OMDP2 TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR EVALUATION. DURING OMDP 449138 PMRB 126 PANELS WILL BE REMOVED AND CRYO-FLOWED. THE FORM AND FIT OF THE MANIFOL 449138 PMRB 127 D PANEL HAS NOT BEEN COMPROMISED. THE POSSIBLE FUNCTION/SAFETY IMPACT IS 449138 PMRB 128 AS DESCRIBED PREVIOUSLY. THIS DEFERRAL DOES NOT EFFECT THE CRITCAL ITEMS 449138 PMRB 129 LIST RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS, AND HAS NO IMPACT ON CERT- 449138 PMRB 130 IFICATION AND ASSOCIATED RATIONALE. PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVED 449138 PMRB 131 FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT)OMDP-2) OF OV-103. 09/09/93. 449138 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED AS A SUSPECT PR DUE TO THE FAILURE OF SEVERAL MAIN 449138 1 2 FOLD VALVES TO CLOSE DURING FLIGHT. THE 4 VALVES THAT HAVE FAILED TO CLO 449138 1 3 SE IN FLIGHT WERE ON PANELS IN OV-104 AND OV-105. BECAUSE OF THOSE FAILU 449138 1 4 RES, SUSPECT PR'S WERE GENERATED ON ALL MANIFOLD PANELS IN ALL ORBITERS. 449138 1 5 THE PLAN WAS TO REMOVE THE PANELS DURING OMDP AND CRYO SCREEN THEM AT T 449138 1 6 HE RI/LSS SERVICE CENTER. HOWEVER, ALL OF THE VALVES IN THIS PANEL (EXCE 449138 1 7 PT FOR THE T-O SUPPLY VALVE) HAVE BEEN CYCLED CLOSED AND OPENED DURING F 449138 1 8 LIGHT (CRYO SCREENED). A SUMMARY OF THESE VALVE CYCLES ARE LISTED BELOW 449138 1 9 THE T-O GAS SUPPLY VALVE DOES NOT REQUIRE CRYO SCREENING. O2 FCP 1 449138 1 10 REACT LVL: CRYO SCREENED DURING STS-51 (FCP1 SHUTDOWN/RESTART DTO) ON 449138 1 11 9-19-93. O2 MANF1 VLV: CRYO SCREENED DURING STS-60 ON 2-3-94 AS WELL AS 449138 1 12 DURING NUMEROUS OTHER FLIGHTS. O2 ECLSS 1 VALVE: CRYO SCREENED DURING 449138 1 13 STS 51 ON 9-17-93. SUCCESSFUL CRYO SCREENING OF THESE VALVES IN FLIGHT 449138 1 14 VALIDATES THIS PANEL. THIS PANEL WILL NOT BE REMOVED FOR FURTHER CRYO 449138 1 15 SCREENING. 449139 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: PROBLEM DISCRIPTION: THE PRSD SYSTEM ISOLATION 449139 PMRB 2 VALVES HAVE EXPERIENCED A NUMBER OF FAILURES IN WHICH THE ISOLATION 449139 PMRB 3 VLV FAILS TO CLOSE WHEN COMMANDED. A SUMMARY OF THESE FAILURES AS FO 449139 PMRB 4 LLOWS. TABLE 1-1. PRSD VALVE FAILURES: VEHICLE - 104, FLT - 05, ISOL 449139 PMRB 5 ATION VLV - 02 MANF 2, VLV S/N 0028. VEHICLE - 104, FLT - 08, ISOLA 449139 PMRB 6 TION VLV - 02 MANF 2, VLV S/N - 0028. VEHICLE - 104, FLT - 09, ISOL 449139 PMRB 7 ATION VLV - H2 MANF 1, VLV S/N 0008. VEHICLE - 105, FLT - 01, ISOLA 449139 PMRB 8 TION VLV - 02 MANF 1, VLV S/N 0029. VEHICLE - 105, FLT - 03, ISOLAT 449139 PMRB 9 ION VLV - 02 MANF 1, VLV S/N 0029. VEHCILE - 105, FLT - 04, ISOLATI 449139 PMRB 10 ON VLV - 02 MANF 1, VLV S/N - 0029. VEHICLE - 105, FLT - 04, ISOLAT 449139 PMRB 11 ION VLV - FC3 H2 REAC, VLV S/N - 0084. ALL FAILURES LISTED ABOVE HAV 449139 PMRB 12 E OCCURRED DURING FLIGHT. ALL EFFORTS TO DUPLICATE THESE FAILURES ON 449139 PMRB 13 THE GROUND HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL, RESULTING IN DEFERRED UNEXPLAINED 449139 PMRB 14 ANOMALIES AND/OR COMPONENT REPLACEMENT. RECENT FAILURE ANALYSIS TEST 449139 PMRB 15 ING ON 02 MANIFOLD 2 VLV (S/N 0028) DID DUPLICATE THE FAILURE. PREL 449139 PMRB 16 IMINARY TEST RESULTS INDICATE THE FAILURE MODE IS TEMPERATURE RELA 449139 PMRB 17 TED IN THAT THE VLV'S ABILITY TO CLOSE DEGRADES AS TEMPERATURE DECRE 449139 PMRB 18 ASES. TESTING CONTINUTES TO DETERMINE THE EXACT CAUSE OF DEGRADTION. 449139 PMRB 19 THIS FAILURE MODE ASSOCIATED WITH PRSD ISOLATION VLVS WAS NOT APPAR 449139 PMRB 20 ENT UNTIL STS-26 WHEN FLIGHT PROCEDURES WERE CHANGED TO CLOSE ONE OF 449139 PMRB 21 TWO MANIFOLD VLVS DURING CREW SLEEP PERIODS. PRIOR TO STS-26, THE ONLY 449139 PMRB 22 ISOLATION VALVE CLOSURE WAS DURING STS-2 OV-102 FUEL CELL 1 SHUTDOWN 449139 PMRB 23 DUE TO FLOODING WITH NOMINAL VLV PERFORMANCE. THE PRSD SYSTEM CONTAIN 449139 PMRB 24 S 14 SOLENOID ISOLATION VLVS OF SIMILAR DESIGN ALL MANUFACTURED BY 449139 PMRB 25 THE SAME SUPPLIER. * SIX FUEL CELL REACTANT VLVS. * FOUR MANIFOLD ISO 449139 PMRB 26 LATION VALVES. * TWO ECLSS SUPPLY VALVES. * TWO T-O GAS SUPPLY VALVES. 449139 PMRB 27 THESE VALVE ARE CONTAINED IN FOUR MANIFOLD PANEL ASSEMBLIES (TWO H2 AND 449139 PMRB 28 TWO O2). MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLV DESCRIPTION/IMPACT. MANIFOLD ISOLATION 449139 PMRB 29 VLVS CLOSURE FUNCTION IS DESIGNED TO ISOLATION PORTIONS OF THE FUEL CELL 449139 PMRB 30 /PRSD SYSTEM IN THE EVENT OF A LEAK. MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VALVE ISOLAT 449139 PMRB 31 ES FUEL CELL 1 AND TANK 1. MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVE ISOLATES FUEL CEL 449139 PMRB 32 L 2 AND TANK 2. FUEL CELL 3 AND REMAINING TANKS ARE COMMON TO MANIFOLD 449139 PMRB 33 1 AND MANIFOLD 2. BOTH O2 AND H2 SYSTEMS ARE FUNCTIONALLY EQUAL. IN THE 449139 PMRB 34 EVENT OF A LEAK, CLOSURE OF MANIFOLD 1 OR MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VALVES 449139 PMRB 35 WOULD ENSURE AT LEAST ONE FUEL CELL AND ONE TANK REMAIN ISOLATED AND 449139 PMRB 36 OPERATIVE. CLOSURE OF ONE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE IS ALSO STANDARD 449139 PMRB 37 CONFIGURATION FOR CREW SLEEP PERIODS. FAILURE OF ONE MANIFOLD VALVE IS 449139 PMRB 38 OLATION VALVE TO CLOSE DURING NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION DOES NOT IMPACT 449139 PMRB 39 THE MISSION. FAILURE OF ONE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE TO CLOSE IN CONJ 449139 PMRB 40 UNCTION WITH A LEAK COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ALL BUT ONE FUEL CELL AND 449139 PMRB 41 ONE TANK. FAILURE OF BOTH MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVES TO CLOSE IN CONJU 449139 PMRB 42 NCTION WITH A LEAK COULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO ISOLATE THE LEAK 449139 PMRB 43 AND POSSIBLE TOTAL SYSTEM FAILURE. MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLV FAILURE TO 449139 PMRB 44 CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/2 DURING ASCENT AND CRIT 1R/3 DURING REMAINDER OF FL 449139 PMRB 45 IGHT. MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLV DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THREE MANIFOLD ISOLAT 449139 PMRB 46 ION VALVES HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR SIX IN-FLIGHT FAILURES AND HAVE BEEN REM 449139 PMRB 47 OVED FROM SERVICE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF OV-104 H2 MANIFOLD 1. ALTHOUGH 449139 PMRB 48 THE PROBABILITY OF A MANIFOLD VALVE FAILING TO CLOSE IS HIGHER THAN 449139 PMRB 49 DESIRABLE, THE PROBABILITY OF ONE OR BOTH MANIFOLD VLVS FAILING TO CLO 449139 PMRB 50 SE IN CONJUCTION WITH A LEAK IS EXTREMELY SMALL. THE PRSD SYSTEM HAVE 449139 PMRB 51 NEVER EXPERIENCED MAJOR LEAKAGE IN-FLIGHT. THE PRSD SYSTEM IN CONTINUO 449139 PMRB 52 USLY MONITORED FOR DECAY DURING PROCESSING AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY IS REV 449139 PMRB 53 ERIFIED POST CRYO SERVICING AND THROUGH LAUNCH BY HAZ GAS DETECTION 449139 PMRB 54 SYSTEM. FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV DESCRIPTION/IMPACT: FUEL CELL REACTANT 449139 PMRB 55 VLVS CLOSURE FUNCTION IS DESIGNED TO ISOLATEF FUEL CELL REACTANT SUPPL 449139 PMRB 56 Y (ONE O2 AND ONE H2 VLV) IN THE EVENT OF A FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN/FAILURE. 449139 PMRB 57 FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV CLOSURES HAVE OCCURRED IN-FLIGHT ON THREE OCCA 449139 PMRB 58 SIONS. STS-2 (OV-102) FCP 1 SHUTDOWN DUE TO FLOODING STS-54 (OV-105) 449139 PMRB 59 FCP 2 SHUTDOWN/RESTART FOR DTO STS-57 (OV-105) FCP 3 SHUTDOWN/RESTART 449139 PMRB 60 FOR DTO. FAILURE OF A REACTANT VLV TO CLOSE IN SUPPORT OF DTO WOULD RE 449139 PMRB 61 SULT IN DTO ABORT (AS OCCURRED ON OV-105 FLT 4). FAILURE OF A REACTANT 449139 PMRB 62 VLV TO CLOSE IN CONJUCTION WITH A FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN (NON-CASTASTROPHIC) 449139 PMRB 63 WOULD NOT AFFECT THE MISSION (CRIT 1R/3). FAILURE OF A REACTANT VLV TO 449139 PMRB 64 CLOSE IN CONJUNCTION WITH A FUEL CELL FIRE OR LEAK COULD RESULT IN THE 449139 PMRB 65 INABILITY TO ISOLATE AT LEAST ONE TANK FROM THE FUEL CELL/FAILURE. FUEL 449139 PMRB 66 CELL REACTANT VLV FAILING TO CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/2. FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV 449139 PMRB 67 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: ONE FUEL CELL REACTANT VLV (OF SIX CYCLED) HAS FAILE 449139 PMRB 68 D VALVE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM SERVICE AND IS SCHEDULED FOR FAILURE ANALY 449139 PMRB 69 SIS. A FUEL CELL FIRE OR LEAK WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR IN CONJUCTION WITH THE 449139 PMRB 70 E INABILITY TO CLOSE THE FUEL CELL REACTANT VLVS IN ORDER TO IMPACT FLI 449139 PMRB 71 GHT SAFETY. IF THE H2 REACTANT VLV FAILS TO CLOSE, THE REACTANT SUPPLY 449139 PMRB 72 CAN STILL BE ISOLATED FROM THE FUEL CELL POWER SECTION BY DEPRESSURIZING 449139 PMRB 73 THE FUEL CELL. THIS WOULD OCCUR AS A RESULT OF THE FUEL CELL COUPLED 449139 PMRB 74 REACTANT REGULATOR LOCKING UP AND TERMINATING THE H2 SUPPLY TO THE FUEL 449139 PMRB 75 CELL POWER SECTION. IF THE O2 REACTANT VLV FAILS TO CLOSE, THE O2 SUPPLY 449139 PMRB 76 PRESSURE TO THE FUEL CELL CANNOT BE ISOLATED BUT COULD BE REDUCED BY OP 449139 PMRB 77 ENING THE PURGE VLV AND DEPRESSURIZING THE FUEL CELL. AT LEAST ONE O2 449139 PMRB 78 TANK COULD NOT BE ISOLATED. THE PROBABILITY OF FUEL CELL FIRE OR LEAK 449139 PMRB 79 AGE IS EXTREMELY LOW. FUEL CELL INSTRUMENTATION (CELL PERFORMANCE MON 449139 PMRB 80 ITOR PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE) WOULD INDICATE AN IMPENDING FAILURE IN 449139 PMRB 81 WHICH CASE THE FUEL CELL WOULD BE SHUTDOWN. IN ADDITION, GROUND TEST 449139 PMRB 82 ING (FCP DIAGNOSTIC TEST) IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE EARLY DETECTION OF 449139 PMRB 83 FUEL CELL DEGRADATION AND IS PERFORMED EACH FLOW. ECLSS SUPPLY VLV 449139 PMRB 84 DESCRIPTION/IMPACT: ECLSS SUPPLY VLVS (PRIMARY AND SECONDARY) CLOSU 449139 PMRB 85 RE FUNCTION IS DESIGNED TO ISOLATE O2 SUPPLY FROM PRSD MANIFOLDS TO 449139 PMRB 86 CLSS O2 SYSTEM. ECLSS O2 SUPPLY VLVS ARE NORMALLY NOT CYCLED IN FLIGHT. 449139 PMRB 87 FAILURE OF AN ECLSS O2 SUPPLY VLV TO CYCLE CLOSED IN RESPONSE TO A LEAK 449139 PMRB 88 IN THE ECLSS SYSTEM WOULD REQUIRED ISOLATION USING ECLSS O2 CROSSOVER 449139 PMRB 89 VLV OR ECLSS O2 REG INLET VLV. IF THE LEAK OCCURRED UPSTREAM OF THE ECL 449139 PMRB 90 SS ISOLATION VLVS THE LEAK COULD BE ISOLATED USING PRSD MANIFOLD ISOLAT 449139 PMRB 91 ION VALVES RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF ONE FUEL CELL AND ONE O2 TANK. ECLSS 449139 PMRB 92 O2 SUPPLY VLV FAILING TO CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/3. ECLSS SUPPLY VLV DEFERRAL 449139 PMRB 93 RATIONALE: ECLSS SUPPLY VLVS HAVE NO HISTORY OF FAILURE TO CLOSE IN FLI 449139 PMRB 94 GHT SINCE THEY ARE ONLY CYCLED IN RESPONSE TO LEAK ISOLATION. IF A FAIL 449139 PMRB 95 URE TO CLOSE DOES OCCUR IN RESPONSE TO A LEAK ISOLOATION ATTEMPT, ECLSS 449139 PMRB 96 O2 CROSSOVER, ECLSS O2 REF INLET OR PRSD MANIFOLD ISOLATION VLVS CAN BE 449139 PMRB 97 USED TO ISOLATE THE LEAK. PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLV DESCRIPTION/IMPACT: 449139 PMRB 98 PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLVS (ONE O2 AND ONE H2) CLOSURE FUNCITON ISOLATES 449139 PMRB 99 PRSD SYSTEM FROM T-O DISCONNECT AND GROUND GAS SUPPLIES. THESE VLVS ARE 449139 PMRB 100 POWERED BY PRE-FLT BUSES AND ARE CYCLED DURING GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY. 449139 PMRB 101 THE LAST VLV CYCLE OCCURS AT T- 2:35 AND IS VERIFIED BY GLS. FAILURE OF 449139 PMRB 102 A T-O GAS SUPPLY VLV TO CLOSE WOULD RESULT IN A LAUNCH SCRUB. PRSD T-O 449139 PMRB 103 GAS SUPPLY VLV FAILING TO CLOSE IS CRIT 1R/2. PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLV 449139 PMRB 104 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: PRSD T-O GAS SUPPLY VLVS HAVE NO HISTORY OF FAILURE 449139 PMRB 105 DURING GROUND OPERATIONS AND ARE NOT FUNCTIONAL DURING FLT. T-O GAS SU 449139 PMRB 106 PPLY VLVS ARE VERIFIED CLOSED BY GLS AT T- 2:30 PRIOR TO LAUNCH. T-O 449139 PMRB 107 GAS SUPPLY VLVS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LOW TEMPERATURES OF OTHER PRSD 449139 PMRB 108 ISOLATION VLVS IN THAT AMBIENT REACTANT GAS IS BEING SUPPLIED FROM 449139 PMRB 109 THE GROUND AND THROUGH THE VLV DURING ITS FINAL CYCLE. IN CONCLUSION, 449139 PMRB 110 ALTHOUGH THE PROBABILITY OF PRSD ISLOATION VLVS FAILING TO CLOSE WHEN 449139 PMRB 111 COMMANDED IN-FLIGHT IS HIGHER THAN DESIRABLE, THE PROBABLITY OF THAT 449139 PMRB 112 FAILURE OCCURRING IN CONJUNCTION WITH A FIRE OR LEAK WHICH COULD IMPACT 449139 PMRB 113 MISSION SAFETY IS REMOTE. IN ADDITION, ALL MANIFOLD ISLOATION VLVS IN 449139 PMRB 114 STALLED IN OV-103 HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CYCLED IN FLIGHT WITH THE EX 449139 PMRB 115 CEPTION OF O2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV (NEWLY INSTALLED VLV). OV-103 449139 PMRB 116 HAS NOT EXPERIENCED ANY IN-FLIGHT ISLOATION VLV FAILURES TO DATE. THIS 449139 PMRB 117 PR SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL OMDP TO ENABLE EXISTING VLVLS AND RECOMMEND 449139 PMRB 118 CORRECTIVE ACTION. IN THE INTERIM, ALL REPLACEMENT VLV PANELS ARE UND 449139 PMRB 119 ERGOING CRYO SCREENING VERIFICATION AS PART OF CORRECTIVE ACTION. THIS 449139 PMRB 120 INCREASES THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE VLV TO CLOSE 449139 PMRB 121 AT CRYO TEMPERATURES IN FLIGHT. DEFERRAL RATIONALE: AT PRESENT IT IS UN 449139 PMRB 122 KNOWN OF THE MANIFOLD PANEL WILL REQUIRE FURTHER ACTION. AS DETAILED AB 449139 PMRB 123 OVE THIS WILL NOT BE DETERMINED UNTIL FAILURE ANALYSIS IS COMPLETED. IT 449139 PMRB 124 IS REQUESTED THAT THIS PR BE APPROVED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE USE AND BE 449139 PMRB 125 DEFERRED TO OMDP2 TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR EVALUATION. DURING OMDP 449139 PMRB 126 PANELS WILL BE REMOVED AND CRYO-FLOWED. THE FORM AND FIT OF THE MANIFOL 449139 PMRB 127 D PANEL HAS NOT BEEN COMPROMISED. THE POSSIBLE FUNCTION/SAFETY IMPACT IS 449139 PMRB 128 AS DESCRIBED PREVIOUSLY. THIS DEFERRAL DOES NOT EFFECT THE CRITCAL ITEMS 449139 PMRB 129 LIST RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS, AND HAS NO IMPACT ON CERT- 449139 PMRB 130 IFICATION AND ASSOCIATED RATIONALE. PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVED 449139 PMRB 131 FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT)OMDP-2) OF OV-103. 09/09/93. 449139 1 1 PRSD MANIFOLD ISO VALVES HAVE A HISTORY OF IN-FLIGHT ANOMALIES (FAILS TO 449139 1 2 ACTUATE UPON COMMAND). CRYOGENIC SCREENING OF MANIFOLD VALVE PANELS WAS 449139 1 3 DEVELOPED AS A MEASURE TO SIMULATE FLIGHT CONDITIONS IN AN ATTEMPT TO R 449139 1 4 EPEAT THE ANOMALY IN A LABORATORY ENVIRONMENT AT THE NSLD. 2 RECENT REPE 449139 1 5 TED FAILURES ON ORBIT OF VALVES THAT HAVE PREVIOUSLY PASSED CRYO SCREENI 449139 1 6 NG HAS RENDERED THE SCREEN TEST UNRELIABLE AS A METHOD OF VALIDATING THE 449139 1 7 VALVES. A PROGRAM DECISION TO CANCEL ANY FURTHER CRYO SCREENING OF VALV 449139 1 8 E PANELS NOT YET SCREENED HAS BEEN INITIATED (REF ATTACHED IL CRG-95-072 449139 1 9 ) THUS THE CANCELLATION OF THIS PR TO REMOVE AND SCREEN THE PRSD 02 449139 1 10 VALVE PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE: VALVE FAILURE IS AN UNEXPLAINED ANOMALY. 449363 1 1 DURING V1228.004, WIRE P306B22 WAS FOUND TO SPLIT KAPTON WITH EXPOSED CO 449363 1 2 NDUCTOR NEAR BACKSHELL TANG OF 50P755. THE CONNECTOR WAS DEMATED AND DAM 449363 1 3 AGED WIRE DEPINNED. THE WIRE WAS CUT BEYOND THE DAMAGE AND A NEW SEGMENT 449363 1 4 OF WIRE WAS SPLICED IN USING AN APPROVED MR REQUEST TO INSTALL KSC SPLI 449363 1 5 CE 0634. THE CONNECTOR WAS THEN RE-ASSEMBLIED. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY 449363 1 6 SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEA 449363 1 7 R AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 449364 1 1 DURING S1287, WIRES P372B20 AND 1P373B20 WERE FOUND TO HAVE EXPOSED COND 449364 1 2 UCTOR APPROX 6" FROM 50P743. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO ADD LENGTH TO E 449364 1 3 ACH WIRE AND THEN RETERMINATE INTO 50P743 (ITEM 1). THE GROUND LUG OF P1 449364 1 4 13E22 AT 50P700 WAS ALSO FOUND BROKEN. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO ADD L 449364 1 5 ENGTH TO WIRE AND THEN INSTALL NEW GNC LUG LUG. A CONTINUITY CHECK WAS P 449364 1 6 ERFORMED TO VERIFY THE LUG INTEGRITY. THE RETEST OF DEMATED CONN. 50P743 449364 1 7 WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBIT 449364 1 8 ER DURING PROCESSING. 449373 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 MOST PROBABLY CAUSE WAS AN INADVERTANT PAPER PROCESSING ER 449373 1 2 ROR. IT WAS ADDRESSED WITH A CLARIFICATION NOTE ABOVE, PROVIDING TRACEAB 449373 1 3 ILITY FOR THE FLOW RESTRICTOR WITHIN THE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 449373 1 4 . 449374 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 MOST PROBABLY CAUSE WAS AN INADVERTANT PAPER PROCESSING ER 449374 1 2 ROR. IT WAS ADDRESSED WITH A CLARIFICATION NOTE ABOVE, PROVIDING TRACEAB 449374 1 3 ILITY FOR THE FLOW RESTRICTOR WITHIN THE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 449374 1 4 . 449489 1 1 DURING S1287, CONNECTOR 50P712 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL. SRP V- 449489 1 2 EL-0001-E-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO FURTHER 449489 1 3 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBI 449489 1 4 TER DURING PROCESSING. 449536 1 1 DURING S1228, CONNECTOR 50P13 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL. SRP V-E 449536 1 2 L-0001-E-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO FURTHER A 449536 1 3 CTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBIT 449536 1 4 ER DURING PROCESSING. 451500 1 1 DURING V76-40002, RECEPTACLE 50J52 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BROKEN KEYWAY. TH 451500 1 2 E CONNECTOR WAS R & R'D WITH ORBITER POWERED DOWN. RETEST OF CONNECTOR W 451500 1 3 ILL BE SCAN TRACKED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAU 451500 1 4 SE: RECEPTACLE HAD WORN-OUT. 451558 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: DURING REVIEW OF OPEN ENGINEERING BY CVAS. IT WAS 451558 PMRB 2 DETECTED THAT ENGINEERING EORDERS V070-773622 A07 AND V070-773622 A08 451558 PMRB 3 WERE NOT ACCOMPLISHED FOR OV-103 FLT 15. RESEARCH REVEALED THAT EO 451558 PMRB 4 V070-773622 A07 WAS RELEASED IN 1989 FOR OV-105 AND SUBS FOR MCR 12516 451558 PMRB 5 IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE WIRE NUMBER FOR Z2DB24 TO Z2DD24. EO V070-773622 451558 PMRB 6 A08 RELEASED IN 1991 REVISED THE EFFECTIVITY OF A07 TO INCLUDE OV-103 451558 PMRB 7 AND OV-104 FOR MCR 11680. DURING MODIFICATION OF FWD PCA 2 AT NSLD FOR 451558 PMRB 8 J1 MOD PERIOD EO A07 WAS NOT WORKED AS REQUIRED BY MCR 11680. APPROVAL 451558 PMRB 9 IS REQUESTED TO DEFER THIS PR TO WORK A07 AND A08 TO FUTURE FLT UNTIL 451558 PMRB 10 FWD PCA 2 IS ROUTED TO NSLD FOR SOME OTHER REASON. THE REIDENTIFICATION 451558 PMRB 11 OF WIRE Z2DB24 DOES NOT AFFECT THE DESIGN CONFIGURATION OF FWD PCA 2. 451558 PMRB 12 PCA 2 WAS SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED DURING MAJOR MOD PERIOD FOR OV-103. THIS 451558 PMRB 13 DISCREPANCY IS TRANSPARENT TO THE CREW. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 451558 PMRB 14 INVALIDATE THE BASIS OF CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT 451558 PMRB 15 THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS FOR 451558 PMRB 16 RESTRICTED USE (FUTURE FLT). PMRB VISIBILITY, NO PMRB REQUIRED, EO A07 451558 PMRB 17 AND A08 NOT BASELINED, PENDING APPROVAL, PR TO CLOSE. 11/16/93, PMRB 451558 PMRB 18 APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (FWD PCA NUMBER 2 REMOVAL) OF OV-103 451558 1 1 DURING CVAS REVIEW IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT EO V070-773622 A07 & A08 WERE 451558 1 2 NOT ACCOMPLISHED ON FWD PCA 2 FOR OV-103. V070-773622 A07 CHANGE WIRE 451558 1 3 Z2DB24 TO Z2DD24 FOR OV-105. V070-773622 A08 REVISED THE EFFECTIVITY OF 451558 1 4 A07 TO INCLUDE OV-103. EO V070-773622 A10 WAS WRITTEN TO RETURN WIRE TO 451558 1 5 ORIGINAL STATE TO AVOID UN-NECESSARY REWORK. V070-773622 A10 CHANGE 451558 1 6 WIRE Z2DD24 TO Z2DB24 FOR OV-103 & SUBS, PLANNING NOTE: DOCUMENTATION 451558 1 7 CHANGE ONLY. THE RE-IDENTIFICATION OF WIRE NOT REQUIRED ON E/I 105. 451558 1 8 ACTUAL WIRE LESS THAN 6 INCHES IN LENGTH DO NOT REQUIRE IDENTIFICATION 451558 1 9 PER MLO303-0029. FIT FORM AND FUNCTION NOT AFFECTED. CERTIFICATION HAS 451558 1 10 NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING. 451559 1 1 DURING OV102 WIRE PROTECTION LOG REVIEW IT WAS DETERMINED THAT CABLES AT 451559 1 2 CONNECTOR 82P317 AND 82P319 WERE LOCATED IN A HIGH TRAFFIC AREA AND SUS 451559 1 3 CEPTIBLE TO CHAFING. TO PREVENT ANY FUTURE CHAFING DAMAGE TO THE WIRE SE 451559 1 4 GMENTS HEAT SHRINKABLE SLEEVING P/N RT1146-0.250 WAS INSTALLED. IN ADDIT 451559 1 5 ION TO THE SLEEVING BEING INSTALLED THE CABLES CURRENTLY CAP AND STOWED 451559 1 6 AT 82P317 WERE CUT JUST PRIOR TO THE FIRST CLAMP FROM 82P317 AND RECAPPE 451559 1 7 D AND STOWED., THUS ALLOWING THE CLAMP TO PROVIDE STOWAGE SUPPORT. CONTI 451559 1 8 NUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT CHECKS WERE PERFORMED AND PASSED. RETEST WILL 451559 1 9 BE PER SCAN TRACK. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO CABLES BEING LOCATED IN A HIGH 451559 1 10 TRAFFIC AREA. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 451562 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DUE TO THE REVIEW OF OV102 WIRE PROTECTION LOG. TH 451562 1 2 E PYRO WIRES AT CONNECTOR 81P317 ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO DAMAGE DURING THE OR 451562 1 3 BITER FLOW. THE WIRES WERE EXTRACTED AT 81P317 AND HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING 451562 1 4 WAS INSTALLED OVER EACH CABLE. PRIOR TO INSTALLING THE HEAT SHRINK SLEEV 451562 1 5 ING ALL CABLES WERE RETERMINATED DUE TO DAMAGE OF THE PIGTAIL BRAIDS (RE 451562 1 6 FERENCE PAGE 1A). THE WIRES WERE THEN RETERMINATED AT 81P317. CONINUITY 451562 1 7 AND ISOLATION CHECKS WERE SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED AT 81P317 BUT THE HYPOT 451562 1 8 FOR PIN -Q FAILED. ADDITIONAL HYPOTS DETERMINED THE DISCREPANT SEGMENT 451562 1 9 WAS 1M326B16 (REFERENCE PAGE 1B). THE CABLE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED 451562 1 10 WITH A NEW SECTION OF CABLE. CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HYPOT CHECKS OF 451562 1 11 THE NEW CABLE 1M326B16 WERE SUCCESSFUL. DURING OPERATION 6 THE HYPOT FOR 451562 1 12 CABLE 1M326B16 WAS PERFORMED AT CONNECTOR 83P317 BUT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT 451562 1 13 81P317 DUE TO A PROCEDURAL ERROR (REFERENCE PAGE 1C). THE REPAIR 451562 1 14 PERFORMED ON THIS PR WAS ALSO BEING PERFORMED AT CONNECTOR 83P317 PER PR 451562 1 15 OEL-3-18-0457. NO DAMAGED OCCURRED DOWNLINE FROM 83P317 SINCE THE TWO 451562 1 16 PINS HYPOTED WERE BOTH IN A SAFE CONFIGURATION AT THE TIME OF THE HYPOT. 451562 1 17 THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 1 WAS PERVENTIVE MAINTENANCE. PROBABLE CAUSE 451562 1 18 OF ITEM 2 WAS DEGRADATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 3 WAS OPERATIONAL 451562 1 19 DEGRADATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 4 WAS PROCEDURAL ERROR. RETEST 451562 1 20 FOR CONNECTORS DEMATED ON THIS PR WILL BE PERFORMED PER SCAN TRACK. 451563 1 1 DURING OV102 WIRE PROTECTION LOG REVIEW IT WAS DETERMINED THAT CABLE SEG 451563 1 2 MENTS GOING TO CONNECTORS 83P317 AND 83P319 WERE IN A HIGH TRAFFIC AREA 451563 1 3 AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO CHAFING (ITEM 1). TO PROTECT THE CABLES FROM POSSIBLE 451563 1 4 DAMAGE IN THE FUTURE HEAT SHRINKABLE SLEEVING P/N: RT1146-0.250 WAS INS 451563 1 5 TALLED. A CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT CHECK WAS PERFORMED AND PASSED 451563 1 6 . A PAGE 1A WAS TAKEN WHEN THE RESISTANCE CHECK AT 83P319 PINS A AND B A 451563 1 7 ND E AND F WERE 0.12295 AND 0.006, S/B 0.2 - 0.6 OHMS. THE RESISTANCE CH 451563 1 8 ECKS WERE REPERFORMED IN OPERATION TWO AND WERE WITHIN SPECIFIICATIONS. 451563 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 1 IS WIRE HARNESSES LOCATED IN A HIGH TRAFFIC 451563 1 10 AREAS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 2 IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIR 451563 1 11 ED. 451577 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING V31-13107, ZONAL DETAIL INSPECTION - CREW H 451577 1 2 ATCH. THE V070-332902-002 ENVIRONEMENTAL PRESSURE SEAL ON THE I/E HATCH 451577 1 3 WAS WORN AND ITS WIRE MESH COVERING FRAYED. PREVIOUS MR REPAIRS (SEE MEQ 451577 1 4 -3-J1-0658) TRIMMED LOOSE WIRE MESH FROM SEVEN DISCREPANT AREAS IN THE 1 451577 1 5 2 O'CLOCK AREA; THE SAME AREA OF NOTICEABLE DAMAGE RECORDED IN THIS PR ( 451577 1 6 SEE FIG 1-1). BASED ON THE DAMAGED NOTED, THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLA 451577 1 7 CED. DISCREPANT CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. RETEST WILL BE PER V1058.004 451577 1 8 . PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFEC 451577 1 9 T LIKE S/N'S. 451851 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT HYDRAULIC FLUID FOUND ON AND AROUND TH 451851 1 2 E RIGHT HAND MAIN LANDING GEAR STRUT. A LEAK CHECK WAS PERFORMED PER V90 451851 1 3 28.003 AND NO EVIDENCE OF LEAKAGE WAS DETECTED. THE LEAK CHECK WAS PERFO 451851 1 4 RMED OVER A 24 HOUR PERIOD AND ALTHOUGH NO LEAKAGE WAS DETECTED, OMRSD V 451851 1 5 51ACO.022 ALLOW 1.0 DROP PER HOUR AT THE DYNAMIC SEAL INTERFACE. THERE I 451851 1 6 S NO PR CONDITION AND THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE IS SLIGHT NOMINAL LEAKAGE 451851 1 7 THROUGH THE DYNAMIC SEAL DURING PAD/FLIGHT/LANDING EVENTS. NO RETEST REQ 451851 1 8 UIRED. 451853 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE RH MLG DOOR ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL DEB 451853 1 2 ONDING AT FWD AND AFT OUTBD CORNERS (ITEMS 1 & 2), THE SPLICE JOINT ON O 451853 1 3 UTBD EDGE (ITEM 3), AND A TEAR IN THE FWD DOOR SEAL (ITEM 4). THE TEAR O 451853 1 4 N THE FWD SEAL WAS REPAIRED WITH RTV AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED US 451853 1 5 E. THE OTHER DISCREPANCIES WERE RETURNED TO PRINT CONDITION. THE REPAIRS 451853 1 6 HAVE BEEN RETESTED BY A LANDING GEAR CYCLE AND NO ANOMALIES WERE FOUND. 451853 1 7 NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION IS NORMAL 451853 1 8 WEAR AND TEAR. 451881 1 1 RIGHT HAND FLIPPER DOOR 12 V070-146068-002 BOLT HAS GALLED THREADS. THE 451881 1 2 BOLT WAS SCRAPPED AND A NEW BOLT WAS OBTAINED. THE INSTALLATION NUTPLATE 451881 1 3 S RUNNING TORQUE WAS CHECKED AND IS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE SPECIFICATIONS. PR 451881 1 4 OBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP; BOLT NOT INSTALLED PER SPECIAL PROCEDURES IN 451881 1 5 JOB CARD. 451918 1 1 FUEL CELL NUMBER 2 DEVELOPED A 3000 SCCM LEAK AT THE O2 PURGE PORT DURIN 451918 1 2 G V1091 OPERATIONS. THE FUEL CELL HAS BEEN REMOVED AND WILL ROUTED TO VE 451918 1 3 NDOR FOR REPAIR. A REPLACEMENT FUEL CELL (SERIAL 115) HAS BEEN INSTALLED 451918 1 4 AND RETESTED PER V5R01 REV L-1. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE 451918 1 5 CAUSE: FUEL CELL PURGE VALVE CONTAMINATION. 451951 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DUE TO HYDRAULIC FLUID VISIBLE ON, ADJACENT TO, AN 451951 1 2 D BELOW THE L/H MLG GLAND NUT. FLUID WAS WIPED OFF AND THEN MONITORED FO 451951 1 3 R 24 HOURS TO DETERMINE LEAK RATE. NO ADDITIONAL FLUID WAS DETECTED AFTE 451951 1 4 R THE 24 HOUR PERIOD, REFERENCE RTOMI 3-100593-06 (V9028.003 SEQ 18). OM 451951 1 5 RS REQUIREMENTS ALLOW A LEAK RATE OF UP TO 1.0 DROP/HOUR FROM THIS DYNAM 451951 1 6 IC SEAL AREA, THEREFORE NO PR CONDITION EXISTS, NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. T 451951 1 7 HIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: SLIGH 451951 1 8 T NOMINAL LEAKAGE THROUGH DYNAMIC SEAL DURING PAD/FLIGHT/LANDING EVENTS. 451954 1 1 THE SUPPORT WAS CRACKED. IT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. NO FURTH 451954 1 2 ER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 452217 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN WHEN THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS WERE CLOSED AND THE L/H M 452217 1 2 OTOR 2 CLOSED INDICATION WAS NOT RECEIVED. TROUBLE-SHOOTING STEPS IN THE 452217 1 3 IPR REVEALED THAT THE LIMIT SWITCH (V070-594222-012) WAS OUT OF RIG PER 452217 1 4 THE RIGGING SPECIFICATION (MLO308-0173). A SIMILAR CONDITION WAS FOUND 452217 1 5 ON THE R/H SIE (REFERENCE MEQ-A0061). STEPS WERE SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED 452217 1 6 ON THIS PR TO RE-RIG THE LIMIT SWITCH. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS PR WAS 452217 1 7 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS P 452217 1 8 R. RETEST WAS PERFORMED BY PLBD CYCLES PER V9023.01. 452275 1 1 THIS PR WAS DETECTED DURING J/C V31-15109. THE V070-565031-006 BUSHING I 452275 1 2 N THE LH AFT DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM ASSEMBLY WAS FOUND TO HAVE BEEN INSTAL 452275 1 3 LED BACKWARDS BY THE VENDOR. THIS AFT MECHANISM ASSEMBLY WAS INSTALLED D 452275 1 4 URING FLIGHT 12 PROCESSING WHEN THE HOUSING WAS MODIFIED. PER THIS WAD T 452275 1 5 HE AFT DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM WAS DISASSEMBLED. THE BUSHING WAS REMOVED, I 452275 1 6 NSPECTED, AND RE-INSTALLED CORRECTLY AND THE AFT MECHANISM ASSEMBLY WAS 452275 1 7 RE-ASSEMBLED. INITIAL AND FINAL RIGGING CHECKS WERE PERFORMED, AND THERE 452275 1 8 WERE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE DOOR CHARACTERISTICS. THE DOOR IS CU 452275 1 9 RRENTLY RIGGED PER SPEC MLO308-0058. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. 452275 1 10 SUCCESSFUL RETEST VERIFIED PER V1097, ET UMBILICAL DOOR FUNCTIONAL TEST. 452275 1 11 RC ACTION: OV-102 AND OV-105 HAVE BEEN INSPECTED AND BUSHINGS ARE 452275 1 12 INSTALLED CORRECTLY. OV-104 WILL BE INSPECTED PRIOR TO NEXT FLIGHT. 452275 1 13 CORRECTIVE ACTION COORDINATED WITH DESIGN CENTER. PROBABLE CAUSE: 452275 1 14 IMPROPER VENDOR INSTALLATION. 452277 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP DURING V31-15109 INSPECTION JOB CARD. THE LH2 ET D 452277 1 2 OOR DRIVE PDU SHAFT END WAS SLIGHTLY COVERED WITH SURFACE CORROSION. THI 452277 1 3 S CORROSION WAS REMOVED USING BARETEX PAD AND IPA. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DI 452277 1 4 SCREPANCY IS EXPOSURE TO THE ELEMENTS. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. THIS PR DO 452277 1 5 ES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 452279 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP DURING V31-15109 INSPECTION JOB CARD. THE LO2 ET D 452279 1 2 OOR DRIVE PDU SHAFT END WAS SLIGHTLY COVERED WITH SURFACE CORROSION. THI 452279 1 3 S CORROSION WAS REMOVED USING BARETEX PAD AND IPA. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DI 452279 1 4 SCREPANCY TO THE ELEMENTS. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFEC 452279 1 5 T LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 452300 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: THIS MR IS FOR RESTRICTED USE/INSTALLATION. MRB APPROVAL R 452300 PMRB 2 EQUIRED TO INSTALL A FABRICATED CLAMP IN LIEU OF CLAMP ME275-0004-0020 F 452300 PMRB 3 OR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE MR CLAMP WAS FARBRICATED USING (304 CRES), MATE 452300 PMRB 4 RIAL VERY SIMILAR TO THE (321 CRES) THE ORIGINAL CLAMP WAS MADE FROM. TH 452300 PMRB 5 E MR CLAMP DIMENSIONS ARE THE SAME AS THE ORIGINAL CLAMP, EXCEPT THAT TH 452300 PMRB 6 E CLAMP FEET WERE EXTENDED 0.204" EACH. THIS ALLOWED FOR INSTALLATION OF 452300 PMRB 7 THE CLAMP TO THE EXISTING MILK STOOL. THE CLAMP HOLES WERE RELOCATED AP 452300 PMRB 8 PROXIMATELY ONE HOLE INBOARD ON THE INBOARD CLAMP BASE, AND HALF OF A HO 452300 PMRB 9 LE INBOARD ON THE OUTBOARD CLAMP BASE. MR FIX ALLOWS THE INSTALLATION TO 452300 PMRB 10 FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT AND MAINTAINS THE MARGIN OF SAFETY FOR THIS 452300 PMRB 11 INSTALLATION. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY REMAINS POSITIVE. THIS IS SECONDARY 452300 PMRB 12 STRUCTURE. MR IDENTIFICATION WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN PREVIOUS STEPS. THIS MR 452300 PMRB 13 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 452300 PMRB 14 IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OF HAZARD 452300 PMRB 15 CONTROLS. 12/10/93 PMRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED "USE AS IS". 452300 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1 (MILK STOOL CRACKED WHICH SUPPORTS A SYSTEM 1 HYDRAULIC LI 452300 1 2 NE) WAS REWORKED WITH MRB APPROVAL BY INSTALLING DOUBLE LAYER FIBERGLASS 452300 1 3 PATCHES OVER THE MILK STOOL BASE. AN MR CLAMP WAS FABRICATED AND INSTAL 452300 1 4 LED IN LIEU OF THE DESIGN ME275-0004-0200 CLAMP. THE REPLACEMENT CLAMP W 452300 1 5 AS FABRICATED WITHOUT HOLES, AND WITH EXTENDED "FEET" SO THAT THE CLAMP 452300 1 6 COULD BE MATCH DRILLED TO THE EXISTING MILK STOOL FASTENER HOLES. THE MO 452300 1 7 ST PROBABLE CAUSE IS THAT THE HYDRAULICS LINE IS LOCATED SLIGHTLY INBOAR 452300 1 8 D OF THE MILK STOOL CENTER. THIS INTRODUCED A PRELOAD ON THE MILK STOOL 452300 1 9 WHEN THE CLAMP WAS ORIGINALLY INSTALLED. 452401 1 1 FUEL CELL NUMBER 3 DEVELOPED A 1470 SCCM LEAK AT THE O2 PURGE PORT DURIN 452401 1 2 G V1091 OPERATIONS. THE FUEL CELL HAS BEEN REMOVED AND WILL ROUTE TO VEN 452401 1 3 DOR FOR REPAIR. A REPLACEMENT FUEL CELL (SERIAL NO. 113) HAS BEEN INSTAL 452401 1 4 LED AND RETESTED PER V5R01 REV I-1. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. PROBA 452401 1 5 BLE CAUSE: FUEL CELL PURGE VALVE CONTAMINATION. 452463 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: CORROSION PITTING WAS FOUND ON THE ET DOOR INTERIOR 452463 PMRB 2 SURFACE. ALL CORROSION PRODUCTS WERE REMOVED AND THE PITS WERE POTTED 452463 PMRB 3 USING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE PER MR DISPOSITION. ALL EXPOSED DOOR BERYLLIUM 452463 PMRB 4 SURFACE SURFACES WERE THEN CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301. CORROSION 452463 PMRB 5 PIT LOCATIONS AND DIMENSIONS ARE DOCUMENTED ON ATTACHMENT "1" AND STEP 452463 PMRB 6 1-3. POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY IS MAINTAINED. ACCEPTING THE REWORKED ET 452463 PMRB 7 DOOR FOR RESTRICTED USE UNTIL FUTURE FLT (MAJOR MOD). THIS IN NO WAY 452463 PMRB 8 COMPROMISES ITS DESIGN INTENT, SAFETY AND/OR FUNCTION. THIS IS PRIMARY 452463 PMRB 9 STRUCTURE. THIS MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS 452463 PMRB 10 MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARDS CONTROLS. 452463 PMRB 11 11/16/93, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (MAJOR MOD) OF OV-103 452463 PMRB 12 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED USE OF THE 452463 PMRB 13 RIGHT HAND ET DOOR, V070-357200-004, WITH CORROSION PITTING ON THE 452463 PMRB 14 INTERIOR SURFACE OF THE DOOR UNTIL NEXT OMDP. DUE TO HAZARDS AND SPECIAL 452463 PMRB 15 CONDITIONS OF BERYLLIUM MECHANICAL OR CHEMICAL CORRISION REMOVAL IS NOT 452463 PMRB 16 POSSIBLE WITHOUT A SPECIALIST. THIS CONDITION ON THE DOOR WILL CONTINUE 452463 PMRB 17 TO BE INSPECTED EACH FLIGHT UNTIL OMDP, WHEN A BERYLLIUM SPECIALIST WILL 452463 PMRB 18 EVALUATE THE CONDITION FOR POTENTIAL FURTHER REPAIRS. ALL PITTED AREAS 452463 PMRB 19 WERE CLEANED BY LOOSENING WITH NONMETALLIC PICKS AND BRUSHES AND BY 452463 PMRB 20 FLUSHING ALL LOOSE CORROSION PRODUCTS USING IPA. PITS DEEPER THAN 0.010" 452463 PMRB 21 (REFERENCE TABLE 3-1 AND ATTACHMENT 2.0 FOR PIT LOCATIONS) WERE POTTED 452463 PMRB 22 USING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. THESE AND ALL OTHER LOCATIONS WERE CORROSION 452463 PMRB 23 PROTECTED. POTTING AND CORROSION PROTECTION WILL SEAL OFF ANY REMAINING 452463 PMRB 24 CORROSION FROM THE ENVIRONMENT WHICH WILL PREVENT FURTHER CORROSION FROM 452463 PMRB 25 FORMING. THE ET DOOR WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 452463 PMRB 26 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE ABOVE REPAIR ON THE ET DOOR WILL NOT 452463 PMRB 27 AFFECT THE DESIGN INTENT, SAFETY AND/OR FUNCTION. THIS IS PRIMARY 452463 PMRB 28 STRUCTURE. THIS MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS 452463 PMRB 29 MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 452463 PMRB 30 07/21/94 PMRB APPROVAL FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (OMDP) OF OV-103. 452463 PMRB 31 452463 PMRB 32 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: TWO AREAS OF CORROSION PITTING WAS FOUND ON THE ET 452463 PMRB 33 DOOR INTERIOR SURFACE. CORROSION PRODUCTS WERE REMOVED AND THE PITS WERE 452463 PMRB 34 MEASURED. BOTH WERE LESS THAN .010" DEEP. THE EXPOSED BERYLLIUM SURFACES 452463 PMRB 35 WERE THEN CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301. CORROSION PIT LOCATIONS 452463 PMRB 36 AND DIMENSIONS ARE DOCUMENTED ON ATTACHMENT 2 AND STEP 8-3. THE ET DOOR 452463 PMRB 37 IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. IT WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT 452463 PMRB 38 WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS MR ACTION IS FOR RESTRICTED LIFE 452463 PMRB 39 UNTIL FUTURE FLT (OMDP 2). THIS MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 452463 PMRB 40 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR 452463 PMRB 41 HAZARDS CONTROLS. MR ID'D PER STEP 4-13. DOOR WILL BE INSPECTED EVERY 452463 PMRB 42 FLIGHT PER V30-15109. 12/06/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT 452463 PMRB 43 (OMDP) OF OV-103. 452463 PMRB 44 452463 PMRB 45 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE OF THE 452463 PMRB 46 RIGHT HAND ET DOOR, V070-357200-003, WITH CORROSION PITTING ON THE 452463 PMRB 47 INTERIOR SURFACE OF THE DOOR UNTIL NEXT OMDP, FLT 22. DUE TO HAZARDS 452463 PMRB 48 AND SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF BERYLLIUM, MECHANICAL OR CHEMICAL CORROSION 452463 PMRB 49 REMOVAL IS NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT A SPECIALIST. THIS CONDITION ON THE 452463 PMRB 50 DOOR WILL CONTINUE TO BE INSPECTED EACH FLIGHT UNTIL OMDP, WHEN A 452463 PMRB 51 BERYLLIUM SPECIALIST WILL EVALUATE THE CONDITION FOR POTENTIAL FURTHER 452463 PMRB 52 REPAIRS. SOME OF THE CORROSION AREAS ON THE DOOR ARE AT THE EDGE OF 452463 PMRB 53 SOME TILE EDGE MEMBERS AND ET DOOR ROLLER/HINGE ASSEMBLIES. THERE IS A 452463 PMRB 54 POSSIBILITY OF CORROSION UNDER THESE AREAS, HOWEVER ANY CORROSION WILL 452463 PMRB 55 BE MINOR AND WILL NOT AFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE DOOR. ALL 452463 PMRB 56 OF THE EXPOSED PITTED AREAS WERE CLEANED BY LOOSENING WITH NONMETALLIC 452463 PMRB 57 PICKS AND BRUSHES AND BY FLUSHING ALL LOOSE CORROSION PRODUCTS USING 452463 PMRB 58 IPA. ALL LOCATIONS WERE CORROSION PROTECTED. CORROSION PROTECTION WILL 452463 PMRB 59 SEAL OFF ANY REMAINING CORROSION FROM THE ENVIRONMENT WHICH WILL 452463 PMRB 60 PREVENT FURTHER CORROSION FROM FORMING. THE ET DOOR WILL CONTINUE TO 452463 PMRB 61 FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE ABOVE 452463 PMRB 62 REPAIR ON THE ET DOOR WILL NOT AFFECT THE DESIGN INTENT, SAFETY AND/OR 452463 PMRB 63 FUNCTION. THIS IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 452463 PMRB 64 BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 452463 PMRB 65 RATIONALE OR HAZARDS CONTROLS. 4/28/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO 452463 PMRB 66 FLT 22 OF OV-103. 452463 1 1 THE RH ET DOOR INNER SURFACE HAD NUMEROUS AREAS OF SUSPECT CORROSION AND 452463 1 2 PITS. AREAS OF CORROSION AND PITTING WERE MEASURED AND RECORDED. THE CO 452463 1 3 RROSION PITS WERE CLEANED AND POTTED USING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE AND ALL A 452463 1 4 REAS MISSING KOROPON WERE RE-CORROSION PROTECTED BY MR APPROVAL FOR REST 452463 1 5 RICTED USE. ADDITIONAL CORROSION PITTING WAS FOUND ON THE ET DOOR INTERI 452463 1 6 OR SURFACE AND WAS REWORKED BY CLEANING AND POTTING. DURING PERFORMANCE 452463 1 7 OF V30-15109 NUMEROUS AREAS OF SUSPECT CORROSION, PITTING AND AREAS OF M 452463 1 8 ISSING KOROPON WERE FOUND. SEVERAL PITTING AND SUSPECT CORROSION AREAS A 452463 1 9 RE LOCATED ALONG THE EDGE MEMBERS AROUND THE RH ET DOOR, THE 'L' SHAPED 452463 1 10 PLATE AND AROUND THE AFT OTBD ROLLER ASSY. THREE EDGE MEMBERS WERE 452463 1 11 REMOVED PER TPS. THE AFT OTBD ROLLER ASSY AND THE 'L' SHAPED PLATE ON 452463 1 12 THE ET DOOR WERE REMOVED AND CLEANED BY THIS PR FOR ENG EVALUATION. THE 452463 1 13 AREAS OF PITTING WERE MEASURED AND RECORDED. THE PITS WERE CLEANED, 452463 1 14 POTTED AND CORROSION PROTECTED BY MR APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED USE UNTIL 452463 1 15 OMDP. BY MRB APPROVAL AT OMDP "SPEED-RING" A SUPPLIER SPECIALIZING IN 452463 1 16 BERYLLIUM REPAIR WAS BROUGHT IN TO REWORK THE DOOR FOR UNRESTRICTED 452463 1 17 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENT. 452465 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: ADDITIONAL CORROSION PITTING WAS FOUND ON THE ET DOOR 452465 PMRB 2 INTERIOR SURFACE ADDRESSED PER ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1A. ALL CORROSION PRODUCTS 452465 PMRB 3 WERE REMOVED AND THE PITS WERE POTTED USING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE PER MR 452465 PMRB 4 DISPOSITION. ALL EXPOSED DOOR BERYLLIUM SURFACES WERE THEN CORROSION 452465 PMRB 5 PROTECTED PER MAO608-301. CORROSION PIT LOCATIONS AND DIMENSIONS ARE 452465 PMRB 6 DOCUMENTED ON ATTACHMENT "1" AND STEP 3-2. POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY IS 452465 PMRB 7 MAINTAINED. ACCEPTING THE REWORKED ET DOOR FOR RESTRICTED USE UNTIL 452465 PMRB 8 FUTURE FLT (MAJOR MOD). THIS IN NO WAY COMPROMISES ITS DESIGN INTENT, 452465 PMRB 9 SAFETY AND/OR FUNCTION. THIS IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR DOES NOT 452465 PMRB 10 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL 452465 PMRB 11 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARDS CONTROLS. 11/16/93, PMRB APPROVED FOR 452465 PMRB 12 DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (MAJOR MOD) OF OV-103. 452465 PMRB 13 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED USE OF THE 452465 PMRB 14 LEFT HAND ET DOOR, V070-357200-003, WITH CORROSION PITTING ON THE 452465 PMRB 15 INTERIOR SURFACE OF THE DOOR UNTIL NEXT OMDP. DUE TO HAZARDS AND SPECIAL 452465 PMRB 16 CONDITIONS OF BERYLLIUM, MECHANICAL OR CHEMICAL CORROSION REMOVAL IS NOT 452465 PMRB 17 POSSIBLE WITHOUT A SPECIALIST. THIS CONDITION ON THE DOOR WILL CONTINUE 452465 PMRB 18 TO BE INSPECTED EACH FLIGHT UNTIL OMDP, WHEN A BERYLLIUM SPECIALIST WILL 452465 PMRB 19 EVALUATE THE CONDITION FOR POTENTIAL FURTHER REPAIRS. ALL PITTED AREAS 452465 PMRB 20 WERE CLEANED BY LOOSENING WITH NONMETALLIC PICKS AND BRUSHES AND BY 452465 PMRB 21 FLUSHING ALL LOOSE CORROSION PRODUCTS USING IPA. PITS DEEPER THAN 0.010" 452465 PMRB 22 (REFERENCE TABLE 3-1 AND ATTACHMETN 2.0 FOR PIT LOCATIONS) WERE POTTED 452465 PMRB 23 USING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. THESE AND ALL OTHER LOCATIONS WERE CORROSION 452465 PMRB 24 PROTECTED. POTTING AND CORROSION PROTECTION WILL SEAL OFF ANY REMAINING 452465 PMRB 25 CORROSION FROM THE ENVIRONMENT WHICH WILL PREVENT FURTHER CORROSION FROM 452465 PMRB 26 FORMING. THE ET DOOR WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 452465 PMRB 27 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE ABOVE REPAIR IN THE ET DOOR WILL NOT 452465 PMRB 28 AFFECT THE DESIGN INTENT, SAFETY AND/OR FUNCTION. THIS IS PRIMARY 452465 PMRB 29 STRUCTURE. THIS MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS 452465 PMRB 30 MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARDS CONTROLS. 452465 PMRB 31 07/21/94 OMRB APPROVAL FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (OMDP) OF OV-103. 452465 PMRB 32 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE OF THE 452465 PMRB 33 LEFT HAND ET DOOR, V070-357200-003, WITH CORROSION PITTING ON THE 452465 PMRB 34 INTERIOR SURFACE OF THE DOOR UNTIL NEXT OMDP, FLT 22. DUE TO HAZARDS 452465 PMRB 35 AND SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF BERYLIUM, MECHANICAL OR CHEMICAL CORROSION 452465 PMRB 36 REMOVAL IS NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT A SPECIALIST. THIS CONDITION ON THE 452465 PMRB 37 DOOR WILL CONTINUE TO BE INSPECTED EACH FLIGHT UNTIL OMDP, WHEN A 452465 PMRB 38 BERYLIUM SPECIALIST WILL EVALUATE THE CONDITION FOR POTENTIAL FURTHER 452465 PMRB 39 REPAIRS. SOME OF THE CORROSION AREAS ON THE DOOR AT THE EDGE OF SOME 452465 PMRB 40 TILE EDGE MEMBERS. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF CORROSION UNDER THESE TILE 452465 PMRB 41 EDGE MEMBERS, HOWEVER THIS CORROSION WILL BE MINOR AND WILL NOT AFFECT 452465 PMRB 42 THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE DOOR. ALL OF THE EXPOSED PITTED AREAS 452465 PMRB 43 WERE CLEANED BY LOOSENING WITH NONMETALLIC PICKS AND BRUSHES AND BY 452465 PMRB 44 FLUSHING ALL LOOSE CORROSION PRODUCTS USING IPA. ALL LOCATIONS WERE 452465 PMRB 45 CORROSION PROTECTED. CORROSION PROTECTION WILL SEAL OFF ANY REMAINING 452465 PMRB 46 CORROSION FROM THE ENVIRONMENT WHICH WILL PREVENT FURTHER CORROSION 452465 PMRB 47 FROM FORMING. THE ET DOOR WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT 452465 PMRB 48 WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE ABOVE REPAIR ON THE ET DOOR WILL 452465 PMRB 49 NOT AFFECT THE DESIGN INLET, SAFETY AND/OR FUNCTION. THIS IS PRIMARY 452465 PMRB 50 STRUCTURE. THIS MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. 452465 PMRB 51 THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARDS 452465 PMRB 52 CONTROLS. 04/18/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. 452465 1 1 THE LH ET DOOR INNER SURFACE HAD NUMEROUS AREAS OF SUSPECT CORROSION AND 452465 1 2 PITS. AREAS OF CORROSION AND PITTING WERE MEASURED AND RECORDED. THE CO 452465 1 3 RROSION PITS WERE CLEANED AND POTTED USING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE AND ALL A 452465 1 4 REAS MISSING KOROPON WERE RECORROSION PROTECTED BY MR APPROVAL FOR RESTR 452465 1 5 ICTED USE. ADDITIONAL CORROSION PITTING WAS FOUND ON THE ET DOOR INTERIO 452465 1 6 R SURFACE AND WAS REWORKED BY CLEANING AND POTTING. DURING ENG EVALUATIO 452465 1 7 N NUMEROUS AREAS OF SUSPECT CORROSION, PITTING AND AREAS OF MISSING KORO 452465 1 8 PON WERE FOUND. SEVERAL PITTING AND SUSPECT CORROSION AREAS ARE LOCATED 452465 1 9 ALONG THE EDGE MEMBERS AROUND THE LH ET DOOR AND AROUND THE AFT AND FWD 452465 1 10 OTBD ROLLER ASSY. 4 EDGE MEMBERS WERE REMOVED PER TPS. THE AFT AND FWD 452465 1 11 OTBD ROLLER ASSY ON THE ET DOOR WERE REMOVED BY THIS PR FOR ENG 452465 1 12 EVALUATION, THE AREAS OF PITTING WERE MEASURED AND RECORDED. THE PITS 452465 1 13 WERE CLEANED, POTTED AND CORROSION PROTECTED BY MR APPROVAL FOR 452465 1 14 RESTRICTED USE UNTIL OMDP. BY MRB APPROVAL AT OMDP SPEED RING A SUPPLIER 452465 1 15 SPECIALIZING IN BERYLLIUM REPAIR WAS BROUGHT IN TO REWORK THE DOOR FOR 452465 1 16 UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENT. 452466 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY NOTED AS ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 OF THIS PR WAS ADDRESSED BY PR 452466 1 2 EVIOUS MR ACTION ON STR-3-11-3435 (COPY ATTACHED). NO FURTHER WORK TO BE 452466 1 3 DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS MR. 452467 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT ELEVON COVE INSPECTION, 2 CUTS AND 2 NICKS WERE FOUND 452467 1 2 IN THE V070-198874 CURTAIN SEALS. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE REPAIRED PER 452467 1 3 MR DISPOSITION USING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRE 452467 1 4 STRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 452467 1 5 THE PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 452485 1 1 DURING V5032.003 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR 50P820 HAD DISCREPANT 452485 1 2 KEY WAY AND GROMMET. CONNECTOR 50P820 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NE 452485 1 3 W CONNECTOR P/N: NBS6GE8-2SA, LOT 90F1410-01. A CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AN 452485 1 4 D HIPOT CHECK WAS PEROFRMED AND PASSED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEA 452485 1 5 R AND TEAR. THIS RETURNS ASSY TO DWG CONFIGURATION. NO FURTHER DISPO REQ 452485 1 6 UIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. 452578 1 1 ITEM 1: THE UPPER AFT INBOARD ANCHOR NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PR 452578 1 2 INT. ITEM 2: THE UPPER AFT OUTBOARD NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PE 452578 1 3 R PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - OPERATI 452578 1 4 ONAL DEGRADATION. 452593 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT ELEVON COVE INSPECTION, 2 CUTS AND 1 NICK WERE FOUND 452593 1 2 IN THE V070-198874 CURTAIN SEALS. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE REPAIRED PER 452593 1 3 MR DISPOSITION USING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRES 452593 1 4 TRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR T 452593 1 5 HE PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 452595 1 1 DURING POST-FLIGHT EVELON COVE INSPECTION, 1 CUT AND 6 SCUFFS WERE FOUND 452595 1 2 IN THE V070-198071 CURTAIN SEALS. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE REPAIRED PER 452595 1 3 MR DISPOSITION USING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRE 452595 1 4 STRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 452595 1 5 THE PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 452598 1 1 A SPRING AND CAPSULE WERE FOUND TO BE MISSING OUT OF SEAL BLOCK THAT IS 452598 1 2 SEATED AGAINST THE CONICAL SEAL OF THE RUDDER SPEED BRAKE. THE SPRING AN 452598 1 3 D CAPSULE WERE REPLACED PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATI 452598 1 4 ON. 452617 1 1 THE BONDED STUD HOLDING THE UPPER LEFT HAND CORNER OF THE CARRIER PANEL 452617 1 2 V070-390311-008 WAS DEBONDED DURING CARRIER PANEL REMOVAL. THE RTV RESID 452617 1 3 UE WAS REMOVED AND A NEW, PER PRINT STUD WAS BONDED IN PLACE IN ACCORDAN 452617 1 4 CE WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES FOR BONDING AGENT MBO130-119, TYPE II. NO 452617 1 5 FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL BOND DEGRADATIO 452617 1 6 N DURING OPERATIONS. 452832 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP DURING V31-15109 INSPECTION JOB CARD. NO CORROSION 452832 1 2 WAS FOUND ON THE ET DOOR CENTERLINE LATCHES AND THEIR INTERFACE SLOTS O 452832 1 3 N THE ET DOORS. SOME RESIDUE CAUSED BY A COMBINATION OF TILE OUTGASSING 452832 1 4 AND HEAT FROM REENTRY WAS FOUND. THE SURFACES WERE WIPED WITH A BARETEX 452832 1 5 PAD AND IPA. NO PITTING IN THE METAL SURFACE WAS FOUND. PROBABLE CAUSE F 452832 1 6 OR DISCREPANCY IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. THIS P 452832 1 7 R DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 452963 1 1 ITEM 1 OF PAGE 1 AND ITEM 2 ON PG 1A WERE REPAIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ST 452963 1 2 ANDARD REPAIR PROCEDURE SRP-V-ST-0015-A. NO FURTHER ENG IS REQUIRED. PRO 452963 1 3 BABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 452965 1 1 DAMAGE TO CLOSEOUT PANEL V070-335084-001 HAS BEEN REPAIRED IN ACCRODANCE 452965 1 2 WITH STANDARD REPAIR OF FIBERGLASS CLOSEOUT PANELS SRP-V-ST-0015-0-0 AN 452965 1 3 D RESHAPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MR APPROVAL PROCEDURES. NO FURTHER ENGINEE 452965 1 4 RING IS REQUIRED AND THE PANEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO SERVICE. PROBABLE CA 452965 1 5 USES: PAGE 1, NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR; PAGE 1C, MANUFACTURING DEFECTS; PAGE 452965 1 6 S 1A, 1B, 1D, 1E, AND 1F BUILD UP OF TOLERANCES AND LIMITED ACCESS. 452972 1 1 ITEMS 1 & 2: THE LOWER INTBD NUTPLATE ON LEFT HAND 12 SPAR FITTING HAS N 452972 1 2 O RUNNING TORQUE AND THERE IS NO ACCESS TO SQUEEZE THE PER PRINT RIVETS. 452972 1 3 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND A NEW NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED SU 452972 1 4 BSTITUTING BLIND RIVETS USING SRP-V-ST-0025. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OPER 452972 1 5 ATIONAL WEAR. 452973 1 1 ITEMS 1 & 2: THE LOWER OUTBD ANCHOR NUT ON LEFT HAND 22 SPAR FITTING HAS 452973 1 2 NO RUNNING TORQUE AND THERE IS NO ACCESS TO SQUEEZE THE PER PRINT RIVETS 452973 1 3 THE DISCREPANT ANCHOR NUT WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ANCHOR NUT WAS INSTALLED 452973 1 4 SUBSTITUTING BLIND RIVETS USING SRP-V-ST-0025. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OP 452973 1 5 ERATIONAL WEAR. 453162 1 1 THE WIRE TRAY COVER WAS DAMAGED BY THE PAYLOAD DEPLOY SYSTEM MALFUNCTION 453162 1 2 . IT WAS REPAIRED PER MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BY BONDING A DOU 453162 1 3 BLER OVER THE DAMAGE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CA 453162 1 4 USE: ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION. 453165 1 1 THE WIRE TRAY COVER WAS DAMAGED BY THE PAYLOAD DEPLOY SYSTEM MALFUNCTION 453165 1 2 . ITEM 1 WAS REPAIRED BY BONDING A DOUBLER OVER THE DAMAGE. ITEM 2 WAS R 453165 1 3 EPAIRED BY TOUCHING UP THE PAINT. ITEM 3 WAS ACCEPTED AS-IS. ITEM 4 WAS 453165 1 4 REPAIRED BY BONDING A DOUBLER OVER THE DAMAGE. ITEM 5 WAS REPAIRED BY BO 453165 1 5 NDING A DOUBLER OVER THE DAMAGE. ITEM 6 - ONE HOLE WAS ELONGATED DURING 453165 1 6 DRILLING AND HAD TO BE DRILLED UP TO .25" TO ROUND IT OUT AND ACCOMODATE 453165 1 7 A LARGER RIVET. ITEM 7 WAS REPAIRED BY PEELING OFF THE BONDED DOUBLER A 453165 1 8 ND BONDING ANOTHER ONE WHICH WAS SLIGHTLY LARGER. ALL REPAIRS WERE PERFO 453165 1 9 RMED WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE 453165 1 10 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION. 453234 1 1 MINOR DEGRADATION OF THREADED FRCS ATTACH POINT NUMBER SIXTEEN HAS BEEN 453234 1 2 EXAMINED AND RESTORED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MR APPROVED PROCEDURE. PROBABLE 453234 1 3 CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION OF THREADED SURFACES. 453260 1 1 REFERENCE ITEM 1 PAGE 1. THE DISCREPANCY WAS WRITTEN AGAINST CARRIER PAN 453260 1 2 EL V070-194106-003 FOR A GALLED FASTENER HOLE. PER MRB APPROVAL THE HOLE 453260 1 3 WAS ENLARGED SYMETRICALLY AND AN OVERSIZED SPACER (FABRICATED AT LES SH 453260 1 4 OP) WAS INSTALLED. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 1 IS OPERATIONAL WEAR OVE 453260 1 5 R TIME. 453267 1 1 REPAIR OF THE SMALL CRACK IN THE FIBERGLASS BRACKET HAS BEEN PERFORMED A 453267 1 2 ND MR IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN REPAIR PROXIMITY. THE REPAIRED PART IS 453267 1 3 APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERAT 453267 1 4 IONAL DEGRADATION/WEAROUT. 453268 1 1 REPAIR OF THE CRACK IN THE FIBREGLASS BRACKET HAS BEEN PERFORMED AND MR 453268 1 2 IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN REPAIR PROXIMITY. THE REPAIRED PART IS APPROV 453268 1 3 ED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 453268 1 4 DEGRADATION / WEAROUT. 453269 1 1 STR/ENG HAS EVALUATED THE LAMINATED SHIMS INDICATED ON PG 1 ITEM 1. SHIM 453269 1 2 S HAVE MINOR DELAMINATION AT CORNER EDGES. SHIMS ARE RIVETED IN PLACE SO 453269 1 3 FULL DELAMINATION IS NOT POSSIBLE. SHIMS ARE ALSO LOCATED FULLY UNDERNE 453269 1 4 ATH EDGE MEMBER AND ARE COMPLETELY CONCEALED WHEN EDGE MEMBER IS IN PLAC 453269 1 5 E. IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 10 OF MF0004-092, FAIR WEAR AND TEAR CRITE 453269 1 6 RIA FOR PARTS AND EQUIPMENT ON THE SHUTTLE ORBITER PROGRAM. THESE DISCRE 453269 1 7 PANCIES ARE MINOR IMPERFECTIONS RESULTING FROM NORMAL SERVICE WEAR WHICH 453269 1 8 DOES NOT AFFECT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY, PERFORMANCE OR FUNCTION. NO FURTH 453269 1 9 ER WORK IS REQUIRED AND THE SHIMS ARE SATISFACTORY. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORM 453269 1 10 AL WEAR AND TEAR. 453284 1 1 THE MR STR-3-07-2645 SHIM WAS MEASURED TO BE .048" THICK. THE REQUIRED T 453284 1 2 HICKNESS PER THE ORIGINAL MR IS .048" +/- .003". THE DELAMINATED LAYER W 453284 1 3 AS PEELED OFF TO LEAVE A SMOOTH EVEN SURFACE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE 453284 1 4 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 453321 1 1 THE XO1307 BULKHEAD SUSTAINED DAMAGED DURING FLIGHT DUE TO A PAYLOAD DEP 453321 1 2 LOY MECHANISM WHICH MALFUNCTIONED. THE PENETRACTION IN THE BULKHEAD WAS 453321 1 3 1/2" 1/8". A DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED BY MRB APPROVAL WITH M 453321 1 4 BO120-037 ADHESIVE AND FOUR JO-BOLTS. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS 453321 1 5 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION. 453322 1 1 THE SEAL WAS BOUND UP BECAUSE IT WAS COCKED IN ITS SLEEVE. IT WAS FREED 453322 1 2 BY APPLYING PRESSURE TO THE OPPOSITE SIDE WITH A NON-METALIC SPATULA. IT 453322 1 3 WAS THEN EXCERCISED TO VERITY THAT IT MOVES FREELY. NO FURTHER WORK TO 453322 1 4 BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - NO DISCREPANCY. 453323 1 1 THIS PR CONDITION HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED AND MR ID'D ON STR-3-1 453323 1 2 7-4619. A COPY IS ATTACHED FOR REFERENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OVERTEMP. 453324 1 1 THIS PR CONDITION HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED AND MR ID'D ON STR-3-1 453324 1 2 2-3500 ITEM 2. A COPY IS ATTACHED FOR REFERENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OVERTEM 453324 1 3 P. 453329 1 1 THIS PR CONDITION HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED AND MR-ID'D ON STR-3-1 453329 1 2 6-4493. A COPY IS ATTACHED FOR REFERENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OVERTEMP. 453505 1 1 ITEM 1: DENTS WERE FOUND AT LOCATIONS 6-17 ON THE R/H LOWER RSB PANEL. D 453505 1 2 ENTS WERE COSMETIC IN SIZE AND WERE MR ID'D AND MR ACCEPTED. LOCATION 4 453505 1 3 IS FORMER CORROSION AND NO ACTION IS REQUIRED. PAINT DEFECT AT LOCATION 453505 1 4 5 WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND PAINTED. ITEM 2: LOCATIONS 1, 2, AND 3 SHO 453505 1 5 WED SIGNS OF ACTIVE CORROSION. ALL OF THESE LOCATIONS WERE ACID ETCHED A 453505 1 6 ND ALL ACTIVE CORROSION WAS REMOVED. A DOUBLER WAS BONDED ON LOCATION 1. 453505 1 7 THE LOCATIONS WERE THEN CORROSION PROTECTED, PAINTED, MR ID'D AND MR AC 453505 1 8 CEPTED. ITEM 3: THE DOUBLER BOND PERFORMED PER STEP 6-3 WAS CURED FOR 6 453505 1 9 HOURS AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN CURED OFR 10.5 HOURS PER V9045 REV C, DEV 6 453505 1 10 10/01. THE DEV PROVIDES A MORE CONSERVATIVE TIME-TEMP TABLE THAN THE 453505 1 11 SPEC REQUIREMENT. PER SPECIFICATION MAI106-301, 6 HOURS IS THE MINIMUM 453505 1 12 ACCEPTABLE CURE TIME FOR A MINIMUM CURE TEMPERATURE OF 270 F. LAP SHEARS 453505 1 13 PASSED WITH AVG RESULTS OF 3026 PSI. (MAO106-301 REQUIRES 2400 AVG 453505 1 14 VALUE). NO MR ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. 453506 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THERE ARE SIX 170D432788-15 BOLTS THAT HAVE INSUFFIC 453506 PMRB 2 IENT THREAD PROTRUSION THRU THEIR NS103623-02-5 NUTPLATES. THE BOLTS ARE 453506 PMRB 3 LOCATED AT RS 193 ON THE LEFT HAND SIDE. THE BOLTS PRIMARY LOCKING FEAT 453506 PMRB 4 URE IS THE TORQUE. THE BOLTS HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND TORQUED 20-25 IN LBS. 453506 PMRB 5 THE BOLTS PROTRUDE FAR ENOUGH INTO THE NUTPLATES THAT THEY ENGAGE THE N 453506 PMRB 6 UTPLATES LOCKING FEATURE. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR RESTRICTED US 453506 PMRB 7 E, ONE FLIGHT. POST FLIGHT DISPO WILL REMOVE THE 170D432711 ISOLATOR AND 453506 PMRB 8 EVALUATE THE PARTS STACK UP. THE INSTALLATION WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION 453506 PMRB 9 PER DESIGN INTENT AND ALLOWS THE MARGIN OF SAFETY TO REMAIN POSITIVE. 453506 PMRB 10 THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASI 453506 PMRB 11 S FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS L 453506 PMRB 12 IST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 453506 PMRB 13 12-07-93, PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 19 OF 453506 PMRB 14 OV-103. 453506 1 1 AFTER CAREFULLY MEASURING THE COMPONENTS IT WAS DETERMINED THAT HTE INST 453506 1 2 ALLATION IS PER PRINT. EVIDENTLY, EXTRA CARE IN ASSEMBLY WAS REQUIRED TO 453506 1 3 ACHIEVE FASTENER THREAD PROTRUSION. IN ALL 6 BOLTS, THREAD PROTRUSION ( 453506 1 4 1/2 TO 1 1/2 THREADS) SUFFICIENT TO ENGAGE THE LOCKING FEATURE OF THE NU 453506 1 5 TS WAS OBTAINED, WITH ONLY BOLTS 3 AND 4 SHOWING 1/2 THREAD PROTRUSION. 453506 1 6 MR ACCEPTANCE OF THE AMOUNT OF THREAD PROTRUSION OBTAINED WAS GRNATED FO 453506 1 7 R CONTINUED, UNRESTRICTED USE, WITH NO MR ID REQUIRED. NO FURTHER ENGINE 453506 1 8 ERING REMAINS TO BE DONE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 453522 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS PER PRINT. THE ONLY DISCREPANCY WAS THAT THE 453522 1 2 SCREW WAS INSTALLED INCORRECTLY. THE SCREW WAS REMOVED AND A NEW SCREW 453522 1 3 WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS W 453522 1 4 ORKMANSHIP. 453531 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: A FASTENER ON THE REAR VERTICAL SPAR COVE PANEL AT RS 453531 PMRB 2 330.491 WAS FOUND TO HAVE IMPROPER THREAD PROTRUSION. THE THREADS OF THE 453531 PMRB 3 FASTENER ARE FLUSH WITH THE NUTPLATE. THERE IS NO ACCESS TO THE HEAD OF 453531 PMRB 4 THE BOLT TO REMOVE AND REPLACE THE FASTENER. THE NUTPLATE IS SECURE AND 453531 PMRB 5 THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THE BOLT BACKING OUT. THE PRELOAD ON THE 453531 PMRB 6 BOLT/NUTPLATE INSTALLATION IS MAINTAINED AS THE PRIMARY LOCKING FEATURE. 453531 PMRB 7 THIS INSTALLATION WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESING INTENT. MARGIN OF 453531 PMRB 8 SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE FOR THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR ACTION 453531 PMRB 9 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 453531 PMRB 10 IMPACT HTE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD 453531 PMRB 11 CONTROLS. THIS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ON 11/09/93 PMRB CONCURS WITH 453531 PMRB 12 CLOSURE, REF SUMMARY CONCLUSION. 453531 1 1 THE FASTENER ON THE REAR VERTICAL SPAR COVE PANEL AT R.S.330.491 WAS 453531 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE NO THREAD PROTRUSION. SINCE THE FASTENER PRELOAD WHICH IS 453531 1 3 THE PRIMARY LOCKING FEATURE IS ENGAGED, AND THE NUTPLATES LOCKING 453531 1 4 FEATURE IS ENGAGED, THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS NOT COMPROMISED. THEY 453531 1 5 WERE MR ID'D AND MR ACCEPTED. 453534 1 1 REFERENCE ITEMS 1 AND 2: DENTS WERE FOUND AT LOCATIONS 9-17 ON THE LH UP 453534 1 2 PER RSB PANEL. DENTS WERE COSMETIC IN SIZE AND WERE MR'ID AND MR ACCEPTE 453534 1 3 D. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. LOCATIONS 1,2, AND 4-5 SHOWED SIGNS OF ACTIVE 453534 1 4 CORROSION. ALL OF THESE LOCATIONS WERE ACID ETCHED AND ALL ACTIVE CORRO 453534 1 5 ISON WAS REMOVED. THE LOCATIONS WERE THEN CORROSION PROTECTED, PAINTED, 453534 1 6 MR ID'D AND MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONEMENTAL DAMAGE. LOCATION 453534 1 7 3 IS FORMER CORROSION - NO ACTION REQUIRED. 453536 1 1 REFERENCE ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3: DENTS WERE FOUND AT LOCATIONS 9-12 ON THE R 453536 1 2 /H UPPER RSB PANEL. DENTS WERE COSMETIC IN SIZE AND WERE MR ID'D AND MR 453536 1 3 ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. LOCATIONS 1-4, AND 7 SHOWED SIGNS OF A 453536 1 4 CTIVE CORROSION. ALL OF THESE LOCATIONS WERE ACID ETCHED AND ALL ACTIVE 453536 1 5 CORROSION WAS REMOVED. AT LOCATIONS 5 AND 6 RIVETS WERE REMOVED AND NO C 453536 1 6 ORROSION WAS PRESENT AND THEY WERE REPLACED. THE LOCATIONS WERE THEN COR 453536 1 7 ROSION PROTECTED, PAINTED, MR ID'D AND MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVI 453536 1 8 RONMENTAL DAMAGE. LOCATION 8 IS FORMER CORROSION: NO ACTION REQUIRED. 453537 1 1 ITEM 1: DENTS WERE FOUND AT LOCATIONS 1-19 ON THE LH LOWER RSB PANEL. DE 453537 1 2 NTS WERE COSMETIC IN SIZE AND WERE MR ID'D AND MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAU 453537 1 3 SE: VENDOR. ITEM 2: LOCATIONS 20, 21 AND 22 WERE PAINT DEFECTS. THE LOCA 453537 1 4 TIONS WERE CORROSION PROTECTED, PAINTED, MR ID'D AND MR ACCEPTED. PROBAB 453537 1 5 LE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. 453540 1 1 ITEM 1: A LOOSE RIVET WAS FOUND ON THE VERTICAL REAR SPAR AT RS 169. THE 453540 1 2 DISCREPANT CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBAB 453540 1 3 LE CAUSE: VENDOR. 453590 1 1 DURING SURV, CONNECTOR 50P647 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL. SRP V-E 453590 1 2 L-0001-E-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO FURTHER A 453590 1 3 CTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 453663 1 1 THIS PR WAS DETECTED DURING J/C V31-15109. THE V070-565031-006 BUSHING I 453663 1 2 N THE RH AFT DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM ASSEMBLY WAS FOUND TO HAVE BEEN INSTAL 453663 1 3 LED BACKWARDS BY THE VENDOR. THIS AFT MECHANISM ASSEMBLY WHEN THE HOUSIN 453663 1 4 G WAS MODIFIED. PER THIS WAD THE AFT DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM WAS DISASSEMBL 453663 1 5 ED. THE BUSHING WAS REMOVED, INSPECTED, AND RE-INSTALLED CORRECTLY AND T 453663 1 6 HE AFT MECHANISM ASSEMBLY WAS RE-ASSEMBLED. INITIAL AND FINAL RIGGING CH 453663 1 7 ECKS WERE PERFORMED, AND THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE DOOR C 453663 1 8 HARACTERISTICS. THE DOOR IS CURRENTLY RIGGED PER SPEC MLO308-0058. NO FU 453663 1 9 RTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. SUCCESSFUL RETEST VERIFIED PER V1097 - ET 453663 1 10 UMBILICAL DOOR FUNCTIONAL TEST. RC ACTION: OV-102 AND OV-105 HAVE BEEN 453663 1 11 INSPECTED AND BUSHINGS ARE INSTALLED CORRECTLY. OV-104 WILL BE INSPECTED 453663 1 12 PRIOR TO NEXT FLIGHT. CORRECTIVE ACTION COORDINATED WITH DESIGN CENTER. 453663 1 13 PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR INSTALLATION ERROR. 453706 1 1 DURING V31-13117 IT WAS DETECTED THAT GROUND LUG ON WIRE 2G7A24SH- JR24 453706 1 2 WAS BROKEN OFF THE BACKSHELL AT CONNECTOR 82P226. THE DISCREPANT LUG WAS 453706 1 3 CUT OFF THE WIRE AND A NEW LUG WAS INSTALLED. A CONTINUITY CHECK WAS PE 453706 1 4 RFORMED ON THE WIRE. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. THE PROBABLE CAU 453706 1 5 SE FOR THIS PR WAS WORKMANSHIP. 453725 1 1 THE RTV GASKET AROUND THE EDGE OF THE 50-01 DOOR WAS SLIGHTLY DEBONDED. 453725 1 2 THE RTV GASKET WAS REBONDED BY APPLYING (WITH MR APPROVAL) MBO130-119 TY 453725 1 3 PE II ADHESIVE TO THE DEBONDED AREAS. THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE BETWEEN T 453725 1 4 HE DOOR AND THE CONTAINER IT IS STORED IN AT THIS POINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: 453725 1 5 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 453726 1 1 THE GASKET AROUND THE EDGE OF THE 50-02 DOOR WAS SLIGHTLY DEBONDED. THE 453726 1 2 RTV GASKET WAS REBONDED BY APPLYING (WITH MR APPROVAL) MBO130-119 TYPE I 453726 1 3 I ADHESIVE TO THE DEBONDED AREAS. THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE D 453726 1 4 OOR AND THE CONTAINER IT IS STORED IN AT THIS POINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPE 453726 1 5 RATIONAL DEGRADATION. 453734 1 1 THE FITTING WAS DAMAGED BY A SLIGHT IMPACT WITH A TOOL. THE DAMAGE WAS S 453734 1 2 MOOTHED OUT AND THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR U 453734 1 3 NRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 453734 1 4 WORKMANSHIP. 453867 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED PRIOR TO BRAKE REMOVAL AND DOCUMENTS A SUSPECT 453867 1 2 LOOSE CAP SCREW CONDITION AND A SMALL NICK ON THE OUTBOARD ROTOR. THE 453867 1 3 NICK IS WITHIN THE ACCEPTABLE LIMITS FOR ROTOR DAMAGE AS DEFINED IN THE 453867 1 4 ATP AND THIS BRAKE WILL BE INSPECTED PRIOR TO RETURNING TO STOCK PER THE 453867 1 5 ATP. THE CAP SCREW BREAKAWAY TORQUES WERE MEASURED AND AVERAGED AROUND 453867 1 6 39 IN-LBS. THESE SCREWS ARE TORQUED TO 43-53 IN-LBS PRIOR TO FLIGHT AND 453867 1 7 THE SCREWS AT LOCATIONS 7 O'CLOCK AND 9 O'CLOCK WERE NOT MARKEDLY LOOSER 453867 1 8 THAT THE OTHER SCREWS. THE BRAKE HAS COMPLETED FIVE SUCCESSFUL FLIGHTS 453867 1 9 AND WILL BE SENT TO THE NSLD FOR INSPECTION AND ATP TO CERTIFY FOR FIVE 453867 1 10 MORE FLIGHTS. AN LRU PR WAS INITATED TO DOCUMENT THE RESULTS OF THIS PR 453867 1 11 AND NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL 453867 1 12 NUMBER END ITEMS AND NO VEHICLE RETEST IS REQUIRED. THE MOST PROBABLE 453867 1 13 CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 453868 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED PRIOR TO BRAKE REMOVAL AND DOCUMENTS BROKEN WARNIN 453868 1 2 G TABS ON CALIPERS 6 AND 7. THESE TABS ARE DECALS WHICH ARE USED TO WAR 453868 1 3 N PERSONNEL WHO ARE DISASSEMBLING THE BRAKE PISTONS THAT THE PISTONS ARE 453868 1 4 SPRING LOADED. THE TABS WILL BE REPLACED DURING BRAKE INSPECTION AND RE 453868 1 5 CERTIFICATION ATP TO BE PERFORMED BY VENDOR. THESE TABS HAVE NO FLIGHT P 453868 1 6 URPOSE AND NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. THE BRAKE HAS COMPLETED FIVE SUCCESSF 453868 1 7 UL FLIGHTS AND WILL BE SENT TO THE NSLD FOR INSPECTION AND ATP TO CERTIF 453868 1 8 Y FOR FIVE MORE FLIGHTS. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMB 453868 1 9 ER END ITEMS AND NO VEHICLE RETEST IS REQUIRED. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE 453868 1 10 FOR THIS CONDITION IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 453871 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2: THERE ARE NUMEROUS AREAS OF CORROSION AND PAINT DEFECTS O 453871 1 2 N THE LH WING SPARE BEHIND RCC'S 8,9,10 AND 11. THE ACTIVE CORROSION WAS 453871 1 3 NUETRALIZED AND MR ACCEPTED. THE CORROSION LOCATIONS ALONG WITH THE PAI 453871 1 4 NT DEFECTS WERE REPAINTED. ITEM 3: THE WRONG RIVET WAS REMOVED AT CORROS 453871 1 5 ION LOCATION 28. THE MD121-0005-05 C'SNK RIVET WAS REINSTALLED. ITEM 4: 453871 1 6 THERE IS NO ACCESS TO REMOVE THE RIVET AT CORROSION LOCATION 28. PER MR 453871 1 7 THE CORROSION AT LOCATION 28 WAS BLENDED OUT USING ABRASIVE PAPER. ITEM 453871 1 8 5: THE HOLE DIMENSIONS RECORDED FOR THE INSIDE DIAMETER OF THE HOLE AT 453871 1 9 LOCATION 19 ARE IN ERROR AND CONSEQUENTLY THE ORIGINAL MR BUSHING 453871 1 10 FABRICATED IS INCORRECT. THE CORRECT MEASUREMENTS ARE RECORDED AND A NEW 453871 1 11 MR BUSHING WAS FABRICATED. ITEM 6: THE HOLE DIAMETER MEASUREMENTS 453871 1 12 RECORDED PER STPE 7-15-2 ARE SLIGHTLY LARGE. THE ORIGINAL MR 453871 1 13 INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE OD OF THE MR BUSHING AND ID OF THE HOLE IS 453871 1 14 MAINTAINED BETWEEN .0007" TO .0012". PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 453872 1 1 ITEMS 1 & 2: THERE ARE NUMEROUS AREAS OF CORROSION AND PAINT DEFECTS ON 453872 1 2 THE LH WING SPAR BEHIND RDD'S 6 & 7. THE ACTIVE CORROSION WAS NUETRALIZE 453872 1 3 D AND MR ACCEPTED. THE CORROSION LOCATIONS ALONG WITH THE PAINT DEFECTS 453872 1 4 WERE REPAINTED. ITEM 3: WHILE ATTEMPTING TO REMOVE THE UPPER NUTPLATE AT 453872 1 5 CORROSION LOCATION 7 THE RIVET SHANKS COULD NOT BE REMOVED. USING PROGR 453872 1 6 ESSIVELY LARGER DIAMETER DRILLS AND REAMERS THE SHANKS WERE REMOVED. ITE 453872 1 7 M 4: THE COINING SCREEN AROUND CORROSION LOCATION 7 RAISED. THE COINING 453872 1 8 SCREEN WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. ITEM 5: THE ORIGINAL RADIUS BLOCK REMOV 453872 1 9 ED AT CORROSION LOCATION 9 WAS TO PITTED TO BE REUSED. A NEW RADIUS 453872 1 10 BLOCK WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED. ITEM 6: A NEW BLEMISH WAS FOUND 453872 1 11 ADJACENT TO LOCATION 2. THE NEW BLEMISH APPEARS TO BE A TOOLING MARK 453872 1 12 WITH NO ACTIVE CORROSION. ITEM 7: THE MEASURED DIMENSIONS FOR THE 453872 1 13 BUSHING HOLE (CORROSION LOCATION 6/6A) ARE TOO LARGE. THE DIMENSIONS 453872 1 14 RECORDED WERE IN ERROR AND WERE REMEASURED. THE NEW DIMENSIONS ARE 453872 1 15 ACCEPTABLE AS IS. ITEM 8: THE 1ST MR BUSHING WAS FABRICATED TO THE WRONG 453872 1 16 DIMENSIONS. A NEW MR BUSHING WAS FABRICATED. ITEM 9: UNABLE TO OBTAIN 453872 1 17 LESS THAN 30 MILLIOHMS REQUIRED FOR THE COINING PROCESS. THE COINING WAS 453872 1 18 REMOVED AND REPLACED AND A RESISTANCE OF 28 MILLIOHMS WAS OBTAINED. 453872 1 19 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 453889 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT HYDRAULIC FLUID FOUND ON AND AROUND TH 453889 1 2 E NOSE LANDING GEAR STRUT FILL AND BLEED PORTS AS WELL AS AROUND THE GLA 453889 1 3 ND NUT DYNAMIC SEAL INTERFACE. A LEAK CHECK WAS PERFORMED PER V9028.003 453889 1 4 AND NO EVIDENCE OF LEAKAGE WAS DETECTED. THE LEAK CHECK WAS PERFORMED OV 453889 1 5 ER AN 81 HOUR PERIOD, AND TLTHOUGH NO LEAKAGE WAS DETECTED, OMRSD V51ACO 453889 1 6 .020 ALLOWS 1.0 DROP PER HOUR AT THE DYNAMIC SEAL INTERFACE. THE FLUID L 453889 1 7 EVEL WAS CHECKED DURING V1165.008 AND NO ADDITIONAL FLUID WAS NEEDED. TH 453889 1 8 ERE IS NO PR CONDITION AND THE MOST PROBABLE CASUE IS SLIGHT NOMINAL 453889 1 9 THROUGHT THE DYNAMIC SEAL DURING PAD/FLIGHT/LANDING EVENTS. NO RETEST 453889 1 10 REQUIRED. 453891 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTED A LINEAR INDICATION ON THE AFT 453891 1 2 FACE OF THE V070-352258-005 BEAM. THE MARK WAS REMOVED USING WIPES AND 453891 1 3 IPA. NO STRUCTURAL DEFECTS WERE NOTED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS DEB 453891 1 4 RIS/CONTAMINATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 454072 1 1 INTENT OF THIS PR WAS SATISFIED. BY TPS STR-3-18-598 ON 10/27/93 WHICH P 454072 1 2 ERFORMED EMU HELMET STOWAGE FIT CHECK. FITTING ARE BEING INSTALLED BY TP 454072 1 3 S STR-3-18-588 E.O.T.F. MOD. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN. 454073 1 1 THE INTENT OF THIS PR WAS SATISFIED BY TPS STR-3-18-598 ON 10/27/93 WHIC 454073 1 2 H PERFORMED EMU HELMET FIT CHECK. THE FITTING IS BEING INSTALLED PER STR 454073 1 3 -3-18-588. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN. 454296 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: MR REQUEST FOR RESTRICTED USE - THREE FLIGHTS ONLY. NO MR 454296 PMRB 2 ID REQUIRED. DURING DMHS POST FLIGHT INSPECTIONS PER JC V41-10016, THE L 454296 PMRB 3 EFT HAND SEGMENT OF ENGINE 2 DOME SUPPORT COVER RING (V070-852928) WAS F 454296 PMRB 4 OUND TO HAVE CORROSION. THE DOME HALF COVER RING IS MADE FROM .040" THIC 454296 PMRB 5 K 17-7PH CRES. CORROSION WAS REMOVED PER THIS PR USING SCOTCH BRITE PADS 454296 PMRB 6 AND INSPECTIONS OF THE CLEANED SURFACE SHOWED EVIDENCE OF MINOR RESIDUA 454296 PMRB 7 L PITTING. PITTING IS NO LARGER THAN .005" IN DEPTH AND BREATH, UNIFORMI 454296 PMRB 8 LY DISTRIBUTED OVER THE ENTIRE COVER RING. EVALUATION OF THESE PITS BY 454296 PMRB 9 ENGINEERING, USING 30X MAGNIFICATION, FOUND CORROSION INSIDE MOST PITS. 454296 PMRB 10 MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED TO ACCEPT THE MINOR PITTING AND CORROSION ON 454296 PMRB 11 THE E-2 L/H SUPPORT RING FOR RESTRICTED USE, THREE FLIGHTS (FLIGHT 21). 454296 PMRB 12 THIS PITTING/CORROSION IS MINOR IN NATURE AND ANY NEW GROWTH OVER THE 454296 PMRB 13 NEXT THREE FLIGHTS WILL NOT AFFECT THE RELIABILITY OF THE PART (AS 454296 PMRB 14 INDICATED FROM PREVIOUS HISTORY). THE THREE FLIGHT DEFERRAL WILL 454296 PMRB 15 CORRESPOND WITH WITH THE NEXT V30ED0.025 DOME HEAT SHIELD COVER RING 454296 PMRB 16 INSPECTION. THIS CONDITION WILL IN NO WAY ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FORM, 454296 PMRB 17 FIT, FUNCTION, OR SAFETY OF THE SUPPORT RING OR THE DMHS ASSEMBLY. THIS 454296 PMRB 18 MR WILL NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROL. THIS 454296 PMRB 19 MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION LIFE LIMIT. 454296 PMRB 20 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: DURING DMHS POST FLIGHT INSPECTIONS PER JC 454296 PMRB 21 V41-10016, THE LEFT HAND SEGMENT OF ENG 2 DOME SUPPORT COVER RING 454296 PMRB 22 (V070-852928) WAS FOUND TO HAVE CORROSION. THE DOME HALF COVER RING IS 454296 PMRB 23 MADE FROM .040" THICK 17-7PH CRES. CORROSION WAS REMOVED PER THIS PR 454296 PMRB 24 USING SCOTCH BRITE PADS AND INSPECTIONS OF THE CLEANED SURFACE SHOWED 454296 PMRB 25 EVIDENCE OF MINOR RESIDUAL PITTING. PITTING IS NO LARGER THAN .005" IN 454296 PMRB 26 DEPTH AND BREATH, UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED OVER THE ENTIRE COVER RING. 454296 PMRB 27 EVALUATION OF THESE PITS BY ENGINEERING, USING 30X MAGNIFICATION, FOUND 454296 PMRB 28 CORROSION INSIDE MOST PITS. PRIME BOARD APPROVAL IS REQUESTED TO ACCEPT 454296 PMRB 29 THE MINOR PITTING AND CORROSION ON THE E-2 L/H SUPPORT RING FOR 454296 PMRB 30 RESTRICTED USE, THREE FLIGHTS (FLIGHT 21). THIS PITTING/CORROSION IS 454296 PMRB 31 MINOR IN NATURE AND ANY NEW GROWTH OVER THE NEXT THREE FLIGHTS WILL NOT 454296 PMRB 32 AFFECT THE RELIABILITY OF THE PART (AS INDICATED FROM PREVIOUS HISTORY). 454296 PMRB 33 THE THREE FLIGHT DEFERRAL WILL CORRESPOND WITH THE NEXT SCHEDULE 454296 PMRB 34 V30ED0.025 DOME HEAT SHIELD COVER RING INSPECTION. ON 11/29/93 PMRB 454296 PMRB 35 APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLIGHT 21 OF OV-103. 454296 PMRB 36 MR RATIONALE: ITEM 7 PAGE 1A: SMALL DING IN THE RING SEGMENT L: 1.2418 454296 PMRB 37 W:.7633 D:.0294 WAS DETECTED IN THE COVER RING. MR ACTION IS REQUESTED 454296 PMRB 38 TO ACCEPT THE DENT FOR UNRESTRICTED USE, THE DENT DOES NOT REDUCE THE 454296 PMRB 39 STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY OR ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FORM, FIT, FUNCTION OR 454296 PMRB 40 SAFETY OF THE DOME RING COVER. MR ID IS REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION IS 454296 PMRB 41 UNRESTRICTED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 454296 PMRB 42 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST 454296 PMRB 43 (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. DEFERRAL RATIONALE: ITEM 454296 PMRB 44 2 (PG 1) AND ITEM 6 (PG 1A): THE MINOR PITTING OF THE V070-351928 RING 454296 PMRB 45 SEGMENT WAS DEFERRED FOR THREE FLIGHTS, (FLT 18 PR), THE PITTING HAS 454296 PMRB 46 NOT SIGNIFICANTLY GROWN OVER THE LAST THREE FLIGHTS, MINOR SURFACE 454296 PMRB 47 CORROSION WAS DETECTED DURING THE REINSPECTION OF THE DOME COVER RING, 454296 PMRB 48 THE CORROSION IS SUPERFICIAL AND DISTRIBUTED UNIFORMLY AROUND THE DOME. 454296 PMRB 49 TIME PERMITTING THE DOME COVER RINGS WILL BE REPLACED WITH INCONEL 718 454296 PMRB 50 RINGS ON FLIGHT 22 PROCESSING (OMDP). ITEM 5 (PG 1A): THE AREAS OF 454296 PMRB 51 SURFACE CORROSION ON THE V070-351957/9 FLEXSEAL RETAINERS IS MINOR 454296 PMRB 52 SURFACE CORROSION AND SUPERFICIAL AND DISTRIBUTED UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED 454296 PMRB 53 AROUND THE DOME. MR ACTION IS REQUESTED TO ACCEPT THE CORROSION AND 454296 PMRB 54 PITTING ON THE V070-351928 DOME COVER RING AND TO ACCEPT THE CORROSION 454296 PMRB 55 ON THE V070-351957/9 FLEXSEAL RETAINERS FOR TWO FLIGHTS. AT THIS STAGE 454296 PMRB 56 OF DEVELOPMENT THE CORROSION AND MINOR PITTING DOES NOT REDUCE THE 454296 PMRB 57 STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY OR ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FORM, FIT, FUNCTION OR 454296 PMRB 58 SAFETY OF THE DOME. THE CORROSION WILL BE INSPECTED AFTER FLIGHT 22 AND 454296 PMRB 59 REMEDIAL ACTION OR RE-DEFERRAL PERFORMED. MR ID IS NOT REQUIRED. THIS 454296 PMRB 60 MR ACTION IS RESTRICTED LIFE: TWO FLIGHTS ONLY. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 454296 PMRB 61 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT 454296 PMRB 62 THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 454296 PMRB 63 04/25/95 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 23 OF OV-103. 454296 PMRB 64 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: MRB APPROVAL IS REQUESTED TO ACCEPT THE DEFERRAL OF 454296 PMRB 65 THE MINOR CORROSION ON THE V070-351957/9 OUTER/INNER FLEXSEAL ATTACH 454296 PMRB 66 RINGS UNTIL POST FLIGHT 25 FOR RESTRICTED LIFE. THE FLEXSEAL ATTACH 454296 PMRB 67 RINGS ON THE LH DMHS OF ENGINE NUMBER 2, ITEM 5 WERE INSPECTED DURING 454296 PMRB 68 THE FLIGHT 22 PROCESSING. THE INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED PER J/C 454296 PMRB 69 V30-15381 AND SATISFIED THE V30ED0.025-C OMRSD REQUIREMENT. NO 454296 PMRB 70 DISCREPANCIES AGAINST THE FLEXSEAL RETAINERS WERE DOCUMENTED DURING THE 454296 PMRB 71 RECENT INSPECTION, HOWEVER, THE POSIBILITY OF SUPERFICIAL CORROSION ON 454296 PMRB 72 THE FLEXSEAL RETAINERS REMAINS. THEREFORE, THIS WAD WILL REMAIN OPEN 454296 PMRB 73 AND WILL BE DEFERRED UNTIL POST FLIGHT 25 OR WHEN THE V070-852626 454296 PMRB 74 BLANKET IS REMOVED, AT WHICH TIME THE V070-351957/9 FLEXSEAL ATTACH 454296 PMRB 75 RINGS WILL BE INSPECTED AGAIN PER J/C V30-15381 AND THIS DOCUMENT. ANY 454296 PMRB 76 CORROSION FOUND WILL BE ADDRESSED AT THAT TIME. ANY CORROSION THAT 454296 PMRB 77 EXISTS IS MINOR AND WILL NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE 454296 PMRB 78 DMHS INSTALLATION. THESE PARTS WILL CONTINUE TO FIT AND FUNCTION PER 454296 PMRB 79 DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. NEITHER THE SAFETY NOR 454296 PMRB 80 THE RELIABILITY OF THIS INSTALLATION HAS BEEN COMPROMISED. THIS MR IS 454296 PMRB 81 FOR RESTRICTED LIFE. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 454296 PMRB 82 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT 454296 PMRB 83 THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 454296 PMRB 84 08/05/97 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (BLANKET REMOVAL OR 454296 PMRB 85 FLT 26) OF OV-103. 454296 1 1 SEVERAL DISCREPANCIES WERE DOCUMENTED AGAINST THE DMHS OF ENGINE NUMBER 454296 1 2 2 (LH SIDE) DURING FLIGHT 18 AND FLIGHT 21. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE 454296 1 3 ADDRESSED AS FOLLOWS: FLIGHT 18 PROCESSING: ITEM 1, SURFACE CORROSION 454296 1 4 ON FASTENER HEADS, WAS ADDRESSED IN OPERATION 1 BY REMOVING THE 454296 1 5 CORROSION WITH A BEHR-TEX PAD. ITEM 2, SURFACE CORROSION ON RING 454296 1 6 SUPPORTING SEAL, THIS ACTUALLY THE V070-351928 ENGINE RING COVER, WAS 454296 1 7 DEFERRED UNTIL FLIGHT 21 PROCESSING. ITEM 3, RTV VOIDS AROUND SPRING 454296 1 8 CAN FITTINGS, WAS ADDRESSED PER OPERATION 1. ALL DEBONDED RTV WAS 454296 1 9 REMOVED FROM THE SPRING CAN BASE AND THE VOIDS WERE FILLED WITH RTV. 454296 1 10 ITEM 4, MISSING KOROPON ON RIVETS, WAS ADDESSED PER OPERATION 1. THE 454296 1 11 MISSING KOROPON WAS REAPPLIED PER MA0608-301. FLIGHT 21 PROCESSING. 454296 1 12 ITEMS 5,6 AND 7 WERE DOCUMENTED WHILE WORKING J/C V30-15381: ITEM 5, 454296 1 13 SURFACE CORROSION ON THE V070-351957/9 FLEXIBLE SEAL RETAINERS, WAS 454296 1 14 DEFERRED FOR (2) FLIGHTS. HOWEVER, DURING THE FLOW FOR FLIGHT 22 J/C 454296 1 15 V30-15381 WAS WORKED AGAIN WITHOUT ANY DOCUMENTED DISCREPANCIES. 454296 1 16 HOWEVER, THIS ITEM WAS DEFERRED UNTIL POST FLIGHT 23 AT WHICH TIME THE 454296 1 17 SURFACE CORROSION WAS REMOVED. ITEM 6 IS THE SAME DISCREPANCY AS ITEM 454296 1 18 2. THESE (2) DISCREPANCIES WERE ADDRESSED PER STR-3-22-697. 454296 1 19 STR-3-22-697 REPLACED THE CRES V070-351928 ENGINE RING COVER WITH AN 454296 1 20 INCONEL RING COVER PER DWG: V070-82700 EO C02 (LI) DOME ASSY AFT 454296 1 21 FUSELAGE. ITEM 7, DING IN RING COVER, WAS ADDRESSED PER OPERATION 3. 454296 1 22 THE DING WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. HOWEVER, THIS DING NO 454296 1 23 LONGER EXISTS SINCE THE RING COVER WAS REPLACED PER STR-3-22-697. 454296 1 24 FLIGHT 23 PROCESSING-DEFERRED ITEM 5 UNTIL POST FLIGHT 23. FLIGHT 24 454296 1 25 PROCESSING-CLEANED THE SURFACE CORROSION FROM THE V070-351957/9 454296 1 26 FLEXIBLE SEAL RETAINERS (ITEM 5). NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE 454296 1 27 CAUSE OF ITEM 1,2,5 AND 6: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 454296 1 28 3,4 AND 7: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 454321 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: THIS MR IS FOR RESTRICTED USE FOR 1 FLIGHT. SURFACE 454321 PMRB 2 IRREGULARITIES WERE FOUND ON THE FORWARD ATTACH FITTING ANGLE BRACKET AT 454321 PMRB 3 XO 387.9 YO -21.0. PHOTOS WERE TAKEN AND REVIEWED BY NASA, LOCKHEED, AND 454321 PMRB 4 ROCKWELL ENGINEERING. THE DISCREPANT AREAS DO NOT HAVE VISIBLE DEPTH OR 454321 PMRB 5 BUILDUP AS COMPARED TO ADJACENT SURFACES. THE DEFECTS ARE LIMITED TO 454321 PMRB 6 SMALL LOCALIZED AREAS AND THEY WILL BE MONITORED ON FUTURE INSPECTIONS. 454321 PMRB 7 A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY WILL BE MAINTAINED ON THIS SECONDARY 454321 PMRB 8 STRUCTURE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 454321 PMRB 9 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 454321 PMRB 10 RATIONALE OF HAZARD CONTROLS. NO MR ID REQUIRED DUE TO LACK OF ACCESS. 454321 PMRB 11 PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: 11/02/93, PMRB APPROVAL FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 19 OF O 454321 PMRB 12 V-103. 454321 1 1 TRACE CORROSION WAS FOUND ON FWD ET ATTACH FITTING ANGLE BRACKET. THE AR 454321 1 2 EA OF THE FWD ET ATTACH FITTING WAS INSPECTED PER V30-13416 DURING FLIGH 454321 1 3 T 18 PROCESSING AND PHOTOS WERE TAKEN OF A SUSPECT AREA. THE AREA WAS RE 454321 1 4 INSPECTED DURING FLIGHT 19 PROCESSING SHOWING NO DEGRADATION. SAMPLES WE 454321 1 5 RE TAKEN INDICATING NO SIGNIFICANT CORROSION. THE DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACC 454321 1 6 EPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBA 454321 1 7 BLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 454345 1 1 THE SCREW WAS REMOVED BY CUTTING THROUGH THE SCREW UNDER THE NUTPLATE. T 454345 1 2 HE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER SRP. NO FURTHER WORK 454345 1 3 TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 454346 1 1 THE DISCREPANT ANCHOR NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER SRP. NO FURTHER W 454346 1 2 ORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 454577 1 1 THE DAMAGE WERE MEASURED BY MOLD IMPRESSIONS. ENG EVALUATED THE DAMAGE. 454577 1 2 THE DAMAGE WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK 454577 1 3 TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 454578 1 1 THE DENTS WERE MEASURED BY MOLD IMPRESSIONS. ENGINEERING EVALUATED THE D 454578 1 2 AMAGE. THE DENTS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER 454578 1 3 WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - WORKMANSHIP. 454579 1 1 BLACK HIGH TEMP COATING WAS FOUND TO BE WORN OFF UPPER SURFACE OF RH FLI 454579 1 2 PPERS DOORS 10,11,12,13 AND 14. TOPS OF FLIPPER DOORS WERE WIPED CLEAN W 454579 1 3 ITH IPA AND INSPECTED. THE PURPOSE OF THE PAINT IS TO INCREASE THE EMISS 454579 1 4 IVITY OF THE FLIPPER DOORS TO AID IN HEAT DISSIPATION. PER INSPECTION IT 454579 1 5 WAS FOUND THAT ENOUGH OF THE PYRO MARK COATING IS REMAINING TO MAINTAIN 454579 1 6 HEAT DISSIPATION CAPABILITIES OF FLIPPER DOORS. FLIPPER DOORS WERE MR A 454579 1 7 CCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 454579 1 8 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 454580 1 1 ITEM 1: THE COVER WAS REMOVED AND THE DAMAGED SHIM AND SEAL WERE SCAPPED 454580 1 2 . A NEW SHIM AND NEW SEAL WERE PROCURED AND INSTALLED. THE SHIM WAS TRIM 454580 1 3 MED TO FIT PER MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2: THE DISCREPANT 454580 1 4 RIVET WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT, AND THE COVER WAS REINSTALLED 454580 1 5 FOR FLIGHT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPER 454580 1 6 ATIONAL DEGRADATION. 454581 1 1 BLACK HIGH TEMP COATING WAS FOUND TO BE WORN OFF UPPER SURFACE OF LH FLI 454581 1 2 PPER DOORS 9,10,11,12 AND 15. TOPS OF FLIPPER DOORS WERE WIPED CLEAN WIT 454581 1 3 H IPA AND INSPECTED. THE PURPOSE OF THE PAINT IS TO INCREASE THE EMISSIV 454581 1 4 ITY OF THE FLIPPER DOORS TO AID IN HEAT DISSIPATION. PER INSPECTION IT W 454581 1 5 AS FOUND THAT ENOUGH OF THE PYRO MARK COATING IS REMAINING TO MAINTAIN H 454581 1 6 EAT DISSIPATION CAPABILITIES OF FLIPPER DOORS. FLIPPER DOORS WERE MR ACC 454581 1 7 EPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OP 454581 1 8 ERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 454623 1 1 ITEM 1 OF THIS PR DESCRIBED A MICRO METEORITE STRIKE INTO FACESHEET OF R 454623 1 2 ADIATOR MEASURING .058"L X .058"W X .014"D. THE NOTED DISCREPANCY WAS A 454623 1 3 SMOOTH BOTTOM DING IN DOUBLER/REENFORCED AREA. ITEM 2 WAS A MONOR SCUFF 454623 1 4 IN THE TOP LAYER OF TAPE AND DID NOT BREAK THRU TO THE DAPTON LAYER. ITE 454623 1 5 M 3 WAS A MICRO METEORITE STRIKE THRU THE TOP LAYER OF TAPE NOT PENETRAT 454623 1 6 ING THE KAPTON LAYER. ALL DOSCREPANCIES DOCUMENTED ON THIS PR WERE MR AC 454623 1 7 CEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INFLIGH 454623 1 8 T DAMAGE. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE S/N'S. 454627 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2 OF THIS PR DOCUMENTED STAINS ON THE RADIATOR TAPE MEASURIN 454627 1 2 G APPROX 3.5L X 4.0W AND 0.1L X 0.1W. THE STAINED AREAS WERE CLEANED WIT 454627 1 3 H IPA AND STAINS WERE STILL VISIBLE. DUE TO THE SMALL AREA AFFECTED BY S 454627 1 4 TAINS MR APPROVAL WAS GRANTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF RADIATOR PANEL. NO 454627 1 5 RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: SUSPECT MANUFACTURING DEFECT. 454737 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT A DISCREPANCY ON THE R/H RADIATOR 2 PA 454737 1 2 NEL. ITEM 1 WAS AN ON-ORBIT DEBRIS IMPACT. THE RADIATOR TAPE WAS REMOVED 454737 1 3 AROUND THE INPACT AND THE FACESHEET INSPECTED. THE IMPACT WAS SMOOTH BO 454737 1 4 TTOMED AND NO CRACKING OR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE WAS DETECTED AND NEW TAPE WA 454737 1 5 S BONDED OVER THE INPACT. THIS REPAIR WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED U 454737 1 6 SE. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS AND THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEA 454737 1 7 R AND EXPOSURE TO ON-ORBIT DEBRIS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. THESE CONDITIONS 454737 1 8 DO NOT AFFECT OTHER S/N INSTALLATIONS OF LIKE END ITEMS. 454743 1 1 ITEM 1 DESCRIBED A PINHOLE STRIKE IN THE TOP LAYER OF RADIATOR TAPE. THE 454743 1 2 DISCREPANCY WAS IN THE TOP LAYER OF TAPE ONLY AND DID NOT DAMAGE THE FE 454743 1 3 CESHEET. ITEM 2 DOCUMENTED A SMALL TEAR (NICK) IN RADIATOR TAPE; APPROXI 454743 1 4 MATELY .010" DIA. OF TOP LAYER TAPE MISSING FROM END OF STRIP. THE DISCR 454743 1 5 EPANCY DID NOT AFFECT THE KAPTON LAYER OR FACESHEET. ITEM 3 DOCUMENTED A 454743 1 6 METEORITE STRIKE IN RADIATOR HINGE DOUBLER SURFACE MEASURING .062L" X . 454743 1 7 062W" X .007"D. THE NOTED DISCREPANCY WAS IN A REENFORCED AREA AND DID N 454743 1 8 OT AFFECT THE FACESHEET. ITEM 4 DOCUMENTED A MICROMETEORITE STRIKE THRU 454743 1 9 TO THE FACESHEET MEASURING .002" DEPTH. THE DISCREPANCY WAS A SMOOTH BOT 454743 1 10 OM DING APPROXIMATELY 2.5" FROM THE NEAREST FREON LINE. ITEM 5 DOCUMENTE 454743 1 11 A MICROMETERITE STRIKE THRU TO THE FACESHEET MEASURING .006"DEPTH. THE 454743 1 12 DISCREPANCY WAS A SMOOTH BOTTOM DING APPROXIMATELY 3.0" FROM THE NEAREST 454743 1 13 FREON LINE. ALL DISCREPANCY ITEMS ON THIS PR WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRES 454743 1 14 RICTED USE. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INFLIGHT DAMAGE. 454745 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT TWO DISCREPANCIES ON THE RH RADIATOR 3 454745 1 2 PANEL. ITEM 1 WAS AN ON-ORBIT DEBRIS IMPACT. THE RADIATOR TAPE WAS REMO 454745 1 3 VED AROUND THE IMPACT AND THE FACESHEET INSPECTED. THE IMPACT WAS SMOOTH 454745 1 4 BOTTOMED AND NO CRACKING OR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE WAS DETECTED AND NEW TAPE 454745 1 5 WAS BONDED OVER THE IMPACT. THIS REPAIR WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTE 454745 1 6 D USE. ITEM 2 WAS A SCUFF IN THE RADIATOR TAPE. THIS ITEM WAS INSPECTED 454745 1 7 AND MR ACCEPTED AS-IS FOR UNRESTRICTED US. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS AND TH 454745 1 8 E PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AND EXPOSURE TO ON-ORBIT DEBRIS 454745 1 9 . NO RETEST REQUIRED. THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT AFFECT OTHER SERIAL 454745 1 10 NUMBER INSTALLATIONS OF LIKE END ITEMS. 454752 1 1 ITEM 1 METEROR STRIKE. VISUAL INSPECTION AND DENTAL NOLD ANALYSIS SHOWED 454752 1 2 A SMOOTH BOTTOM DING IN FACE SHEET OF 0.027" DIAMETER X 0.0027" DEEP. F 454752 1 3 ACE SHEET WAS NOT CRACKED OR PENETRATED. DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR 454752 1 4 UNRESTRICTED USE. NO DEBRIS WAS FOUND AT STRIKE. ITEM 2, MINOR TAPE DIN 454752 1 5 G. MAXIMUM DEPTH 0.0082" AND WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 454752 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR BOTH ITEMS: IN FLIGHT DAMAGE. NO RETEST REQUIRED. AL 454752 1 7 L ITEMS HAVE BEEN ENTERED INTO RADIATOR DING MAP. LIKE S/N'S NOT AFFECTE 454752 1 8 D. 454753 1 1 THE NOTED DISCREPANCY WAS DETECTED DURING INSPECTION JOB CARD V37-10001. 454753 1 2 THE NOTED DISCREPANCY WAS EVALUATED BY ENGINEERING. THE CRUSHED BULB SE 454753 1 3 AL SPLICE WAS MASSAGED PER GOOD SHOP PRACTICE AND THE "MEMORY" OF THE SP 454753 1 4 RING CAUSED IT TO RETURN TO ITS ORIGINAL SHAPE ON ITS OWN. THE TAPE REPA 454753 1 5 IR IN THE AREA WAS STRAIGTENED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 454753 1 6 N. THE BULB SEALS ARE INSPECTED EVERY FLOW. ADDITIONAL DEGRADATION WOULD 454753 1 7 BE DETECTED DURING THE NEXT INSPECTION. THIS SAME CONDITON IS NOT SUSPE 454753 1 8 CTED TO AFFECT OTHER SERIAL NUMBERS OR END ITEMS. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 454773 1 1 ITEM 1 DESCRIBES A NICK IN THE RADIATOR TOP LAYER OF TAPE MEASURING .171 454773 1 2 L" X .076"W. THE NOTED DISCREPANCY DID NOT DAMAGE THE FACESHEET AND IS A 454773 1 3 PPROXIMATELY 2.5" FROM NEAREST FREON LINE AND DID NOT DAMAGE KAPTON TAPE 454773 1 4 LAYER. ITEM 3 DOCUMENTED A SCUFF IN THE TOP LAYER OF RADIATOR TAPE MEAS 454773 1 5 URING .263"L X .158"W. THE NEAREST FREON LINE IS APPROXIMATELY 2.5" AWAY 454773 1 6 AND THE FACESHEET WAS NOT DAMAGED. ITEM 4 DOCUMENTED A NICK IN THE RADI 454773 1 7 ATOR HINGE DOUBLE SURFACE MEASURING .071"L X .060"W AND 2.0" FROM NEARES 454773 1 8 T FREON LINE. DISCREPANCY DID NOT DAMAGE THE FACESHEET. ITEM 5 DOCUMENTE 454773 1 9 D A NICK IN THE TOP LAYER OF TAPE MEASURING .066"L X .053"W AND 3.0" 454773 1 10 FROM NEAREST FREON LINE. DISCREPANCY DID NOT DAMAGE THE FACESHEET. ALL 454773 1 11 OF THE LISTED DISCREPANCIES WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO 454773 1 12 RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INFLIGHT DAMAGE. 454774 1 1 THE NOTED DISCREPANCY WAS DETECTED DURING INSPECTION JOB CARD V37-10001. 454774 1 2 THE NOTED DISCREPANCY WAS EVALUATED BY ENGINEERING. THE CRUSHED BULB SE 454774 1 3 AL SPLICE WAS APPARENTLY MASSAGED PER GOOD SHOP PRACTICE OR THE "MEMORY" 454774 1 4 OF THE SPRING CAUSED IT TO RETURN TO ITS ORIGINAL SHAPE ON ITS OWN. THE 454774 1 5 TAPE REPAIR IN THE AREA WAS STRAIGHTENED. PROBABLE CASUE IS OPERATIONAL 454774 1 6 DEGRADATION. THE BULB SEALS ARE INSPECTED EVERY FLOW. ADDITIONAL DEGRAD 454774 1 7 ATION WOULD BE DETECTED DURING THE NEXT INSPECTION. THIS SAME CONDITION 454774 1 8 IS NOT SUSPECTED TO AFFECT OTHER S/N'S OR END ITEMS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 454817 1 1 DURING CE-3-18-146 IT DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR 40P15A BACKSHELL WAS BRO 454817 1 2 KEN. THE BROKEN BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND A SPLIT TYPE BACKSHELL P/N: ME 454817 1 3 127-0106-4110 WAS INSTALLED PER SRP V-EL-0001-E-0. THIS RETURNS CONNECTO 454817 1 4 R ASSEMBLY TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON-DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVER 454817 1 5 SELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE OR INTERCHANGEA 454817 1 6 BILITY. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE WHILE PROCESSING THE OR 454817 1 7 BITER. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 454914 1 1 ITEM 1: A BROKEN (FRAYED) 170D432774-13 ISOLATOR WASHER WAS FOUND ON THE 454914 1 2 LEFT HAND, LOWER, RUDDER SPEED BRAKE, THERMAL SEAL. THE 170D442630-11 B 454914 1 3 OLT WAS LOOSENED AND THE LOOSE FIBERS WERE TRIMMED OFF. THE BOLT WAS TIG 454914 1 4 HTENED AND MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 455016 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A SUSPECT CRACK ON THE V070-351422-003 BEAM. THE DISCR 455016 1 2 EPANCY IS ACTUALLY PREVIOUSLY REWORKED TOOLING MARK REWORKED PER VENDOR 455016 1 3 MR. THE MR NUMBER WAS APPLIED TO THE BEAM IN THE VICINITY OF THE REWORK. 455016 1 4 NO NEW DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 455304 1 1 THE I/B PUSH ROD FOR LH FLIPPER DOOR 1 WAS BENT WHILE RAISING LH I/B ELE 455304 1 2 VON DURING HYDRAULIC OPERATIONS. THE PUSH ROD WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED W 455304 1 3 ITH A PUSH ROD OBTAINED FROM OV-104 PER SHIT K-4296. THE NEW ROD WAS TEM 455304 1 4 PORARILY INSTALLED. THE FLIPPER DOOR WAS RIGGED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MLO30 455304 1 5 8-0093. THEN THE ROD WAS PERMANENTLY INSTALLED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DO 455304 1 6 NE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 455321 1 1 DURING INS-3-18-181 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE TAG RING ON CONNECTOR 82V 455321 1 2 77W9P80 BACKSHELL WAS LOOSE. CONNECTOR 82P80 BACKSHELL WAS OPENED AND BA 455321 1 3 CKSHELL/CONNECTOR INSPECTED. NO DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND AND THE BACKSHE 455321 1 4 LL WAS CLOSED. THIS RETURNS CONNECTOR ASSEMBLY TO DRAWING SPECIFICATIONS 455321 1 5 . PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 455422 1 1 ITEM 1: PANEL V070-339653-001 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A CRACK NEAR THE MIDDLE 455422 1 2 OF THE MOUNTING HOLE. IT WAS REPAIRED PER SRP-V-0015-A. ITEM 2: A NUTPLA 455422 1 3 TE WAS MOVED TO AVOID INTERFERENCE PER OPERATION 12 OF A0244 WHICH RESUL 455422 1 4 TED IN A MISMATCH WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE SCREW HOLE OF THIS PANEL. A 455422 1 5 FLANGE WAS RELOCATED TO MATCH THE NEW ORIENTATION. THE ALTERATION WAS M 455422 1 6 R ACCEPTED AND MR ID'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: INTERFERENCE. ITEM 3: MBO120-079 455422 1 7 , TYPE II ADHESIVE WAS USED INSTEAD OF TYPE I ADHESIVE. THE USE OF THE T 455422 1 8 YPE II ADHESIVE FOR THE STANDARD REPAIR WAS MR ACCEPTED. 455527 1 1 WHILE PERFORMING V1086.001 THE BACKSHELL OF 50P807 WAS FOUND TO BE LOOSE 455527 1 2 . THE NOTED CONN. WAS DEMATED AND THE CONN. BACKSHELL WAS OPENED IN ORDE 455527 1 3 R TO INSPECT FOR ANY ANOMALIES. INSPECTION OF THE CONN. AND BACKSHELL RE 455527 1 4 VEALED TO ANOMALIES. THE BACKSHELL WAS CLOSED AND CONN. 50P807 WAS REMAT 455527 1 5 ED. RETEST OF 50P807 WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQU 455527 1 6 IRED ON THIS PR. 455571 1 1 THE CARRIER PANEL WAS DAMAGED WHEN A FASTENER FOR THE ADJACENT CARRIER P 455571 1 2 ANEL HAD TO BE SAWED IN HALF TO BE REMOVED. THE DAMAGE WAS SMOOTHED OUT 455571 1 3 AND CORROSION PROTECTED WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTH 455571 1 4 ER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. THE "U" SHAPED GROOVE GOES THROUGH THE TH 455571 1 5 ICKNESS AT THE EDGE AND TAPERS TO THE SURFACE (0 INCHES DEEP) WITHIN (1) 455571 1 6 ONE INCH. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 455572 1 1 THE DISCREPANT ANCHOR NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER SRP. NO FURTHER W 455572 1 2 ORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 455645 1 1 ITEM 1 OF THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING V5148.001, "B" TO "C" HATCH CONVE 455645 1 2 RSION WHEN THREE OF EIGHT HATCH TO COLLAR GAP MEASUREMENTS, ALL ON THE H 455645 1 3 INGELINE, WERE NOT WITHIN SPECIFICATION. COLLAR GAPS AT THE 7, 8 AND 1 P 455645 1 4 OSITIONS (REFERENCE FIGURE 1-2) WERE 0.101", 0.099" AND 0.102" RESPECTIV 455645 1 5 ELY, S/B 0.095" MAXIMUM. ITEM 2 WAS INITIATED DURING OMI V1047, HATCH SE 455645 1 6 AL LEAK CHECK, WHEN A 3 PSIG/MIN LEAK RATE WAS OBTAINED (1 PSIG/MIN MAXI 455645 1 7 MUM ALLOWABLE). ALL SIX LATCH PEDESTALS WERE RE-RIGGED TO BRING HATCH TO 455645 1 8 COLLAR GAPS WITHIN SPEC. THE SMALLER COLLAR GAPS OBTAINED PROVIDED 455645 1 9 BETTER SEAL COMPRESSION WHICH RESULTED IN AN ACCEPTABLE LEAK RATE OF 0.3 455645 1 10 PSIG/MIN. DISCREPANT CONDITIONS NO LONGER EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: TUNNEL 455645 1 11 ADAPTER COLLAR WALL THICKNESS IS APPROXIMATELY 0.020" THINNER ALONG 455645 1 12 HINGELINE AREA THAN THE REST OF THE COLLAR. RETEST SATISFACTORILY 455645 1 13 COMPLETED PER OMI V1058.005. LIKE S/N'S NOT AFFECTED. 455765 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: PMRB CONCURRENCE IS REQUESTED TO MR ACCEPT "AS IS" 455765 PMRB 2 DISCREPANT AREAS ON CARBON BRAKE COMPONENTS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. DAMAGE 455765 PMRB 3 ITEMS 1 THRU 5, ON TABLE 1-1, HAVE RECORDED WIDTH DIMENSIONS THAT EXCEED 455765 PMRB 4 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AS SPECIFIED BY MLO308-0029, EO F07. THIS SPEC 455765 PMRB 5 STATES THAT MAXIMUM WIDTH DIMENSIONS SHALL NOT EXCEED 0.060". SAID SPEC 455765 PMRB 6 ALSO STATES THAT "ACCEPTANCE OF DAMAGE EXCEEDING THE ABOVE CRITERIA 455765 PMRB 7 SHOULD BE TREATED THROUGH STANDARD ENGINEERING DISPOSITION PRACTICES. IN 455765 PMRB 8 SOME CASES IT MAY BE ALLOWABLE TO PERMIT EXCEEDANCE OF THESE CRITERIA, 455765 PMRB 9 BUT EACH CASE MUST BE TREATED ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS TO ASSURE PARTS 455765 PMRB 10 FUNCTIONAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED". ABOVE NOTED DISCREPANCIES WERE 455765 PMRB 11 INSPECTED BY VENDOR TRAINED LSOC/MEQ ENGINEER, NASA/MEQ AND RI/LSS MEQ 455765 PMRB 12 ENGINEERS. ALL AGREED THAT DISCREPANCIES TO CARBON COMPONENTS WERE 455765 PMRB 13 SUPERFICIAL CHIPS (SCALLOP SHAPED) THAT WOULD NOT BECOME STRESS RISERS. 455765 PMRB 14 ADDITIONALLY, NOTED CHIPS WERE NOT ON WEAR SURFACES OF CARBON DISKS. 455765 PMRB 15 UNRESTRICTED MR ACCEPTANCE IS ALSO REQUESTED FOR NOTED DAMAGED AREA ON 455765 PMRB 16 THE 378-35 HEAT SHIELD (TABLE 1-2). NOTED HEAT SHIELD IS A NON-MOVING 455765 PMRB 17 PART WITH A BROKEN SPOT WELD ON IT'S OUTER DIAMETER. ABOVE NOTED 455765 PMRB 18 DISCREPANCIES WILL NOT AFFECT THE SAFETY, FORM, FIT OR FUNCTION OF THE 455765 PMRB 19 MC621-0075-0001 CARBON BRAKE ASSY. NO MR-ID REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION 455765 PMRB 20 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 455765 PMRB 21 IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARDS 455765 PMRB 22 CONTROL. PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED "USE AS 455765 PMRB 23 IS". ON 11/09/93 PMRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED "USE AS IS". 455765 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED (PAGE 1) AS A SUSPECT PR WHEN IT WAS NOTED THAT TH 455765 1 2 E BRAKE ASSY WAS RECEIVED FROM LOGISTICS WITHOUT A SERVICEABLE PARTS TAG 455765 1 3 . ADDITIONALLY, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE CARBON BRAKE SHIPPING CONTAINER, A 455765 1 4 S RECEIVED FROM LOGISTICS, HAD THE BRAKE PACKAGED IN AN INCORRECT ORIENT 455765 1 5 ATION (WITH BRAKE DISCS VERTICAL). LOGISTICS, RI CVAS, RI DATAPACKS, AND 455765 1 6 QDC WERE CONTACTED REGARDING THE MISSING SERVICEABLE PARTS TAG. NONE CO 455765 1 7 ULD BE FOUND. THIS BRAKE ASSY, S/N -0033, WAS RECEIVED NEW FROM THE VEND 455765 1 8 OR ON 27 NOV 1990. IT WAS SUBSEQEUNTLY INSTALLED AND FLOWN ON OV-104 FOR 455765 1 9 TWO FLIGHTS. IT WAS THEN REMOVED AND RETURNED TO STOCK WHEN OV-104 WAS 455765 1 10 SENT TO PALMDALE FOR OMDP. NO OPEN PR'S EXISTED FOR THIS BRAKE ASSEMBLY 455765 1 11 PRIOR TO THIS PR. THIS BRAKE ASSY IS IN A FLIGHT READY CONDITION AND THE 455765 1 12 SERVICEABLE PARTS TAG WAS MERELY MISPLACED. REGARDING PACKAGING AND 455765 1 13 HANDLING, MLO308-0029, EO F05, HAS NUMEROUS CAUTIONS AND WARNINGS 455765 1 14 STATING THAT "... BRAKES SHOULD BE PLACED... (WITH) DISCS AND ROTORS 455765 1 15 PARALLEL TO THE GROUND. BRAKES SHOULD NOT BE RESTED ON THE ROTORS, 455765 1 16 STATORS, OR HEAT SHIELDS AT ANY TIME DURING HANDLING EXCEPT WHEN 455765 1 17 SUSPENDED IN LIFTING SLING." UPON INSTALLATION ON THE MLG AXLE, THE 455765 1 18 BRAKE ASSY WAS INSPECTED AND CHIPS TO THE CARBON COMPONENTS AND A 455765 1 19 DAMAGED HEAT SHIELD WERE NOTED (PAGE 1A). DISCREPANCIES WERE INSPECTED, 455765 1 20 MEASURED, AND RECORDED. UNRESTRICTED MR CONCURRENCE WAS GRANTED TO ALLOW 455765 1 21 USE OF NOTED DISCREPNACIES ON THE BRAKE ASSEMBLY FOR THE REMAINDER OF 455765 1 22 ITS LIMITED LIFE CYCLE, AT WHICH TIME IT WILL BE REFURBISHED AT THE NSLD 455765 1 23 AND/OR VENDOR. BRAKE ASSEMBLIES ARE REFURBISHED AFTER FIVE FLIGHTS. THIS 455765 1 24 BRAKE ASSY, S/N -0033, CURRENTLY HAS TWO FLIGHTS LOGGED AND THUS WILL BE 455765 1 25 REPAIRED AFTER THREE MORE FLIGHTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: IMPROPER PACKAGING 455765 1 26 AND STORAGE OF BRAKE ASSEMBLY BY KSC LOGISTICS. SERVICEABLE PARTS TAG 455765 1 27 MISPLACED AND LOST. CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQUESTED TO INSURE THAT 455765 1 28 IMPROPER PACKAGING OF CARBON BRAKE ASSEMBLIES DOES NOT RECUR. NOTE: MCR 455765 1 29 17412 IS IN WORK TO PROVIDE NEW BRAKE ASSY HANDLING/SHIPPING CONTAINER 455765 1 30 "CLAMSHELLS" TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THIS PROBLEM. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 455810 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN THE FORCE TO UNLOCK THE ACTUATOR LOCK LEVER W 455810 1 2 AS 6 LBS, SHOULD BE 7-18 LBS PER OMRS (ITEM 1). A FIT CHECK WAS PERFORME 455810 1 3 D TO SEE IF THE REMOVABLE HANDLE FROM "A" HATCH COULD BE USED IN PLACE O 455810 1 4 F THE HANDLE FROM THE DISCREPANT ACTUATOR (ON "D" HATCH). HOWEVER THE LO 455810 1 5 CK LEVER ON THE REPLACEMENT HANDLE DID NOT FULLY ACTUATE THE LEVER ON TH 455810 1 6 E FIXED SIDE OF THE ACTUATOR, WHICH IS THE SIDE THAT ACTUATES THE LOCKIN 455810 1 7 G PIN (REF ITEM 2 PG 1A). THE ACTUATOR (S/N 0024) WAS THEN REMOVED AND R 455810 1 8 OUTED TO THE NSLD FOR REPAIR. A REPLACEMENT ACTUATOR (S/N 0025) WAS ORDE 455810 1 9 RED AND INSTALLED. DURING ENGINEERING INSPECTION, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE 455810 1 10 LOCK LEVER ON THE REMOVABLE HANDLE SIDE OF THE ACTUATOR DID NOT ALWAYS 455810 1 11 GO PAST ITS DETENT TO THE FULL LOCKED POSITION WHEN ACTUATED FROM THE 455810 1 12 FIXED HANDLE SIDE (REF ITEM 3 PAGE 1B). THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED 455810 1 13 AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 1 IS OPERATIONAL 455810 1 14 DEGRADATION, OF ITEM 2 IS PARTS WERE NOT RIGGED TO EACH OTHER, AND OF 455810 1 15 ITEM 3 IS A RESULT OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ATP AND OMRSD LOCKING TAB 455810 1 16 REQUIREMENTS. RETEST WAS VERIFIED PER STEP 3-17. ALL THREE DISCREPANCIES 455810 1 17 DO NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 456067 1 1 AT THE LH FWD SIDEWALL OF THE CREW MODULE MID-DECK, THE V070-338931-002 456067 1 2 PANEL INTERFERED WITH THE INSTALLATION OF THE V070-337431-004 PANEL BECA 456067 1 3 USE A V070-337431-004 PANEL HAD NEVER BEEN INSTALLED BEFORE. THESE FIBER 456067 1 4 GLASS CLOSEOUT PANELS ARE PROVIDED WITH EXTRA MATERIAL ALONG THE EDGES T 456067 1 5 O PERMIT TRIMMING UPON INSTALLATION. ONCE THE PER PRINT TRIMMING WAS ACC 456067 1 6 OMPLISHED THE PANELS COULD BE INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NEW INSTALLAT 456067 1 7 ION BEING ACCOMPLISHED. 456094 1 1 THE DENTS WERE MEASURED BY MOLD IMPRESSIONS. ENGINEERING EVALUATED THE D 456094 1 2 AMAGE. THE DENTS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER 456094 1 3 WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT MALFUN 456094 1 4 CTION. 456095 1 1 THE DAMAGE TO THE PARTS IN ITEMS 1 THROUGH 4 PROBABLY OCCURRED AS A RESU 456095 1 2 LT OF TEH ELEVON BEING RAISED WITH A FLIPPER RESTING ON IT. ITEM 1 - THE 456095 1 3 V070-198211-004 BLANDE SEAL WAS REMVOED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. ITEMS 2 456095 1 4 THROUGH 4 - THE SHARP EDGES AND RAISED METAL WERE REMOVED BY LIGHT SAND 456095 1 5 ING WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE O 456095 1 6 N THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 456096 1 1 THE HI-LOK WAS LOOSE BECAUSE THE THREADS IN THE COLLAR HAD STRIPPED OUT. 456096 1 2 THIS PROBABLY OCCURRED WHEN THE ELEVON WAS RAISED WITH THE FLIPPER DOOR 456096 1 3 RESTING ON IT AND THE PUSH ROD BECAME JAMMED (REF PR STR-3-18-4724). THE 456096 1 4 FLIPPER DOOR WAS REMOVED AND THE FITTING WAS REMOVED AND INSPECTED. THE 456096 1 5 FITTING WAS NOT DAMAGED. ONE HOLE IN THE STRUCTURE WAS ELONGATED. THIS 456096 1 6 HOLE WAS DRILLED UP IN THE FITTING AND IN THE STRUCTURE TO ACCEPT AN 456096 1 7 OVERSIZE HI-LOK. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 456096 1 8 THE FITTING WAS REINSTALLED WITH OVERSIZED HI-LOK AND LIQUID SHIM PER 456096 1 9 MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE FLIPPER DOOR WAS REINSTALLED. NO 456096 1 10 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE OF THIS PR. 456097 1 1 A .125" DIA MISDRILLED PILOT HOLE WAS FOUND ON CARRIER PANEL V070-393515 456097 1 2 -003. MR ACCEPTANCE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE WAS GIVEN TO INSTALL A MD121-00 456097 1 3 01-04XX RIVET DOUBLE PLUG FLUSH. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 456114 1 1 DURING POST-FLIGHT ELEVON COVE INSPECTION, 5 NICKS FOUND IN THE V070-198 456114 1 2 071 CURTAIN SEALS. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE REPAIRED PER MR DISPOSITION 456114 1 3 USING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO 456114 1 4 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE TO THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE PR IS OPERAT 456114 1 5 IONAL DEGRADATION. 456115 1 1 THE CHIPS IN THE HIGH TEMP COATING WERE REPAIRED PER SRP-V-ST-0024. NO F 456115 1 2 URTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATI 456115 1 3 ON. 456202 1 1 PR VOIDED. DUPLICATE OF STR-3-A0217. PAGE 1D. 456487 1 1 THE V070-351992-005 ET DOOR ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL LOCATED AT THE RH AFT/OTB 456487 1 2 D CORNER OF THE LO2 CAVITY WAS FOUND TO HAVE A TEAR APPROX 1/2" LONG. TH 456487 1 3 E SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER LRU OMI V5K25.004, AND THE DISCREPAN 456487 1 4 T SEAL ROUTED TO HDA PER AN LRU PR. RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER STEP 2-3, A 456487 1 5 ND PER V1097. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THIS PR DOES NO 456487 1 6 T AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 456509 1 1 PAGE 1 (ITEMS 1A-1G) OF THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT (3EA) NICKS, ( 456509 1 2 3EA) SCRATCHES AND KOROPON PAINT TO THE AIRLOCK SEALING SURFACE. THE NOT 456509 1 3 ED SCRATCHES AND NICKS WERE MR SANDED WITH 600 GRIT SANDPAPER. PAGE 1A ( 456509 1 4 ITEMS 2A-2E) WAS INITIATED TO SANDPAPER. PAGE 1A (ITEMS 2A-2E) WAS INITI 456509 1 5 ATED TO DOCUMENT 5 OF 6 SANDED AREAS NOT BLENDED WITH SURROUNDING SURFAC 456509 1 6 E. PAGE 1B AND C (ITEMS 3H-3O) DOCUMENTED EIGHT DISCREPANCIES (SCRATCHES 456509 1 7 AND NICKS) NOT PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED. DISCREPANCY ITEMS 1A-1E, 1G, 2A-2 456509 1 8 E AND 3H-3O WERE MR SANDED AND BLENDED WITH 400 GRIT SANDPAPER, SURFACES 456509 1 9 BURNISHED WITH 600 GRIT SANDPAPER AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER 456509 1 10 MA0608-301 CODE 00-CF-20-XX. DISCREPANCY ITEM 1E DOCUMENTED KOROPON 456509 1 11 PAINT ON THE SEALING SURFACE. THE PAINT WAS REMOVED WITH A NONMETALLIC 456509 1 12 TOOL AND IPA. THE SEALING SURFACE WAS SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED PER 456509 1 13 V5147.001. ALL DISCREPANCY ITEMS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 456509 1 14 HARDWARE AND/OR TOOLS CONTACTING SEALING SURFACE. 456674 1 1 THE ELONGATED HOLE WAS DRILLED UP AND A LARGER RIVET WAS INSTALLED WITH 456674 1 2 MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR 456674 1 3 . PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 456942 1 1 THE DISCREPANT ANCHOR NUT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER SRP. NO FURTHER W 456942 1 2 ORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 456943 1 1 THE DAMAGE TO FCP 1 BLANKET HAS BEEN REPAIRED USING RTV. THE REPAIR HAS 456943 1 2 BEEN APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE, REMOVAL/ I 456943 1 3 NSTALLATION OF PROTECTIVE COVER. 457037 1 1 THE RIVET HOLES WERE LEFT WHEN THE SUPPORTING STRUCTURE FOR VENT DOORS 4 457037 1 2 AND 7 WERE REMOVED (REF TPS STR-3-18-589). THE HOLES COULD NOT BE PLUGG 457037 1 3 ED WITH RIVETS DUE TO A LACK OF ACCESS. THESE HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH HI 457037 1 4 -LOKS INSTEAD. NO FURTHER WORK IS TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 457037 1 5 ACCESS. 457038 1 1 THE HOLES WERE LEFT FROM WHERE THE SUPPORTING STRUCTURE FOR VENT DOORS 4 457038 1 2 & 7 WERE REMOVED (REFERENCE STR-3-18-589). THEY WERE PLUGGED USING HI-L 457038 1 3 OKS AND JO-BOLTS INSTEAD OF RIVETS BECAUSE ACCESS DID NOT PERMIT RIVET I 457038 1 4 NSTALLATION. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FU 457038 1 5 RTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - ACCESS. 457040 1 1 THE HI-LOKS ARE LEFT FROM WHERE THE SUPPORTING STRUCTURE FOR VENT DOORS 457040 1 2 4 AND 7 WAS REMOVED (REFERENCE TPS STR-3-18-589). THEY COULD NOT BE REMO 457040 1 3 VED BECAUSE A BRACKET IS INSTALLED OVER THEIR HEADS. WASHERS WERE INSTAL 457040 1 4 LED WITH NEW COLLARS. THE HI-LOKS WILL PLUG THE HOLES AND HELP TO TRANSF 457040 1 5 ER THE LOAD PAST THE HOLES. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRI 457040 1 6 CTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCESS. 457071 1 1 PROBLEM ITEM 1: 29 OF 32 BOLTS THAT ATTACH BODY FLAP TO AFT FUSELAGE WER 457071 1 2 E NOT AT CORRECT TORQUE. ALL 32 BOLTS HAD NEW NUTS INSTALLED AND TORQUED 457071 1 3 TO 500 +/- 40 IN LBS PER EO-TO-FOLLOW DISPOSITION. THE CAUSE OF THE ORI 457071 1 4 GINAL TORQUE DEVIATIONS HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. PROBLEM 2: 16 VENDOR MR 457071 1 5 ACO958-000M SPACERS HAD SQUARE, SHARP EDGES. ALL THE VENDOR SPACERS HAD 457071 1 6 THEIR AFT EDGES CHAMFERED TO RELIEVE POTENTIAL STRESS RISERS. THIS PROBL 457071 1 7 EM WAS DUE TO VENDOR. PROBLEM ITEMS 3, 5, 6 AND 7: 5 BOLT HOLES ARE TOO 457071 1 8 CLOSE TO STRUCTURE FILLET RADIUS AT LH, OUTBOARD FITTING. THIS CAUSES 457071 1 9 WASHERTO RIDE UP ON RADIUS. 5 MR RADIUS BLOCKS WERE FABRICATED AND 457071 1 10 INSTALLED UNDER NUTS TO RELIEVE INTERFERENCE. THIS PROBLEM WAS DUE TO 457071 1 11 VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. PROBLEM ITEMS 4 AND 10: 2 BOLT HOLES WERE MEASURED 457071 1 12 AND FOUND TO BE OVERSIZE. ONE WAS .0007" OVERSIZE AND THE OTHER .0063" 457071 1 13 OVERSIZE. THE HOLES WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THIS PROBLEM WAS DUE TO 457071 1 14 VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. PROBLEMS ITEMS 8 AND 9: 2 VENDOR MRACO958-000M PLUGS 457071 1 15 WERE PROTRUDING FROM STRUCTURE. BOTH PLUGS WERE RESEATED FLUSH WITH 457071 1 16 STRUCTURE. CAUSE OF PLUG SHIFT HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. 457073 1 1 TH HOLES WERE FILLED WITH RIVETS WITH PROTRUDING HEADS AND OR FAILS AND 457073 1 2 HI-LOKS. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHE 457073 1 3 R WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCESS LIMITATIONS. 457481 1 1 THE NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED TO ALLOW THE STRUCTURE TO BE MATCH DRILLED. T 457481 1 2 HEY WERE THEN REINSTALLED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS 457481 1 3 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURE. 457581 1 1 THE HOLES WERE LEFT FROM WHERE THE SUPPORTING STRUCTURE FOR VENT DOORS 4 457581 1 2 AND 7 WAS REMOVED (REFERENCE STR-3-18-590). THEY WERE PLUGGED WITH A HI 457581 1 3 -LOK AND A JO-BOLT INSTEAD OF RIVETS BECAUSE ACCESS DID NOT PERMIT RIVET 457581 1 4 INSTALLATION. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO 457581 1 5 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 457703 1 1 THE NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED TO ALLOW THE STRUCTURE TO BE MATCH DRILLED. T 457703 1 2 HEY WERE THEN REINSTALLED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS 457703 1 3 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURE/ACCESS. 457727 1 1 PANELS V070-339683-001 AND -002 HAVE BEEN REIDENTIFIED WITH CORRECT DASH 457727 1 2 NUMBER MARKINGS. FOR THEIR RECORDS, ROCKWELL CVAS HAS BEEN ADVISED OF TH 457727 1 3 E CORRECTIONS. OCN NUMBERS ARE UNCHANTGED. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQ 457727 1 4 UIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: PANELS MISIDENTIFIED DURING MANUFACTURE. 457728 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: THE BODY FLAP ATTACH FITTINGS MOUNT TO THE BASE HEAT SHIEL 457728 PMRB 2 D BULKHEAD AT YO+/-90. THE V070-352213 AND -352214 FITTINGS ARE TITANIUM 457728 PMRB 3 . THE V070-352258 BULKHEAD IS ALUMINUM. THESE DISSIMILAR METALS CAUSE GA 457728 PMRB 4 LVANIC CORROSION. THE ALUMINUM BULKHEAD HAS ACTIVE CORROSION AT THE FITT 457728 PMRB 5 INGS FAYING SURFACE AT YO-90,-30 AND +30. THE CORROSION CURRENTLY IS MIN 457728 PMRB 6 OR IN NATURE. IT IS PRESENT ON A SMALL PORTION OF THE FAYING SURFACE, CO 457728 PMRB 7 NCENTRATED AT THE LOWER, MIDDLE AREA OF THE FITTINGS FAYING SURFACE. THE 457728 PMRB 8 CORROSION CAN NOT BE REMOVED WITHOUT REMOVING THE FITTINGS. THE V070-35 457728 PMRB 9 2258 BASE HEAT SHIELD BULKHEAD WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTE 457728 PMRB 10 NT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. SAFETY, 457728 PMRB 11 FIT OR FUNCTION HAVE NOT BEEN COMPROMISED. THIS MR ACTION IS NO IMPACT O 457728 PMRB 12 N CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS 457728 PMRB 13 MR ACTION IS NO IMPACT ON CERTIFICATION AND ASSOCIATED RATIONALE. MR AC 457728 PMRB 14 TION IS RESTRICTED TO OMDP. BULKHEAD PREVIOUSLY MR ID'D. 457728 PMRB 15 12-07-93, PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT 457728 PMRB 16 (OMDP) OF OV-103. 457728 1 1 DURING FLIGHT 18 PROCESSING, ALL RIVETS SECURING THE BODY FLAP FITTINGS 457728 1 2 TO THE BASE HEAT SHIELD WERE FOUND CORRODED (ITEM 1). ACTIVE CORROSION 457728 1 3 WAS FOUND ON THE OUTBOARD SIDE OF THE V070-352296-001 FITTING AT YO 457728 1 4 -35.050 (ITEM 3). ALL RIVETS SECURING THE FITTINGS TO THE BASE HEAT 457728 1 5 SHIELD (ITEM 1) AND ACTIVE CORROSION AREA (ITEM 3) WERE CLEANED AND MR 457728 1 6 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. SUSPECT CORROSION WAS FOUND AT THE 457728 1 7 FITTINGS AND BASE HEAT SHIELD INTERFACES (ITEM 2). DUE TO LIMITED 457728 1 8 ACCESS, THESE AREAS WERE DEFERRED UNTIL OMDP FOR FURTHER INSPECTION AND 457728 1 9 REPAIR. DURING OMDP/FLIGHT 22 PROCESSING, NUMEROUS CORROSION AREAS WERE 457728 1 10 FOUND INSIDE THE BODY FLAP COVE AREA. THE CORROSION AREAS WERE REPAIRED 457728 1 11 PER SRP IN PR STR-3-22-5815. AREAS AT THE FITTINGS AND BASE HEAT SHIELD 457728 1 12 INTERFACES (ITEM 2) WERE INSPECTED AND FOUND NO SIGNS OF ACTIVE 457728 1 13 CORROSION. THE SUSPECT CORROSION WAS MOST LIKELY SURFACE CONTAMINATION. 457728 1 14 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. THE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS ENVIRONMENTAL 457728 1 15 DAMAGE. 457755 1 1 VOID THIS PR, IT IS A DUPLICATE OF STR-3-18-4744, (PV-6-255698). 457915 1 1 DURING CE-3-18-0283, WIRE 2ZK296A24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. SRP 457915 1 2 -V-EL-0007 METHOD B WAS USED TO TAPE THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503. 457915 1 3 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND T 457915 1 4 EAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 458084 1 1 ITEM 1: THE LOWER OUTBD ANCHOR NUT (F12056-10-4) AT L/H 16 SPAR FITTING 458084 1 2 HAS NO RUNNING TORQUE AND THERE IS NO ACCESS TO SQUEEZE THE PER RIVETS. 458084 1 3 THE DISCREPANT ANCHOR NUT WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ANCHOR NUT WAS INSTALLED 458084 1 4 . SUBSTITUTING BLIND RIVETS USING SRP-V-ST-0025. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL 458084 1 5 OPERATIONAL WEAR. 458126 1 1 THE HI-LOKS ARE LEFT FROM WHERE THE SUPPORTING STRUCTURE FOR VENT DOORS 458126 1 2 4 AND 7 WAS REMOVED (REFERENCE STR-3-18-590). THEY COULD NOT BE REMOVED 458126 1 3 BECAUSE A BRACKET IS INSTALLED OVER THEIR HEADS. WASHERS WERE INSTALLED 458126 1 4 WITH NEW COLLARS. THE HI-LOKS WILL PLUG THE HOLES AND HELP TO TRANSFER T 458126 1 5 HE LOAD PAST THE HOLES. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED 458126 1 6 USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCESS. 458135 1 1 ITEM 1: THE 4TH BOLT ALONG THE AFT ROW OF FASTENERS FROM THE RH OUTBD SI 458135 1 2 DE CONTACTS THE PIANO HINGE AND CAUSES IT TO POP ON MOVEMENT. ONE NAS158 458135 1 3 7-3 WASHER WAS REMOVED UNDER THE BOLT HEAD, ELIMINATING THE INTERFERENCE 458135 1 4 WITH THE PIANO HINGE. STEP 2-1 DOCUMENTS NORMAL OPERATIONAL NOISE WHICH 458135 1 5 IS CAUSED FROM THE BODYFLAP RUB SURFACES IN CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER. PR 458135 1 6 OBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 458235 1 1 DAMAGE TO CLOSEOUT PANEL V070-339529-005 HAS BEEN REPAIRED IN ACCORDANCE 458235 1 2 WITH STANDARD REPAIR OF FIBERGLASS CLOSEOUT PANELS SRP-V-ST-0015-A AND 458235 1 3 RETURNED TO SERVICE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 458359 1 1 STR/ENGR'S HAS EVALUATED THE ANOMALIES REPORTED BY THIS PR. AT THE NOTED 458359 1 2 LOCATION, THE BULB SEAL HAS MINOR NICKS IN THE SURFACE LAYER THAT DOES 458359 1 3 NOT COMPROMISE THE INTEGRITY OR FUNCTION OF THE BULB SEAL. IN ACCORDANCE 458359 1 4 WITH SECTION 10 OF MF0004-092, FAIR WEAR AND TEAR CRITERIA FOR PARTS AN 458359 1 5 D EQUIPMENT OF THE SHUTTLE ORBITER PROGRAM, THIS DISCREPANCY IS A MINOR 458359 1 6 IMPERFECTION RESULTING FROM NORMAL SERVICE WEAR WHICH DOES NOT AFFECT ST 458359 1 7 RUCTURAL INTEGRITY, PERFORMANCE OR FUNCTION. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED 458359 1 8 AND THE BULB SEAL IS SATISFACTORY AS IS. THE BULB SEAL IS SECONDARY STR 458359 1 9 UCTURE. THE CAUSE WAS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 458541 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1 (BENT BOLT) WAS REWORKED BY INSTALLING A NEW LWR RH 3/8" T-0 458541 1 2 BOLT. ITEMS 2 AND 3 PAGE 1A (UPPER AND LOWER BUSHINGS HAVE METAL PROTRU 458541 1 3 SION ON INNER DIAMETERS) WERE REWORKED BY POLISHING OUT THE BURRS WITH E 458541 1 4 MORY CLOTH. ITEM 4 PG 1B (ALL 4 NAS1006 SUSCEPTABLE TO BENDING) WAS REWO 458541 1 5 RKED BY INSTALLING NEW DESIGN BOLTS IN ALL FOUR LOCATIONS PER EO TO FOLL 458541 1 6 OW V070-854330 C06, WHICH SUBSTITUTED V070-857533-001/002 BOLTS FOR NAS1 458541 1 7 006-36A/40A RESPECTIVELY. THE -001 BOLTS WERE INSTALLED. THE -002 BOLTS 458541 1 8 WERE REPLACED BY MR APPROVED NAS1006-42A BOLTS TO COMPENSATE FOR THE ADD 458541 1 9 ITIONAL THICKNESS RESULTING FROM THE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED MR BUSHINGS. 458541 1 10 THESE NEW DESIGN BOLTS HAVE A .067" HOLE DRILLED THROUGH THE CENTER TO 458541 1 11 ALLOW FOR A "GO, NO GO" PIN TO BE INSERTED THROUGHT THE BOLTS AFTER BOLT 458541 1 12 INSTALLATION TO VERIFY THEIR EXISTING CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEMS 458541 1 13 1,2,3 AND 4 IS OPERATIONAL WEAR FROM T-0 MATING AND/OR DEMATING. 458553 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED USE FOR ONE 458553 PMRB 2 FLIGHT OF THE DELAMINATED 70C6636-1 WIRE SUPPORT BRACKETS. THE BRACKETS 458553 PMRB 3 ARE CONSTRUCTED OF 10 LAYERS OF PHENOLIC FIBERS WITH RESIN IN BETWEEN. 458553 PMRB 4 THE RESIN HAS FAILED ALONG THE BEND OF BRACKETS 1,4,6,7,8 AND 10. THE 458553 PMRB 5 FIBERS HOWEVER, REMAIN INTACT. THE FIBERS PROVIDE THE STRENGTH OF THE 458553 PMRB 6 MATERIAL WHEREAS THE RESIN PROVIDES THE STIFFNESS. THE DELAMINATION OF 458553 PMRB 7 THE LAYERS HAS CAUSED A LOSS OF RIGIDITY ALONG THE BEND RADIUS. THE 458553 PMRB 8 WIRES WHICH ARE TO BE INSTALLED IN THIS LOCATION WILL USE BRACKETS SHOWN 458553 PMRB 9 IN FIGURE 1-1. THE DISCREPANT BRACKETS WHICH WILL BE USED ARE NUMBERS 7 458553 PMRB 10 AND 10. BRACKETS NUMBERS 7 AND 10 HAVE CRACKS IN THE LOWER RADIUS 458553 PMRB 11 EXTENDING THROUGH SOME BUT NOT ALL OF THE PHENOLIC LAYERS. IF BOTH 458553 PMRB 12 BRACKETS BREAK IN TWO, THE REMAINING TWO BRACKETS (5 AND 9) HAVE 458553 PMRB 13 SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO RESTRAIN THE WIRE BUNDLES. THE SEPARATED PIECES 458553 PMRB 14 ARE CONNECTED TO THE WIRE BUNDLE ON THE FLOOR OF BAY 12. THERMAL 458553 PMRB 15 PROTECTION BLANKETS WOULD CONTAIN ANY SPLINTERS, IF BRACKETS WERE TO 458553 PMRB 16 BREAK. THEREBY PREVENTING CONTAMINATION OF THE PAYLOAD. FROM NUMBER 7 458553 PMRB 17 THE WIRES ARE ATTACHED TO THE WING CARRY THROUGH BOX. FROM NUMBER 10 THE 458553 PMRB 18 WIRES ARE ATTACHED TO NUMBER 5 WHICH REMAINS RIGID AND STRONG. THE 458553 PMRB 19 LONGEST SPAN BETWEEN ATTACH POINTS IS LESS THAN 8 INCHES. THE WIRE 458553 PMRB 20 SUPPORT BRACKETS WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 458553 PMRB 21 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE BRACKETS ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURE. NO MR 458553 PMRB 22 ID IS NECESSARY DUE TO THIS BEING A RESTRICTED MR. POST FLIGHT DISPO 458553 PMRB 23 WILL REPLACE THE DISCREPANT BRACKETS. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE 458553 PMRB 24 THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL 458553 PMRB 25 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 11-23-93, PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: 458553 PMRB 26 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 19 OF OV-103. 458553 1 1 THE DISCREPANT BRACKETS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER 458553 1 2 WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 458684 1 1 ITEM 1: THE LOWER ANCHOR NUT (F12056-10-4) AT L/H 12 SPAR FITTING HAS NO 458684 1 2 RUNNING TORQUE AND THERE IS NO ACCESS TO SQUEEZE THE PER PRINT RIVETS. 458684 1 3 THE DISCREPANT ANCHOR NUT WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ANCHOR NUT WAS INSTALLED 458684 1 4 SUBSTITUTING BLIND RIVETS USING SRP-V-ST-0025. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL O 458684 1 5 PERATIONAL WEAR. 458685 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER S 458685 1 2 RP-V-ST-0025. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPE 458685 1 3 RATIONAL DEGRADATION. 458739 1 1 THIS DISCREPANCY WAS RESOLVED ON PR TRP03-19-1833 WHICH CLOSED ON 12/2/9 458739 1 2 3. THE PANELS WERE ACTUALLY NOT TOO WIDE ACCORDING TO THE PRINT BUT WERE 458739 1 3 TOO WIDE TO ALLOW THE PROPER FILLERBARD OVERLAP. THIS SMALLER FILLERBAR 458739 1 4 OVERLAP WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE ON THE REFERENCED PR. NO WORK 458739 1 5 TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DUPLICATE PR. 458911 1 1 PROBABLE CAUSE: INABILITY TO INSPECT OMS POD THRUSTER ATTACH FITTINGS UN 458911 1 2 DER BOLTS MD111-4001-0304. WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE BOLTS WERE NOT T 458911 1 3 O BE REMOVED PER WAIVER WK02931R1. 459407 1 1 ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 (3 WASHERS INADVETANTLY DISCARDED) WS REWORKED WITH MRB 459407 1 2 APPROVAL TO FABRICATE AND INSTALL REPLACEMENT WASHERS FOR CARRIER PANEL 459407 1 3 V070-395972-006, FIND NUMBERS 16A, 16F, AND 16G. PER THIS PR, WASHERS W 459407 1 4 ERE IDENTIFIED WITH "MR" TO FACILITATE TRACKING DURING FUTURE PROCESSING 459407 1 5 . MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS A PROCEDURAL ERROR; NO PART 459407 1 6 MARKING DURING ORIGINAL MR WASHER FABRICATION PER MR STR-3-10-3156. 459670 1 1 DURING V76-10001, THE GROUND WIRES ON 50P516 AND 50P503 HAD GROUND LUGS 459670 1 2 BROKEN OFF. NEW GROUND LUGS WERE INSTALLED AND SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY CHE 459670 1 3 CKS WERE PERFORMED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUS 459670 1 4 E: WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 459792 1 1 ITEMS 1: THE LOWER ANCHOR NUT (F12056-10-4) AT L/H 4 SPAR FITTING HAS NO 459792 1 2 RUNNING TORQUE AND THERE IS NO ACCESS TO SQUEEZE THE PER PRINT RIVETS. 459792 1 3 THE DISCREPANT ANCHOR NUT WAS REMOVED AN A NEW ANCHOR NUT WAS INSTALLED 459792 1 4 SUBSTITUTING BLIND RIVETS USING SRP-V-ST-0025. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OP 459792 1 5 ERATIONAL WEAR. 459946 1 1 DURING V76-10001 A SMALL TEAR WAS DETECTED ON THE LO2 INNER MONOBALL SEA 459946 1 2 L. THE TEAR EXTENDED THROUGH SEAL AND WAS APPROX 1/16 OF AN INCH IN SIZE 459946 1 3 . THE NOTED TEAR WAS REPAIRED USING MBO130-119 RTV PER SRP-V-EL-0027-0-O 459946 1 4 . NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIB 459946 1 5 UTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 460149 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN BOTH THE LATCHING AND UNLATCHING TORQUES EXCE 460149 1 2 EDED THE MAX ALLOWABLE PER OMRS DURING THE FUNCTIONAL TEST PER V1058.003 460149 1 3 . ALL OTHER CHECKS DURING THE FUNCTIONAL WERE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED. A 460149 1 4 TPS PR PERFORMED A MASSAGE OF THE NEW THERMAL BARRIER WHICH HAD JUST PRE 460149 1 5 VIOUSLY BEEN INSTALLED AT THE HATCH. THE LATCHING AND UNLATCHING TORQUES 460149 1 6 WERE THEN REMEASURED AND FOUND TO BE WITHIN OMRS ALLOWABLES. PROBABLE C 460149 1 7 AUSE OF ITEMS 1 AND 2 IS THE NEW THERMAL BARRIER WAS INITIALLY STIFF AND 460149 1 8 CAUSED RESISTANCE TO CLOSURE. RETEST PERFORMED PER STEPS 1-1 AND 1-2. T 460149 1 9 HIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE S/N'S. 460221 1 1 VOID THIS PR, DUPLICATE OF STR-3-08-2813, DAMAGE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRIC 460221 1 2 TED USE. 460228 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DEMT FOUND ON THE 70B2000-79 STRUT. THE STRUT WAS RE 460228 1 2 MOVED AND ROUTED TO THE VENDOR FOR FLIGHT CERTIFICATION (S-RAY EXAMINATI 460228 1 3 ON AND PROOF LOAD TESTING). UPON RETURN FROM THE VENDOR, THE STRUT WAS I 460228 1 4 NSTALLED PER DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CASUE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMAN 460228 1 5 SHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 460305 1 1 THE BRACKET WAS FOUND BROKEN AND REMOVED. A NEW BRACKET WAS OBTAINED AND 460305 1 2 INSTALLED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CA 460305 1 3 USE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 460594 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V41-10004 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR 50P4 460594 1 2 30 WAS DEMATED WITHOUT SCAN AUTHORIZATION AND EXCESSIVE MOVEMENT WAS NOT 460594 1 3 ICED AT THE BACKSHELL/CONVOLUTED TUBING INTERFACE. THE NOTED CONNECTOR W 460594 1 4 AS INSPECTED INCLUDING THE AREA OF EXCESSIVE MOVEMENT BY DISASSEMBLING T 460594 1 5 HE 90 DEGREE BACKSHELL ADAPTER TO INSPECT THE ASSOCIATED WIRING AND BY A 460594 1 6 LSO INSPECTING THE CONNECTOR AND MATING RECEPTACLE FOR BENT PINS. NO ANO 460594 1 7 MALIES WERE FOUND IN EITHER AREA. THE CONNECTOR WAS RE-ASSEMBLED AND MAT 460594 1 8 ED. THIS RETURNS THE CONNECTOR TO PRINT CONFIGURATION AND SCAN WAS 460594 1 9 NOTIFIED OF THE UNAUTHORIZED DEMATE. RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRACKED. NO 460594 1 10 FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. RC 460594 1 11 ACTION IS BEING PERFORMED BY CAE. 460603 1 1 THIS PR WAS DETECTED DURING V1165.007, MLG STRUT SERVICING. THE RIGHT ML 460603 1 2 G STRUT FILLER VALVE LEAKED GREATER THAN 10 CC DURING THE 30 MINUTE VOLU 460603 1 3 METRIC LEAK CHECK (SHOULD BE 0 CC). THE VALVE SHOULD SEAT AT 50 IN LBS B 460603 1 4 UT WAS LEAKING AFTER HAVING BEEN TORQUED TO 60 IN LBS. THE VALVE WAS REM 460603 1 5 OVED AND REPLACED. THE NEW VALVE WAS SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED BY PASSING TH 460603 1 6 E VOLUMETRIC LEAK CHECK. THE RMG STRUT ALSO PASSED THE STRUT GN2 DECAY C 460603 1 7 HECK (REFERENCE OMRS V51AC0.012-C). NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXISTS. PRO 460603 1 8 BABLE CASUE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. RC ACTION: NO CHANGE REQUIRED TO 460603 1 9 PROCEDURE OR REQUIREMENTS. ANY VALVE LEAKAGE WILL BE DETECTED DURING 460603 1 10 V1165.007. WORN/DISCREPANT VALVES WILL BE REPLACED AS REQUIRED. 460625 1 1 FIVE OF THE SIX ATTACHING FASTENERS FOR THE V070-395217-005 CARRIER PANE 460625 1 2 L HAVE IMPROPER THREAD PROTRUSION THRU THEIR NUTPLATES. THE MD112-1002-0 460625 1 3 302 SCREWS WERE REMOVED AND MD112-1002-0303 SCREWS WERE INSTALLED. A DEV 460625 1 4 IATION WAS WRITTEN TO JOB CARD V80-05800 AND V80-95800 REFLECTING THAT O 460625 1 5 V-103 NEEDS MD112-1002-0303 SCREWS. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 460626 1 1 5 OF THE 6 ATTACHING FASTENERS FOR THE V070-395217-006 CARRIER PANEL HAV 460626 1 2 E IMPROPER THREAD PROTRUSION THRU THEIR NUTPLATES. THE MD112-1002-0302 S 460626 1 3 CREWS WERE REMOVED AND MD112-1002-0303 SCREWS WERE INSTALLED. A DEVIATIO 460626 1 4 N WAS WRITTEN TO JOBCARD V80-05860 AND V80-95860 REFLECTING THAT OV-103 460626 1 5 NEEDS MD112-1002-0303 SCREWS. PROBABLE CAUSE: LIMITED ACCESS. 460781 1 1 FIBERGLASS PANEL V070-337433-006 HAS BEEN REPAIRED AND RETURNED TO UNRES 460781 1 2 TRICTED SERVICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH MR APPROVED PROCEDURE. NO FURTHER ENG 460781 1 3 INEERING IS REQUIRED. 461052 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR 50V77W67P430 WAS DE 461052 1 2 MATED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION. ENGINEERING DETERMINED THAT DUE TO THE LOCA 461052 1 3 TION OF 50P430, IT COULD BE INADVERTENTLY DEMATE WHILE PROCESSING THE OR 461052 1 4 BITER IN THE OPF. IT WAS ALSO DETERMINED THAT CONNECTORS 50P410 AND 50P4 461052 1 5 50 WERE SUSCEPTIBLE TO BECOMING INADVERTENTLY DEMATED (REFERENCE ITEM 2) 461052 1 6 . TO PREVENT ANY FUTURE UNAUTHORIZED DEMATE OF CONNECTOR 50P430, 50P410 461052 1 7 AND 50P450 EPOXY WAS APPLIED BETWEEN THE CONNECTOR COUPLING RING AND THE 461052 1 8 RIGHT ANGLE ADAPTER WITH EOTF APPROVAL. AN EO WAS RELEASED TO DRAWING 461052 1 9 V070-795571 TO SHOW THIS CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE 461052 1 10 WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST OF 461052 1 11 DEMATED CONNECTORS WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. 461170 1 1 DAMAGE TO CLOSEOUT PANEL V075-333118-003 HAS BEEN REPAIRED IN ACCORDANCE 461170 1 2 WITH STANDARD REPAIR OF FIBERGLASS CLOSEOUT PANELS SRP-V-ST-0015-A AND 461170 1 3 RETURNED TO SERVICE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 461228 1 1 THE DAMAGE TO THE V070-198201-001 RAMP AND THE V070-198219-001 TIP WAS C 461228 1 2 AUSED BY CONTACT WITH THE BLADE SEAL. THE ROUGH AREAS WERE BLENDED OUT A 461228 1 3 ND CORROSION PROTECTED WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHE 461228 1 4 R WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 461383 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 3: THE DELAMINATION WAS REPAIRED BY INJECTING ADHESIVE BETWE 461383 1 2 EN THE LAYERS. THE CHIPS WERE REPAIRED BY FILLING THE VOIDS WITH ADHESIV 461383 1 3 E. THIS WAS DONE BY MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2: THE TWO S 461383 1 4 USPECT CRACKS WERE DETERMINED TO BE ONLY COSMETIC IMPERFECTIONS DUE TO A 461383 1 5 PREVIOUS FOLD IN THE GRAPHITE FABRIC OR A SHIFTED FIBER. THIS WAS LIGHT 461383 1 6 LY SANDED AS A COSMETIC REPAIR. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. P 461383 1 7 ROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 1 AND 3: WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 2: NO DISCREPANCY. 461432 1 1 DURING V63-50023 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CONNECTOR 45P689 HAD A BROKEN BACK 461432 1 2 SHELL TANG. THE DISCREPANT BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW 461432 1 3 SPLIT BACKSHELL PER SRP V-EL-0001-E-0. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR 461432 1 4 THIS PR. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS WORKMANSHIP. 461434 1 1 THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER SRP. NO FURTHER WOR 461434 1 2 K TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 461460 1 1 APU 2 LINE THERMOSTAT, 50V46S24A, FUNCTIONAL CHECK HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY 461460 1 2 COMPLETED (AFTER OEL REPAIR OF VEHICLE WIRES 2U33C26-1 AND -2). NO FURT 461460 1 3 HER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. NO RC ACTION IS REQUESTED. P/C OPERATIO 461460 1 4 NAL DEGRAD. 461561 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 (BRACKET CRACKED THROUGH), WAS REWORKED BY REMOVING THE B 461561 1 2 RACKET AND INSTALLING A NEW ONE. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE W 461561 1 3 AS OPERATIONAL WEAR FROM NORMAL OPF PROCESSING IN A LIMITED ACCESS AREA. 461614 1 1 DURING V1032, CONNECTOR 50P642 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL. SRP V- 461614 1 2 EL-0001-E-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO FURTHER 461614 1 3 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBI 461614 1 4 TER DURING PROCESSING. 461670 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 (LIP OF BRACKET BROKEN OFF) WAS REWORKED BY REMOVING THE 461670 1 2 BRACKET AND INSTALLING A NEW BRACKET. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A (NUTPLATES ON WRON 461670 1 3 G SIDE OF BRACKET), WAS REWORKED PER MRB CONCURRENCE TO REMOVE THE NUTPL 461670 1 4 ATES AND INSTALLING THEM ON THE OTHER (DESIGN CONFIGURATION) SIDE OF THE 461670 1 5 BRACKET. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 1 WAS OPERATIONAL WEAR FROM NORMAL 461670 1 6 OPF PROCESSING IN A LIMITED ACCESS AREA. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 2 461670 1 7 WAS VENDOR FABRICATION ERROR. 461714 1 1 DURING V1240 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CONNECTOR 50P716 HAD A BROKEN BACKSHEL 461714 1 2 L STRAIN RELIEF. THE DISCREPANT BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH 461714 1 3 A NEW SPLIT BACKSHELL PER SRP V-EL-0001-E-0. RETEST OF CONNECTOR 50P716 461714 1 4 IS NOT REQUIRED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS WORKMANSHIP. 461715 1 1 DURING AN V1240, THE GROUND LUG TO 50P703 WAS FOUND BROKEN. A NEW LUG WA 461715 1 2 S INSTALLED AND A CONTINUITY CHECK ON NEW LUG TO GROUND WAS PERFORMED SU 461715 1 3 CCESSFULLY. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMA 461715 1 4 L WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 461716 1 1 DURING V1240 THE BACKSHELL ON CONNECTOR 50P710 WAS FOUND LOOSE. THE BACK 461716 1 2 SHELL WAS OPENED AND INSPECTION AND TORQUED TO THE CORRECT VALUE. NO FUR 461716 1 3 THER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 461746 1 1 DURING PRE-ROLLOUT MIDBODY INSPECTIONS PER V00-10072, FOUR SPLICES ON TH 461746 1 2 E AFT PLBD BULDHEAD WERE FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT. ITEMS 1 AND 2, AND ITEM 461746 1 3 3 FOR LH WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 3 FOR RH SID 461746 1 4 E (THE VERTICAL SPLICE NEAR THE R-T-L SWITCH MODULE) WAS FOUND DEBONDED. 461746 1 5 THE ENTIRE DISCREPANT SEAL ASSY (TUBE AND MESH SPRING) WAS REMOVED AND 461746 1 6 SCRAPPED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW ASSY (OLD SPRING WAS NOT RE-USABLE). RE 461746 1 7 TEST WAS SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED PER V5018. AND V9023.001 WHILE IN THE OP 461746 1 8 F. PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. CONDITION DOES AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMB 461746 1 9 ERS, HOWEVER THIS IS A KNOWN "WEAR AND TEAR" ITEM SO NO SUSPECT PR'S ARE 461746 1 10 REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 461749 1 1 CONDUCTOR WAS EXPOSED AT 83SP178 AND 835SP179. THE SPLICES WERE REPLACED 461749 1 2 . COM RETEST WAS NOT PERFORMED BECAUSE PINS G AND G OF CONNECTOR 83P137 461749 1 3 ARE THE POWER AND RETURN FOR THE GPS SYSTEM, WHICH IS NOT INSTALLED. WIR 461749 1 4 E 3R533B26 HAD ITS INSULATION MASHED. THE MASHED AREA WAS REMOVED AND A 461749 1 5 SPLICE IDENTIFIED AS KSC-0641 WAS INSTALLED. RETEST WAS PERFORMED BY V10 461749 1 6 45, V2, DEV 05/01T WHICH IS ATTACHED. (FRCS MAN S ISO VALVE) AND NO FURT 461749 1 7 HER WORK WILL BE REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TE 461749 1 8 AR. 461750 1 1 DURING V12401 THE GROUND LUG ON VENDOR LEAD 50HR16-2 AT 50E214 WAS FOUND 461750 1 2 BROKEN. A NEW LUG WAS INSTALLED ON 50HR16-2 VENDOR WIRE. AN E-BOND CHEC 461750 1 3 K WAS PERFORMED FROM THE TOP LUG TO STRUCTURAL GROUND TO VERIFY ALL LUGS 461750 1 4 ON 50E214 ARE PROPERLY GROUNDED. FUNCTIONAL RETEST OF BODY FLAP A SCD L 461750 1 5 N, HTR 1, REF: DES 50V58HR16 WAS COMPLETE WITH SATISFACTORY RESULTS. NO 461750 1 6 FURTHER ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: IS OPERATIONAL DEGR 461750 1 7 ADATION. 461803 1 1 REF PD 1 "DENT" IN RADIATOR PANEL LH 2 HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ON TWO PREVIOUS 461803 1 2 OCCASION VIA MRB PRS. NO ACTION WAS REQUIRED OTHER THAN TO TAKE STEPS T 461803 1 3 O ENSURE THAT THIS DENT IS NOT WRITTEN UP IN THE PRACA SYSTEM AGAIN. REF 461803 1 4 PD 2 CONTAMINATION IS COMPRISED OF ITEMS/MATERIALS THAT WERE SUBSEQUENT 461803 1 5 LY REMOVED/CLEANED DURING PERFORMANCE OF OMI V1176.002-PAYLOAD BAY CLEAN 461803 1 6 ING. THIS PR MAY BE CLOSED. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 1-N 461803 1 7 OT PROPERLY LOGGED IN DING MAP. ITEM 2-INSPECTION PERFORMED BEFORE RADIA 461803 1 8 TOR CLEANING. 461880 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE LH MLG DOOR ENVIRONMENTAL SEALS DE 461880 1 2 BONDING AT MITERED EDGES OF THE INBOARD AFT AND OUTBOARD FORWARD CORNERS 461880 1 3 . SEAL CORNERS WERE REBONDED USING RTV AND THEN TRIMMED TO ENSURE CONTIN 461880 1 4 UITY ACROSS SEAL. REPAIR WAS INSPECTED BY LSOC, NASA AND RI ENGINEERING 461880 1 5 AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT RETEST WAS NOT REQUIRED (REFERENCE OMRS V51GE 461880 1 6 N.010 REMARK C). DISCREPANCY DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBAB 461880 1 7 LE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 461881 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE RH MLG DOOR ENVIRONMENTAL SEALS DE 461881 1 2 BONDING AT MITERED EDGES OF THE INBOARD FORWARD, INBOARD AFT AND OUTBOAR 461881 1 3 D FORWARD CORNERS. SEAL CORNERS WERE REBONDED USING RTV AND THEN TRIMMED 461881 1 4 TO ENSURE CONTINUITY ACROSS SEAL. REPAIR WAS INSPECTED BY LSOC, NASA AN 461881 1 5 D RI ENGINEERING AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT RETEST WAS NOT REQUIRED (REF 461881 1 6 ERENCE OMRS V51GEN.010 REMARK C). DISCREPANCY DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIA 461881 1 7 L NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 461920 1 1 ALL 9 ITEMS ON LH 4 RADIATOR NOTED ON PAGE 1 WERE DETECTED DURING ROLLOU 461920 1 2 T INSPECTIONS PER V00-10072 PRIOR TO FINAL PLB DOOR CLOSURE. ALL HAVE BE 461920 1 3 EN MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE SINCE THEY ARE MINOR IMPRESSIO 461920 1 4 NS IN THE TAPE ONLY (MAXIMUM DEPTH 0.0025"). NO RETEST REQUIRED. CONDITI 461920 1 5 ON DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: HANDLING DAMAGE. 462206 1 1 A LOOSE SCREW WAS FOUND ON A BRACKET NEAR THE HYDRAULIC LINES UNDER FLIP 462206 1 2 PER DOOR 12 R/H SIDE. THE SCREW WAS TORQUED TO 20-30 IN-LBS. PROBABLE CA 462206 1 3 USE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED. 462367 1 1 THE NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED USING BLIND RIVETS PER MRB APPROVA 462367 1 2 L FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE CARRIER PANEL WAS THEN REINSTALLED ON THIS P 462367 1 3 R. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DE 462367 1 4 GRADATION. 462636 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: PIN 36 OF CONNECTOR 82P65 (PORT PLBD OPEN 1 IND) AND 462636 PMRB 2 PIN 105 OF CONNECTOR 82P61 (STBD PLBD OPEN 2 IND) WERE DEMATED AT MDM P 462636 PMRB 3 F2. THE REQUIRED SCAN RETEST FOR THE PINS WAS NOT PERFORMED IN OPF PRIOR 462636 PMRB 4 TO THE PLBD SYSTEM BEING CONFIGURED FOR OPF ROLLOUT. THE RETEST REQUIRE 462636 PMRB 5 S BOTH L/H AND R/H PLBD'S TO BE OPENED TO 175 DEGREES, WHICH CANNOT BE P 462636 PMRB 6 ERFORMED AT THE PAD. EXCEPTION EK02971 WAS PROCESSED AND APPROVED FOR ON 462636 PMRB 7 E FLIGHT TO ACCEPT THE NOTED CONDITION. THE PINS IN QUESTION SUPPLY OPEN 462636 PMRB 8 PLBD LIMIT SWITCH INDICATIONS TO MDM PF2. THESE PINS ARE 1 OF 2 INDICAT 462636 PMRB 9 TIONS FOR EACH PLBD WHICH ARE THE 175 DEGREE FULL OPEN INDICATIONS. THE 462636 PMRB 10 INDICATIONS DO INHIBIT MOTOR OPERATION, HOWEVER, THESE PINS ARE NOT IN 462636 PMRB 11 THE FEEDBACK CIRCUIT TO THE MCA AND MOTOR OPERATION WOULD NOT BE 462636 PMRB 12 AFFECTED BY LOSS OF CONTINUITY AT THESE PINS. IN THE EVENT OF AN IN 462636 PMRB 13 FLIGHT FAILURE THERE WILL BE NO IMPACT TO THE PLBD OPERATION; HOWEVER, 462636 PMRB 14 THE CREW WILL LOSE VISIBILITY TO THE INDICATION(S) ON THE SM OPS202 462636 PMRB 15 DISPLAY. THIS DISCREPANCY DOES NOT AFFECT THE FIT, FORM, FUNCTION OR 462636 PMRB 16 SAFETY LEVEL OF THE PLBD OPERATION. THIS MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 462636 PMRB 17 BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST 462636 PMRB 18 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD LEVEL. REQUEST PMRB APPROVAL TO DEFER THIS 462636 PMRB 19 PR FOR ONE FLIGHT. RETEST OF PINS WILL BE VERIFIED IN FLIGHT (FLT 18) OR 462636 PMRB 20 PER V5006 UPON RETURN OF THE ORBITER TO THE OPF FOR FLIGHT 19 462636 PMRB 21 PROCESSING. 01/13/94 PMRB CHRM APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 19 OF 462636 PMRB 22 OV-103. APPROVED EXCEPTION EK02971. 462636 1 1 PIN 36 OF CONN 82P65 (PORT PLBD OPEN 1 IND) AND PIN 105 OF CONN 82P61 (S 462636 1 2 TBD PLBD OEPN 2 IND) WERE DEMATED AT MDM PF2. THE REQUIRED SCAN RETEST F 462636 1 3 OR THE PINS WAS NOT PERFORMED IN OPF PRIOR TO THE PLBD SYSTEM BEING CONF 462636 1 4 IGURED FOR OPF ROLLOUT. THE RETEST REQUIRED BOTH LH AND RH PLBD'S TO BE 462636 1 5 OPENED TO 175 DEG, WHICH COULD NOT BE PERFORMED AT THE PAD. EXCEPTION EK 462636 1 6 02971 WAS PROCESSED AND APPROVED FOR ONE FLIGHT TO ACCEPT TH NOTED CONDI 462636 1 7 TION. THE PINS WERE SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED. PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS 462636 1 8 . NO FURTHER RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: SCAN RETEST NOT PERFORMED. 463394 1 1 DURING V76-40004, 1 BAYONETT WAS FOUND BROKEN OFF CONNECTOR SAVER 50J69. 463394 1 2 THE DISCREPANT CONNECTOR SAVER WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW ONE, 463394 1 3 P/N ME414-0630-1003. PROBABLE CASUE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO 463394 1 4 RETEST IS REQUIRED. 463629 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: DURING FLIGHT 18 PROCESSING, THE V070-339683-002 V07 463629 PMRB 2 0-339683-001 CLOSEOUT PANELS WERE FOUND TO BE MISIDENTIFIED (REF PR STR- 463629 PMRB 3 3-18-4746). INITIAL DOCUMENTATION REVIEW BY CVAS SHOWED THAT THE OCN'S O 463629 PMRB 4 F THE PANEL DID NOT NEED TO BE CHANGED. FURTHER INVESTIGATION BY CVAS AF 463629 PMRB 5 TER CLOSURE OF STR-3-18-4746 INDICATES THAT THE OCN'S WERE, IN FACT, INC 463629 PMRB 6 ORRECTLY MARKED AT MANUFACTURE. THE V070-339683-002 (F69529) PANEL INSTA 463629 PMRB 7 LLED ON THE L/H SIDE WILL BE REMOVED POST FLIGHT AND THE OCN WILL BE COR 463629 PMRB 8 RECTED. THIS DISCREPANCY DOES NOT AFFECT THE FORM, FIT OR FUNCTION OF TH 463629 PMRB 9 E V070-339683-002 PANEL. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. NO MR ID REQ 463629 PMRB 10 UIRED. THIS MR ACTION IS FOR ONE FLIGHT RESTRICTED USE. THIS MR ACTION D 463629 PMRB 11 OES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 463629 PMRB 12 IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 463629 PMRB 13 01/25/94, PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 19 OF O 463629 PMRB 14 V-103. 463629 PMRB 15 ON 05/10/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (OMDP/CCTV MONITOR 463629 PMRB 16 REMOVAL) OF OV-103. 463629 1 1 THE OCN NUMBER WAS CHANGED AND RECORDED PER MAO104-301 CODE BL-08-NG-13. 463629 1 2 THIS PANEL WILL BE INSTALLED WITH ALL THE OTHER PANEL ON V30-13333 TABL 463629 1 3 E 2. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 463630 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: DURING FLIGHT 18 PROCESSING, THE V070-339683-001 V07 463630 PMRB 2 0-339683-002 CLOSEOUT PANELS WERE FOUND TO BE MISIDENTIFIED (REF STR-3-1 463630 PMRB 3 8-4746). INITIAL DOCUMENTATION REVIEW BY CVAS SHOWED THAT THE OCN'S OF T 463630 PMRB 4 HE PANEL DID NOT NEED TO BE CHANGED. FURTHER INVESTIGATION BY CVAS AFTER 463630 PMRB 5 CLOSURE OF STR-3-18-4746 INDICATES THAT THE OCN'S WERE, IN FACT, INCORR 463630 PMRB 6 ECTLY MARKED AT MANUFACTURE. THE V070-339683-001 (F69528) PANEL INSTALLE 463630 PMRB 7 D ON THE L/H SIDE WILL BE REMOVED POST FLIGHT AND THE OCN WILL BE CORREC 463630 PMRB 8 TED. THIS DISCREPANCY DOES NOT AFFECT THE FORM, FIT OR FUNCTION OF THE 463630 PMRB 9 V070-339683-001 PANE. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. MO MR ID REQUIR 463630 PMRB 10 ED. THIS MR ACTION IS FOR ONE FLIGHT RESTRICTED USE. THIS MR ACTION DOES 463630 PMRB 11 NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPA 463630 PMRB 12 CT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 463630 PMRB 13 01/25/94, PRIME BOARD ACTIONS: PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 19 OF 463630 PMRB 14 OV-103. 463630 PMRB 15 ON 05/10/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (OMDP/CCTV MONITOR 463630 PMRB 16 REMOVAL) OF OV-103. 463630 1 1 THE CLOSEOUT PANEL WAS RE-ID'D WITH CORRECT OCN IN ITEM 1.7. AND THE PAN 463630 1 2 EL WILL BE INSTALLED PER FC V30-13333 TABLE 2. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSH 463630 1 3 IP. 464111 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTS DEFORMED CLIPS ON THE V070-3516 464111 1 2 14-001 SHELL AT THE LH2 ORBITER ET AFT ATTACH POINT. THE DISCREPANT ASSE 464111 1 3 MBLY WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. THE DISCREPANT SHE 464111 1 4 LL WAS ROUTED TO THE HDA ON A LRU PR FOR REFURBISHMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE F 464111 1 5 OR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP (FAILURE TO PROPERLY ALIGN ORBITER AND SLING P 464111 1 6 RIOR TO LIFTING FROM THE ORBITER TRANSPORTER). NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINE 464111 1 7 ERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 464509 1 1 DURING S0004 THE WIRE 4F273C22-2 WAS FOUND TO HAVE EXPOSED BUT NOT 464509 1 2 DAMAGED CONDUCTOR AT 50P513, ITEM 1, PG 1. IN ADDITION THE WIRES 464509 1 3 2P621C22-1 AND 2P621C22-2 WERE FOUND TO HAVE EXPOSED BUT NOT DAMAGED 464509 1 4 CONDUCTORS AT 50P533, ITEM 2 PG 1A. ALL THREE WIRES WERE REPAIRED USING 464509 1 5 MBO150-025 HEAT SHRINK PER SRP-V-EL-0029-0-O. ITEM 3 PG 1B NOTED THE 464509 1 6 CONNECTOR 50P513 HAD THE RF RING BAND DEBONDED FROM THE CONNECTOR. THE 464509 1 7 DAMAGED CONN 50P513 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW CONNECOR. THE 464509 1 8 PROBABLE CASEU OF ITEMS 1, 2 AND 3 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. 464509 1 9 RETEST OF CONNECTOR 50P513 WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. 464511 1 1 DURING S0004 THE V070-565411-001 LH2 UPPER MONOBALL SEAL WAS FOUND TO HA 464511 1 2 VE A TEAR. A NEW SEAL WAS ORDERED AND INSTALLED PER S0004. THE DAMAGED S 464511 1 3 EAL WAS ROUTED TO VENDOR FOR POSSIBLE REFURBISHMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN 464511 1 4 BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RETEST IS 464511 1 5 REQUIRED. 464624 1 1 DURING S0004 THE LO2 MONOBALL SEAL WAS FOUND TO HAVE A SMALL HOLE ON THE 464624 1 2 FACE OF THE SEAL NEAR LOCATION 50P501. THE SEAL WAS REPAIRED PER SRP-00 464624 1 3 27 BY APPLYING MBO130-119 RTV. ANY ANOMALIES WITH THE REPAIR WILL BE DET 464624 1 4 ECTED DURING V1149, SEQUENCE 13 WHICH PERFORMS A PURGE OF THE MONOBALL C 464624 1 5 AVITY. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 464629 1 1 DURING S0004 THE GND LUG ON WIRE P497C22 AT 50P748 WAS FOUND BROKEN, ITE 464629 1 2 M 1 PG 1. A NEW GND LUG WAS INSTALLED ON WIRE P497C22 PER OPERATION 1 DI 464629 1 3 SPOSITION. WHILE WORKING THE OPERATION 1 DISPO, TO REMOVE SPOT TIES THE 464629 1 4 WIRE 3P493C20 WAS INADVERTANTLY CUT, ITEM 2 PAGE 1A. THE DAMAGED WIRE WA 464629 1 5 S DISPOSITIONED TO BE REPAIRED PER SRP-0002 USING A KSC SPLICE. HOWEVER, 464629 1 6 DURING THE OPERATION 2 REPAIR PROCEDURE THE SPLICE COULD NOT BE INSTALL 464629 1 7 ED AS REQUIRED, ITEM 3 PG 1B. THE DAMAGED WIRE 3P493C20 WAS THEN REMOVED 464629 1 8 FROM THE CONNECTOR BACK TO THE DESIGN SPLICE. A NEW 3P493C20 WIRE SEGME 464629 1 9 NT WAS THEN INSTALLED FROM THE CONNECTOR 50P748 BACK TO THE DESIGN 464629 1 10 SPLICE LOCATION AND A NEW DESIGN SPLICE 50SP794 INSTALLED. THE PROBABLE 464629 1 11 CAUSE OF ITEM 1 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. ITEM 2 AND 464629 1 12 3 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO WORKMANSHIP. RETEST OF THE 50P748 CONNECTOR WAS 464629 1 13 ACCOMPLISHED SUCCESSFULLY ON THIS PR. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED AND 464629 1 14 THIS PR MAY NOW CLOSE. 464717 1 1 PROBLEM CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THE R/H T-0 SPHERICAL BEARING WA 464717 1 2 S FOUND TO HAVE RAISED METAL EDGE DURING A POST T-0 UMBILICAL CARRIER PL 464717 1 3 ATE OPERATIONS BY USING THE T-0 SPHERICAL BEARING GO-GO GAGE. DURING THE 464717 1 4 INSPECTION, THE .6235" END OF THE GO-GO GAGE COULD NOT BE FULLY INSERTE 464717 1 5 D INTO THE BEARING. THIS RAISED EDGE IS FORMED AT THE BACK SIDE OF THE B 464717 1 6 EARING DURING THE INSTALLATION/REMOVAL OF THE T-0 LIGHT WEIGHT FRAME. TH 464717 1 7 E LIP/RAISED EDGE ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE BEARING WAS REMVOED USING A JE 464717 1 8 WELERS FILE. THE BEARING HAS BEEN RESTORED TO DRAWING SPECS. NO FURTHER 464717 1 9 WORK WILL TAKE PLACE ON THIS PR AND NO R/C ACTION IS REQUIRED. 465724 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: IT IS REQUESTED THAT THIS PR REMAIN OPEN AND BE 465724 PMRB 2 DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 19 OF OV-103. THE ITEM 1 CONDITION CONCERNING THE 465724 PMRB 3 T-TOOL INTERFERENCE HAS BEEN ALLEVIATED BY TRIMMING THE T-TOOL STOP RING 465724 PMRB 4 PER EO TO GSE DWG G070-505209 ON PR A70-0788-03-019-0002. THE ITEM 2 465724 PMRB 5 CONDITION CONCERNING T-TOOL INTERFERENCE WITH THE TPS CARRIER PANEL HAS 465724 PMRB 6 BEEN ALLEVIATED BY ENLARGING HE EMERGENCY ACCESS HOLE IN THE CARRIER 465724 PMRB 7 PANEL PER EO TO DWG V070-390441. THE MARCHINING TO ENLARGE THE ACCESS 465724 PMRB 8 HOLE WAS PERFORMED ON THIS PR. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. 465724 PMRB 9 MEASUREMENTS OF THE INNER/OUTER HATCH ALIGNMENT HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE 465724 PMRB 10 VERTICAL PER THIS WAD. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THIS PR REMAIN OPEN TO TAKE 465724 PMRB 11 MEASUREMENTS WHEN THE ORBITER IS HORIZONTAL, POST FLIGHT 18. 02/01/94, 465724 PMRB 12 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 19 OF OV-103. 465724 1 1 THIS PR WAS DETECTED DURING S0017 WHEN INTERFERENCE WAS NOTED BETWEEN TH 465724 1 2 E G070-505210 HATCH T-TOOL AND THE ACCESS HOLE IN THE OUTER HATCH (ITEM 465724 1 3 1). THE T-TOOL INTERFERENCE WAS ELIMINATED BY TRIMMING THE T-TOOL STOP R 465724 1 4 ING PER EO A02 TO GSE DWG G070-505209 ON PR'S A70-0788-03-019-0002 AND A 465724 1 5 70-0788-03-020-001. ITEM 2 DOCUMENTED INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE T-TOOL AN 465724 1 6 D THE HOLE IN THE HATCH TPS CARRIER PANEL. THE INTERFERENCE HAS BEEN ELI 465724 1 7 MINATED BY ENLARGING THE EMERGENCY ACCESS HOLE IN THE CARRIER PANEL PER 465724 1 8 EO A04 TO DWG V070-390441. THE MACHINING TO ENLARGE THE ACCESS HOLE WAS 465724 1 9 PERFORMED ON THIS PR. MEASUREMENTS TAKEN WITH THE VEHICLE IN HORIZONTAL 465724 1 10 AND VERTICAL ORIENTATIONS INDICATE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE LOCATION 465724 1 11 OF THE ACCESS HOLE HOLE IN THE HATCH. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. 465724 1 12 RETEST HAS BEEN PERFORMED DURING SEVERAL HATCH CYCLES. THIS CONDITION 465724 1 13 DOES AFFECT LIKE END ITEMS AND HAS BEEN ADDRESSED BY INDIVIDUAL VEHICLE 465724 1 14 PR'S. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DIFFIENCY. 466611 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS THE INSTALLATION OF A V070-398558-057 PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 466611 1 2 BULB SEAL SPLICE INSTEAD OF A V070-398558-056 SPLICE AT RH HINGELINE XO 466611 1 3 1183 LOCATION. THE SEAL SPLICE HAS BEEN FLOWN IN THIS CONFIGURATION AND 466611 1 4 INSPECTED AFTER FLIGHT. NO SIGNIFICANT CONCERNS OR ANOMALIES WERE FOUND. 466611 1 5 THE CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR RESTRICTED INSTALLATION. RETEST WAS S 466611 1 6 ATISFIED BY ONE FLIGHT OF USE IN NOTED CONFIGURATION. THIS CONDITION DOE 466611 1 7 S NOT AFFECT SIMILAR END ITEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS PROCEDURAL ERROR. 466626 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THE V070-351614-001 ET LINER SHELL ASSY INSTALLED AT 466626 PMRB 2 THE LH2 ET-ORBITER AFT ATTACH POINT WAS RECORDED TO HAVE AN OCN J56684 466626 PMRB 3 PER STR-3-18-4781. A V070-351614-001 SHELL ASSY WITH OCN J56684 WAS LOCA 466626 PMRB 4 TED AT THE NSLD. SINCE THE OCN OF THE INSTALLED SHELL CANNOT BE SEEN IN 466626 PMRB 5 THE INSTALLED CONFIGURATION, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO VERIFY THE OCN OF THE 466626 PMRB 6 INSTALLED SHELL. THE V070-351614-001 SHELL ASSY (RECORDED OCN J56684) A 466626 PMRB 7 S INSTALLED WILL FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT. THE UNVERIFIED OCN OON THE 466626 PMRB 8 V070-351614-001 SHELL ASSY DOES NOT AFFECT THE FORM, FIT, OR FUNCTION OF 466626 PMRB 9 FUNCTION OF THE SHELL. MARGIN OF SAFETY FOR THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE 466626 PMRB 10 REMAINS POSITIVE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 466626 PMRB 11 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 466626 PMRB 12 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR IS FOR ONE FLIGHT RESTRICTED USE. 466626 PMRB 13 ON 01/31/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLIGHT 19 OF OV-103. 466626 1 1 THE V070-351614-001 ET LINER SHELL ASSY'S OCN WAS MARKED ON THE PART 466626 1 2 INCORRECTLY. THE INCORRECT OCN WAS REMOVED AND THE CORRECT OCN WAS 466626 1 3 APPLIED TO THE SHELL ASSY. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 467164 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1): THIS DR DOCUMENTS A DISCREPANT NUTPLATE ON THE 5 467164 1 2 6-09 DOOR. THE DOOR WAS REMOVED, NUTPLATE REMOVED AND REPLACED, AND ALL 467164 1 3 HARDWARE REINSTALLED PER JOB CARD V80-95609. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR 467164 1 4 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. 467176 1 1 UNABLE TO SHOW PAPERWORK ON THE INSTALLATION OF THE V070-390227-001 CARR 467176 1 2 IER PANEL. THE CARRIER PANEL WAS REMOVED AND REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE 467176 1 3 : PAPER WORK PROBLEM. 467274 1 1 DURING V1287 THE WIRE 3P1235B26 AT KSC SPLICE 0389 WAS DETECTED AS BEING 467274 1 2 BROKEN. THE DAMAGED AREA OF WIRE AND KSC SPLICE WERE REMOVED. A NEW KSC 467274 1 3 SPLICE WITH SAME NUMBER WAS INSTALLED ON WIRE 3P1235B26. RETEST OF WIRE 467274 1 4 3P1235B26 WAS PERFORMED PER S1006 AND WAS SUCCESSFUL. NO FURTHER ACTION 467274 1 5 IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL 467274 1 6 DEGRADATION. 467469 1 1 THE WASHER PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPO BECAME DEBONDE 467469 1 2 D. THE DOOR WAS COUNTERSUNK IN THE WRONG LOCATION. A NEW CONICAL WASHER 467469 1 3 WAS BONDED INTO THE COUNTERSINK TO BRING IT UP TO FLUSH. MRB APPROVAL FO 467469 1 4 R UNRESTRICTED USE WAS OBTAINED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 467469 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 467721 1 1 DURING LH2 LOAD A LEAK DEVELOPED IN THE GSE (REF IPR 60V-0098) WHICH CAU 467721 1 2 SED THE PRSD LH2 TANKS TO BE LESS THAN 190 PSIA AT THE END OF STABILIZAT 467721 1 3 ION. THIS IS A VIOLATION OF OMRSD V45DLO.010 WHICH CALLS FOR A PRESSURE 467721 1 4 RANGE OF 190-263 PSIA. THE PRIMARY INTENT OF STABILIZATION IS TO ENSURE 467721 1 5 LIQUID TRAPPED IN THE VEHICLE FILL AND VENT LINES HAS BOILED OFF. THIS I 467721 1 6 S TO PREVENT TANK OVERPRESSURIZATION SUBSEQUENT TO AIRBORNE HALF COUPLIN 467721 1 7 G CLOSURE. A PRESSURE RANGE OF 190-263 PSIA IS SPECIFIED TO ENSURE A MAR 467721 1 8 GIN OF SAFETY FOR TANK RELIEF VALVE CRACK ON THE UPPER END AND A PRESSUR 467721 1 9 E CONSISTENT WITH SINGLE PHASE OPERATION ON THE LOWER END. THE LOWER END 467721 1 10 ALSO ENSURES A LEAK CHECK AT FLIGHT PRESSURE TO VERIFY SYSTEM INTEGRITY. 467721 1 11 ALL FOUR TANKS DROPPED TO APPROXIMATELY 165 PSIA AS A RESULT OF THE GSE 467721 1 12 LEAK. ONCE THE VEHICLE WAS ISOLATED FROM THE LEAK TANK PRESSURES BEGAN 467721 1 13 TO INCREASED TO THEIR NOMINAL RANGE. ALTHOUGH 165 PSIA IS BELOW THE 467721 1 14 PRESSURE SPECIFIED IT IS ADEQUATE TO MAINTAIN TANKS AT A SINGLE PHASE. 467721 1 15 ALL TANKS WERE PRESSURIZED TO FLIGHT PRESSURE WHILE THE VEHICLE WAS 467721 1 16 UNDER A GN2 PURGE AND HGDS ACTIVE TO VERIFY SYSTEM INTEGRITY. A WAIVER 467721 1 17 WILL BE PROCESSED. 467801 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THIS MR ACTION IS FOR RESTRICTED USE, 1 FLIGHT. WHIL 467801 PMRB 2 E INSTALLING THE 44 DOOR'S LOWER CARRIER PANEL (V070-393316-001), THE AF 467801 PMRB 3 T FASTENERS NUT ELEMENT DISENGAGED FROM THE BASE OF THE NUTPLATE (MD114- 467801 PMRB 4 5005-0405). THE NAS1578C4T12 BOLT IS FIRMLY SECURED TO THE NUT ELEMENT A 467801 PMRB 5 ND EXHIBITED FROM 5 TO 10 IN LBS RUNNING TORQUE PRIOR TO FAILURE. FIVE O 467801 PMRB 6 F THE SIX FASTENERS USED TO INSTALL THE CARRIER PANEL ARE INSTALLED PROP 467801 PMRB 7 ERLY. MR ACCEPTING "AS IS" FOR 1 FLIGHT WILL ALLOW THE INSTALLATION TO F 467801 PMRB 8 UNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT. THE STRUCTURAL INTERGRITY OF THE INSTALLATION 467801 PMRB 9 IS MAINTAINED WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. POST FLIGHT DISPO WILL 467801 PMRB 10 REMOVE AND REPLACE THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE. THE CARRIER PANEL 467801 PMRB 11 INSTALLATION IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. THIS MR 467801 PMRB 12 ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION 467801 PMRB 13 DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR 467801 PMRB 14 HAZARD CONTROLS. 02/03/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 19 OF 467801 PMRB 15 OV-103. 467801 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF V80-04400 IT WAS NOTED THAT AN EXTRA WASHER WAS IN 467801 1 2 STALLED UNDER THE HEAD OF THE FASTENER IN THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE. THIS 467801 1 3 CAUSED THE THREAD ENGAGEMENT TO BE INSUFFICIENT GIVING THE APPEARANCE TH 467801 1 4 AT THE NUTPLATE HAD SPUN OUT. THE NUTPLATE WAS INSPECTED AND FOUND TO BE 467801 1 5 ACCEPTABLE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO D 467801 1 6 ISCREPANCY. 469002 1 1 VOID THIS PR. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED ON MPS-3-15-1091 AS ITEM 469002 1 2 6 (PV-6-230549). 469005 1 1 ITEM 1 WAS A RESULT OF A TRANSFERRED WORK FROM STR-3-17-4652 (STR-17-A02 469005 1 2 26). DISCREPANCY WAS ALLEVIATED BY REMOVAL OF FRSI PLUG. PROBABLE CAUSE: 469005 1 3 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 469006 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V76-40001 TO MATE GSE TO ORBITER FOR POWER UP I 469006 1 2 T WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR SAVER 50J55 WAS MISS-ALIGNED. THIS DISCR 469006 1 3 EPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY REMOVING THE DISCREPANT CONNECTOR SAVER AND REPL 469006 1 4 ACING WITH A NEW ONE. THIS RETURNS THE CONNECTOR SAVER TO PRINT CONFIGUR 469006 1 5 ATION. RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRACKED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS P 469006 1 6 R. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 469023 1 1 FUEL CELL ONE O2 PURGE VALVE WAS FOUND TO LEAK AT ABOVE THE ALLOWED RATE 469023 1 2 OF 100 SCCM (5736 SCCM) AT THE END OF V1091. THE PURGE VALVE WAS CYCLED 469023 1 3 AND THE LEAKAGE STOPPED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN SEEN BEFORE AND IS MOST LI 469023 1 4 KELY CAUSED BY DEBRIS ON THE PURGE VALVE SEAT. THE DEBRIS SOURCE IS THOU 469023 1 5 GHT TO BE CORROSION ON THE CELL PLATES CAUSED BY THE REACTION OF KOH ELE 469023 1 6 CTROLYTE WITH IMPURITIES IN THE FUEL CELL. THE CORROSION PARTICLES FLOW 469023 1 7 DOWNSTREAM DURING PURGE INTO THE REGULATOR AND THE PURGE VALVE SEAT AND 469023 1 8 CREATE THE PROBLEM NOTED. FUEL CELL VENDOR IS PRESENTLY RETRO-FITTING AL 469023 1 9 L FUEL CELL PURGE VALVES WITH INLET SCREENS ON AN AS AVAILABLE BASIS. 469023 1 10 THIS FUEL CELL WAS REPLACED WITH ANOTHER CELL THAT HAS HAD THE SCREEN 469023 1 11 MOD COMPLETED. DEFECTIVE FUEL CELL WAS REPLACED AND RETEST OF NEW CELL 469023 1 12 WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED. PROBABLE CAUSE: PURGE VALVE SEAT 469023 1 13 CONTAMINATION CAUSED BY COLLECTION OF CORROSION WITHIN CELL PLATES AT 469023 1 14 PURGE VALVE. 469337 1 1 REF: ITEM 1 ON PAGE: THIS PR DOCUMENTS COTTER PINS ON THE LH RCC ANGLE 1 469337 1 2 INSULATOR ASSEMBLY THAT WERE RUBBING ON THE RCC SURFACE. THE COTTER PIN 469337 1 3 S WERE REMOVED AND REINSTALLED PER THE ALTERNATE METHOD ALLOWED PER SPEC 469337 1 4 IFICATION. THE AREA WHERE THE PINS WERE RUBBING WAS VERIFIED TO BE FREE 469337 1 5 OF DAMAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS BUILD UP OF TOLERANCE. NO FURTH 469337 1 6 ER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 469340 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1: THIS PR DOCUMENTS A SPACE THAT BECAME SEPARATED FR 469340 1 2 OM THE CARRIER PANEL DURING THE REMOVAL OF A SHIM BONDED TO IT. THE REMA 469340 1 3 INING PORTION OF THE SPACER WAS REMOVED AND NEW HARDWARE INSTALLED PER P 469340 1 4 RINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. NO 469340 1 5 FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 469438 1 1 ITEM 1: UPON REMOVAL AND CLEANUP OF THE DETACHABLE PORTION OF THE HAZ 469438 1 2 GAS TUBE SUPPORT CLAMPS, ME275-0004-1004, IT WAS NOTED THAT CORROSION 469438 1 3 HAD PROGRESSED UNDER THE FIXED PORTION OF THE CLAMPS AND THE RIVETS, 469438 1 4 (ITEM 2) AND THAT IT WAS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO TREAT THE CORROSION 469438 1 5 WITHOUT REMOVING THE SUPPORT BRACKETS, V070-357488, WHICH WERE RIVETED 469438 1 6 IN PLACE (ITEM 3). MR PROCEDURE WAS APPROVED TO REPAIR THE BRACKETS AS 469438 1 7 FOLLOWS: THE UPPER AND LOWER V070-357488 HAZ GAS TUBE SUPPORT BRACKETS 469438 1 8 WERE REMOVED TO TREAT ACTIVE CORROSION AROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE 469438 1 9 THREADED FASTENER HOLES ON THE EXPOSED VERTICAL SURFACE OF THE BRACKET. 469438 1 10 NO PITTING WAS DETECTED BETWEEN THE FAYING SURFACES RIVETED TO THE 469438 1 11 STRUCTURE. THE CORROSION WAS NEUTRALIZED WITH TURCO METAL GLO NO. 6, AND 469438 1 12 PITS WERE FILLED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE TO RESTORE THE FLAT SURFACE, 469438 1 13 AND CORROSION PROTECTIVE FINISH APPLIED. MR ID WAS PROVIDED. THE 469438 1 14 REFURBISHED V070-357488-001 BRACKETS WERE REINSTALLED ACCORDING TO PRINT 469438 1 15 USING SOLID MD121-003 RIVETS. THE REMOVABLE PARTS OF THE UPPER AND LOWER 469438 1 16 TUBE CLAMPS. ME275-004-1004, WERE THEN REPLACED SECURING THE HAZ GAS 469438 1 17 LINE, AND THE FASTENERS TORQUED ACCORDING TO PRINT, COMPLETING THE 469438 1 18 INSTALLATION. MOUNTING PLACEMENT, HARDWARE, AND ORIENTATION ARE 469438 1 19 UNCHANGED FROM THE ORIGINAL INSTALLATION. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS 469438 1 20 REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: GALVANIC CORROSION BETWEEN THE STATIONARY 469438 1 21 BRACKET AND THE MATING SURFACE OF THE REMOVABLE CLAMP. 469439 1 1 THIS PR WAS DETECTED DURING JC V31-15106. TWO BLACK MARKS WERE NOTICED O 469439 1 2 N THE FWD UPPER CORNER OF THE PRESSURE SEAL AROUND LKH VENT DOOR 9. THE 469439 1 3 MARKS WERE THOUGHT TO BE BLISTERS, BUT INSPECTIONS DETERMINED THEM TO BE 469439 1 4 BLACK RTV FROM A REPAIR OF THE THERMAL BARRIER IN THAT AREA. THE RTV WA 469439 1 5 S REMOVED AND THE SEAL WAS CLEANED WITH IPA. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EX 469439 1 6 IST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 469577 1 1 3 AREAS OF CORROSION WERE FOUND ON THE V070-190633-033 CARRIER PANEL. ON 469577 1 2 E OF THE AREAS HAD TWO LOCATIONS WERE CORROSION WAS ACTIVE. ALL AREAS WE 469577 1 3 RE ETCHED WITH TURCO METAL BLO NO 6 TO NEUTRALIZE CORROSION BY PRODUCTS. 469577 1 4 MOLD IMPRESSIONS SHOWED THE MAX DEPTH WAS 0.005". THE FACESHEET THICKNE 469577 1 5 SS FOR THIS PANEL IS 0.020". BASED ON WORST CASE PIT DEPTH AND FACESHEET 469577 1 6 THICKNESS, AND THE LOCATION ON THE PANEL, THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF T 469577 1 7 HE PANEL IS NOT COMPROMISED. ALL AREAS OF CORROSION WERE LOCATED IN LOW 469577 1 8 STRESS AREAS ON THE PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEMS IS ENVIRONMENTA 469577 1 9 L DAMAGE. REF ITEM 2 ON PG 1A. THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS A DENT FOUND ON THE 469577 1 10 LOWER FACESHEET OF THE PANEL. THE DENT WAS LOCATED UNDER THE FIB WHICH 469577 1 11 WAS REMOVED TO REWORK THE CORROSION. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE DENT ARE 469577 1 12 .450L X .446W X .0015D. VISUAL INSPECTION FOR CRACKS AND COIN TAPS WERE 469577 1 13 PERFORMED. NO EVIDENCE OF CRACKS OR FACESHEET DELAMINATION WAS NOTED. 469577 1 14 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 3 ON 469577 1 15 PG 1B) WHILE ETCHING THE CORROSION LOCATIONS, A SMALL HOLE WAS FOUND ON 469577 1 16 THE EDGE OF THE FACESHEET. ETCHANT MAY HAVE BECOME ENTRAPPED INSIDE THE 469577 1 17 HONEYCOMB CELLS OF THE PANEL. TO PREVENT ANY FURTHER PANEL DEGRADATION, 469577 1 18 THE HOLE WAS ENLARGED TO ALLOW THE ETCHANT TO BE FLUSHED OUT AND THE 469577 1 19 EXPOSED CELLS WERE FILLED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 469577 1 20 THIS ITEM IS ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. (REF ITEM 4 PG 1C) THIS ITEM 469577 1 21 DOCUMENTS THE FACT THAT THE V070-199225-010 SHIM CAME DEBONDED FROM THE 469577 1 22 CARRIER PANEL. THE SHIM WAS REBONDED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE 469577 1 23 CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG ACTION 469577 1 24 REQUIRED. 469589 1 1 DURING V35-40004, IT WAS NOTICED THAT UPPER MONOBALL SEAL HAD A 3/8" TEA 469589 1 2 R AT THE BASE. A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED TO REPLACE DISCREPANT SEAL AND TH 469589 1 3 E DISCREPANT WAS SENT TO VENDOR FOR REFURBISHMENT. THIS RETURNS THE SEAL 469589 1 4 TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR 469589 1 5 . PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 469721 1 1 THE UMBILICAL PURGE CURTAIN RETAINERS INSTALLED PER DRAWING V070-851042 469721 1 2 WERE FOUND TO BE LOOSE DUE TO SUSPECT DEBRIS IN BOTTOM OF HOLES. WHILE C 469721 1 3 LEANING ONE OF THE HOLES FOR THE V070-851032-011 RETAINER, THE TAP BROKE 469721 1 4 OFF IN THE HOLE. THE V070-851032-011 RETAINER WAS REMOVED, THE TAP PIEC 469721 1 5 E REMOVED, AND THE RETAINER WAS THEN REINSTALLED TO PRINT CONDITION. NO 469721 1 6 FURTHER REWORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS DEBRIS BUILD UP IN FASTENE 469721 1 7 R HOLES. 469754 1 1 ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF DISCREPANCIES NOTED AS ITEMS 1,2 AND 3 ON PAGE 469754 1 2 1 HAS DETERMINED THAT MR ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ARE NOT EXCEEDED BY THE DE 469754 1 3 GRADATION SUSTAINED BY THE MONEL METAL MESH AT THIS TIME. MR APPROVAL HA 469754 1 4 S BEEN GRANTED FOR CONTINUED, UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE PART. MR ID HAS BE 469754 1 5 EN PROVIDED TO RECORD EXISTING DAMAGE FOR FUTURE REFERENCE. PROBABLE CAU 469754 1 6 SE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 469789 1 1 THE GAP UNDER THE LH WING TRAILING SEAL WAS BROUGHT TO WITHIN PRINT TOLE 469789 1 2 RANCE BY RETORQUING THE FASTENERS. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR 469789 1 3 . PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 469824 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT INSPECTION THE R/H FORWARD NLG DOOR HINGE BOOT WAS FO 469824 1 2 UND TO HAVE A 3/8" TEAR ABOVE THE HINGE. THE SILICON GLASS FABRIC WAS RE 469824 1 3 PAIRED PER UNRESTRICTED MR BY APPLYING AN RTV PATCH. NO FURTHER DISCREPA 469824 1 4 NCY EXISTS WITH THE BOOT. THIS IS A UNIQUE, ISOLATED CASE WHICH DOES NOT 469824 1 5 AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATI 469824 1 6 ONAL DEGRADATION - TEAR WAS PROBABLY CAUSED BY FLYING DEBRIS AT TOUCH DO 469824 1 7 WN. 469901 1 1 DURING V31-13102 IT WAS DETECTED THE ADAPTER P/N: ME414-0628-0010 WAS LO 469901 1 2 OSE AT SENSOR 21A3. THE ADAPTER ASSEMBLY WAS DISASSEMBLED AND INSPECTED 469901 1 3 FOR POSSIBLE DAMAGE. DURING THE DISASSEMBLY IT WAS NOTICED THE SENSOR DI 469901 1 4 D NOT HAVE ANY LOCKING TEETH AS A STANDARD ORBITER CONNECTOR (REFERENCE 469901 1 5 PAGE 1A). RESEARCH REVEALED THE SENSOR IS NOT DESIGNED TO HAVE ANY LOCKI 469901 1 6 NG TEETH ON THE SENSOR BARREL. THE ADAPTER ASSEMBLY WAS REASSEMBLED PER 469901 1 7 SPECIFICATION AND NO MOVEMENT OF THE ADAPTER WAS FOUND. THE PROBABLE CAU 469901 1 8 SE FOR ITEM 1 WAS WORKMANSHIP. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 2 WAS NO DISC 469901 1 9 REPANCY. 469902 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT WEAR MARKS ON THE V070-510782 NLG DOOR 469902 1 2 BUNGEE BOOSTER SUPPORT BEAM. THE WEAR MARKS ARE CHIPS IN THE PLOYURETHA 469902 1 3 NE TOPCOAT AND SOME MARKS THROUGH PAINT AND INTO THE METAL. THIS AREA IS 469902 1 4 WHERE THE G070-502439 NLGD BOOSTER BUNGEE COCKING TOOL RESTS AGAINST TH 469902 1 5 E STRUCTURE DURING BUNGEE COCKING. INSTALLATION OF THE TOOL INTO THIS AR 469902 1 6 EA IS DIFFICULT AND SOME CONTACT WITH THE BEAM IS NORMAL. ALSO, THE TOOL 469902 1 7 PRESSES AGAINST THE BEAM FOR LEVERAGE DURING BUNGEE COCKING. THE AREAS 469902 1 8 WHERE THE BARE METAL IS EXPOSED ARE SMALL AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF CR 469902 1 9 ACKING OR STRUCTURAL DEFECTS. PER THE MF0004-092 FAIR WEAR AND TEAR 469902 1 10 SPEC, THIS TYPE OF WEAR IS ACCEPTABLE (SECTIONS 15.1.2 & .3). THE 469902 1 11 CORROSION PROTECTION HAS BEEN RE-APPLIED AND NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. NO 469902 1 12 RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL SERVICE WEAR. 469935 1 1 THE GAPS AT BOTH THE INBOARD AND OUTBOARD LOCATIONS AT THE YO214 LOCATIO 469935 1 2 N WERE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE GAP AT THE OUTBOARD LOCATION WAS FOUND TO B 469935 1 3 E DUE PARTIALLY TO A PIECE OF CURED RTV INTERFERING. THE RTV WAS REMOVED 469935 1 4 BRINGING THE GAP DOWN SOMEWHAT. THE REMAINING GAPS WERE ELIMINATED BY A 469935 1 5 PPLYING RTV ON THE SEAL PANEL. THIS WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE ON 469935 1 6 OV-103. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIO 469935 1 7 NAL DEGRADATION. 470120 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: IT IS REQUESTED THIS PR REMAIN OPEN AND BE DEFERRED 470120 PMRB 2 TO FLIGHT 20 OF OV-103. ITEM 1 DOCUMENTS GOUGES/WEARING ON THE 470120 PMRB 3 V070-332533-002 I/E HATCH FITTING (GUIDE) AND ITS INTERFACING THE 470120 PMRB 4 V070-332542-002 ROLLER ASSY. MRB CONCURRENCE WAS OBTAINED AND THE ROUGH 470120 PMRB 5 AREAS WERE SANDED SMOOTH. WHILE THE ORBITER WAS HORIZONTAL, INSPECTIONS 470120 PMRB 6 OF THE AREA WERE PERFORMED WHILE CYCLING THE HATCH, BUT NO PROBLEMS WERE 470120 PMRB 7 DETECTED WITH THE ORBITER VERTICAL, THE AREA WAS REINSPECTED. IT WAS 470120 PMRB 8 DETERMINED THE WEARING WAS CAUSED DURING HATCH CLOSURE IN THE VERTICAL 470120 PMRB 9 DUE TO AN INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE V070-332533-002 FITTING AND THE 470120 PMRB 10 V070-332542-002 ROLLER ASSY. WHEN THE HATCH IS CLOSING, (2) CLOCKING 470120 PMRB 11 PINS ON THE FWD FUSELAGE ENGAGE FITTINGS ON THE HATCH TO CENTER THE 470120 PMRB 12 HATCH ASSY. DURING A PORTION OF THE TRAVEL AS THE HATCH IS CENTERING, 470120 PMRB 13 THE V070-332533-002 FITTING SCAPES ACROSS THE V070-332542-002 FOLLER 470120 PMRB 14 CAUSING THE DAMAGE. THIS CONDITION IS MOST LIKELY DUE TO INCORRECTLY 470120 PMRB 15 RIGGED ROLLWER AND/OR CLOCKING PIN ASSEMBLIES. PER SPECIFICATION 470120 PMRB 16 MLO308-0064, THE RIGGING CAN ONLY BE VERIFIED/ADJUST WHILE THE ORBITER 470120 PMRB 17 IS HORIZONTAL. REQUEST MRB CONCURRENCE TO ACCEPT THIS CONDITION FOR ONE 470120 PMRB 18 FLIGHT RESTRICTED USE AND DEFER THIS PR TO FLIGHT 20 FOR MEASUREMENTS 470120 PMRB 19 AND/OR RE-RIGGING IN THE OPF. THE INTERFERENCE OCCURS ONLY DURING A 470120 PMRB 20 PORTION OF THE HATCH CLOSING OPERATION. THE ROLLER AND GUIDE ALIGNMENT 470120 PMRB 21 IS NOMINAL WHEN THE HATCH IS CLOSED AND LATCHED, AND IT HAS NO AFFECT ON 470120 PMRB 22 HATCH OPENING. THIS CONDITIN DOES NOT AFFECT THE FORM, FIT, FUNCTION, OR 470120 PMRB 23 OPERATION OF THE I/E HATCH. THE HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL HATCH FUNCTIONAL 470120 PMRB 24 CHECKOTUS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED WITH NO ANOMALIES. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 470120 PMRB 25 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL 470120 PMRB 26 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 09/08/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR 470120 PMRB 27 DEFERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 470120 PMRB 28 470120 PMRB 29 MR RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. DURING FLIGHT 470120 PMRB 30 20 PROCESSING, THE OUTER HATCH RIGGING WAS CHECKED AGAINST SPEC 470120 PMRB 31 MLO308-0192 IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF HATCH MISALIGNMENT 470120 PMRB 32 DURING CLOSING IN THE VERTICAL. INITIAL DENTAL MOLD READINGS SHOWED 470120 PMRB 33 SEVERAL OUT OF SPEC CONDITIONS INCLUDING THE LOWER CLOCKING PIN WHICH 470120 PMRB 34 WAS ADJUSTED ONE SERRATION FWD. THE RESULTING MOLDS REVEALED THREE GAPS 470120 PMRB 35 THAT WERE STILL OUT OF SPEC (REF TAB 10-1). THE AFT CLOCKING PIN GAPS 470120 PMRB 36 CAN ONLY BE INCREASED BY MOVING OUTER HATCH INBOARD. (APPROX 0.250") 470120 PMRB 37 WHICH WOULD AFFECT HATCH PERIMETER TILE STEPS. THE FWD ROLLER GAP WAS 470120 PMRB 38 NOT ADJUSTED SINCE THE CLOCKING PINS WILL LIMIT TRAVEL. THE RESULT OF 470120 PMRB 39 THIS, AS RIGGED, CONDITION IS AN OTUER HATCH TRAVEL OF APPROX 0.120" VS 470120 PMRB 40 0.170-0201" PER SPEC. THIS CONDITION HAS EXISTED AT LEAST SINCE FLIGHT 7 470120 PMRB 41 AND HAS FUNCTIONED ADEQUATELY LESS MINOR DAMAGE TO THE FWD LOWER HATCH 470120 PMRB 42 ROLLER GUIDE. REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE HATCH AS 470120 PMRB 43 RIGGED. THE OUTER HATCH RIGGING MEASUREMENTS PER TABLE 10-1 WILL NOT 470120 PMRB 44 ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SAFETY FIT, FORM, OR FUNCTION OF THE HATCH. NO MR 470120 PMRB 45 ID REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 470120 PMRB 46 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 470120 PMRB 47 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 01/06/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR CLOSURE, CRIT 470120 PMRB 48 1 HARDWARE. 470120 1 1 ITEM 1 OF THIS PR DOCUMENTED GOUGES IN THE I/E HATCHS V070-332533-002 FW 470120 1 2 D HATCH FITTING AND THE V070-332542-005 ROLLER ASSY. THE MOST SEVERE DAM 470120 1 3 AGE MEASURED .125"L X .0234"W X .003"D ON THE ROLLER ASSY; .5"L X .041"W 470120 1 4 X .026"D ON THE FWD HATCH FITTING. MRB CONCURRENCE WAS GRANTED TO LIGHT 470120 1 5 LY SAND RAISED METAL EDGES AND CORROSION PROTECT PER MAO608-301. ITEM 2 470120 1 6 OF THIS PR DOCUMENTED THE V070-593205-001 FWD AND AFT HATCH HINGE SHIM H 470120 1 7 ANGING LOOSE FROM ATTACHING H/W. THE V070-593205-001 HATCH SHIM (TAB SHI 470120 1 8 M) IS SECURELY INSTALLED ON THE HATCH HINGE ARM BY (1E) NAS1935C29D BOLT 470120 1 9 AMD (1EA) MD114-1002-0005 NUT. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS FOR DISCREPANCY 470120 1 10 ITEM 2. NO FURTHER RETEST REQUIRED FOR ITEMS 1 AND 2. ITEM 3, THIS PR 470120 1 11 WAS DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 20 TO CHECK OUTER HATCH RIGGING WHICH MUST BE 470120 1 12 DONE IN THE HORIZONTAL POSITION (TO DETERMINE CAUSE OF ITEM 1). THESE 470120 1 13 CHECKS SHOWED THREE OUTER HATCH GAPS TO BE OUT OF SPEC (REF FIG 10-1). 470120 1 14 THESE GAPS WERE MRB ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. TO AVOID FURTHER 470120 1 15 DAMAGE, THE HATCH CLOSING PROCEDURES (V5067, V1058) ARE BEING CHANGED TO 470120 1 16 RAISE THE HINGELINE OF THE HATCH AS WELL AS THE HATCH HANDLE PRIOR TO 470120 1 17 CLOSING IN THE VERTICAL. THIS WILL ELIMINATE THE HATCH SAG TOWARDS THE 470120 1 18 AFT AND MORE CLOSELY ALIGN HATCH GUIDES. THESE DISCREPANCIES DO NOT 470120 1 19 AFFECT LIKE S/N'S. RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED PER V1058.004 IN VAB. 470120 1 20 PROBABLE CAUSE: HATCH RIGGING AND/OR IMPROPER CLOSING OF I/E HATCH IN 470120 1 21 VERTICAL POSITION. 470136 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V31-13117 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT RECEPTACLE 82J 470136 1 2 5 HAD A MISSING BAYONET PIN AT THE 4 O'CLOCK POSITION. FURTHER INSPECTIO 470136 1 3 N BY LSOC, RI-LSS AND NASA ENGINEERING (ALSO LSOC QC AND TECH) REVEALED 470136 1 4 THAT THERE WAS NO DISCREPANCY WITH THE RECEPTACLE AND NASA QC PROBABLY W 470136 1 5 ROTE THIS PR BECAUSE HE WAS UNABLE TO SEE THE BAYONET PIN THROUGH THE IN 470136 1 6 SPECTION HOLE WITH THE CONNECTOR MATED. THE CONNECTOR DEMATED FOR INSPEC 470136 1 7 TION WILL BE TRACKED PER SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 470136 1 8 PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 470142 1 1 THE GAPS AT THE YO-214 LOCATION BETWEEN THE POLYIMIDE SEALS AND THE V070 470142 1 2 -198552-001 CLOSEOUT ANGLES WERE SUSPECTED TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THEY 470142 1 3 WERE MEASURED AND THE GAP AT THE INBOARD LOCATION WAS FOUND TO BE ACCEPT 470142 1 4 ABLE PER PRINT. THE GAP AT THE OUTBOARD LOCATION WAS FOUND TO BE OUT OF 470142 1 5 TOLERANCE DUE TO BENDING OF THE ANGLE FROM NORMAL WEAR. THE ANGLE WAS RE 470142 1 6 MOVED AND BENT TO APPROXIMATE ITS PRINT CONFIGURATION WITH MRB APPROVAL. 470142 1 7 IT WAS THEN REINSTALLED PER PRINT. MEASUREMENTS SHOWED THAT A GAP STILL 470142 1 8 EXISTED AT HIGHER ANGLES OF THE ELEVON. THE GAP AT THE OUTBOARD LOCATIO 470142 1 9 N WAS FILLED WITH MBO130-119 TYPE 2 RTV ADHESIVE. THIS WORK WAS 470142 1 10 INITIALLY PERFORMED PER STR-3-19-4851 BY ACCIDENT AND A PAGE 1A WAS 470142 1 11 PICKED UP. OPERATION 5 WAS WRITTEN TO COVER THIS WORK. MEASUREMENTS WERE 470142 1 12 THEN RETAKEN AT 3 ANGLES OF THE ELEVON PER STEP 4-4. THESE MEASUREMENTS 470142 1 13 ARE ALL WITHIN TOLERANCE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 470142 1 14 PROBABLE CAUSE ITEMS 1 AND 2-OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. PROBABLE CAUSE 470142 1 15 ITEM 3-WORKMANSHIP. 470177 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) SIX AREAS OF CORROSION WERE FOUND ON THE B91B1222 470177 1 2 2-1 L/H WING LEADING EDGE SPAR. EVALUATION OF THE PITS AND CORROSION LOC 470177 1 3 ATIONS REVEALED THAT THE CORROSION NOTED PER THIS PR WAS SUPERFICIAL IN 470177 1 4 NATURE AND THE AREAS WERE ISOLATED. THREE OF THE PITS HAD A DEPTH MEASUR 470177 1 5 ED BETWEEN 0.008 TO 0.012" WHICH IS 10 TO 15 PERCENT OF THE STRUCTURE TH 470177 1 6 ICKNESS. THE REMAINING THREE PITS WERE LESS THAN 0.003 DEEP (LESS THAN 3 470177 1 7 .8 PERCENT OF MATERIAL THICKNESS). ALL OF THE CORROSIVE PRODUCTS WERE NE 470177 1 8 UTRALIZED AND REMOVED USING TURCO METAL GLO 6 PER PREVIOUS MR DISPOSITIO 470177 1 9 N. THREE COATS OF MBO125-050 KOROPON PRIMER WERE APPLIED TO INHIBIT 470177 1 10 FURTHER DEGRADATION OF THE PANEL. THE PITS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS REPAIRED 470177 1 11 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS ENVIRONMENTAL 470177 1 12 EXPOSURE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 470178 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTS AREAS OF SUSPECT CORROSION ON T 470178 1 2 HE B91B12216-1 WING LEADING EDGE SPAR BEHIND RCC PANELS 18, 19, AND 20. 470178 1 3 THERE WERE 14 TOTAL LOCATIONS OF SUSPECT CORROSION. OF THESE LOCATIONS, 470178 1 4 ONLY ELEVEN WERE ACTIVE CORROSION. ALL CORROSION PRODUCTS WERE REMOVED F 470178 1 5 ROM THE PITS BY CHEMICAL AND MECHANICAL METHODS. THE PITTING AT LOCATION 470178 1 6 S 9 AND 12 WERE SEVERE ENOUGH TO REQUIR ADDITIONAL REWORK. AT THESE LOCA 470178 1 7 TIONS THE SPAR FITTING ATTACH HOLES WERE ENLARGED AND BUSHINGS WERE INST 470178 1 8 ALLED TO REPLACE THE DEGRADED METAL. THE PITS AT THESE LOCATIONS WERE AL 470178 1 9 SO POTTED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. THE REMAINING LOCATIONS (1, 2, 3, 4, 470178 1 10 5, 6, 10, 11, AND 13) WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 470178 1 11 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. (REF ITEM 2 ON 470178 1 12 PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS AN INTERFERENCE PROBLEM DURING NUTPLATE 470178 1 13 INSTALLATION. THE FASTENER THAT INTERFERED WAS REMOVAL AND REINSTALLED 470178 1 14 AFTER NUTPLATE INSTALLATION. THE REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT WAS PERFORMED 470178 1 15 PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. THIS IS NOT A DISCREPANCY. NO FURTHER SHOP OR 470178 1 16 ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED PER THIS PR. 470199 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR USE OF THE V070-198153-004 WING 470199 PMRB 2 TRAILING EDGE SEAL AS MODIFIED. THE OLD SEAL WAS PUSHED OUTBOARD BY 470199 PMRB 3 INTERFERENCE WITH THE INBOARD BLADE SEAL REQUIRING 3 HOLES TO BE 470199 PMRB 4 ELONGATED. THIS WAS DONE ON A PREVIOUS MR, BUT NO DOCUMENTATION HAS BEEN 470199 PMRB 5 FOUND. THE INBOARD EDGE OF THE NEW WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL WAS TRIMMED 470199 PMRB 6 TO ALLOW IT TO BE INSTALLED WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH THE BLADE SEAL AND 470199 PMRB 7 TO ALLOW FREEPLAY IN THE Y DIRECTION FOR THERMAL EXPANSION. A SECOND PRO 470199 PMRB 8 BLEM IS THAT THE MOST OUTBOARD NUTPLATE HAS BEEN INSTALLED ON THE WING 470199 PMRB 9 INCORRECTLY. TO INSTALL THE WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL THE MOST OUTBOARD H 470199 PMRB 10 OLE WAS ELONGATED. ELONGATING THE HOLE WILL LEAVE LESS THAN 1D EDGE DIST 470199 PMRB 11 ANCE; HOWEVER, THE HOLE IS SLOTTED TO MINIMIZE STRESS IN THE CRITICAL DI 470199 PMRB 12 RECTION THUS REDUCING THE POTENTIAL FOR THE HOLE TO CRACK THROUGH. THIS 470199 PMRB 13 END IS UNDERNEATH THE ADJACENT WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL WHEN INSTALLED. T 470199 PMRB 14 HE SEAL IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. IT WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN 470199 PMRB 15 INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. MR ID WAS ACCOMPLISHED ABOVE. T 470199 PMRB 16 HIS MR ACTION IS RESTRICTED TO THIS INSTALLATION ON OV-103. THIS MR ACTI 470199 PMRB 17 ON DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES 470199 PMRB 18 NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 470199 PMRB 19 MR RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR USE OF THE V070-198153-004 WING 470199 PMRB 20 TRAILING EDGE SEAL AS MODIFIED. THE OLD SEAL WAS PUSHED OUTBOARD BY 470199 PMRB 21 INTERFERENCE WITH THE INBOARD BLADE SEAL REQUIRING 3 HOLES TO BE 470199 PMRB 22 ELONGATED. THIS WAS DONE ON A PREVIOUS MR. BUT NO DOCUMENTATION HAS BEEN 470199 PMRB 23 FOUND. THE INBOARD EDGE OF THE NEW WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL WS TRIMMED TO 470199 PMRB 24 ALLOW IT TO BE INSTALLED WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH THE BLADE SEAL AND TO 470199 PMRB 25 ALLOW FREEPLAY IN THE Y DIRECTION FOR THERMAL EXPANSION. TO INSTALL THE 470199 PMRB 26 WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL THE MOST OUTBOARD HOLE WAS ELONGATED. ELONGATING 470199 PMRB 27 THE HOLE WILL LEAVE LESS THAN 1D EDGE DISTANCE: HOWEVER, THE HOLE IS 470199 PMRB 28 SLOTTED TO MINIMIZE STRESS IN THE CRITICAL DIRECTION THUS REDUCING THE 470199 PMRB 29 POTENTIAL FOR THE HOLE TO CRACK THROUGH. THIS END IS UNDERNEATH THE 470199 PMRB 30 ADJACENT WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL WHEN INSTALLED. THE SEAL IS SECONDARY 470199 PMRB 31 STRUCTUTE. IT WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 470199 PMRB 32 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. MR 1D WAS ACCOMPLISHED ABOVE. THIS MR ACTION 470199 PMRB 33 IS RESTRICTED TO THIS INSTALLATION ON OV-103. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 470199 PMRB 34 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT 470199 PMRB 35 THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 05/17/94, PRM APPROVED 470199 PMRB 36 FOR RESTRICTED INSTALLATION, TOP R/H WING TRAILING EDGE AT YW 134. 470199 1 1 ITEM - THE WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE BENT. IT WAS REMOVED 470199 1 2 AND A NEW ONE WAS PROCURED FOR INSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE - OPERATIONA 470199 1 3 L DEGRADATION. ITEM 2 - THIS ITEM BECAME A MOOT POINT WHEN THE SEAL WAS 470199 1 4 DISCOVERED TO BE THE WRONG DASH NUMBER AND RETURNED TO STOCK. REF: ITEM 470199 1 5 3. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. ITEM 3 - THE SEAL WHICH WAS OBTAINED 470199 1 6 WAS MISMARKED FROM THE VENDOR. ITEM 4 - THE SEAL WAS TRIMMED ON THE INBO 470199 1 7 ARD END AND ONE HOLE WAS ELONGATED TO ALLOW IT TO FIT. THIS WAS DONE WIT 470199 1 8 H MRB APPROVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE - PREVIOUS MR. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE 470199 1 9 ON THIS PR. 470200 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF PR STR-3-A0231, BOTH LEFT AND RIGHT HAND ROLLER AS 470200 1 2 SY RIGGINGS WERE FOUND DISCREPANT. REFERENCE PAGE 1 FOR DIMENSIONS AND R 470200 1 3 EQUIREMENTS. A 0.002" GROOVE WAS ALSO FOUND ON THE OUTER SURFACE OF SECT 470200 1 4 OR WHERE IT INTERFACED WITH THE LEFT LOWER ROLLER CREST. (ITEM 1) FURTHE 470200 1 5 R EVALUATION AND MEASUREMENT OF THE GAP, INDICATED ONLY THE RIGHT LOWER 470200 1 6 ROLLER IS OUT OF TOLERANCE. BOTH LEFT UPPER AND LOWER ROLLERS ARE IN THE 470200 1 7 CORRECT CONFIGURATION. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. THE CAUSE OF THIS 470200 1 8 ITEM IS NOT HARDWARE DISCREPANCY. (ITEM 2) LEFT UPPER GAP AND LEFT LOWE 470200 1 9 R GAP WERE MEASURED 0.008" AND 0.006", RESPECTIVELY, DURING EVALUATION. 470200 1 10 THE UPPER GAP IS WITHIN THE DWG TOLERANCE OF 0.010" +/- 0.002". MR FOR 470200 1 11 UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE LEFT LOWER ROLLER CONFIGURATION WAS APPROVED. NO 470200 1 12 FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. THE CAUSE OF THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL 470200 1 13 DEGRADATION. (ITEM 3) THE GROOVE FOUND ON THE OUTER SURFACE OF SECTOR 470200 1 14 WAS SUPERFICIAL AND WILL NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF THE RSB. MR FOR 470200 1 15 UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE SECTOR WAS APPROVED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS 470200 1 16 REQUIRED. THE CAUSE OF THIS ITEM IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 470212 1 1 THE V070-350635-001 CLIP ON THE R/H XO1365 BULKHEAD WAS BROKE. THE CLIP 470212 1 2 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH HI-LOKS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL VEHICLE PR 470212 1 3 OCESSING. 470516 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP TO DOCUMENT A CHIPPED L/H MLG FWD/INBD DOOR HOOK 470516 1 2 TIP. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE FWD/INBD DOOR HOOK TIP CONTACTED THE 470516 1 3 DOOR ROLLER DURING EXTENSION AND RETRACTION. THE LATCH PRELOAD WAS 470516 1 4 REDUCED 1/2 TURN (LENGTHENED) PER SPEC. THIS TOOK THE RELEASED POSITION 470516 1 5 MORE TOWARDS RELEASE AND OUT OF THE WAY OF THE ROLLER. THE CONTACT WAS 470516 1 6 REDUCED BUT WAS STILL EVIDENT. THIS CONTACT AS WELL AS THE DAMAGED HOOK 470516 1 7 WAS MRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. RIGGING MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN 470516 1 8 AFTER ADJUSTMENTS WERE MADE. THESE MEASUREMENTS WERE COMPARED TO 470516 1 9 PREVIOUS (MRB ACCEPTED) DATA AND MRB ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THIS 470516 1 10 PR DOES NOT AFFECT OTHER VEHICLES. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 470516 1 11 DEGRADATION, LESS THAN OPTIONAL RIGGING. 470586 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DISCREPANT NUT PLATE ON THE V 470586 1 2 070-199219-002 SPAR FITTING. THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REP 470586 1 3 LACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PER A PREVIOUS MR THE NUT PLATE WAS INSTAL 470586 1 4 LED WITH BLIND FASTENERS. THE BLIND FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND PER PRINT 470586 1 5 RIVETS WERE INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRAD 470586 1 6 ATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 470587 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DISCREPANT NUT PLATE ON THE V 470587 1 2 070-199218-002 SPAR FITTING. THE DISCREPANT NUT PLATE WAS REMOVED AND RE 470587 1 3 PLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL 470587 1 4 DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 470679 1 1 REFERENCE ITEM 1: ALL 12 LOCATIONS HAD BEEN TREATED FOR CORROSION IN THE 470679 1 2 PAST (SEE STR-3-18-4704). LOCATIONS 4 AND 5 SHOWED SIGNS OF ACTIVE CORR 470679 1 3 OSION. THESE LOCATIONS WERE ACID ETCHED AND ALL ACTIVE CORROSION WAS REM 470679 1 4 OVED. THE OTHER 10 LOCATIONS WERE REPORTED BECAUSE OF DEFECTIVE/MISSING 470679 1 5 PAINT. ALL LOCATIONS WERE CORROSION PROTECTED. PAINTED, AND MR ACCEPTED. 470679 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. 470680 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: DURING V30-15368, THE V070-298120-001 THERMAL BARRIER WAS 470680 PMRB 2 FOUND TO BE CRACKED. A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND DURING INSTALLATION, IT 470680 PMRB 3 WAS FOUND THAT THE LOCATOR HOLE DID NOT LINE UP WITH THE HOLE IN THE ST 470680 PMRB 4 RUCTURE. BY ELONGATING THE LOCATOR HOLE, PROPER POSITIONING IF THE THERM 470680 PMRB 5 AL BARRIER MAY BE ACHIEVED. TO ACCOMMODATE THE REDUCED BEARING SURFACE D 470680 PMRB 6 UE TO THE ELONGATED HOLE, A MD153-0018-0003 WASHER WILL BE INSTALLED UND 470680 PMRB 7 ER THE HEAD OF THE SCREW. THE HOLE ELONGATION WILL ALLOW THE PART TO BE 470680 PMRB 8 INSTALLED PER DESIGN INTENT. THIS REWORK DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFETY, REL 470680 PMRB 9 IABILITY, DURABILITY, OR INTEGRITY OF THE THERMAL BARRIER INSTALLATION. 470680 PMRB 10 THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE RETAINS A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS MR 470680 PMRB 11 ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION 470680 PMRB 12 DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR 470680 PMRB 13 ACTION IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ON 04/12/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR 470680 PMRB 14 UNRESTRICTED "USE AS IS". 470680 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 AND 3 ON PGS 1 AND 1A): THIS PR ADDRESSED DISCREPANT THERMAL 470680 1 2 BARRIERS ON THE LH UPPER RSB. THIS PR REMOVED THE UPPER CORNER AND UPPE 470680 1 3 R AFT THERMAL BARRIERS AND REPLACED THEM WITH NEW THERMAL BARRIER ASSYS 470680 1 4 PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. THE THREE DAMAGED THERMAL BARRIERS AT THE LOWER, 470680 1 5 FWD EDGE OF THE UPPER PANEL WERE REMOVED PER STR-3-19-615. AFTER REMOVA 470680 1 6 L, THIS PR ROUTED THE DISCREPANT ASSYS TO THE HDA, OBTAINED AND ASSEMBLE 470680 1 7 D THE NEW ASSYS, THEN KITTED THEM WITH THE HW TO BE MODIFIED AND REINSTA 470680 1 8 LLED PER STR-3-19-615. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS IS FLIGHT DAMAGE. 470680 1 9 (REF ITEM 2 ON PG 1A): DURING V30-15368, THE V070-298120-001 THERMAL 470680 1 10 BARRIER WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED. A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND DURING 470680 1 11 INSTALLATION, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE LOCATOR HOLE DID NOT LINE UP WITH 470680 1 12 THE HOLE IN THE STRUCTURE. THE HOLE WAS ELONGATED PER UNRESTRICTED MR 470680 1 13 DISPO AND A MD153-0018-0003 WASHER WAS INSTALLED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE 470680 1 14 BEARING SURFACE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS VENDOR. (REF ITEM 4 ON PG 470680 1 15 1B): THE DISCREPANCY NOTED AS ITEM 4 ON PG 1B IS AGAINST A PART 470680 1 16 PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED ON STR-3-19-4844. THE DISCREPANT THERMAL BARRIER 470680 1 17 IS BEING SENT TO THE SERVICE CENTER FOR REWORK OF CRACKED TAB. THIS IS A 470680 1 18 DUPLICATE ITEM. (REF ITEM 5 ON PG 1C): THE DISCREPANCY NOTED PER ITEM 5 470680 1 19 ON PG 1 IS A DUPLICATE OF ONE OF THE THERMAL BARRIERS NOTED PER ITEM 1 470680 1 20 OF THIS PR. STEPS 1-32 THROUGH 1-44 ADDRESSES AND SCRAPS THIS THERMAL 470680 1 21 BARRIER. THIS IS A DUPLICATE ITEM. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION 470680 1 22 REQUIRED. 470681 1 1 LOCATIONS 1 THROUGH 11 SHOWED SIGNS OF ACTIVE CORROSION. ALL OF THESE LO 470681 1 2 CATIONS WERE ACID ETCHED AND ALL ACTIVE CORROSION WAS REMOVED. THE MYLAR 470681 1 3 WHEET DEPICTING THE HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE CORROSION REMOVAL EFFORTS 470681 1 4 WAS UPDATED TO INCLUDE THE OPERATION UNDER THIS PR. THE LOCATIONS WERE T 470681 1 5 HEN CORROSION PROTECTED, PAINTED, AND MR ACCEPTED. NO FURTHER ENGINEERIN 470681 1 6 G IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL AND OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION 470682 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1: THIS PR ADDRESSES TWO THERMAL BARRIERS ON THE L/H 470682 1 2 LOWER RSB PANEL WHICH HAVE MISSING TABS. THE DISCREPANT THERMAL BARRIERS 470682 1 3 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. THE DISCREPANT THERMA 470682 1 4 L BARRIERS WERE ROUTED TO THE NSLD FOR REWORK. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS P 470682 1 5 R IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQU 470682 1 6 IRED. 470683 1 1 REFERENCE ITEMS 1 AND 2: LOCATIONS 8 AND 9 WERE MISSING TOP COAT, ONLY. 470683 1 2 THE OTHER 23 LOCATIONS SHOWED SIGNS OF ACTIVE CORROSION. ALL OF THESE LO 470683 1 3 CATIONS WERE ACID ETCHED AND ALL ACTIVE CORROSION WAS REMOVED. THE LOCAT 470683 1 4 IONS WERE THEN CORROSION PROTECTED, PAINTED, MR ID'D, AND MR ACCEPTED. N 470683 1 5 O FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADA 470683 1 6 TION. 470684 1 1 REFERENCE ITEMS 1, AND 2: LOCATIONS, 1, 2 AND 3 OF ITEM 1 SHOWED SIGNS O 470684 1 2 F ACTIVE CORROSION. ALL OF THESE LOCATIONS WERE ACID ETCHED AND ALL ACTI 470684 1 3 VE CORROSION WAS REMOVED. THE DISCREPANT LOCATIONS WERE THEN CORROSION P 470684 1 4 ROTECTED, PAINTED, MR ID'D AND MR ACCEPTED. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS RE 470684 1 5 QUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONEMENTAL AND OPERATIONAL DAMAGE. 470739 1 1 THE V080-596090-003 WASHER THAT WAS FOUND LOOSE UNDER FLIPPER DOOR 15 (I 470739 1 2 TEM 1) SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTALLED WITH THE CLEVIS UNDER THE DOOR AND WAS 470739 1 3 NOT (REF STEP 1-1 AND ITEM 3). THE WASHER WAS KITTED WITH THE FLIPPER D 470739 1 4 OOR 15 INSTALLATION JOB CARD. THE LOOSE WASHER FOUND IN ITEM 2 WAS IDENT 470739 1 5 IFIED AS NOT REQUIRED FOR FLIPPER DOOR INSTALLATION AND SCRAPPED. THE MI 470739 1 6 SSING MD153-1001-0006 WASHER FROM FLIPPER DOOR 14 (ITEM 4) WAS OBTAINED 470739 1 7 AND KITTED WITH THE 14 INSTALLATION JOB CARD. THE MISSING MD153-0016-200 470739 1 8 6 SHIM IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 5 WAS OBTAINED FROM LOGISTICS AND KITTED WITH 470739 1 9 THE FLIPPER DOOR 14 INSTALLATION JOB CARD. CONCLUDE THAT ALL THE PER 470739 1 10 PRINT HARDWARE HAS BEEN KITTED WITH THE FLIPPER DOOR INSTALLATION JOB 470739 1 11 CARDS AND THAT THE JOB CARDS ARE PER PRINT AND THEREFORE NO FURTHER WORK 470739 1 12 IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEMS 1-5 ARE WORKMANSHIP. 471054 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS HYD FLUID FOUND ON NLG SERVICE PORTS. BLOCK 17 NOTES T 471054 1 2 HAT "THE SAME CONDITION WAS WRITTEN UP ON FLIGHT 18, BUT COULD NOT DUPLI 471054 1 3 CATE LEAK IN HIGH BAY. APPEARS TO BE LEAKING AT LANDING...". THE NLG STR 471054 1 4 UT WAS CHECKED FOR LEAKAGE PER RTOMI V9028.003. NO LEAKAGE WAS DETECTED. 471054 1 5 THE HYD FLUID WIPED OFF THE STRUT WAS SO MINOR THAT IT COULD NOT BE MEA 471054 1 6 SURED. THE STRUT WAS CHECKED AGAIN AFTER A GEAR CYCLE. NO ADDITIONAL FLU 471054 1 7 ID WAS NOTED, NO LEAK WAS FOUND. THE NLG STRUT HYD FLUID LEVEL WAS CHECK 471054 1 8 ED PER V1165.008. NO HYD SERVICING WAS REQUIRED (AS WAS THE CASE LAST FL 471054 1 9 OW). THIS INDICATES THAT NO SIGNIFICATN LOSS OF STRUT HYD FLUID HAS 471054 1 10 OCCURRED. THE LEAKAGE NOTED (AS TRACES OF HYD FLUID ON WIPER) WAS WELL 471054 1 11 BELOW 1 DROP/HOUR AND IS, WITHIN THE ALLOWABLE LIMITS FOR GLAND NOT 471054 1 12 LEAKAGE, THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS HIGH DYNAMIC LOADS ON SEALS DURING 471054 1 13 LANDING. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. 471054 1 14 NO RETEST REQUIRED. 471119 1 1 DURING POST FLIGHT ELEVON COVE INSPECTION, 1 CUT WAS FOUND IN THE V070-1 471119 1 2 98874-036 CURTAIN SEALS. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS REPAIRED PER MR DISPOSITIO 471119 1 3 N USING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 471119 1 4 NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPE 471119 1 5 RATIONAL DEGRADATION. 471205 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V1240 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE SEGMENTS 1H29 471205 1 2 8D26 AND 1D1063B26 HAD EXPOSED CONDUCTORS WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE PRIMARY 471205 1 3 CONDUCTORS. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY PERFORMING MR APPROVED SRP 471205 1 4 V-EL-0029-0-0 TO INSTALL INSULATOR SLEEVE OVER THE DAMAGED AREAS. THIS 471205 1 5 RETURNS THE WIRE SEGMENTS TO DESIGN INTENT. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION 471205 1 6 REQUIRED ON THIS DOCUMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON FLIGH 471205 1 7 T ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 471206 1 1 DURING V1240 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 4R2386B22-1 HAD EXPOSED CONDUCT 471206 1 2 OR. THE WIRE WAS REPAIRED BY INSTALLING SPLICES. SEE INTERIM SUMMARY BY 471206 1 3 OEL ON PAGE 12. RETEST WAS PERFORMED BY V1278.001, STEPS 05-012 AND 19-1 471206 1 4 00. NO FURTHER WORK REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: MATERIALS DEGRA 471206 1 5 DATION. 471207 1 1 WIRE REPAIRED BY SRP. THIS FUNCTION WAS RETESTED VIA STANDARD ORBITER PO 471207 1 2 WER DOWN ON 8 MARCH 1994. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. REFEREN 471207 1 3 CE INTERIM SUMM PG-5. P/C: NORMAL WEAR. 471208 1 1 DURING V1240 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE J191A20-1 HAD CONDUCTOR SHOWING 471208 1 2 WITH NO VISIBLE CONDUCTOR DAMAGE. WIRE J191A20-1 WAS REPAIRED BY HEAT S 471208 1 3 HRINKING SEALING SLEEVE OVER DISCREPANT AREA. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORM 471208 1 4 AL WEAR AND TEAR WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. THIS RETURNS WIRE HARNESS 471208 1 5 TO AN ACCPETABLE BUT NON-DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFEC 471208 1 6 T SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE, OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. N 471208 1 7 O FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 471231 1 1 REF: ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1. THE MR STR-3-07-2050 SHIM BONDED TO THE V070-1983 471231 1 2 20-001 PANEL AT THE OUTBOARD ATTACH POINT FOR THE V070-194123 CARRIER PA 471231 1 3 NEL WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED. A NEW SHIM WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED TO TH 471231 1 4 E PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. REF: ITE 471231 1 5 M 2 ON PAGE 1A. THE MR STR-3-17-2050 SHIM BONDED TO THE V070-198320-001 471231 1 6 PANEL AT THE INBOARD ATTACHED POINT FOR THE V070-194123 CARRIER WAS FOUN 471231 1 7 D TO BE DEBONDED. A NEW SHIM WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED TO THE PANEL. PRO 471231 1 8 BABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. REF: ITEM 3 ON PAGE 471231 1 9 1B. THE SHIM BONDED TO THE V070-198320 PANEL PER DISPOSITION ADDRESSING 471231 1 10 ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 WAS FABRICATED TO THE WRONG DIMENSIONS. PAPER CALLED 471231 1 11 OUT DIMENSIONS FOR THE INBOARD SHIM, NOT THE OUTBOARD. THE SHIM WAS 471231 1 12 REMOVED AND USED TO REPLACE THE DISCREPANT SHIM NOTED PER ITEM 2. 471231 1 13 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS A WORK AUTHORIZATION ERROR. NO FURTHER 471231 1 14 SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 471314 1 1 REF ITEMS 1 AND 3 IN BLOCK 17: TWO OF THE RETAINED BOLTS WHICH SECURE TH 471314 1 2 E GRAPHITE SEALS ON THE FWD SIDE OF THE RSB WOULD NOT TIGHTEN DOWN SECUR 471314 1 3 ELY WHEN BROUGHT UP TO FULL TORQUE. RETORQUING THE BOLTS AMELIORATED THE 471314 1 4 CONDITION, BUT ONE OF THE BOLTS IS STILL SUFFICIENTLY LOOSE TO PERMIT T 471314 1 5 HE ISOLATOR WASHER TO ROTATE. LOOSENESS OF THIS SINGLE WASHER IS MR APPR 471314 1 6 OVED AS AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR ID PROVIDED. PR 471314 1 7 OBABLE CAUSE: INCREASED THREAD FRICTION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THREAD CONDITIO 471314 1 8 N OR CONTAMINATION. ITEM 2 IN BLOCK 17: TAPE WAS REPLACED SATISFACTORILY 471314 1 9 ON DR STR-3-19-0799 PRIOR TO UPGRADE OF THE DR TO STR-3-19-4821. 471526 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DUE TO SHIMS, AT THE B HATCH SUPPORT LEG ATTACH LI 471526 1 2 NKS, NOT BEING INSTALLED PER STEP 01-005 OF OMI V5148.002. THE SHIMS WER 471526 1 3 E INSTALLED PER THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. NO RETEST REQUIR 471526 1 4 ED. THIS DOE NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. ENG NOTE: A PERM DEV HAS BE 471526 1 5 EN WRITTEN TO CLARIFY PROCEDURE. 471570 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN AGAINST SEVERAL SCRATCHES NOTED ON THE V075-593327 B 471570 1 2 HATCH HINGE ARMS (REF. FIGURE 1-1). THE SCRATCHES WERE ACCEPTABLE PER T 471570 1 3 HE FAIR WEAR AND TEAR SPEC., AND WERE LIGHTLY SANDED TO ELIMINATE SHARP 471570 1 4 EDGES. CHEMICAL FILM PROTECTION WAS THEN APPLIED. THIS CONDITION DOES NO 471570 1 5 T AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL SERVICE WEAR DUE 471570 1 6 TO HANDLING. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 471750 1 1 DURING OEL-3-19-067 WIRE 1M1209AA24 WAS INADVERTENTLY CUT AT DESIGN SPLI 471750 1 2 CE 40SP2256 (ITEM 1). WIRE 1M1209AA24 WAS REPAIRED BY REINSTALLING DESIG 471750 1 3 N SPLICE 40SP2256. THIS RETURNS WIRE TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE 471750 1 4 CAUSE DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. AFTER REROUTING WIRE 1M103A24 WAS TO SHORT TO 471750 1 5 TERMINATE TO 40P9783 (ITEM 2). ADDITIONAL WIRE P/N: MP571-0086-0002 WAS 471750 1 6 SPLICED ONTO 1M103A24 USING KSC SPLICE "KSC-0647" AND TERMINATED TO 40P9 471750 1 7 783 PER OEL-3-19-067. THIS RETURNS WIRE SEGMENT TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON 471750 1 8 -DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DU 471750 1 9 RABILITY, PERFORMANCE, OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO 471750 1 10 REDESIGN OF WIRE CIRCUIT. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER 471750 1 11 SCAN TRACK OF DEMATED CONNECTOR 40P9783. 471781 1 1 THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS CORROSION ON ALL THERMAL BARRIER SPRINGS ON THE RSB. 471781 1 2 THE THERMAL BARRIER SPRING ASSEMBLIES ARE MADE OF INCONEL SHEET. INCONE 471781 1 3 L IS A HIGHLY CORROSION RESISTANT MATERIAL WHICH RESISTS CORROSION TO A 471781 1 4 TEMPERATURE OF 1500 DEG F. THE CORROSION NOTED PER ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 HAS 471781 1 5 BEEN NOTED AND DOCUMENTED IN THE PAST AND HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE A COMBINA 471781 1 6 TION OF RESIDUE FROM THE SRB'S AND SUPERFICIAL SURFACE OXIDATION WHICH D 471781 1 7 OES NOT DEGRADE THE THERMAL BARRIERS. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. (REF ITEMS 471781 1 8 2,13 AND 15 ON PAGES 1A,1B AND 1C). THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT DISCREPANT 471781 1 9 THERMAL BARRIERS SPRING SEALS. THE DISCREPANT HARDWARE WAS REMOVED AND 471781 1 10 NEW HARDWARE WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. THE REMOVED HARDWARE 471781 1 11 WAS ROUTED TO THE NSLD FOR RECOMMENDED REWORK TO FIX MISSING AND CRACKED 471781 1 12 TABS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF 471781 1 13 ITEMS 3 THROUGH 12 ON PAGES 1A AND 1B) THESE ITEMS DOCUMENTED BENT TABS 471781 1 14 ON THE V070-298115-001 THERMAL BARRIER SPRING SEALS. THE DISCREPANT 471781 1 15 HARDWARE WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE DISCREPANT 471781 1 16 HARDWARE WAS MR IDENTIFIED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS IS 471781 1 17 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 14 ON PAGE 1B) THIS IS A DUPLICATE OF 471781 1 18 A DISCREPANCY NOTED PER STR-3-19-4826. NO ADDITIONAL DISCREPANCY EXISTS. 471781 1 19 NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 471820 1 1 WHILE REMOVING SPOT TIES FOR TPS OEL-3-19-066 WIRE 1D22A26 WAS CUT. DISP 471820 1 2 OSITION WAS WRITTEN TO INSTALL KSC SPLICE KSC-0648. AFTER CRIMPING OF TH 471820 1 3 E SPLICE, THE WIRE WAS NOT VISIBLE THRU THE INSPECTION HOLE. AFTER REMOV 471820 1 4 AL OF THE DISCREPANT SPLICE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT LENGTH TO INSTALL ANO 471820 1 5 THER SPLICE (REFERENCE PAGE 1A). A NEW SECTION OF WIRE WAS INSTALLED FRO 471820 1 6 M THE END OF WIRE 12D22A26 (GOING OUTBOARD) TO CONNECTOR 81P719 USINING 471820 1 7 KSC SPLICE KSC-0648 WITH MR APPROVAL. THE OLD SECTION OF WIRE 1D22A26 WA 471820 1 8 S SCRAPPED LOCALLY. THE RETEST OF THIS PR WILL BE TRACKED PER THE SCAN L 471820 1 9 OG NUMBER ON PAGE 17. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEMS 1 AND 2 WERE 471820 1 10 WORKMANSHIP. 472071 1 1 ITEM 1: JOGGLES FORMED ON 2 V070-370113-002 DOUBLERS HAVE CREASES ON THE 472071 1 2 BEND RADIUS. THE CREASES WERE BLENDED AWAY AND THE DOUBLERS WERE MR ACC 472071 1 3 EPTED. ITEM 2: AN EXISTING HOLE IN THE T01P33349-003 BRACKET TO TOO CLOS 472071 1 4 E TO A NEW DOUBLER HOLE. UPON INSTALLATION OF THE DOUBLER THE HI-LOK AT 472071 1 5 THIS LOCATION WAS REVERSED. THE BRACKET DID NOT HAVE TO BE TRIMMED AND W 472071 1 6 AS REINSTALLED PER PRINT. ITEM 3: SEVERAL HOLES IN THE GRAPHITE DOORS AR 472071 1 7 E DOOR ARE OUT OF TOLERANCE. ALL HOLES IN THE DOOR ARE WITHIN PRINT TOLE 472071 1 8 RANCES ON THE T01P TULSA DRAWING FOR THE GRAPHITE DOORS. IT IS NOT A PR 472071 1 9 CONDITION BUT WAS AN ENGINEERING CONCERN. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 1: 472071 1 10 CREASES FORMED DURING MACHINING OF THE PART, ITEM 2: BUILD UP OF 472071 1 11 TOLERANCES. 472073 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 PAGE 1) THE V070-370113-001 DOUBLERS WERE FOUND TO HAVE TOOL 472073 1 2 ING MARKS IN THE RADII OF THE JOGGLES. THE TOOL MARKS APPEAR TO BE THE R 472073 1 3 ESULT OF MANUAL FORMING OF THE JOGGLES USING A VISE. THE DISCREPANT AREA 472073 1 4 S WERE EVALUATED BY ENGINEERING AND FOUND TO HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF CRACKIN 472073 1 5 G. PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION, THE DISPLACED METAL WAS REMOVED AND 472073 1 6 THE DOUBLERS WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 472073 1 7 PR IS VENDOR MANUFACTURING. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUI 472073 1 8 RED FOR THIS PR. 472203 1 1 THE AREA WAS CLEANED AND INSPECTED. NO EVIDENCE OF DEGRADATION WAS FOUND 472203 1 2 . PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR. 472243 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT CRACKS FOUND IN THE LO2 ET DOOR BULB SEA 472243 1 2 L. ITEM 1 OF PAGE 1 REFERENCES DAMAGE TO THE V070-351992-003 SEAL. STESP 472243 1 3 WERE PERFORMED IN THIS PR TO REPLACE THE SEAL. RETEST WAS PERFORMED SUC 472243 1 4 CESSFULLY IN OPERATION 2. ITEM 2 OF PAGE 1 REFERENCES DAMAGE TO THE V070 472243 1 5 -351992-002 SEAL. THIS DAMAGE IS IN THE FORM OF SEVERAL SMALL CRACKS IN 472243 1 6 THE TEFLON OUTER LAYER OF THE SEAL AND IS LOCATED ON THE SIDE OF THE SEA 472243 1 7 L. NO DAMAGE EXISTS ON THE SEALING SURFACE OR ON THE SURFACE AREA EXPOSE 472243 1 8 D TO HOT GSES DURING RE-ENTRY. ITEM 2 WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED U 472243 1 9 SE. ITEM 3 OF PAGE 1A WAS WRITTEN IN ERROR TO DOCUMENT DAMAGE TO THE ET 472243 1 10 DOOR BUBL SEAL RETAINER. THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN AS A NEW PR AS 472243 1 11 THE RETAINER HAS A DIFFERENT PART NUMBER THAN THE BULB SEAL. STEP 3-1 OF 472243 1 12 THIS PR INITIATED MEQ-3-19-0780 TO ADDRESS THIS ANOMALY. ITEM 4 OF PAGE 472243 1 13 1B WAS WRITTEN TO IDENTIFY A PROPOSED DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE MAO106 472243 1 14 BONDING SPECS AND THE V070-352000 DRAWING. THE MAO106-368 SPEC DEALS 472243 1 15 WITH SPLICING AND CLOSEOUT OF SILICONE RUBBER BULB SEALS. SECTION 3.1.1 472243 1 16 CALLS OUT FOR THE TYPE OF BONDING MATERIAL REQUIRED AND REFERENCES THE 472243 1 17 MAO106-322 SPEC FOR DETAILS ON WORKING WITH THE SPECIFIED BONDING 472243 1 18 MATERIAL (IE MIXING RATIO'S, WORKING LIFE, ETC). ITEM 4 WAS WRITTEN 472243 1 19 BECAUSE THE BONDING PROCEDURE PERFORMED IN V5K25.004 DOES NOT REQUIRE 472243 1 20 LAP SHEAR TESTS AS CALLED OUT IN THE -322 SPEC. THE -322 SPEC IS A 472243 1 21 GENERAL USE BONDING SPEC AND DOES NOT SUPERCEDE THE -368 SPEC REFERENCED 472243 1 22 IN THE DRAWING. PER THE -368 SPEC INSPECTION SHALL BE VISUAL WITH THE 472243 1 23 UNAIDED EYE. THIS VISUAL INSPECTION SHALL BE USED TO DETERMINE 472243 1 24 CONFORMANCE AS STATED IN SECTION 3.2.3 FOR FILLER TUBE BONDS. THE ONLY 472243 1 25 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE SPLICE BONDS PER -368 IS A SHORE A 472243 1 26 HARDNESS TEST WHICH WAS PERFORMED IN V5K25.004. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF 472243 1 27 ITEMS 1 AND 2 ARE OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 3 472243 1 28 WAS WORKMANSHIP. THIS WAS ADDRESSED IN PR MEQ-3-19-0780. THE PROBABLE 472243 1 29 CAUSE OF ITEM 4 WAS THAT NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. 472262 1 1 ITEM 1: TWO EXISTING HOLES IN THE PLBD WILL CONFLICT WITH NEW HOLES TO B 472262 1 2 E DRILLED. THE TWO EXISTING HOLES IN THE PLBD ARE TO BE USED AS EXISTING 472262 1 3 HOLES FOR THE DOUBLER, REF MOC-001 TO TPS STR-3-19-606. ITEM 2: HOLE AT 472262 1 4 XO 799-11 HAS COMPOSITE DAMAGE. THE DAMAGE WAS MR REPAIRED WITHIN THE G 472262 1 5 UIDELINES OF SPEC. T03012. ITEM 3: ONE HOLE AT XO801.43 IS OVERSIZED TO 472262 1 6 .166 AND S/B .1657. THE HOLE IS WITHIN PRINT TOLERANCES PER THE T01P TUL 472262 1 7 SA DWG FOR THE GRAPHITE DOORS. PROBABLE CAUSE: THE COMPOSITE DAMAGE WAS 472262 1 8 NOTED AT THE TIME OF HI-LOK REMOVAL AND WAS PROBABLY FROM THE VENDOR. 472327 1 1 THE CORNERS OF THE V070-291495-008 CARRIER PANEL (OCN 8V049-6531) ARE PE 472327 1 2 R PRINT. STRUCTURES ENGINEERING HAS LOOKED AT THE PANEL AND COULD NOT FI 472327 1 3 ND ANY DISCREPANCIES. THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. 472403 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT METAL FOIL WHICH APPEARED TO BE SEPARA 472403 1 2 TING FROM SEVERAL PLBD HINGE BEARINGS. THIS H/W IS MAINTAINED BY TPS ENG 472403 1 3 AND WILL BE ADDRESSED PER PR MID-3-18-3192. NO DESCREPANCIES EXIST WITH 472403 1 4 THE MEQ PORTION OF THE PLBD. 472506 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THE V070-146002-004 FLIPPER DOOR 2 ON THE R/H INB 472506 1 2 OARD ELEVON WAS FOUND TO HAVE TWO SMALL DENTS IN THE UPPER FACESHEET OF 472506 1 3 THE V070-146025 PANEL. THE FACESHEET THICKNESS AT THE LOCATION OF THE DE 472506 1 4 NTS IS 0.018 (+/- 0.002) INCH. THE DENTS WERE FOUND TO BE 0.006" AND 0.0 472506 1 5 04 DEEP WITH NO SHARP RADII. A COIN TAP WAS PERFORMED AND SHOWED NO EVID 472506 1 6 ENCE OF FACESHEET DELAMINATION. VISUAL INSPECTION WITH MAGNIFICATION SHO 472506 1 7 WED NO EVIDENCE OF CRACKED FACESHEET. THE V070-146002-004 FLIPPER DOOR 2 472506 1 8 ASSEMBLY WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 472506 1 9 PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION 472506 1 10 REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 472525 1 1 DURING STRUCTURED SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE S82288A20-1 A 472525 1 2 SSOCIATE WITH DESIGN SPLICE 82SP226 HAD AN EXPOSED CONDUCTOR. WIRE S8228 472525 1 3 8A20-1 WAS REPAIRED BY REMOVING DESIGN SPLICE 82P226 AND THE DAMAGED WIR 472525 1 4 E SECTION THEN RETERMINATING DESIGN SPLICE 82P226. THE RETEST OF WIRE SE 472525 1 5 GMENT S82288A20-1 AND DESIGN SPLICE 82P226 WAS SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHED 472525 1 6 PER V1179.008. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO UNAVOIDAB 472525 1 7 LE DAMAGE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON 472525 1 8 THIS WAD. 472526 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, WIRE 5YK605E24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON/SHIELD DAMA 472526 1 2 GE. THE DISCREPANT WIRE WAS REMOVED REPLACED WITH A NEW SEGMENT. CONTINU 472526 1 3 ITY, HIPOT AND ISOLATION CHECKS WERE PERFORMED AND WERE SUCCESSFUL. PROB 472526 1 4 ABLE CAUSES WERE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 472603 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLES 1ZK296B24, 2ZK296B24, 4Z 472603 1 2 K296B24, AND 5ZK296B24 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE EXPOSING THE SHIELD. NO SHIELD 472603 1 3 STRAND DAMAGE WAS DETECTED. THE DAMAGE AREAS OF ALL FOUR CABLES WERE TAP 472603 1 4 ED WITH MYSTIK 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE WITH MR APPROVAL. THERE IS NO RETEST 472603 1 5 REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS OPERATIONAL DE 472603 1 6 GRADATION. 472604 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLES 1YC1150A24 AND 1YC1151 472604 1 2 A24 HAD SHIELD DAMAGE AT 83P128. CABLES 1YC1150A24 AND 1YC1151A24 WERE R 472604 1 3 EMOVED AND NEW CABLES ROUTED IN BETWEEN 83P128 AND 83P152. A CONTINUITY, 472604 1 4 ISOLATION AND HIPOT CHECK WAS PERFORMED AND PASSED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE 472604 1 5 TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. THIS RETURNS THE WIR 472604 1 6 E HARNESS TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WI 472604 1 7 LL BE PER SCAN TRACK. 472704 1 1 THE DAMAGED GASKET IDENTIFIED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS REMOVED AND A NEW GA 472704 1 2 SKET MADE PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. AFTER CURE OF NEW GASKET IT WAS NOTED 472704 1 3 THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT ADHESIVE TO PROVIDE A CONTINOUS SEAL DUE T 472704 1 4 O EXCESSIVE GAP BETWEEN CARRIER PANEL AND DOOR (ITEM 2, PAGE 1A). THE GA 472704 1 5 SKET WAS REMOVED AND ANOTHER NEW GASKET, WITH MORE ADHESIVE, WAS FORMED 472704 1 6 PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. AFTER CURE SMALL VOIDS WERE FOUND IN THE GASKET 472704 1 7 (ITEM 3, PAGE 1B). THE VOIDS WERE FILLED PER SPECIFICATION. CAUSE OF DAM 472704 1 8 AGE (ITEM 1) WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AND EXCESSIVE GAP (ITEM 2) 472704 1 9 WAS DUE TO BUILD-UP OF TOLERANCES AND VOIDS (ITEM 3) WAS NOT 472704 1 10 DISCREPANCY. CONCLUDE NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED AND THIS PR MAY BE 472704 1 11 CLOSE. 472709 1 1 ITEMS 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 - SUSPECT CORROSION WAS CLEANED AND INSPECTED FOR 472709 1 2 DEGRADATION. ITEMS 1, 4, 6 AND 9 - NO CORROSION. PROBABLE CAUSE - NO DI 472709 1 3 SCREPANCY. ITEM 5 - THE CORROSION WAS REMOVED BY MECHANICAL MEANS TO A D 472709 1 4 EPTH OF .0106" WITH MRB APPROVAL AND THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED. P 472709 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE - OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. ITEM 7 - NO CORROSION. THE UNCO 472709 1 6 ATED FASTENERS WERE ACCEPTED UNDER FAIR WEAR AND TEAR CRITERIA. PROBABLE 472709 1 7 CAUSE - FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 3 - 4 RIVETS NOT SEATED. THREE OF THE 472709 1 8 RIVETS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE - WORKMANSHIP 472709 1 9 . ITEM 10 WAS PICKED UP ON THE FOURTH HOLE. ITEM 10 - HOLE IS ENLARGED. 472709 1 10 THE FOURTH HUCK RIVET WAS REPLACED WITH AN OVERSIZE HI-LOK WITH MRB 472709 1 11 APPROVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE - WORKMANSHIP. 472741 1 1 FUEL CELL 1 (S/N 107) DISSOLVED GAS WAS MEASURED AT 16%. NEWLY INSTALLED 472741 1 2 FUEL CELLS SHOULD HAVE A DISSOLVED GAS CONTENT OF 15% OR LESS. THE PROB 472741 1 3 LEM WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE A70-0685-1 COOLANT SERVICING UNIT. SAMPLES TAK 472741 1 4 EN FROM THE UNIT SHOWED A DISSOLVED GAS CONTENT OF 16%. THE UNIT WS SENT 472741 1 5 TO MBMR FOR RESERVICING OF COOLANT. A NEWLY SERVICED A70-0685-1 UNIT HA 472741 1 6 S A DISSOLVED GAS CONTENT OF 4% MAX. SUBSEQUENT SAMPLING OF THE FUEL CEL 472741 1 7 L 1 COOLANT LOOP SHOWED A DISSOLVED GAS CONTENT OF 8%. TO PREVENT THIS P 472741 1 8 ROBLEM FROM REOCCURRING THE A70-0685-1 COOLANT SERVICING UNIT WILL BE RE 472741 1 9 SERVICED PRIOR TO USE ON NEWLY INSTALLED FUEL CELLS. THIS WILL BE 472741 1 10 VERIFIED IN THE INSTALLATION OMI V5R01. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS ANOMALY 472741 1 11 IS A PROCEDURAL ERROR. 472742 1 1 THE RIVETS WERE INSPECTED AND WERE FOUND TO ALL BE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF 472742 1 2 MPP 101M302M01. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: N 472742 1 3 O DISCREPANCY. 472787 1 1 THE RIVETS WERE INSPECTED UNDER 10X MAGNIFICATION. ALL BUT ONE WERE FOUN 472787 1 2 D TO BE WITHIN THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MPP 101M302M01. THE ONE WAS REMOV 472787 1 3 ED AND REPLACED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 472787 1 4 WORKMANSHIP. 472789 1 1 ITEMS 1: THIS CONDITION IS COVERED UNDER THE FAIR WEAR AND TEAR SEPC AND 472789 1 2 ARE NOT PR CONDITIONS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. ITEMS 2: THIS AR 472789 1 3 EA WAS CLEANED AND INSPECTED. NO ADDITIONAL CONTAMINATION OR DEGRADATION 472789 1 4 WAS FOUND. PROBABLE CAUSE: CONTAMINATION. 472812 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A MIS-DRILLED HOLE IN THE GR/E TORQUE BOX AT THE R/H X 472812 1 2 O 687 DOUBLER LOCATION. THE HOLE IN THE GR/E WAS FILLED USING MBO120-008 472812 1 3 ADHESIVE PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. THE DRILL POINT IN THE V070-3 472812 1 4 70114-002 DOUBLER WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS AFTER X-RAY INSPECTION CONFIRMED 472812 1 5 NO CRACKS WERE EVIDENT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP. NO F 472812 1 6 URTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 472828 1 1 THE RTV GASKET AROUND THE EDGE OF THE 50-01 DOOR WAS SLIGHTLY DEBONDED. 472828 1 2 THE RTV GASKET WAS REBONDED BY APPLYING MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE TO T 472828 1 3 HE DEBONDED AREAS. THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE DOOR AND THE CON 472828 1 4 TAINER IT IS STORED IN AT THIS POINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRAD 472828 1 5 ATION. 472830 1 1 THE RTV GASKET AROUND THE EDGE OF THE 50-02 DOOR WAS SLIGHTLY DEBONDED. 472830 1 2 THE RTV GASKET WAS REBONDED BY APPLYING MBO130-119 TYPE II ADJESIVE TO T 472830 1 3 HE DEBONDED AREAS. THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE DOOR AND THE CON 472830 1 4 TAINER IT IS STORED IN AT THIS POINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRAD 472830 1 5 ATION. 472846 1 1 THE REMOVAL OF THE PARTS LISTED IN ITEMS 1 THROUGH 6 OF THIS PR WAS OFFI 472846 1 2 CIALLY DOCUMENTED ON PR STR-3-A0223 STEP 10-1 AND ALL NECESSARY SIGNATUR 472846 1 3 ES WERE OBTAINED. NO WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: LSOC SE 472846 1 4 MISINTERPRETATION OF TTL SPI SP-006. TTL SPI TEAM IS IN WORK TO CLARIFY 472846 1 5 AND RELEASE NEW REVISION OF SP-006. 472935 1 1 A BEND WITH A LENGTH OF 1/8" AND DEFLECTION OF 1/16" WAS FOUND ON THE LO 472935 1 2 WER FORWARD CORNER OF THE V070-390201-002 C/P. THE CARRIER PANEL WAS MR 472935 1 3 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND ID'D WITH THIS PR NUMBER AT THE LOCATI 472935 1 4 ON OF THE BEND. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 472994 1 1 DURING SURV, ITEM 1 WIRE SEGMENT C2500G20-2 WAS FOUND TO HAVE EXPOSED CO 472994 1 2 NDUCTOR DAMAGE. MR APPROVAL WAS REQUESTED TO CUT OUT THE DAMAGED AREA AN 472994 1 3 D INSTALL KSC SPLICE KSC-0657 ON WIRE C2500G20-2. WIRE C2500G20-2 HAD DA 472994 1 4 MAGED PRIMARY INSULATION EXPOSING THE CONDUCTOR. WIRE C2500G20-2 IS THE 472994 1 5 -2 OF A TWO CONDUCTOR TWISTED PAIR. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT ACCESS TO SEP 472994 1 6 ARATE THE WIRES TO PERFORM A CLAMSHELL REPAIR. ITEM 2 WIRE SEGMENT C2723 472994 1 7 B24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE PAIN MISSING ONLY NO CONDUCTOR DAMAGE. THIS IS COM 472994 1 8 SMETIC ONLY AND DOES NOT REQUIRED REPAIR. RETEST OF CONN 83P703 WILL BE 472994 1 9 TRACKED BY SCAN 3-19-0500. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO NROMAL WEAR AND 472994 1 10 TEAR. 473166 PMRB 1 THIS MR ACCEPTS THE BODY FLAP REAR SPAR WITH SUSPECT CORROSION "AS IS" F 473166 PMRB 2 OR RESTRICTED USE TO NEXT FLIGHT. DURING I-5 INSPECTION OF THE BODY FLAP 473166 PMRB 3 ON V30-15405 JOB CARD, AN AREA OF SUSPECT CORROSION WAS FOUND (SEE ATTA 473166 PMRB 4 CHED PICTURE AND SKETCH). LSOC AND NASA ENGINEERING INSPECTION DETERMINE 473166 PMRB 5 D THAT THERE ARE MINUTE AREAS OF POSSIBLE SURFACE CORROSION BUT NO INDIC 473166 PMRB 6 ATION OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVE CORROSION. SHOULD THE CORROSION BE ACTIVE, I 473166 PMRB 7 T WILL NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCTURE BEYOND A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE 473166 PMRB 8 SPAR IS .050" THICK IN THE AREA OF THE SUSPECT CORROSION. BY DEFERRING 473166 PMRB 9 THIS PR TO NEXT FLIGHT, A FOLLOW UP INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED TO 473166 PMRB 10 DETERMINE IF ANY CHANGES TO THE EXTENT OF THE CORROSION ARE OCCURING. 473166 PMRB 11 THE BODY FLAP SPAR IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 473166 PMRB 12 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT 473166 PMRB 13 THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PMRB APPROVAL FOR 473166 PMRB 14 DEFERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 05/24/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO 473166 PMRB 15 FLT 20 OF OV-102. 473166 PMRB 16 473166 PMRB 17 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: 1A) REQUESTED ACTION: MR ACCEPT AS IS - RESTRICTED 473166 PMRB 18 LIFE INSTALLATION. 1B) TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR 473166 PMRB 19 RESTRICTED LIFE OF THE BODY FLAP REAR SPAR WITH SUSPECT CORROSION UNTIL 473166 PMRB 20 FLIGHT 21. NDE INSPECTION DETERMINED THAT THERE IS ONE (1) REMAINING 473166 PMRB 21 AREA OF POSSIBLE CORROSION. HOWEVER A COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS 473166 PMRB 22 PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CONDITION HAS WORSENED. THE SPAR 473166 PMRB 23 IS .050" THICK IN THE AREA OF THE SUSPECT CORROSION. A FOLLOW-UP 473166 PMRB 24 INSPECTION AT FLIGHT 21 WILL BE PERFORMED TO DETERMINE IF THE CONDITIONS 473166 PMRB 25 IN THE AREA HAS WORSENED. THE AREA WILL BE INSPECTED AFTER EACH 473166 PMRB 26 SUBSEQUENT FLIGHT BY ENGINEERING TO DETERMINE IF THE SUSPECT CORROSION 473166 PMRB 27 CONDITIONS HAVE CHANGED/WORSENED. THE BODY FLAP AFT SPAR IS PRIMARY 473166 PMRB 28 STRUCTURE. THE SPAR WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 473166 PMRB 29 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. NO MR IDENTIFICATION IS REQUIRED. 1C) 473166 PMRB 30 STATEMENT OF COMPROMISE: THIS MR ACTION IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE 473166 PMRB 31 ON OV-103 FLIGHT 20. 2) "CIL" STATEMENT: THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT 473166 PMRB 32 THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 3) 473166 PMRB 33 "CERTIFICATION" STATEMENT: THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS 473166 PMRB 34 FOR CERTIFICATION. 12/20/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF 473166 PMRB 35 OV-103. 473166 PMRB 36 473166 PMRB 37 MR/DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED LIFE OF 473166 PMRB 38 THE BODY FLAP REAR SPAR WITH SUSPECT CORROSION UNTIL FLIGHT 22 OMDP. 473166 PMRB 39 NDE INSPECTION DETERMINE THAT THERE IS AN AREA OF POSSIBLE CORROSION 473166 PMRB 40 WHICH HAS WORSENED. FROM THE BORESCOPE PHOTOS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO TELL 473166 PMRB 41 IF THE AREA IN QUESTION IS CORRODED AT ALL. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DO ANY 473166 PMRB 42 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS BECAUSE THE SUSPECT AREA IS ON THE AFT SPAR OF 473166 PMRB 43 THE BODY FLAP, SEVERAL FEET OUT OF REACH. FROM THE PHOTOS, THE AREA 473166 PMRB 44 DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE SIGNIFICATNLY WORSE THAN CORROSION SEEN ON ANY 473166 PMRB 45 OTHER PART OF THE VEHICLE. IF THERE IS CORROSION AND IT IS SIMILAR TO 473166 PMRB 46 THAT FOUND IN TOTHER LOCATIONS ON THE VEHICLE THEN IT MOST LIKELY DOE 473166 PMRB 47 SNOT EXCEED 25% OF THE SPAR THICKNESS. THE SPAR IS .050" IN THE SUSPECT 473166 PMRB 48 AREA. THE CURRENT CONDITION DOES NOT WARRANT REWORK AT THIS TIME. OMDP 473166 PMRB 49 IS SCHEDULED FOR FLIGHT 22. AT THAT TIME THE BODY FLAP WILL BE 473166 PMRB 50 INSPECTED AND/OR REPAIRED. THE BODY FLAP AFT SPARE IS PRIMARY 473166 PMRB 51 STRUCTURE. THE SPAR WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 473166 PMRB 52 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. NO MR IDENTIFICATION IS REQUIRED. FIT, FORM, 473166 PMRB 53 AND FUNCTIN AHVE NOT BEEN COMPOMISED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT 473166 PMRB 54 THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 473166 PMRB 55 THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. 473166 PMRB 56 05/02/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. 473166 PMRB 57 MR DEFERRAL RATIONALE: DEFER OF THIS PR TO THE NEXT, SCHEDULED BODY 473166 PMRB 58 FLAP REMOVAL, THE NEXT OMDP, (WHICHEVER COMES FIRST) IS REQUESTED TO 473166 PMRB 59 ALLOW A MORE EFFECTIVE AND THOROUGH CLEANING AND INSPECTION WHEN THE 473166 PMRB 60 BODY FLAP IS REMOVED AND THE AREAS IN QUESTION ARE ACCESSIBLE. NO 473166 PMRB 61 CONFIRMED CORROSION WAS FOUND DURING BORESCOPE EXAMINATION DURING THE 473166 PMRB 62 OMDP J-2 MOD AT PALMDALE, NOR WAS ANY REASON FOUND FOR CONCERN FOR THE 473166 PMRB 63 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OR FUNCTION OF THE BODY FLAP DURING THE 473166 PMRB 64 ANTICIPATED DEFERRAL PERIOD. THE BODY FLAP, AFT SPARE IS PRIMARY 473166 PMRB 65 STRUCTURE WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 473166 PMRB 66 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. MR IDENTIFICATION IS NOT REQUIRED. AREA NOT 473166 PMRB 67 ACCESSIBLE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 473166 PMRB 68 CERTIFICATION AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) 473166 PMRB 69 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS DISPOSITION WAS 473166 PMRB 70 COORDINATED WITH TOM COLLINS OF DOWNEY M&P ENGINEERING/ORBITER 473166 PMRB 71 CORROSION CONTROL REVIEW BOARD, AL BRANSCOMB OF NASA PALMDALE AND W.E. 473166 PMRB 72 WILSON, PALMDALE ENGINEERING DIRECTOR. 02/10/97 PMRB APPROVED FOR 473166 PMRB 73 DEFERRAL TO FLT 23 OF OV-103. 473166 PMRB 74 MR RATIONALE: MRB APPROVAL IS REQUESTED TO DEFER THIS PR FOR FUTURE FLIG 473166 PMRB 75 HT RESTRICTED LIFE, UNTIL BODY FLAP REMOVAL OR NEXT OMDP. NO CONFIRMED 473166 PMRB 76 CORROSION WAS FOUND DURING BORESCOPE EXAMINATION DURING THE OMDP-J2 MOD 473166 PMRB 77 AT PALMDALE, NOR WAS ANY REASON FOUND FOR CONCERN OF THE STRUCTURAL 473166 PMRB 78 INTEGRITY OR FUNCTION OF THE BODY FLAP DURING THE ANTICIPATED DEFERRAL 473166 PMRB 79 PERIOD. A MORE THOROUGH AND EFFECT INSPECTION AND CLEANING CAN BE 473166 PMRB 80 PERFORMED WITH THE BODY FLAP REMOVED. THE BODY FLAP, AFT SPAR IS 473166 PMRB 81 PRIMARY STRUCTURE WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT 473166 PMRB 82 WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE 473166 PMRB 83 THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION, AND DOES NOT IMPACTN THE CRITICAL ITEMS 473166 PMRB 84 LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. BODY FLAP FIT IS NOT 473166 PMRB 85 AFFECTED. MR ID IS NOT REQUIRED AND IS NOT ACCESSIBLE. 07/02/97 PMRB 473166 PMRB 86 APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (BODY FLAP REMOVAL OR OMDP) OF 473166 PMRB 87 OV-103. 473166 1 1 (ITEMS 1,2,3,5,6) SUSPECT CORROSION WAS DOCUMENTED IN THE INTERNAL BODY 473166 1 2 FLAP.THE CORROSION WAS INSPECTED AFTER EACH FLIGHT TO VERIFY NO SIGNIFIC 473166 1 3 ANT STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION AND DEFERRED UNTIL THE BODY FLAP WAS REMOVED 473166 1 4 TO PROVIDE ACCESS FOR CORROSION CLEANUP. UPON REMOVAL OF THE BODY FLAP, 473166 1 5 THE FRONT SPARS WERE REMOVED AND THE INTERNAL BODY FLAP WAS CLEANED AND 473166 1 6 INSPECTED FOR CORROSION. INDIVIDUAL PRS WERE GENERATED FOR EACH OF THE 1 473166 1 7 3 BAYS OF THE BODY FLAP TO DOCUMENT ANY CORROSION AND/OR KOROPON DEGRADA 473166 1 8 TION WHICH WAS DETECTED. AT THIS TIME ALL WORK ON THE INDIVIDUAL PRS HAS 473166 1 9 BEEN COMPLETED TO CLEAN UP CORROSION AND ACCEPT REMAINING PITTING. NO FU 473166 1 10 RTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. (ITEM 4) RESIDUAL HYDRAULIC FLUID DOCUMENTED IN 473166 1 11 THE INTERNAL BODY FLAP. THE HYDRAULIC FLUID WAS CLEANED UP AS BEST POSSI 473166 1 12 BLE IN THE ACCESSIBLE AREAS. THE REMAINING RESIDUE IS ACCEPTABLE PER MF0 473166 1 13 004-092 PARAGRAPH 15.1.4. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 473167 PMRB 1 MR/DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THIS MR ACCEPTS THE BODY FLAP ACTUATOR RIB WITH 473167 PMRB 2 SUSPECT CORROSION "AS-IS" FOR RESTRICTED USE TO OMDP-2 (SCHEDULED FOR 473167 PMRB 3 FLIGHT 22, SEPT 95). DURING 1-5 INSPECTION OF THE BODY FLAP ON V30-15405 473167 PMRB 4 JOB CARD, AN AREA OF SUSPECT CORROSION WAS FOUND (SEE ATTACHED PICTURE 473167 PMRB 5 AND SKETCH). MINUTE SAMPLES OF THE SUSPECT CORROSION WERE OBTAINED AND 473167 PMRB 6 ANALYZED. THE ANALYSIS WAS INDEFINITE AS TO WHETHER THE SAMPLE CONTAINED 473167 PMRB 7 ALUMINUM OXIDES. LSOC AND NASA ENGINEERING INSPECTION WITH LSOC AND NASA 473167 PMRB 8 QUALITY DETERMINED THAT THERE ARE MINUTE AREAS OF POSSIBLE SURFACE 473167 PMRB 9 CORROSION BUT NO INDICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVE CORROSION. SHOULD THE 473167 PMRB 10 CORROSION BE ACTIVE, IT WILL NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCTURE BEYOND A POSITIVE 473167 PMRB 11 MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE RIB IS AT LEAST .125 THICK. BY DEFERRING THIS PR 473167 PMRB 12 TO OMDP-2, A FOLLOW UP INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED TO DETERMINE IF ANY 473167 PMRB 13 CHANGES TO THE EXTENT OF THE CORROSION ARE OCCURRING. THE BODY FLAP RIB 473167 PMRB 14 IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 473167 PMRB 15 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 473167 PMRB 16 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 473167 PMRB 17 05/17/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 473167 1 1 FLIGHT 19: SUSPECT CORROSION WAS FOUND ON THE BODY FLAP ACTUATOR RIB AT 473167 1 2 +YBF90.00. SAMPLES FROM THE AREA WAS TAKEN AND SENT TO THE NASA MAB LAB 473167 1 3 FOR TESTING. THE RESULTS REVEALED THAT THE SAMPLES CONTAINED SMALL 473167 1 4 AMOUNTS OF DUST, GLASS FIBERS, AND RTV. THIS PR WAS THEN DEFERRED TO 473167 1 5 FLIGHT 20 SO A FOLLOW UP INSPECTION COULD BE PERFORMED. (MR RESTRICTED). 473167 1 6 FLIGHT 20: A FOLLOW UP INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED AND NUMEROUS AREAS WERE 473167 1 7 FOUND WITH ACTIVE CORROSION. THE CORROSION WAS REMOVED AND THE AREAS 473167 1 8 WERE REPAINTED WITH KOROPON. THE NUT PLATE BARRELS WERE FOUND TO HAVE 473167 1 9 SUPERFICIAL SURFACE CORROSION. THIS CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED AS-IS ON AN 473167 1 10 MR UNRESTRICTED BASIS. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 473167 1 11 PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. 473193 1 1 PR VOIDED (DUPLICATE CONDITION), THERMAL BARRIER NOTED ABOVE WAS REMOVE 473193 1 2 D AND SCRAPPED ON STR-3-19-4816. (COPY ATTACHED). 473195 1 1 VOID THIS PR. T/B HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED. REF: STR-3-16-4497. 473226 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON INS-3-19-188 STEP 1-9, WHILE MATING CONNECTOR 4 473226 1 2 0P918 IT WAS FOUND THAT THE PAPER CALLS FOR A REF DES OF 40V77W19P918/40 473226 1 3 V75A81A4J2 BUT THE SHIP HAS THE FOLLOWING REF DES OF 40V77W36P918/40V75A 473226 1 4 81A4J2. FURTHER RESEARCH REVEALS THAT SCAN ALSO HAS 40V77W36P918/40V75A8 473226 1 5 1A4J2. THE REF DES ON INS-3-19-188 STEP 1-9 IS INCORRECT AND WILL BE CHA 473226 1 6 NGED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO AN INCORRECT CALLOUT. NO RETEST IS REQUI 473226 1 7 RED. 473227 1 1 DURING INS-3-19-0188 STEP 1-9 IT WAS DETECTED THAT THE CONNECTOR REFEREN 473227 1 2 CE DESGNATOR ID PLATE FOR 40P917 IN THE ORBITER CONFLICTED WITH THE REFE 473227 1 3 RENCE DESGNATOR IN SCAN. RESEARCH REVEALED THE REF DES INSTALLED AT 40 P 473227 1 4 917 IN THE ORBITER WAS INCORRECT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS 40V7 473227 1 5 7W21P917. THE INCORRECT CONNECTOR ID PLATE WAS REMOVED AT 40P917 AND A N 473227 1 6 EW CONNECTOR ID PLATE WITH THE PROPER REF DES WAS INSTALLED. THE PROBABL 473227 1 7 E CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS VENDOR. 473251 1 1 DURING SURV IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT PIN 14 ON RECEPTACLE 30V77W31J51 WAS 473251 1 2 BENT APPROX 20 DEG. WITH MR APPROVAL PIN 14 WAS STRAIGHTENED USING A MAT 473251 1 3 ING CONTACT. INSPECTION VERIFIED PIN 14 HAD NO PLATING DAMAGE, BOWED OR 473251 1 4 DOG LEGGED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE WHILE PROCESSING TH 473251 1 5 E ORBITER. THIS RETURNS RECEPTACLE 30J51 TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON0DESIGN 473251 1 6 CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILIT 473251 1 7 Y, PERFORMANCE OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. NO FURTHER DISPO RO RETEST REQUIRE 473251 1 8 D. 473464 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS INTEFERENCE BETWEEN THE FILLER BAR SUPPORT BRACKET FAS 473464 1 2 TENER AND THE ADJACENT CARRIER PANEL. APPROXIMATELY 0.020" OF MATERIAL W 473464 1 3 AS REMOVED PER MR ACTION TO ALLEVIATE THE INTERFERENCE. MISSING KOROPON 473464 1 4 WAS TOUCHED UP PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS P 473464 1 5 R IS BUILD UP OF TOLERANCE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIR 473464 1 6 ED. 473827 1 1 THE TWO CHIPS AND THE DELAMINATING SHIM ON THE V070-337433-008 PANEL WAS 473827 1 2 REPAIRED USING MB0120-079 ADHESIVE. THIS REPAIR WAS DONE ON AN UNRESTRIC 473827 1 3 TED BASIS AND THE PANEL WAS MR ID'D. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRA 473827 1 4 DATION. 473873 1 1 ITEM 1: GOUGES IN THE V070-351417-005 ENGINE SUPPORT THRUST BEAM HAVE BE 473873 1 2 EN SANDED SMOOTH IN ACCORDANCE WITH MR APPROVED PROCEDURE AND THE DENT H 473873 1 3 AS BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS. THE REPAIR WAS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 473873 1 4 NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR AN 473873 1 5 D TEAR. 473874 1 1 ITEM 1 - THE V070-398558-050 SPLICE WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED. THE SPLICE 473874 1 2 WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE INSTALLED PER LRU OMI VK25.001. PROBABLE CAUS 473874 1 3 E OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THIS REPAIR WILL BE RETESTED DURING V5018 FIN 473874 1 4 AL OPF PLBD CLOSURE. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 474060 1 1 ITEM 1 - THE FITTING HAD SEVERAL DINGS AROUND THE EDGES WHICH WERE BURNI 474060 1 2 SHED OUT WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2 - THE MR BUSHING 474060 1 3 S INSTALLED PER STR-3-15-4448 WERE GALLED. THEY WERE REMOVED AND REPLACE 474060 1 4 D WITH NEW MR BUSHINGS BY LES. THIS WAS MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED US 474060 1 5 E. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 474075 1 1 DURING V5124.001,S06-005 EXPOSED CONDUCTOR NEAR BACKSHELL ON 30P400 AND 474075 1 2 30P403 ENG INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE PAINT WAS SCRAPPED AND THE GOLD 474075 1 3 KAPTON INSULATION WAS EXPOSED, NOT CONDUCTOR. ADDITIONAL INSPECTION VERI 474075 1 4 FIED THESE FINDINGS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAU 474075 1 5 SE: NO ANOMALY. 474133 1 1 THE DAMAGE TO THE 70E2140-2 FRAME CAP ASSY WAS DETERMINED TO BE GREATER 474133 1 2 THAN THE DAMAGE WHICH WAS MR ACCEPTED ON PR STR-3-15-4452. IT WAS BURNIS 474133 1 3 HED OUT AND CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR ID'D WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNREST 474133 1 4 RICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - OPER 474133 1 5 ATIONAL DEGRADATION. 474142 1 1 THE SMALL HOLE, EVIDENTLY DRILLED INADVERTENTLY, IN THE V070-351422 ENGI 474142 1 2 NE THRUST SUPPORT BEAM DOES NOT COMPROMISE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF T 474142 1 3 HE BEAM IN ANY WAY. THE BEAM IS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS-IS. 474142 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. 474279 1 1 THIS PR WAS DETECTED DURING MEQ-3-19-0777 WHILE REMOVING AN ET DOOR ENVI 474279 1 2 RONMENTAL SEAL. THE SEAL RETAINER ON THE OUTBOARD EDGE OF THE RIGHT DOOR 474279 1 3 WAS DAMAGED. THE DISCREPANT RETAINER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW RETAINER WAS 474279 1 4 INSTALLED PER THS WAD. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. RETEST WAS PER M 474279 1 5 EQ-3-19-0777 VIA VIA SEAL COMPRESSION TEST. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 474279 1 6 THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. 474365 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1), PER EO C06 OF DRAWING V070-198300, 474365 PMRB 2 THE VOIDS AND GAPS IN THE V070-198330-001 BLOCK SEAL ARE REQUIRED TO BE 474365 PMRB 3 FILLED WITH MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE. THE APPLICATION OF THE 474365 PMRB 4 ADHESIVE CAUSES THE SEAL TO NOT MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ITS SEALING 474365 PMRB 5 SURFACE DURING ELEVON CYCLING. THE SEAL LOCKS SUFFICIENT RIGIDITY TO 474365 PMRB 6 MAINTAIN A PROPER SEAL. BY COVERING THE ENTIRE SEAL WITH ADHESIVE AND 474365 PMRB 7 INJECTING THE ADHESIVE INTO THE VOIDS BETWEEN THE SEAL AND THE ADJACENT 474365 PMRB 8 STRUCTURE, ALL LEAK AND FLOW PATHS WILL BE ELIMIATED. THE ADHESIVE WILL 474365 PMRB 9 SERVE AS THE FLOW BARRIER. THIS WILL ALLOW THE SEAL ASSEMBLY AT THE 474365 PMRB 10 -YW212 HINGE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF 474365 PMRB 11 SAFETY. AN EVALUATION OF THE SEAL DESIGN AT THIS LOCATION IS IN WORK. 474365 PMRB 12 DURING THE NEXT REMOVAL OF THE PRIMARY SEAL PANELS AND THE BLOCK SEAL, 474365 PMRB 13 THE DISCREPANT SEAL WILL BE REPLACED WITH A NEW SEAL. THIS MR ACTION 474365 PMRB 14 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 474365 PMRB 15 IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS 474365 PMRB 16 FOR RESTRICTED FLIGHT USE UNTIL SEAL PANEL REMOVAL. 474365 1 1 FLIGHT DAMAGED POLYIMIDE SEAL (OVERTEMP, CRAZING) WAS ACCEPTED FOR 474365 1 2 UNRESTRICTED USE ON FLIGHT 19. GAPS TO THE BLOCK SEAL WERE REWORKED 474365 1 3 WITH SCREED AND ELEVON WAS CYCLED TO VERIFY NO GAPS. MR APPROVAL WAS 474365 1 4 OBTAINED FOR FUTURE FLIGHT DEFERRAL AND MR IDENTIFICATION WAS APPLIED. 474365 1 5 PRIOR TO FLIGHT 22 (OMDP), THE RESTRICTED BLOCK SEAL WAS REPLACED 474365 1 6 DURING ELEVON COVE MOD PER STR-3-22-715 AND STR-3-22-5857. THE 474365 1 7 RESTRICTED CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: FLIGHT 474365 1 8 DEGRADATION AND DESIGN DEFICIENCY, WHICH WAS CORRECTED/MODIFIED PER 474365 1 9 STR-3-22-715 MOD 001. 474600 1 1 ITEM 1 OF THIS PR DOCUMENTS A CUT IN THE TOP LAYER OF RADIATOR TAPE, APP 474600 1 2 ROXIMATELY .0625" IN LENGTH. THE CUT DOES NOT GO THRU THE KAPTON TAPE LA 474600 1 3 YER AND FACESHEET IS UNDAMAGED. DISCREPANCY IS LOCATED 70" FROM HINGELIN 474600 1 4 E, 25" FROM AFT EDGE AND ON BOTTOM SIDE OF PANEL. ITEM 2 OF THIS PR DOCU 474600 1 5 MENTS A MINOR MICROMETEROITE STRIKE. THE DISCREPANCY IS LOCATED 43.5" FR 474600 1 6 OM HINGELINE, 38" FROM AFT EDGE AND ON BOTTOM SIDE OF THE RADIATOR PANEL 474600 1 7 . THE STRIKE IS INTO THE TOP LAYER OF TAPE, THE FACESHEET IS UNDAMAGED. 474600 1 8 THE STRIKE MEASURED LESS THAN .001" IN LENGTH, WIDTH AND DEPTH. BOTH 474600 1 9 ITEMS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTUR- 474600 1 10 ING DEFECT AND INFLIGHT DAMAGE. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 474601 1 1 THREE DISCREPANCY ITEMS WERE IDENTIFIED ON THIS PR. ITEM 1 DOCUMENTS A D 474601 1 2 ING MEASURING .149"L X .08"W X .006"D. THE DISCREPANCY IS IS LOCATED 38" 474601 1 3 FROM FWD EDGE AND 8.5" FROM H/L. ITEM 2 DOCUMENTS A DING MEASURING .158 474601 1 4 "L X .104"W X .005"D. THE DISCREPANCY IS IS LOCATED 38.8" FROM FWD EDGE 474601 1 5 AND 8.25" FROM H/L. ITEM 3 DOCUMENTS A SCRATCH MEASURING APPROX 1.5" LEN 474601 1 6 GTH. THE DISCREPANCY IS LOCATED 40" FROM FWD EDGE AND 6.75" FROM H/L. TH 474601 1 7 E SCRATCH IS ON TH TOP LAYER OF TAPE. MINOR DAMAGE WAS CAUSED TO THE FAC 474601 1 8 ESHEET. NONE OF DISCREPANCIES ARE LOCATED OVER FREON LINES. MR APPROVAL 474601 1 9 WAS GRANTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. NO RETEST 474601 1 10 REQUIRED. 474801 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1): THE V070-194103-002 CARRIER PANEL SHOWED SIGNS O 474801 1 2 F OVERTEMP. THE KOROPON WAS REMOVED AND A CONDUCTIVITY TEST WAS PERFORME 474801 1 3 D TO DETERMINE IF THE PANEL WAS ANNEALED. THE TEST SHOWED THAT THE PANEL 474801 1 4 DID NOT SEE SUFFICIENT HEAT TO RESULT IN THE LOSS OF TEMPER. THE PANEL 474801 1 5 WAS CORROSION PROTECTED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 474801 1 6 PR IS FLIGHT DAMAGE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR 474801 1 7 THIS PR. 474802 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THE V070-194104-002 CARRIER PANEL SHOWED SIGNS OF 474802 1 2 OVERTEMP. THE KOROPON WAS REMOVED AND A CONDUCTIVITY TEST WAS PERFORMED 474802 1 3 TO DETERMINE IF THE PANEL WAS ANNEALED. THE TEST SHOWED THAT THE PANEL 474802 1 4 DID NOT SEE SUFFICIENT HEAT TO RESULT IN THE LOSS OF TEMPER. THE PANEL W 474802 1 5 AS CORROSION PROTECTED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS P 474802 1 6 R IS FLIGHT DAMAGE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR T 474802 1 7 HIS PR. 474803 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1-4 ON PGS 1 AND 1A). THIS PR DOCUMENTS HEAT DAMAGE ON THE V0 474803 1 2 70-194123-003 CARRIER PANEL. DUE TO THE EXTENT OF THE KOROPON DISCOLORAT 474803 1 3 ION, A CONDUCTIVITY TEST WAS PERFORMED TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANNEALING HA 474803 1 4 S OCCURRED. THE TEST SHOWED THAT THE HEAT AFFECTED AREAS HAVE BEEN ANNEA 474803 1 5 LED TO AN APPROXIMATE T7 TEMPER. THE PANEL WAS ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRES 474803 1 6 TRICTED USE AND NEW CORROSION PREVENTATIVE FINISH WAS APPLIED PER DWG RE 474803 1 7 EQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS FLIGHT DAMAGE. NO FURTHER SHO 474803 1 8 P OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED. 474804 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1): THE V070-194124-002 CARRIER PANEL SHOWED SIGNS O 474804 1 2 F OVERTEMP. THE KOROPON WAS REMOVED AND A CONDUCTIVITY TEST WAS PERFORME 474804 1 3 D TO DETERMINE IF THE PANEL WAS ANNEALED. THE TEST SHOWED THAT THE PANEL 474804 1 4 DID NOT SEE SUFFICIENT HEAT TO RESULT IN THE LOSS OF TEMPER. THE PANEL 474804 1 5 WAS CORROSION PROTECTED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS 474804 1 6 PR IS FLIGHT DAMAGE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR 474804 1 7 THIS PR. 474805 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1-4 ON PGS 1 AND 1A) THIS PR DOCUMENTS HEAT DAMAGE ON THE V07 474805 1 2 0-194124-005 CARRIER PANEL. DUE TO THE EXTENT OF THE KOROPON DISCOLORATI 474805 1 3 ON, A CONDUCTIVITY TEST WAS PERFORMED TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANNEALING HAS 474805 1 4 OCCURRED. THE TEST SHOWED THAT THE HEAT AFFECTED AREAS HAVE BEEN ANNEAL 474805 1 5 ED TO AN APPROXIMATE T7 TEMPER. THE PANEL WAS ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTR 474805 1 6 ICTED USE AND NEW CORROSION PREVENTATIVE FINISH WAS APPLIED PER DWG REQU 474805 1 7 IREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS FLIGHT DAMAGE. NO FURTHER SHOP O 474805 1 8 R ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 474933 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1): THIS PR DOCUMENTS THE CONDITION THAT THE V070-29 474933 1 2 8114-018 RUB STRIPS WERE NOT REMOVED PRIOR TO DRILLING HOLES FOR THE NEW 474933 1 3 POTTED INSERTS PER STR-3-19-615. THE DISCREPANT RUB STRIPS WERE REMOVED 474933 1 4 AND NEW STRIPS WERE INSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FO 474933 1 5 R THIS DISCREPANCY IS PROCEDURAL/WORK AUTHORIZATION ERROR. (REF ITEM 2 O 474933 1 6 N PAGE 1): THE V070-298114 AND V070-298005 DRAWINGS DO NOT ALLOW FOR DRI 474933 1 7 LLING HOLES THROUGH THE V070-298114-013 AND -018 RUB STRIPS. THE RUB STR 474933 1 8 IPS WERE REMOVED AND HOLES WERE DRILLED PER EO A10 TO DRAWING V070-29800 474933 1 9 5. THE NEW THERMAL BARRIERS WERE THEN REINSTALLED PER DRAWING 474933 1 10 REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. (REF 474933 1 11 ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1A): THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS SUSPECT CORROSION UNDER THE 474933 1 12 REMOVED RUB STRIPS. AFTER CORROSION PROTECTIVE FINISH REMOVAL AND 474933 1 13 SURFACE PREPARATION FOR RUB STRIP INSTALLATION, NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSION 474933 1 14 WAS FOUND. SINCE NO CORROSION IS PRESENT, THIS IS NOT A PR CONDITION. 474933 1 15 (REF ITEMS 4 AND 5 ON PAGES 1B AND 1C): THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT DISCREPANT 474933 1 16 INSERT INSTALLATIONS IN THE RSB PANELS. THE INSERTS WERE INSTALLED PER 474933 1 17 STR-3-19-615. THEY SHOULD BE FLUSH TO 0.002 RECESSED. THEY ARE 0.030 AND 474933 1 18 0.070 RECESSED RESPECTIVELY. THE THERMAL BARRIERS WERE FITCHECKED AND NO 474933 1 19 PROBLEMS WERE NOTED. PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION, THE RECESSED 474933 1 20 INSERTS WERE POTTED FLUSH WITH MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE AND THE 474933 1 21 FASTENER GRIP LENGTH WAS INCREASED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS IS 474933 1 22 WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 474946 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V30-14195, 4 DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND ON THE UPPER 474946 1 2 SURFACE OF R/H RADIATOR 2. ITEM 1 DAMAGE WAS A SMALL HOLE IN HTE SURFAC 474946 1 3 E OF THE RADIATOR TAPE THAT DID NOT PUNCTURE THE FACESHEET. IT WAS PROBA 474946 1 4 BLY CAUSED BY AN ON-ORBIT IMPACT. ITEMS 2 THROUGHT 4 WERE TAPE TEARS. DI 474946 1 5 SCREPANCIES WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. NO RETEST REQUI 474946 1 6 RED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 1, ON ORBIT IMPACT. ITEM 2 THROUGH 4, OPERATIO 474946 1 7 NAL DEGRADATION. DOES NOT AFFECT SIMILAR END ITEMS. 474977 1 1 ITEM 1: THE V070-398501-042 SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE TORN. THE SEAL WAS TAPE 474977 1 2 REPAIRED PER SRP-V-ST-0027-0. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 474977 1 3 THIS REPAIR WILL BE RETESTED DURING V5018 FINAL OPF PLBD CLOSURE. THIS P 474977 1 4 R DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 474980 1 1 ITEM 1: THE V070-398558-056 SPLICE WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED. THE SPLICE 474980 1 2 WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE INSTALLED PER LRU OMI V5K25.001. PROBABLE CAUS 474980 1 3 E OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THIS REPAIR WILL BE RETESTED DURING V5018 FIN 474980 1 4 AL OPF PLBD CLOSURE. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 474985 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL TO ENLARGE THE DISCREPANT HOLE IN THE 474985 PMRB 2 V070-194103-001 PANEL AND INSTALL WITH MR-001 SPACER. GOOD EDGE DISTANCE 474985 PMRB 3 IS MAINTAINED IN THE PANEL. AN MR SPACER WILL ALLOW THE PANEL TO 474985 PMRB 4 FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE PANEL 474985 PMRB 5 IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. MR ID WAS ACCOMPLISHED ABOVE OV-103, ELEVON 474985 PMRB 6 COVER C/P INSTALLATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE GASIS FOR 474985 PMRB 7 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 474985 PMRB 8 REATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 05/03/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR RESTRICTED 474985 PMRB 9 INSTALLATION, OV-103, ELEVON COVER C/P INSTALLATION. 474985 1 1 THE SLOTTED HOLE WAS ENLARGED TO ELIMINATE THE IRREGULARITIES. AN MR SPA 474985 1 2 CER WAS FABRICATED TO FIT. DEV'S WERE WRITTEN TO THE JOB CARD TO REFLECT 474985 1 3 THIS CHANGE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE WITH THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 474985 1 4 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 475099 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT MINOR ANOMALIES IN THE LH RADIATOR 4 PAN 475099 1 2 EL. ITEM 1 DOCUMENTS A SMALL CUT, APPROX 1/32", IN THE TAPE. THIS CUT OC 475099 1 3 CURRED IN A SMALL TAPE BUBBLE. STANDARD REPAIR PROCEDURE PUNCTURE THE BU 475099 1 4 BBLE AND PRESS THE TAPE BACK AGAINST THE RADIATOR. THE DISCREPANT AREA I 475099 1 5 S THEN MONITORED FOR 5 MIN. IF IT REMAINS FLAT FOR THIS TIE PERIOD THEN 475099 1 6 IT IS CONSIDERED AN ACCEPTABLE REPAIR. THIS PROCEDURE WAS SUCCESSFULLY P 475099 1 7 ERFORMED IN STEP 1-1 (NO PUNCTURE WAS REQUIRED AS THE ABOVE MENTIONED CU 475099 1 8 T ACTED AS THE VENT). THE REMAINING CUT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 475099 1 9 USE AS IS. ITEM 2 DOCUMENTS A TAPE DELAMINATION ON THE FORWARD 475099 1 10 CENTERLINE EDGE OF THE RADIATOR. SRP-V-ST-0020-0-0 WAS SUCCESSFULLY 475099 1 11 PERFORMED TO REBOND THE DELAMINATION. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THESE 475099 1 12 ANOMALIES IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THESE ANOMALIES DO NOT EFFECT LIKE 475099 1 13 SERIAL NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 475133 1 1 DURING V3570, 11 DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND ON THE BOTTOM SURFACE OF R/H R 475133 1 2 ADIATOR 1. ITEMS 1, 3, 4, 6, 7J, 10, AND 11 WERE MINOR DINGS AND TAPE CU 475133 1 3 TS/SCRATCHES IN THE RADIATOR TAPE/FACESHEET. THEY WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR U 475133 1 4 NRESTRICTED USE. ITEMS 2 AND 5 WERE AREAS OF RAISED TAPE CAUSED BY DEBRI 475133 1 5 S BETWEEN THE TAPE AND FACESHEET. THESE ITEMS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRES 475133 1 6 TRICTED USE. ITEMS 8 AND 9 WERE TAPE EDGE DELAMINATIONS THAT WERE MR ACC 475133 1 7 PETED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST RE 475133 1 8 QUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. 475144 1 1 THE DISCREPANT V070-305005-001 NUT RETAINER HAS BEEN SCRAPPED LOCALLY AN 475144 1 2 D REPLACED BY A NEW PART. CONFIGURATION ACCORDING TO PRINT AS AMENDED BY 475144 1 3 ROCKWELL MR YY6224-600H HAS BEEN RESTORED AND ID PROVIDED TO ASSIST FUT 475144 1 4 URE IDENTIFICATION EFFORTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 475165 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTED A DENT INTO THE FACESHEET OF L/H RADIATOR PANEL 2. TH 475165 1 2 E DISCREPANCY MEASURED .008"L X .0065"W X .0032"D AND WAS .500" FROM THE 475165 1 3 NEAREST FREON TUBE. MRB APPROVAL WAS GRANTED TO ACCEPT THIS DISCREPANCY 475165 1 4 AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE PER SEPAR SPC-0209. NO MR ID REQUIRED. NO RE 475165 1 5 TEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INFLIGHT DAMAGE. 475167 1 1 ITEM 1 OF THIS PR DOCUMENTED A SCRATCH IN THE TOP LAYER OF THE RADIATOR 475167 1 2 TAPE MEASURING .0085"L X .0074"W X .0010"D. THE NOTED DISCREPANCY WAS 1/ 475167 1 3 8" FROM THE NEAREST FREON LINE. DISCREPANCY ITEM 2 WAS A SCRATCH IN THE 475167 1 4 KAPTON LAYER OF RADIATOR TAPE MEASURING .0094"L X .0075"W X .0009"D. THE 475167 1 5 SCRATCH WAS APPROX 3/8" FROM THE NEAREST FREON LINE. DISCREPANCY ITEM 3 475167 1 6 WAS A SCRATCH INTO THE FACESHEET OF THE RADIATOR MEASURING .0348"L X .0 475167 1 7 178"W X .0063"D AND WAS .250" FROM THE NEAREST FREON LINE. DISCREPANCY I 475167 1 8 TEM 4 WAS A MICRO METEORITE STRIKE INTO THE TOP LAYER OF RADIATOR TAPE M 475167 1 9 EASURING STRIKE INTO THE TOP LAYER OF RADIATOR TAPE MEASURING .0348"L X 475167 1 10 .0178"W X .0063"D AND WAS .750" FROM THE NEAREST FREON LINE. DISCREPANCY 475167 1 11 ITEM 5 WAS A MICRO METEORITE STRIKE INTO THE TOP LAYER OF RADIATOR TAPE 475167 1 12 .250" FROM THE NEAREST FREON LINE. THE DISCREPANCY WAS TOO SMALL TO READ 475167 1 13 ON AN OPTICAL COMPARATOR. DISCREPANCY ITEM 6 WAS A MICRO METEORITE 475167 1 14 STRIKE INTO THE TOP LAYER OF RADIATOR TAPE .250" FROM THE NEAREST FREON 475167 1 15 LINE. THE DISCREPANCY WAS TOO SMALL TO READ ON AN OPTICAL COMPARATOR. 475167 1 16 DISCREPANCY ITEM 6 WAS A MICRO METEORITE STRIKE INTO THE RADIATOR 475167 1 17 FACESHEET MEASURING .0098"L X .0084"W X .0005"D AND .250" FROM THE 475167 1 18 NEARESST FREON LINE. THE 6 NOTED DISCREPANCIES WERE MRB APPROVED FOR 475167 1 19 UNRESTRICTED USE. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INFLIGHT DAMAGE. 475171 1 1 DURING V63-50001, ITEM 1 WIRE SEGMENT 2N144C12 WAS FOUND TO HAVE DAMAGE 475171 1 2 AND MISSING KAPTON APPROX 3/8" LONG, MR APPROVAL REQUESTED FOR UNRESTRIC 475171 1 3 TED USE TO INSTALL RT1146 HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE. WHI 475171 1 4 LE WORKING STEP 1-9 TO EXTRACT WIRE FROM PIN F A PAGE 1A ITEM 2 WAS TAKE 475171 1 5 N TO NOTE THAT PIN F COULD NOT BE EXTRACTED AND A PIECE OF THE EXTRACTIO 475171 1 6 N TOOL WAS BROKEN OFF IN THE CONNECTOR MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO EXTRACT T 475171 1 7 HE PIN. UPON INSPECTION OF WIRE 2N144C12 IT WAS FOUND TO HAVE EXPOSED CO 475171 1 8 NDUCTOR. A PAGE 1B ITEM 3 WAS TAKEN. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED FOR UNREST 475171 1 9 RICTED USE ON CABLE 2N144C12 TO INSTALL A NEW SEGMENT OF WIRE WITH 2 475171 1 10 SPLICES FORM CONNECTOR (40P106) TO BACK PAST DAMAGE AREA. AFTER THE 475171 1 11 COMPLETION OF THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW WIRE SEGMENT AND CONNECTOR, 475171 1 12 CONTINUITY, ISOLATION CHECKS AND HI POT TEST WERE PERFORMED, TESTS WERE 475171 1 13 SUCCESSFUL. RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED PER SCAN RETEST. PROBABLE CAUSE: 475171 1 14 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 475173 1 1 DURING V63-50005, WIRE T528A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. WIRE WAS 475173 1 2 WRAPPED WITH MYSTIC 7503 PER SRP V-EL-0007. THIS RETURNS WIRE SEGMENT T 475173 1 3 O DESIGN INTENT. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBAB 475173 1 4 LE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 475236 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 24 DISCREPANCIES WERE DOCUMENTED ON THE 475236 1 2 UPPER SURFACE OF L/H RADIATOR 3. ITEM 1 WAS AN ON ORBIT IMPACT, TAPE WA 475236 1 3 S REMOVED AND THE PINHOLE WAS FOUND TO BE A SMOOTH BOTTOMED DEPRESSION I 475236 1 4 N THE FACESHEET THAT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS AFTER CH 475236 1 5 EMGLAZE WAS APPLIED OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA. ITEMS 2,3,4,8,9,10,12,21, 475236 1 6 AND 22 WERE NICKS OR SCUFFS IN THE RADIATOR TAPE WHICH WERE MR ACCEPTED 475236 1 7 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. ITEMS 6,14,19,23, AND 24 WERE BUBBLES OR MAN 475236 1 8 UFACTURING FLAWS BONDED UNDERNEATH THE RADIATOR TAPE DURING MANUFACTURIN 475236 1 9 G. THEY WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. NO DISCREPANCIES 475236 1 10 WERE FOUND AT 3 LOCATIONS. ITEM 7,15, AND 18, DURING A QC/ENGINEERING 475236 1 11 INSPECTION. ITEM 11 WAS A TAPE DELAMINATION WHICH WAS REBONDED PER SRP. 475236 1 12 ITEM 13 WAS AN ON ORBIT IMPACT. TAPE WAS REMOVED AND THE PINHOLE WAS 475236 1 13 FOUND TO BE A SMOOTH BOTTOMED DEPRESSION IN THE FACESHEET THAT WAS MR 475236 1 14 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS AFTER NEW RADIATOR TAPE WAS BONDED 475236 1 15 OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA. ITEMS 16,17, AND 20 WERE ON ORBIT IMPACTS. 475236 1 16 ITEM 16 AND 17 WERE PINHOLES WITH SMOOTH BOTTOMED DEPRESSIONS IN THE 475236 1 17 FACESHEET THAT WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. ITEM 20 WAS 475236 1 18 A DING WITH A SMOOTH BOTTOM DEPRESSION IN THE FACESHEET THAT WAS MR 475236 1 19 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO 475236 1 20 RETEST REQUIRED. THESE DISCREPANCIES DO NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 475236 1 21 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION EXCEPT ITEMS 6,14,19,23, AND 24 475236 1 22 WHICH WERE MANUFACTURING FLAWS. 475342 1 1 THE WIPER CLOSEOUT WAS SEWN TO RTV COATED FABRIC AND THEN THE ASSY WAS B 475342 1 2 ONDED TO THE LONGERON. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED 475342 1 3 USE BECAUSE THE ETCH ON THE TFE COATING ON THE WIPER HAS EXPIRED. NO FUR 475342 1 4 THER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION 475533 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: THE FORWARD RIGHT BOLT IN POSITION 3 OF THE FORWARD RCC ET 475533 PMRB 2 ATTACH POINT, HAS INSUFFICIENT RUNNING TORQUE. THE INSTALLATION TORQUE 475533 PMRB 3 OR PRELOAD IS THE PRIMARY LOCKING FEATURE FOR THE BOLT/NUTPLATE INSTALLA 475533 PMRB 4 TION. USE OF LOCKTITE WILL PROVIDE A SECONDARY LIGHT LOCKING FORCE. THE 475533 PMRB 5 FORWARD MC621-0007-7010 RCC PLATE IS INSTALLED WITH A TOTAL OF 5 EA 1/4 475533 PMRB 6 28 BOLTS, 3 EA ACROSS THE FORWARD EDGE AND 1 EA ON THE SIDE. THE REWORK 475533 PMRB 7 PERFORMED WILL ALLOW THE DISCRESPANT BOLT/NUTPLATE TO FUNCTION PER DESIG 475533 PMRB 8 N INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS MR ACTION IS FOR ONE FLI 475533 PMRB 9 GHT RESTRICTED LIFE USE. THIS IS SENCODARY STRUCTURE. REPLACING THE 475533 PMRB 10 NUTPLATE ON THE V070-562032-003 MULITPIECE BEARING RACE WILL REQUIRE 475533 PMRB 11 EXTENSIVE REMOVAL, TESTING, AND REWORK OF THE FWD RCC PLATES AND 475533 PMRB 12 HAZARDOUS FWD ET SEPARATION ATTACH ASSY. POST FLIGHT DISPO WILL REMOVE 475533 PMRB 13 AND REPLACE THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE 475533 PMRB 14 THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL 475533 PMRB 15 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. ON 04/12/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR 475533 PMRB 16 DEFERRAL TO FLIGHT 20 OF OV-103. 475533 1 1 REPLACEMENT OF THE DISCREPANT MD114-5012-1004 NUT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED O 475533 1 2 N OMI V5127 (REV F) IN SEQUENCE 01-009 AND MINIMUM BREAKAWAY TORQUE WILL 475533 1 3 BE DETERMINED IN SEQUENCE 01-010. THEREFORE, ROUTINE MAINTENANCE WILL S 475533 1 4 ATISFY THE INTENT OF THIS PR AND NO FURTHER ENGINEERING EFFORT IS REQUIR 475533 1 5 ED. PROBABLE CAUSE: MATERIAL DEGRADATION. 475630 1 1 ITEM 1 WAS ADDRESSED BY SHAVING THE HEAD OF THE HI-LOK AT THE DISCREPANT 475630 1 2 LOCATION TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILDUP. ITE M2 WA 475630 1 3 S ADDRESSED BY FABRICATING A RADIUS BLOCK TO BE INSTALLED UNDER THE HEAD 475630 1 4 OF THE COLLAR. CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILDUP. ITEM 3 WAS ADDRESSED BY INSTAL 475630 1 5 LING A FASTENER AS IDENTIFIED FOR THE OPPOSITE INSTALLATION. CAUSE: WORK 475630 1 6 MANSHIP. ITEM 4 WAS ADDRESSED BY INSTALLING 0.190" DIAMETER HARDWARE INS 475630 1 7 TEAD OF 0.164" DIA HARDWARE. ALL ACTIONS WERE COMPLETED WITH MRB APPROVA 475630 1 8 L FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. CAUSE: PR 475630 1 9 EVIOUS MR. 475641 1 1 DURING GNC-3-19-0154 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE GND LUG AT 30V77W56P382 475641 1 2 WAS BROKEN. BROKEN GND LUG WAS REPOARED BY INSTALLING NEW WIRE SEGMENT J 475641 1 3 R22 HOING TO PARALLEL SPLICE 1E AND CRIMPING ON NEW LUG. A CONTINUITY CH 475641 1 4 ECK WAS PERFORMED AND PASSED. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE 475641 1 5 DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. THIS RETURNS WIR 475641 1 6 E HARNESS TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. 475739 1 1 THE STARBOARD RADIATOR 2 INBOARD CENTER LATCH PUSHROD WAS FOUND TO BE CH 475739 1 2 AFFED AND APPEARED TO BE CONTACTING AN INTERCOSTAL WHICH IS PASSES THROU 475739 1 3 GH. THE LATCHES WERE RELEASED AND LATCHED WITH NO CONTACT. OBSERVERS REP 475739 1 4 ORTED THAT THE MINIMUM CLEARANCE BETWEEN THE PUSHROD AND THE INTERCOSTAL 475739 1 5 AT THAT LOCATION WAS APPROXIMATELY 1/2". THE CHAFFING WAS THROUGH THE T 475739 1 6 OP COAT AND PRIMER TO EXPOSE METAL BUT THERE WAS NO METAL DISPLACED. DEN 475739 1 7 TAL MOLDS SHOWED THE DEPTH OF THE CHAFFING TO BE .00080" WITH NO DEFECTS 475739 1 8 OR IRREGULARITIES. CORROSION PROTECTION WAS REAPPLIED LESS TOP COAT 475739 1 9 WITH UNRESTRICTED MR CONCURRENCE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO 475739 1 10 RETEST REQUIRED. LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 475739 1 11 INTERFERENCE BETWEEN PUSHROD AND INTERCOSTAL DURING INITIAL RIGGING. 475987 1 1 THE LOWER OUTBOARD EDGE OF THE V070-198535-001 BLOCK SEAL IS TORN APPROX 475987 1 2 1/2" IN LENGTH. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED "AS IS". PROBABLE CAUSE: 475987 1 3 OPERATIONAL WEAR. 476021 1 1 ITEM 1 WAS ADDRESSED BY SHAVING THE HEAD OF THE HI-LOK AT THE DISCREPANT 476021 1 2 LOCATION TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR 476021 1 3 UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE 476021 1 4 : TOLERANCE BUILDUP. 476083 1 1 THE LH MLG DOOR FORWARD INBD ROLLER WAS FOUND TO BE GALLED. THE ROLLER W 476083 1 2 AS SANDED TO REMOVE SLIGHTLY RAISED METAL AND ACCEPTED PER UNRESTRICTED 476083 1 3 MR. DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY CONTACT WITH THE CORRESPONDING DOOR HOOK. PR ME 476083 1 4 Q-3-19-0773 ADDRESSES THE DAMAGE TO THE HOOK AS WELL AS MINOR ADJUSTMENT 476083 1 5 S TO ELIMINATE CONTACT AND SATISFIES ALL RETEST REQUIREMENTS. THIS DEFEC 476083 1 6 T DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE ITEMS ON OTHER VEHICLES ALTHOUGH A SIMILAR CONDIT 476083 1 7 ION EXISTS WITH THE RH MLG AND HAS BEEN ADDRESSED PER PR UA-3-A0032. NO 476083 1 8 FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST WITH THE LH MLG DOOR ROLLER. PROBABLE CAUSE 476083 1 9 SLIGHT MISRIGGING OF THE DOOR HOOK TO ROLLER ALIGNMENT/OPERATIONAL DEGRA 476083 1 10 DATION. 476084 1 1 ITEM 1 THE V070-398503-013 EAL WAS FOUND TO BE TORN. THE SEAL WAS TAPE R 476084 1 2 EPAIRED PER SRP-V-ST-0027-0. PROBABLE CAUSE OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THI 476084 1 3 S REPAIR WILL BE RETESTED DURING V5018 FINAL OPF PLBD CLOSURE. THIS PR D 476084 1 4 OES NOT AFFECT LIKE S/N 476096 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 1 DISCREPANCY WAS FOUND ON THE UPPER SU 476096 1 2 RFACE OF R/H RADIATOR 2. ITEM 1 WAS MINOR TAPE DAMAGE ONLY AND WAS MR AC 476096 1 3 CEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST R 476096 1 4 EQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THIS CONDITION DOES NO 476096 1 5 T AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. 476097 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 3 DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND ON THE UPPER 476097 1 2 SURFACE OF R/H RADIATOR 1. ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3 WERE MINOR TAPE DAMAGE ONL 476097 1 3 Y AND WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER DISCRPANCIES EXI 476097 1 4 ST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THIS CO 476097 1 5 NDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. 476247 1 1 THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS CORROSION AND PITTING ON THE V070-199733-078 C/PS FW 476247 1 2 D AND AFT ENDS. THE MATERIAL ON THE ENDS OF THE C/P IS EPOXY ADHESIVE US 476247 1 3 ED TO CLOSEOUT THE EXPOSED HINEY COMB CELLS. THE PITS ARE JUST BUBBLES I 476247 1 4 N THE EPOXY BACKFILL. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. THE LAMINATED SHIM ON THE C 476247 1 5 /P IS MADE OF A CORROSION RESISTANT STEEL. NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSION PROD 476247 1 6 UCTS WERE NOTED ON THE SHIM. THE ITEM NOTED IS ACTUALLY COSMETIC BLEMISH 476247 1 7 ES ON THE SHIM. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQ 476247 1 8 UIRED FOR THIS PR. 476248 1 1 THIS PR REMOVED AND REPLACED V070-199744-002 SHIMS FROM THE V070-199732- 476248 1 2 084 LESS CARRIER PANEL. AFTER THE SHIM WAS REPLACED AND PRIOR TO PEELING 476248 1 3 , A TILE NEAR THE CARRIER PANEL WAS FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT. THE NEW SHIM 476248 1 4 WAS REMOVED, FOR THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW TILE, AND REPLACED AFTER T 476248 1 5 HE NEW TILE WAS INSTALLED PER RSI-3-19-257. SINCE RSI-3-19-257 REMOVED A 476248 1 6 ND REPLACED THE SHIM, THE DISCREPANCY NOTED ON PAGE 1 HAS BEEN RESOLVED. 476248 1 7 ITEM 1 WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR DURING CARRIER PANEL REMOVAL. 476481 1 1 THE WIPER CLOSEOUTS WERE SEWN TO RTV COATED FABRIC AND THEN THE ASSEMBLY 476481 1 2 WAS BONDED TO THE LONGERON. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTR 476481 1 3 ICTED USE BECAUSE THE ETCH ON THE TFE COATING ON THE WIPER HAS EXPIRED. 476481 1 4 NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRA 476481 1 5 DATION. 476635 1 1 PR HYD-3-08-0275 WAS PICKED UP FOR VISIBLE HYDRAULIC FLUID ON LMG STRUT. 476635 1 2 AN INSPECTION BY HYD ENG PROVED THAT NONE OF THEIR SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 476635 1 3 WERE COMPROMISED AND HYD TRANSFERRED THIS PR TO MEQ. MEQ DISPO'D TO CLEA 476635 1 4 N THE STRUT AND MONITOR FOR LEAKAGE. PER OMRS V51ACO.021 THE MAX ALLOWAB 476635 1 5 LE LEAK RATE IS 1 DROP/HR; WHICH WAS SATISFIED. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. P 476635 1 6 ROBABLE CAUSE: HYD FLUID REMAINING FROM STRUT SERVICING. 477246 1 1 THE 3RD HOLE DOWN FROM THE TOP ALONG THE FWD EDGE OF THE EPOXY GLASS FAB 477246 1 2 RIC V070-353368-002 TCS BLANKET SUPPORT HAS A MISDRILLED PILOT HOLE. THI 477246 1 3 S CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED "AS-IS" FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE 477246 1 4 : WORKMANSHIP AT ORIGINAL MANUFACTURE. 477288 1 1 ITEM 1 OF THIS PR WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT A FAILED B-HATCH SEAL LEAK CHE 477288 1 2 CK. STEPS WERE PERFORMED IN ATTACHMENT 1 TO CLEAN BOTH SEALS PRIOR TO HA 477288 1 3 TCH CLOSURE. HATCH SEAL LEAK CHECKS WERE SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED USING TH 477288 1 4 E SERIAL 2 UNIT AND A SPECIAL TEST HAND PUMP UNIT (REF MEQ TPS 215). ALT 477288 1 5 HOUGH THE SEALS WERE SIMILARLY CLEANED DURING THE OPERATIONS PERFORMING 477288 1 6 THE FAILED LEAK CHECK IN V1047, SOME CONTAMINATION MUST HAVE STILL EXIST 477288 1 7 ED ON THE SEALS. THIS CONTAMINATION RESULTED IN THE 3 PSI DECREASE INDIC 477288 1 8 ATED IN ITEM 1. ITEM 2 OF PAGE 1A WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT A SMALL GOUGE 477288 1 9 IN THE SEAL ON THE COLLAR OF B-HATCH. THIS DISCREPANCY IS ON THE SIDE OF 477288 1 10 THE SEAL AND DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE SEALING SURFACE. MOLD IMPRESSIONS 477288 1 11 WERE TAKEN WITHIN THIS PR AND DIMENSIONS OF L=0.1219, D=0.0113, AND 477288 1 12 W=0.0953 WERE RECORDED. PER V070-332504 DEFECTS ARE ALLOWED TO RE .18" 477288 1 13 MAX WIDTH & LENGTH AND .005" IN DEPTH. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED 477288 1 14 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF BOTH OF THESE DISCREPANCIES 477288 1 15 IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THESE ANOMALIES DO NOT EFFECT LIKE SERIAL 477288 1 16 NUMBERS. 477297 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN TO IDENTIFY THAT OMRS V33AC0.010 (B-HATCH OPENING - 477297 1 2 AIRLOCK SIDE) WAS NOT SATISFIED DUE TO INSTALLATION OF THE HELMET HOLDER 477297 1 3 ASSEMBLY. THE REQUIREMENT STATES THAT THE HATCH LEGS SHALL EXTEND AND S 477297 1 4 IT FIRMLY ON THE AIRLOCK FLOOR WHEN THE HATCH IS OPEN. WHEN THE HELMET H 477297 1 5 OLDER ASSEMBLY IS INSTALLED, THE HATCH LEGS SIT ON THE ASSEMBLY AS OPPOS 477297 1 6 ED TO SITTING ON THE FLOOR. RCN OV12031 WAS INITIATED TO SPECIFY THAT TH 477297 1 7 E HELMET HOLDING ASSEMBLY DOES NOT NEED TO BE INSTALLED TO SATISFY FLIGH 477297 1 8 T CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENTS DURING THE HATCH FUNCTIONAL. THE HATCH CYCL 477297 1 9 E WAS REPERFORMED WITH AND WITHOUT THE ASSEMBLY INSTALLED AND ALL 477297 1 10 MEASUREMENTS WERE NOMINAL. OMRS V33AC0.010 WAS SATISFIED PER V1058.001. 477297 1 11 NO FURTHER WORK OR RETEST IS REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT 477297 1 12 OTHER SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: FUNCTIONAL PERFORMED IN NON 477297 1 13 STANDARD CONFIGURATION. 477316 1 1 THE MALE FOOT ON THE RH AFT BULKHEAD PLBD BULB SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE DEBO 477316 1 2 NDED DURING REWORK PER MEQ-3-19-0779. DURING PREPS TO REBOND THE MALE FO 477316 1 3 OT, A PAGE 1A WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT POOR INTERFACE BETWEEN THE FEMALE 477316 1 4 AND MALE JOINT OF THE BASES WHERE THE 2 SEALS MEET. AN EXTENTION WAS MR 477316 1 5 BONDED ON THE MALE BASE. ALL BONDS PASSED LAP SHEAR. PROBABLE CAUSE IS O 477316 1 6 PERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THE REPAIR WILL BE RETESTED DURING PLBD CLOSURE 477316 1 7 FOR VAB STORAGE AND OPENING IN BAY 2 OPERATIONS. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT 477316 1 8 AFFECT OTHER SIMILAR END ITEMS. 477382 1 1 THE DENT IN THE AIRLOCK WAS REPAIRED WITH A DOUBLER HOT BONDED WITH -053 477382 1 2 ADHESIVE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMA 477382 1 3 NSHIP. 477408 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED USE OF THE 477408 PMRB 2 70C3718-1 PLATE ASSY AS INSTALLED ON THE 70W2309 STUB FRAME INSTL UNTIL 477408 PMRB 3 OMDP. THE PLATE ASSY APPEARS TO BE OUT OF PLANE WITH THE REMAINING 477408 PMRB 4 ADAPTIVE PAYLOAD CARRIER ATTACH POINTS ON THE XO1090 FRAME AND ON THE 477408 PMRB 5 SILL LONGERON (BAY 10 LH SIDE). THE MISALIGNMENT CAUSES A TAPERED GAP 477408 PMRB 6 UNDER THE HEAD OF THE BOLT AT THIS ATTACH POINT WHICH VARIES FROM .003" 477408 PMRB 7 TO .021". THE DESIGN GAP IS .002" TO .005" IN AT LEAST ONE LOCATION AND 477408 PMRB 8 .002" TO .008" IN ALL OTHER LOCATIONS. STS-64 IS THE FIRST TIME AN APC 477408 PMRB 9 HAS BEEN INSTALLED IN THIS LOCATION AND THE ONLY TIME ONE WILL BE FLOWN 477408 PMRB 10 IN THIS LOCATION BEFORE OMDP. PR CM-3-19-0315 WILL ACCEPT THE OUT OF 477408 PMRB 11 TOLERANCE GAPS UNDER THE HEAD OF THE BOLT. THE PLATE ASSY, STUB FRAME, 477408 PMRB 12 AND APC INSTALLATION WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 477408 PMRB 13 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE STUB FRAME IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. POST 477408 PMRB 14 FLIGHT ANALYSIS WILL OPTICALLY EVALUATE THE STUB FRAME INSTALLATION TO 477408 PMRB 15 DETERMINE WHERE THE MISALIGNMENT ORIGINATES. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 477408 PMRB 16 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT 477408 PMRB 17 THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PMRB APPROVAL FOR DEFE 477408 PMRB 18 ERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 05/24/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTUR 477408 PMRB 19 FLT (OMDP) OF OV-103. 477408 PMRB 20 477408 PMRB 21 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED LIFE OF THE XO 477408 PMRB 22 1115 STUB FRAME IN ITS OUT OF PLANE CONDITION UNTIL OMDP 2. OPTICS HAS 477408 PMRB 23 PERFORMED AN EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND HAS ATTACHED THE FINDINGS 477408 PMRB 24 TO THIS PR. THIS DATA WILL BE FORWARDED TO RI DOWNEY FOR EVALUATION AND 477408 PMRB 25 DESIGNING AN APPROPRIATE REPAIR. THE OUT OF PLANE CONDITION IS ONLY A 477408 PMRB 26 CONCERN WHEN AN APC IS INSTALLED IN THIS LOCATION. NOTHING WILL BE 477408 PMRB 27 INSTALLED IN THIS LOCATION FOR FLIGHT 21. THE STUB FRAME IS PRIMARY 477408 PMRB 28 STRUCTURE. IT WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 477408 PMRB 29 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. NO MR ID REQUIRED. THE STUB FRAME WILL BE 477408 PMRB 30 REPAIRED/REWORKED DURING OMDP. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT AFFECT THE CIL 477408 PMRB 31 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 477408 PMRB 32 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. 4/4/95, PMRB APPROVED TO 477408 PMRB 33 DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. 477408 1 1 OPTICAL EVALUATION CONFIRMS THE XO1115 STUB FRAME 70W2309 IS CANTED SLIG 477408 1 2 HTLY FWD APPROX 1/2 OF A DEG (IE THE AFT EDGE OF THE FRAME IS FURTHER IN 477408 1 3 BD THAN THE FWD EDGE BY .014"). THIS CANTED CONDITION IS VERY MINOR AND 477408 1 4 WILL NOT AFFECT THE STRUCTURAL LOAD CARRYING CAPABILITY OF THE STUB FRAM 477408 1 5 E INSTALLATION. THE CANTED CONDITION DOES, HOWEVER, INFLUENCE THE CARGO/ 477408 1 6 MECHANICAL INTERFACE WHEN A LONGERON BRIDGE IS INSTALLED ON THIS FRAME. 477408 1 7 THE CANTED FRAME INDUCES A NON-DESIGN TAPERED GAP UNDER THE HEAD OF THE 477408 1 8 BRIDGE BOLT (REF SKETCH A) WHICH RANGES FROM .003" (AFT SIDE) TO .021" ( 477408 1 9 FWD SIDE). TYPICALLY A LONGERON BRIDGE REQUIRES A DESIGN GAP OF .002" - 477408 1 10 .005" IN AT LEAST ONE LOCATION AND .002" - .008" AT ALL OTHER 477408 1 11 LOCATIONS. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE DESIGN GAP REQUIREMENT IS TO 477408 1 12 MINIMIZE IMPACT LOADING ON THE BRIDGE BOLT HEAD CAUSED BY EXCESSIVE 477408 1 13 AMPLITUDE CHATTER (INBD AND OTBD MOVEMENT OF BRIDGE). SINCE THE DESIGN 477408 1 14 GAP OF .002"-.005" FOR AT LEAST ONE LOCATION CAN BE OBTAINED, IMPACT 477408 1 15 LOADING WILL BE MINIMIZED AS DESIGN INTENDED FOR ALL FUTURE LONGERON 477408 1 16 BRIDGE/APC INSTALLATIONS AT THIS LOCATION. MR IDENTIFICAITON HAS BEEN 477408 1 17 APPLIED FOR FUTURE REF. THE 70W2309 XO1115 STUB FRAME (BAY 10, LEFT 477408 1 18 SIDE) WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE 477408 1 19 MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 477408 1 20 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR 477408 1 21 HAZARD CONTROLS. THE STUB FRAME IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 477408 1 22 WORKMANSHIP. 477429 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE 5 WIRES WERE FOUND TO BE PINCHED IN A CLAMP. AFTER R 477429 1 2 EMOVAL OF THE CLAMP IT WAS FOUND THAT WIRE 3C1040A24 HAD CONDUCTOR EXPOS 477429 1 3 ED. AFTER HINGING OPEN PANEL A1L, FURTHER INSPECTION FOUND ONLY PANT DAM 477429 1 4 AGE WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE PER MLO303-0014. NO FURTHER DISPO IS REQUIRED, R 477429 1 5 ETEST WILL BE PERFORMED BY SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 477655 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT A MALFUNCTIONING SWITCH WITHIN THE V07 477655 1 2 0-510395-004 LH MLG BUNGEE INDICATOR ASSEMBLY. PER TPS MEQ-3-19-219, THE 477655 1 3 DISCREPANT -004 INDICATOR ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED AND AN UPGRADED -006 IND 477655 1 4 ICATOR ASSEMBLY WAS INSTALLED. PER THIS PR, AN LRU PR WAS GENERATED WHIC 477655 1 5 H ROUTED THE DISCREPANT -004 INDICATOR ASSY TO HDA TO ROUTE TO NSLD TO B 477655 1 6 E MODIFIED TO THE -006 CONFIGURATION. PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. RET 477655 1 7 EST SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED BY V1098.001 LANDING GEAR FUNCTIONAL. PROBABL 477655 1 8 E CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. THIS CONDITION DOES 477655 1 9 NOT AFFECT OTHER SERIAL NUMBERS OF LIKE END ITEMS. 477809 1 1 DURING A SURVEILLANCE, WIRES 2G38B12 AND 1G28B12-3 WERE FOUND TO HAVE EX 477809 1 2 POSED CONDUCTOR. THE ASSOCIATED CONNECTOS WERE DEMATED AND THE DAMAGED W 477809 1 3 IRES WERE EXTRACTED FORM THE CONNECTORS. A HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING WAS THEN 477809 1 4 SLID OVER DAMAGED WIRES. THE WIRES WERE THEN RE-INSERTED AND THE CONNEC 477809 1 5 TORS MATED. AN MR ID WAS INSTALLED AT DAMAGED AREAS. NO FURTHER ACTION R 477809 1 6 EQUIRED ON THIS PR. CONNECTOR RETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. PROBABLE C 477809 1 7 AUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 477953 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE LUG ON WIRE P305E22 WAS B 477953 1 2 ROKEN AT 50P791 WITH INSUFFICIENT SLACK TO RETERMINATE. A SECTION OF WIR 477953 1 3 E WAS SPLICED TO P305E22 AND A NEW LUG CRIMPED ON AND RETERMINATED TO 50 477953 1 4 P791. SLEEVING P/N N/T-0.125 WAS ALSO HEAT SHRINK OVER WIRE P305E22 FOR 477953 1 5 PROTECTION AGAINST ANY FUTURE DAMAGE. THIS RETURNS ASSEMBLY TO AN ACCEPT 477953 1 6 ABLE BUT NON-DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, REL 477953 1 7 IABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. PROBABLE CAUSE 477953 1 8 DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE WHILE PROCESSING THE VEHICLE. 477963 1 1 DURING DIG-3-19-0163 WIRE 2ZK353B24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. THI 477963 1 2 S WIRE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW WIRE SEGMENT ALONG WITH HEAT 477963 1 3 SHRINK SLEEVING. CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HYPOT CHECKS WERE THEN PERFOR 477963 1 4 MED AND WERE SUCCESSFUL. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 477963 1 5 RETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. 477964 1 1 DURING DIG-3-19-0163, WIRES 4Z353B24 & 4YK259A24 WERE FOUND TO HAVE CRAC 477964 1 2 KED INSULATION AND EXPOSED SHIELD. THESE WIRES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED 477964 1 3 WIHT A NEW WIRE SEGMENTS ALONG WITH HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING ON BOTH WIRES. 477964 1 4 CONTINUITY, ISOLATION & HYPOT CHECKS WERE THEN PERFORMED ON BOTH WIRES 477964 1 5 AND WERE SUCCESSFUL. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. RET 477964 1 6 EST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. 477965 1 1 DURING DIG-3-19-0163, WIRE 1ZK353B24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE CRACKED INSULATIO 477965 1 2 N AND EXPOSED SHIELD. THIS WIRE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WTIH A NEW WIRE 477965 1 3 SEGMENT ALONG WITH HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING. PAGE 1A WAS TAKEN ON THE BACKS 477965 1 4 HELL, DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO REPLACE THE DISCREPANT BACKSHELL WITH A NEW B 477965 1 5 /S. PAGE 1B WAS WRITTEN ON THE CONTACTS ON CABLE 1ZK353B24, DISPO WAS WR 477965 1 6 ITTEN TO REPLACE THE DISCREPANT CONTACTS WITH NEW CONTACT. CONTINUITY, I 477965 1 7 SOLATION & HYPOT CHECKS WERE THEN PERFORMED AND WERE SUCCESSFUL. PROBABL 477965 1 8 E CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. 478013 1 1 ITEM 1: TWO GOUGES IN THE V070-351439-001 STRUT ASSEMBLY HAVE BEEN SANDE 478013 1 2 D SMOOTH IN ACCORDANCE WITH MR APPROVED PROCEDURE. THE REPAIR WAS MR APP 478013 1 3 ROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE 478013 1 4 CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 478018 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THE BODY FLAP ATTACH FITTING BOLT TORQUE VALUES OBTA 478018 PMRB 2 INED FOLLOWING FLIGHT 18 PER TPS STR-3-19-617, COULD NOT VERIFY THE PREL 478018 PMRB 3 OAD WAS MAINTAINED DURING FLIGHT 18. THESE BOLTS WERE TORQUED USING UNIV 478018 PMRB 4 ERSALS PRIOR TO FLIGHT 18, WHICH PROVIDED ERRONEOUS READINGS ON ORIGINAL 478018 PMRB 5 TORQUE VALUES. COMBINATIONS OF TORQUE ADAPTERS WERE USED DURING FLIGHT 478018 PMRB 6 19 OPF PROCESSING TO ACCURATELY RETORQUE ALL 32 BOLTS TO THE SPECIFIED T 478018 PMRB 7 ORQUE RANGE OF 500 +/- 40 IN LBS. DEFERRAL OF THIS PR FOR ONE FLIGHT WIL 478018 PMRB 8 L ALLOW THE BODY FLAP ATTACH FITTING BOLTS TO BE RECHECKED FOLLOWING 478018 PMRB 9 FLIGHT 19. THIS WILL CONFIRM THE TORQUE VALUES ARE MAINTAINED DURING 478018 PMRB 10 FLIGHT 19 AND CONSEQUENTLY SATISFY THE OBJECTIVE OF JSC CHIT J4331. NO 478018 PMRB 11 MR ID REQUIRED ON THIS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 478018 PMRB 12 INVALID THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE 478018 PMRB 13 CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS ACTION DOES NOT 478018 PMRB 14 ADVERSLY AFFECT SAFETY, FORM OR FUNCTION. THIS DEFERRAL IS FOR ONE 478018 PMRB 15 FLIGHT ONLY. 06/03/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 478018 PMRB 16 478018 PMRB 17 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED LIFE FOR ONE 478018 PMRB 18 FLIGHT OF THE BODY FLAP ACTUATOR FITTING ATTACH BOLTS AS REPAIRED PER 478018 PMRB 19 THIS DISPO. THE BREAKAWAY TORQUE OF EACH BOLTS WAS CHECKED. ALL BUT 3 OF 478018 PMRB 20 THE BOLTS FELL WITHIN THE OR ABOVE THE SPECIFIED RANGE. OF THE THREE 478018 PMRB 21 THAT WERE LOW, THERE WAS ONE ON THE RIGHT OUTBOARD ACTUATOR, ONE ON THE 478018 PMRB 22 RIGHT INBOARD ACTUATOR AND ONE ON THE LEFT INBOARD ACTUATOR. THESE THREE 478018 PMRB 23 WERE RE-TORQUED TO THEIR PRINT REQUIRED TORQUE OF 500 +/-40 INCH POUNDS. 478018 PMRB 24 SIXTEEN OF THE BOLTS DID NOT MOVE WHEN THE MAX TORQUE WAS APPLIED. THIS 478018 PMRB 25 IS LIKELY DUE TO THE STATIC COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION BEING HIGHER THAN 478018 PMRB 26 THE KINETIC COEFFECIENT OF FRICTION INDICATING A HIGHER PRELOAD THAN 478018 PMRB 27 REQUIRED. ALL 32 BOLTS WILL BE CHECKED AGAIN FOLLOWING FLIGHT 20 TO 478018 PMRB 28 VERIFY THAT THEY HAVE NOT LOST PRELOAD. THE FITTINGS ARE PRIMARY 478018 PMRB 29 STRUCTURE. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 478018 PMRB 30 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. MR ID NOT REQ'D. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 478018 PMRB 31 IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION 478018 PMRB 32 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. 12/06/94, PMRB APPROVED 478018 PMRB 33 FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF OV-103. 478018 PMRB 34 478018 PMRB 35 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED LIFE FOR ONE 478018 PMRB 36 FLIGHT OF THE BODY FLAP ACTUATOR FITTING ATTACH BOLTS AS REPAIRED PER 478018 PMRB 37 THIS DISPO. THE BREAKAWAY TORQUE OF EACH BOLTS WAS CHECKED. ALL BUT 3 478018 PMRB 38 OF THE BOLTS WERE ABOVE THE MINIMUM FLIGHT TORQUE. OF THE THREE THAT 478018 PMRB 39 WERE LOW, THERE WAS ONE ON THE LEFT OUTBOARD ACTUATOR, AND TWO ON THE 478018 PMRB 40 RIGHT INBOARD ACTUATOR. THESE THREE WERE RE-TORQUED TO THEIR PRINT 478018 PMRB 41 REQUIRED TORQUE OF 500 +/- 40 INCH POUNDS. THE RESULTS OF THE TORQUE 478018 PMRB 42 CHECKS ARE TABULATED IN ATTACHMENT 1. IN 21 LOCATIONS A NEW TOOL WAS 478018 PMRB 43 USED. IT IS AN IN-LINE TORQUE ANALYSER WHICH READS THE APPLIED TORQUE 478018 PMRB 44 REGARDLESS OF THE WRENCH USED. ALL 32 BOLTS WILL BE CHECKED AGAIN 478018 PMRB 45 FOLLOWING FLIGHT 21 TO QUALIFY THE PROCESS. THE FITTINGS ARE PRIMARY 478018 PMRB 46 STRUCTURE. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 478018 PMRB 47 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. MR ID NOT REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 478018 PMRB 48 IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION 478018 PMRB 49 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. 4/28/95, PMRB APPROVED 478018 PMRB 50 FOR DEFFERAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. 478018 PMRB 51 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED LIFE FOR ONE 478018 PMRB 52 FLIGHT OF THE BODY FLAP ACTUATOR FITTING ATTACH BOLTS WITH 7 BOLTS 478018 PMRB 53 FAILING MINIMUM TORQUE CHECK PER TPS STR-3-J2-677. THE BREAKAWAY TORQUE 478018 PMRB 54 OF EACH BOLTS WAS CHECKED. ALL BUT 7 OF THE BOLTS WERE ABOVE THE 478018 PMRB 55 MINIMUM FLIGHT TORQUE. THESE SEVEN WERE RE-TORQUED TO THEIR PRINT 478018 PMRB 56 REQUIRED TORQUE OF 500 +/- 40 INCH POUNDS PER PR STR-3-J2-5347. ALL 32 478018 PMRB 57 BOLTS WILL BE CHECKED AGAIN FOLLOWING FLIGHT 22. THE FITTINGS ARE 478018 PMRB 58 PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT 478018 PMRB 59 WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. MR ID WAS ACCOMPLISHED ABOVE. SAFETY, 478018 PMRB 60 FIT OR FUNCTION IS NOT COMPROMISED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE 478018 PMRB 61 CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 478018 PMRB 62 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. 11/22/96 PMRB APPROVED FOR 478018 PMRB 63 DEFERRAL TO FLT 23 OF OV-103. 478018 1 1 THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST, BY OPERATION NUMBER, THAT SUMMARIZES THE WORK 478018 1 2 ACCOMPLISHED PER STR-3-A0241. ALL ITEMS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED AND ANY 478018 1 3 FURTHER TORQUE CHECKS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED ON A TPS PER JSC CHIT J4990 478018 1 4 R1. OPERATION 1 (FLIGHT 19) ADDRESSED ITEMS 1 AND 2 (B/F ACTUATOR 478018 1 5 ATTACH POINT BOLTS NOT TORQUED TO PRINT VALUE) BY DETORQUING ALL 32 B/F 478018 1 6 ACTUATOR ATTACH POINT BOLTS TO 30% OF MAX TORQUE AND THEN TORQUING THE 478018 1 7 BOLTS TO 500 +/- 40 IN LBS BY STEPPING FROM 162, TO 216, TO 376 AND 478018 1 8 FINALLY TO 500 IN LBS. OPERATION 2 DEFERRED THIS WAD FOR 1 FLIGHT IN 478018 1 9 ORDER TO CHECK THE TORQUE ON THE ACTUATOR ATTACH POINT BOLTS FOR FLIGHT 478018 1 10 20. POST FLIGHT DISPOSITION MEASURED THE PRELOAD ON ALL 32 ATTACH POINT 478018 1 11 BOLTS. (2) NUTS WERE WRITTEN UP AS ROUNDED OFF (ITEM 3) AND SEVERAL 478018 1 12 LOCATIONS WERE WRITTEN UP AS INACCESSIBLE (ITEMS 4 AND 5). OPERATION 3 478018 1 13 COMPILED THE DATA THAT WAS OBTAINED IN OPERATION 2. HOWEVER, SOME OF 478018 1 14 THE DATA WAS DETERMINED UNRELIABLE BECAUSE THE TORQUE CHECK WAS DONE 478018 1 15 WITHOUT RESTRAINING THE BOLT HEAD. OPERATION 4 ADDRESSED ITEMS 3-5 BY 478018 1 16 DETERMINING THE BEST CONFIGURATION OF TORQUE WRENCH AND TORQUE ADAPTER 478018 1 17 THAT COULD ACCESS THE BOLTS. OPERATION 4 ALSO CHECKED THE TORQUE ON THE 478018 1 18 LOCATIONS WHERE THE BOLT HEAD WAS NOT RESTRAINED. OPERATION 5 CHECKED 478018 1 19 THE TORQUE ON THE LOCATIONS THAT COULD NOT BE ACCESSED PER OPERATION 4. 478018 1 20 OPERATION 6 ADDRESSED ITEM 6 WHICH DOCUMENTED THREE OF THE ATTACH POINT 478018 1 21 BOLTS THAT WERE UNDER MINIMUM DRAWING SPECIFIED TORQUE (460 IN LBS). 478018 1 22 THE THREE LOCATIONS THAT WERE BELOW MINIMUM DRAWING SPECIFIED TORQUE 478018 1 23 WERE TORQUED TO THE CORRECT DRAWING SPECIFIED TORQUE (500 +/- 40 IN 478018 1 24 LBS). ALSO, THIS OPERATION DEFERRED THE WAD UNTIL FLIGHT 21 IN ORDER TO 478018 1 25 RECHECK THE TORQUE ON THE ATTACH POINT BOLTS. OPERATION 7 CHECKED THE 478018 1 26 TORQUE ON THE B/F ACTUATOR ATTACH POINT BOLTS FOR FLIGHT 21. ONE 478018 1 27 LOCATION WAS FOUND THAT WAS UNDER MINIMUM DRAWING SPECIFIED TORQUE 478018 1 28 (ITEM 7). OPERATION 8 CHECKED THE TOOLS AND THE CONFIGURATIONS USED IN 478018 1 29 OPERATION 7 TO DETERMINE THE ACCURACY OF THE MEASUREMENTS. THE 478018 1 30 CONFIGURATIONS USED WERE DETERMINED ACCURATE. OPERATION 9 ENGINEERING 478018 1 31 USED THE DATA COLLECTED IN OPERATION 7 TO DETERMINE THE BOLTS THAT 478018 1 32 REQUIRED REWORK. THE LOCATION 478018 1 33 S REQUIRING REWORK WERE TORQUED TO THEIR NOMINAL PRINT CONFIGURATION 478018 1 34 (500 +/-40 IN LBS). OPERATION 10 WAS WORKED PRIOR TO OPERATION 9. 478018 1 35 OPERATION 10 TESTED A TORQUE ANALYZER, WHICH ENABLES THE TORQUE TO BE 478018 1 36 READ DIRECTLY FROM THE BOLT, INDEPENDENT OF TOOL CONFIGURATION. THIS 478018 1 37 TOOL WAS THEN USED IN OPERATION 9 WHERE ACCESS PERMITTED. OPERATION 11 478018 1 38 DEFERRED THE WAD UNTIL POST FLIGHT 21. OPERATION 12 DEFERRED THE WAD 478018 1 39 UNTIL POST FLIGHT 22. ALL 32 BOLTS WERE CHECKED PER TPS STR-3-J2-667, 478018 1 40 WITH 7 OF THE 32 BELOW MINIMUM DRAWING SPECIFIED TORQUE (ITEM 8). THE 478018 1 41 BOLTS WERE RETORQUED PER STR-3-J2-5347. OPERATION 13 CHECKED THE TORQUE 478018 1 42 FOR FLIGHT 23 PROCESSING. ALL (16) OF THE UPPER ATTACH POINT BOLTS WERE 478018 1 43 CHECKED WITH A CLICK STYLE TORQUE WRENCH INSTEAD OF A DIAL TORQUE 478018 1 44 WRENCH (ITEM 9). OPERATION 14 ADDRESSED ITEM 9 BY RECHECKING THE TORQUE 478018 1 45 ON THE UPPER 16 BOLTS USING A DIAL TORQUE WRENCH. PER OPERATIONS 13 AND 478018 1 46 14, 2 OF THE 32 ATTACH POINT BOLTS WERE FOUND TO BE BELOW MINIMUM 478018 1 47 DRAWING SPECIFIED TORQUE (ITEM 10). OPERATION 15 ADDRESSED ITEM 10 BY 478018 1 48 TORQUING THE 2 LOCATIONS THAT WERE FOUND TO BE BELOW MIN TORQUE IN THE 478018 1 49 PER PRINT SEQUENCE TO 500 +/- 40 IN LBS. 478041 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: WHILE WORKING PR DIG-3-19-0163 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT AFT 478041 PMRB 2 MCA 3 HAD ONE OF ITS FOURTEEN CAPTIVE FASTENERS THAT HAD APPROXIMATELY 1 478041 PMRB 3 /8 OF ROTATIONAL PLAY. PER SPECIFICATION MLO308-0007 THE TORQUE REQUIREM 478041 PMRB 4 ENT FOR CAPTIVE FASTENER P/N: ME112-0010-0014 IS 43 TO 53 IN LBS. HOWEVE 478041 PMRB 5 R, TO SEAT THE CAPTIVE FASTENER PROPERLY REQUIRED 80 IN LBS (REF STEP 2- 478041 PMRB 6 1). MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF CAPTIVE FASTENER AS 478041 PMRB 7 IS. THE EXCESSIVE TORQUE OF THE FASTENER IS A NON-DESIGN CONDITION THAT 478041 PMRB 8 DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE 478041 PMRB 9 OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. NO MR ID REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 478041 PMRB 10 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT 478041 PMRB 11 THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 478041 PMRB 12 THIS MR ACTION IS UNRESTRICTED FOR UNRESTRICTED LIFE. PMRB APPROVAL 478041 PMRB 13 FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (MCA REMOVAL) OV OV-103. 478041 PMRB 14 478041 PMRB 15 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: WHILE WORKING DIG-3-19-0163 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT 478041 PMRB 16 ONE OF THE FOURTEEN CAPTIVE FASTENERS ON AMCA 3 HAD APPROXIMATELY 1/8 478041 PMRB 17 OF ROTATIONAL PLAY. PER SPECIFICATION MA0101-308 THE ME112-0010-0014 478041 PMRB 18 CAPTIVE FASTENERS IS TO BE TORQUED 43-53" LBS. HOWEVER, TO SEAT THE 478041 PMRB 19 CAPTIVE FASTENER PROPERLY REQUIRED A TORQUE OF 80" LBS. DEFERRAL IS 478041 PMRB 20 REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED USE OF ME112-0010-0014 CAPTIVE FASTENER TO 478041 PMRB 21 FUTURE FLIGHT WHEN MCA NUMBER 3 REMOVED ANDTHE FASTENER AND AV BAY 6 478041 PMRB 22 INSERT CAN BE INSPECTED FOR CROSSED THREADS OR CONTAMINATION. THE OVER 478041 PMRB 23 TORQUE OF THE FASTENER WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH ITS ABILITY TO SECURE THE 478041 PMRB 24 MCA TO ITS MATING SURFACE (COLD PLATE). THE FASTENER IS CONSIDERED A 478041 PMRB 25 NON-STRUCTURAL FASTENER WITH LOW APPLIED TENSION AND SHEAR LOADS. THE 478041 PMRB 26 TORQUE OF 80" LBS IS BELOW THE YIELD STRENGTH OF THE FASTENER MATERIAL 478041 PMRB 27 AND CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE. UNTIL RECENTLY MAO101-308 REQUIRED A TORQUE 478041 PMRB 28 OF 60-80" LBS ON ME112-0010 CAPTIVE FASTENERS. IT WAS RECENTLY CHANGED 478041 PMRB 29 TO 43-53 BECAUSE THE CAPTIVE FASTENER IS CONSIDERED A NON-STRUCTURAL 478041 PMRB 30 FASTENER, LOW APPLIED TENSION AND SHEAR LOADS AND THEREFORE DOES NOT 478041 PMRB 31 REQUIRED THE CLASS 2 TORQUE OF 60-80" LBS. THE EXCESSIVE TORQUE OF THE 478041 PMRB 32 FASTENER IS A NON-DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT 478041 PMRB 33 SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. THIS 478041 PMRB 34 CONDITION IS TRANSPARENT TO THE CREW. NO MR ID REQUIRED. *"THIS MR 478041 PMRB 35 ACTION IS NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION." *"THIS MR ACTION 478041 PMRB 36 DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR 478041 PMRB 37 HAZARD CONTROLS." *"THIS MR ACTION IS FOR RESTRICTED USE, FUTURE 478041 PMRB 38 FLIGHT." PMRB APPROVAL FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (MCA REMOVAL) OF 478041 PMRB 39 OV-103. 478041 PMRB 40 06/21/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (MCA 3 REMOVAL) OF 478041 PMRB 41 OV-103. 478041 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF DIG-3-19-0163 THE FOLLOWING DISCREPANCY WAS FOUND 478041 1 2 AND ADDRESSED. ONE FASTENER ON AFT MCA 3 WAS FOUND LOOSE AND WAS TORQUED 478041 1 3 TO 80" LBS WITH MR APPROVAL. (PER MAO101-308 PROPER TORQUE IS 43-53" LB 478041 1 4 S). DURING THIS FLOW, THE MR'D FASTENER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW CAPTIVE SC 478041 1 5 REW ASSEMBLY (ME112-0010-0014) AND RETAINER NUT (ME114-0025-0002) WAS IN 478041 1 6 STALLED AND TORQUED PROPERLY. AFT MCA 3 WAS THEN INSTALLED IN THE ORBITE 478041 1 7 R EPR V5C12.003 AS CALLED OUT ON OEL-3-J3-213,S60-8. RETEST WILL BE SCAN 478041 1 8 TRACKED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. ITEM 1: WC=AFT MCA 3 (V070-7654 478041 1 9 30-001), DC=OTHER, DL=LRU, CD=OTHER, RM=REMOVE AND REPLACE DISCREPANT FA 478041 1 10 STENER. PROBABLE CAUSE: CODE T - OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION/WEAROUT. 478205 1 1 SPHERICAL BEARING ME131-0038-1005 AT THE AFT INBOARD FES MOUNT WAS FOUND 478205 1 2 TO BE GALLED AROUND THE INNER CIRCUMFERENCE. AFTER OBTAINING DIMENSIONS 478205 1 3 OF IRREGULARITIES IN THE INNER SURFACE OF THE BEARING (0.001", MAX) ON A 478205 1 4 PREVIOUS SHIFT, OPERATION 3 WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TTL CONCEPT 478205 1 5 IN CONCERT WITH LSOC/STR, NASA/STR, RI/LSS AS TTL WITH LSOC/QE, NASA/QE 478205 1 6 APPROVAL. IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTION, THE INSIDE DIAMETER OF THE SPH 478205 1 7 ERICAL BEARING WAS POLISHED SMOOTH USING 220 GRIT ABRASIVE PAPER UNTIL B 478205 1 8 OLT MD111-4025-0513 COULD BE INSERTED INTO THE BEARING WITHOUT BINDING, 478205 1 9 BUT WITH FULL CIRCUMFERENTIAL CONTACT AND MINIMUM RUNOUT. THIS WAS ANMR 478205 1 10 PROCEDURE APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE; MR IDENTIFICATION HAS BEEN 478205 1 11 PROVIDED. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 478205 1 12 BINDINGINTERFERENCE BETWEEN INNER DIAMETER OF SPHERICAL BEARING 478205 1 13 ME131-0038-1005 AND OUTER DIAMETER OF BOLT MD111-4025-0513. OPERATIONAL 478205 1 14 DEGRADATION. 478241 1 1 THE TWO PUNCTURES WERE REPAIRED BY POTTING THE HONEYCOMB CELLS AND BONDI 478241 1 2 NG A DOUBLER WITH MB0120-008 ADHESIVE AT AMBIENT CURE. THE INITIAL BOND 478241 1 3 FAILED AND ITEM 2 WAS PICKED UP. THE DOUBLER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE W 478241 1 4 AS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTR 478241 1 5 ICTED USE. THIS DAMAGE EXISTED PRIOR TO THIS FLIGHT. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHE 478241 1 6 N THE DAMAGE OCCURRED OR IF IT HAS EXISTED SINCE ORIGINAL INSTALLATION. 478241 1 7 NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP (ITEM 478241 1 8 1) MATERIALS DEFICIENCY (ITEM 2). 478271 1 1 DURING STRUCTURED SURVEILLANCE, WIRE 1ZK452A24 AT CONNECTOR 30P36 WAS FO 478271 1 2 UND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. THE WIRE WAS EXTRACTED FROM THE CONNECTOR AND 478271 1 3 HEAT SHRINK TUBING P/N RT1146-0.250 WAS INSTALLED OVER DAMAGED AREA FRO 478271 1 4 M THE CONNECTOR TO THE FIRST CLAMP. THE WIRE WAS RE-PINNED AND A CONTINU 478271 1 5 ITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT CHECK WERE PERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY. NO FURTHER A 478271 1 6 CTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. RETEST IS SCAN TRACKED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMA 478271 1 7 L WEAR AND TEAR. 478272 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLE 4ZK325D24 HAD DAMAGED KAP 478272 1 2 TON EXPOSING THE SHIELD (REFERENCE ITEM 1). THE DAMAGE TO THE CABLE WAS 478272 1 3 REPAIRED BY WRAPPING THE AREA WITH MYSTIK 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE. CABLE 2Z 478272 1 4 K421A24 ALSO HAD DAMAGED KAPTON WITH SHIELD SEPARATION (REFERENCE ITEM 2 478272 1 5 ). THE CABLE WAS EXTRACTED FROM 82P18 AND RT1146-0.250 WAS HEAT SHRUNK O 478272 1 6 VER THE CABLE. THE CABLE WAS REINSERTED INTO 82P18. DURING THE REPAIR OF 478272 1 7 2ZK421A24 IT WAS FOUND THAT CABLE 2K612D26 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE. THE CABLE 478272 1 8 WAS EXTRACTED FROM 82P18 AND HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING WAS INSTALLED OVER 478272 1 9 THE DAMAGED AREA. THE CABLE WAS REINSERTED INTO 82P18. CONTINUTITY, 478272 1 10 ISOLATION AND HYPOT WAS PERFORMED ON CABLE 2ZK421A24. RETEST OF 478272 1 11 CONNECTORS DEMATED ON THIS PR WILL BE RETESTED PER SCAN TRACKING. 478272 1 12 REFERENCE STEP 1-83 AND 1-84. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEMS 1, 2 AND 3 478272 1 13 WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 478337 1 1 THE PRELOADED PANEL NOTED IN ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPAB 478337 1 2 LE PER SPECIFICATION AND DESIGN AND THEREFORE IS NOT A PR CONDITION. 478433 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED TO ACCEPT THE FROZEN SPHERICAL 478433 PMRB 2 BEARING, P/N ME131-0038-1005, ON THE FRAME STRUCTURE, V070-855316-001, 478433 PMRB 3 AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE DISCREPANT SPHERICAL BEARING IS LOCATED 478433 PMRB 4 AT THE XO1400, YO-22.371 MOUNTING POINT. AN ATTEMPT TO LOOSEN THE 478433 PMRB 5 SPHERICAL BEARING WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. THE DESIGN INTENT OF THE SPHERICAL 478433 PMRB 6 BEARING IS TO AID ALIGNMENT OF ATTACH HOLE DURING FES ATTACH BOLT 478433 PMRB 7 INSTALLATION. THERE IS A TOTAL OF FOUR FES AVAILABLE, AND ALL FOUR ARE 478433 PMRB 8 INTERCHANGEABLE BY DESIGN. SINCE THE ALIGNMENT OF THE SPHERICAL BEARING 478433 PMRB 9 FITS TWO OF THE FOUR FES, THE BEARING IS PROPERLY ALIGNED FOR ALL FOUR 478433 PMRB 10 FES INSTALLATIONS. THE BEARING NON-DESIGN CONDITION AFFECTS THE ORIGINAL 478433 PMRB 11 GROUND PROCESSING FUNCTION OF THE BEARING BUT DOES NOT AFFECT THIS 478433 PMRB 12 INSTALLATION. THE FROZEN SPHERICAL BEARING WHICH IS IN THE PROPER 478433 PMRB 13 CONFIGURATION FOR ATTACH BOLT INSTALLATION, WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION 478433 PMRB 14 PER FLIGHT DESIGN INTENT WITH POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. FORM AND FIT OF 478433 PMRB 15 THE BEARING ARE NOT COMPROMISED. THE SPHERICAL BEARING IS SECONDARY 478433 PMRB 16 STRUCTURE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 478433 PMRB 17 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 478433 PMRB 18 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 478433 PMRB 19 05/17/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED "USE AS IS". 478433 1 1 DURING INSTALLATION OF FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM (FES), SPHERICAL BEARING 478433 1 2 LOCATED AT THE XO-1400, YO-22.371 MOUNTING POINT WAS FOUND FROZEN. INSTA 478433 1 3 LALLATION OF THE REPLACEMENT FES INDICATED THAT THE SPHERICAL BEARING IS 478433 1 4 FROZEN IN THE PROPER CONFIGURATION FOR ATTACH BOLT INSTALLATION. MR FOR 478433 1 5 UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE SPHERICAL BEARING WAS APPROVED. MR ID WAS APPLI 478433 1 6 ED ONT HE FRAME ADJACENT TO THE DISCREPANT SPHERICAL BEARING. NO FURTHER 478433 1 7 ACTION REQUIRED. THE CAUSE OF THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 478511 1 1 DURING ECL-3-19-0996, CONNECTOR 50P636 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BROKEN BACKSH 478511 1 2 ELL TANG. THE DISCREPANT BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW S 478511 1 3 PLIT BS P/N: ME127-0106-0110. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO WEAR AND TEAR. N 478511 1 4 O RETEST IS REQUIRED. 478557 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). PER EO C06 OF DRAWING V070-198300, 478557 PMRB 2 THE VOIDS AND GAPS IN THE V070-198330-001 BLOCK SEAL ARE REQUIRED TO BE 478557 PMRB 3 FILLED WITH MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE. THE APPLICATION OF THE 478557 PMRB 4 ADHESIVE CAUSES THE SEAL TO NOT MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ITS SEALING 478557 PMRB 5 SURFACE DURING ELEVON CYCLING. THE SEAL LACKS SUFFICIENT RIGIDITY TO 478557 PMRB 6 MAINTAIN A PROPER SEAL. BY COVERING THE ENTIRE SEAL WITH ADHESIVE AND 478557 PMRB 7 INJECTING THE ADHESIVE INTO THE VOIDS BETWEEN THE SEAL AND THE ADJACENT 478557 PMRB 8 STRUCTURE, ALL LEAK AND FLOW PATHS WILL BE ELIMINATED. THE ADHESIVE WILL 478557 PMRB 9 SERVE AS THE FLOW BARRIER. THIS WILL ALLOW THE SEAL ASSEMBLY AT THE 478557 PMRB 10 YW212 HINGE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF 478557 PMRB 11 SAFETY. AN EVALUATION OF THE SEAL DESIGN AT THIS LOCATION IS IN WORK. 478557 PMRB 12 DURING THE NEXT REMOVAL OF THE PRIMARY SEAL PANELS AND THE BLOCK SEAL, 478557 PMRB 13 THE DISCREPANT SEAL WILL BE REPLACED WITH A NEW SEAL. IN THE INTERIM, 478557 PMRB 14 THIS SEAL AND ADJACENT STRUCTURE WILL BE INSPECTED EACH FLIGHT PER OM 478557 PMRB 15 RSD V09AK0.034. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFI 478557 PMRB 16 CATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HA 478557 PMRB 17 ZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS FOR RESTRICTED FLIGHT USE UNTIL SEAL PA 478557 PMRB 18 NEL REMOVAL. 05/17/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT(SEAL PAN 478557 PMRB 19 EL REMOVAL) OF OV-103. 478557 1 1 OPERATION 1 WAS A PMRB APPROVED REWORK OF THE ITEM 1 YW212 478557 1 2 V070-198330-001 BLOCK SEAL FOR RESTRICTED FLIGHT USE UNTIL SEAL PANEL 478557 1 3 REMOVAL. THE GAPS BETWEEN THE SEAL AND THE HINGE WERE FILLED WITH 478557 1 4 MB0130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE UNTIL NO GAPS WERE PRESENT AT ELEVON NULL, 478557 1 5 UP AND DOWN POSITIONS. STR-3-22-716 REMOVED BLOCK SEAL. OPERATION 2 478557 1 6 OBTAINED A NEW V070-198330-001 BLOCK SEAL ASSEMBLY. THE DISCREPA 478557 1 7 REPLACEMENT (STEP 2-3) SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH THE NEW 478557 1 8 ASSEMBLY PER PR STR-3-22-5948. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE IS DESIGN 478557 1 9 DEFICIENCY/NON CONFORMANCE. NOTE: STR-3-22-716 INCORPORATED AN EO TO 478557 1 10 ITS TENDENCY TO DEBOND. 478672 1 1 THE V070-354759-001 CLIP LOCATED AT XO 1323, YO-52.5, AND Z0 278.88 COME 478672 1 2 S IN CONTACT WITH THE FOAM INSULATION ON PV-17 AND AT ZO 270 IS NOT USED 478672 1 3 THE CLIPS WAS REMOVED PER E.O.T.F. AND ITS HOLES PLUGGED WITH HI-LOKS. P 478672 1 4 ROBABLE CAUSE:DESIGN 478784 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DETECTED JR24 WIRE AT 50P418 HAD A BROKEN GRO 478784 1 2 UND LUG. THE DISCREPANCY WAS INITIALLY ADDRESSED ON DR OEL-3-19-0155. AF 478784 1 3 TER FURTHER RESEARCH IT WAS FOUND THE WIRE WOULD REQUIRE A CONTINUITY CH 478784 1 4 ECK FROM 50P418 PIN C TO STR GND. THE DR WAS UPGRADED TO PR OEL-3-19-051 478784 1 5 6. THE DISCREPANT LUG WAS REMOVED AND A NEW LUG WAS CRIMPED ON. A CONTIN 478784 1 6 UITY CHECK WAS PERFORMED FOR THE NEW GROUND LUG. RETEST OF 50P418 WILL B 478784 1 7 E SCAN TRACKED WHEN THE CONNECTOR IS REMATED PER V5005 SSME INSTALLATION 478784 1 8 . THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS WORKMANSHIP. 479371 1 1 TWO DENTS FOUND ON V070-356735-012 DOOR WERE DETERMINED TO BE OF NO STRU 479371 1 2 CTURAL CONSEQUENCE. MEASUREMENTS OF DENT DIMENSIONS WERE TAKEN BY MOLD-I 479371 1 3 MPRESSION AND THE ABSENCE OF CRACKS VERIFIED BY DYE-PENETRANT INSPECTION 479371 1 4 . COIN-TAP TEST SHOWED FACE-SHEET BOND INTACT, AND STRESS ANALYSIS CONFI 479371 1 5 RMED THAT THE DENTS WILL NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT OF TH 479371 1 6 IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE DENTS WERE MR ACCEPTED "AS IS" FOR UNRESTRIC 479371 1 7 TED USE. MR ID WAS PROVIDED. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABL 479371 1 8 E CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 479388 1 1 ITEM 1 WAS PICKED UP DURING UA-3-A0032 WHICH DETERMINED THE GAP BETWEEN 479388 1 2 THE BUNGEE ARMING ROLLER AND PLUNGER WAS 0.037" (S/B .040-.060). THE GAP 479388 1 3 WAS RECHECKED WITH THE ROLLER SIDE PLAY REMOVED AND THE GAP MEASURED .0 479388 1 4 43". PR CONDITION DOES NOT EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PR IS INCORRECT ME 479388 1 5 ASURING TECHNIQUE. 479496 1 1 DURING OEL-3-19-0510 IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLES 3G129A26, 2G133A26, AND 479496 1 2 2G134A26 HAD DAMAGED SHIELD JACKET INSULATION AT THE BACKSHELL TANG OF 479496 1 3 RECEPTACLE 50J458. INSPECTION REVEALED NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMAR 479496 1 4 Y INSULATION. THE DISCREPANT AREAS WERE REPAIRED BY WRAPPING MYSTIK 7503 479496 1 5 ELECTRICAL TAPE OVER THE DAMAGE WITH MR CONCURRENCE. THERE IS NO RETEST 479496 1 6 REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS NORMAL WEAR AN 479496 1 7 D TEAR. 479559 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V31-15114 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE SEGMENT 4 479559 1 2 ZK343B24 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE WITH EXPOSED SHIELD APPROXIMATELY 10 INCHES F 479559 1 3 ROM CONNECTOR 56P9. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY REPLACING THE WIRE 479559 1 4 SEGMENT FROM CONNECTOR 56P9 TO RECEPTACLE 56J30 AND INSTALLING HEAT SHR 479559 1 5 INK SLEEVING TO MINIMIZE FUTURE DAMAGE. A PAGE 1A WAS GENERATED WHEN THE 479559 1 6 HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING WOULDN'T SHRINK TO A TIGHT FIT ON THE SEGMENT. THI 479559 1 7 S DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY REMOVING IN INCORRECT SIZE SLEEVING (0.37 479559 1 8 5 IN.) AND REPLACING WITH THE CORRECT SIZE SLEEVING (0.125). A CONTINUIT 479559 1 9 Y, ISOLATION AND HIPOT TEST WERE PERFORMED TO VERIFY THE INTEGRITY OF 479559 1 10 THE NEW WIRE SEGMENT. THE ABOVE MENTIONED REPAIR PROCEDURE RETURNS THE 479559 1 11 SEGMENT TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRACKED. NO FURTHER 479559 1 12 ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF 479559 1 13 FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 479560 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V31-15114 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE SEGMENTS 479560 1 2 1ZK543B24 AND 1ZK343B24 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE WITH EXPOSED AND/OR DAMAGED SH 479560 1 3 IELD. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY REPLACING THE WIRE SEGMENTS FROM 479560 1 4 THEIR EXISTING CONNECTORS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE RECEPTACLES AND INSTALLIN 479560 1 5 G HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING TO MINIMIZE FUTURE DAMAGE. A CONTINUITY, ISOLATIO 479560 1 6 N AND HIPOT TEST WERE PERFORMED TO VERIFY THE INTEGRITY OF THE NEW WIRE 479560 1 7 SEGMENTS. THE ABOVE MENTIONED REPAIR PROCEDURE RETURNS THE SEGMENTS TO P 479560 1 8 RINT CONFIGURATION. RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRACKED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS RE 479560 1 9 QUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF FLIGHT 479560 1 10 ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 479561 1 1 DURING V31-15114 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLE 5ZK353A24 HAD KAPTON DAMAG 479561 1 2 E AND EXPOSED SHIELDING (ITEM 1). CABLE 5ZK353A24 WAS REPAIRED BY INSTAL 479561 1 3 LING HEAT SHRINKABLE SLEEVING P/N: RT1146-0.250 FROM 56V77W1127P52 TO ED 479561 1 4 GE OF SHELF. A CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT TEST WAS PERFORMED AND PA 479561 1 5 SSED. IT WAS ALSO DISCOVERED THAT THE EXTRUSION RUBBER WAS DEBONDING FRO 479561 1 6 M AV BAY 6 SHELF (ITEM 2). THE EXTRUSION RUBBER WAS REMOVED AND NEW EXTR 479561 1 7 USION RUBBER BONDED ON. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. RETE 479561 1 8 ST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 479935 1 1 DURING ECL-3-19-0991 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 1E775N20 WAS TOO SHORT 479935 1 2 TO SPLICE TO VENDOR LEAD "B PWR - B SPLY" AND 50V63S4-1 USING DESIGN SPL 479935 1 3 ICE 50SP934. WIRE 1E775N20 WAS REPAIRED BY SPLICING ON ADDITIONAL WIRE L 479935 1 4 ENGTH USING KSC SPLICE "KSC-0660". NEW END OF WIRE 1E775N20 WILL BE SPLI 479935 1 5 CED TO VENDOR LEAD "B PWR - B SPLY" AND 50V63S4-1 PER ECL-3-19-0991. NO 479935 1 6 ADDITIONAL DISPOSITION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCE 479935 1 7 SSING THE ORBITER. THIS RETURNS WIRE TO AN ACCPETABLE BUT NO-DESIGN COND 479935 1 8 ITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, 479935 1 9 PERFORMANCE OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. REFERENCE ECL-3-19-0991 FOR RETEST. 480126 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THE MD112-1003-0305 SCREW AT THE CENTER FASTENER 480126 1 2 HOLE ON THE V070-298112-032 THERMAL BARRIER WAS FOUND TO HAVE A GAP UND 480126 1 3 ER ON SIDE OF THE HEAD. THE GAP MEASURED APPROXIMATELY 0.030 WITH THE FA 480126 1 4 STENER TORQUED TO MAXIMUM CLASS 1 TORQUE. THE FASTENER IS CANTED DUE TO 480126 1 5 THE INSERT BEING POTTED AT AND ANGLE TO THE FACESHEET. PER RESTRICTED VE 480126 1 6 HICLE MR DISPOSITION, A TAPERED WASHER WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED. PRO 480126 1 7 BABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP (IMPROPER POTTING OF INSERT DURIN 480126 1 8 G INSTALLATION). NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS 480126 1 9 PR. 480606 1 1 THE MR SHIM WAS REBONDED WITH MBO130-119 TYPE 2 ADHESIVE (REF: STR-3-07- 480606 1 2 2048, STR-3-07-2645). NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CA 480606 1 3 USE: PREVIOUS MR. 480758 1 1 THE NUTPLATE WAS DISCREPANT. IT WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE WAS REINSTALLE 480758 1 2 D WITH BLIND RIVETS PER SRP. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROB 480758 1 3 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 480759 1 1 THE ANCHOR NUT WAS DISCREPANT. IT WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE WAS REINSTAL 480759 1 2 LED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER SRP. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PR 480759 1 3 OBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 481048 1 1 MISSING CONICAL WASHER HAS BEEN REPLACED. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQU 481048 1 2 IRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 481112 1 1 THE PANEL WAS REMOVED FOR ACCESS PER TES-3-19-0324. IT WAS DISCOVERED TO 481112 1 2 HAVE BEEN INSTALLED BY A PERVIOUS MRB ACTION, BUT DOCUMENTING PAPERWORK 481112 1 3 COULD NOT BE FOUND. IT WAS REINSTALLED WITH MRB APPROVAL. NO FURTHER WO 481112 1 4 RK TO BE DONE AND THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS MR. 481159 1 1 THIS PR WAS TAKEN TO DOCUMENT A BROKEN TAB ON A LOCKING WASHER ON THE RI 481159 1 2 GHT MAIN LANDING GEAR DOOR LINK ASSEMBLY. THE LOCKING WASHER HAS SEVERAL 481159 1 3 TABS AND TWO TABS ARE REMAINING WHICH ALLOW IT TO LOCK PROPERLY. THIS C 481159 1 4 ONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED AS-IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER PR CONDI 481159 1 5 TION EXISTS. RETEST SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED BY LANDING GEAR FUNCTIONAL CY 481159 1 6 CLE V1098.001. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR 481159 1 7 . 482747 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO ADDRESS CDR CM3-1903. THE PART WAS VERIFIED TO 482747 1 2 BE A V070-198153-004 SEAL BY ENGINEERING. THE PART WAS REMOVED AND THE O 482747 1 3 CN WAS RECORDED. THE OCN MARKED ON THE UNDERSIDE OF THE SEAL IS "BS-2003 482747 1 4 " AS ORIGINALLY NOTED IN PR STR-3-19-4805. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON 482747 1 5 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 482877 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V76-50002 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR SAVE 482877 1 2 R 50J60 WAS CLOCKED INCORRECTLY. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY REMOV 482877 1 3 ING THE DISCREPANT CONNECTOR SAVER AND REPLACING WITH A NEW ONE. THIS RE 482877 1 4 TURNS THE CONNECTOR SAVER TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. RETEST WILL BE SCAN TR 482877 1 5 ACKED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEA 482877 1 6 R AND TEAR. 483120 1 1 IN A PREVIOUS PR, THE BROKEN GROUND CLIP WAS REMOVED. THEN IT WAS DISCOV 483120 1 2 ERED THAT THE HOLES IN THE UNDERLYING STRUCTURE HAD BEEN ELONGATED. THES 483120 1 3 E HOLES WERE DRILLED UP TO .257 AND THE BRACKET WAS INSTALLED WITH .250" 483120 1 4 RIVETS PER MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE SUBSEQUENT BREAKAGE OF 483120 1 5 THIS GROUND CLIP (THE SUBJECT OF THIS PR) EMPHASIZED THE DESIRABILITY F 483120 1 6 OR HI-LOK FASTENERS WHICH WOULD BE EASIER TO INSTALL THAN THE 1/4" CONVE 483120 1 7 NTIONAL RIVETS USED PREVIOUSLY. UNRESTRICTED MR APPROVAL FOR THE FASTENE 483120 1 8 R SUBSTITUTION WAS OBTAINED. THERE IS NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS 483120 1 9 PR. THE V070-350635-001 GROUND CLIP WAS BROKEN. IT WAS REMOVED AND A NEW 483120 1 10 ONE WAS INSTALLED USING ME112-0013-08XX HI-LOK FASTENERS AND 483120 1 11 ME114-0022-0108 COLLARS PER MR APPROVED PROCEDURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 483120 1 12 OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 483591 1 1 DURING IPR 064V-0040 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 3M616A26 WAS PULLED FRO 483591 1 2 M DESIGN SPLICE 565P290. DESIGN SPLICE 56SP290 WAS CUT OUT AND WIRES 3M6 483591 1 3 16A26 AND 1M627C26 RESPLICED. THIS RETURNS WIRE HARNESS TO DRAWING CONFI 483591 1 4 GURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE WHILE PROCESSING THE 483591 1 5 ORBITER. RETEST OF PIN PER V1314 WAS SUCCESSFUL. 483664 1 1 WHILE PERFORMING FUNCTIONAL TEST OF A-HATCH A NICK WAS NOTED ON THE CROW 483664 1 2 N OF THE EXPOSED PORTION OF THE SEAL. IT COULD NOT BE DETERMINED IF THE 483664 1 3 NICK EXCEEDED MAX ALLOWABLES SO MOLD IMPRESSION MEASUREMENTS WERE REQUES 483664 1 4 TED BY ENGINEERING TO BE PERFORMED AFTER THE LEAK CHECK WAS COMPLETED. T 483664 1 5 HE SEAL SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED THIS LEAK CHECK. AFTER APPLICATION OF THE MO 483664 1 6 LD MATERIAL IT WAS FOUND THAT THE MATERIAL COULD NOT BE REMOVED DUE TO T 483664 1 7 HE FACT THAT NO RELEASE AGENT WAS USED-REF PD ITEM 1. THIS SEAL WAS REPL 483664 1 8 ACED WITH A NEW SEAL THAT SUBSEQUENTLY FAILED THE FUNCTIONAL TEST DUE TO 483664 1 9 AN EXCESSIVE LEAK RATE-REF PD ITEM 2. ACCOUSTIC LISTENING INSTRUMENTS 483664 1 10 WERE EMPLOYED TO LOCATE THE LEAK TO NO AVAIL AND COMPRESSABILITY 483664 1 11 MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN ON BOTH THE HATCH AND AIRLOCK COLLAR-SIDE SEALS. 483664 1 12 SINCE THE HATCH SEAL WAS THE ONLY ITEM CHANGED SINCE THE FIRST 483664 1 13 SUCCESSFUL LEAK CHECK, THE SEAL WAS REPLACED AGAIN. THIS THIRD SEAL 483664 1 14 SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED THE V1058.002 FUNCTIONAL LEAK CHECK WITH A VALUE OF 483664 1 15 0.1 PSI/MINUTE. THE CAUSE OF ITEM 1 OF THIS PR WAS THE LACK OF A MOLD 483664 1 16 RELEASE AGENT. QC SUPERVISION AND ENGINEERING ARE WORKING TO ENSURE THAT 483664 1 17 IN THE FUTURE A RELEASE AGENT IS USED WHENEVER TAKING IMPRESSIONS OF A 483664 1 18 SEAL. RC ACTION IS REQUIRED. THE CAUSE OF ITEM 2 IS PROBABLY THE 483664 1 19 VARIATION IN THE HATCH/COLLAR SEAL COMPRESSABILITY. THIS PR DOES NOT 483664 1 20 AFFECT LIKE SERIAL ITEMS. RC ACTION REQUIRED BY 1/95 AND/OR CLOSEST 483664 1 21 S0007 AFTER THIS DATE. 483701 1 1 A MINOR GOUGE WAS FOUND ON THE FWD SIDE OF THE XO 1090 BEAM ASSY. THE RE 483701 1 2 AISED METAL WAS REMOVED, BLENDED AND AN MR DOUBLER WAS FASTENED OVER THE 483701 1 3 DISCREPANT AREA USING JOBOLTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 483812 1 1 V63-50007 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BACKSHELL ON 40P9853 WAS LOOSE. THE 483812 1 2 BACKSHELL WAS TORQUED 30-35 PER MLO303-0040. NO FURTHER DISPO IS REQUIR 483812 1 3 ED. THIS RETURNS WIRE HARNESS ASSEMBLY TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. PROBABL 483812 1 4 E CAUSE DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 484132 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THIS PR DOCUMENTS 13 RIVETS IN THE R/H WING WHIC 484132 1 2 H WERE BELIEVED TO BE INSTALLED IMPROPERLY. SEVEN OF THE FASTENERS WERE 484132 1 3 ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. OF THE REMAINING SIX RIVETS REPORTE 484132 1 4 D AS BEING DISCREPANT, ONE WAS REWORKED PER OPERATION 2 BY APPLYING MBO1 484132 1 5 30-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE TO THE TAIL TO BOND THE STEM IN PLACE (XO 893). 484132 1 6 FIVE HAVE BEEN DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE PER SPECIFICATION (XO 915, A 484132 1 7 ND 929 THROUGH 932). PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS VENDOR (IMPROPER INST 484132 1 8 ALLATION DURING ASSEMBLY). NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION 484132 1 9 REQUIRED. 484133 1 1 REF ITEM 1 PAGE 1: THIS PR DOCUMENTS 50 RIVETS IN THE L/H WING WHICH WER 484133 1 2 E BELIEVED TO BE INSTALLED IMPROPERLY. FIFTEEN OF THE FASTENERS WERE ACC 484133 1 3 EPTED AS IS FOR RESTRICTED USE. ALL OTHER FASTENERS WERE EITHER REMOVED 484133 1 4 AND REPLACED OR DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE PER SPECIFICATION. REF ITEMS 484133 1 5 2 AND 3 ON PAGES 1A AND 1B: THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT SLIGHT HOLE MISALIGNME 484133 1 6 NT ON HOLES 1984 THROUGH 1989. THE HOLES WERE ENLARGED TO ACCEPT 0.190" 484133 1 7 DIA HI-LOKS IN STEAD OF THE UNAVAILABLE JO-BOLTS (REF ITEM 3). THIS WORK 484133 1 8 WAS PERFORMED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. REF: ITEM 4 ON PAGE 1C. 484133 1 9 THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS SLIGHT HOLE ELONGATION ON THREE HOLES AT THE UPPER 484133 1 10 SPLICE ALONG YO 105. THE HOLES WERE DRILLED TO ACCEPT OVERSIZED JO-BOLTS 484133 1 11 PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS VENDOR 484133 1 12 (IMPROPER INSTALLATION DURING ASSEMBLY). NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 484133 1 13 ACTION REQUIRED. 484397 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: ACCEPTABLE AS IS - RESTRICTED USE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. THE 484397 PMRB 2 GIMBAL BOLTS ARE INSERTED THROUGH THE THRUST STRUCTURE AND ARE TORQUED 484397 PMRB 3 TO THE SSME GIMVAL BEARINGS. ACCESS TOTHE GIMBAL BOLT HEADS IS EXTREMELY 484397 PMRB 4 DIFFICULT DUE TO THEIR LOCATION AND SURROUNDING STRUCTURE; THEREFORE, 484397 PMRB 5 WRENCH FITTINGS ARE INSTALLED OVER THE BOLT HEADS (IN PAIRS) AND 484397 PMRB 6 RETAINED IN PLACE WITH A JACKSCREW ASSEMBLY. THIS JACKSCREW IS SNUGGED 484397 PMRB 7 TO SECURE THE ASSEMBLY AND PREVENTS THE GIMBAL BOLTS FROM ROTATING 484397 PMRB 8 DURING THE TORQUING THE OF THE GIMBAL NUTS. ONCE THIS IS COMPLETED, THE 484397 PMRB 9 WRENCH FITTING AND RETAINER INSTALLATION IS BENIGN. ITEMS ONE THROUGH 484397 PMRB 10 THREE DOCUMENT GAPS BETWEEN THE RETAINERS AND WRENCH FITTINGS AT THE 484397 PMRB 11 ENGINE ONE LOWER RIGHT, ENGINE TWO UPPER LEFT, AND ENGINE TWO LOWER 484397 PMRB 12 RIGHT LOCATIONS. INSPECTION REVEALS THAT THE RETAINERS AND FITTINGS ARE 484397 PMRB 13 ARE FLUSH AGAINST THE BOLT HEADS AND NO BOLT LONGITUDINAL MOVEMENT IS 484397 PMRB 14 NOTED. THESE INSTALLATIONS HAVE BEEN TORQUED ONCE PREVIOUSLY AND WILL 484397 PMRB 15 ALLOW NOMINAL TORQUING OF THE GIMBAL BOLTS THROUGH THEIR LIFE LIMIT OF 484397 PMRB 16 FOUR TORQUES; FURTHERMORE, THIS INSTALLATION AND WILL NOT AFFECT THE 484397 PMRB 17 FORM, FIT, FUNCTION OR SAFETY OF HE THRUST STRUCTURE. THIS MR ACTION 484397 PMRB 18 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 484397 PMRB 19 IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 484397 PMRB 20 THIS M IS RESTRICTED TO FLIGHT 22 OF OV-103. REFERENCE FOLLOWING 484397 PMRB 21 DEFERRAL RATIONALE. DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THE "GAPS" BETWEEN THE ENGINE 484397 PMRB 22 ONE LOWER RIGHT, ENGINE TWO UPPER LEFT, AND ENGINE TWO LOWR RIGHT HAVE 484397 PMRB 23 BEEN INSPECTED AND DETERMINED TO BE SLIGHT MISALIGNMENTS. THIS CONDITION 484397 PMRB 24 HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE MRB AND IS RESTRICTED TO FLIGHT 22 OF OV-103. 484397 PMRB 25 TIME AND CYCLE OMRS REQUIREMENTS WILL THEN DICTATE THE DISASSEMBLY OF 484397 PMRB 26 ALL GIMBAL BOLT LOCATIONS. INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED PER THIS WAD AND 484397 PMRB 27 FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTION IDENTIFIED AT THIS TIME. 06/30/94, PMRB 484397 PMRB 28 APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. 484397 1 1 THE SSME GIMBAL BOLT INSTALLATION (BOLTS AND NUTS) ARE TIME/CYCLE LIMITE 484397 1 2 D (A CYCLE CONSISTS OF A TORQUE APPLICATION IN EXCESS OF 200" LBS). THE 484397 1 3 GIMBAL BOLTS WEE A CYCLE EACH TIME A MAIN ENGINE IS REMOVED AND REPLACED 484397 1 4 AND ARE LIMITED TO 4 CYCLES. THE NONCONFORMANCES WAS DETECTED DURING OM 484397 1 5 I V5005 DEV 02/03P. THIS IS THE OMI THAT INSTALLS THE SSME IN THE HORIZO 484397 1 6 NTAL POSITION. THE SEQ AFFECTED BY THE DEV IS TO VERIFY THE NUMBER OF CY 484397 1 7 CLES ON THE BOLT INSTALLATION THRU CM TO INSURE THE TIME/CYCLE REQUIREME 484397 1 8 NT IS NOT VIOLATED. THE DEV BREAKS DOWN THE CYCLE LINES INTO TWO CATEGOR 484397 1 9 IES, NUTS AND BOLTS. IN ADDITION, THE DEV ADDS A "QV" INSP POINT. OMI 484397 1 10 V5005 DOES NOT HAVE A SEQUENCE TO INSPECT THE GIMBAL BOLT INSTALLATION. 484397 1 11 IT IS UNCLEAR HOW THESE NONCONFORMANCES WERE DISCOVERED. HOWEVER, THE 484397 1 12 NONCONFORMANCES SPECIFIED ON THE PR CANNOT EXIST. THE 0.060 DIMENSION 484397 1 13 THAT WAS VIOLATED IS A REF DIMENSION ON DWG V070-351394 A GAP IS 484397 1 14 REQUIRED TO ALLOW THE BOLT TO FLOAT FOR ALIGNMENT PURPOSES. THIS GAP IS 484397 1 15 BETWEEN THE BOLT HEAD AND THE BOTTOM SURFACE OF THE RETAINER. THE 484397 1 16 PURPOSE OF THE WRENCH IS TO SECURE THE BOLTS HEAD TO ALLOW INSTALLATION 484397 1 17 OF THE NUT. THE WRENCH COULD NOT FUNCTION UNLESS THE RETAINER WAS FLUSH 484397 1 18 AGAINST THE WRENCH (NO GAP). THE JAK SCREW WHICH IS A PART OF THE 484397 1 19 RETAINER (FOR BOLT INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL) IS RUN DOWN DURING THE 484397 1 20 BOLT INSTALLATION UNTIL THE RETAINER IS FLUSH ON THE WRENCH AND THEN IS 484397 1 21 GIVEN AND ADDITIONAL 3/4 +/- 1/4 TURN. IF THE GAPS WRITTEN UP IN ITEMS 484397 1 22 1,2,3 EXISTED, THEY ARE EASILY CORRECTED BY ADJUSTING THE JACK SCREW. 484397 1 23 AS A RESULT OF THE DESIGN OF THE RETAINER (JACK SCREW THREADED INTO THE 484397 1 24 RETAINER), THE RETAINER CANNOT BE COCKED AT ONE END ONLY. IT IS UNCLEAR 484397 1 25 WHAT THE REAL NONCONFORMANCES WERE, BUT REPLACEMENT OF THE GIMBAL NUTS 484397 1 26 AND BOLTS PER OMI V5E29 RUN 1 HAS VERIFIED THE INSTALLATION NOW MEETS 484397 1 27 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNKNOWN (PR AS WRITTEN IS NOT 484397 1 28 VALID). 484420 1 1 A MINOR SCRATCH WAS FOUND ON THE 70B2000-73 STRUT, LOCATED IN THE XO 114 484420 1 2 0 BEAM ASSY. THE SCRATCH WAS MR ACCEPTED AFTER HAVING THE RAISED METAL R 484420 1 3 EMOVED AND THE SCRATCH CORROSION PROTECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 484554 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT CONFUSION OVER THE REFERENCE DESIGNATO 484554 1 2 R MARKINGS ON THE SPIFEX PEDESTALS AND THE LOCATIONS OF THE CONNECTOR AS 484554 1 3 SHOWN ON THE M072-000328 ELETRICAL INSTALLATION TECH ORDER. THIS PR WAS 484554 1 4 PREVIOUSLY DISPO'D TO MARK THE FULL REF DES ON THE PEDESTALS AND EOTF R 484554 1 5 ATIONALE WAS SIGNED TO MAKE THE DRAWING MATCH THE HARDWARE. THE STEPS TO 484554 1 6 RE-ID THE CONNECTORS WERE DELETED BECAUSE THE CARGO INTERFACE DIAGRAM S 484554 1 7 PECIFICALLY STATES THAT THE REF-DES ID'S ARE FOR SCAN USE ONLY AND MAY N 484554 1 8 OT REFLECT THE ACTUAL REF-DES ON THE HARDWARE (REF V070-200133 NOTE 16). 484554 1 9 THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR THE HARDWARE TO BE MARKED WITH THE SPIFEX 484554 1 10 PAYLOAD REFERENCE DESIGNATORS. THE CONNECTORS ARE CLOCKED SUCH THAT THEY 484554 1 11 ARE UNIQUE TO THEIR MATING CONNECTOR (J1 TO P1, J2 TO P..ETC). THE 484554 1 12 CONECTORS HAVE BEEN MATED PER TPS MEQ-3-19-220 AND THE MECHANISMS CYCLED 484554 1 13 PER TPS MEQ-3-19-222 AND -216 WITH NO DISCREPANCIES. NO PR CONDITION 484554 1 14 EXISTS AND NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT NAY 484554 1 15 OTHER SERIAL NUMBER INSTALLATIONS OF LIKE END ITEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 484554 1 16 THIS PR IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 484842 1 1 WHILE WORKING N1064 SEQ 08 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE RESISTANCE FROM 38 484842 1 2 P77W647P5409 PINS 19 AND 32 TO STR GND FLUCTUATED. THROUGH TROUBLESHOOTI 484842 1 3 NG ON IPR 64V-0049 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE JUMPER WIRE ATTACHED TO CA 484842 1 4 BLE X175A22SH AT 30P28 WAS DISCREPANT. THE JUMPER WIRE WAS REPLACED AND 484842 1 5 A CONTINUITY CHECK WAS PERFORMED FROM 30P28 TO 38P5409 AND WAS SUCCESSFU 484842 1 6 L. PAYLOAD ELECTRICAL ALSO PERFORM A RETEST (REF PG 37) AND WAS SUCCESSF 484842 1 7 UL. THIS RETURNS WIRE HARNESS TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE D 484842 1 8 UE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 485046 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THAT THE SED39124320-301 MID SPIFEX MP 485046 1 2 M PEDESTAL OVERCENTER STOW TORQUE EXCEEDED THE PER SPEC ALLOWABLE OF 19 485046 1 3 IN-LBS. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND NO PR CO 485046 1 4 NDITION EXISTS. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT THE LIKE SERIAL NUMBER IT 485046 1 5 EMS OF OTHER INSTALLATIONS. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR TH 485046 1 6 IS DISCREPANCY IS RIGGING PERFORMED AT NSLD. 485249 1 1 WHILE WORKING PR EPD-3-19-1456, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 3U47E24 WAS 485249 1 2 BROKEN AT SPLICE 56SP112, AND WIRE 3U48E24 HAD INSULATION DAMAGE AT SPLI 485249 1 3 CE 56SP111. THE DAMAGED SECTION OF WIRES 3U47E24 AND 3U48E24 WERE CUT OU 485249 1 4 T ALONG THE DESIGN SPLICES (56SP111 AND 56SP112) AND DISCARDED. SPLICES 485249 1 5 56SP111 AND 56SP112 WERE THEN RE-INSTALLED. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF SPLIC 485249 1 6 ES 56SP111 AND 56SP112 WAS PERFORMED BY TPS APU-3-19-135, BASIC, OPERATI 485249 1 7 ON 2. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. NO RC ACTION IS REQUESTED. 485249 1 8 PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 485768 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED USE FOR ONE 485768 PMRB 2 FLIGHT OF THE XO LOCATION IDENTIFICATION MARKINGS MISPLACED AT LH AND RH 485768 PMRB 3 XO1084.75. THESE MARKINGS ARE USED FOR REFERENCE ONLY AND WILL NOT BE 485768 PMRB 4 USED BY THE ASTRONAUTS THIS FLIGHT. STRUCTURAL INEGRITY AND MARGIN OF 485768 PMRB 5 SAFETY REMAIN POSITIVE ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE DISCREPANT 485768 PMRB 6 MARKINGS ARE LOCATED APPROX 2-4 INCHES FORWAR OF WHERE THEY SHOULD BE. 485768 PMRB 7 THIS MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION NOR DOES IT 485768 PMRB 8 IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. MR ID IS NOT 485768 PMRB 9 REQUIRED. MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED USE AS IS FOR ONE 485768 PMRB 10 FLIGHT. 7/29/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLIGHT 20 OF OV-103. 485768 1 1 THE SILL LONGERON WAS IDENTIFIED IN THE WRONG LOCATION NEAR XO1084.75 ON 485768 1 2 THE LEFT AND RIGHT HAND SIDES. THESE MARKINGS WERE REMOVED AND THE NEW 485768 1 3 MARKINGS WERE INSTALLED PER SPEC. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 485768 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 485772 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: PER B91B10092, GM4110 ADHESIVE IS REQUIRED TO SEAL VOIDS B 485772 PMRB 2 ETWEEN THE STRINGERS AND BULKHEADS. GM4110 ADHESIVE IS A VENDOR MATERIAL 485772 PMRB 3 AND NOT AVAILABLE FOR USE. BY SUBSTITUTING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE 485772 PMRB 4 FOR THE GM4110 ADHESIVE, THE SCREEN MAY BE REBONDED TO SEAL THE VOID. T 485772 PMRB 5 HE INSTALLATION WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSIT 485772 PMRB 6 IVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. MR ID REQUIRED. MBO13 485772 PMRB 7 0-119 TYPE 3 ADHESIVE WILL FUNCTION IN AN EQUIVALENT MANNER AS THE GM411 485772 PMRB 8 0 ADHESIVE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATI 485772 PMRB 9 ON. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD 485772 PMRB 10 CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 485772 PMRB 11 07/21/94 PMRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED "USE AS IS". 485772 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1. THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DEBONDED STIFFENER SCREEN. THE 485772 1 2 SCREEN WAS BONDED BACK DOWN USING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE. THE USE 485772 1 3 OF THE MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE INSTEAD OF THE GM4110 ADHESIVE WAS 485772 1 4 APPROVED PER UNRESTRICTED MR. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL 485772 1 5 DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 485945 1 1 DAMAGE TO THE V070-35145-001 STRUT WAS CAUSED BY CONTACT OF THE STRUT WI 485945 1 2 TH A HI-LOK FASTENER INSTALLED IN THE THRUST STRUCTURE SHEAR PANEL. THE 485945 1 3 INTERFEREING HI-LOK WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A SHORTENED MD111-4024 485945 1 4 -0506 BOLT, MD153-5004-0005 WASHER, NAS1587-5L WASHER AND MD114-1001-000 485945 1 5 6 NUT. MR ID WAS PROVIDED. CLEARANCE BETWEEN HI-LOK AND STRUT THUS OBTAI 485945 1 6 NED IS SUFFICIENT TO PRECLUDE RECURRENCE OF DAMAGE DUE TO STRUT/FASTENER 485945 1 7 INTERFERENCE. MAXIMUM STRUT DAMAGE, 0.0176" DEEP (REF PG 10.1) BY 0.241 485945 1 8 5" LONG BY 0.1427" WIDE (REF PAGE 5) WAS CAUSED BY CONTACT WITH THE HI 485945 1 9 LOK FITTING. AREAS OF LESSER, INCIDENTAL DAMAGE WERE RECORDED UNDER ITEM 485945 1 10 S 3 AND 4. MBO120-008 ADHESIVE WAS USED TO REPAIR/POT THE DAMAGED AREAS 485945 1 11 ON THE STRUT. MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE WAS OBTAINED FOR HI LOK 485945 1 12 REPLACEMENT AND STRUT REPAIR. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING ACTION IS REQUIRED. 485945 1 13 PROBABLE CAUSES: ITEMS 1 AND 2: TOLERANCE BUILD UP. ITEM 3: WORKMANSHIP 485945 1 14 BY VENDOR. ITEM 4: OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 486339 1 1 DURING SURV, WIRE T232A26-1 WAS FOUND TO HAVE EXPOSED CONDUCTOR DAMAGE A 486339 1 2 T THE BACKSHELL OF CONN 50P637. CABLES T282A26-1 & -2 WERE EXTRACTED OUT 486339 1 3 , CUT BEHIND THE DAMAGED AREA THEN RE-ETRMINATED IN CONN 50P637. PROBABL 486339 1 4 E CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN 486339 1 5 3-19-1061. 486386 1 1 THE CARRIER PANEL WAS BENT OUT APPROXIMATELY .050". IT WAS BENT BACK TO 486386 1 2 APPROXIMATE ITS PRINT CONDITION AND A DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION WAS DONE 486386 1 3 TO BERIFY THAT NO CRACKING HAD OCCURRED. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL 486386 1 4 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE C 486386 1 5 USE - WORKMANSHIP. 486879 1 1 THE BULB SEAL WAS DAMAGED ON THE ENDS. AN LRU PR WAS INITIATED TO REWORK 486879 1 2 THE BULB SEAL AT THE HDA. A NEW BULB SEAL WAS PROCURED AND INSTALLED PE 486879 1 3 R PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIO 486879 1 4 NAL DEGRADATION. 486881 1 1 ITEM 1 - THE V070-398558-056 SPLICE WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED. THE SPLICE 486881 1 2 WAS REMOVED AND A NEW ONE INSTALLED PER LRU OMI V5K25.001. THIS REPAIR 486881 1 3 WILL BE RETESTED DURING V5018 FINAL OPF PLBD CLOSURE. THIS PR DOES NOT A 486881 1 4 FFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 487126 1 1 THE PR WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT A CONDITION WHICH IS KNOWN TO EXIST ON TH 487126 1 2 E FLIPPER DOOR TRAILING EDGE BULB SEALS. IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS A BULB SEA 487126 1 3 L OF ONE DOOR PROTRUDES OUT FROM THE DOOR SO FAR THAT IT DOES NOT BUTT A 487126 1 4 GAINST THE ADJACENT BULB SEAL BETWEEN THE DOORS BUT RATHER UNDER THE TRA 487126 1 5 ILING EDGE SEAL OF ONE OF THE ADJACENT DOORS. THIS IS THE DESIGN CONDITI 487126 1 6 ON. WHEN THE BULB SEALS ARE ALL INSTALLED THEY ALL FIT OVER THE LENGTH O 487126 1 7 F THE ELEVON. THEY DO NOT HOWEVER BUTT EACH OTHER BETWEEN THE FLIPPER DO 487126 1 8 ORS. FOR THIS PR, THE TRAILING EDGE SEAL OF FLIPPER DOOR 13 WAS REMOVED 487126 1 9 TO ALLOW CLOSURE OF THE DOOR. IT WAS THEN REINSTALLED AROUND THE BULB 487126 1 10 SEAL OF FLIPPER DOOR 14. PROBABLE CAUSE IS PROCEDURAL ERROR. THE 487126 1 11 FOLLOWING DEVS WERE WRITTEN TO THE APPLICABLE JOB CARDS TO CORRECT 487126 1 12 PROCEDURAL PROBLEM. V80-06102 DEV 06/02, V80-06103 DEV 06/02, V80-06104 487126 1 13 DEV 06/05, V80-06105 DEV 06/02, V80-96106 DEV 06/02, V80-06109 DEV 487126 1 14 06/02, V80-96110 DEV 06/02, V80-06111 DEV 06/01, V80-06112 DEV 06/02, 487126 1 15 V80-06113 DEV 06/02, V80-96101 DEV 02/02, V80-96102 DEV 02/02, V80-96103 487126 1 16 DEV 02/02, V80-96105 DEV 02/02, V80-96106 DEV 02/02, V80-96107 DEV 487126 1 17 02/02, V80-96108 DEV 02/01, V80-96109 DEV 02/01, V80-96110 DEV 02/01, 487126 1 18 V80-96112 DEV 02/01, V80-96113 DEV 02/01 AND V80-96114 DEV 02/01. 487140 1 1 FOUR MD112-1002-0302 SCREWS ATTACHING V070-358723 GROUND STRAPS TO AVION 487140 1 2 ICS BAY 6 DO NOT HAVE 1 THREAD MINIMUM THREAD PROTRUSION. THE SCREWS WER 487140 1 3 E MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 487208 1 1 THE BULB SEAL WAS DAMAGED ON THE ENDS. AN LRU PR WAS INITATED TO REWORK 487208 1 2 THE BULB SEAL AT THE HDA. A NEW BULB SEAL WAS PROCURED AND INSTALLED PER 487208 1 3 PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATION 487208 1 4 AL DEGRADATION. 487258 1 1 DURING V5012.007 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLE 3E45C20 HAD KAPTON AND SHI 487258 1 2 ELD DAMAGE AT 82V77W9P754. CABLE 3E45C20 WAS BUT BEYOND THAT DAMAGED ARE 487258 1 3 A AND RETERMINATED TO 82P754. HEAT SHRINKABLE TUBING WAS ALSO INSTALLED 487258 1 4 ON 3E45C20 TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBLE DAMAGE IN THE FUTURE. THIS RETURNS CA 487258 1 5 BLE 3E45C20 TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR 487258 1 6 AND TEAR. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. 487278 1 1 THE BULB SEAL WAS DAMAGED ON THE ENDS. AN LRU PR WAS INITIATED TO REWORK 487278 1 2 THE BULB SEAL AT THE HDA. A NEW BULB SEAL WAS PROCURED AND INSTALLED PER 487278 1 3 PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATION 487278 1 4 AL DEGRADATION. 487279 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED LIFE OF THE (2) 487279 PMRB 2 JO-BOLTS WITH GAPS UNDER THE TAILS AS-IS UNTIL OMDP. THE (2) MD128-0002- 487279 PMRB 3 0305 JO-BOLTS WERE NEVER FULLY INSTALLED. THE TAILS OF THE JO-BOLTS WERE 487279 PMRB 4 SWELLED ENOUGH DURING INSTALLATION TO PREVENT THEM FROM FALLING OUT OF 487279 PMRB 5 THE HOLES BUT WERE NOT PULLED DOWN TO PROVIDE PROPER CLAMP-UP OF THE MAT 487279 PMRB 6 ERIALS FOR LENSION APPLICATIONS. THE FASTENERS ON THIS INSTALLATION WILL 487279 PMRB 7 BEAR THE TENSION LOADS. THE V070-198321 FUSELAGE STUB WILL CONTINUE TO 487279 PMRB 8 FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS IS A 487279 PMRB 9 PRIMARY STRUCTURE. MR ID WAS ACCOMPLISHED ABOVE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 487279 PMRB 10 IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION 487279 PMRB 11 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. 08/02/94, PMRB 487279 PMRB 12 APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT(OMDP) OF OV-103. 487279 1 1 ITEM 1 & ITEM 3: THE LOOSE JO-BOLTS WERE REMOVED FROM THE LH WING TRAILI 487279 1 2 NG EDGE, DURING REMOVAL OF THE JO-BOLTS THE OTBD HOLE WAS FOUND TO BE SL 487279 1 3 IGHTLY OVERSIZED. THE HOLE WAS REAMED AND A .015 OVERSIZE, JO-BOLT WAS I 487279 1 4 NSTALLED WITH MR ACCEPTANCE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR ID WAS APPLIED. THE 487279 1 5 INBD JO-BOLT WAS REPLACED PER PRINT. ITEM 2: DURING REMOVAL OF THE JO-B 487279 1 6 OLTS THE FRAME AT XO1365 YW123 WAS NICKED WITH THE CUTTING TOOL THE .65 487279 1 7 X .162 X .023 CUT WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR ACCEPTED AS IS. PROBABL 487279 1 8 E CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 487406 1 1 THE NUT BROKE OUT OF THE NUTPLATE. NO ACCESS WAS AVAILABLE TO INSTALL A 487406 1 2 NEW NUTPLATE. THE OLD NUTPLATE WAS LEFT IN PLACE AND A JO-BOLT WAS INSTA 487406 1 3 LLED IN THIS LOCATION WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED INSTALLATION ON O 487406 1 4 V-103 LHS. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERAT 487406 1 5 IONAL DEGRADATION. 488057 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE ITEM 1.0 DISCREPANCY (DEBON 488057 PMRB 2 DED TAPE IN CORNER OF REPAIR) BE MR ACCEPTED FOR ONE FLIGHT RESTRICTED U 488057 PMRB 3 SE. THE DISCREPANCY IS A DEBONDED AREA ON PREVIOUSLY APPLIED TAPE REPAIR 488057 PMRB 4 . THE TAPE REPAIR IS APPROXIMATELY 1.5" SQUARE AND THE DISCREPANCY AFFEC 488057 PMRB 5 TS A CORNER OF THE REPAIR. THE REMAINDER OF THE REPAIRED AREA IS FIRMLY 488057 PMRB 6 BONDED AND NOT IN JEOPARDY OF FURTHER DELAMINATION. THE FACESHEET HAS BE 488057 PMRB 7 EN INSPECTED AND THERE IS NO SIGN OF IMPACT DAMAGE, THIS IS A TAPE DELAM 488057 PMRB 8 INATION ONLY. THIS DEBONDED TAPE AREA (APPROX 0.10 SQ IN) IS A SMALL 488057 PMRB 9 PERCENTAGE OF THE OVERALL REFLECTIVE SURFACE AREA OF THE RADIATOR PANEL 488057 PMRB 10 AND PER THE VOUGHT MANUAL, A MAXIMUM OF 113 SQ IN OF DAMAGE IS ALLOWABLE 488057 PMRB 11 WITH A MAXIMUM SINGLE DAMAGE ARE NOT TO EXCEED 12 SQ IN. THIS 488057 PMRB 12 DISCREPANCY IS SMALL AND WILL NOT AFFECT THE FIT FORM OR FUNCTION OF THE 488057 PMRB 13 RADIATOR FOR ITS INTENDED USE. REPAIR REQUIRES A 7 DAY OUTGASSING/CURE 488057 PMRB 14 TIME OF THE RTV ADHESIVE AND SINCE PLBD CLOSURE FOR ROLLOUT IS SCHEDULED 488057 PMRB 15 FOR 3 DAYS AWAY, IT IS OPINION OF ENGINEERING THAT THIS DISCREPANCY 488057 PMRB 16 SHOULD BE MR/DEFERRED AND REPAIRED DURING FLIGHT 20 PROCESSING. THE 488057 PMRB 17 MR/DEFERRAL WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE THERMAL EMISSIVITY OF THE 488057 PMRB 18 PANEL. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST HAZARDS 488057 PMRB 19 CONTROL OR RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 488057 PMRB 20 BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. NO MR ID REQUIRED ON RADIATOR PANELS. THE 488057 PMRB 21 RADIATOR PANELS ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 08/02/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR 488057 PMRB 22 DEFERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 488057 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING FINAL RADIATOR INSPECTION. DUE TO THE OUTGA 488057 1 2 SING OF THE RTV USED IN REPAIRING A TAPE DELAMINATION AND THE PLBD BEING 488057 1 3 CLOSED FOR OPF ROLL-OUT, THIS PR WAS DEFERRED FROM FLIGHT 19. THE TAPE 488057 1 4 REPAIR EDGE DELAMINATION HAS SINCE BEEN REBONDED PER SRP. NO RETEST REQU 488057 1 5 IRED. THIS PR DOES NOT EFFECT LIKE S/N'S. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL DEGRADA 488057 1 6 TION. 488219 1 1 DURING STR-3-19-0702, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLES DF217A24, DF216A24, 488219 1 2 DF215A24, DF214A24, DF213A24 AND DF212A24 HAD KAPTON AND SHIELD DAMAGE A 488219 1 3 T 50P9696 (ITEM 1). CABLES WERE CUT BEYOND THE DAMAGED AREA, SCRAPED AND 488219 1 4 NEW SECTION OF CABLES SPLICED IN WITH MR APPROVAL USINGKSC SPLICES KSC- 488219 1 5 0662 THRU KSC-0673. WHILE WORKING THIS PR THE SOLDER SLEEVES AT THE KSC 488219 1 6 SPLICES WERE INADVERTENTLY SHRUNK DOWN BEFORE THE JR24 WERE INSTALLED (I 488219 1 7 TEM 2). THE SPLICES WERE CUT OUT AND NEW SOLDER SLEEVES AND SPLICES INST 488219 1 8 ALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE (ITEM 1): NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR WHILE PROCESSING TH 488219 1 9 E ORBITER. PROBABLE CAUSE (ITEM 2): WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER DISPO 488219 1 10 REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK OF DEMATED CONNECTOR 50P9696. 488593 1 1 DURING S0004 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT UPPER LO2 MONOBALL SEAL HAD A TEAR I 488593 1 2 N THE BOOT. DISCREPANT SEAL WAS ROUTED TO HDA AND A NEW SEAL P/N V070-56 488593 1 3 5411-002 WAS OBTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 488787 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: THE V070-198313-001 POLYMIDE SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE "COCKING 488787 PMRB 2 " IN THE HOUSING DURING ELEVON CYCLING. BY INSTALLING TWO MS24585-C228 S 488787 PMRB 3 PRINGS AT THE TWO AFT SPRING LOCATIONS ON THE LOWER SEGMENT, SUFFICIENT 488787 PMRB 4 PRESSURE WILL BE MAINTAINED TO PROVIDE PROPER ALIGNMENT BETWEEN THE POLY 488787 PMRB 5 MIDE SEAL AND THE PRIMARY SEAL PANEL. THE MS24585-C228 SPRINGS WILL EACH 488787 PMRB 6 PROVIDE APPROXIMATELY 1.1 POUNDS OF ADDITIONAL FORCE. THE V070-198518-0 488787 PMRB 7 01 SPRINGS PROVIDE APPROXIMATELY 0.75 LBS EACH AT THE -YW214 POLYMIDE SE 488787 PMRB 8 AL LOCATION. THE ADDITIONAL SPRINGS WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATIO 488787 PMRB 9 N OF THE PER PRINT V070-198518-001 SPRINGS AND WILL NOT RESTRICT THE 488787 PMRB 10 COMPRESSIBILITY OF THE ASSEMBLY. THE MS24585-C228 SPRINGS AND 488787 PMRB 11 V070-198518-001 SPRINGS ARE MADE FROM SIMILAR CRES ALLOY AND PRESENT NO 488787 PMRB 12 INCOMPATIBILITY PROBLEMS. THE V070-198313-001 POLYMIDE SEAL WILL 488787 PMRB 13 FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS MR 488787 PMRB 14 DOES NO INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 488787 PMRB 15 IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS 488787 PMRB 16 FOR ONE FLIGHT RESTRICTED USE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 488787 PMRB 17 488787 PMRB 18 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: BY INSTALLING TWO MS24585-C228 SPRINGS AT THE AFT 488787 PMRB 19 TWO SPRING LOCATIONS ON THE LOWER SEGMENT, SUFFICIENT PRESSURE WILL BE 488787 PMRB 20 MAINTAINED PROVIDE PROPER ALIGNMENT BETWEEN THE POLYMIDE SEAL AND THE 488787 PMRB 21 PRIMARY SEAL PANEL. THE MS24585-C228 SPRINGS WILL EACH PROVIDE 488787 PMRB 22 APPROXIMATELY 1.1 POUNDS OF ADDITIONAL FORCE. THE V070-198518-001 488787 PMRB 23 SPRINGS PROVIDE APPROX 0.75 POUNDS EACH AT THE -YW214 POLYMIDE SEAL 488787 PMRB 24 LOCATION. THE ADDITIONAL SPRINGS WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION 488787 PMRB 25 OF THE PER PRINT V070-198518-001 SPRINGS AND WILL NOT RESTRICT THE 488787 PMRB 26 COMPRESSIBILITY OF THE ASSEMBLY. THE MS24585-C228 SPRINGS AND 488787 PMRB 27 V070-198518-001 SPRINGS ARE MADE FROM SIMILAR CRES ALLOY AND PRESENT NO 488787 PMRB 28 INCOMPATABILITY PROBLEMS. THE V070-198313-001 POLYMIDE SEAL WILL 488787 PMRB 29 FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS MR 488787 PMRB 30 ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION 488787 PMRB 31 DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR 488787 PMRB 32 ACTION IS FOR ONE FLIGHT RESTRICTED USE. POST FLIGHT EVALUATION WILL 488787 PMRB 33 VERIFY NO ABNORMAL WEAR OF THE V070-198313-001 POLYMIDE SEAL. NO MR ID 488787 PMRB 34 REQUIRED. 488787 PMRB 35 8/30/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 488787 PMRB 36 MR/DEFERRAL RATIONALE: TWO MS24585-C228 SPRINGS WERE INSTALLED AT THE 488787 PMRB 37 AFT TWO SPRING LOCATIONS ON THE LOWER SEGMENT OF THE V070-198313-001 488787 PMRB 38 POLYMIDE SEAL AT -YW214. THE SPRINGS WILL PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PRESSURE TO 488787 PMRB 39 MAINTAIN PROPER ALIGNMENT BETWEEN THE POLYIMIDE SEAL AND THE PRIMARY 488787 PMRB 40 SEAL PANEL. THE MS24585-C228 SPRINGS WILL EACH PROVIDE APPROXIMATELY 1.1 488787 PMRB 41 POUNDS OF ADDITIONAL FORCE. THE V070-198518-001 SPRINGS PROVIDE APPROX 488787 PMRB 42 0.75 POUNDS EACH AT THE -YW214 POLYIMIDE SEAL LOCATION. THE ADDITIONAL 488787 PMRB 43 SPRINGS WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF THE PER PRINT 488787 PMRB 44 V070-198518-001 SPRINGS AND WILL NOT RESTRICT THE COMPRESSIBILITY OF THE 488787 PMRB 45 ASSEMBLY. THE MS24585-C228 SPRINGS AND V070-198518-001 SPRINGS ARE MADE 488787 PMRB 46 FROM SIMILAR CRES ALLOY AND PRESENT NO INCOMPATIBILITY PROBLEMS. THE 488787 PMRB 47 V070-198313-001 POLYMIDE SEAL WILL FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 488787 PMRB 48 POSITIVE MARGIN OR SAFETY. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS 488787 PMRB 49 FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 488787 PMRB 50 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS FOR FUTURE FLIGHT, 488787 PMRB 51 RESTRICTED LIFE (SEAL REMOVAL). THE MR SPRINGS WILL BE REMOVED WHEN THE 488787 PMRB 52 SEAL IS REMOVED AND NEW STIFFER DESIGN SPRINGS ARE INSTALLED. RESTRICTED 488787 PMRB 53 LIFE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 12/13/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFFERAL TO FUTURE 488787 PMRB 54 FLT (-YW214 POLYIMIDE SEAL REMOVAL) OF OV-103. 488787 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A BROKEN POLYMIDE SEAL AT -YW214 ON THE LEFT HAND 488787 1 2 INBOARD ELEVON. THE SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE BROKEN AFTER A HYDRAULICS 488787 1 3 CYCLE TO VERIFY TPS COMPONENT FIT (ITEM 1). THE POLYIMIDE SEAL WAS 488787 1 4 REMOVED AND A NEW SEAL INSTALLED. DURING ELEVON CYCLING, THE NEW SEAL 488787 1 5 BOUND IN THE HOUSING. IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THE SECONDARY SEAL CURTAIN 488787 1 6 WAS CAUSING THE SEAL'S AFT END TO BE COMPRESSED EXCESSIVELY WHICH 488787 1 7 RESULTED IN BINDING. THE SECONDARY SEAL CURTAIN WAS REMOVED AND THE 488787 1 8 ELEVON WAS CYCLED AGAIN. THE SEAL BOUND IN ITS HOUSING, AGAIN. 488787 1 9 EVALUATION OF THE INSTALLATION SHOWED THAT AS THE ELEVON WAS RAISED, 488787 1 10 THE POLYIMIDE SEAL BECAME COCKED IN THE HOUSING. WHEN THE ELEVON WAS 488787 1 11 CYCLED DOWN, THE POLYIMIDE SEAL ROTATED IN THE HOUSING. WHEN TEH SEAL 488787 1 12 ROTATED, THE PROTRUDING FORWARD END BOUND ON THE HOUSING WHEN THE 488787 1 13 ELEVON FORCED COMPRESSION. TO PREVENT THE SEAL FROM COCKING, ADDITIONAL 488787 1 14 SPRINGS WERE INSTALLED AT THE TWO AFT MOST HOLES ON THE LOWER SEGMENT 488787 1 15 OF THE POLYIMIDE SEAL. ADDITIONAL ELEVON CYCLES BEFORE AND AFTER 488787 1 16 CURTAIN INSTALLATION VERIFIED PROPER FUNCTION OF THE POLYIMIDE SEAL. 488787 1 17 THE CURTAIN WAS REPLACED DUE TO DAMAGE AND FIT PROBLEMS. ITEM 2 HOLES 488787 1 18 WERE ALSO ELONGATED TO OBTAIN OPTIMUM FIT. THIS PR WAS DEFERRED FOR ONE 488787 1 19 FLIGHT TO ALLOW POST FLIGHT EVALUATION TO VERIFY NO ABNORMAL WEAR OF 488787 1 20 DISCREPANCIES. FAILED LEAK CHECK (ITEM 3) WAS CORRECTED BY RECONNECTING 488787 1 21 THE HOSE. POST FLIGHT, SEAL WAS EVALUATED DURING CYCLE AND FOUND TO 488787 1 22 ACCEPTABLE. PR WAS DEFERRED TO OMDP (FLIGHT 22). STR-3-22-715 REMOVED 488787 1 23 AND INSTALLED NEW SPRINGS IN THE AFT TWO LOCATIONS PER PRINT (EO) 488787 1 24 REQUIREMENTS. DISCREPANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 1 488787 1 25 DESIGN DEFICIENCY, ITEM 2 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. ITEM 3 HOSE 488787 1 26 DISCONNECTED WORKMANSHIP. 488889 1 1 DURING CARRIER PANEL SCREW REMOVAL ON WINDOW 6 A THREADED INSERT HAS BAC 488889 1 2 KED OUT OF THE WINDOW FRAME. THE INSERT WAS REPLACED AND RETURNED TO PRI 488889 1 3 NT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 488891 1 1 DURING C/P SCREW REMOVAL ON WINDOW 3 THE SCREW HEAD BECAME GALLED. THE 488891 1 2 DISCREPANT SCREW AND INSERT WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW HARDWARE 488891 1 3 AND RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADA 488891 1 4 TION. 489104 1 1 DUE TO SLIP IN SCHEDULED FINAL GEAR RETRACTION, THE NLG TIRES WERE REQUI 489104 1 2 RED TO BE CHECKED/TOPPED OFF AGAIN TO SATISFY THE OMRS REQUIREMENT THAT 489104 1 3 THE TIRES BE VERIFIED AT FLIGHT PRESSURE WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF FINAL GEAR 489104 1 4 RETRACTION. THE EXCESSIVE DECAY RATES OF 0.51 PSI/DAY (NWA-046) AND 0.54 489104 1 5 PSI/DAY (NWA-005) WERE SUSPECTED AS BEING DUE TO THE COMBINATION OF THE 489104 1 6 PRESSURE CHECK BEING DONE SO SOON AFTER THE LAST TOP-OFF (APPROXIMATELY 489104 1 7 THREE DAYS BETWEEN TOP-OFF AND CHECK) AND THE LARGE VOLUME OF GN2 (APPR 489104 1 8 OXIMATELY 27-30 PSIG) ADDED TO EACH OF THE TIRES DURING THE TOP-OFF. THE 489104 1 9 WEEP-HOLES IN THE TWO TIRE SIDE WALLS CHECKED FOR LEAKAGE USING LEAK TEK 489104 1 10 SOLUTION, AS WERE THE BEAD AREAS, TPDMS TRANSDUCERS, THERMAL PLUGS AND 489104 1 11 INFLATION VALVES. NO LEAKAGE WAS DETECTED. A THIRD PRESSURE CHECK WAS 489104 1 12 PERFORMED EIGHT DAYS AFTER THE FINAL TOP OFF DUE TO A SUBSEQUENT SLIP IN 489104 1 13 SCHEDULED FINAL GEAR RETRACTION. NO TOP OFF WAS REQUIRED AND A DECAY 489104 1 14 RATE OF 0.13 PSI/DAY AND 0.15 PSI/DAY WAS ESTABLISHED FOR THE SERIAL 489104 1 15 NUMBER 046 AND 005 NOSE WHEEL ASSEMBLIES RESPECTIVELY. THESE VALUES ARE 489104 1 16 WITHIN THE 0.30 MAXIMUM DECAY RATE AND ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. TIRE 489104 1 17 PRESSURE DATA IS OBTAINED DAILY USING TPDMS (WHEN THE VEHICLE IS 489104 1 18 POWERED), AND FINAL DECAY RATES ARE VERIFIED IN S0007. ANY FURTHER 489104 1 19 CHANGES IN DECAY RATE WILL BE MONITORED AND VERIFIED AS ACCEPTABLE PRIOR 489104 1 20 TO LAUNCH. NO FURTHER WORK OR RETEST IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. THIS 489104 1 21 CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT OTHER AND ITEMS/SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE 489104 1 22 CAUSE: INSUFFICIENT TIME BETWEEN TIRE PRESSURE TOP OFF AND PRESSURE 489104 1 23 DECAY CHECK. 489142 1 1 ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1: ELEVON COVE SEAL V070-198348-007 HAS (3) MINOR DEBONDE 489142 1 2 D AREAS. THE SEAL WAS REBONDED IN PLACE PER MR CONCURRENCE. PROBABLE CAU 489142 1 3 SE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 489174 1 1 A RESISTANCE CHECK WAS PERFORMED ACROSS THE DISCREPANT GROUND STRAPS AND 489174 1 2 THEY WERE FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE PER PRINT. THE DAMAGED INSULATION WAS 489174 1 3 REPAIRED BY MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE USING TEFLON FILM TAPE. NO 489174 1 4 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 489174 1 5 ION. 489351 1 1 DURING V76-50002, THE CONNECTOR SAVER ON 50J72 WAS FOUND TO BE MISSING O 489351 1 2 N LOCKING PIN. THE CONNECTOR SAVER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW CONNECTOR SAVER 489351 1 3 INSTALLED. AN LRU PR WAS WRITTEN AGAINST THE DISCREPANT CONNECTOR SAVER 489351 1 4 AND ROUTED TO HDA FOR REFURBISHMENT. RETEST ON THE REPAIR WILL BE TRACK 489351 1 5 ED BY SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMA 489351 1 6 L WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 489769 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: THE V070-358375 RTV SEALS ON THE 50-02 DOOR WERE FOUND TO 489769 PMRB 2 BE DEBONDED AT SEVERAL LOCATIONS AROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE DOOR. THE D 489769 PMRB 3 EBONDED REGIONS CONTAIN ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF THE TOTAL GRADE "A" BOND 489769 PMRB 4 LINE AREA OF THE SEAL. DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE DEBONDS, PER SPECIFICATI 489769 PMRB 5 ON SURFACE PREPARATION CAN NOT BE PERFORMED DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CO 489769 PMRB 6 NTAMINATION BY MATERIAL ENTRAPMENT. BY APPLYING MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHES 489769 PMRB 7 IVE TO THE DEBONDED REGIONS, THE SEAL WILL FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT. T 489769 PMRB 8 O PREVENT FURTHER DEBONDS THE V070-358375 SEALS WERE TRIMMED BACK FROM 489769 PMRB 9 THE EDGE OF THE DOOR APPROXIMATLY 0.06" AND A MBO130-119 TYPE II 489769 PMRB 10 ADHESIVE FILLET SEAL WAS FORMED. THIS REPAIR DOES NOT DEGRADE THE 489769 PMRB 11 SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. 489769 PMRB 12 MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE FOR THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. NO MR ID 489769 PMRB 13 IS REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 489769 PMRB 14 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST 489769 PMRB 15 (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS FOR 489769 PMRB 16 UNRESTRICTED USE. 489769 PMRB 17 8/30/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED "USE AS REPAIRED". 489769 1 1 THE RTV GASKET AROUND THE EDGE OF THE 50-02 DOOR WAS SLIGHTLY DEBONDED. 489769 1 2 THE RTV GASKET WAS REBONDED BY APPLYING MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE TO T 489769 1 3 HE DEBONDED AREAS. THE EDGE OF THE SEAL WAS TRIMMED AND A FILLET BEAD AP 489769 1 4 PLIED TO PREVENT FURTHER DEBONDS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 489769 1 5 N. 489770 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: THE V070-358375 RTV SEALS ON THE 50-01 DOOR WERE FOUND TO 489770 PMRB 2 BE DEBONDED AT SEVERAL LOCATIONS AROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE DOOR. THE D 489770 PMRB 3 EBONDED REGIONS CONTAIN ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF THE TOTAL GRADE "A" BOND 489770 PMRB 4 LINE AREA OF THE SEAL. DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE DEBONDS, PERSPECIFICATIO 489770 PMRB 5 N SURFACE PREPARATION CAN NOT BE PERFORMED DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CON 489770 PMRB 6 TAMINATION BY MATERIAL ENTRAPMENT. BY APPLYING MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESI 489770 PMRB 7 VE TO THE DEBONDED REGIONS, THE SEAL WILL FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT. TO 489770 PMRB 8 PREVENT FURTHER DEBONDS, THE V070-358375 SEALS WERE TRIMMED BACK FROM 489770 PMRB 9 THE EDGE OF THE DOOR APPROXIMATELY 0.06" AND A MBO130-119 TYPE II 489770 PMRB 10 ADHESIVE FILLET SEAL WAS FORMED. THIS REPAIR DOES NOT DEGRADE THE 489770 PMRB 11 SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. 489770 PMRB 12 MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE FOR THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. NO MR ID 489770 PMRB 13 IS REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 489770 PMRB 14 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST 489770 PMRB 15 (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS FOR 489770 PMRB 16 UNRESTRICTED USE. 489770 PMRB 17 8/30/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED "USE AS REPAIRED". 489770 1 1 THE RTV GASKET AROUND THE EDGE OF THE 50-01 DOOR WAS SLIGHTLY DEBONDED. 489770 1 2 THE RTV GASKET WAS REBONDED BY APPLYING MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE TO 489770 1 3 THE DEBONDED AREAS. THE EDGE OF THE SEAL WAS TRIMMED AND A FILLET BEAD 489770 1 4 APPLIED TO PREVENT FURTHER DEBONDS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 489770 1 5 DEGRADATION. 490002 1 1 DURING S0004 SEQ 21 IT WAS DETECTED THAT WIRE 4F272C22-1 HAD EXPOSED CON 490002 1 2 DUCTOR AT THE EXTENSION OF CONNECTOR 50P513. THE WIRE WAS REPAIRED BY IN 490002 1 3 STALLING MBO150-025 CLASS 4 SIZE 2 HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING OVER THE DAMAGED 490002 1 4 AREA WITH MR APPROVAL. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. PROBABL 490002 1 5 E CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 490003 1 1 DURING S0004 SEQ 21 IT WAS DETECTED THAT WIRE S120A20-1 HAD EXPOSED COND 490003 1 2 UCTOR AT THE EXTENSION OF CONNECTOR 50P533. THE WIRE WAS REPAIRED BY INS 490003 1 3 TALLING MBO150-025 CLASS 4 SIZE 2 HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING OVER THE DAMAGED 490003 1 4 AREA WITH MR APPROVAL. THERE IS NOT RETEST REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. PROBABL 490003 1 5 E CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 490004 1 1 DURING S0004, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT JR20 WIRE OF 50P537 HAD EXPOSED CON 490004 1 2 DUCTOR WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE PRIMARY CONDUCTOR FOUND. THIS DISCREPANCY W 490004 1 3 AS ADDRESSED BY PERFORMING A CLAMSHELL REPAIR PER SRP V-EL-0029-0-0. NO 490004 1 4 RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEA 490004 1 5 R AND TEAR OF FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 490005 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING S0004 WHEN THE V070-332629-001 CAP ASSY COU 490005 1 2 LD NOT BE EASILY INSTALLED ON THE V070-332612-001 ECL FITTING ON THE I/E 490005 1 3 HATCH (ITEM 1). ENGINEERING INSPECTIONS FOUND SCRATCHES WITH DISPLACED 490005 1 4 METAL ON THE INSIDE SURFACE OF THE V070-332612-001 FITTING (ITEM 2) AND 490005 1 5 SCRATCHES ON THE INTERFACING SURFACE OF THE V070-332629-001 CAP ASSY (IT 490005 1 6 EM 3). MRB CONCURRENCE WAS OBTAINED AND THE SCRATCHES ON BOTH THE CAP AN 490005 1 7 D FITTING WERE SANDED TO REMOVE ANY RAISED METAL AND BURNISH THE SURFACE 490005 1 8 . THE V070-332612-001 ECL FITTING (ITEM 2) AND V070-332629-001 CAP ASSY 490005 1 9 (ITEM 3) WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE IN THIS CONDITION. A 490005 1 10 FIT-CHECK OF THE CAP ASSY WAS PERFORMED AFTER THE REWORK WITH SUCCESSFUL 490005 1 11 RESULTS. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. SEAL LEAKAGE OF THE CAP 490005 1 12 ASSEMBLY WAS RETESTED PER OPERATION 2 OF THIS PR BY APPLYING 15 PSIG TO 490005 1 13 THE FITTING ASSEMBLY AND PERFORMING A BUBBLE LEAK CHECK AND 5 MINUTE 490005 1 14 DECAY RATE CHECK. NO LEAKAGE WAS DETECTED AND THE MEASURED DECAY RATE 490005 1 15 WAS 0 PSIG IN 5 MINUTES. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL 490005 1 16 NUMBERS/END ITEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION-C70-0894 UNIT 490005 1 17 CABLE WAS ROUTED THROUGH THE FITTING AND IS KNOWN TO CAUSE INTERFERENCE 490005 1 18 BETWEEN THE CONNECTOR BACKSHELL AND THE INSIDE OF THE FITTING. 490108 1 1 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF V1149, THE LH2 17" DISCONNECT (PD2) COULD NOT 490108 1 2 BE CYCLED CLOSED. TROUBLESHOOTING AND INSPECTIONS DISCOVERED A BROKEN WI 490108 1 3 RE AT SPLICE 50SP790 SOME 12" FROM CLOSING SOLENOID LV49. THE WIRE AND S 490108 1 4 PLICE WERE REPLACED AND THEN THE SOLENOID WAS SUCCESSFULLY CYCLED WITH H 490108 1 5 ANDS ON VERIFICATION. THIS ITEM IS NO LONGER A PR CONDITION AND MAY CLOS 490108 1 6 E. PROBABLE CAUSE: SPLICE IS NOT PROPERLY INSTALLED. 490505 1 1 THE FASTENER WAS NOT FULLY SEATED. IT WAS REMOVED AND THE HOLE WAS CLEAN 490505 1 2 ED. THE FASTENER AND THE HOLE WERE GRIPPED. THE PROPER FASTENER WAS INST 490505 1 3 ALLED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 490505 1 4 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 491106 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THE MR STR-3-01-0418 PLUG INSTALLED TO REPAIR A 491106 1 2 MISDRILLED HOLE IN THE V070-316234-005 DOOR PANEL BECAME DEBONDED. BY RE 491106 1 3 BONDING THE MR STR-3-01-0418 PLUG USING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE, THE INTEGRI 491106 1 4 TY OF THE LOWER FORWARD CARRIER PANEL ATTACH POINT WAS RESTORED. THIS WA 491106 1 5 S PERFORMED WITH MRB CONCURRENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIO 491106 1 6 NAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 491674 1 1 1 SCREW WAS FOUND TO BE LOOSE ON LH SIDE OF XO1307 BULKHEAD FOR V070-395 491674 1 2 232-003 CARRIER PANEL (V070-395027-094 TILE LOWER SCREW). THE SCREW WAS 491674 1 3 TORQUED AND FRSI PLUG INSTALLED PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: IS WORKMANSHI 491674 1 4 P. 491696 1 1 PROBLEM CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. THE LH T-O SPERICAL BEARING WAS 491696 1 2 FOUND TO HAVE RAISED METAL EDGE DURING A POST T-O UMBILICAL CARRIER PLAT 491696 1 3 E OPERATIONS BY USING THE T-O SPERICAL BEARING GO-GO GAUGE. DURING THE I 491696 1 4 NSPECTION, NEITHER END OF THE GO-GO GAUGE COULD BE FULLY INSERTED INTO T 491696 1 5 HE T-O SPHERICAL BEARING. THIS RAISED EDGE IS FORMED AT THE BACK SIDE OF 491696 1 6 THE BEARING DURING THE INSTALLATION / REMOVAL OF THE T-O LIGHT WEIGHT F 491696 1 7 RAME. THE LIP/RAISED EDGE ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE BEARING WAS REMOVED US 491696 1 8 ING A JEWELERS FILE. THE BEARING WAS THEN REINSPECTED USING THE GO-GO 491696 1 9 GAUGE COULD BE FULLY INSERTED INTO THE T-O SPHERICAL BEARING. THIS 491696 1 10 RAISED EDGE IS FORMED AT THE BACK SIDE OF THE BEARING DURING THE 491696 1 11 INSTALLATION/REMOVAL OF THE T-O LIGHT WEIGHT FRAME. THE LIP/RAISED EDGE 491696 1 12 ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE BEARING WAS REMOVED USING A JEWELERS FILE. THE 491696 1 13 BEARING WAS THEN REINSPECTED USING THE GO-GO GAUGE SUCCESSFULLY, THIS 491696 1 14 VERIFIED THAT THE BEARING HAS BEEN RESTORED TO DRAWING SPECS. NO FURTHER 491696 1 15 WORK WILL TAKE PLACE ON THIS PR AND NO R/C ACTION IS REQUIRED. 491815 1 1 DURING MPS-3-19-1188 IT DISCOVERED THAT THE LOCKING TEETH ON CONNECTOR 5 491815 1 2 0V77W118P638 WERE WORN. CONNECTOR 50P638 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A 491815 1 3 NEW CONNECTOR P/N: NC2E8-3SN. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEA 491815 1 4 R. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. FUNCTIONAL RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. 492169 1 1 DURING V80-00456 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BACKSHELL TANG ON 55J66 WAS 492169 1 2 LOOSE. SET SCREW ON 55J66 BACKSHELL WAS TORQUED 8-12 IN-OZS PER MLO303-0 492169 1 3 040. PROBABLE CAUSE: DUE TO WORKMANSHIP NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 492393 1 1 THE OPEN HOLE IN THE SIDE HONEYCOMB PANEL IS TO SUPPORT THE WIRING FOR T 492393 1 2 HE APU COOLING TIMER. THE TIMER IS INSTALLED ON V070-705004. THE WIRING 492393 1 3 FOR THE TIMER IS INSTALLED ON V070-795441. THE TIMER WAS DELETED PER V07 492393 1 4 0-705004 EO B01 LEAVING SIX OPEN HOLES FOR THE TIMER AND TWO OPEN HOLES 492393 1 5 FOR THE WIRING. THIS IS A PER PRINT CONDITION. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DON 492393 1 6 E ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 492431 PMRB 1 MR/DEFERRAL RATIONALE: MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED TO USE THE 528-41798-6 G 492431 PMRB 2 RAY TAPE AND ONE CAPTIVE FASTENER TO SECURE THE V070-731868-002 COVER AS 492431 PMRB 3 SEMBLY TO THE ADJACENT CEILING PANEL FOR ONE FLIGHT. THE V070-731868-002 492431 PMRB 4 COVER ASSEMBLY IS NORMALLY USED AS A GSE GROUND ACCESS POINT AND IS SEC 492431 PMRB 5 URED TO THE CEILING PANEL WITH TWO CAPTIVE FASTENERS. THE AFT ATTACH NUT 492431 PMRB 6 PLATE DEBONDED FROM THE CEILING PANEL. INSTALLATION OF THE COVER WITH O 492431 PMRB 7 NE CAPTIVE FASTENER AND 528-41798-6 TAPE AT THE AFT EDGE OF THE PANEL WI 492431 PMRB 8 LL SECURE THE COVER ASSEMBLY TO THE CEILING PANEL. THE CEILING PANELS 492431 PMRB 9 AND THE COVER DO NOT CARRY ANY LOAD. THE SAFETY, RELIABILITY AND 492431 PMRB 10 FUNCTION OF THE PANEL WILL NOT BE COMPROMISED. THE INSTALLATION OF THE 492431 PMRB 11 PANEL WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH POSITIVE MARGIN 492431 PMRB 12 OF SAFETY. THE PANEL IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR IS FOR RESTRICTED 492431 PMRB 13 USE FOR ONE FLIGHT. NO MR ID REQUIRED. THIS MR DOES NOT INVALID THE 492431 PMRB 14 BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 492431 PMRB 15 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 09/07/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 492431 PMRB 16 20 OF OV-103. 492431 1 1 DURING INSTALLATION OF V070-731868-002 COVER, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE 492431 1 2 FORWARD ATTACH NUT PLATE DEBONDED FROM THE V070-731877-010 LUMINOUS CEI 492431 1 3 LING PANEL. MR RESTRICTED FOR ONE FLIGHT WAS APPROVED TO INSTALL THE PAN 492431 1 4 EL WITH ONLY ONE CAPTIVE FASTENER AT THE AFT END AND TAPE AT THE FORWARD 492431 1 5 END. FOLLOWING FLIGHT 07 LAUNCH ABORT, THE DEBONDED NUT PLATE WAS REBON 492431 1 6 DED TO THE CEILING PANEL. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. THE CAUSE OF THIS 492431 1 7 PR IS MATERIAL DEGRADATION. 492651 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: V070-852713-002 AND V070-852713-005 SPLICE PLATE COV 492651 PMRB 2 ERS FOR WIRE HARNESS SUPPORT BOX WERE FOUND TO BE BENT. THESE SPLICE COV 492651 PMRB 3 ERS JOIN THE V070-852102 *=(YLT+37.86 TO YLT -52.13) SUPPORT BOX. THESE 492651 PMRB 4 SPLICE COVERS WITH THIS SMALL BENT AREA WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE PROPER 492651 PMRB 5 CLOSEOUT FOR WIRES AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND DESIGN INTENT IS MAINTAI 492651 PMRB 6 NED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THI 492651 PMRB 7 S MR ACTION IS NO IMPACT ON CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONAL 492651 PMRB 8 E OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS NO IMPACT ON CERTIFICATION AND 492651 PMRB 9 ASSOCIATED RATIONALE. MR ACTION IS RESTRICTED LIFE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 492651 PMRB 10 09/07/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 492651 1 1 THE V070-852713-002 SPLICE PLATE WAS BENT BACK AND INSPECTED FOR CRACKS. 492651 1 2 NONE WERE FOUND. IT WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE V070-852713- 492651 1 3 005 SPLICE PLATE WAS ALSO BENT BACK AND INSPECTED FOR CRACKS. A CRACK WA 492651 1 4 S NOTED AND A PAGE 1A WAS PICKED UP. THE CRACK WAS STOP DRILLED WITH MRB 492651 1 5 APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE -002 AND -005 SPLICE PLATES WERE COR 492651 1 6 ROSION PROTECTED AND MR ID'D. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PRO 492651 1 7 BABLE CAUSE - WORKMANSHIP. 492715 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: ORBITER AFT GROUND STUDS, REFERENCE DESIGNATORS 57E1 492715 PMRB 2 AND 57E2, SUPPORT ORBITER POWER DURING ORBITER/SCA FERRY FLIGHT 492715 PMRB 3 OPERATIONS. THE FERRY FLIGHT WIRE HARNESS IS INSTALLED AT REMOTE LANDING 492715 PMRB 4 SITE PER DRAWING M072-795001. THIS MISSION KIT DRAWING PROVIDES A 492715 PMRB 5 GENERAL NOTE AUTHORIZING KSC TO NOT REMOVE THESE PARTICULAR GROUND STUDS 492715 PMRB 6 WHEN REMOVING THE FERRY FLIGHT WIRE HARNESS. HOWEVER; AUTHORIZATION 492715 PMRB 7 SHOULD BE REFLECTED ON AN ORBITER "V070" INSTALLATION DRAWING TO ALLOW 492715 PMRB 8 GROUND STUDS TO REMAIN INSTALLED DURING SPACE MISSIONS. DEFERRAL 492715 PMRB 9 APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR ONE FLIGHT AS AN INTERIM ACTION UNTIL A 492715 PMRB 10 CORRECTIVE DESIGN IS READY FOR INCORPORATION. THIS CONFIGURATION DOES 492715 PMRB 11 NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE, OR 492715 PMRB 12 INTERCHANGEABILITY. IN ADDITION, DEFERRAL DOES NOT AFFECT THE BASIS FOR 492715 PMRB 13 CERTIFICATION NOR IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST RETENTION RATIONALE OR 492715 PMRB 14 HAZARDS CONTROL. DEFERRAL IS RESTRICTED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE (ONE 492715 PMRB 15 FLIGHT). 09/08/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 492715 1 1 DURING REVIEW OF DRAWING M072-795001 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE GENERAL 492715 1 2 NOTE AUTHORIZING KSC TO NOT REMOVE E GND HARDWARE FROM 57E1 AND 57E2 SHO 492715 1 3 ULD BE REFLECTED ON ORBITER DRAWING V070-795451 TO SHOW THAT THE HARDWAR 492715 1 4 E IS A PERMANENT INSTALLATION. EO'S V070-795451 G06 AND M072-795001 C09 492715 1 5 WERE RELEASED TO SHOW THIS CONFIGURATION. TPS OEL-3-20-070 WAS ALSO RELE 492715 1 6 ASED TO VERIFY THE HARDWARE INSTALLED AND TO CONFORMAL COAT 57E1 AND 57E 492715 1 7 2 AS SHOWN ON V070-795451 G06 SHEET 2. PROBABLE CAUSE: DRAWING CORRECTIO 492715 1 8 N. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 492734 1 1 DURING S1287 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BACKSHELL ON 50J38 WAS LOOSE. 50 492734 1 2 J38 BACKSHELL ASSY WAS DISASSEMBLED. NO DISCREPANCY WAS FOUND AND BACKSH 492734 1 3 ELL CLOSED PER MLO303-0040. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO FUR 492734 1 4 THER DISPO REQUIRED. 492812 PMR 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: 1 MD111-4020-0616 UPPER BOLTS ATTACHING 492812 PMR 2 V070-395956-003 CARRIER PANEL FOR LH BASE HEAT SHIELD/LOWER TAILCONE 492812 PMR 3 FITTING ARE FLUSH WITH NUTPLATES. THE BOLT SHOULD HAVE 1 THREAD MINIMUM 492812 PMR 4 THREAD PROTRUSIION PER SPECIFICATION. THE BOLTS, AS INSTALLED, PROVIDES 492812 PMR 5 FULL ENGAGEMENT INTO NUTPLATE LOCKING FEATURE AND IS ACCEPTABLE AS IS 492812 PMR 6 FOR 1 FLIGHT. THE NUT IS CLAMPED TIGHT AGAINST THE STRUCTURE INDICATING 492812 PMR 7 FASTENER PRELOAD. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND DESIGN INTENT IS MAINTAINED. 492812 PMR 8 MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. THIS IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR 492812 PMR 9 ACTION IS NO IMPACT ON CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR 492812 PMR 10 HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS NO IMPACT ON CERTIFICATION AND 492812 PMR 11 ASSOCATED RATIONALE. MR ACTION IS RESTRICTED LIFE. 09/08/94, PMRB 492812 PMR 12 APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 492812 1 1 THE 2 MD111-4020-0616 UPPER BOLTS ATTACHING V070-395956-003 CARRIER 492812 1 2 PANEL FOR LH BASE HEAT SHIELD LOWER TAILCONE FITTING WERE FOUND TO BE 492812 1 3 FLUSH ON FLIGHT 19 AT PAD. THE BOLTS WERE ACCEPTED FOR 1 FLIGHT WITH NO 492812 1 4 THREAD PROTRUSION. THE CARRIER PANEL WAS REMOVED AT DRYDEN TO INSTALL 492812 1 5 TAILCONE FITTING THEN BACK AT KSC THE CARRIER PANEL WAS INSTALLED FOR 492812 1 6 MODAL ANALYSIS. THE BOLTS WERE INSPECTED AND WERE STILL FOUND TO BE 492812 1 7 FLUSH ON STEP 2-2 PAGE 6. THESE TWO UPPER BOLTS WERE INSTALLED WITH 2 492812 1 8 WASHER PER BOLT WHEN IT IS REQUIRED TO ONLY HAVE 1 WASHER PER BOLT. THE 492812 1 9 CARRIER PANEL WAS THEN REMOVED AFTER THE MODAL TEST AND INSTALLED FOR 492812 1 10 FLIGHT ON 12-15-94 WITH 1 WASHERS INSTALLED PER BOLT. THE PROPER THREAD 492812 1 11 PROTRUSION WAS VERIFIED IN STEP 3-5 ON PAGE 11. PROBABLE CAUSE IS 492812 1 12 WORKMANSHIP. 493042 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: 1 OF 8 SCREWS FOR V070-393315-004 CARRIER PANEL IS I 493042 PMRB 2 NSTALLED WITHOUT TORQUE DUE NUTPLATE SPINNING IN CAGE. THE SCREW IS SEAT 493042 PMRB 3 ED FULLY WITH NO GAP. THE CLOSEST FASTENER IS ONLY 3" AWAY. CARRIER PANE 493042 PMRB 4 L AS INSTALLED WITH 7 SCREWS INSTALLED WITH TORQUE AND 1 SCREW FULLY SEA 493042 PMRB 5 TED IS ACCETPABLE AS IS FOR 1 FLIGHT. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND DESIGN IN 493042 PMRB 6 TENT ARE MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. THIS MR DOES NOT 493042 PMRB 7 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION NOR DOES IT IMPACT THE CIL RETEN 493042 PMRB 8 TION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. MR ACTION IS RESTRICTED USE. NO MR 493042 PMRB 9 ID REQUIRED. 090994, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 20 OF OV-103. 493042 1 1 THE SCREW WAS REMOVED FROM THE NUTPLATE WITH NORMAL PROCEDURES. INSPECTI 493042 1 2 ON PERFORMED AFTER THE DOOR WAS REMOVED REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF ANY NUTP 493042 1 3 LATE ANOMALY. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. FASTENERS REMOVED F 493042 1 4 ROM THE CARRIER PANEL WERE SCRAPPED AT DFRF, PROBABLY DUE TO DISCREPANT 493042 1 5 THREADS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 495353 1 1 DURING S5022, RCPT 40J438 WAS FOUND TO HAVE GALLED THREADS. THE DISCREPA 495353 1 2 NT RCPT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW RCPT P/N: ME414-0234-7224. P 495353 1 3 ROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO WEAR AND TEAR. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. 495553 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE MD114-1002-0003 NUT OF THE V070-15 495553 1 2 0395-006 INDICATOR BRACKET CONTACTING THE V070-51010-005 LMG BUNGEE BOOS 495553 1 3 TER CYLINDER. THE CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 495553 1 4 NO RETEST REQUIRED. MR ID WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSTALLATION TOLE 495553 1 5 RANCE OF BUNGEE SWITCH BRACKET. (LIKE S/N ARE NOT EFFECTED). 495569 1 1 DURING V76-40003, WIRE'S 3D65B0 AND 3D66BO GOING TO CONNECTOR 50P438 WER 495569 1 2 E THOUGHT TO BE TOO SHORT. CLAMPS AND SPOT TIES WERE REMOVED AND ENOUGH 495569 1 3 SLACK WAS OBTAINED TO PROPERLY MATE CONNECTOR 50P438 ON OEL-3-20-0542. P 495569 1 4 ROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED ON TH 495569 1 5 IS PR. 495738 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLE T226A26 HAD KAPTON SEPARA 495738 1 2 TION EXPOSING THE SHIELD. INSPECTION REVEALED NO BROKEN SHIELD STRANDS. 495738 1 3 THE WIRE WAS REPAIRED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIK 7503 ELEC 495738 1 4 TRICAL TAPE PER SRP-V-EL-0007-E-0. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. TH 495738 1 5 E PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 495739 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DETECTED THAT CABLE T276A26 HAD KAPTON SEPARA 495739 1 2 TION EXPOSING THE SHIELD. INSPECTION REVEALED NO BROKEN SHIELD STRANDS. 495739 1 3 THE WIRE WAS REPAIRED BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIK 7503 ELEC 495739 1 4 TRICAL TAPE PER SRP-V-EL-0007-E-0. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. TH 495739 1 5 E PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR WAS DUE TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 495867 1 1 DURING WORK PERFORMED ON V41-10004 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE SEGMENT T 495867 1 2 1870A26 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD OR PRIMARY CONDUC 495867 1 3 TOR(S). THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY PERFORMING AN MR APPROVED SRP 495867 1 4 V-EL-0007-E-0 TO INSTALL MYSTIK 7503 ELECTRICAL TAPE OVER THE DAMAGED AR 495867 1 5 EA. THE AREA WAS THEN COVERED WITH CONVOLUTED TUBING TO MINIMIZE FUTURE 495867 1 6 DAMAGE. THIS RETURNS THE WIRE SEGMENT TO DESIGN INTENT. NO RETEST OR FUR 495867 1 7 THER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR O 495867 1 8 F FLIGHT ELECTRICAL HARDWARE. 495953 PMRB 1 MR/DEFERRAL RATIONALE: DURING BORESCOPE EXAMINATION OF THE INSIDE VENT 495953 PMRB 2 DOOR 9 (RH) CAVITY, NUMEROUS AREAS OF CORROSION WERE DISCOVERED BEHIND 495953 PMRB 3 THE VENT DOOR AND BEHIND THE V070-385317-012 BAFFLE. BECAUSE THESE AREAS 495953 PMRB 4 ARE INACCESSIBLE WITHOUT REMOVAL OF THE AFFECTED COMPONENTS, IT IS NOT 495953 PMRB 5 POSSIBLE TO SAY WHICH OF THE AREAS INVOLVE ACTIVE CORROSION, OR TO 495953 PMRB 6 ACCOMPLISH CORROSION PROTECTION WHILE COMPONENTS ARE INSTALLED. 495953 PMRB 7 CORROSION PROTECTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH MA0608-301 WAS PERFORMED UPON 495953 PMRB 8 THE 21 AREAS OF CORROSION (LISTED IN TABLE 1 OF ATTACHMENT 1) WHICH ARE 495953 PMRB 9 ACCESSIBLE AT THIS TIME. ACCESSIBILITY OF GROUND STRAP (ITEM 2) IS ALSO 495953 PMRB 10 INHIBITED AND SHOULD BE DEFERRED PENDING COMPONENT REMOVAL. PMRB 495953 PMRB 11 APPROVAL IS REQUESTED TO DEFER FURTHER CORROSION CONTROL EFFORTS INSIDE 495953 PMRB 12 THE CAVITY UNTIL FLIGHT 21 FLOW. AT THAT TREATMENT WITHOUT COMPROMISING 495953 PMRB 13 OTHER OPERATIONS. THIS DEFERRAL DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 495953 PMRB 14 CERTIFICATION; NOR DOES IT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD 495953 PMRB 15 CONTROLS. DEFERRAL DOES NOT AFFECT DESIGN INTENT AND A POSITIVE SAFETY 495953 PMRB 16 MARGIN IS MAINTAINED. MR ID IS PROVIDED. THIS IS A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 495953 PMRB 17 DEFERRAL IS FOR ONE FLIGHT ONLY. MR ACTION FOR RESTRICTED LIFE. 12/13/94 495953 PMRB 18 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF OV-103. 495953 1 1 AREAS OF ACTIVE CORROSION WERE FOUND INSIDE THE VENT DOOR PLENUM (ITEMS 495953 1 2 1, 3, AND 4) AND WERE TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SRP V-ST-0029-0, CORROS 495953 1 3 ION INSPECTION AND REPAIR FOR ALUMINUM STRUCTURE. PITTING AT LOCATIONS 1 495953 1 4 , 6, 7, 8, 12, AND 12A WERE MR ACCEPTED AS BEING WITHIN STRUCTURAL ACCEP 495953 1 5 TANCE PARAMETERS; MR ID WAS PROVIDED. A RIVET BLASTER WAS USED TO REMOVE 495953 1 6 CORROSION IN 5 LOCATIONS. THE BLAST MEDIA AND PROCEDURE WERE MR APPROVE 495953 1 7 D FOR CORROSION CONTROL. USE OF THE MEDIA BLASTER GUN PRODUCED EXCELLENT 495953 1 8 RESULTS WITH A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN PREPARATION TIME. THE GROUND 495953 1 9 (ITEM 2) WAS CORRODED TO THE EXTENT THAT IT HAD TO BE REPLACED. A NEW 495953 1 10 STRAP WAS PROVIDED AND INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MAO113-306, CLASS 495953 1 11 L, TYPE 1, ELECTRICAL BOND AND TEST. IN THE COURSE OF THIS CORROSION 495953 1 12 CONTROL EFFORT, IT WAS NECESSARY TO DISCONNECT THE V070-385317-012 495953 1 13 PURGE BAFFLE. DISCONNECTION AND POST-TREATMENT WERE PERFORMED IN 495953 1 14 OPERATION 5. DOOR REMOVAL AND POST-TREATMENT REINSTALLATION WERE 495953 1 15 PERFORMED (OPERATION 3) PER OMI V5K09.006 (BASIC) RH VENT DOOR 8/9 RMVL 495953 1 16 - INSTALLATION. AFTER INSTALLATION, THE DOOR WAS FOUND TO BE OUT OF 495953 1 17 CONFORMINTY WITH THE OML AND HAD TO BE RERIGGED. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED 495953 1 18 ON A PR, MEQ-3-21-0872, THE CHECKOUT AND COMPLETION PERFORMED PER 495953 1 19 V1322. ALL WORK IN THIS WAD HAS BEEN PERFORMED AND NO ENGINEERING 495953 1 20 REMAINS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 495985 1 1 THE RTV GASKET AROUND THE EDGE OF THE 50-02 DOOR WAS SLIGHTLY DEBONDED. 495985 1 2 THE RTV GASKET WAS REPAIRED BY REMOVING THE DEBONDED PORTIONS AND APPLYI 495985 1 3 NG MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE TO THE VOID AREAS. THE EDGE OF THE SEAL W 495985 1 4 AS TRIMMED TO A TAPER TO PREVENT FURTHER DEBONDS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERAT 495985 1 5 IONAL DEGRADATION. 495986 1 1 THE RTV GASKET AROUND THE EDGE OF THE 50-01 DOOR WAS SLIGHTLY DEBONDED. 495986 1 2 THE RTV GASKET WAS REPAIRED BY REMOVING THE DEBONDED PORTIONS AND APPLYI 495986 1 3 NG MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE TO THE VOID AREAS. THE EDGE OF THE SEAL W 495986 1 4 AS TRIMMED TO A TAPER TO PREVENT FURTHER DEBONDS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERAT 495986 1 5 IONAL DEGRADATION. 496071 1 1 DURING V31-13115 INSPECTION, THE FOLLOWING DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND: 1) 496071 1 2 WIRE 1YT81C24 HAD SPLIT KAPTON, 2) WIRE 1ZK713A24 HAD MULTIPLE SPLIT KAP 496071 1 3 TON NEAR CONNECTOR 81P386 AND 3) 2ZK495B24 HAD SPLIT KAPTON NEAR CONNECT 496071 1 4 OR 81P384. WIRE 1YT81C24 WAS REPAIRED USING SRP-V-EL-0007 TO WRAP MYSTIC 496071 1 5 7503 TAPE OVER DAMAGED AREA. AFTER THE REPAIR WAS COMPLETED ON WIRE 1YT 496071 1 6 18C24 A SECOND LOCATION WAS FOUND WITH KAPTON DAMAGE. A PAGE 1B WAS INIT 496071 1 7 IATED AND AGAIN SRP-V-EL-0007 WAS USED. WIRES 1ZK713A24 AND 2ZK495B24 WE 496071 1 8 RE DEPINNED AND RT11460 BLACK HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING WAS INSTALLED OVER 496071 1 9 DAMAGES FROM THE CONNECTOR BACK THROUGH THE FIRST CLAMP. A CONTINUITY, 496071 1 10 ISOLATION AND HIPOT CHECK WERE THEN SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED. NO FURTHER 496071 1 11 ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON 496071 1 12 ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 496072 1 1 DURING V6001, ITEM 1 WIRE 1ZK498A24 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE AT THE BACHSHELL O 496072 1 2 F CONN 81P82. ITEM 2 WIRE 2ZK459B24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE AT T 496072 1 3 HE BACKSHELL TANG. THE REPAIRS OF THESE WIRES WAS TO INSTALL HEAT SHRINK 496072 1 4 SLEEVING OVER THE DAMAGED AREA. CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT CHECKS 496072 1 5 WERE PERFORMED ON BOTH WIRES AND WERE SUCCESSFUL. ITEM 3, WIRE 1ZK486A24 496072 1 6 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE ONLY APPROX 11" FROM CONN 81J2. SRP V-E 496072 1 7 L-0007-E-0 METHOD "B" WAS PERFORMED TO REPAIR THE WIRE. ITEM 4 WIRE 1ZK4 496072 1 8 86A24-BRN CONTACT HAD CONDUCTOR DAMAGE. THE CONTACTS WERE REMOVED FROM 496072 1 9 1ZK486A24-BSC AND BRN. NEW CONTACTS WERE THEN CRIMPED ON. ITEM 5 CABLE 496072 1 10 1ZK273C26 PIGTAIL BRAID WAS SERVED DURING BACKSHELL CLOSURE. THE WIRE 496072 1 11 WAS EXTRACTED AND CONTACT WAS CUT/REMOVED. TEH WIRE THEN WAS PIGTAIL 496072 1 12 BRAIDED. A NEW CONTACT WAS CRIMPED ON AND WIRE 1ZK273C26 WAS TERMINATED. 496072 1 13 PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED 496072 1 14 BY SCAN. 496074 1 1 DURING V31-13115, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLE C121A22 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE 496074 1 2 TWO PLACES ABOUT TWELVE INCHES FROM 81V74A26J3, CABLE 1A48A26 HAD KAPTO 496074 1 3 N DAMAGE AT TANG OF 81V76A2J4 AND CABLE 1A44A26 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE AT TAN 496074 1 4 G OF 81V76A2J4. SRP V-EL-0007 (E-O) METHOD B WAS PERFORMED ON CABLE C121 496074 1 5 A22. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO USE MYSTIK 7503 TAPE ON CABLES 1A44A26 496074 1 6 AND 1A48A26. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RETEST REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE C 496074 1 7 AUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 496075 1 1 DURING V31-13115, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLE 5ZK324B24 HAD KAPTON DAMA 496075 1 2 GE. ENGINEERING INSPECTION REVEALED THAT ONLY KAPTON AND NO SHIELD DAMAG 496075 1 3 E WAS FOUND. SRP V-EL-0007-E-0 METHOD B (TAPE REPAIR) WAS PERFORMED ON C 496075 1 4 ABLE. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RETEST REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: N 496075 1 5 ORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 496096 1 1 DURING V31-13117, INSPECTION REVEALED THAT WIRE H130A26 HAD DAMAGE INSUL 496096 1 2 ATION THUS EXPOSING THE CONDUCTOR. THEREFORE M.R. APPROVAL WAS REQUESTED 496096 1 3 TO CUT THE WIRE AT THE DAMAGE AREA AND SPLICE IN A NEW SECTION OF WIRE 496096 1 4 USING KSC SPLICE 0674. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. R 496096 1 5 ETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN 3-20-0275. 496097 1 1 DURING V31-13117 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLE 2ZK518A24 HAD SPLIT KAPTON 496097 1 2 APPROXIMATELY 8" FROM CONNECTOR (ITEM 1). CABLE 2ZK518A24 WAS REPAIRED 496097 1 3 PER SRP V-EL-0007-E-O OPTION "B" BY WRAPPING THE DISCREPANT AREA WITH MY 496097 1 4 STIC 7503 TEFLON TAPE. IT WAS ALSO DISCOVERED THAT CABLE 1ZK518B24 HAD S 496097 1 5 PLIT KAPTON AT 82P68. CABLE 1ZK518B24 WAS REPAIRED BY INSTALLING HEAT SH 496097 1 6 RINKABLE TUBING OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA. A CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HI 496097 1 7 POT WAS PERFORMED AND SUCCESSFUL. WHILE WORKING OEL-3-20-0552 THE GROMME 496097 1 8 T ON 82P68 WAS FOUND SPLIT BETWEEN PINS 11 AND 12. A NEW CONNECTOR P/N 496097 1 9 NLS6GT10-35A WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE (ITEMS 1, 2 & 3) 496097 1 10 DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE 496097 1 11 PER SCAN TRACK. 496098 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLES 2J119B16 AND P646A22 H 496098 1 2 AD SPLIT KAPTON AT 50V77W108P785. CABLES 2J119B16 AND P646A22 WERE REPAI 496098 1 3 RED PER SRP V-EL-0007 OPTION "B" BY WRAPPING THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTI 496098 1 4 K 7503 TEFLON TAPE. NO FURTHER DISPO OR RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE 496098 1 5 DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 496099 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE ITEM 1.0 DISCREPANCY (GOUGE 496099 PMRB 2 IN B-HATCH COLLAR SEAL) BE MR ACCEPTED FOR ONE FLIGHT RESTRICTED LIFE. 496099 PMRB 3 THE DISCPREPANCY IS A GOUGED AREA APPROXIMATELY 0.11" LONG X 0.103" WIDE 496099 PMRB 4 X 0.009" DEEP AND IS LOCATED IN THE TWELVE O'CLOCK POSITION. THE B-HATCH 496099 PMRB 5 IS REMOVED AND WILL BE FLOWN AS A C-HATCH THIS FLOW. THEREFORE, THE 496099 PMRB 6 DISCEPANT COLLAR SEAL WILL NOT BE ACTING AS A SEALING SURFACE THIS FLOW. 496099 PMRB 7 THIS DISCREPANCY WILL NOT AFFECT THE FIT, FORM OR FUNCTIN OF THE COLLAR 496099 PMRB 8 SEAL WITHOUT B-HATCH INSTALLED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE 496099 PMRB 9 CRITICAL ITEMS LIST HAZARDS CONTROL OR RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS MR 496099 PMRB 10 ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. NO MR ID 496099 PMRB 11 REQUIRED. ROUTE PR TO PRIME BOARD FOR DEFERRAL APPROVAL. (SEE PAGE 5.1 496099 PMRB 12 FOR PRIME BOARD DEFERRAL SIGNATURES). 10/25/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR 496099 PMRB 13 DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF OV-103. 496099 1 1 DURING CREW MODULE CLOSEOUT FOR OPF ROLL-OUT DURING FLIGHT 20 PROCESSING 496099 1 2 , THE HATCH SEAL PROTECTIVE TAPE FOR THE B-HATCH COLLAR SEAL WAS FOUND T 496099 1 3 O BE STUCK TO THE SEAL ITSELF. THIS CAUSED A GOUGE IN THE SEAL WHEN THE 496099 1 4 TAPE WAS REMOVED. THE PR WAS DEFERRED FOR ONE FLIGHT AS B-HATCH WAS NOT 496099 1 5 BEING FLOWN SINCE THE UTNNEL ADAPTER WAS INSTALLED. DURING FLIGHT 21 PRO 496099 1 6 CESSING, THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER LRU OMI V5K17. THE SEAL W 496099 1 7 AS SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED PER V1058.001 B-HATCH FUNCTIONAL, INCLUDING A S 496099 1 8 EAL LEAK RATE OF 0.2 PSI/MIN (1 PSI/MIN ALLOWABLE). NO ADDITIONAL RETEST 496099 1 9 IS REQUIRED. LIKE S/NS'EICN ARE NOT EFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 496099 1 10 WORKMANSHIP, TAPE ISNTALLED TO SEAL ITSELF. 496164 1 1 ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF DISCREPANCIES NOTED AS ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 AND 496164 1 2 ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A HAS DETERMINED THAT MR ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ARE NOT 496164 1 3 EXCEEDED BY THE DEGRADATION SUSTAINED BY THE MONEL METAL MESH AT THIS 496164 1 4 TIME. NEITHER ARE THE TRACES OF RESIN FOAM EMBEDDED IN THE MESH OF ANY 496164 1 5 CONSEQUENCE. MR APPROVAL HAS BEEN GRANTED FOR CONTINUED, UNRESTRICTED 496164 1 6 USE OF THE PART. MR ID HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO RECORD EXISTING DAMAGE FOR 496164 1 7 FUTURE REFERENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 496204 1 1 AT CARRIER PANEL V070-390081-040 (WINDOW 2) THE RUNNING TORQUE OF ONE RO 496204 1 2 SAN WAS FOUND TO BE EXCESSIVE. A TAP WAS RUN INTO THE DISCREPANT ROSAN F 496204 1 3 ITTING TO CLEANUP THE THREADED SURFACE. SUBSEQUENT RUNNING TORQUE CHECK 496204 1 4 INDICATION WAS WELL WITHIN PRESCRIBED PARAMETERS. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING 496204 1 5 IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION OF THREADED SURFAC 496204 1 6 E. 496231 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, WIRE T222A26 AT 50P650 AND WIRE T223A26 AT 50P608 W 496231 1 2 ERE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. SRP-V-EL-0007 METHOD B WAS USED TO TAPE 496231 1 3 THE DAMAGED AREAS WITH MYSTIC 7503. ALSO, AT 50P650 18 INCHES OF CONVOL 496231 1 4 UTED TUBING WAS INSTALLED FOR ADDITIONAL PROTECTION. NO FURTHER ACTION R 496231 1 5 EQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURI 496231 1 6 NG PROCESSING. 496280 1 1 DISCREPANCY ITEM 1 OF THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE 496280 1 2 V070-326876-001FWD NLG CENTER OVERLAP SEAL BEING RIPPED AND DEBONDING. 496280 1 3 THE SUSPECT SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW SEAL. DURING THE 496280 1 4 INSPECTION OF THE NEWLY BONDED SEAL A PAGE 1A WAS INITIATED ON A 496280 1 5 SUSPECTED VOID IN THE RTV. FURTHER INSPECTION BY MEQ AND TPS ENGINEERING 496280 1 6 VERIFIED THE BOND IS PER SPEC AND NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. COMPRESSION OF 496280 1 7 THE SEAL WAS TESTED WITH NOMINAL RESULTS. ALL PR CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN 496280 1 8 ADDRESSED AND NO PR CONDITION EXIST. DISCREPANCY DOES NOT AFFECT OTHER 496280 1 9 S/N'S OF LIKE END ITEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 496298 1 1 LOCKER "F" WAS FOUND TO HAVE 1 DENT .0354 DEEP. THE LOCKER WAS THEN REMO 496298 1 2 VED AND A MR DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED OVER DISCREPANT AREA. THE 496298 1 3 LOCKER IS THEN INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS INSUFFICIENT DATA. 496412 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT GROUND LUG ON WIRE 1G150B22 G 496412 1 2 OING TO 50P502 WAS BROKEN. A NEW GROUND LUG WAS CRIMPED ON AND CONTINUIT 496412 1 3 Y CHECK PERFORMED AND SUCCESSFUL. 1G150B22 GROUND LUG WILL BE ATTACHED T 496412 1 4 O 50P502 BACKSHELL DURING S0004 SEQ 24. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEA 496412 1 5 R AND TEAR. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 496430 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN SUPERFICIAL CRACKS WRE NOTICED 496430 PMRB 2 ON THE UPSET BUCKED TAILS OF THE NINE RIVETS INSTALLED ON THE 496430 PMRB 3 V070-510466 RMLG GUIDE ASSY. THE CRACKS OBSERVED IN THE NINE RIVETS 496430 PMRB 4 SATISFY THE CRITERIA FOR BEING CATEGORIZED AS "SUPERFICIAL" AS DETAILED 496430 PMRB 5 IN MPP 101M302M01. THAT IS, NONE OF THE CRACKS HAVE A VISIBLE OPENING AT 496430 PMRB 6 THE SURFACE AND NONE OF THEM EXTEND INTO THE CRITICAL (1.1 DIAMETER) 496430 PMRB 7 AREA OF THE DRIVEN HEAD OF THE RIVET. PAGE 1A OF THIS PR DOCUMENTS A 496430 PMRB 8 LARGE NUMBER OF CRACKS IN THESE RIVETS (UP TO 7" ONE RIVET). RI SPEC MPP 496430 PMRB 9 101M302M01 AND MAO101-302 ALLOW A MAXIMUM OF TWO CRACKS. REQUEST MRB 496430 PMRB 10 CONCURRENCE TO ACCEPT THESE RIVETS AS IS. THE NINE RIVETS IN QUESTION 496430 PMRB 11 ARE ALL PART OF A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CRACKS ALTHOUGH MANY IN 496430 PMRB 12 NUMBER, ARE EXTREMELY MINOR, AND WERE PROBABLY CREATED ON THE DAY THE 496430 PMRB 13 PART WAS INSTALLED. THE STRUCTURE IS SECURELY FASTENED TOGETHER. THIS 496430 PMRB 14 CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT THE FORM, FIT, OR FUNCTION OF THE LANDING GEAR 496430 PMRB 15 SYSTEM. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. 496430 PMRB 16 THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 496430 PMRB 17 THIS PART WILL BE MR ID'D. 10/25/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR CLOSURE, CRIT 2 496430 PMRB 18 HARDWARE. 496430 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN SUPERFICIAL CRACKS WERE NOTICED ON THE UPSET 496430 1 2 BUCKED TAILS OF THE NINE RIVETS INSTALLED ON THE V070-510466 RMLG GUIDE 496430 1 3 ASSY. THE CRACKS OBSERVED IN THE NINE RIVETS SATISFY THE CRITERIA FOR BE 496430 1 4 ING CATEGORIZED AS "SUPERFICIAL" AS DETAILED IN MPP 101M302M01. THAT IS, 496430 1 5 NONE OF THE CRACKS HAVE A VISIBLE OPENING AT THE SURFACE AND NONE OF TH 496430 1 6 EM EXTEND INTO THE CRITICAL (1.1 DIAMETER) AREA OF THE DRIVEN HEAD OF T 496430 1 7 HE RIVET. PAGE 1A OF THIS PR DOCUMENTS A LARGE NUMBER OF CRACKS IN THESE 496430 1 8 RIVETS (UP TO 7 IN ONE RIVET). RI SPEC MPP 101M302M01 AND MAO101-302 496430 1 9 ALLOW A MAXIMUM OF TWO CRACKS. THE STRUCTURE IS SECURELY FASTENED 496430 1 10 TOGETHER. THE RIVETS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE QUIDE ASSY WAS MR ID'D. 496430 1 11 THIS PR CONDITION HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. HARDWARE 496430 1 12 WITH LIKE P/N AND DIFFERENT S/N'S ARE NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE - 496430 1 13 MANUFACTURING DEFECT. 496431 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN SUPERFICIAL CRACKS WERE NOTICED 496431 PMRB 2 ON THE UPSET BUCKED TAILS OF THE NINE RIVETS INSTALLED ON THE 496431 PMRB 3 V070-510466 LMLG GUIDE ASSY. THE CRACKS OBSERVED INTHE NIN RIVETS 496431 PMRB 4 SAFTISFY THE CRITERIA FOR BEING CATEGORIZED AS "SUPERFICIAL" AS DETAINED 496431 PMRB 5 IN MPP 101M302M01. THAT IS, NONE OF THE CRACKS HAVE A VISIBLE OPENING AT 496431 PMRB 6 THE SURFACE AND NONE OF THEM EXTEND INTO THE CRITICAL (1.1 DIAMETER) 496431 PMRB 7 AREA OF THE DRIVEN HEAD OF THE RIVET. PAGE 1A OF THIS PR DOCUMENTS A 496431 PMRB 8 LARGE NUMBER OF CRACKS IN THESE RIVETS (UP TO 11" ONE RIVET). RI SPEC 496431 PMRB 9 MPP 101M302M01 AND MAO101-302 ALLOW A MAXIMUM OF TWO CRACKS. REQUEST MRB 496431 PMRB 10 CONCURRENCE TO ACCEPT THESE RIVETS AS IS. THE NINE RIVETS IN QUESTION 496431 PMRB 11 ARE ALL PART OF A SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CRACKS ALTHOUGH MANY IN 496431 PMRB 12 NUMBER, ARE EXTREMELY MINOR, AND WERE PROBABLY CREATED ON THE DAY THE 496431 PMRB 13 PART WAS INSTALLED. THE STRUCTURE IS SECURELY FASTENED TOGETHER. THIS 496431 PMRB 14 CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT THE FORM, FIT, OR FUNCTION OF THE LANDING GEAR 496431 PMRB 15 SYSTEM. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. 496431 PMRB 16 THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 496431 PMRB 17 THIS PART WILL BE MR ID'D. ASSOCICIATED HARDWARE IS SECURE AND RIVETS 496431 PMRB 18 ARE NOT LOOSE. 10/25/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR CLOSURE, CRIT 2 HARDWARE. 496431 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN SUPERFICIAL CRACKS WERE NOTICED ON THE UPSET 496431 1 2 BUCKED TAILS OF THE NINE RIVETS INSTALLED ON THE V070-510466 LMLG GUIDE 496431 1 3 ASSY. THE CRACKS OBSERVED IN THE NINE RIVETS SATISFY THE CRITERIA FOR BE 496431 1 4 ING A CATEGORIZED AS "SUPERFICIAL" AS DETAILED IN MPP 101M302M01. THAT I 496431 1 5 S, NONE OF THE CRACKS HAVE A VISIBLE OPENING AT THE SURFACE AND NONE OF 496431 1 6 THE EXTEND INTO THE CRITICAL (1.1 DIAMETER) AREA OF THE DRIVEN HEAD OF T 496431 1 7 HE RIVET (UP TO 11 IN ONE RIVET). RI SPEC MPP 101M302M01 AND MAO101-302 496431 1 8 ALLOW A MAXIMUM OF TWO CRACKS. THE RIVETS WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS. THE 496431 1 9 GUIDE ASSY WAS MR ID'D. THIS PR CONDITION HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS IS. NO 496431 1 10 RETEST REQUIRED. HARDWARE WITH LIKE P/N AND DIFFERENT S/N'S ARE NOT 496431 1 11 AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE - MANUFACTURING DEFECT. 496447 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: REQUEST MR APPROVAL TO MODIFY A V070-398522-011 PLBD 496447 PMRB 2 ENVIRONMENTAL EXPANSION JOINT SEAL ASSY INTO A -009 SEAL ASSY AND ACCEPT 496447 PMRB 3 FOR RESTRICTED INSTALLATION. SPECIFICALLY, REQUEST TO CUT 1.18" FROM ONE 496447 PMRB 4 END AND TRIM 1.21" FROM THE FOOT OF THE SAME END OF A -011 SEAL ASSY AS 496447 PMRB 5 SHOWN IN FIGURE 3-1. THESE MODIFICATIONS WILL RESULT IN AN OVERALL 496447 PMRB 6 LENGTH, OR "A" DIMENSION OF 8.68" AND "B" DIMENSION OF 2.96" AT ONE END 496447 PMRB 7 OF THE ASSY WHICH ARE THE PER PRINT -009 DIMENSIONS (REF DWG 496447 PMRB 8 V070-398522). THE RESULTING MOD'D -011 ASSY'S "C" DIMENSION WILL BE 496447 PMRB 9 2.79" WHEREAS THE PER PRINT "C" DIMENSION (-009) SHOULD BE 2.76". THE 496447 PMRB 10 DIFFERENCE IN THE "C" DIMENSIONS IS DUE TO NOT TRIMMING 0.03" FROM THE 496447 PMRB 11 OPPOSITE FOOT ("B" DIMENSION) OF THE -011 ASSY (FROM 2.93" TO 2.96"). 496447 PMRB 12 PRELIMINARY ENGINEERING EVALUATION INDICATES THAT TRIMMING THE OPPOSITE 496447 PMRB 13 FOOT 0.03" IS NOT REQUIRED FOR PROPER FIT. THESE MODIFICATIONS WILL NOT 496447 PMRB 14 ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FORM, FIT, FUNCTION, OR SAFETY OF THE SEAL ASSY'S 496447 PMRB 15 INTENDED USE AND WILL BE ACCEPTABLE FOR RESTRICTED INSTALLATION. NO MR 496447 PMRB 16 ID REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 496447 PMRB 17 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 496447 PMRB 18 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 12/20/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR RESTRICTED 496447 PMRB 19 INSTALLATION, OV-103 L/H PLBD C/L XO 758 LOCATION. 496447 1 1 ITEM 1 OF THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING JC V37-10001, PLBD PRESSURE SEAL 496447 1 2 POST FLIGHT INSPECTION, WHEN THE V070-398522-009 BULB SEAL SPLICE WAS OB 496447 1 3 SERVED TO BE CRACKED AND TOO SHORT. DURING REPAIR OPERATIONS TO REMOVE A 496447 1 4 ND REPLACE THE BULB SEAL, THE REPLACEMENT SEAL SEPARATED DURING INSTALLA 496447 1 5 TION AND WAS DOCUMENTED AS BEING DISCREPANT AS ITEM 2 ON PG 1A OF THIS P 496447 1 6 R. MR APPROVAL WAS GRANTED TO MODIFY A V070-398522-011 SEAL ASSY BY CUTT 496447 1 7 ING IT DOWN TO THE APPROX SIZE OF A -009 ASSY AS DETAILED IN THE MR RATI 496447 1 8 ONALE. THE MODIFIED -011 WAS INSTALLED AND THE DISCREPANT CONDITION NO L 496447 1 9 ONGER EXISTS. LIKE S/N'S NOT AFFECTED. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE 496447 1 10 CAUSE; NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 496472 1 1 DURING V31-13119 THE CABLE 4YT86C24 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE AT T 496472 1 2 HE BACKSHELL OF 83P74, ITEM 1 PG. 1. THE NOTED CABLE WAS VERIFIED TO HAV 496472 1 3 E NO SHIELD DAMAGE. THE CABLE WAS THEN EXTRACTED FROM CONNECTOR AND HEAT 496472 1 4 SHRINK SLEEVING INSTALLED OVER THE DAMAGED AREAS. IN ADDITION, CABLES 2Y 496472 1 5 C1151A24 AND 2YC1150A24 WERE FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE AT THE BACKSHEL 496472 1 6 L OF 83P129, ITEM 2 PG 1 AND ITEM 3 PAGE 1A. THE NOTED DAMAGED CABLES WE 496472 1 7 RE REMOVED AND NEW RESPECTIVE CABLES WERE INSTALLED FORM 83P129 TO 83P12 496472 1 8 7. HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING WAS INSTALLED AT EACH END OF CABLE FOR ADDITIONA 496472 1 9 L WIRE PROTECTION. CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOTENTIAL TESTING WERE 496472 1 10 PERFORMED ON ALL THREE CABLES TO VERIFY CABLES TERMINATION INTEGRITY. NO 496472 1 11 FURTHER ACION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. CONNECTOR RETEST WILL BE TRACKED 496472 1 12 BY SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 496473 1 1 DURING V31-13119, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLE 1C1255A20 HAD KAPTON DAMG 496473 1 2 E AT THE BACKSHELL TANG OF RECEPTACLE 83J5 AND CABLE 2C1255A20 HAD KAPTO 496473 1 3 N DAMAGE ABOUT SEVEN INCHES FROM RECEPTACLE 83J5. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAIN 496473 1 4 ED TO USE MYSTIK 7503 TO TAPE REPAIR CABLE 1C1255A20. SRP-V-EL-0007 METH 496473 1 5 OD B WAS PERFORMED TO TAPE CABLE 2C1255A20. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RETEST 496473 1 6 IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 496490 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: REQUEST RESTRICTED INSTALLATION MR APPROVAL TO INSTALL 496490 PMRB 2 V070-398558-057 (4.20") SPLICE AT THE LH PLBD SILL XO688 LOCATION 496490 PMRB 3 INSTEAD OF THE PER PRINT V070-398558-056 (3.61") SPLICE. PREVIOUS MR 496490 PMRB 4 APPROVAL GRANTED TO MANUFACTURE AND INSTALL 5.00" SPLICE AT THIS 496490 PMRB 5 LOCATION PER MR STR-3-13-3731-001. CURRENT GAP BETWEEN ADJACENT BULB 496490 PMRB 6 SEALS IS 3.00". DESIRE TO HAVE AT LEAST 0.50" OVERLAP BETWEEN 496490 PMRB 7 SPLICE/BULB SEAL AT EACH END OF THE SPLICE. THE INSTALLATION OF THE 496490 PMRB 8 LONGER MR SPLICE WILL PREVENT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SPLICE ENDS FROM 496490 PMRB 9 COMING OUT OF THE ADJACENT SEALS BY PROVIDING APPROXIMATELY 0.60" 496490 PMRB 10 OVERLAP AT BOTH SPLICE/BULB SEAL INTERFACES. THE INSTALLATION OF THE 496490 PMRB 11 LONGER SPLICE RETURNS THE BULB SEAL INSTALLATION TO AN ACCEPTABLE 496490 PMRB 12 NON-DESIGN CONDITION WHICH DOES NOT DEGRADE THE SAFETY, FORM, FIT OR 496490 PMRB 13 FUNCTION OF THE SECONDARY STRUCTURE. NO MR MARKING REQUIRED. THIS MR 496490 PMRB 14 ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT CRITICAL ITEMS LIST OR INVALIDATE BASIS FOR 496490 PMRB 15 CERTIFICATION. 12/13/94 PMRB APPROVED FOR RESTRICTED INSTALLATION, 496490 PMRB 16 OV-103, LH PLBD SILL XO688 ONLY. 496490 1 1 ITEM 1 OF THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING J/C V37-10001, PLBD PRESSURE SEAL 496490 1 2 POST FLIGHT INSPECTION, WHEN THE V070-398558-056 BULB SEAL SPLICE ASSY 496490 1 3 WAS OBSERVED TO BE PULLED APART. DURING ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF THE 496490 1 4 SPLICE ASSY, THE FEMALE END OF THE V070-398503-012 BULB SEAL ASSY WHICH 496490 1 5 IS FWD OF AND ADJACENT TO THE SPLICE ASSY WAS OBSERVED AS BEING 496490 1 6 DISCREPANT AND WAS DOCUMENTED AS ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1A OF THIS PR. 496490 1 7 RESTRICTED MR APPROVAL WAS GRANTED TO INSTALL A LONGER LENGTH 496490 1 8 V070-398558-057 (4.20") SPLICE ASSY INSTEAD OF A PER PRINT -056 (3.61") 496490 1 9 ASSY AT THE XO688 LOCATION ONLY TO IMPROVE SPLICE/BULB SEAL OVERLAP AS 496490 1 10 DETAILED IN THE MR RATIONALE. THE REMOVAL OF THE -056 ASSY AND 496490 1 11 INSTALLATION OF THE -057 ASSY WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER V5K25.001 AND THE 496490 1 12 FEMALE REPAIR OF THE BULB SEAL ASSY WAS DONE PER SRP-V-ST-0027-0. 496490 1 13 DISCREPANCIES NO LONGER EXIST. LIKE S/N'S NOT AFFECTED. NO RETEST 496490 1 14 REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR BOTH ITEMS: NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 496491 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING J/C V37-10001 WHEN THE FEMALE END OF THE V0 496491 1 2 70-398503-012 BULB SEAL WAS OBSERVED TO BE WORN/DAMAGED. THE PREVIOUS TA 496491 1 3 PE REPAIR MATERIAL WAS REMOVED AND A NEW TAPE REPAIR COMPLETED PER SRP-V 496491 1 4 -ST-0027-0. DISCREPANT CONDITION NO LONGER EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. LI 496491 1 5 KE S/N'S NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 496492 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING J/C V37-10001 WHEN THE FEMALE END OF THE V0 496492 1 2 70-398503-012 BULB SEAL WAS OBSERVED TO BE WORN/DAMAGED. THE PREVIOUS TA 496492 1 3 PE REPAIR MATERIAL WAS REMOVED AND A NEW TAPE REPAIR COMPLETED PER SRP-V 496492 1 4 -ST-0027-0. DISCREPANT CONDITION NO LONGER EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. LI 496492 1 5 KE S/N'S NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 496493 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING J/C V37-10001 WHEN THE LH PLBD SILL BULB SE 496493 1 2 AL AT THE XO 788 LOCATION WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN PULLED APART. ALTHOU 496493 1 3 GH ITEM 1 WAS DISPOSITIONED FOR REPAIR, SHOP TECHNICIANS REQUESTED QC AN 496493 1 4 D ENGINEERING VERIFICATION TO PROCEED WITH REPAIRS BASED ON THEIR VISUAL 496493 1 5 INSPECTION WHICH INDICATED THAT NO REPAIRS WERE NEEDED. QUALITY AND ENG 496493 1 6 INEERING VERIFIED THAT NO REPAIRS WERE NEEDED. QUALITY AND ENGINEERING V 496493 1 7 ERIFIED THAT NO REPAIRS WERE NEEDED AT THE LH XO 788 SILL LOCATION. SINC 496493 1 8 E FIVE BULB SEAL PR'S HAD BEEN INITIATED, IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT ITEM 1 MA 496493 1 9 Y HAVE INADVERTENLY REPAIRED UNDER A DIFFERENT PR. THEREFORE, ALL BULB 496493 1 10 SEALS/SPLICES ON THE LH PLBD WERE REINSPECTED AND THE PR WHICH 496493 1 11 DOCUMENTED IT/THEM (IF APPLICABLE) WAS/WERE NOTED. REINSPECTION RESULTS 496493 1 12 WERE NEGATIVE IN TERMS OF DETERMINING WHICH PR CORRECTED ITEM 1. SINCE 496493 1 13 NO DISCREPANCY EXISTED, REPAIR DISPOSITION WAS DELETED. NO RETEST 496493 1 14 REQUIRED. LIKE S/N'S NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 496664 1 1 THE FITTING WAS DAMAGED ON THE INNER EDGE. IT WAS BLENDED SMOOTH AND COR 496664 1 2 ROSION PROTECTED WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK 496664 1 3 TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 497095 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 3 DISCREPANCY WERE FOUND, 1 TAPE GOUGE 497095 1 2 AND 2 TAPE DEBONDS. ITEM 1 WAS A TAPE GOUGE. THE DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCE 497095 1 3 PTED AS IS. ITEMS 2 AND 3 WERE TAPE DELAMINATIONS/DEBONDS NEAR LATCH CUT 497095 1 4 OUTS. THE DISCREPANT TAPE WAS TRIMMED AND CHEMGLAZE THERMAL COATING WAS 497095 1 5 APPLIED TO THE FACE SHEET PER SRP-V-ST-0021-0-0 AT BOTH LOCATIONS. NO FU 497095 1 6 RTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT A 497095 1 7 FFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADA 497095 1 8 TION. 497099 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 7 DISCREPANCIES WERE DOCUMENTED ON THE 497099 1 2 UPPER SURFACE OF LH RADIATOR 1. ITEM 1 WAS A METEOR STRIKE WITH NO MEASU 497099 1 3 REABLE DEFECT INTO THE FACESHEET THAT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED U 497099 1 4 SE AS IS AFTER CHEMGLAZE WAS APPLIED OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA. ITEMS 2,4 497099 1 5 AND 5 WERE DISCOLORATIONS IN THE RADIATOR TAPE THAT WERE MR ACCEPTED FO 497099 1 6 R UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. ITEMS 3 AND 6 WERE BUBBLES IN THE RADIATOR WHE 497099 1 7 RE THE TAPE BECAME DELAMINATED. THE TAP WAS CUT AWAY AND THE AREA WAS CH 497099 1 8 EMGLAZED PER A SRP. ITEM 7 WAS A DEBOND THAT WAS REBONDED PER A SRP. NO 497099 1 9 FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. THESE DISCREPANCIES DO 497099 1 10 NOT EFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: FLIGHT. 497100 1 1 DURING INSPECTION JOB CARD V31-14195, TWO DISCREPANCIES WERE DOCUMENTED 497100 1 2 ON THE UPPER SURFACE OF LH RADIATOR 2. ITEM 1 WAS A DENT THAT DID NOT PE 497100 1 3 NETRATE THE FACESHEET AND WAS SMOOTH BOTTOMED THAT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR U 497100 1 4 NRESTRICTED USE AS IS. ITEM 2 WAS A METEROR STRIKE WITH A SMOOTH BOTTOME 497100 1 5 D FACESHEET THAT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS AFTER CHEMGL 497100 1 6 ZE WAS APPLIED OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. 497100 1 7 NO RETEST REQUIRED. THESE DISCREPANCIES DO NOT EFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBE 497100 1 8 RS. PROBABLE CAUSE: FLIGHT. 497101 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 2 DISCREPANCIES WERE DOCUMENTED ON THE 497101 1 2 UPPER SURFACE OF LH RADIATOR 3. ITEM 1 WAS A METEOR STRIKE WITH A SMOOTH 497101 1 3 BOTTOMED FACESHEET THAT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AFTER CHEM 497101 1 4 GLAZE WAS APPLIED OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA. ITEM 2 WAS A METEOR STRIKE W 497101 1 5 ITH NO MEASUREABLE DEFECT INTO THE FACESHEET THAT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UN 497101 1 6 RESTRICTED USE AFTER CHEMGLAZE WAS APPLIED OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA. NO 497101 1 7 FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. THESE DISCREPANCIES DO 497101 1 8 NOT EFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: FLIGHT. 497102 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 1 DISCREPANCY WAS DOCUMENTED ON THE UPP 497102 1 2 ER SURFACE OF LH RADIATOR 4. IT WAS A METEOR STRIKE WITH A SMOOTH BOTTOM 497102 1 3 ED FACESHEET THAT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS AFTER CHEMG 497102 1 4 LAZE WAS APPLIED OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIS 497102 1 5 T. NO RETEST REQUIRED. THESE DISCREPANCIES DO NOT EFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUM 497102 1 6 BERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: FLIGHT. 497104 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 11 DISCREPANCIES WERE DOCUMENTED ON THE 497104 1 2 UPPER SURFACE OF RH RADIATOR 1. ITEM 1,2 AND 3 WERE METEOR STRIKES WITH 497104 1 3 NO MEASUREABLE DEFECT INTO THE FACESHEET THAT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR 497104 1 4 UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS AFTER CHEMGLAZE WAS APPLIED OVER THE DISCREPANT 497104 1 5 AREA. ITEMS 4,6,7,10 AND 11 WERE METEOR STRIKES WITH A SMOOTH BOTTOMED 497104 1 6 FACESHEET THAT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS AFTER 497104 1 7 CHEMGLAZE WAS APPLIED OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA. ITEMS 5 AND 8 WERE 497104 1 8 DEBONDS THAT WERE TRIMMED AND CHEMGLAZED PER A SRP. ITEM 9 WAS A DEBOND 497104 1 9 THAT WAS REBONDED PER A SRP. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST 497104 1 10 REQUIRED. THESE DISCREPANCIES DO NOT EFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 497104 1 11 PROBABLE CAUSE: FLIGHT. 497105 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 1 DISCREPANCY WAS FOUND ON THE CENTERLI 497105 1 2 NE EDGE OF R/H RADIATOR 2. ITEM 1 WAS A TAPE DELAMINATION/DEBOND AT THE 497105 1 3 LATCH CUTOUT. THE DISCREPANT TAPE WAS REMOVED AND CHEMGLAZE THERMAL COAT 497105 1 4 ING WAS APPLIED TO THE FACESHEET PER SRP-V-ST-0021-0-0. NO FURTHER DISCR 497105 1 5 EPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE 497105 1 6 SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 497106 1 1 DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14195, 4 DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND ON THE UPPER 497106 1 2 SURFACE OF RH RADIATOR 3. ITEM 1 WAS ALREADY DOCUMENTED ON MEQ-3-A0069 497106 1 3 AND WILL BE ADDRESSED ON THAT PR. ITEM 2 WAS A SMOOTH BOTTOMED 497106 1 4 DENT/DEPRESSION CAUSED BY SOME OBJECT OR MICRO-METEORITE STRIKE. THE 497106 1 5 TAPE WAS REMOVED FOR EVALUATION PURPOSES. MRB CONCURRENCE WAS OBTAINED 497106 1 6 TO MR ACCEPT FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CHEMGLAZE PAINT WAS APPLIED PER SRP. 497106 1 7 ITEMS 3 AND 4 WERE AREAS OF TAPE EDGE DELAMINATION. FOR ITEMS 3 AND 4 497106 1 8 THE DELAMINATED TAPE WAS TRIMMED PAINT WAS APPLIED PER SRP. NO FURTHER 497106 1 9 DISCREPANCIES EXIST. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 497106 1 10 DEGRADATION. THESE DISCREPANCIES DO NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEMS. 497131 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN DURING A POST-FLIGHT ZONAL INSPECTION TO DOCUMENT EV 497131 1 2 IDENCE OF CORROSION ON THE FASTENERS SECURING THE L/H VENT DOOR 9 DRIVE 497131 1 3 SHAFT BEARING TO THE CHAMBER WALL. A VISUAL INSPECTION AND SAMPLING YIEL 497131 1 4 DED NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSION. SURFACE CONTAMINATION WAS NOTED AND CLEANE 497131 1 5 D WITH IPA-DAMPENED WIPES. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFE 497131 1 6 CT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NOR 497131 1 7 MAL EXPOSURE TO AMBIENT ELEMENTS. 497145 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN DURING A POST FLIGHT ZONAL INSPECTION TO DOCUMENT EV 497145 1 2 IDENCE OF CORROSION ON THE FASTENERS SECURING THE R/H VENT DOOR 8 DRIVE 497145 1 3 SHAFT BEARING TO THE CHAMBER WALL. A VISUAL INSPECTION AND SAMPLING YIEL 497145 1 4 DED NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSION. DISCOLORATION OF WASHERS WAS NOTED. NO PR 497145 1 5 CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. 497145 1 6 NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL EXPOSURE TO ELEMENTS. 497167 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE THE CABLE 2F258BB22 AND T2288S26 WERE DISCOVERED TO 497167 1 2 HAVE KAPTON AND SHIELD DAMAGE NEAR HARNESS CLAMP, ITEM 1 AND 2. IN 497167 1 3 ADDITION WHILE OBTAINING CABLE ID FOR ITEM 2 THE CABLE 2H14C26 WAS FOUND 497167 1 4 TO HAVE KAPTON AND SHIELD DAMAGE ALSO, ITEM 3 PG 1A. ALL THREE CABLES 497167 1 5 WERE REPAIRED BY TRIMMING THE DAMAGED SHIELD BRAID FLUSH TO PARENT 497167 1 6 SHIELD AND INSTALLING MYSTIK 7503 OVER THE DAMAGED AREAS. MR APPROVAL 497167 1 7 WAS REQUESTED TO PERFORM THE REPAIR SINCE REPAIRS WOULD FALL UNDERNEATH 497167 1 8 CABLE CLAMP. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RETEST IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 497167 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEMS 1, 2 AND 3 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPERATIONAL 497167 1 10 DEGRADATION. 497182 1 1 DURING V6012, WIRE S5074A22 WAS PREVIOUSLY CAP/STOWED. THE CAP HAS FALLE 497182 1 2 N OFF. THE WIRE SEGMENT WAS AGAIN CAP/STOWED PER SPEC. PROBABLE CAUSE WA 497182 1 3 S DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 497221 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS AN OUT OF TOLERANCE GAP 497221 1 2 BETWEEN THE V070-198313-001 POLYIMIDE SEAL AND THE ADJACENT PRIMARY SEAL 497221 1 3 PANEL. THE GAP WAS MEASURED TO BE 0.060 AT FULL UP. THIS IS A PREVIOUSLY 497221 1 4 EXPLAINED CONDITION THAT WITH THE ELEVONS FULL UP, A GAP OPENS UP 497221 1 5 BETWEEN THE SEAL AND PANEL. AT NULL AND ALL OTHER COMMANDED ELEVON 497221 1 6 DEFLECTIONS ENCOUNTERED DURING FLIGHT, THE GAPS ARE ACCEPTABLE. 497221 1 7 REFERENCE PR'S STR-3-19-4802 AND STR-3-A0247 FOR A HISTORY OF POLYIMIDE 497221 1 8 SEAL DYNAMICS. A MOD IS SCHEDULED TO BE RELEASED NEXT FLIGHT TO ADD 497221 1 9 STIFFER SPRINGS AT THE AFT TWO LOCATIONS WHICH WILL PREVENT THIS NON 497221 1 10 DISCREPANT CONDITION FROM RECURRING. (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1) THIS ITEM 497221 1 11 DOCUMENTS CHARRING ON THE V070-198313-001 POLYIMIDE SEAL AT THE INBOARD 497221 1 12 LOCATION AT THE -YW212 POSITION ON THE LEFT HAND INBOARD ELEVON. THIS 497221 1 13 CONDITION WAS PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED ON STR-3-19-4851 AND MR ACCEPTED AS 497221 1 14 IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE AREA OF CONCERN WAS EVALUATED BY 497221 1 15 ENGINEERING AND HAD NOT FURTHER DETERIORATED. THERE IS NO NEW 497221 1 16 DISCREPANCY. PROBABLE CAUSE IS EXPLAINED CONDITION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR 497221 1 17 ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 497240 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGES 1 AND 1A). THE B91B2216-1 WING SPAR ASSEMBLY 497240 1 2 HAD AREAS OF ACTIVE CORROSION. THE CORROSION WAS REMOVED BY MECHANICAL 497240 1 3 AND CHEMICAL MEANS. FINAL PIT MEASUREMENTS SHOWED WORST CASE PITTING AT 497240 1 4 LOCATION 21, 0.019 DEEP IN 0.08 STRUCTURE (23.75%). FIVE PITS 2, 3, 9, 1 497240 1 5 9, AND 21 HAD PITS WITH DEPTHS IN EXCESS OF 15% OF STRUCTURE THICKNESS. 497240 1 6 THE PITTING AT ALL OTHER LOCATIONS WAS FOUND TO BE SUPERFICIAL. ALL CORR 497240 1 7 OSION PRODUCTS HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND CORROSION PROTECTION HAS BEEN APPLI 497240 1 8 ED. ALL REWORKED AREAS WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUS 497240 1 9 E: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED 497261 1 1 A REEVALUATION BY QC/ENG HAS SHOWN THE ABOVE NOTED CONDITION IS WITHIN 497261 1 2 DWG TOLERANCE NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. VOID THIS PR. 497263 1 1 THE SCRATCHES ON THE V070-395210-003 CARRIER PANEL WERE EVIDENTLY CAUSED 497263 1 2 BY INTERFERENCE WITH ACCESS PANEL V070-352289-001 FASTENERS. THE SCRATC 497263 1 3 HES WERE SUPERFICIAL, (0.003", MAX DEPTH) REQUIRING ONLY LOCAL SURFACE P 497263 1 4 REP AND KOROPON APPLICATION PER MR INSTRUCTION. MR ID WAS PROVIDED. NO F 497263 1 5 URTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 497264 1 1 MEASUREMENTS TAKEN IN THE PRECEDING OPERATION SHOW THE COUNTERSINK FOR T 497264 1 2 HE DISCREPANT FASTENER TO BE 0.047" DEEPER THAN REQUIRED. HOWEVER, IN TH 497264 1 3 E 3/16" THICK PANEL, THERE IS 9/64" OF MATERIAL REMAINING BENEATH THE FA 497264 1 4 STENER HEAD. THERE IS NO DEFORMATION IN THIS AREA TO INDICATE THAT PULL- 497264 1 5 THROUGH IS IMMINENT. CHIPPING AND DETERIORATION NOTED IN 1-2 ARE COSMETI 497264 1 6 C IN NATURE AND NOT A STRUCTURAL CONCERN. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF THE DE 497264 1 7 PTH AND CONDITION OF THE CAPTIVE FASTENER COUNTERSINK SHOWS NO JUSTIFICA 497264 1 8 TION FOR REWORK AT THIS TIME AND THE FASTENER INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTED A 497264 1 9 S-IS. MR ID HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO DOCUMENT THE PRESENT CONDITION. PROBABL 497264 1 10 E CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 497318 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1): THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS POSSIBLE ACTIVE CORROSION ON 497318 1 2 THE R/H WING SPAR. ALL ACTIVE CORROSION WAS REMOVED AND THE PITS WERE 497318 1 3 ACCEPTED AS REWORKED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS 497318 1 4 ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1): THE SPAR FITTING NUT 497318 1 5 PLATES WERE FOUND TO HAVE AN EXTREMELY LIGHT COAT OF KOROPON ON THE 497318 1 6 RIVET TAILS. KOROPON WAS APPLIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AFTER 497318 1 7 VISUAL INSPECTION VERIFIED NO CORROSION ON RIVETS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 497318 1 8 THIS ITEM IS WORKMANSHIP (IMPROPER CORROSION PROTECTION APPLICATION). 497318 1 9 (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1A): WHILE BONDING A COINING SCREEN OVER AN AREA 497318 1 10 WHERE CORROSION WAS REWORKED, THE POST FILLING RESISTANCE CHECK WAS 497318 1 11 FAILED. THE RESISTANCE WAS MEASURED AS 6 MILLIOHM AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 497318 1 12 LESS THAN 1 MILLIOHM. THE COINING SCREEN WAS ULTIMATELY REMOVED AFTER 497318 1 13 ADDITIONAL SANDING FAILED TO YIELD ACCEPTABLE READINGS. THE COINING 497318 1 14 SCREEN WAS REAPPLIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS WITH NO ANOMALIES. 497318 1 15 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR 497318 1 16 ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 497319 1 1 ITEM 1 (ON PG 1): THE COINING PADS ON WING SPAR 21 ASSY HAD AREAS OF SUS 497319 1 2 PECT CORROSION. INSPECTION SHOWED THAT ONLY TWO LOCATIONS HAD ACTIVE COR 497319 1 3 ROSION. THE CORROSION WAS REMOVED BY CHEMICAL MEANS FOR LOCATION ONE AND 497319 1 4 MECHANICAL MEANS FOR LOCATION TWO. ALL CORROSION PRODUCTS WERE REMOVED 497319 1 5 AND CORROSION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED. ALL REWORKED AREAS WERE MR ACCEPTE 497319 1 6 D FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ALL THE INSPECTED AREAS WITHOUT CORROSION WERE R 497319 1 7 E-CORROSION PROTECTED. THE COINING SCREENS WERE REINSTALLED. THE PROBABL 497319 1 8 E CAUSE FOR THE DISCREPANCY IS ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. ITEM 2 (ON PG 1): R 497319 1 9 IVETS ON BACKSIDE OF COINING PADS WERE NOT TOP COATED AND SHOWED SIGNS 497319 1 10 OF POSSIBLE ACTIVE CORROSION. INSPECTION DETERMINED THAT NO CORROSION 497319 1 11 EXITED. THE RIVETS WERE CORROSION PROTECTED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE 497319 1 12 DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 3 (ON PG 1A): WHILE WORKING STEP 2-2 497319 1 13 (REMOVING NUTPLATE AT LOCATION 1), CORROSION WAS FOUND UNDER THE 497319 1 14 NUTPLATE AND RIVETS. THE CORROSION WAS REMOVED BY CHEMICAL MEANS. 497319 1 15 ADHESIVE WAS USED TO FILL PITS UNDER THE NUTPLATE TO PREVENT MOISTURE 497319 1 16 ENTRAPMENT. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DISCREPANCY IS ENVIRONMENTAL 497319 1 17 DAMAGE. ITEM 4 (ON PG 1B): AFTER CLEANING LOCATION 1, PITTING FROM 497319 1 18 CORROSION WAS EVIDENT IN THE BOLT HOLE. PER MR DISO, THE BOLT HOLE WAS 497319 1 19 REAMED AND A FABRICATED BUSHING WAS INSTALLED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 497319 1 20 THE DISCREPANCY IS ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. (REF UPR FWD HOLE 21AA, 497319 1 21 XW1318.15, ZW113.41). ITEM 5 (ON PG 1C): DURING STEP 3-35 (SANDING OF 497319 1 22 CURED ADHESIVE USED TO FILL PITS AT LOCATION ONE) THE MBO120-008 497319 1 23 ADHESIVE WAS CHIPPED. THE CHIPPED ADHESIVE WAS SANDED TO OBTAIN SMOOTH, 497319 1 24 ROUNDED EDGES. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. NO 497319 1 25 FURTHER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 497321 1 1 CHIPPED PAINT AND A DENT WAS FOUND ON A 70B2000-050 STRUT. THE .0068 DP 497321 1 2 DENT (ITEM 1) WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS, AND THE CHIPPED PAINT (ITEM 2) WAS 497321 1 3 TOUCHED UP WITH KORPON. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 497442 1 1 ITEM 1-THE CORROSION PITS WERE BLENDED OUT WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTR 497442 1 2 ICTED USE. THE AREA WAS CHEM FILMED AND LEFT BARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH MLO 497442 1 3 601-9024 PROCESS 200 NOTES ON PAGE 155. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL. I 497442 1 4 TEM 2-THE PLATE IS MECHANICALLY FASTENED TO THE TUBE, NOT BONDED. THE GA 497442 1 5 P BETWEEN THE PLATE AND THE TUBE IS ACCEPTABLE PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE 497442 1 6 : NO DISCREPANCY. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 497687 1 1 RING, P/N V070-198704-010, WAS FOUND TO BE DAMAGED BEYOND ALLOWABLE REPA 497687 1 2 IR. A REPLACEMENT RING WAS OBTAINED AND WILL BE INSTALLED ONTO R/H FLIPP 497687 1 3 ER DOOR 2. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 497688 1 1 TRAILING EDGE SEAL, P/N V070-198702-024, WAS FOUND TO BE DAMAGED BEYOND 497688 1 2 ALLOWABLE REPAIR. A REPLACEMENT SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND WILL BE INSTALLED 497688 1 3 ONTO RH FLIPPER DOOR 2. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 497751 1 1 REF; ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THIS PR DOCUMENTS A DISCREPANT NUTPLATE ONTHE R/ 497751 1 2 H SPAR FITTING 20. THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED A NEW NUTPLATE IN 497751 1 3 STALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTH 497751 1 4 ER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 497754 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: 1A) REQUESTED ACTION: MR ACCEPT AS IS - RESTRICTED 497754 PMRB 2 LIFE. 1B) TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION: WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL, P/N 497754 PMRB 3 V070-198153-003, HAS SMALL CREASES ON THE INBOARD EDGE. THE CREASES ARE 497754 PMRB 4 FROM THE SEAL BEING BENT TO ACCOMODATE THE RAISING OF THE FLIPPER DOORS. 497754 PMRB 5 THIS CONDITION HAS BEEN OBSERVED ON OTHER ORBITERS AND HAS PREVIOUSLY 497754 PMRB 6 FLOWN ON A RESTRICTED BASIS (REF: STR-4-A0044). DURING THE PREVIOUS 497754 PMRB 7 RESTRICTED FLIGHTS, THERE WAS NO CONTINUING DEGRADATION OF THE SEALS. 497754 PMRB 8 THE INSTALLED SEAL WILL BE FLOWN IN THE AS-IS CONDITION AND EVALUATED 497754 PMRB 9 AFTER EACH FLIGHT BY ENGINEERING TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF THE SEAL FOR 497754 PMRB 10 THE UPCOMING FLIGHT. THE SEAL SERVES AS AN AEROTHERMAL SEAL TO KEEP HOT 497754 PMRB 11 GASES OUT OF THE UPPER ELEVON COVE AREA. THE CREASES WILL NOT KEEP THE 497754 PMRB 12 SEAL FROM PERFORMING AS DESIGNED. THE SEAL IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. IT 497754 PMRB 13 WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF 497754 PMRB 14 SAFETY. THIS MR DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFETY, FIT, FORM OR FUNCTION OF THE 497754 PMRB 15 SEAL SURROUNDING AREA. MR IDENTIFICATION REQUIRED. 1C) STATEMENT OF 497754 PMRB 16 COMPROMISE: THIS MR ACTION IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE ON OV-103 497754 PMRB 17 FLIGHT 20. 2) "CIL" STATEMENT: THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE 497754 PMRB 18 CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 3) 497754 PMRB 19 "CERTIFICATION" STATEMENT: THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS 497754 PMRB 20 FOR CERTIFICATION. 12/06/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF 497754 PMRB 21 OV-103, PMRB CHRM/ENG REVIEW FOR FUTURE FLTS. 497754 PMRB 22 031695, PMRB CHRM APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. PMRB 497754 PMRB 23 CHRM/ENG REVIEW FOR FUTURE FLTS. 497754 PMRB 24 01/09/97 PMRB CHRM APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 23 OF OV-103. 497754 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1: THE V070-198153-003 WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL UNDER 497754 1 2 FLIPPER DOOR NUMBER 1 WAS FOUND BENT. THE SEAL COULD NOT BE REMOVED AND 497754 1 3 WAS DEFERRED AND REEVALUATED (WITH NO ADDITIONAL DAMAGE FOUND) AFTER (FL 497754 1 4 IGHTS 20,21,22). FLIPPER DOOR NUMBER 1 WAS OPENED POST FLIGHT 22. SEAL A 497754 1 5 ND HARDWARE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER DRAWING. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERAT 497754 1 6 IONAL DEGRADATION. 497755 1 1 TRAILING EDGE SEAL, P/N V070-198702-025, WAS FOUND TO BE DAMAGED. A REPL 497755 1 2 ACEMENT SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND WILL BE INSTALLED ONTO THE R/H FLIPPER DOO 497755 1 3 R 7. THE DAMAGED SEAL WAS SENT TO THE HDA/MSC FOR REPAIR. PROBABLE CAUSE 497755 1 4 : OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 497765 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1: THE BLADE SEAL ATTACHED TO FLIPPER DOOR 1 CONTACTS A FASTEN 497765 1 2 ER HEAD WHEN THE FLIPPER DOOR IS RAISED FOR INSPECTIONS DURING PROCESSIN 497765 1 3 G. AT ELEVON POSITIONS HIGHER THEN NULL, THIS INTERFERENCE PREVENTS THE 497765 1 4 DOOR FROM BEING RAISED HIGH ENOUGH TO ALLOW THE PUSH ROD TO ROTATE AROUN 497765 1 5 D FOR STOWAGE. DEVIATIONS TO THE JOB CARDS WERE WRITTEN TO PROVIDE FOR T 497765 1 6 HIS CONDITION DURING FLIPPER DOOR OPENING AND CLOSING. V80-96001 02/02 V 497765 1 7 80-96009 02/02. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILDUP. ITEM 2 PG 1A: NAS1578 497765 1 8 C3T11 BOLT FOR INSTALLATION OF V070-198157-002 SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE TOO 497765 1 9 LONG. AN EOTF WAS OBTAINED TO ADD 1 NAS620C416L WASHER AND CHANGE BOLT 497765 1 10 TO NAS1587T6. PROBABLE CAUSE IS DESIGN DEFICIENCY. WHILE INSTALLING THE 497765 1 11 SHORTER BOLT A SLIGHT INTERFERENCE WITH THE B91B12186-16 CLIP WAS NOTED. 497765 1 12 THE CLIP WAS TRIMMED WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. UPON 497765 1 13 VERIFICATION THAT RELEASED EO REFLECTS ENG DISPO. CLOSE THIS PR. 497842 1 1 ACTIVE CORROSION WAS FOUND ON RIGHT HAND OMS DECK ABOVE AMMONIA TANK. TH 497842 1 2 E CORROSION WAS CLEANED UP AND 1 PIT WAS FOUND. THE PIT WAS BURNISHED OU 497842 1 3 T AND AREA CORROSION PROTECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. 497869 1 1 THE DAMAGE ON THE RAMP WAS SMOOTHED OUT TO LIMIT THE FRICTION IN THE BLA 497869 1 2 DE. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WOR 497869 1 3 K TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 497908 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DUE TO OPENING OF ET DOORS TO 90 DEGREES WITHOUT 497908 1 2 QC VERIFICATION ON THE WALKDOWN. THE WALKDOWN HAD BEEN PERFORMED BY SHOP 497908 1 3 OR ENGINEERING. (SHOP HAD NOT SIGNED UP FOR QUALITY ON THE CALL SHEET). 497908 1 4 THE ENGINEER GOT CONCURRENCE FROM THE TECHNICIAN SUPPORTING THE JOB THAT 497908 1 5 THEY WERE READY FOR THE CYCLE TO BEGIN, HOWEVER, CONCURRENCE WAS NOT 497908 1 6 GIVEN BY ANY QC. (QC IS NOT REQUIRED ON THE CYCLES, ONLY ON THE 497908 1 7 WALKDOWN). WHEN BUYING THE PAPER, TECHNICIAN AND ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED 497908 1 8 THAT A QC VERIFICATION WAS BYPASSED AND NOTIFIED QC PERSONNAL AT ONCE. 497908 1 9 THIS PR WAS THEN INITIATED AND WAIVER ORB-008-94 WAS PROCESSED TO 497908 1 10 DOCUMENT AND APPROVE THE MISSED DIP DURING THE OPERATION. THERE IS NO 497908 1 11 HARDWARE CONCERN. NO RETEST REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT 497908 1 12 LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 497909 1 1 BRACKET, P/N V070-857348-001, WAS FOUND TO HAVE CIRCULAR INDENTIONS ALON 497909 1 2 G THE OUTBOARD EDGES. DAMAGE WAS FOUND TO BE A RESULT OF THE SA04-07050- 497909 1 3 01 ENTRANCE DEBRIS COVER RUBBING AGAINST THE BRACKET DURING INSTALLATION 497909 1 4 . GSE PR SA-19-2-0002 WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT THE PROBLEM (COPY ATTACHED 497909 1 5 ). ALL WORK TO THE COVER WILL BE ADDRESSED ON THE GSE PR. MR APPROVAL WA 497909 1 6 S OBTAINED TO ACCEPT THE V070-857348-001 BRACKET IN THE AS-IS CONDITION 497909 1 7 ON AN UNRESTRICTED BASIS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABL 497909 1 8 E CAUSE: DESIGN DIFICIENCY OF COVER. 497944 1 1 THE FRCS ATTACH POINT 16 HAS GALLING AND THREAD MARKS ON THE INSIDE OF I 497944 1 2 T'S BUSHING (ITEM 1). THESE DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPT 497944 1 3 ED ON STR-3-18-4687. THE BARREL NUT WAS FOUND TO BE MISALIGNED AND FROZE 497944 1 4 N (ITEM 2). AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO REPLACE THIS NUT BUT AN AREA OF RAISE 497944 1 5 D METAL PREVENTED THE BARREL NUT REMOVAL (ITEM 3). THE RAISED METAL WAS 497944 1 6 REMOVED BY SANDING PER MR DISPOSITION. WHILE INSTALLING A BARREL NUT A S 497944 1 7 MALL BEAD OF RTV HAD REDUCED THE DIA OF THE HOLE (ITEM 4). THE RTV WAS R 497944 1 8 EMOVED AND THE BARREL NUT WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERA 497944 1 9 TIONAL DEGRADATION. 497949 1 1 DURING A SURVEILLANCE, WIRE T1885A26 WAS FOUND TO HAVE KAPTON DAMAGE. SR 497949 1 2 P V-EL-0007 METHOD B WAS USED TO TAPE THE DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503. 497949 1 3 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND 497949 1 4 TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 497992 1 1 DURING TPS OEL-3-20-069 (REACTIVATION OF MADS ACOUSTICS) IT WAS FOUND TH 497992 1 2 ERE WAS INSUFFICIENT PIGTAIL BRAID TO TERMINATE STOWED WIRES DF817A24, D 497992 1 3 F818A24, DF863AA24 AND DF870A24 (REFERENCE ITEMS 1 THRU 4 OF THE PR) IN 497992 1 4 SUPPORT OF OEL-3-20-069. WIRES DF817A24, DF818A24, DF863A24, DF863AA24 A 497992 1 5 ND DF870A24 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW SECTIONS OF WIRE THAT WOU 497992 1 6 LD ALLOW TERMINATION PER OEL-3-20-069. DURING THE INSTALLATION OF HEAT S 497992 1 7 HRINK SLEEVING FOR DESIGN SPLICE 45SP2304 THE HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING TORE 497992 1 8 (REFERENCE ITEM 5). DUE TO THE DAMAGE TO 45SP2304 BOTH DESIGN SPLICES 497992 1 9 45SP2303 AND 45SP2304 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW DESIGN SPLICES 497992 1 10 45SP2303 AND 45SP2304. THE RETEST OF CONNECTORS 50P669, 50P670, 50P732, 497992 1 11 50P742 WILL BE SCAN TRACKED PER THE SCAN LOG NUMBERS RECORDED ON STEPS 497992 1 12 1-15, 1-23, 1-43 AND 1-54. RETEST OF DESIGN SPLICES 45SP2303 AND 497992 1 13 45SP2304 WILL BE PERFORMED BY THE RETEST OF TPS OEL-3-20-069. CONNECTORS 497992 1 14 45P530, 45P555 AND 45P556 WERE DEMATED PER OEL-3-20-069 AND WILL BE 497992 1 15 REMATED PER THE TPS. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. THE PROBABLE 497992 1 16 CAUSE FOR ITEMS 1 THRU 4 WERE DESIGN DEFICIENCY. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 497992 1 17 5 WAS WORKMANSHIP. 498022 1 1 THE HARDWARE IN THE V070-352244-001 FITTING CONSISTS OF (1) V070-352891- 498022 1 2 002 PIN AND (1) NAS1006-36A BOLT AS WELL AS OTHER WASHERS, NUTS, AND COT 498022 1 3 TER PINS. ALL OF THE HARDWARE IS INCONEL OR STAINLESS STEEL AND DOES NOT 498022 1 4 SHOW CORROSION IN THIS WAY. THE DISCOLORATION IS CAUSED BY DEPOSITS ON 498022 1 5 THE SURFACE OF THE PARTS. THESE DEPOSITS DO NOT AFFECT THE PARTS IN ANY 498022 1 6 WAY AND ARE ACCEPTABLE PER MF0004-092. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THI 498022 1 7 S PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - NO DISCREPANCY. 498072 1 1 DURING V31-14152 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLE 3M327C20 HAD CRACKED KAPTO 498072 1 2 N APPROXIMATELY 2 INCHES FROM 40P9584. WITH MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED 498072 1 3 USE, CABLE 3M327C20 WAS REPAIRED WITH MYSTIC 7503 TEFLON TAPE. PROBABLE 498072 1 4 CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO FURTHER DISPO OR RETEST REQUIRED. 498072 1 5 THIS REPAIR RETURNS CABLE TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT NON-DESIGN CONDITION THA 498072 1 6 T DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE 498072 1 7 OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. 498077 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHILE PERFORMING J/C V31-10001, PLBD BUBL SEAL INS 498077 1 2 PECTION. AT THE XO1307 LOCATION, THE V070-398558-050 SPLICE WAS DEBONDED 498077 1 3 FROM ITS FOOT AND THE ADJOINING V070-398507-007 BULB SEAL HAD A WORN/FA 498077 1 4 ULTY TAPE REPAIR OF THE FEMALE END. THE SPLICE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED 498077 1 5 AND A NEW TAPE REPAIR OF THE BULB SEAL'S FEMALE END WAS MADE. DISCREPANT 498077 1 6 CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. LIKE S/N'S NOT AFFECTED 498077 1 7 . PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 498128 1 1 DURING INSTALLATION OF THE HOLE COVER BOLT AT XO -892.5 INTERFERENCE WAS 498128 1 2 ENCOUNTERED AND THE BOLT AND BUSHING WERE EVENTUALLY SIEZED TOGETHER. A 498128 1 3 NEW BOLT AND BUSHING WERE OBTAINED AND INSTALLED RETURNING THIS ASSEMBL 498128 1 4 Y TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. OLD B 498128 1 5 USHING WAS SCRAPPED LOCALLY. 498183 1 1 THE NUT PLATE WAS DISCREPANT. IT WAS REMOVED AND A REPLACEMENT WAS REINS 498183 1 2 TALLED WITH BLIND RIVETS PER SRP. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 498183 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 498243 1 1 DURING V30-15327 IT WAS DETECTED THAT WIRE 4F247B22 HAD BROKEN SHIELD JA 498243 1 2 CKET INSTALLATION EXPOSING THE SHIELD. INSPECTION REVEALED NO DAMAGE TO 498243 1 3 THE SHIELD. THE DISCREPANT AREA WAS WRAPPED WITH MYSTIK 7503 ELECTRICAL 498243 1 4 TAPE WITH MR CONCURRENCE. THERE IS NO RETEST REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. THE P 498243 1 5 ROBABLE FOR THIS PR WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 498244 1 1 EXAMINATION OF THE ME112-0013-1005 HI-LOK FASTENERS IN THE VICINITY OF T 498244 1 2 HE DISCREPANT FASTENER CONFIRMED THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER LOOSE HI-LOKS. 498244 1 3 NEITHER WAS THERE ANY STRUCTURAL DAMAGE IN THE AREA. THEREFORE, THE CAU 498244 1 4 SE CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO FLIGHT DAMAGE OR TO ATTRITION, NOR TO OPERATI 498244 1 5 ONAL OR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. EXAMINATION OF THE DISCREPANT ME112-0013-1 498244 1 6 005 HI-LOK NUT TO REACH SHEARING TORQUE PRIOR TO BOTTOMING-OUT. SINCE TH 498244 1 7 ERE WAS NO BINDING FIT (THE FASTENER COULD BE ROTATED BY HAND) AND THE N 498244 1 8 EW HI-LOK INSTALLATION WAS ROUTINE, FAILURE TO SEAT MUST HAVE BEEN DUE T 498244 1 9 O A DEFECTIVE HI-LOK NUT. THE DEFECTIVE HI-LOK HAS BEEN SCRAPPED AND A 498244 1 10 NEW ONE INSTALLED CORRECTLY IN ITS PLACE. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING 498244 1 11 REMAINS. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. 498350 1 1 THREADS WERE NOT VISIBLE THROUGH V082-544893 BRACE WITNESS HOLES ON MPM 498350 1 2 SHOULDER BASE ASSEMBLY. THE V082-544878 SLEEVES ARE ENGAGED 0.54" (11 TH 498350 1 3 READS) WHICH IS 1 THREAD SHORT OF WITNESS HOLE. THIS CONDITION WAS MR AC 498350 1 4 CEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. MR ID WAS APPLIED. NO RETEST REQUIRED 498350 1 5 . LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INITIAL RIGGING. 498441 1 1 THE DISCREPANT MD128-0002-0203 FASTENER HAS BEEN REMOVED AND A NEW ONE I 498441 1 2 NSTALLED PER MA0101-302, INSTALLED PER MA0101-302, INSTALLATION OF CONVE 498441 1 3 NTIONAL RIVETS AND BLIND FASTENERS. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. 498441 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP ON THE PART OF THE MANUFACTURER. 498472 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGES 1 AND 1A) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS POSSIBLE ACTIV 498472 1 2 E CORROSION ON THE R/H WING SPAR. ALL ACTIVE CORROSION WAS REMOVED AND T 498472 1 3 HE PITS WERE ACCEPTED AS REWORKED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE F 498472 1 4 OR THIS PR IS ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1B) WHILE BONDIN 498472 1 5 G A COINING SCREEN OVER AN AREA WHERE CORROSION WAS REWORKED, THE POST F 498472 1 6 ILLING RESISTANCE CHECK WAS FAILED. THE RESISTANCE WAS MEASURED AS 6 MIL 498472 1 7 LIOHM AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN LESS THAN 1 MILLIOHM. THE COINING SCREEN WAS 498472 1 8 ULTIMATELY REMOVED AFTER ADDITIONAL SANDING FAILED TO YEILD ACCEPTABLE 498472 1 9 READINGS. THE COINING SCREEN WAS REAPPLIED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENT 498472 1 10 S WITH NO ANOMALIES. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS WORKMANSHIP. NO 498472 1 11 FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 498480 1 1 (REF: ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1): THE V070-198417-004 RAMP ASSEMBLY ON THE RH OUT 498480 1 2 BOARD ELEVON WAS FOUND TO HAVE ITS SILVER PLATING WORN OFF. THE AREA WHE 498480 1 3 RE THE PLATING WAS MISSING IS APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT OF THE EXPOSED SU 498480 1 4 RFACE. THE RAMP ASSEMBLY WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PRO 498480 1 5 BABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR E 498480 1 6 NGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 498481 1 1 (REF: ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1): THE V070-198417-003 RAMP ASSEMBLY ON THE OUTBOA 498481 1 2 RD ELEVON WAS FOUND TO HAVE ITS SILVER PLATING WORN OFF. THE AREA WHERE 498481 1 3 THE PLATING WAS MISSING IS APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT OF THE EXPOSED SURFA 498481 1 4 CE. THE RAMP ASSEMBLY WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBAB 498481 1 5 LE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGI 498481 1 6 NEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 498550 1 1 THE METAL/GLASS-FLOURIDE PLASMA SPRAYED COATING IS APPLIED TO THESE SURF 498550 1 2 ACES PER V070-198483 EO A09 FLAG NOTE 1. VOIDS OF THE SIZE NOTED ON PAGE 498550 1 3 1 ARE ACCEPTABLE PER THIS NOTE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 498550 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE - NO DISCREPANCY. 498565 PMRB 1 MR/DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THE L/H V070-302017-001 VERTICAL TAIL FWD ATTACH 498565 PMRB 2 BOLTS NEGATIVE SOURCE LEAD BROKE DURING TROUBLESHOOTING OF ERRONEOUS 498565 PMRB 3 DATA. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS A BREAK IN THE WIRE AT THE 498565 PMRB 4 SURFACE OF THE EPOXY FILLER IN THE HEAD OF THE BOLT. ALTHOUGH NOT 498565 PMRB 5 VERIFIABLE, TREND ANALYSIS FOR THE PAST FOUR FLIGHTS SUGGESTS THE 498565 PMRB 6 CURRENT PRELOAD ON THE BOLT IS 51,500 POUNDS. THIS IS ACCEPTABLE PER 498565 PMRB 7 DRAWING REQUIREMENTS (49,000 +/- 3,000 POUNDS). EXCEPTION EK03183R1 IS 498565 PMRB 8 BEING PROCESSED TO ADDRESS THIS DISCREPANCY. THE BROKEN LEAD DOES NOT 498565 PMRB 9 AFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE BOLT. THE BOLT WILL CONTINUE TO 498565 PMRB 10 FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. DURING 498565 PMRB 11 OMDP-2 (AFTER FLT 21) THE BOLT IS SCHEDULED TO BE CHANGED OUT WITH A 498565 PMRB 12 SOLID BOLT TO ALLOW ULTRASONIC DETERMINATION OF PRELOAD. MR ACTION FOR 498565 PMRB 13 RESTRICTED LIFE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 498565 PMRB 14 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 498565 PMRB 15 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 12/13/94 PMRB APPROVED 498565 PMRB 16 FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF OV-103. APPROVED EXCEPTION EK03183R1. 498565 PMRB 17 03/10/95 PMRB CHRM APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. APPROVED 498565 PMRB 18 EXCEPTION EK03183R1. 498565 1 1 THE VERTICAL BOLT HAS BEEN REMOVED AND REPLACED PER MCR 17792 AND VK70-2 498565 1 2 65003-001 AND TPS STR-3-J2-636. THE BOLT WAS INSTALLED WET AFTER SOAKING 498565 1 3 IN LIQUID NITROGEN FOR 30 MINUTES AND TORQUED TILL THE PRELOAD WAS 4900 498565 1 4 0 +/- 8000 LBS, LOADS WERE VERIFIED AFTER 24 HOURS. (SEE TPS STR-3-J2-63 498565 1 5 6 FOR COMPLETE DOCUMENTATION). THE BOLTS AS INSTALLED PER THE MCR17792 R 498565 1 6 ETURNS THE BOLTS ASSY TO ITS ORIGINAL INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS. THE STR 498565 1 7 UCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED, DESIGN FIT AND FUNCTION NOT AFFECTED. P 498565 1 8 ROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN IMPROVEMENT. 498803 1 1 THE CORROSION ON THE RH ET DOOR IS BEING ADDRESSED ON STR-3-A0228. THE I 498803 1 2 TEM ON THIS PR WILL BE TRANSFERRED AND ADDRESSED ON THAT PR. PROBABLE CA 498803 1 3 USE: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. 498804 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2 - THE CORROSION WAS CLEANED UP USING MECHANICAL METHODS WI 498804 1 2 TH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED. 498804 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE - ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION. ITEMS 3 AND 4 - ALL BUT ONE 498804 1 4 RIVET WERE ACCEPTABLE PER SPEC. THE DISCREPANT RIVET WAS RETURNED TO WIT 498804 1 5 HIN SPEC. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - VENDOR 498960 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED BY NASA QC TO DOCUMENT A R/H ET DOOR STOP BOLT WIT 498960 1 2 H INSUFFICIENT THREAD ENGAGEMENT IN IT'S NUTPLATE. THE DISCREPANT STOP B 498960 1 3 OLT (V070-351601-004) REPLACED WITH THE NEXT SIZE LONGER STOP BOLT (-005 498960 1 4 ), WHICH RETURNS IT TO A PER PRINT CONDITION. SHIMS UNDER THE HEAD OF TH 498960 1 5 E STOP BOLT WERE ADJUSTED TO MAINTAIN THE ORIGINAL RIGGING OF THE R/H ET 498960 1 6 DOOR. ET DOOR CLOSURES WITH MOLD IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN TO CONFIRM PROP 498960 1 7 ER RIGGING. THE NEW V070-351601-005 ET DOOR STOP BOLT NOW PROTRUDES THRO 498960 1 8 UGH IT'S NUT PLATE LOCKING FEATURE BY ONE FULL THREAD. TPS ENGINEERING 498960 1 9 HAS INSPECTED HARDWARE CHANGES AND SIGNED OFF AS NOT REQUIRING ANY 498960 1 10 RETEST FOR TPS REQUIREMENTS. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT 498960 1 11 AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. NO ADDITIONAL RETEST REQUIRED. 498960 1 12 PROBABLE CAUSE: PROPER STOP BOLT THREAD PROTRUSION NOT VERIFIED DURING 498960 1 13 ORIGINAL INSTALLATION/RIGGING. 499423 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE CABLES TERMINATED AT 50V7 499423 1 2 7W106J486 HAD EXCESSIVE SHIELD SHOWING WITH SHIELD DAMAGE (ITEM 1). THE 499423 1 3 CABLES WERE CUT BEYOND THE DAMAGED AREA AND RETERMINATED TO 50J486. WHIL 499423 1 4 E WORKING THIS PR IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE LOCKING TEETH WERE SHEARED 499423 1 5 OFF ON RECEPTACLE 50J486 (ITEM 2). THE RECEPTACLE WAS REMOVED AND A NEW 499423 1 6 RECEPTACLE INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ITEM 1 AND 2 IS WORKMANSHIP. TH 499423 1 7 IS RETURNS ASSEMBLY TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 499423 1 8 RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. 499479 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE FIVE OF THE SIXE CABLES ASSOCIATED WITH CONNECTOR 50 499479 1 2 P9698 WERE FOUND TO HAVE MULTIPLE KAPTON DAMAGES WITH NO SHIELD DAMAGE. 499479 1 3 ENGINEERING EVALUATION DETERMINED THAT ALL SIX CABLES TERMINATED INTO CO 499479 1 4 NNECTOR WOULD BE MORE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED IF HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING WAS I 499479 1 5 NSTALLED ON EACH CABLE. THE CABLES DF205A24, DF204A24, DF203A24, DF202A2 499479 1 6 4, DF201A24 AND DF100A24 WERE EXTRACTED FROM 50P9898 AND HEAT SHRINK SLE 499479 1 7 EVING WAS INSTALLED. THE CONNECTOR WAS PREVIOUSLY DEMATED WHEN ENGINE 3 499479 1 8 WAS REMOVED. THE CONNECTOR WILL BE REMATED ONCE THE ENGINE IS RE-INSTALL 499479 1 9 ED. RETEST WILL THEN BE TRACKED PER SCAN. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED 499479 1 10 ON THIS PR. 499732 1 1 THE DISCREPANT BOLT WAS SENT TO THE HDA ON AN LRU PR FOR SCRAP. A NEW ON 499732 1 2 E WAS OBTAINED AND WILL BE INSTALLED PER V5011.001. NO FURTHER WORK TO B 499732 1 3 E DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 499735 1 1 THE DISCREPANT LOCKING COLLAR WAS SENT TO THE HDA ON AN LRU PR FOR SCRAP 499735 1 2 . A NEW ONE WAS OBTAINED AND WILL BE INSTALLED PER V5011.001. NO FURTHER 499735 1 3 WORK TO BE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 499736 1 1 THE DAMAGE WAS ON THE FACE OF THE HEAD ONLY. IT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRE 499736 1 2 STRICTED USE AS IS. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUS 499736 1 3 E: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 499996 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLES YC2538A24 AND 499996 1 2 YC2042A24 HAD SPLIT KAPTON AND CABLE YC2041A24 HAD SPLIT KAPTON AND 499996 1 3 SHIELD DAMAGE AT CONNECTOR 30P227 (ITEM 1 AND 4). CABLES WERE REPAIRED 499996 1 4 BY TRIMMING ANY BROKEN SHIELD STRANDS AND INSTALLING HEAT SHRINKABLE 499996 1 5 TUBING OVER THE DAMAGED AREAS. A CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT CHECK 499996 1 6 WAS PERFORMED AND SUCCESSFUL. IT WAS ALSO DISCOVERED THAT CABLE 499996 1 7 YC2039B24 HAD KAPTON AND SHIELD DAMAGE AT SEVERAL LOCATIONS AT CONNECTOR 499996 1 8 30P8 (ITEM 2 AND 5). CABLE WAS REPAIRED BY TRIMMING ANY BROKEN SHIELD 499996 1 9 STRANDS AND INSTALLING HEAT SHRINKABLE TUBING OVER THE DAMAGED AREAS. A 499996 1 10 CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND HIPOT CHECK WAS PERFORMED AND SUCCESSFUL. 499996 1 11 CABLES YC196A24, YC157A24, YC277A24, YC146A24, YC1449A24, YC160A24 AND 499996 1 12 YC172A24 WERE ALSO FOUND TO HAVE SPLIT KAPTON AT CONNECTOR 30P6 (ITEM 3 499996 1 13 AND 6). WITH MR APPROVAL THE CABLES WERE REPAIRED BY WRAPPING THE 499996 1 14 DAMAGED AREAS WITH MYSTIC 7503 TEFLON TAPE. PROBABLE CAUSE (ITEMS 1 THRU 499996 1 15 6): NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER 499996 1 16 SCAN TRACK. 500042 1 1 DURING SURV IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CABLES T2381A24, T2382A24, DF2062A24, 500042 1 2 DF2068A24, DF2061A24, T1879A26, T1880A26, T1877A26 AND T1878A26 HAD SPL 500042 1 3 IT KAPTON WITH NO SHIELD DAMAGE. THE CABLES WERE REPAIRED BY WRAPPING TH 500042 1 4 E DAMAGED AREAS WITH MYSTIC 7503 TEFLON TAPE. CONVOLUTED TUBING WAS ALSO 500042 1 5 INSTALLED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST ANY FURTHER DAMAGE. 500042 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO FURTHER DISPO OR RETEST R 500042 1 7 EQUIRED. 500327 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE T268A26 HAD INSULATION D 500327 1 2 AMAGE AT 50P660 BACKSGEKK TANG. WIRE T268A24 WAS REWORKED BY CUTTING BEY 500327 1 3 OND THE DAMAGED AREA AND RETERMINATING T268A26 TO 50P660. PROBABLE CAUSE 500327 1 4 DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. REWORK RETURNS T268A26 TO DRAWING CONFIGUR 500327 1 5 ATION. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. 500343 1 1 MR SPACER, FABRICATED ON PR STR-3-18-4688, IS TO BE INSTALLED ON CARRIER 500343 1 2 PANEL V070-194106-003. INITIALLY THE SPACER COULD NOT BE LOCATED BY SHO 500343 1 3 P OR LOGISTICS. HOWEVER, THE MR SPACER WAS FOUND BY SHOP AND WILL BE INS 500343 1 4 TALLED ONTO THE V070-194106-003 CARRIER PANEL. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQU 500343 1 5 IRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 500552 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS THREE DISCREPANCIES DETECTED DURING OMI V5147.001 WHIL 500552 1 2 E INSPECTING THE AIRLOCK BULKHEAD SEALING SURFACE. ALL DISCREPANCIES WER 500552 1 3 E SMALL GOUGES/SCRATCHES. ALL WERE SANDED TO ELIMINATE THE ROUGH SURFACE 500552 1 4 S, CORROSION PROTECTED, AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER 500552 1 5 DISCREPANCIES EXIST. CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END 500552 1 6 ITEMS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 500606 1 1 SHIMS ON THE BODY FLAP RIBS, AT THE LOCATIONS LISTED ON PAGE 1 OF THIS P 500606 1 2 R, WERE FOUND TO HAVE SOME MINOR DELAMINATION. UPON INSPECTION BY LSOC A 500606 1 3 ND RI STR ENGINEERING, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE DELAMINATION WAS AROUN 500606 1 4 D THE CORNER EDGES OF THE SHIMS. THIS CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED AS IS ON AN 500606 1 5 MR UNRESTRICTED BASIS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 500626 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP WHILE INSPECTING TUNNEL ADAPTER SEALS FOR INSTALLA 500626 1 2 TION. THE TWO NOTED SEALS DID NOT PASS INSPECTION. THE SEALS WERE ROUTED 500626 1 3 TO VENDOR THRU HDA FOR POTENTIAL REPAIR/REWORK. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 500626 1 4 THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE S/N'S. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCIES IS 500626 1 5 HANDLING/MANUFACTURING FLAW. 500730 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED WHEN ONE OF THREE MOUNTING SCREWS WHICH SECURE THE 500730 1 2 LH ET DOOR DRIVE PDU WAS DISCOVERED TO BE LOOSE. ALL SIX FASTENERS SECU 500730 1 3 RING BOTH ET DOOR DRIVE PDU'S WERE THEN CONSIDERED SUSPECT. THE LOOSE SC 500730 1 4 REW APPEARED TO HAVE "SHANKED OUT" AGAINST THE NUT. THUS IT WAS FULLY TO 500730 1 5 RQUED, BUT STILL TURNED IN THE HOLE. THIS SCREW, ALONG WITH ANOTHER LOOS 500730 1 6 E SCREW DISCOVERED ON THE RH SIDE WERE REPLACED WITH ONE DASH NUMBER SHO 500730 1 7 RTER LENGTH SCREW (ACCEPTABLE PER MAO101-301). THE LOCKING FEATURE ON TH 500730 1 8 E NUTS FOR THE OTHER FOUR FASTENERS WERE VERIFIED ACCEPTABLE AND THE 500730 1 9 TIGHTNESS OF THE FASTENERS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE HOLES WERE VERIFIED 500730 1 10 ACCEPTABLE. THE FOUR "TIGHT" FASTENERS ALL HAD TWO WASHERS BEHIND THE 500730 1 11 NUT. THE TWO "LOOSE" FASTENERS HAD ONLY ONE WASHER. THE SHORTER SCREWS 500730 1 12 INSTALLED IN PLACE OF THE "LOOSE" FASTENERS CORRECTED THE DISCREPANCY. 500730 1 13 THIS PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. THIS PR 500730 1 14 CONDITION DOES AFFECT LIKE PART NUMBER END ITEMS. PR MEQ-5-08-0328 WAS 500730 1 15 INITIATED AGAINST OV-105. PROBABLE CAUSE: IMPROPER INSTALLATION, 500730 1 16 FASTENERS WERE NOT VERIFIED TIGHT AFTER TORQUING DURING ORIGINAL 500730 1 17 INSTALLATION. 500765 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THE V070-390392-001 STUD HOLDING THE UPPER AFT CO 500765 1 2 RNER OF THE V070-390310-008 CARRIER PANEL WAS DEBONDED DURING CARRIER PA 500765 1 3 NEL REMOVAL. THE RTV RESIDUE WAS REMOVED AND A NEW STUD WAS INSTALLED US 500765 1 4 ING MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESIVE AS REQUIRED PER THE INSTALLATION DRAWING 500765 1 5 . PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATION DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING 500765 1 6 ACTION REQUIRED. 500823 1 1 REFERENCE ITEM 1: ON THE UNDERSIDE OF THE UPPER LEFT HAND RSB PANEL, 32 500823 1 2 LOCATIONS SHOWED SIGNS OF ACTIVE CORROSION. THERE WAS NO PITTING BENEATH 500823 1 3 THE SURFACE AND DAMAGE WAS CONFINED TO SURFACE CORROSION AND PAINT IMPE 500823 1 4 RFECTION. AT ALL THE LOCATIONS, CORROSION WAS REMOVED BY MECHANICAL MEAN 500823 1 5 S, THE AREAS CORROSION PROTECTED, PAINTED, MR ID'D AND MR ACCEPTED. NO F 500823 1 6 URTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATIO 500823 1 7 N. 500824 1 1 REF: ITEMS 1 AND 3 BLOCK 17: THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT DISCREPANT THERMAL 500824 1 2 BARRIERS SPRING SEALS. THE DISCREPANT HARDWARE WAS REMOVED AND NEW 500824 1 3 HARDWARE WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT REQUIREMENTS. THE REMOVED HARDWARE WAS 500824 1 4 ROUTED TO THE NSLD FOR RECOMMENDED REWORK TO FIX CRACKS AND WELD 500824 1 5 IMPERFECTIONS IN SPRING TABS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS IS 500824 1 6 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. (REF ITEM 2 IN BLOCK 17) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS 500824 1 7 LOOSE, APPARENTLY SHANKED OUT SCREWS AT F/N 45. AFTER CLEANING THE SCREW 500824 1 8 AND SCREW HOLE WITH IPA, THE FASTENER WAS REINSTALLED NORMALLY, WITH 500824 1 9 COMPLETE THREAD ENGAGEMENT AT THE SPECIFIED TORQUE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 500824 1 10 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED 500824 1 11 FOR THIS PR. 500825 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: AT THE R/H LOWER SPEED BRAKE PANEL, THE 500825 PMRB 2 170D432758-11 SPRING WAS FOUND TO BE OUT OF ITS RETAINER. FURTHER 500825 PMRB 3 EXAMINATION SHOWED THE SPRING TO BE DAMAGED BEYOND REPAIR AND IT WAS 500825 PMRB 4 REMOVED. PMRB APPROVAL IS REQUESTED TO DEFER SPRING REPLACEMENT FOR ONE 500825 PMRB 5 FLIGHT. THE DAMAGED SPRING IS ONE OF 19 SPRINGS IN THE SEAL SEGMENT. 500825 PMRB 6 THIS DEFERRAL DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION; NOR DOES 500825 PMRB 7 IT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD 500825 PMRB 8 CONTROLS. DEFERRAL DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. 500825 PMRB 9 DEFERRAL DOES NOT AFFECT FUNCTION OR DESIGN INTENT OF THE RUDDER SPEED 500825 PMRB 10 BRAKE (RSB) THERMAL SEAL, AS THE REMAINING 18 SPRINGS ARE SUFFICIENT TO 500825 PMRB 11 MAINTAIN ADEQUATE SEAL INTERFACE. A POSITIVE SAFETY MARGIN IS 500825 PMRB 12 MAINTAINED. THE RSB IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. MR APPROVAL IS RESTRICTED TO 500825 PMRB 13 ONE FLIGHT, ONLY. MR ACTION FOR RESTRICTED LIFE. 12/20/94, PMRB APPROVED 500825 PMRB 14 FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF OV-103. 500825 PMRB 15 500825 PMRB 16 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: AT THE RH LOWER SPEED BRAKE PANEL, THE 500825 PMRB 17 170D432758-11 SPRING WAS FOUND TO BE OUT OF ITS RETAINER. ATTEMPTS TO 500825 PMRB 18 INSTALL THE NEW SPRING WITHOUT DISASSEMBLING THE SEAL WERE 500825 PMRB 19 UNSUCCESSFUL. IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO DEFER SPRING REPLACEMENT TO 500825 PMRB 20 OMDP, WHICH IS TO OCCUR AFTER THE NEXT FLIGHT. NO FLIGHT DAMAGES WAS 500825 PMRB 21 NOTED. PMRB APPROVAL IS REQUESTED TO DEFER SPRING REPLACEMENT FOR ONE 500825 PMRB 22 FLIGHT. THE DAMAGED SPRING IS ONE OF 19 SPRINGS IN THE SEAL SEGMENT. 500825 PMRB 23 THIS DEFERRAL DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION; NOR DOES 500825 PMRB 24 IT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD 500825 PMRB 25 CONTROLS. DEFERRAL DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. 500825 PMRB 26 DEFERRAL DOES NOT AFFECT FUNCTION OR DESIGN INTENT OF THE RUDDER SPEED 500825 PMRB 27 BRAKE (RSB) THERMAL SEAL, AS THE REMAINING 18 SPRINGS ARE SUFFICIENT TO 500825 PMRB 28 MAINTAIN ADEQUATE SEAL INTERFACE. A POSITIVE SAFETY MARGIN IS 500825 PMRB 29 MAINTAINED. THE RSB IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. MR APPROVAL IS RESTRICTED TO 500825 PMRB 30 ONE FLIGHT, ONLY. MR ACTION FOR RESTRICTED LIFE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 500825 PMRB 31 4/4/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. 500825 1 1 THE ROTATING SECTOR ASSY WAS REMOVED TO PERMIT REWORK AND INSP. THE 170D 500825 1 2 432180-15 GRAPHITE SEAL BLOCK WAS REMOVED FROM THE SECTOR. INSPECTINO OF 500825 1 3 THE 170D432180-15 GRAPHITE SEAL BLOCK SHOWED NO DAMAGE. THE DAMAGED 170 500825 1 4 D432758-11 SPRING THAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY REMOVED AT KSC HAS BEEN REPLA 500825 1 5 CED WITH A NEW SPRING. THE OUT-OF-POSITION PSRING (REF PG 24) WAS INSPEC 500825 1 6 TED AND FOUND TO BE UNDAMAGED AND THEREFORE, WAS REINSTALLED. THESE PART 500825 1 7 S WERE INSTALLED INTO THE SECTOR PER 170D432176 ASSY. THE ROTATING SECTO 500825 1 8 R ASSY WAS REINSTALLED. THE SEAL ASSY HAS BEEN RETURNED TO ITS DESIGN CO 500825 1 9 NFIGURATION. REWORK IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 500825 1 10 DESIGN CONTRIBUTES TO SPRING MISLOCATION ON ASSY (LACK OF FEATURES TO 500825 1 11 STABILIZE THE RELATIVELY LONG SPRING OR FIX ITS LOCATION ON THE BOTTOM 500825 1 12 OF BLOCK). DURING REINSTALLATION OF THE PARTS, SPRINGS MOVED OUT OF 500825 1 13 POSITION SEVERAL TIMES WHILE BEING COMPRESSED BEFORE THEY WERE 500825 1 14 SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED. 500830 1 1 ITEM 1 WAS FOUND TO BE PER PRINT. CAUSE INVALID DISCREPANCY. 500832 1 1 ITEM 1 WAS ACCEPTED WITH MR CONCURRENCE. CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 500891 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP DURING V31-15109 INSPECTION JOB CARD. DISCREPANCY 500891 1 2 1 ADDRESSED SLIGHT SURFACE CORROSION ON THE RH ET DOOR DRIVE PDU SHAFT E 500891 1 3 ND. THIS CORROSION WAS REMOVED. A THIN LAYER OF MBO140-010 TYPE 2 GREASE 500891 1 4 WAS APPLIED TO THE SHAFT END AS CORROSION PROTECTION. E.O. D01 & D02 WE 500891 1 5 RE RELEASED AGAINST DWG V070-565001 TO ALLOW APPLICATION OF GREASE TO EA 500891 1 6 CH PDU SHAFT FOR CORROSION PROTECTION. DISCREPANCY 2 ADDRESSED THE PDU B 500891 1 7 USHING PROTRUDING BEYOND THE END OF THE PDU SHAFT. THE END OF THE SHAFT 500891 1 8 IS SUPPORTED BY TWO BUSHINGS, ONE NESTED INSIDE THE OTHER. THE LARGER 500891 1 9 BUSHING, P/N MD137-0005-1616, IS PRESS FIT INTO THE ET DOOR DRIVE 500891 1 10 HOUSING AND IS FLUSH WITH THE HOUSING. THE SECOND BUSHING, P/N 500891 1 11 V070-565031-004, FITS INSIDE THE FIRST BUSHING AND DIRECTLY INTERFACES 500891 1 12 WITH THE PDU SHAFT. THIS SECOND BUSHING "FLOATS" ALONG THE SHAFT, BUT IS 500891 1 13 CONTAINED ON ONE SIDE BY THE FIRST BUSING AND ON THE OTHER BY THE 500891 1 14 SHOULDER AND BELLCRANK ON THE PDU SHAFT. HENCE, THIS BUSHING CAN AT 500891 1 15 TIMES PROTRUDE UP TO 0.069 INCH BEYOND THE SECOND BUSHING (WHICH IS 500891 1 16 FLUSH WITH HOUSING) OR BE RECESSED INSIDE THE HOUSING UP TO 0.562 INCH. 500891 1 17 THE BUSHING WAS MEASURED TO PROTRUDE 0.0643 INCH. DISCREPANCY 2 IS 500891 1 18 THEREFORE AN EXPLAINED CONDITION. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. DISCREPANCY 1 500891 1 19 AFFECTS LIKE P/N HARDWARE AND WAS ADDRESSED ON OV 103 LH SIDE BY PR 500891 1 20 MEQ-3-20-0837, ON OV 104 BY TPS MEQ-4-14-150 AND ON OV 105 BY PR 500891 1 21 MEQ-5-08-0326. DISCREPANCY 2 DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE P/N HARDWARE. PROBABLE 500891 1 22 CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY 1 IS EXPOSURE TO THE ELEMENTS. DISCREPANCY 2 IS AN 500891 1 23 EXPLAINED NON-DISCREPANT CONDITION. 500894 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP DURING V31-15109 INSPECTION JC. DISCREPANCY 1 ADDR 500894 1 2 ESSED SLIGHT SURFACE CORROSION ON THE LH ET DOOR DRIVE PDU SHAFT END. TH 500894 1 3 IS CORROSION WAS REMOVED. A THIN LAYER OF MBO140-010 TYPE 2 TREASE WAS A 500894 1 4 PPLIED TO THE SHAFT END AS CORROSION PROTECTION. EO D01 & D02 WERE RELEA 500894 1 5 SED AGAINST DWG V070-565001 TO ALLOW APPLICATION OF GREASE TO EACH PDU S 500894 1 6 HAFT FOR CORROSION PROTECTION. DISCREPANCY 2 ADDRESSED THE PDU BUSHING B 500894 1 7 EING RECESSED INTO THE ET DOOR HOUSING. TH END OF THE SHAFT IS SUPPORTED 500894 1 8 BY TWO BUSHINGS, ONE NESTED INSIDE THE OTHER. THE LARGER BUSHING, P/N M 500894 1 9 D137-0005-1616, IS PRESS FIT INTO THE ET DOOR DRIVE HOUSING AND IS FLUSH 500894 1 10 WITH THE HOUSING. THE SECOND BUSHING, P/N V070-565031-004, FITS INSIDE 500894 1 11 THE FIRST BUSHING AND DIRECTLY INTERFACES WITH THE PDU SHAFT. THIS 500894 1 12 SECOND BUSHING FLOATS ALONG THE SHAFT, BUT IS CONTAINTED ON ONE SIDE BY 500894 1 13 THE FIRST BUSHING AND ON THE OTHER BY THE SHOULDER AND BELLCRANK ON THE 500894 1 14 PDU SHAFT. HENCE, THIS BUSHING CAN AT TIMES PROTRUDE UP TO 0.069" BEYOND 500894 1 15 THE SECOND BUSHING (WHICH IS FLUSH WITH THE HOUSING) OR BE RECESSED 500894 1 16 INSIDE THE HOUSING UP TO 0.562". THE BUSHING WAS MEASURED TO BE RECESSED 500894 1 17 0.0193". DISCREPANCY 2 IS THEREFORE AN EXPALINED CONDITION. NO RETEST IS 500894 1 18 REQUIRED. DISCREPANCY 1 AFFECTS LIKE P/N HARDWARE AND WAS ADDRESSED ON 500894 1 19 OV-103 RH SIDE BY PR MEQ-3-20-0836, ON OV-104 BY TPS MEQ-4-14-150 AND ON 500894 1 20 OV-105 BY MEQ-5-08-0326. DISCREPANCY 2 DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE P/N 500894 1 21 HARDWARE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DISCREPANCY 1 IS EXPOSURE TO THE ELEMENTS. 500894 1 22 DISCREPANCY 2 IS AN EXPLAINED NON-DISCREPANT CONDITION. 501302 1 1 DURING 'D' HATCH INSTALLATION INTO TUNNEL ADAPTER ITEM 1 WAS PICKED UP T 501302 1 2 O DOCUMENT PART NUMBER V519-593301 NOT BEING ID'D ON HATCH. V519-593301 501302 1 3 IS AN INSTALLATION PART NUMBER WHICH DOES NOT GET ID'D ON HARDWARE. FOR 501302 1 4 CLARIFICATION THE PROCEDURE WAS CHANGED TO CALL OUT PART NUMBER V519-331 501302 1 5 051 'D' HATCH ASSEMBLY, WHICH IS HARD STAMPED ON HATCH. V519-593301 ('D' 501302 1 6 HATCH INSTALLATION) WAS LEFT ON THE INSTALLATION STEP WHICH MUST BE OBT 501302 1 7 AINED FROM CVAS. LIKE S/N'S NOT AFFECTED PROBABLE CAUSE, PROCEDURAL ERRO 501302 1 8 R. NO RETEST REQUIRED. SEE ATTACHED DEVIATION TO V5067. 501314 1 1 DURING V6042 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT 3M1188B20 GND LUG WAS BROKEN FROM CO 501314 1 2 NNECTOR 40P9162. BROKEN GND LUG WAS REMOVED AND NEW GND LUG CRIMPED ON. 501314 1 3 A CONTINUITY CHECK WAS PERFORMED AND SUCCESSFUL. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO A 501314 1 4 VOIDABLE DAMAGE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 501441 1 1 THE C HATCH COLLAR SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT DURING C HATCH INSTAL 501441 1 2 LATION. THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED AND THE HATCH WAS SUCCESSFULLY 501441 1 3 LEAK CHECKED WITH NO ANOMALIES PER V5K17. LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS NOT EFFEC 501441 1 4 TED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 501517 1 1 DURING CLOSE OUT INSPECTION, THE V070-197114-001 INSULATOR ATTACHED TO L 501517 1 2 /H FLIPPER DOOR 14 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A PIN HOLE APPROXIMATELY 0.09" DIAM 501517 1 3 ETER. THE DISCREPANCY WAS REPAIRED WITH MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND 501517 1 4 ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS DISCREPANC 501517 1 5 Y IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 501519 1 1 DURING POST-FLIGHT ELEVON COVE INSPECTION, SEVERAL CUTS WERE FOUND IN TH 501519 1 2 E V070-198874-036 CURTAIN SEAL. THESE NICKS WERE REPAIRED PER MR DISPOSI 501519 1 3 TION USING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED US 501519 1 4 E. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP 501519 1 5 OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 501629 1 1 FRCS ATTACH POINTS 1,2 AND 15 NUT ELEMENTS HAD NO RUNNING TORQUE 501629 1 2 (LOCKING FEATURE). FIVE TILES WERE REMOVED TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE NUT 501629 1 3 ELEMENTS. THE PROBLEM NUT ELEMENTS WERE REMOVED FROM THEIR BORES. GOUGES 501629 1 4 WERE FOUND IN THE BORES OF ATTACH POINTS 1 AND 2. THE GOUGES WERE 501629 1 5 SMOOTHED AND MR ACCEPTED AS IS. NEW NUT ELEMENTS AND RETAINERS WERE 501629 1 6 INSTALLED AT ATTACH POINTS 1,2 AND 15. THE LOSS OF RUNNING TORQUE IN THE 501629 1 7 NUT ELEMENTS IS A NORMAL WEAR OUT CHARACTERISTIC. THE GOUGES WERE CAUSED 501629 1 8 BY RUNNING THE BOLTS IN TOO FAR DURING NUT ELEMENT RUNNING TORQUE CHECK. 501630 1 1 DURING V5008.003 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 4R612D22-4 HAD EXPOSED COND 501630 1 2 UCTOR AT 2V77W1P28. CABLE 4R612D22 AND 4R612D26 WERE CUT BEYOND THE DAMA 501630 1 3 GED AREA AND RETERMINATED TO 22P28. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AN 501630 1 4 D TEAR. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK, REF: 2 501630 1 5 2P28 DEMATE SCAN LOG NUMBER 3-20-0726. 501672 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT A SMALL DEFECT ON THE C-HATCH, HATCH S 501672 1 2 EAL. MOLD IMPRESSION OF THE DEFECT GAVE DIMENSIONS OF: L=0.1655", W=0.05 501672 1 3 00", D=0.0046". PER DRAWING V070-332504, DEFECTS OF UP TO L=0.18" AND D= 501672 1 4 0.005" ARE ALLOWED ON THE SEAL SURFACE. THUS, THE DISCREPANT CONDITION I 501672 1 5 S NOT A PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIA 501672 1 6 L NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: MINOR DEFECT DUE TO HANDL 501672 1 7 ING. SEAL HAS BEEN LEAK CHECKED PER V1058.005. 501775 1 1 THE 70B2000-48 STRUT WAS FOUND TO HAVE SEVEN DEFECTS (SCRAPS AND DINGS). 501775 1 2 THE DEFECTS AT LOCATIONS 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, AND 7 WERE 0.003" DEEP OR LESS. 501775 1 3 THE DEFECT AT LOCATION 3 WAS 0.0006" DEEP. VISUAL INSPECTION REVEALED N 501775 1 4 O EVIDENCE OF BROKEN FIBERS. THE DAMAGE IS COSMETIC IN NATURE. PROBABLE 501775 1 5 CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP (DAMAGE TO STRUT RESULTING FROM PLATFOR 501775 1 6 M INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL). NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUI 501775 1 7 RED. 501998 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTORS 50P409, 50P410, 50 501998 1 2 P449 AND 50P450 WERE NOT SAFETY WIRED AS SHOWN ON V070-795571 EO D04. TH 501998 1 3 E SAFETY WIRE WAS REMOVED AND CONNECTORS SAFETY WIRED PER V070-795571 EO 501998 1 4 D04. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. RETEST OF DEMATED CONNECTORS WI 501998 1 5 LL BE PER SCAN TRACK. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 502144 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: 70B2000-49 STRUT ON RH SIDE OF XO693 FRAME OF 502144 PMRB 2 MIDBODY WAS FOUND TO HAVE 1 DENT ON FORWARD SIDE OF STRUT .012 DEEP 502144 PMRB 3 (ITEM 1) AND NUMEROUS NICKS AND SCRAPES IN KOROPON EXPOSING METAL. THE 502144 PMRB 4 DENT HAD A EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION PERFORMED WHICH SHOWED NO SIGNS OF 502144 PMRB 5 CRACKS AT DENT. THE PER PRINT NOMINAL WALL STRUT THICKNESS IS .028 AND 502144 PMRB 6 AT DENT LOCATION THE REMAINING WALL THICKNESS IS .016. MINOR NICKS AND 502144 PMRB 7 SCRAPES ARE ACCEPTABLE PER SPEC 70B0001 BUT KOROPON IS REQUIRED TO BE 502144 PMRB 8 TOUCHED UP. KOROPON WILL BE TOUCHED UP NEXT FLIGHT AFTER STRUT IS 502144 PMRB 9 EVALUATED FOR REPLACEMENT OR PROOFLOAD. THIS STRUT WILL CONTINUE TO 502144 PMRB 10 FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY FOR 1 502144 PMRB 11 FLIGHT. THE STRUT WILL THEN BE EVALUATED FOR PROOFLOAD OR REPLACEMENT. 502144 PMRB 12 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. THIS IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR 502144 PMRB 13 ACTION IS NO IMPACT ON CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR 502144 PMRB 14 HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS NO IMPACT ON CERTIFICATION AND 502144 PMRB 15 ASSOCIATED RATIONALE. MR ACTION IS FOR RESTRICTED LIFE. 12/20/94, PMRB 502144 PMRB 16 APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF OV-103. 502144 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1: 70B2000-49 STRUT ON RH SIDE OF XO693 FRAME OF MIDBODY WA 502144 1 2 S FOUND TO HAVE 1 DENT ON FORWARD SIDE OF STRUT .012 DEEP (ITEM 1). THE 502144 1 3 DENT WAS ACCEPTED FOR 1 FLIGHT THEN ON FLIGHT 21 PROCESSING THE DENT WAS 502144 1 4 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2, PAGE 1: STRUT WAS WRITTEN UP 502144 1 5 TO HAVE MINOR NICKS AND SCRAPES IN KOROPON PAINT EXPOSING METAL. THIS KO 502144 1 6 ROPON ONLY DAMAGE WAS ACCEPTED 1 FLIGHT AND THEN KOROPON WAS TOUCHED UP 502144 1 7 PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS WAS WORKMANSHIP. 502664 1 1 MR UNRESTRICTED APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO CORROSION PROTECT, WITH THREE ( 502664 1 2 3) COATS OF KOROPON, THE EXPOSED RECESSED AREAS ON THE RIGHT HAND BODY F 502664 1 3 LAP RUB PANEL WHERE PREVIOUSLY APPLIED ADHESIVE HAD FALLEN OUT. THE ADHE 502664 1 4 SIVE WAS PREVIOUSLY APPLIED ON PR STR-3-15-4302 TO FILL IN PITS WERE COR 502664 1 5 ROSION HAD BEEN BURNISHED OUT. ITEM 2 WAS ADDRESSED BY REPEATING STEP 1- 502664 1 6 1, TRICH WIPE, AND DID NOT CHANGE THE INTENT OF THE DISPOSITION. NO FURT 502664 1 7 HER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ADHESIVE DEGRADATION. 502665 1 1 MR UNRESTRICTED APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO CORROSION PROTECT, WITH THREE ( 502665 1 2 3) COATS OF KOROPON, THE EXPOSED RECESSED AREAS ON THE LEFT HAND BODY FL 502665 1 3 AP RUB PANEL WHERE PREVIOUSLY APPLIED ADHESIVE HAD FALLEN OUT. THE ADHES 502665 1 4 IVE WAS PREVIOUSLY APPLIED ON PR STR-3-15-4301 TO FILL IN PITS WERE CORR 502665 1 5 OSION HAD BEEN BURNISHED OUT. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PR 502665 1 6 OBABLE CAUSE: ADHESIVE DEGRADATION. 502738 1 1 THE V070-351614-001 ET LINE, OCN J56685, WAS FOUND TO HAVE WORN OFF KAHR 502738 1 2 LON. THE DISCREPANT ET LINER WAS ROUTED TO THE NSLD FOR REFURBISHMENT AN 502738 1 3 D A REPLACEMENT LINER ORDERED FOR REINSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: MATERI 502738 1 4 AL DEFICIENCY/DEGRADATION. 502739 1 1 THE V070-855059-001 ET LINER, OCN SO0433, WAS FOUND TO HAVE WORN OFF KAH 502739 1 2 RLON. THE DISCREPANT ET LINER WAS ROUTED TO THE NSLD FOR REFURBISHMENT A 502739 1 3 ND A REPLACEMENT LINER ORDERED FOR REINSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: MATER 502739 1 4 IAL DEFICIENCY/DEGRADATION. 502796 1 1 ITEM 1: THE V070-332902-002 SEAL WAS CLEANED WITH IPA AND A BRUSH. THIS 502796 1 2 REMOVED MOST OF THE MOLD IMPRESSION RESIDUE. THE TWO SMALL SPOTS THAT WE 502796 1 3 RE LEFT WERE MR ACCEPTED. NO MR ID WAS APPLIED. ITEM 2: THE FRAYED COPPE 502796 1 4 R MESH ON THE V070-332902-002 SEAL WAS TRIMMED AND MR ACCEPTED. NO RETES 502796 1 5 T REQUIRED. THESE DISCREPANCIES DO NOT AFFECT OTHER HARDWARE WITH LIKE P 502796 1 6 ART NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 1: WORKMANSHIP AND ITEM 2: OPERATIONAL 502796 1 7 DEGRADATION. 502834 1 1 THIS PR WSA INITIATED DURING V1052.004, CABIN LEAK CHECK, WHEN DENTAL MO 502834 1 2 LD MATERIAL WAS DISCOVERED TO BE BONDED TO THE I/E HATCH COLLAR SEAL. TH 502834 1 3 E DENTAL MOLD MATERIAL WAS REMOVED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND THE DISCRE 502834 1 4 PANCY NO LONGER EXISTS. LIKE S/N'S NOT AFFECTED. RETEST REQUIRED WAS V10 502834 1 5 47. PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCIDENTAL SPILLAGE/RESIDUE FROM MOLD IMPRESSIONS TA 502834 1 6 KEN IN THE I/E HATCH AREA. 503034 1 1 170D441410-1 SKIN PANEL ON OUTSIDE OF RH UPPER RUDDER SPEED BRAKE WAS FO 503034 1 2 UND TO HAVE A SCRATCH WITH THE FOLLOWING MAXIMUM DIMENSIONS 22.40 LONG X 503034 1 3 .086 WIDE AND .0023 DEEP. THE SCRATCH WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 503034 1 4 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 503039 1 1 DURING OEL-3-20-071, THE SAFETY WIRE INSTALLED CONNECTOR 50P450 WAS FOUN 503039 1 2 D BROKEN. THE BROKEN SAFETY WAS CUT/REMOVED. NEW SAFETY WIRE WAS THEN IN 503039 1 3 STALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO WEAR AND TEAR. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED 503039 1 4 BY SCAN. 503232 1 1 THE PRSD O2 TANK 2 RELIEF LINE INDENTATIONS NOTED WERE FOUND TO BE TOOLI 503232 1 2 NG MARKS. ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF LINE APPEARANCE AND DIMENSIONAL DATA 503232 1 3 INDICATES INDENTATIONS WERE CAUSED FROM SUPPLEMENTAL TUBE BENDS MADE IN 503232 1 4 PALMDALE DURING ORBITER FINAL ASSEMBLY. TUBE IS AS IT WAS WHEN IT WAS B 503232 1 5 UILT, IS WITHIN SPEC AND NOTED INDENTATIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE PER TUBE FABR 503232 1 6 ICATION AND INSTALLATION SPEC (SEE PREVIOUS SUMMARY). PROBABLE CAUSE, IN 503232 1 7 DENTATIONS MADE FROM TOOLING DURING ORBITER BUILD. 503357 1 1 THE V070-198219-002 BECAME WORN IN A LOCALIZED AREA BY RUBBING FROM THE 503357 1 2 BLADE SEAL. THE WORN AREA WAS BURNISHED SMOOTH AND CORROSION PROTECTED W 503357 1 3 ITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THI 503357 1 4 S PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 503363 1 1 WHILE WORKING V1224 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE RFI GROUNDING STRAP ON CO 503363 1 2 NNECTOR SAVER ME414-0630-0121 FOR 50P475 HAD BECOME DEBONDED. THE CONNEC 503363 1 3 TOR SAVER WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED (ITEM 1). THE DISCREPANT CONNECTOR SA 503363 1 4 VER ALSO WAS DISCOLORED ON THE OUTSIDE (ITEM 2). THE CONNECTOR SAVER WAS 503363 1 5 ROUTED TO FAILURE ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE DISCOLORATION. 503363 1 6 THE ANALYSIS DETERMINED THAT THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE WAS OXIDIZATION BY 503363 1 7 A CHEMICAL REACTION. PROBABLE CAUSE ITEM 1: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. PROBA 503363 1 8 BLE CAUSE ITEM 2: UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO FURTHER 503363 1 9 DISPO OR RETEST REQUIRED. 503668 1 1 THE LOWER AFT LESS C/P ATTACH NUT PLATE ON SPAR FITTING 6 WAS DISCREPANT 503668 1 2 . THE BAD NUT PLATE WAS R&R'D USING (2) MD114-5003-03XX BLIND RIVETS IN 503668 1 3 PLACE OF NAS1199-3 RIVETS PER SRP-V-ST-0025. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. 503668 1 4 THE CAUSE OF THIS PR WAS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 503747 1 1 DURING INSPECTION JOB CARD V00-10072, THE BULB SEAL SPLICE AT Z +24.2 (S 503747 1 2 TARBOARD) ON THE AFT BULKHEAD (XO1307) WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED. THE SPL 503747 1 3 ICE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER LRU OMI V5K25.001. THIS CONDITION DOES 503747 1 4 NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEMS. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. RETEST WILL B 503747 1 5 E PERFORMED PER V5018 AND V9023 PLBD CYCLES. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 503747 1 6 DEGRADATION. 503749 1 1 DURING INSPECTION JOB CARD V00-10072. THE BULB SEAL SPLICE AT YO -63.8 O 503749 1 2 N THE AFT BULKHEAD (XO1307) WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED THE SPLICE WAS REMO 503749 1 3 VED AND REPLACED PER LRU OMI V5K25.00. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LI 503749 1 4 KE END ITEMS. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED P 503749 1 5 ER V5018 AND V9023 PLBD CYCLES. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 503755 1 1 SEE OPERATION 4 FOR OEL ENGINEERING SUMMARY. WIRE P1136A26 WAS FOUND DAM 503755 1 2 AGED AND WAS REPAIRED BY OEL ENGINEERING. THIS WIRE IS FOR THE E-3 LO2 P 503755 1 3 REVALVE RPC INDICATOR V76X4046E WHICH WAS RETESTED PER OPERATION 5 OF TH 503755 1 4 IS PR. THE RETEST WAS SUCCESSFUL AND THIS PR CAN CLOSE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 503755 1 5 NORMAL WEAR. 503921 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: ITEMS 1 AND 3 - REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED 503921 PMRB 2 LIFE FOR ONE FLIGHT OF THE V070-198223 SEAL ASSY WITH GAPS. THE MAXIMUM 503921 PMRB 3 GAP IS LESS THAN .029" OVER A DISTANCE OF 2 1/4". THIS GAP IS DUE TO AN 503921 PMRB 4 IMBALANCED SPRING FORCE BETWEEN THE HALF MOON SEAL AND THE L-SEAL ASSY A 503921 PMRB 5 ND DUE TO FRICTION IN THE SYSTEM WHICH PREVENTS THE SEALS FROM FULLY EXT 503921 PMRB 6 ENDING. THE SEALS ARE USED TO KEEP HOT GASES FROM FLOWING INTO THE ELEVO 503921 PMRB 7 N COVE. THE GAP IS SMALL ENOUGH THAT IT WILL NOT CAUSE AN OVERTEMP CONDI 503921 PMRB 8 TION IN THIS AREA. THE SEAL SYSTEM IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. IT WILL CONTI 503921 PMRB 9 NUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. NO 503921 PMRB 10 MR ID IS REQUIRED. NO EVIDENCE OF OVERTEMP EXISTS. THIS MR ACTION DOES N 503921 PMRB 11 OT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION 503921 PMRB 12 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. PMRB APPROVAL FOR DEFE 503921 PMRB 13 RRAL TO FLT 21 OF OV-103. 01/06/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 503921 PMRB 14 OF OV-103. 503921 1 1 ITEM 1- DURING FLIGHT 20 PROCESSING, A GAP WAS DETECTED AT THE RH L-SEAL 503921 1 2 TO FUSELAGE STUB INTERFACE. THE SEAL WAS DISASSEMBLED AND EVALUATED FOR 503921 1 3 CONFORMANCE TO PRINT. AT THAT TIME IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ONE OF THE BL 503921 1 4 OCK SEALS THAT WAS INSTALLED ON THE RH SIDE ACTUALLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN 503921 1 5 STALLED ON THE LEFT HAND SIDE (ITEM 2). THE CORRECT BLOCK WAS INSTALLED 503921 1 6 AND THE GAPS WERE REINSPECTED. AFTER FINDING THAT THE GAPS WERE NOT ELIM 503921 1 7 INATED (ITEM 3), THE PR WAS DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 21 FOR FURTHER WORK. DURI 503921 1 8 NG FLIGHT 21 PROCESSING THE SEAL ASSY WAS DISASSEMBLED AND EVALUATED FOR 503921 1 9 FIT. TWO BLOCKS REQUIRED REWORK FOR PROPER FIT (ITEMS 4 & 5). THESE 503921 1 10 WERE REWORKED WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE SEAL WAS THEN 503921 1 11 REASSEMBLED FOR A FIT CHECK. THIS CHECK REVEALED TWO AREAS WHERE THE 503921 1 12 BLOCKS STILL DID NOT FIT PROPERLY (ITEMS 6 & 7). DUE TO THE REPAIR FOR 503921 1 13 ITEM 4, ONE OF THE SPRINGS HAD TO BE TRIMMED (ITEM 8). THESE REPAIRS 503921 1 14 WERE ACCOMPLISHED WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE FINAL FIT 503921 1 15 CHECK REVEALED THAT ALL GAPS ARE ACCEPTABLE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE 503921 1 16 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. 503922 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: ITEMS 1 AND 3 - REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR RESTRICTED 503922 PMRB 2 LIFE FOR ONE FLIGHT OF THE V070-198223 SEAL ASSY WITH GAPS. THE MAXIMUM 503922 PMRB 3 GAP IS LESS THAN .039" OVER A DISTANCE OF 3 1/4". THIS GAP IS DUE TO AN 503922 PMRB 4 IMBALANCED SPRING FORCE BETWEEN THE HALF MOON SEAL AND THE L-SEAL ASSY A 503922 PMRB 5 ND DUE TO FRICTION IN THE SYSTEM WHICH PREVENTS THE SEALS FROM FULLY EXT 503922 PMRB 6 ENDING. THE SEALS ARE USED TO KEEP HOT GASES FROM FLOWING INTO THE ELEVO 503922 PMRB 7 N COVE. THE GAP IS SMALL ENOUGH THAT IT WILL NOT CAUSE AN OVERTEMP CONDI 503922 PMRB 8 TION IN THIS AREA. THE SEAL SYSTEM IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. IT WILL CONTI 503922 PMRB 9 NUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. NO 503922 PMRB 10 MR ID IS REQUIRED. NO EVIDENCE OF OVERTEMP EXISTS. THIS MR ACTION DOES N 503922 PMRB 11 OT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION 503922 PMRB 12 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. PMRB APPROVAL FOR DEFE 503922 PMRB 13 RRAL TO FLT 21 OF OV-103. 01/06/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 503922 PMRB 14 OF OV-103. 503922 1 1 ITEM 1: DURING FLIGHT 20 PROCESSING, A GAP WAS DETECTED AT THE LH L-SEAL 503922 1 2 TO FUSELAGE STUB INTERFACE. THE SEAL WAS DISASSEMBLED AND EVALUATED FOR 503922 1 3 CONFORMANCE TO PRINT. AT THAT TIME IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ONE OF THE BL 503922 1 4 OCK SEALS THAT WAS INSTALLED ON THE LH SIDE ACTUALLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN 503922 1 5 STALED ON TH RH SIDE (ITEM 2). THE CORRECT BLOCK WAS INSTALLED AND THE G 503922 1 6 APS WERE REINSPECTED. AFTER FINDING THAT THE GAPS WERE NOT ELIMINATED (I 503922 1 7 TEM 3), THE PR WAS DEFERRED TO FLIGHT 21 FOR FURTHER WORK. DURING FLIGHT 503922 1 8 21 PROCESSING THE SEAL ASSEMBLY WAS DISASSEMBLED AND EVALUATED FOR FIT. 503922 1 9 THE HOUSING REQUIRED SLIGHT SANDING (ITEM 4), AND TWO BLOCKS REQUIRED 503922 1 10 REWORK FOR PROPER FIT (ITEMS 5 AND 6). THESE WERE REWORKED WITH MRB 503922 1 11 APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE SAL WAS THEN REASSEMBLED FOR A FIT 503922 1 12 CHECK. THIS CHECK REVEALED TWO AREAS WHERE THE BLOCKS STILL DID NOT FIT 503922 1 13 PROPERLY (ITEMS 7 AND (), AND ONE AREA WHERE THE HOUSING WAS TOO NARROS 503922 1 14 (ITEM 8). THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE REPAIRED WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR 503922 1 15 UNRESTRICTED USE. THE FINAL FIT CHECK REVEALED THAT ALL GAPS ARE 503922 1 16 ACCEPTABLE PER PRINT. THE MAXIMUM GAP IS .012" OVER A DISTANCE OF 1". 503922 1 17 THIS OCCURS AT THE STEP BETWEEN THE KOROPONED FUSELAGE STUB AND THE 503922 1 18 ANODIZED SURFACE BELOW IT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONES ON THIS PR. 503922 1 19 PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. 503994 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: 1A) REQUESTED ACTION: MR ACCEPT AS IS - RESTRICTED 503994 PMRB 2 LIFE INSTALLATION FOR 1 FLIGHT. 1B) TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION: TWO (2) 503994 PMRB 3 FASTENERS COULD NOT BE INSTALLED INTO THEIR ASSOCIATED NUTPLATES BECAUSE 503994 PMRB 4 OF GALLING. THE FASTENERS ARE USED TO SECURE CARRIER PANELS ONTO THE 503994 PMRB 5 WATER SYSTEM ACCESS DOOR. THE NUTPLATES WERE TAPPED IN AN EFFORT TO 503994 PMRB 6 CLEAR ANY DEBRIS FROM THE THREADS. THE RUNNING TORQUE ON THE NUTPLATES 503994 PMRB 7 WERE FOUND TO BE LESS THAN THE MINIMUM OF 2 IN-LBS. THE FASTENERS WERE 503994 PMRB 8 INSTALLED USING MIL-S-24473 GRADE H LOCKTITE. LOCKING COMPOUND WILL 503994 PMRB 9 PROVIDE LOCKING FORCE TO PREVENT THE FASTENERS FROM BACKING OUT. PRELOAD 503994 PMRB 10 IS THE PRIMARY LOCKING FEATURE FOR THE FASTENERS. THE REWORK PERFORMED 503994 PMRB 11 WILL ALLOW THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATES TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A 503994 PMRB 12 POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE NUTPLATES/FASTENERS ARE SECONDARY 503994 PMRB 13 STRUCTURE. NO MR IDENTIFICATION REQUIRED. 1C) STATEMENT OF COMPROMISE: 503994 PMRB 14 THIS MR ACTION IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE ON OV-103 FLIGHT 20. 2) 503994 PMRB 15 "CIL" STATEMENT: THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST 503994 PMRB 16 (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 3) "CERTIFICATION" 503994 PMRB 17 STATEMENT: THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 503994 PMRB 18 CERTIFICATION. 12/20/94, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF OV-103. 503994 1 1 UPON REMOVAL OF CARRIER PANELS V070-390250-002 AND V070-390253-002 503994 1 2 PREPARATORY TO FLIGHT 20, TWO (2) OF THE ATTACHMENT SCREWS WERE FOUND 503994 1 3 TO HAVE GALLED THREADS. WHILE INSTALLING NEW SCREWS, IT WAS DETERMINED 503994 1 4 THAT THE RUNNING TORQUE GENERATED BY THE MATING THREADS OF THE 503994 1 5 INSTALLED NUTPLATES WAS LESS THAN SPECIFIED MINIMUM (PAGE 1A). 503994 1 6 REPLACEMENT OF THE DEFECTIVE NUTPLATES WAS DEFERRED WITH PMRB APPROVAL 503994 1 7 TO FLIGHT 21. MR APPROVAL WAS SECURED FOR THE USE OF LOCKING COMPOUND 503994 1 8 TO PROVIDE RETENTIVE FORCE TO THE THREADED SURFACES OF THE DISCREPANT 503994 1 9 FASTENERS. AFTER RETURN FROM FLIGHT 20, THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATES WERE 503994 1 10 REMOVED AND NEW ONES INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH POST-FLIGHT 503994 1 11 DISPOSITION IN OPERATION 2 OF THIS PR. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING WORK 503994 1 12 REMAINS. PROBABLE CAUSE: MATERIALS DEFICIENCY/DEGRADATION. 504024 1 1 ITEM 1: DURING SURVEILLANCE, THE BULB SEAL SPLICE ON THE LH HINGELINE (X 504024 1 2 O1084) WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED. THE SPLICE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER 504024 1 3 LRU OMI V5K25.001. ITEM 2: DURING SURVEILLANCE, THE BULB SEAL SPLICE ON 504024 1 4 THE LH HINGELINE (XO1183) WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED. THE SPLICE WAS REMO 504024 1 5 VED AND REPLACED PER LRU OMI V5K25.001. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT L 504024 1 6 IKE END ITEMS. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED 504024 1 7 PER V50198 AND V9023 PLBD CYCLES. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 504024 1 8 N. 504094 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: THIS MR ACTION SATISFIES OMRS V56AF0.070 AND SOOHC0. 504094 PMRB 2 200 FOR THE DISCREPANT AREA AS NOTED PER ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1. THE V070-3516 504094 PMRB 3 14-001 (OCN AY9856) ET SHELL ASSEMBLY HAS PART OF THE KARHLON WORN DOWN 504094 PMRB 4 TO SUBSTRATE. THE DAMAGE IS LIMITED TO THE OUTER CIRCUMFERENCE OF THE SU 504094 PMRB 5 RFACE WHERE THE INSERT BEARS ON THE SHELL ASSEMBLY. THE KARHLON IS WORN 504094 PMRB 6 COMPLETELY THROUGH TO SUBSTRATE EXPOSING BARE ALUMINUM APPROXIMATELY 1.4 504094 PMRB 7 " AROUND THE CIRCUMFERENCE CENTERED OVER THE OUTBOARD FORWARD SCREW LOCA 504094 PMRB 8 TION. BY APPLYING CHEM FILM TO THE EXPOSED AREAS, THE POSSIBILITY OF COR 504094 PMRB 9 ROSION ON THE ALUMINUM SHELL WILL BE ELIMINATED. THE AREA WHERE THE 504094 PMRB 10 KARHLON IS DEGRADED REPRESENTS LESS THAN 1% OF THE TOTAL BEARING 504094 PMRB 11 SURFACE. THE V070-565247-001 INSERT WILL CONTINUE TO ROTATE FREELY ON 504094 PMRB 12 THE SHELL. THE AREA OF DEGRADED KARHLON DOES NOT INHIBIT THE ABILITY OF 504094 PMRB 13 THE SPHERICAL INSERT TO ROTATE IN THE SHELL ASSEMBLY. THE EFFECT ON THE 504094 PMRB 14 COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION IS NEGLIGABLE. THE INSTALLATION WILL CONTINUE TO 504094 PMRB 15 FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE 504094 PMRB 16 V070-351614-001 SHELL ASSEMBLY IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR ACTION 504094 PMRB 17 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 504094 PMRB 18 IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR IS FOR 1 504094 PMRB 19 FLT, RESTRICTED LIFE. NO MR ID REQUIRED. 01/03/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR 504094 PMRB 20 DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF OV-103. 504094 1 1 THE SHELL HAD AN AREA OF WORN KARHLON SURFACE WHERE BARE METAL WAS SHOWI 504094 1 2 NG. THE DAMAGE WAS ACCEPTED AS IS FOR ONE FLIGHT. POST FLIGHT 20, AN LRU 504094 1 3 PR WAS INITIATED TO ROUTE THE SALAD BOWL FOR REWORK AT THE HDA. A NEW S 504094 1 4 HELL WAS PROCURED AND WILL BE INSTALLED PER PRINT DURING NORMAL FLOW OPE 504094 1 5 RATIONS. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIO 504094 1 6 NAL DEGRADATION. 504433 1 1 THE A HATCH COLLAR SEAL WAS DAMAGED WHEN REMOVING PROTECTIVE TAPE AS THE 504433 1 2 TAPE WAS ADHERED TO THE SEAL ITSELF. THE SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED 504433 1 3 AND THE HATCH WAS LEAK CHECKED WITH NO ANOMALIES PER V5K17. THE OPENING 504433 1 4 AND CLOSING FORCES WERE RETESTED PER ATTACHMENTS TO THIS PR. NO ADDITION 504433 1 5 AL RETEST IS REQUIRED. LIKE SEAL NUMBERS NOT EFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: W 504433 1 6 ORKMANSHIP. 504487 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTS CONDITION THAT THE V070-198378- 504487 1 2 002 SEAL WAS BOUND IN ITS HOUSING. THE HOUSING WAS FLUSHED WITH IPA AND 504487 1 3 CONTAMINATION WAS REMOVED. THE SEAL TRAVEL HAS BEEN RESTORED. PROBABLE C 504487 1 4 AUSE FOR THIS PR IS CONTAMINATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION 504487 1 5 REQUIRED. 504489 1 1 DURING V76-10001 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BLOCK HEAT SHRINK TUBING DID 504489 1 2 NOT EXTEND INTO THE CONNECTOR EXTENSION ON CONNECTORS 50P501, 50P506, 5 504489 1 3 0P512 AND 50P533. CLAMPS AND SPOT TIES WERE REMOVED AND THE TUBING WAS E 504489 1 4 XTENDED INTO THE CONNECTOR EXTENSION. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE WHILE 504489 1 5 PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO FURTHER DISPO OR RETEST REQUIRED. 504497 1 1 DURING V76-10001, THE LUG ON JR20 WIRE AT 50P537 WAS FOUND BROKEN. A NEW 504497 1 2 LUG WAS INSTALLED ON JR20 WIRE AND A CONTINUITY CHECK ON NEW LUG WAS PE 504497 1 3 RFORMED SUCCESSFULLY. INSTALLATION OF LUG ON BACKSHELL WILL BE PERFORMED 504497 1 4 IN S0004. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL 504497 1 5 WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 504584 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL/MR RATIONALE: TROUBLESHOOTING OF IPR 63V-0058 ISOLATED AN OPEN 504584 PMRB 2 BETWEEN 51J306 AND 51P11 PINS 66 AND C, RESPECTIVELY. SUBSEQUENTLY WIRIN 504584 PMRB 3 G AT POD TO ORBITER INTERFACE AND AT LV218 WAS CAPPED AND STOWED TO PREV 504584 PMRB 4 ENT ANY POSSIBLE SHORT CIRCUIT AND LOSS OF PHASE C CIRCUITRY. THE WIRING 504584 PMRB 5 AT LV218 INTERFACE WAS CAPPED AND STOWED PER LP01-23-0667. DEFERRAL APP 504584 PMRB 6 ROVAL IS REQUESTED UNTIL REMOVAL OF POD LP01, SINCE LV218 IS FUNCTIONAL 504584 PMRB 7 WITHOUT THE PHASE C WIRING. THIS M.R. ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BAS 504584 PMRB 8 IC FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS M.R. ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEM 504584 PMRB 9 S LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS M.R. ACTION IS 504584 PMRB 10 FOR RESTRICTED LIFE UNTIL LP01 REMOVAL. CAPPING AND STOWING THE PHASE C 504584 PMRB 11 WIRING DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, 504584 PMRB 12 PERFORMANCE, OR INTERCHANGEABILITY. 01/03/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL 504584 PMRB 13 TO FUTURE FLT(LP01 REMOVAL) OF OV-103. APPROVED WAIVER WK0321R1. 504584 1 1 T/S OF IPR 63V-0058 ISOLATED AN OPEN BETWEEN 51J306 AND 51P11 PINS 66 AN 504584 1 2 D C, RESPECTIVELY. SUBSEQUENTLY WIRING AT POD TO ORBITER INTERFACE AND A 504584 1 3 T LV218 WAS CAPPED AND STOWED TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBLE SHORT CIRCUIT AND 504584 1 4 LOSS OF PHASE C CIRCUITRY. THE WIRING AT LV218 INTERFACE WAS CAPPED AND 504584 1 5 STOWED PER LP01-23-0667. DEFERRAL APPROVAL WAS REQUESTED UNTIL REMOVAL O 504584 1 6 F POD LP01, SINCE LV218 IS FUNCTIONAL WITHOUT THE PHASE C WIRING. WIRE S 504584 1 7 SEGMENT 2R2161C22-3 WAS THEN RETERMINATED ON THE VEHICLE SIDE ONCE THE V 504584 1 8 EHICLE RETURNED FROM FLIGHT. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO FUNCTIONAL FAILUR 504584 1 9 OF WIRING ON POD LP01. RETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. 504586 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF JC V80-90123, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE GND LUG O 504586 1 2 N WIRE 3K563A8 WAS BROKEN AT 83E5. THE DISCREPANT GROUND LUG WAS REMOVED 504586 1 3 AND REPLACED, FOLLOWED BY A SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY CHECK. ADDITIONALLY, 504586 1 4 A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF GROUND STUD 83E5 WAS PERFORMED BY DPS ENGINEERING 504586 1 5 , REFERENCE INTERIM SUMMARY ON PAGE 15. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON PR 504586 1 6 . PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREPANCY IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 504861 1 1 THE CLAMP HAD A GOUGE. THE GOUGE WAS BURNISHED OUT, CORROSION PROTECTED 504861 1 2 AND MR ID'D. THIS MR IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE 504861 1 3 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 505059 1 1 V070-352252-003 SKIN PANEL WAS FOUND TO HAVE A GOUGE WITH RAISED METAL. 505059 1 2 THE RAISED METAL WAS REMOVED AND SHARP EDGES SMOOTHED BY MR ACTION FOR U 505059 1 3 NRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 505064 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PG 1: THIS PR DOCUMENTED A MISSING MR WASHER REQUIRED FOR 505064 1 2 CARRIER PANEL INSTALLATION. ADDITIONAL WASHERS WERE FABRICATED PER LP01- 505064 1 3 A0034 FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING A SURPLUS FOR FUTURE USE. 505064 1 4 SINCE THE SURPLUS HAS BEEN DEPLETED, ADDITIONAL WASHERS WERE REQUIRED TO 505064 1 5 BE FABRICATED FOR INSTALLATION PER THE PREVIOUS MR ACTION. THE NEW WASH 505064 1 6 ERS WERE FABRICATED TO THE SAME REQUIREMENTS AS THE ORIGINAL MR WASHERS. 505064 1 7 EXCESS HARDWARE WAS RETURNED TO ENG FOR FUTURE USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPE 505064 1 8 RATIONAL DEGRADATION. 505097 1 1 DURING SURV, CONNECTOR 50P619 WAS FOUND WITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL. SRP V-E 505097 1 2 L-0001-E-0 WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. NO FURTHER A 505097 1 3 CTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBIT 505097 1 4 ER DURING PROCESSING. 505099 1 1 DURING V35-10010, CONNECTOR 50P611 WAS FOUND IN A SOFT MATED CONDITION. 505099 1 2 THE CONNECTOR WAS DEMATED, INSPECTED WITH NO ANOMALIES FOUND AND THEN RE 505099 1 3 MATED. RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRACKED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS P 505099 1 4 R. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 505101 1 1 DURING V35-10010 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BACKSHELL ON CONNECTOR 50V77 505101 1 2 W91P45 WAS LOOSE (ITEM 1). THE BACKSHELL AND CONNECTOR WERE INSPECTED AN 505101 1 3 D NO ANOMALIES FOUND AND RETORQUED PER MLO303-0040. IT WAS ALSO DISCOVER 505101 1 4 ED THAT GND WIRE P727C22 GOING TO 50V77W91P713 WAS PINCHED BY THE BACKSH 505101 1 5 ELL. THE GND WIRE WAS REMOVED FROM THE BACKSHELL SO THAT IT NO LONGER WA 505101 1 6 S PINCHED AND INSPECTED FOR INSULATION DAMAGE. INSPECTION FOUND NO DISCR 505101 1 7 EPANCIES. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO F 505101 1 8 URTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST OF DEMATED CONNECTORS WILL BE PER SCAN TRA 505101 1 9 CK. 505218 1 1 THE INSERT WHICH WAS INSTALLED WAS RECORDED AS SCRAP IN THE ROCKWELL DAT 505218 1 2 ABASE. THIS ONE WAS REMOVED AND ROUTED TO THE HDA ON AN LRU PR. A NEW ON 505218 1 3 E WAS PROCURED AND INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON T 505218 1 4 HIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR SUPPLIED A SCRAPPED PART. 505782 1 1 ITEM 1 - I/E HATCH SEAL LEAK RATE WAS 12 PSI/MIN (MAX ALLOWABLE IS 1 505782 1 2 PSI/MIN). THIS ITEM WAS PICKED UP IN THE OPF JUST PRIOR TO ROLLOUT. 505782 1 3 INSPECTIONS OF THE HATCH SEALS IN THE VAB FOUND DENTAL MOLD STUCK TO THE 505782 1 4 COLLAR SEAL (PR MEQ-3-A0047 WAS PERFORMING MOLDS IN THE AREA). THIS MOLD 505782 1 5 WAS REMOVED AND SUCCESSFUL SEAL LEAK CHECK PERFORMED. PR CONDITION NO 505782 1 6 LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE - DENTAL MOLD ON SEAL (WORKMANSHIP). ITEM 505782 1 7 2 - SCRATCH ON HATCH SEALING SURFACE AT 6 O'CLOCK (IN VERTICAL). THE MAX 505782 1 8 DEPTH IS .0064" WITH NO RAISED METAL. A SUCCESSFULL LEAK CHECK WAS 505782 1 9 PERFORMED. THE SCRATCH WAS MRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. NO 505782 1 10 MR ID APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE - TRAFFIC IN & OUT OF CREW MODULE. ITEM 3 505782 1 11 & 4 - DETENTS ON HATCH T-TOOL WOULD NOT ENGAGE HATCH ACTUARTOR. THIS PR 505782 1 12 WAS PICKED UP DURING V1058.003 I/E HATCH FUNCTIONAL. A BOROSCOPE 505782 1 13 INSPECTION OF THE ACTUATOR SQUARE DRIVE SHOWED SOME MINOR WEAR (DENTS IN 505782 1 14 BALL RECESSES) WHICH IS TYPICAL AND WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 505782 1 15 USE. A FIT CHECK OF 5 T-TOOLS (S/N 002, 004, 007, 011 & 018) SHOWED THAT 505782 1 16 SEVERAL TOOLS (4, 7 & 11) WOULD NOT FULLY ENGAGE INTO ACTUAROR WITHOUT 505782 1 17 SOME WIGGLING THE OTHERS (2 & 18) WORKED NORMALLY. ONCE S/N 4, 7, & 11 505782 1 18 TOOLS WERE ENGAGED THEY LOCKED AND UNLOCKED NORMALLY. THE DIFFICUTLY IN 505782 1 19 ENGAGEMENT IS DUE TO THE TOOLS BEING RIGGED BIASED TOWARDS LOCKED NOT A 505782 1 20 WORN ACTUATOR (WHICH WOULD HELP TOOLS ENGAGE). DUE TO THE RIGGING 505782 1 21 TOLERANCE BETWEEN ACTUATORS, NOT ALL T-TOOLS WORK ON EVERY ACTUATOR 505782 1 22 PERFECTLY. MEQ ENGINEERING IS UPDATING THE T-TOOL TO VEHICLE LIST TO 505782 1 23 PREVENT ENCOUNTERING THESE PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE. THE ACTUATOR DAMAGE 505782 1 24 WAS MRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO MR ID APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 505782 1 25 ITEM 3 - RIGGING OF T-TOOL; ITEM 4 - NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR AT INTERFACE 505782 1 26 WITH T-TOOL. ITEMS DUE NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. NO RETEST 505782 1 27 REQUIRED. 506020 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1: EXPOSED ALUMINUM AROUND ET LINER WAS FOUND TO BE DOCUMENTED 506020 1 2 ON STR-2-16-4089 FOR V070-351614-001 OCN AY9856 WHICH CHEM FILMED ALUMI 506020 1 3 NUM. ITEM 2 PG 1 V070-351614-001 ET LINER WAS FOUND TO HAVE 2 SCRATCHES 506020 1 4 AT 8:00 AND 2:00 POSITIONS AROUND SPHERICAL WASHER. THE SCRATCHES WERE A 506020 1 5 BRADED. CHEM FILMED AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE 506020 1 6 : OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 506354 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE TO 506354 PMRB 2 ACCEPT CONNECTOR 50P501'S CONNECTOR/EXTENSION AND END-FITTING AS THEY 506354 PMRB 3 ARE FOR ONE FLIGHT. WHILE ASSEMBLING MONOBALL CONNECTOR 50P501 DURING 506354 PMRB 4 S0004, THE END FITTING STARTED BINDING AND WOULDN'T TORQUE ANY FURTHER. 506354 PMRB 5 SUBSEQUENTLY, AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO REMOVE THE END-FITTING AND APPLY 506354 PMRB 6 LUBRICANT TO ALLOW FOR EASIER INSTALLATION. THIS ATTEMPT WAS 506354 PMRB 7 UNSUCCESSFUL DUE TO THE CONNECTOR'S EXTENSION ROTATING. ATTEMPTS WERE 506354 PMRB 8 THEN MADE TO ADJUST THE TURNBUCKLES TO ACHIEVE THE REQUIRED GO/NO GO 506354 PMRB 9 TEST. ALL CONNECTORS PASSED BOTH TEST WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE. 506354 PMRB 10 CONNECTOR 50P501 FAILED THE NO-GO TEST BETWEEN 1 AND 3 O'CLOCK. MR 506354 PMRB 11 APPROVAL IS REQUESTED TO ACCEPT ROTATING OF THE EXTENSION BASED ON ITEMS 506354 PMRB 12 1-3 AND THE NO-GO FAILURE PER ITEMS 4-6 BELOW. 1) SPRING TENSION WILL 506354 PMRB 13 KEEP THE CONNECTOR MATED. 2) SAFETY WIRING OF THE END FITTING WILL 506354 PMRB 14 PROHIBIT ROTATION OF THE EXTENSION IF THE LOCKING TEETH OF THE 506354 PMRB 15 CONNECTOR/EXTENSION ARE SHEARED/WORN. 3) THIS PROBLEM IS NOT 506354 PMRB 16 UNPRECENDENTED. THERE IS DOCUMENTED DATA ON OV-103 FLIGHT 1. REFERENCE 506354 PMRB 17 PR EPD-3-01-0180. 4) 50P501'S END-FITTING PASSED THE NO-GO TEST AT ALL 506354 PMRB 18 AREAS EXCEPT BETWEEN 1-3 O'CLOCK. THIS INDICATES THERE IS A MINIMUM 506354 PMRB 19 ENGAGEMENT OF AT LEAST 5 THREADS. 5) THE END FITTINGS ARE SAFETY-WIRED. 506354 PMRB 20 6) THE O-RING INTERNAL TO THE END FITTING PROPERLY SEALED THE MONOBALL 506354 PMRB 21 HARDWARE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 506354 PMRB 22 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST 506354 PMRB 23 (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS 506354 PMRB 24 RESTRICTED FOR ONE FLIGHT ONLY. THE PRESENT CONDITIONS DO NOT ADVERSELY 506354 PMRB 25 AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE OR 506354 PMRB 26 INTERCHANGEABILITY. 01/13/95 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF 506354 PMRB 27 OV-103. 506354 1 1 WHILE WORKING S0004, FLIGHT 20, THE END FITTING FOR CONNECTOR 50P501 WAS 506354 1 2 BINDING AND THE EXTENSION WOULD TURN WHEN TRYING TO BACK OFF THE END FI 506354 1 3 TTING (PAGE 1). ALSO THE NO-GO TEST PERFORM DURING S0004 ON 50P501 FAILE 506354 1 4 D (PAGE 1A). PR OEL-3-20-0585 WAS DEFERRED FROM FLIGHT 20 TO 21 WHEN 50P 506354 1 5 501 COULD BE DISASSEMBLED. AFTER DISASSEMBLING 50P501 IT WAS DISCOVERED 506354 1 6 THAT THE LOCKING TEETH ON THE CONNECTOR WERE WORN (PAGE 1B) WHICH ALLOWE 506354 1 7 D THE EXTENSION TO TURN. CONNECTOR 50P501 P/N NB6WGE22-55SYT WAS REMOVED 506354 1 8 AND A NEW CONNECTOR INSTALLED. AFTER EXTRACTING THE WIRES FROM 50P501 506354 1 9 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT 10 OF THE WIRES GOING TO 50P501 WERE NOT CRIMPED 506354 1 10 PROPERLY (PAGE 1C). THE CONTACTS WERE CUT OFF AND NEW CONTACTS CRIMPED 506354 1 11 ON. WHILE WORKING THIS PR IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT HEAT SHRINK SLEEVING 506354 1 12 INSTALLED OVER THE WIRE HARNESS WAS CHAFFED AND HAD 1/4" HOLE JUST 506354 1 13 ABOVE THE EXTENSION TUBE (PAGE 1D). THE SLEEVING WAS REMOVED AND 506354 1 14 REPLACED. WHILE WORKING STEP 8-7 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 2F265C22-1 506354 1 15 HAD INSULATION DAMAGE APPROXIMATELY 6" FROM THE SOCKET (PAGE 1E). WIRE 506354 1 16 2F265C22-1 WAS REPAIRED PER SRP V-EL-0012 BY SLIDING AN INSULATOR 506354 1 17 SEALING SLEEVE OVER THE DAMAGED AREA AND HEAT SHRINKING IN PLACE. WHILE 506354 1 18 WORKING STEP 8-11 WIRE S101A20-2 WOULD NOT LOCK INTO PLACE IN TERM -V 506354 1 19 OF 50P501 (PAGE 1F). PER QC NOTE ON PAGE 66 THE CONNECTOR WAS RINSED 506354 1 20 WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND A SMALL PIECE OF INSERTION TOOL WAS REMOVED. 506354 1 21 WIRE S101A20-2 WAS INSERTED INTO -V AND LOCKED INTO PLACE. PROBABLE 506354 1 22 CAUSE ITEMS 1,2,3,5, AND 6: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR WHILE PROCESSING THE 506354 1 23 ORBITER. PROBABLEC CAUSE ITEM 4: WORKMANSHIP. PROBABLE CAUSE ITEM 7: 506354 1 24 UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. A CONTINUITY, ISOLATION AND 506354 1 25 HIPOT CHECK WAS PERFORMED ON 50P501 AND WAS SUCCESSFUL. NO FURTHER 506354 1 26 DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST OF DEMATED CONNECTORS WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK 506533 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE THE E-1 GH2 PRESS TRANSDUCER (V41P1160A1) FAILED OFF 506533 1 2 SCALE. THROUGH TROUBLESHOOTING IT WAS FOUND THAT WIRE T168A26-4 WAS PUL 506533 1 3 LED FROM KSC SPLICE KSC-0140 (ITEM 1). WHILE WORKING THIS PR IT WAS ALSO 506533 1 4 DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT WIRE LENGTH BETWEEN SOLDER SLEEV 506533 1 5 ES TO INSTALL NEW KSC SPLICES (ITEM 2). CABLE T168A26 WAS REPAIRED BYROU 506533 1 6 TING A IN A NEW SECTION OF CABLE FROM 50P603 TO SPLICE AREA AND REINSTAL 506533 1 7 LING KSC SPLICES KSC-139, -140, -141, AND -142. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN 506533 1 8 TRACK OF DEMATED CONNECTOR 50P603. NO FURTHER DISPO IS REQUIRED. PROBABL 506533 1 9 E CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 507740 1 1 DURING SURV IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE HARNESS V070-775931 WAS CHAFFING 507740 1 2 STRUCTURE (ITEM 1). TO PREVENT CHAFFING CONVOLUTED TUBING WAS INSTALLED 507740 1 3 OVER THE WIRE HARNESS STARTING AT 50P758 TO APPROX 48" FROM CONNECTOR. 507740 1 4 INSP OF WIRE HARNESS V070-775931 FOUN EXPOSED CONDUCTOR ON WIRES 3P541B2 507740 1 5 6 AND 3P540B26 (ITEM 2). WIRE 3P541B26 WAS REPAIRED BY INSTALLING A CLAM 507740 1 6 SHELL OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA PER SRP V-EL-0029. WIRE 3P541B26 WAS REPA 507740 1 7 IRED BY CUTTING THE WIRE BEYOND THE DISCREPANT AREA AND RE CAP AND STOW 507740 1 8 3P540B26. PROBABLE CAUSE (ITEM 1): WORKMANSHIP. PROBABLE CAUSE (ITEM 2): 507740 1 9 NORMLA WEAR AND TEAR. NO FURTHER DISPO OR RETEST REQUIRED. 507746 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR 50P780 WAS FOUND W 507746 1 2 ITH A BROKEN BACKSHELL AND THE LUG WAS BROKEN ON WIRE P986D22. SRP V-EL- 507746 1 3 0001-E-O WAS USED TO REPLACE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE AND A NEW LUG W 507746 1 4 AS INSTALLED ON WIRE P986D22. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RETEST REQUIRED ON TH 507746 1 5 IS PR. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TE 507746 1 6 AR ON ORBITER DURING PROCESSING. 507748 1 1 DURING OEL-3-20-0588, THE GROUND LUG WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITHOUT HA 507748 1 2 VING TO ADD ANY ADDITIONAL WIRE LENGTH TO WIRE SEGMENT 1G150B22 ON THE B 507748 1 3 ACKSHELL ON CONNECTOR 50P502. NO FURTHER RETESTING OR ACTION IS REQUIRED 507748 1 4 ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR - WORK LOCATION FOR LH 507748 1 5 2 MONOBALL IS RESTRICTED. 509483 1 1 DURING S1287 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE P650A22 HAD CONDUCTOR DAMAGE AT 509483 1 2 CONNECTOR 50P786. P650A22 WAS REPAIRED BY CUTTING CABLES P648A22, P649A 509483 1 3 22, AND P650A22 BEYOND THE DAMAGED AREA AND RETERMINATING TO 50P786. PRO 509483 1 4 BABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO ADDITIONAL DISPO REQUIRED. R 509483 1 5 ETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK OF CONNECTOR 50P786. 509486 1 1 DURING S1287, WIRE SEGMENT T219A26 AT CONNECTOR 50V77W119P616 WAS FOUND 509486 1 2 TO HAVE KAPTON/MINOR SHIELD DAMAGE. THE WIRE SEGMENT T219A26 WAS REPAIRE 509486 1 3 D PER SRP-V-EL-0007-E-O METHOD "A". NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUS 509486 1 4 E IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 509796 1 1 INBOARD MOST SCREW ON V070-198157-001 WING TRAILING EDGE SEAL OF LH WING 509796 1 2 WAS WRITTEN UP TO BE TOO LONG. THE PER PRINT SCREW IS INSTALLED (NAS157 509796 1 3 8C3T11). PR STR-3-20-4941 CHANGED THE SCREW LENGTH FROM NAS1578C3T11 TO 509796 1 4 NAS1578C3T6 ON THE RH SIDE BY E-O-T-F. THE REMAINING LH SIDE DOCUMENTED 509796 1 5 ON THIS PR WILL BE INCORPORATED BY A TPS NEXT FLIGHT SINCE EO FOR SCREW 509796 1 6 CHANGE ON LH SIDE IS EFFECTIVE FOR OV-103 FLIGHT 21. NO PR IS REQUIRED ( 509796 1 7 REF DRAWING V070-198150 EO B02). PROBABLE CAUSE IS NO DISCREPANCY. 509967 1 1 THIS PR WAS INADVERTENTLY WRITTEN AGAINST THE ORBITER, OV103, AS OPPOSED 509967 1 2 TO BEING GENERATED AGAINST THE HARDWARE AS AN LRU-FES-PADB-PR. DISPOSIT 509967 1 3 ION IN THIS PR HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO AFFECT THIS CHANGE. NO RETEST REQUIRE 509967 1 4 D. PROBABLE CAUSE: PR SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN AS LRU-FES-PADB PR. CAUSE 509967 1 5 WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THE LRU-FES-PADB PR. 509970 1 1 THIS PR WAS INADVERTENTLY WRITTEN AGAINST THE ORBITER, OV-103, AS OPPOSE 509970 1 2 D TO BEING GENERATED AGAINST THE HARDWARE AS AN LRU-FES-PAB-B PR. DISPOS 509970 1 3 ITION IN THIS PR HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO AFFECT THIS CHANGE. NO RETEST REQUI 509970 1 4 RED. PROBABLE CAUSE: PR SHOULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN AS AN LRU-FES-PAD-B PR. 509970 1 5 CAUSE WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THE LRU-FES-PAD-B PR. 510482 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB CONCURRENCE FOR RESTRICTED LIFE OF THE 510482 PMRB 2 V519-333014 SUPPORT FITTINGS WITH THE PART IDENTIFICATION NOT CHANGED 510482 PMRB 3 FROM V519-333014-005 AND -006 TO -008 AND -009, RESPECTIVELY. NO MR 510482 PMRB 4 MARKING IS REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT EFFECT THE FORM, FIT, OR 510482 PMRB 5 FUNCTION OF THE HATCH SUPPORTS. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 510482 PMRB 6 BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 510482 PMRB 7 RATIONALE OR HAZARDS CONTROL. MRB CONCURRENCE IS REQUESTED TO DEFER PART 510482 PMRB 8 IDENTIFICATION CHANGE UNTIL FLIGHT 21. 02/02/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR 510482 PMRB 9 DEFERRAL TO FLT 21 OF OV-103. 510482 1 1 THIS PR WAS INTITATED TO DOCUMENT SHIMS FABRICATED PER V519-333014 EO A0 510482 1 2 4 AND M117660 THAT COULD NOT BE VERIFIED ON PAPER AS HAVING BEEN CORROSI 510482 1 3 ON PROTECTED. EDGES AND CORNERS BORKEN TO 0.06"R, AND PART NUMBER IDENTI 510482 1 4 FICATIONS APPLIED. THERE WAS NO ACCESS TO THE SHIMS AT THE TIME, AS THEY 510482 1 5 WERE INSTALLED ON THE D-HATCH SUPPORT IN TUNNEL ADAPTER S/N 002. ALL OF 510482 1 6 WHICH WAS INSTALLED FOR FLIGHT IN OV-103, AT PAD-B. HATCHES WERE CLOSED 510482 1 7 FOR FLIGHT. THE CORROSION PROTECTION AND CORNERS BEING .06 R WERE ACCEP 510482 1 8 TED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. THE PART IS WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR ONE 510482 1 9 FLIGHT AND DEFERRED. POST FLIGHT THE STOP ASSEMBLIES WERE PROPERLY 510482 1 10 IDENTIFED. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE ITEM SER 510482 1 11 IAL NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 511159 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AS AN IN FLIGHT ANOMALY AND IPR 70V-0003 WHEN THE 511159 1 2 PORT RADIATOR LATCH 1-6 LATCH MOTOR 1 INDICATION DID NOT TRANSITION TO 511159 1 3 ON AFTER FLIGHT STOWING OF THE RADIATOR. SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL 511159 1 4 FAILURE, THE LIMIT SWITCH INDICATION BEGAM TO TOGGLE ON AND OFF UNTIL 511159 1 5 IT ULTIMATELY CAME ON AND REMAINED ON THROUGH OUT THE REMAINDER OF THE 511159 1 6 FLIGHT. UPON RETURN TO KSC, TROUBLESHOOTING CHECKED VOLTAGE THROUGHT 511159 1 7 THE LIMIT SWITCH, INSPECTED THE PDU WIRING HARNESS AND PERFORMED A 511159 1 8 SHAKE TEST. ALL TROUBLESHOOTING RESULTS WERE NOMINAL. THE NOTED FAILURE 511159 1 9 HAS BEEN SEEN PREVIOUSLY (OV-105 FLT 04) AND IS INDICATIVE OF POOR 511159 1 10 CONTACT OF THE PDU LIMIT SWITCHES. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PDU 511159 1 11 SHOULD BE REMOVED AND ROUTED FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS. PRIOR TO PDU 511159 1 12 REMOVAL, INITIAL RIGGING CHECKS WERE PERFORMED AND THE AFT CENTERLINE REF_RPT_NO TEXT_ SEQ_NO DISPOSITION ---------- ----- ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 511159 1 13 EDGE LATCH WAS FOUND TO BE OUT OF SPEC. THE PDU WAS REMOVED AND A 511159 1 14 REPLACEMENT UNIT INSTALLED. PR MEQ-3-21-0860 WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE 511159 1 15 REMOVED PDU AND IT WAS ROUTED FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS. RIGGING WAS CHECKED 511159 1 16 WITH THE NEW PDU INSTALLED AND FOUND TO BE SIMILAR TO THE INITIAL 511159 1 17 CONFIGURATION WITH THE AFT CENTERLINE EDGE LATCH BEING OUT OF SPEC. 511159 1 18 ADJUSTMENT WAS ATTEMPTED BUT THE PER SPEC VALUE COULD NOT BE OBTAINED. 511159 1 19 PR MEQ-3-21-0869 WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THIS OUT OF SPEC CONDITION. 511159 1 20 THE LATCH OUT OF SPEC RIGGING IS NOT A CAUSE OF THE INITIAL IPR 511159 1 21 CONDITION. LRU RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER OMI V1322. NO FURTHER WORK OR 511159 1 22 RETEST IS REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 511159 1 23 THIS PR IS BEING CLOSED AS A DUPLICATE OF PR MEQ-3-21-0860 WHICH WILL 511159 1 24 TRACK FAILURE ANALYSIS OF THE DISCREPANT PDU. PROBABLE CAUSE IS 511159 1 25 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 511272 1 1 DURING FLIGHT 20 OF OV-103, CRT DEU NUMBER 4 "BLANKED" AND TRIPPED THE D 511272 1 2 EU BITE FLAG ON FOUR DIFFERENT OCCASIONS (IFA NUMBER 4). THROUCH TROUBLE 511272 1 3 SHOOTING IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT RPC 46 IN FWD PCA NUMBER 3 WAS DISCREPAN 511272 1 4 T. FPCA V070-763360-020 OCN 620749 WAS REMOVED PER OMI V5C05.003 SEQ 1 A 511272 1 5 ND ROUTED TO HDA FOR REPAIR BY THE VENDOR. NEW FPCA V070-763360-019 OCN 511272 1 6 EJ3166 WAS INSTALLED PER OMI V5C05.003 SEQ 2. RETEST OF FPCA3 BY DPS ENG 511272 1 7 INEERING WAS UNOFFICIALLY ACCOMPLISHED BY POWERING UP AND OPERATING THE 511272 1 8 DPS LRU'S THAT RECEIVE POWER FROM FPCA3. OFFICIAL DPS RETEST WILL BE 511272 1 9 "BOUGHT OFF" IN SCAN FOLLOWING THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE FOLLOWING DPS 511272 1 10 TESTS: OMI V1059-COMPUTER COMPLEX CHECKOUT. OMI V1177-HUD CHECKOUT. OMI 511272 1 11 V1080-HCDS SYSTEM CHECKOUT. THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THESE TESTS SHOULD 511272 1 12 NOT CONSTRAIN THE CLOSURE OF THIS PR. RETEST BY EPD ENGINEERING WAS 511272 1 13 ACCOMPLISHED VIA A) AN EMERGENCY LIGHTING TEST, B) INVERTER POWER UP 511272 1 14 TRANSIENT PROTECTION TEST, C) V9001,V1 STANDARD POWER UP AND POWER 511272 1 15 DOWN, D) V1003 SEQUENCES 9 AND 12, E) V1086.003, F) V1086.004. ALL EPD 511272 1 16 RETST FOR FPCA3 HAS BEEN COMPLETED. NO ADDITIONAL WORK IS REQUIRED ON 511272 1 17 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OF THE FPCA. 511668 1 1 DURING V76-50001 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR SAVER FOR RECEPTACLE 5 511668 1 2 0J69 HAD A BROKEN BAYONET. THE DISCREPANT CONNECTOR SAVER P/N: ME414-063 511668 1 3 0-1003 WAS REMOVED FROM 50J69 AND ROUTED TO HDA FOR POSSIBLE REPAIR. A N 511668 1 4 EW CONNECTOR SAVER WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO UNA 511668 1 5 VOIDABLE DAMAGE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO FURTHER DISPO OR RETEST 511668 1 6 REQUIRED. 511857 1 1 ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL DEBONDS WERE DETECTED DURING INSPECTION J/C V31-14177 511857 1 2 . THE MITERED EDGES OF THE B91B50050 FWD-13/O/B-15 AND AFT-13/I/B-15 RH 511857 1 3 MLG DOOR ENVIRONMENTAL SEALS WERE DEBONDED FROM EACH OTHER AND FROM THE 511857 1 4 DOOR. DEBONDS REPAIRED USING MBO 130-119, TYPE III ADHESIVE PER MAO 106- 511857 1 5 303. REPAIR INTEGRITY VERIFIED FOLLOWING LG CYCLE PER V9002. THIS CONDIT 511857 1 6 ION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE ITEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 511858 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING POST FLIGHT ZONE INSPECTIONS TO DOCUMENT NI 511858 1 2 CKS AND GOUGES ON THE V070-510328 R/H MLG UPLOCK HOOK. MOLD IMPRESSION M 511858 1 3 EASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN AND RECORDED. DEFECTS WERE MAPPED. UNRESTRICTED M 511858 1 4 R CONCURRENCE WAS GIVEN TO SAND THE DISCREPANT AREA SMOOTH. THE REPAIR W 511858 1 5 AS MR-IDENTIFIED. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE E 511858 1 6 ND ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR 511858 1 7 AND TEAR. 511945 1 1 DURING V35-00003 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BACKSHELL ON 50P699 HAD A LO 511945 1 2 OSE BACKSHELL (ITEM 1). CONNECTOR 50P699 BACKSHELL WAS OPENED AND INSPEC 511945 1 3 TION FOUND THE LOCKING TEETH ON THE CONNECTOR WAS WORN OFF (ITEM 2). THE 511945 1 4 DISCREPANT CONNECTION WAS REMOVED AND A NEW CONNECTOR INSTALLED. PROBAB 511945 1 5 LE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO ADDITIONAL DISPO REQUIRED. RETE 511945 1 6 ST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK OF DEMATED CONNECTOR 50P699. 512059 1 1 EXPOSED METAL WAS FOUND IN THE NLG WHEEL WELL. THE TAPE WAS PEELED BACK. 512059 1 2 THE AREA WAS SANDED AND REPAINTED. NO DISPLACED METAL WAS FOUND. CORROS 512059 1 3 ION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED, AND THE TAPE WAS REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE: W 512059 1 4 ORKMANSHIP. 512061 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE V070-326876-001 FWD NLG CENTER OVE 512061 1 2 RLAP SEAL BEING RIPPED AND DEBONDING. THE SUSPECT SEAL WAS MR REPAIRED F 512061 1 3 OR UNRESTRICTED USE BY REAPPLYING NEW RTV. RETEST INSPECTION OF THE REPA 512061 1 4 IRED SEAL WAS PERFORMED AFTER NLG RETRACT AND EXTENSION WITH NOMINAL RES 512061 1 5 ULTS PER V1098.001. NO LONGER DOES A CONDITION EXIST. DISCREPANCY DOES N 512061 1 6 OT AFFECT OTHER S/N'S OF LIKE END ITEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEG 512061 1 7 RADATION. 512224 1 1 ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF DISCREPANCIES NOTED AS ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 HAS DE 512224 1 2 TERMINED THAT MR ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ARE NOT EXCEEDED BY THE DEGRADATION 512224 1 3 SUSTAINED BY THE MONEL METAL MESH AT THIS TIME. MR APPROVAL HAS BEEN GR 512224 1 4 ANTED FOR CONTINUED, UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE PART. MR ID HAS BEEN PROVID 512224 1 5 ED TO RECORD EXISTING DAMAGE FOR FUTURE REFERENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERA 512224 1 6 TIONAL DEGRADATION. 512454 1 1 DURING V31-13115 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT RECEPTACLE 81V74A17J6 HAD A BENT 512454 1 2 PIN. THE BENT PIN WAS STRAIGHTENED PER SRP V-EL-0009-A USING A MATING C 512454 1 3 ONTACT. WITH MR APPROVAL A SOFT MATE WAS NOT PERFORMED BECAUSE 81J6 IS C 512454 1 4 URRENTLY A SPARE AND NO MATING CONNECTOR IS PRESENT TO PERFORM SOFT MATE 512454 1 5 . PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. 512579 1 1 DURING V31-14105 INTERNAL INSPECTION OF THE LH FORWARD PLBD A GROUND STR 512579 1 2 AP WAS FOUND TO HAVE A HOLE THROUGH IT. THE HOLE WAS MEASURED (0.087" X 512579 1 3 0.093") AND PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN. FROM THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND A VISUAL IN 512579 1 4 SPECTION IT WAS DETERMINED THAT ONLY ABOUT 2 OF THE 240 STRANDS WERE BRO 512579 1 5 KEN. AN ELECTRICAL BOND TEST WAS DONE ON THE GROUND STRAP AND IT HAD A R 512579 1 6 EADING OF 2.18 MOHMS RESISTANCE AND THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE IS 2.50 MOHMS 512579 1 7 PER MAO113-306 SECT.3 TABLE 1. THE GROUND STRAP WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FO 512579 1 8 R UNRESTRICTED USE. NO RETEST REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT 512579 1 9 LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 512590 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING POST FLIGHT ZONAL INSPECTIONS TO DOCUMENT A 512590 1 2 PREVIOUSLY MR'D PLBD BULB SEAL TAPE REPAIR THAT HAD COME LOOSE. THE DIS 512590 1 3 TURBED TAPE REPAIR WAS CUT AWAY AND RE-REPAIRED PER STANDARD REPAIR PROC 512590 1 4 EDURE, SRP V-ST-0027-0. INSPECTION OF BULB SEAL, AFTER REPAIR, SHOWED NO 512590 1 5 POTENTIAL LEAK PATH CONDITIONS. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NO 512590 1 6 T AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CUAS 512590 1 7 E: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 513202 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THIS PR DOCUMENTS IMPROPER TRAVEL OF THE LINEAR 513202 1 2 SEAL IN THE V070-198520 PANEL ON THE R/H O/B ELEVON. THE PANEL ASSEMBLY 513202 1 3 WAS FLUSHED WITH IPA TO REMOVE CONTAMINANTS AND DEBRIS. FREE TRAVEL OF T 513202 1 4 HE LINEAR SEAL ASSEMBLY WAS RESTORED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS CONT 513202 1 5 AMINATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 513203 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THIS PR DOCUMENTS DISCOLORED KOROPON AND RTV AT 513203 1 2 THE OUTBOARD AND THE V070-198515 SEAL PANEL. DISCOLORED KOROPON WAS REMO 513203 1 3 VED AND CORROSION PROTECTION WAS REAPPLIED. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY 513203 1 4 SUBSTRATE DEGRADATION RESULTING FROM THE FLOW IN THIS AREA. PROBABLE CA 513203 1 5 USE FOR THIS PR IS FLIGHT DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING AC 513203 1 6 TION REQUIRED. 513345 1 1 ON THE LEFT HAND LOWER CORNER OF THE 170D441100 RUDDER SPEED BRAKE, (RSB 513345 1 2 ) UPPER AFT CORNER DRAIN HOLE, A RIVET TAIL FROM A PREVIOUSLY DRILLED-OU 513345 1 3 T RIVET HAD MIGRATED INTO THE DRAIN HOLE, CREATING A PARTIAL BLOCKAGE. A 513345 1 4 FTER ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE THE RIVET TAIL OUT OF THE DRAIN HOLE WERE UN 513345 1 5 PRODUCTIVE, THE RIVET FRAGMENT WAS PUSHED AWAY FROM THE DRAIN HOLE INTO 513345 1 6 THE INTERIOR OF THE RSB. AS THE RIVET TAIL IS OUT OF THE WAY OF THE DRAI 513345 1 7 N, FUNCTION OF THE DRAIN HOLE IS RESTORED. IN AS MUCH AS DRILLED OUT R 513345 1 8 IVET-TAILS ARE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN THE INTERIOR OF THE RSB, THE POSSIBI 513345 1 9 LITY OF ONE OCCASIONALLY WORKING ITS WAY INTO THE DRAIN HOLE IS AN ACCEP 513345 1 10 TED OPERATIONAL OCCURRENCE. SO LONG AS THE RIVET TAILS REMAIN INSIDE THE 513345 1 11 RSB CAVITY, THEY CAN DO NOT HARM (THE DRAIN WORKS TO SOME EXTENT EVEN 513345 1 12 WITH THE RIVET-TAIL BLOCKING THE OPENING). SINCE THE OCCLUSION IS NOT A 513345 1 13 TOTAL SEAL AND CLEARING DEBRIS FROM DRAINHOLES AN OPERATION PERFORMED 513345 1 14 ROUTINELY, THERE IS NO OBSERVABLE DAMAGE, DEGRADATION OR OTHER 513345 1 15 DISCREPANT CONDITION TO RECORD. THIS APPEARS TO HAVE A BEEN A SINGULAR 513345 1 16 OCCURRENCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 513346 1 1 THE INBOARD ROD ASSEMBLY WOULD NOT CLEAR THE RUB PANEL TO BE ROTATED UP 513346 1 2 FOR STOWAGE. THIS IA A KNOWN CONDITION. AN APPROPRIATE WORK AROUND WAS D 513346 1 3 EV'ED INTO THE JOBCARDS; HOWEVER, THE DEV WAS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED FROM 513346 1 4 THE WORK PACKAGE PUT TOGETHER BY WORK CONTROL. AFTER THE PR WAS INITIAT 513346 1 5 ED, THE DEV WAS ENTERED AND THE WORK WAS COMPLETED. NO WORK TO BE DONE O 513346 1 6 N THIS PR. DEV 04/02 PERMANENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR. 513373 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A RSB THERMAL BARRIER ASSEMBLY WITH A MISSING TAB. THE 513373 1 2 DISCREPANT BARRIER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW THERMAL BARRIER ASSEMBLY INSTA 513373 1 3 LLED. THE DISCREPANT HARDWARE WAS ROUTED TO THE NSLD FOR REWORK. PROBABL 513373 1 4 E CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGIN 513373 1 5 EERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 513375 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTS A RSB THERMAL BARRIER ASSEMBLY 513375 1 2 WITH A MISSING TAB. THE DISCREPANT BARRIER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW THERMAL 513375 1 3 BARRIER ASSEMBLY INSTALLED. THE DISCREPANT HARDWARE WAS ROUTED TO THE N 513375 1 4 SLD FOR REWORK. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. N 513375 1 5 O FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 513376 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTS A RSB THERMAL BARRIER ASSEMBLY 513376 1 2 WITH A MISSING TAB. THE DISCREPANT BARRIER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW THERMAL 513376 1 3 BARRIER ASSEMBLY INSTALLED. THE DISCREPANT HARDWARE WAS ROUTED TO THE M 513376 1 4 SCHDA FOR SCRAP. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 513376 1 5 NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 513377 1 1 REFERENCE ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1. THIS PR DOCUMENTS A RSB THERMAL BARRIER ASSE 513377 1 2 MBLY WITH A MISSING TAB. THE DISCREPANT BARRIER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW TH 513377 1 3 ERMAL BARRIER ASSEMBLY INSTALLED. THE DISCREPANT HARDWARE WAS ROUTED TO 513377 1 4 THE NSLD FOR REWORK. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATI 513377 1 5 ON. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 513452 1 1 VOID THIS PR. NOT A PR CONDITION. SEEE NOTE 9 EO9 V101-198483 FLAG NOTE 513452 1 2 1. 513607 1 1 DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE 50-1 DOOR, THE V070-395251-013 CARRIER PANEL W 513607 1 2 AS FOUND TO HAVE A BEND. A 10X MAGNIFICATION WAS PERFORMED AND NO EVIDEN 513607 1 3 CE OF CRACKING WAS FOUND. THE CARRIER PANEL WAS MR ID'D AND ACCEPTED. PR 513607 1 4 OBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 513665 1 1 TWO WEBS ON THE LOWER 1307 BULKHEAD WERE DAMAGED. THE DAMAGE WAS BURNISH 513665 1 2 ED OUT, THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR ID'D. THIS MR IS UNRESTR 513665 1 3 ICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - WORKMANS 513665 1 4 HIP. 513702 1 1 THE RING WHICH WAS REMOVED WAS IN INCORRECT DASH NUMBER. IT WAS RETURNED 513702 1 2 , AND A NEW RING WITH THE CORRECT DASH NUMBER WAS OBTAINED AND WILL BE I 513702 1 3 NSTALLED PER NORMAL FLIPPER DOOR CLOSURE PROCEDURE. NO FURTHER WORK TO B 513702 1 4 E DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - WORKMANSHIP. 513704 1 1 THE BULB SEAL WAS DAMAGED. AN LRU PR WAS INITIATED TO REWORK THE BULB SE 513704 1 2 AL AT THE HDA. A NEW BULB SEAL WAS PROCURED AND INSTALLED PER PRINT. NO 513704 1 3 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 513704 1 4 ION. 513708 1 1 THE BULB SEAL WAS DAMAGED. AN LRU PR WAS INITIATED TO REWORK THE BULB SE 513708 1 2 AL AT THE HDA. A NEW BULB SEAL WAS PROCURED AND INSTALLED PER PRINT. NO 513708 1 3 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - OPERATIONAL DEGRADA 513708 1 4 TION. 513863 1 1 A SMALL AREA OF THE 170D432376, RH 3 CONICAL SEAL WAS WRITTEN-UP AS HAVI 513863 1 2 NG CORROSION AND POSSIBLE PITTING. ENGINEERING EXAMINATION AND EVAULATIO 513863 1 3 N CONCLUDED THAT THE DISCREPANCY NOTED IS A MINOR SUFACE IMPERFECTION IN 513863 1 4 THE PYROMARK COATING, AND OF NO SIGNIFICANCE. ENGINEERING RECORDS CONFI 513863 1 5 RM (JUDGING FROM THE NUMBER OF SIMILAR ITEMS) THAT SUCH WRITE-UPS ARE NO 513863 1 6 T UNCOMMON, AS THE SURFACE IMPERFECTION SEEMS TO MIMIC OXIDATION OF THE 513863 1 7 UNDERLYING SURFACE. IN THE NICKEL ALLOY (INCONEL) COMPRISING THE CONICAL 513863 1 8 SEAL STRUCTURE, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO HISTORY OF SUCH CORROSION. PROBABL 513863 1 9 E CAUSE: OPERTIONAL DEGRADATION. 513908 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A RSB THERMAL BARRIER ASSEMBLY WITH A SHANKED OUT FAST 513908 1 2 ENER. THE DISCREPANT FASTENER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW FASTENER INSTALLED. 513908 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP -- IMPROPER FASTENER INSTALLAT 513908 1 4 ION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 514021 1 1 THE 74-04 PANEL WAS NOT SEATED FLUSH AT IT'S LEADING EDGE. FURTHER INVES 514021 1 2 TIGATION HAS FOUND THAT THE TWO FORWARD SCREWS WERE NOT INSTALLED AND WE 514021 1 3 RE FLOATING WITHIN THE TILE PLUG CAVITY. LOCKING TORQUE ON THE NUTPLATE 514021 1 4 AND FASTENER GRIP WERE FOUND TO BE WITHIN SPECIFICATIONS. THE PANEL WAS 514021 1 5 SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED DURING A FIT CHECK. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQ 514021 1 6 UIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: IMPROPER INSTALLATION. 514089 1 1 REFERENCE ITEM 1, ON PAGE 1: THE 170D441111 L/H LOWER RSB INNER PANEL WA 514089 1 2 S FOUND TO BE SCRATCHED. THE SCRATCH IS .739 LONG, .011 WIDE, AND .003 D 514089 1 3 EEP. BY LIGHTLY SANDING WITH ABRASIVE PAPER, SHARP EDGES AND RAISED META 514089 1 4 L WAS REMOVED REDUCING STRESS RISERS IN THE LOCAL AREA. THE SCRATCH WAS 514089 1 5 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS ITEM IS OPERAT 514089 1 6 IONAL DEGRADATION. REFERENCE ITEMS 2 AND 3 ON PAGE 1: THIS PR DOCUMENTS 514089 1 7 PAINT DEFECTS AND CORROSION ON THE LH LOWER RSB INNER PANEL. NO EVIDENCE 514089 1 8 OF CORROSION WAS NOTED AFTER TOPCOAT REMOVAL. CORROSION PROTECTION WAS 514089 1 9 REAPPLIED PER SPECIFICATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS IS 514089 1 10 WORKMANSHIP, IMPROPER APPLICATION OF TOPCOAT. NO FURTHER SHOP OR 514089 1 11 ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 514092 1 1 REFERENCE ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 1. THIS PR DOCUMENTS PAINT DEFECTS AND C 514092 1 2 ORROSION ON THE R/H LOWER RSB INNER PANEL. NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSION WAS 514092 1 3 NOTED AFTER TOPCOAT REMOVAL. CORROSION PROTECTION WAS REAPPLIED PER SPEC 514092 1 4 IFICATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP, IMPROPER APPLICATI 514092 1 5 ON OF TOPCOAT. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS P 514092 1 6 R. 514093 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3 ON PAGE 1). THIS PR DOCUMENTS PAINT DEFECTS AND C 514093 1 2 ORROSION ON THE R/H UPPER RSB INNER PANEL. NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSION WAS 514093 1 3 NOTED AFTER TOPCOAT REMOVAL. CORROSION PROTECTION WAS REAPPLIED PER SPEC 514093 1 4 IFICATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP - IMPROPER APPLICAT 514093 1 5 ION OF TOPCOAT. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS 514093 1 6 PR. 514094 1 1 REFERENCE ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3 ON PAGE 1. THIS PR DOCUMENTS PAINT DEFECTS A 514094 1 2 ND CORROSION ON THE L/H UPPER RSB INNER PANEL. NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSION 514094 1 3 WAS NOTED AFTER TOPCOAT REMOVAL. CORROSION PROTECTION WAS REAPPLIED PER 514094 1 4 SPECIFICATION. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP, IMPROPER APPLI 514094 1 5 CATION OF TOPCOAT. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED ON THI 514094 1 6 S PR. 514105 1 1 THERE WAS FOD FOUND IN THE V070-386318-004 VENT SCREEN UNDER RH FLIPPER 514105 1 2 DOOR 13. THE SCREEN WAS REMOVED. THE FOD WAS REMOVED AND NOTED AND THE S 514105 1 3 CREEN WAS REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: CONTAMINATION. 514175 1 1 THE NUT PLATE NOTED ON PG 1 WAS FOUND TO BE TOO DAMAGED FOR FURTHER USE. 514175 1 2 THE NUT PLATE WAS REMOVED AND A REPLACEMENT WAS REINSTALLED. NO FURTHER 514175 1 3 WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 514235 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON GP 1) THIS PR DOCUMENTS CORROSION ON THE LEFT HAND WING S 514235 1 2 PAR BEHIND RCC PANELS 8,9 AND 10. ALL ACTIVE CORROSION WAS REMOVED BY ME 514235 1 3 CHANICAL MEANS. REWORKED AREAS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PR 514235 1 4 OBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE/DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER 514235 1 5 SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 514400 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTED A CONDITION WHERE THE V070-326875 NLG DOOR OVERLAP SE 514400 1 2 AL (AFT) HAD EXCESSIVE INTERFERENCE WITH THE RH NLG DOOR RESULTING IN A 514400 1 3 CONDITION WHERE THE SEAL WAS BEING ROLLED UPWARDS DURING DOOR CLOSURE. N 514400 1 4 O REQUIREMENTS EXIST ON ALLOWABLE SEAL UPWARD DEFLECTION, HOWEVER, MEASU 514400 1 5 REMENTS OF SEAL FORE/AFT COMPRESSION WERE TAKEN AND THE INTERFACE WAS FO 514400 1 6 UND OT BE OUT OF SPECIFICATION. DRAWING V070-326881 REQUIRES SEAL COMPRE 514400 1 7 SSION TO BE 0.120 +/- 0.060 INCH. THE SEAL WAS TRIMMED AND SUBSEQUENT RE 514400 1 8 TEST SHOWED SEAL DEFLECTION WAS REDUCED TO AN ACCEPTABLE AMOUNT PER 514400 1 9 ENGINEERING JUDGEMENT. IN ADDITION, SEAL COMPRESSION WAS MEASURED TO BE 514400 1 10 0.065 INCH. THIS SEAL WAS PREVIOUSLY MR'D (PR MEQ-3-16-0688) TO ALLOW A 514400 1 11 NOTCH IN THE CORNER. THIS WAD TRIMMED SEAL TO MAINTAIN DIMENSIONS OF 514400 1 12 THIS NOTCH. SEAL HAS OTHERWISE BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT. PR MEQ-3-16-0688 514400 1 13 INSTALLED AND VERIFIED COMPRESSION OF THE CURRENT SEAL WITH A 514400 1 14 MEASUREMENT OF 0.090 INCH IN FEBRUARY 1993. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCY 514400 1 15 EXISTS. NO FURTHER RETEST REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE 514400 1 16 SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE CHANGE IN COMPRESSION IS A CHANGE 514400 1 17 IN DOOR POSITION POSSIBLY DUE TO THERMAL BARRIER REWORK AND WEAR AND 514400 1 18 TEAR. 514546 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS CORROSION ON THE LEFT HAND WING SPAR BEHIND RCC PANEL 514546 1 2 10. ALL ACTIVE CORROSION WAS REMOVED BY MECHANICAL MEANS. REWORKED AREAS 514546 1 3 WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS EN 514546 1 4 VIRONMENTAL DAMAGE/DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION RE 514546 1 5 QUIRED FOR THIS PR. 514547 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS CORROSION ON THE LEFT HAND WING SPAR BEHIND RCC PANEL 514547 1 2 9. ALL ACTIVE CORROSION WAS REMOVED BY MECHANICAL MEANS. REWORKED AREAS 514547 1 3 WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS ENV 514547 1 4 IRONMENTAL DAMAGE/DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQ 514547 1 5 UIRED FOR THIS PR. 515044 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: RESTRICTED LIFE FOR ONE FLIGHT (FLT 21). DURING BOLT HOLE 515044 PMRB 2 COVER INSTALLATION, SEVERAL NUTPLATES WERE FOUND TO HAVE A RUNNING TORQU 515044 PMRB 3 E BELOW THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENT. ONE OF THESE WERE CHANGED OUT PER PRINT 515044 PMRB 4 . AT THE REMAINING 13 LOCATIONS LOCKTITE WILL BE USED TO PROVIDE SUFFICI 515044 PMRB 5 ENT LOCKING FEATURE FOR THE FASTENER. THE INSTALLATION OF THE BOLT HOLE 515044 PMRB 6 COVERS WITH MIL-S-22473 GRADE C (LOCKTITE) DOES NOT DEGRADE THE SAFETY, 515044 PMRB 7 RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, OR INTERGRITY OF THE INSTALLATION. THE BOLT HOL 515044 PMRB 8 E COVERS ARE SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DES 515044 PMRB 9 SIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. MR ID IS REQUIRED. THIS 515044 PMRB 10 MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD 515044 PMRB 11 CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 515044 PMRB 12 CERTIFICATION. 032195, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. 515044 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: 14 BOLT HOLE COVER LOCATIONS LISTED ON PAGE 1 WAS WRITTEN 515044 1 2 UP AS HAVING TOO LOW RUNNING TORQUE. NUTS OR NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND 515044 1 3 REPLACED. ITEM 2 PAGE 1A: ACCESS COULD NOT BE OBTAINED DUE TO HOLE COVE 515044 1 4 R BOLTS BEING INSTALLED. STEPS WERE ADDED TO REMOVE AND INSTALL BOLTS FO 515044 1 5 R ACCESS TO REPLACE NUTS. ITEM 3 PAGE 1B: 5 ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS WERE FO 515044 1 6 UND WITH RUNNING TORQUE TOO LOW. THE NUTS OR NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND 515044 1 7 REPLACED. ITEM 4 PAGE 1C: LH BAY 13 70A2047-3 CLIP WAS FOUND TO BE INSTA 515044 1 8 LL WITH 1/8 RIVETS WHEN DRAWING REQUIRES 5/32 RIVETS. THE HOLES WERE 515044 1 9 DRILLED UP TO PROPER SIZE AND PER PRINT RIVETS INSTALLED. 515611 1 1 TWO FASTENER HOLES ON THE PLBD PATCH PANEL ARE DAMAGED DUE TO THE FASTEN 515611 1 2 ER STARTING TO PULL THROUGH THE PANEL. THE MATERIAL IS RAISED UP AND DAM 515611 1 3 AGED IMMEDIATELY AROUND THE HOLE. THE RAISED AREA WAS SHAVED FLUSH WITH 515611 1 4 THE PANEL AND FIBERGLASS PATCHES WERE INSTALLED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE HOL 515611 1 5 E. HOLES WERE DRILLED OUT AND PANEL WAS RE-PAINTED WHITE. PROBABLE CAUSE 515611 1 6 : POSSIBLE MISSING RETAINING RING. (WORKMANSHIP). 515643 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: ENGINEERING AND QC INSPECTIONS AS DOCUMENTED ON PAGE 515643 PMRB 2 4, SHOW THAT THE FUNCTION OF THE RSB THERMAL SEAL SYSTEM IS UNIMPAIRED, 515643 PMRB 3 AND WILL CONTINUE TO PERFORM ACCORDING TO DESIGN INTENT FOR ONE MORE FL 515643 PMRB 4 IGHT. PMRB APPROVAL IS REQUESTED TO DEFER REFURBISHMENT OF THE RSB THERM 515643 PMRB 5 AL SEALING SYSTEM UNTIL OMDP. AT THAT TIME DISPOSITION WILL REMOVE AND R 515643 PMRB 6 EPLACE OPERATIONALLY DEGRADED SYSTEM COMPONENTS. DEFERRAL IS FOR ONE FLI 515643 PMRB 7 GHT ONLY. MR ID IS NOT REQUIRED. DEFERRAL DOES NOT AFFECT DESIGN INTENT 515643 PMRB 8 AND A POSITIVE SAFETY MARGIN IS MAINTAINED. FORM, FIT AND FUNCTION ARE 515643 PMRB 9 NOT AFFECTED. THIS DEFERRAL DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 515643 PMRB 10 CERTIFICATION; NOR DOES IT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD 515643 PMRB 11 CONTROLS. MR ACTION FOR RESTRICTED LIFE. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 515643 PMRB 12 04/18/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. 515643 1 1 ITEM 1- PART OF A 170D432627 BROKEN SEAL BLOCK WAS FOUND IN THE RSB AREA 515643 1 2 . THE AREA WAS INSPECTED AND THE DETERMINATION WAS MADE THAT THE SMALL T 515643 1 3 AB IS AN ALIGNMENT SURFACE AND NOT A SEALING SURFACE. THE REMAINING ALIG 515643 1 4 NMENT TABS ARE SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN ALIGNMENT AS REQUIRED PER PRINT. T 515643 1 5 HERE ARE NO GAPS, WITH NO HEAT PATHS RESULTING, AND THE ABSENCE OF THE A 515643 1 6 LIGNMENT TAB WILL NOT AFFECT THE SEALING CAPABILITY OF THE RSB SEAL SYST 515643 1 7 EM. DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2 - A 170D432 515643 1 8 758-11 SPRING WAS FOUND MISSING FROM UNDER THE AFT END OF THE SEAL BLOCK 515643 1 9 LOCATED ON THE RH SIDE OF THE CONICAL SEAL, ABOVE THE LOWER HINGE OF 515643 1 10 THE LOWERRH RSB, OTBD OF THE ACTUATOR. REPLACEMENT OF THE MISSING 515643 1 11 SPRING WAS DEFERRED TO OMDP (POST FLIGHT 22) PER STR-3-A0256. DURING 515643 1 12 OMDP THE MISSING SPRING WAS REPLACED PER DWG REQUIREMENTS BY PR 515643 1 13 STR-3-A0256. ITEM 3- A 170D432758 SPRING WAS FOUND TO BE OUT OF THE 515643 1 14 RETAINER ON THE RH SIDE OF THE CONICAL SEAL BLOCK LOCATED BEHIND THE 515643 1 15 LOWER HINGE BRACKET OF THE RH UPPER RSB. THE SPRING OUT OF THE RETAINER 515643 1 16 DID NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FUNCTION OF THE OTHER SEAL SPRING WHICH IS 515643 1 17 SUFFICIENT TO KEEP THE SEAL BLOCK IN POSITION. THE FURTHER EVALUATION 515643 1 18 AND/OR REPLACEMENT OF THE SPRING WAS DEFERRED TO OMDP. IT WAS BELIEVED 515643 1 19 THAT THE SPRING WAS REPLACED ON PR STR-3-A0256. THE SPRING WAS VERIFIED 515643 1 20 TO NOT BE MISSING BY BORESCOPE INSPECTION. THE SPRING INSTALLATION IS 515643 1 21 PER DWG REQUIREMENTS. ITEM 4- A TAB OF A 170D432627-9B SEAL BLOCK WAS 515643 1 22 FOUND TO BE BROKEN, AND A PIN WAS BACKING OUT OF ITS ROLLER AGAINST THE 515643 1 23 UPPER TAB. THE AREA WAS INSPECTED AND THE DETERMINATION WAS MADE THAT 515643 1 24 THE SMALL TAB IS AN ALIGNMENT SURFACE AND NOT A SEALING SURFACE. THE 515643 1 25 REMAINING ALIGNMENT TABS ARE SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN ALIGNMENT AS 515643 1 26 REQUIRED PER PRINT. IN ADDITION A ROLLER PIN WAS FOUND TO BE 515643 1 27 TRANSLATING ALONG ITS AXIS. THIS WAS FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE, AS FURTHER 515643 1 28 MOVEMENT OF THE PIN IS BLOCKED BY THE UPPER ALIGNMENT TAB WHICH IS IN 515643 1 29 PLACE. THERE ARE NO GAPS, WITH NO HEAT PATHS RESULTING, AND THE ABSENCE 515643 1 30 OF THE ALIGNMENT TAB WILL NOT AFFECT THE SEALING CAPABILITY OF THE RSB 515643 1 31 SEAL SYSTEM. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 515643 1 32 ITEM 5- A 170D432627-31 SEAL BLOCK WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED ON THE FWD 515643 1 33 OTBD SIDE OF THE RH UPPER RSB. THE AREA WAS INSPECTED AND THE 515643 1 34 DETERMINATION WAS MADE THAT THE CRACK IN THE BLOCK DOES NOT IMPAIR THE 515643 1 35 SEAL FUNCTION. THERE ARE NO GAPS, WITH NO HEAT PATHS RESULTING, AND THE 515643 1 36 ABSENCE OF THE ALIGNMENT TAB WILL NOT AFFECT THE SEALING CAPABILITY OF 515643 1 37 THE RSB SEAL SYSTEM. THE DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 515643 1 38 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE (FOR ALL DISCREPANCIES) ; OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 515832 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1,2 AND 3 ON PG 1, 1A, AND 1B) THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT DISCREPAN 515832 1 2 T FASTENERS ON THE AFT SPAR OF THE RH MLG WHEEL WELL. 27 FASTENERS WRE F 515832 1 3 OUND TO BE DISCREPANT. 21 WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. T 515832 1 4 HE REMAINING 6 WERE RMEOVED AND REPLACED. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS 515832 1 5 IS VENDOR. (REF ITEM 4 ON PG 1B) THIS ITEM SUSPECTS THE RIVETS COVERED 515832 1 6 WITH TAPE. ALL BLIND FASTENERS WERE INSPECTED FROM THE HEAD SIDE AND DET 515832 1 7 ERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE PER SPECIFICATION. BASED ON THE EVALUATION OF T 515832 1 8 HE OTHER RIVETS IN THE AREA, THERE IS NO CONCERN REGARDING THE STRUCTURA 515832 1 9 L INTEGRITY OF THE REMAINING FEW FASTENERS WHOSE TAILS ARE NOT VISIBLE. 515832 1 10 NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. (REF ITEM 5 ON PG 1C) THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS AN 515832 1 11 OVERSIZED HOLE AT FASTENER LOCATION 24. THE HOLE WAS ENLARGED TO ACCEPT 515832 1 12 A ME128-0005-03 JO-BOLT PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 515832 1 13 THIS ITEM IS WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION 515832 1 14 REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 515835 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1) THESE ITEMS DOCUMENT DISCREPANT FASTENERS ON THE 515835 1 2 AFT SPAR OF THE L/H MAIN LANDING GEAR WHEEL WELL. THIRTY TWO FASTENERS 515835 1 3 WERE FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT. FOURTEEN WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR 515835 1 4 UNRESTRICTED USE. THE REMAINING EIGHTEEN WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED. 515835 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THESE ITEMS IS VENDOR. (REF ITEM 2 ON PAGE 1) 515835 1 6 THIS ITEM SUSPECTS THE RIVETS COVERED WITH TAPE. ALL BLIND FASTENERS 515835 1 7 WERE INSPECTED FROM THE HEAD SIDE AND DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE PER 515835 1 8 SPECIFICATION. BASED ON THE EVALUATION OF THE OTHER RIVETS IN THE AREA, 515835 1 9 THERE IS NO CONCERN REGARDING THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE REMAINING 515835 1 10 FEW FASTENERS WHOSE TAILS ARE NOT VISIBLE. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. NO 515835 1 11 FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 515844 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: (REF ITEM 7 ON PAGE 1F). 128 MD121-0004 BLIND 515844 PMRB 2 RIVETS IN THE R/H WING XO1365 SPAR WERE FOUND TO HAVE MALFORMED TAILS. 515844 PMRB 3 DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM SURROUNDING HARDWARE, ACCESS TO REMOVE THE 31 515844 PMRB 4 RIVETS IS NOT AVAILABLE. THE FASTENER HEADS WERE INSPECTED AND FOUND TO 515844 PMRB 5 BE ACCEPTABLE PER SPECIFICATION MAO601-301 () INSTALLATION OF 515844 PMRB 6 MD121-0004 AND MD121-0005 BLIND RIVETS. THE SPECIFICATION ASSUMES THE 515844 PMRB 7 TAIL SIDE OF THE FASTENERS ARE INACCESSIBLE AND PROVIDES VERY LITTLE 515844 PMRB 8 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA EXCEPT TO SAY "WHEN ACCESSIBLE, THE FLARED SLEEVE 515844 PMRB 9 SHALL BE VISUALLY SNUG TO THE ASSEMBLED JOINT". THIS MR IS FOR 515844 PMRB 10 RESTRICTED LIFE, UNTIL OMDP AND WILL ACCEPT 31 RIVET INSTALLATIONS NOT 515844 PMRB 11 SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED BY THE SPECIFICATION AND 0 RIVET INSTALLATIONS 515844 PMRB 12 IN VIOLATION OF SPECIFICATION. SUFFICIENT ACCESS IS NOT AVAILABLE TO 515844 PMRB 13 REMOVE AND REPLACE THESE DISCREPANT FASTENERS FROM THE HEAD SIDE. THE 515844 PMRB 14 RISK OF STRUCTURE DAMAGE RESULTING FROM ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE THE RIVETS 515844 PMRB 15 FROM THE TAIL SIDE WARRANTS DEFERRAL OF THIS WAD TO OMDP-2. THE RIVETS 515844 PMRB 16 WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF 515844 PMRB 17 SAFETY FOR THE NEXT FLIGHT. POST FLIGHT, THE RIVETS WILL BE ASSESSED TO 515844 PMRB 18 DETERMINE BEST REMOVAL TECHNIQUE (REMOVE ADJACENT HARDWARE OR REMOVE 515844 PMRB 19 FROM TAIL SIDE) AND SUBSEQUENT REWORK WILL BE COMPLETED. THIS MR ACTION 515844 PMRB 20 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES 515844 PMRB 21 NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. MR ID HAS 515844 PMRB 22 BEEN APPLIED. 4/28/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (OMDP) 515844 PMRB 23 OF OV-103. 515844 1 1 ITEM 1 & 2: SEVERAL BLIND RIVETS WERE FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT IN THE RH W 515844 1 2 ING. THOSE THAT WERE ACCESSIBLE WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. THO 515844 1 3 SE THAT COULD NOT BE ACCESSED WERE WRITTEN UP AS ITEMS 6 & 7. ITEM 3 & 4 515844 1 4 : WHILE REMOVING TWO FASTENERS, THE HOLES WERE DAMAGED AND OVERSIZED, AN 515844 1 5 D THE STRUCTURE WAS DIMPLED. CRACKS WERE FOUND ADJ TO ONE OF THE 2 HOLES 515844 1 6 USING DYE PENETRANT INSP. THE HOLE WAS ENLARGED TO .80 DIAMETER AND AN 515844 1 7 MR SPACER AND DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED. THE .156 DIAMETER HO 515844 1 8 LES WERE REAMED UP TO .190 AND .250, WHICH RETURNED THEM TO AN ACCEPTABL 515844 1 9 E CONDITION FOR FLIGHT. THEN FASTENERS WERE INSTALLED. ITEM 5: WHILE 515844 1 10 PERFORMING DYE PENETRANT INSP, IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT PENETRANT SEEPED 515844 1 11 THRU A CRACK BETWEEN ADJOINING STRUCTURE. STIFFENERS WERE REMOVED TO 515844 1 12 MOP UP THE PENETRANT, AND THEN THEY WERE REINSTALLED. ITEM 6 & 7: 31 515844 1 13 BLIND RIVETS COULD NOT BE REMOVED AND REPLACED DUE TO A LACK OF ACCESS. 515844 1 14 THE REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT WAS DEFERRED TO OMDP WHERE BETTER ACCESS 515844 1 15 WOULD BE AVAILABLE AFTER FLIPPER DOOR REMOVAL. MOST RIVETS WERE REMOVED 515844 1 16 AND REPLACED PER PRINT, BUT SOME WERE INSTALLED BY MR WITH THE HEAD 515844 1 17 LOCATED OPPOSITE OF THE PRINT ORIENTATION. ITEM 8: 3 RIVETS WERE FOUND 515844 1 18 TO BE MISSING LOCKING COLLARS. THEY WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER 515844 1 19 PRINT. MR ID WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEMS 1,2 AND 8: IMPROPER 515844 1 20 RIVET INSTALLATION DURING MANUFACTURE OF WING. ITEMS 3,4,AND 5: 515844 1 21 WORKMANSHIP. ITEMS 6 & 7: NO ACCESS. 515901 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF V1086.002 SEQUENCE 2 STEP 4, PRE-FLIGHT BITE FAILU 515901 1 2 RES WERE ENCOUNTERED FOR MEC 2 SRB RSS SAFE 1 R AND MEC 2 ATVC SRB DEADF 515901 1 3 ACE 3. TROUBLESHOOTING AND DATA ANALYSIS DETERMINED THAT MEC 2 WAS NOT F 515901 1 4 UNCTIONING NOMINALLY, PARTICULARLY THE PRE-FLIGHT BITE CIRCUIT. MEC 2 WA 515901 1 5 S CHANGED OUT PER V5C04 P/N MC450-0016-0006 OCN 94756LMV0001 BEING REPLA 515901 1 6 CED WITH OCN 0002. A SUCCESSFUL EPD RETEST WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER V1086.00 515901 1 7 7, V1086.011, TPS EPD-3-21-354, PR OEL-3-21-0605 ATTACHMENT 1. ALL OTHER 515901 1 8 SYSTEM RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRACKED. 515913 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: (REF ITEM 3 ON PAGE 1B). FIFTY NINE MD121-0004 515913 PMRB 2 BLIND RIVETS IN THE LH WING XO1365 SPAR WERE FOUND TO HAVE MALFORMED 515913 PMRB 3 TAILS. DUE TO INTERFERENCE FROM SURROUNDING HARDWARE, ACCESS TO REMOVE 515913 PMRB 4 EIGHT OF THE RIVETS IS NOT AVAILABLE. THE FASTENER HEADS WERE INSPECTED 515913 PMRB 5 AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE PER SPECIFICATION MAO601-301 () INSTALLATION 515913 PMRB 6 OF MD121-0004 AND MD121-0005 BLIND RIVETS. THE SPECIFICATION ASSUMES 515913 PMRB 7 THE TAIL SIDE OF THE FASTENERS ARE INACCESSIBLE AND PROVIDES VERY 515913 PMRB 8 LITTLE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA EXCEPT TO SAY "WHEN ACCESSIBLE, THE FLARED 515913 PMRB 9 SLEEVE SHALL BE VISUALLY SNUG TO THE ASSEMBLED JOINT". THE MR IS FOR 515913 PMRB 10 RESTRICTED LIFE, UNTIL OMDP AND WILL ACCEPT 8 RIVET INSTALLATIONS IN 515913 PMRB 11 VIOLATION OF SPECIFICATION (GAP BETWEEN BULB AND STRUCTURE). SUFFICIENT 515913 PMRB 12 ACCESS IS NOT AVAILABLE TO REMOVE AND REPLACE THESE DISCREPANT 515913 PMRB 13 FASTENERS FROM THE HEAD SIDE. THE RISK OF STRUCTURE DAMAGE RESULTING 515913 PMRB 14 FROM ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE THE RIVETS FROM THE TAIL SIDE WARRANTS DEFERRAL 515913 PMRB 15 OF THIS WAD TO OMDP-2. THE RIVETS WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN 515913 PMRB 16 INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY FOR THE NEXT FLIGHT. POST 515913 PMRB 17 FLIGHT, THE RIVETS WILL BE ASSESSED TO DETERMINE BEST REMOVAL TECHNIQUE 515913 PMRB 18 (REMOVE ADJACENT HARDWARE OR REMOVE FROM TAIL SIDE) AND SUBSEQUENT 515913 PMRB 19 REWORK WILL BE COMPLETED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS 515913 PMRB 20 FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION 515913 PMRB 21 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. MR ID HAS BEEN APPLIED. 4/28/95, PMRB 515913 PMRB 22 APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (OMDP) OF OV-103. 515913 1 1 ITEMS 1 & 2: SEVERAL BLIND RIVETS WERE FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT IN THE LH 515913 1 2 WING. THOSE THAT WERE ACCESSIBLE WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. IN 515913 1 3 ADDITION SEVERAL JO-BOLTS WERE FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT, AND WERE REMOVED 515913 1 4 AND REPLACED PER PRINT. THE BLIND RIVETS THAT WERE NOT ACCESSIBLE WERE 515913 1 5 DOCUMENTED AS ITEM 3. ITEM 3: 8 BLIND RIVETS COULD NOT BE REMOVED DUE TO 515913 1 6 A LACK OF ACCESS. THEY WERE DEFERRED TO OMDP, WHERE 7 OF THEM WERE REMO 515913 1 7 VED AND REPLACED. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO INSTALL SOME OF THE RIVETS 515913 1 8 WITH THE HEADS LOCATED OPPOSITE OF THE PER PRINT ORIENTATION. THE 8TH R 515913 1 9 IVET WHICH WAS NOT REPLACED WAS WRITTEN UP AS ITEM 4. ITEM 4: IT WAS 515913 1 10 NOT POSSIBLE TO INSTALL A BLIND RIVET, SO A JO-BOLT WAS INSTALLED BY 515913 1 11 MR. ADDITIONALLY THE MAP THAT WAS TO BE USED TO LOCATE THE 8 RIVETS 515913 1 12 DEFERRED TO OMDP WAS LOST IN TRANSIT FROM KSC TO PALMDALE. HOWEVER THE 515913 1 13 8 RIVETS COULD BE LOCATED FOR REMOVAL BECAUSE THEY HAD THE WORD 515913 1 14 "DEFERRED" STAMPED ADJ TO THEM. MR ID WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 515913 1 15 1 & 2: IMPROPER INSTALLATION DURING MANUFACTURE OF WING. ITEM 3 & 4: NO 515913 1 16 ACCESS. 516075 1 1 THE ME364-0013-0002 INSULATOR ON THE 56-02 DOOR HAS SEVERAL AREAS WHERE 516075 1 2 THE CRES FOIL HAS DEBONDED FROM THE INTERIOR RUBBER INSULATION. UNRESTRI 516075 1 3 CTED MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO BOND THE FOIL TO THE INSULATION USING M 516075 1 4 B0130-119 TYPE III RTV. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRAD 516075 1 5 ATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 516082 1 1 THE LARGER MR-001 SPACERS ARE NEEDED TO INCREASE THE BEARING SURFACE AND 516082 1 2 TO PREVENT THE SPACERS FROM FALLING THROUGH THE HOLES ELONGATED IN THE 516082 1 3 V070-395969-004 CARRIER PANEL PER MR STR-3-01-0427. STR-3-17-4655 FABRIC 516082 1 4 ATED THE ORIGINAL WASHERS FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE ORIGINAL WASHERS WERE NO 516082 1 5 T FOUND DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE 59-07 PANEL. (10) WASHERS WERE FABRICA 516082 1 6 TED. (2) WILL BE INSTALLED AND THE REMAINING WILL BE STORED FOR FUTURE U 516082 1 7 SE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 516084 1 1 THE LARGER RP03-A0050 WASHERS ARE NEEDED TO INCREASE THE BEARING SURFACE 516084 1 2 AND TO PREVENT THE SPACERS FROM FALLING THROUGH THE HOLES IN THE V070-3 516084 1 3 96257-004 CARRIER PANEL. THE HOLES IN THE CARRIER PANEL HAVE A DIAMETER 516084 1 4 OF 0.375". THE MR WASHER HAS AN OUTSIDE DIAMETER OF 0.500". RP03-A0050 F 516084 1 5 ABRICATED THE ORIGINAL WASHERS FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE ORIGINAL WASHERS WE 516084 1 6 RE LOST AFTER THE REMOVAL OF THE 59-04 PANEL. 2 WASHERS WERE FABRICATED 516084 1 7 AND INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 516086 1 1 THE V070-396242-004 CARRIER PANEL AND V070-396235-002 WERE REMOVED AND M 516086 1 2 R HARDWARE WAS MISSING. THE ORIGINAL MR COULD NOT BE REWORKED DUE TO THE 516086 1 3 INAVAILABILITY OF THE MATERIAL. NEW MR WASHERS WERE FABRICATED FROM OFF 516086 1 4 -THE-SHELF SHIMS AND INSTALLED PER THE JOB CARD. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMAN 516086 1 5 SHIP. 516125 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: MRB CONCURRENCE IS REQUESTED TO ALLOW THE TWO GROUND 516125 PMRB 2 STRAPS TO REMAIN INSTALLED IN THE ORBITER AND BE SECURED TO THE 516125 PMRB 3 AFT-MOST MPM BASES WITH L-T-80 FLIGHT TAPE. THIS MR ACTION WILL BE 516125 PMRB 4 RESTRICTED LIFE UNTIL A FUTURE FLIGHT OPPORTUNITY (PAYLOAD BRACKET 516125 PMRB 5 REMOVAL OR MPM PEDESTAL INSTALLATION). THIS MR CONDITION DOES NOT 516125 PMRB 6 AFFECT THE FIT, FORM OR FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM FOR IT'S INTENDED 516125 PMRB 7 PURPOSE. MR-ID IS REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 516125 PMRB 8 BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS 516125 PMRB 9 LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS 516125 PMRB 10 RESTRICTED LIFE. DEFERRAL RATIONALE: MRB CONCURRENCE IS REQUESTED TO 516125 PMRB 11 DEFER THIS PR TO A FUTURE FLIGHT. THIS WAD SHALL REMAIN OPEN UNTIL 516125 PMRB 12 EITHER OF THE FOLLOWING TWO CONDITIONS ARE MET: 1) PAYLOAD BRACKET 516125 PMRB 13 REMOVAL, OR 2) MPM PEDESTAL INSTALLATION. 4/4/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR 516125 PMRB 14 DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (PAYLOAD BRACKET REMOVAL OR MPM PEDESTAL 516125 PMRB 15 INSTL) OF OV-103. 516125 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING MPM PEDESTAL REMOVAL PER OMI V5046.004. 516125 1 2 TWO OF FOUR GROUND STRAP JUMPERS COULD NOT BE REMOVED FROM THE MPM 516125 1 3 PEDESTAL BASES AT THE XO1189 AND XO1256 LOCATIONS. FASTENERS SECURING 516125 1 4 THESE JUMPERS COULD NOT BE REMOVED DUE TO AN INTERFERENCE WITH A 516125 1 5 PAYLOAD BRACKET INSTALLED ADJACENT TO THEM. MRB APPROVAL WAS GIVEN TO 516125 1 6 SECURE THE GROUND STRAP JUMPERS TO THEIR MPM BASES WITH L-T-80 FLIGHT 516125 1 7 CERTIFIED METAL TAPE FOR FLIGHT 21 (STS-70). WHEN THE MPM PEDESTALS 516125 1 8 WERE REINSTALLED PER OMI V5046.003, THE L-T-80 TAPE WAS REMOVED AND THE 516125 1 9 GROUND STRAP JUMPERS WERE REATTACHED TO THE APPROPRIATE MPM PEDESTALS. 516125 1 10 RETEST (ELECTRICAL BOND CHECKS) WILL BE PERFORMED PER OMI V5046.003. PR 516125 1 11 CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM 516125 1 12 SERIAL NUMBERS. NO ADDITIONAL RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 516125 1 13 INTERFERENCE WITH PAYLOAD BRACKET. 516130 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A RSB THERMAL BARRIER ASSEMBLY WITH A MISSING TAB. THE 516130 1 2 DISCREPANT BARRIER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW THERMAL BARRIER ASSEMBLY INSTA 516130 1 3 LLED. THE DISCREPANT HARDWARE WAS ROUTED TO THE NSLD FOR REWORK. PROBABL 516130 1 4 E CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGIN 516130 1 5 EERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 516146 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING IPR 70V-0003 TO DOCUMENT A SUSPECTED FAILUR 516146 1 2 E IN THE L/H RADIATOR LATCH 1-6 PDU. THE PDU WAS REMOVED FROM THE ORBITE 516146 1 3 R PER THE IPR. AND AN LRU-PR WAS INITIATED TO ROUTE THE SUSPECT PDU TO T 516146 1 4 HE NSLD FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS. THE JSC ORBITER ACTION TRACKING LIST, OATL 516146 1 5 63RF05-010, SHALL REMAIN OPEN TO TRACK THE FINAL FAILURE ANALYSIS OF TH 516146 1 6 E SUSPECT DISCREPANT PDU. REPLACEMENT PDU WAS SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED PER 516146 1 7 IPR 70V-0003 AND OMI V1322. THE ORBITER PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. T 516146 1 8 HIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 516146 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 516414 1 1 THIS WAD WAS INITIATED AS IPR 070V-0027. DURING OMI V1100, AIR DATA PROB 516414 1 2 E FUNCTIONAL TEST, IT WAS NOTED BY THE ORBITER OBSERVERS THAT THE RH AIR 516414 1 3 DATA PROBE (ADP) SEEMED TO HESITATE AND SHUDDER MORE THAN USUAL WHEN BE 516414 1 4 ING DEPLOYED AND STOWED USING MOTOR 2. FOR TROUBLESHOOTING, THE RH ADP W 516414 1 5 AS DEPLOYED AND STOWED, USING MOTOR 1 AND MOTOR 2 MODES OF OPERATION, WH 516414 1 6 ILE BEING OBSERVED BY ALL ASSOCIATED ENGINEERING WITNESSES. THE ANOMALY 516414 1 7 WAS DETERMINED TO BE DUE TO A TIGHT FIT OF THE ADP INCONEL THERMAL SEALS 516414 1 8 IN THE ADP CAVITY AND ON THE ENDS OF THE ROTATING PROBE. ADDITIONAL 516414 1 9 TROUBLESHOOTING CLEANED THESE SEALS, WHICH ELIMINATED MOST, BUT NOT 516414 1 10 ALL, OF THE HESITATION ORIGINALLY NOTED. THE IPR WAS UPGRADED TO A MEQ 516414 1 11 PR. AT THE REQUEST OF NASA-JSC, ADDITIONAL CLEANING OF THE ADP INCONEL 516414 1 12 THERMAL SEALS WAS PERFORMED AND THE OPERATION OF THE RH ADP NOW APPEARS 516414 1 13 TO BE NORMAL. DURING OMI V1100, AIR DATA PROBE FUNCTIONAL TEST, ALL 516414 1 14 TIMING AND ELECTRICAL CURRENT DRAWS WERE WITHIN ALLOWABLE CRITERIA. NO 516414 1 15 PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL 516414 1 16 NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 516453 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT SEVERAL GOUGES AND SCRATCHES ON THE INBO 516453 1 2 ARD HINGE ARM V075-593323 OF BOTH THE LH AND RH V075-593327 HINGE ARM AS 516453 1 3 SEMBLIES - REF PD 1 AND 2. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE POLISHED OUT WITH MR 516453 1 4 B APPROVAL. ENGINEERING HAS DETERMINED THAT THE DAMAGE OCCURS WHEN THE H 516453 1 5 ATCH IS OVER-ROTATED DURING OPENING/CLOSING WHICH ALLOWS THE HINGE ARM T 516453 1 6 O CONTACT BOLTHEADS ON THE ADJACENT LATCH HOUSINGS. A REQUEST FOR A SHOP 516453 1 7 AID HAS BEEN GENERATED TO PREVENT (SA-095-033) DAMAGE IN THE FUTURE. PD 516453 1 8 ITEM 3 REFERES TO MIS-MARKING OF THE V075-593327 HINGE ASSY. THE ASSEMB 516453 1 9 LY ROLLED FROM A -001 TO A -004 UPON INCORPORATION OF KIT DRAWING 516453 1 10 VK75-593337. THIS PART WAS REPART MARKED AND AN INCORRECT SUB ASSY P/N 516453 1 11 WAS DELETED. PD ITEM 4 APPLIED TO A DISCREPANT ROSAN AT THE UPPER RIGHT 516453 1 12 MOUNTING HOLE FOR THE V075-593310-001 BRACKET (LH). THIS ROSAN WAS 516453 1 13 REPLACED. NO FURTHER RETEST IS REQUIRED. THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT AFFECT 516453 1 14 LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE (MPC) FOR ITEMS 1 AND 2 IS 516453 1 15 ANADVERTENT CONTACT DURING OPENING/CLOSING. THE MPC FOR ITEM 3 IS THE 516453 1 16 DWG CHANGE NOT BEING INCORPORATED. THE MPC FOR ITEM 4 IS NORMAL WEAR 516453 1 17 AND TEAR. 516497 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1). THE V070-198373-001 AND V070-198373-002 SIDE SEA 516497 1 2 LS (J-SEALS) ON THE RHOB ELEVON ACTUATOR HINGE ARE CHARRED ON THE LOWER 516497 1 3 EXPOSED SURFACES BLISTERING THE TEFLON COATING ON THE SEALS. THE SEALS W 516497 1 4 ERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR I 516497 1 5 S FLIGHT DAMAGE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION RQUIRED FOR THIS 516497 1 6 PR. 516566 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF RTOMI V5U02, WIRE 1U341BB22 WAS FOUND TO BE OF INS 516566 1 2 UFFICIENT LENGTH TO TERMINATE TO DESIGN SPLICE 50SP1830. THE EXISTING WI 516566 1 3 RE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH AN ADEQUATELY LONG SEGMENT AND SUBSEQUE 516566 1 4 NTLY SPLICED VIA RTOMI V5U02. THE WIRE REPLACEMENT RETURNS THE WIRE HARN 516566 1 5 ESS TO DRAWING/FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF WIRE 1U341BB 516566 1 6 22 (APU 1 WATER CONTROL VALVE 50V46LV13) WAS PERFORMED BY LSOC APU ENGIN 516566 1 7 EERING VIA OMI V1019-73 ON 4-20-95. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREAPANCY IS WO 516566 1 8 RKMANSHIP. 516567 1 1 DURING PERFORMANCE OF RTOMI V5U02, WIRE 2U354BB22 WAS FOUND TO BE OF INS 516567 1 2 UFFICIENT LENGTH TO TERMINATE TO DESIGN SPLICE 50SP1831. THE EXISTING WI 516567 1 3 RE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH AN ADEQUATELY LONG SEGMENT AND SUBSEQUE 516567 1 4 NTLY SPLICED VIA RTOKI V5U02. THE WIRE REPLACEMENT RETURNS THE WIRE HARN 516567 1 5 ESS TO DRAWING/FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF WIRE 2U354BB 516567 1 6 22 WAS PERFORMED BY LSOC APU ENGINEERING VIA OMI V1019-74 ON 20APR95. NO 516567 1 7 FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON PR. WIRE SUPPORTS APU NO.2 WATER CONTROL VAL 516567 1 8 VE 50V46LV23. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREPANCY IS WORKMANSHIP. 516592 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS CORROSION ON THE LEFT HAND WING SPAR BEHIND RCC PANEL 516592 1 2 8. ALL ACTIVE CORROSION WAS REMOVED BY MECHANICAL MEANS. REWORKED AREAS 516592 1 3 WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS ENV 516592 1 4 IRONMENTAL DAMAGE/DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQ 516592 1 5 UIRED FOR THIS PR. 516781 1 1 THE FORWARD OUTBOARD ATTACH HOLE IN THE V070-352287-001 DOOR HAS BEEN WO 516781 1 2 RN OVERSIZE. ALL SHARP EDGES HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND THE DISCREPANT HOLE I 516781 1 3 S MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 516861 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE THE BACKSHELL OF CONNECTOR 41P9115 ON WIRE HARNESS V 516861 1 2 070-774001-001 WAS FOUND LOOSE. THE BACKSHELL OF CONNECTOR 41P9115 WAS T 516861 1 3 ORQUED IN PLACE WITHOUT HAVING TO DEMATE THE CONNECTOR, THEREFORE THERE 516861 1 4 IS NO RETEST REQUIREMENT. THE PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 516959 1 1 DURING INSPECTION JOB CARD V31-14195, A DENT WAS FOUND. THE DISCREPANCY 516959 1 2 WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. THIS 516959 1 3 CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE: 516959 1 4 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 516961 1 1 DURING INSPECTION JOB CARD V31-14195, TWO DENTS WERE FOUND. THE DISCREPA 516961 1 2 NCIES WERE MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED 516961 1 3 . THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. PROBABLE 516961 1 4 CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 516964 1 1 DURING INSPECTION JC V31-14195, A SCRATCH 3.000"L X 0.0466"W X 0.0006"D 516964 1 2 WAS FOUND. THE DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 516964 1 3 THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. PROBABLE 516964 1 4 CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 516965 1 1 DURING INSPECTION JC V31-14195, TAPE WAS FOUND MISSING FROM THE AFT HING 516965 1 2 ELINE CORNER. THE 1/2" X 1" AREA HAD NEW TAPE REBONDED TO THE RADIATOR P 516965 1 3 ER SRP V-ST-0022-0-0. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFF 516965 1 4 ECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATI 516965 1 5 ON. 516967 1 1 DURING INSPECTION JOB CARD V31-14195, A METERORITE IMPACT WITH A LENGTH 516967 1 2 OF 0.0312", A WIDTH OF 0.0256", AND A DEPTH OF 0.0040" WAS FOUND. THE DI 516967 1 3 SCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE WITH THE DISCREPANCY CHEM 516967 1 4 -GLAZED TO PROTECT THE FACESHEET FROM CORROSION. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 516967 1 5 THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. PROBABLE C 516967 1 6 AUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 516974 1 1 DURING INSPECTION JOB CARD V31-14195, A BUBBLE 0.1082" X 0.01707" X 0.00 516974 1 2 57" WAS FOUND. THE DISCREPANCY WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS AS DEBRIS UNDER THE 516974 1 3 TAPE FROM MANUFACTURING. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT 516974 1 4 AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS/END ITEMS. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING FLA 516974 1 5 W. 517079 1 1 THE MC621-0076-0013 MORTAR INTERFACE PLATE HAS FIVE WELDS THAT HAVE HAIR 517079 1 2 LINE CRACKS. THE CRACKS FORM AT THE START END OF THE WELDS AND ARE APPRO 517079 1 3 XIMATELY .15" LONG MAXIMUM. THE REMAINING SIX OF THE TOTAL ELEVEN WELDS 517079 1 4 DO NOT EXHIBIT ANY INDICATION OF CRACKING. THE PLATE WAS MR ACCEPTED AS 517079 1 5 IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS VENDOR WORKMANSHI 517079 1 6 P. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 517195 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS AN IMPROPERLY INSTALLED NUT PLATE ON THE RCC SPAR FITT 517195 1 2 ING. ONE RIVET WAS NOT INSTALLED PER SPECIFICATION. THE DISCREPANT NUT P 517195 1 3 LATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER SRP. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WOR 517195 1 4 KMANSHIP. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 517888 1 1 THE V070-393316-002 CARRIER PANEL WAS FOUND TO HAVE A SMOOTH BEND ALONG 517888 1 2 AN EDGE. THE CARRIER PANEL WAS MR ACCEPTED WITH THE SMOOTH BEND. PROBABL 517888 1 3 E CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 517968 1 1 AN IMPROPERLY INSTALLED JOBOLT ON THE XO1365 SPAR WAS REPLACED AND RETUR 517968 1 2 NED TO PRINT SPEC. A SMALL AMOUNT OF JOBOLT DEBRIS FROM DRILLING WAS LEF 517968 1 3 T INSIDE THE BOX BEAM AND WAS MR ACCEPTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING 517968 1 4 DISCREPANCY. 518040 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, IT WAS NOTICED THAT HARNESS V070-775784 WAS ROUTED 518040 1 2 BETWEEN TWO CLAMPS AND WAS PULLED TOO TIGHT CAUSING A BANJO EFFECT. ENGI 518040 1 3 NEERING RESEARCH FOUND THAT THE HARNESS WAS NOT ROUTED UNDER THE CLAMPS 518040 1 4 PER PRINT. THE HARNESS WAS ROUTED PER PRINT UNDER THE CLAMP AND THE HARN 518040 1 5 ESS WAS INSPECTED FOR DISCREPANCIES, WHICH NONE WERE FOUND. NO FURTHER A 518040 1 6 CTION OR RETEST IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 518134 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS A NUTPLATE ON THE SPAR FITTING FOR THE LESS CARRIER PA 518134 1 2 NEL INSTALLATION HAD GALLED THREADS. THE DISCREPANT NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED 518134 1 3 AND REPLACED PER SRP. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADA 518134 1 4 TION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 518148 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: MRB APPROVAL IS REQUESTED TO ACCEPT THE DEFERRAL OF 518148 PMRB 2 THE MINOR CORROSION ON THE V070-351957/9 OUTER/INNER FLEXSEAL ATTACH 518148 PMRB 3 RINGS UNTIL POST FLIGHT 25 FOR RESTRICTED LIFE. THE FLEXSEAL ATTACH 518148 PMRB 4 RINGS, ITEMS 1, WERE INSPECTED DURING THE FLOW FOR FLIGHT 22. THE 518148 PMRB 5 INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED PER J/C V30-15381 AND SATISFIED THE V30ED0.025- 518148 PMRB 6 E OMRSD REQUIREMENT. NO DISCREPANCIES AGAINST THE FLEXSEAL RETAINERS 518148 PMRB 7 WERE DOCUMENTED DURING THE RECENT INSPECTION, HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY 518148 PMRB 8 OF SUPERFICIAL CORROSION ON THE FLEXSEAL RETAINERS REMAINS. THEREFORE, 518148 PMRB 9 THIS WAD WILL REMAIN OPEN AND WILL BE DEFERRED, AT WHICH TIME THE 518148 PMRB 10 V070-351957/9 FLEXSEAL ATTACH RINGS WILL BE INSPECTED AGAIN PER J/C 518148 PMRB 11 V30-15381 AND THIS DOCUMENT. ANY CORROSION FOUND WILL BE ADDRESSED AT 518148 PMRB 12 THAT TIME. ANY CORROSION THAT EXISTS IS MINOR AND WILL NOT DEGRADE THE 518148 PMRB 13 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE DMHS INSTALLATION. THESE PARTS WILL 518148 PMRB 14 CONTINUE TO FIT AND FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN 518148 PMRB 15 OF SAFETY. NEITHER THE SAFETY NOR THE RELIABILITY OF THIS INSTALLATION 518148 PMRB 16 HAS BEEN COMPROMISED. THIS MR IS FOR RESTRICTED LIFE. NO MR ID IS 518148 PMRB 17 REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 518148 PMRB 18 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST 518148 PMRB 19 (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 08/05/97 PMRB APPROVED 518148 PMRB 20 FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (BLANKET REMOVAL OR FLT 26) OF OV-103. 518148 1 1 MINOR CORROSION WAS DOCUMENTED ON THE OUTER/INNER FLEX SEAL ATTACH RING 518148 1 2 SEGMENT, P/N V070-351957/9, ON THE DOME HEAT SHIELD OF ENGINE 3 (LH SIDE 518148 1 3 ). THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ORIGINALLY DOCUMENTED DURING THE FLOW FOR FLIGHT 518148 1 4 21 AND WAS DEFERRED UNTIL THE FLOW FOR FLIGHT 23. HOWEVER, DURING THE FL 518148 1 5 OW FOR FLIGHT 23. HOWEVER, DURING THE FLOW FOR FLIGHT 22 J/C V30-15381 W 518148 1 6 AS WORKED WHICH SATISFIED V30EDO.025-E OMRSD REQUIREMENT. NO DISCREPANCI 518148 1 7 ES AGAINST THE ENGINE 3 LH DMHS WERE DOCUMENTED. THEREFOR, THIS WAD WAS 518148 1 8 DEFERRED UNTIL THIS FLOW. THE RING SEGMENTS WERE INSPECTED PER J/C V30-1 518148 1 9 5381 AND THIS DOCUMENT. SURFACE CORROSION WAS FOUND ON THE FLEXIBLE SEAL 518148 1 10 RETAINERS. THE SURFACE CORROSION WAS REMOVED AND NOOTHER DISCREPANCIES W 518148 1 11 ERE DOCUMENTED. PROBABLE CAUSE OF ITEM 1; ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. 518158 1 1 ITEM 1- THE PANEL WAS FOUND WITH SEVERAL DENTS ON THE SURFACE. THEY WERE 518158 1 2 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE ON THIS PR. ITEM 2- THESE DENTS HAD ALREA 518158 1 3 DY BEEN ACCEPTED PER STR-3-07-1259. ITEM 3- THE KOROPON WAS TOUCHED UP. 518158 1 4 NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRA 518158 1 5 DATION. 518224 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: RADIATOR LATCH RIG CHECKS WERE PERFORMED PER IPR 70V-0003 518224 PMRB 2 AFTER PORT RADIATOR LATCH PDU REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT ON THAT WAD. THE O 518224 PMRB 3 VER CENTER DIMENSION MEASURED AT THE PORT RADIATOR 1, AFT CENTERLINE EDG 518224 PMRB 4 E LATCH WAS 0.087". PER MLO308-0162 EO-A01, THE ALLOWABLE OVER CENTER ME 518224 PMRB 5 ASUREMENT USING THE A70-0608 RADIATOR RIGGING TOOL IS A RANGE FROM 0.070 518224 PMRB 6 INCH OVER CENTER TO 0.010" UNDER CENTER. THE INITIAL RIGGING OF THIS LA 518224 PMRB 7 TCH WAS MEASURED AT 0.085" OVER CENTER PRIOR TO PDU REMOVAL (IPR 70V-000 518224 PMRB 8 3). THE ADJUSTABLE ROD END ON THE PUSH ROD ASSEMBLY IS ADJUSTABLE ONLY I 518224 PMRB 9 N HALF TURN INCREMENTS. THIS DISCRETE ADJUSTMENT COULD NOT OBTAIN A VALU 518224 PMRB 10 E IN THE SPECIFIED RANGE. THE INTENT OF THE MAXIMUM ON THE OVER CENTER D 518224 PMRB 11 IMENSION IS TO PREVENT THE LATCH MECHANISM FROM CONTACTING ITS HARD STOP 518224 PMRB 12 WHEN IN THE LATCHED POSITION. THIS ALLOWS THE LATCH TO MOVE FURTHER IN 518224 PMRB 13 THE LATCH DIRECTION DUE TO ANY THERMAL EXPANSION IN THE SYSTEM AND PREVE 518224 PMRB 14 NTS BACK DRIVE OF THE UP STREAM MECHANISM. THE GAP AT THE HARD STOP IS 518224 PMRB 15 0.014". THIS IS SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMODATE ANY MOVEMENT OF THE LATCH DUE 518224 PMRB 16 TO THERMAL EXPANSION. REQUEST MR ACCEPTANCE OF THIS CONDITION FOR 518224 PMRB 17 UNRESTRICTED USE. THIS CONDITION WILL NOT AFFECT THE FIT, SAFETY OR 518224 PMRB 18 FUNCTION OF THE LATCH MECHANISM FOR ITS INTENDED USE. THIS CONDITION 518224 PMRB 19 DOES NOT AFFECT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE, CERTIFICATION, OR HAZARD 518224 PMRB 20 CONTROLS. MR ID IS NOT REQUIRED. 04/18/95, PMRB APPROVED FOR CLOSURE, 518224 PMRB 21 CRIT 1 HARDWARE. 518224 1 1 RADIATOR LATCH RIG CHECKS WERE PERFORMED PER IPR 70V-0003 AFTER PORT RAD 518224 1 2 IATOR LATCH PDU REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT. THE OVER CENTER DIMENSION MEASU 518224 1 3 RED AT THE PORT RADIATOR NUMBER 1, AFT CENTERLINE EDGE LATCH WAS 0.087 I 518224 1 4 NCH. PER MLO308-0162 EO-A01, THE ALLOWABLE OVER CENTER MEASUREMENT USING 518224 1 5 THE A70-0608 RADIATOR RIGGING TOOL IS A RANGE FROM 0.070 INCH OVER CENT 518224 1 6 ER TO 0.010 INCH UNDER CENTER. THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THIS OU 518224 1 7 T OF SPEC CONDITION. THE OUT OF SPEC CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRES 518224 1 8 TRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK OR RETEST IS REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES 518224 1 9 NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 518224 1 10 N. 518352 1 1 DURING V1004 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT RECEPTACLE 30J1393 HAD 3 CHIPS ON TH 518352 1 2 E MATING SURFACE ADJACENT TO PINS 32, 40, AND 47. ENGINEERING INSPECTION 518352 1 3 (LSOC, NASA, AND RI LSS) DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS MINOR CHIPS ON THE O 518352 1 4 UTER EDGE OF THE PHENOLIC SURFACE. THE CHIPS ON THE PHENOLIC SURFACE WIL 518352 1 5 L NOT EFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE MOISTURE SEAL. PER SPECIFICAITON MLO30 518352 1 6 3-0014, PARAGRAPH 6.3.2.9 THIS DISCREPANCY IS ACCEPTABLE. NO FURTHER DIS 518352 1 7 PO IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 518833 1 1 ITEM 1-THE NUTPLATES IN THE BRACKET WERE RELOCATED ACCORDING TO ECL ENGI 518833 1 2 NEERING AND STR ENGINEERING INSTRUCTIONS TO MINIMIZE THE PRELOAD ON THE 518833 1 3 FILTER QD. THIS WAS DONE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABL 518833 1 4 E CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILD UP. ITEMS 2,3,4-THESE DISCREPANCIES DOCUMENTED 518833 1 5 THE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE OCCURRED IF THE REPAIR HAD BEEN PERFORME 518833 1 6 D AS ORIGINALLY DISPO'S. THE REPAIR PROCEDURE WAS CHANGED AND THE CONDIT 518833 1 7 IONS DID NOT OCCUR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. ITEM 5-THIS CONDITIO 518833 1 8 N IS DOCUMENTED ON A WWM PR (REFERENCE ATTACHED COPY) AND WILL BE ADDRES 518833 1 9 SED THERE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. 518844 1 1 ITEM 1 WAS FOUND TO BE PER PRINT. CAUSE INVALID DISCREPANCY. 519061 1 1 ITEM 1: WINDOW 6 EXTERIOR THERMAL FRAME WAS CORROSION PROTECTED WITHOUT 519061 1 2 A VACCUUM BAKE CURE OF TOPCOAT. MR APPROVAL WAS GRANTED FOR THE UNRESTRI 519061 1 3 CTED USE OF THE WINDOW FRAME WITHOUT VACUUM BAKE CURE BECAUSE THE DISCRE 519061 1 4 PANT AREA WAS SMALL AND OFF-GASING EFFECTS ARE NEGLIBLE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 519061 1 5 WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 2: THE PRIMER APPLIED WAS WET-SANDED TO ALLOW FOR THE 519061 1 6 APPLICATION OF BLACK TOPCOAT. PROBABLE CAUSE: EXPIRED SERVICE LIFE. 519189 1 1 (REF ITEMS 1 AND 2 ON PAGE 1): THIS PR DOCUMENTS TWO DISCREPANT RIVETS A 519189 1 2 T RIB SPLICE NUMBER 14 UPPER LESS CARRIER PANEL ATTACH POINTS. THE DISCR 519189 1 3 EPANT FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 519189 1 4 . PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS IMPROPER INSTALLATION-WORKMANSHIP. NO FU 519189 1 5 RTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 519552 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: DURING CLEANING OF AV BAY 1 A SMOKE DETECTOR 519552 PMRB 2 BRACKET WAS FOUND TO BE LOOSE. TWO OF THE FOUR RETAINING SCREWS WERE 519552 PMRB 3 REPLACED WITH THE PROPER GRIP LENGTH FASTENERS AND WERE TORQUED DOWN 519552 PMRB 4 TIGHT. DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS TWO SCREWS COULD NOT BE REPLACED. THESE 519552 PMRB 5 SHANKED OUT SCREWS SHOW THREAD PROTRUSION AND ARE HELD IN PLACE BY THE 519552 PMRB 6 LOCKING FEATURE OF THEIR NUTPLATES. THE BRACKET IS SUFFICIENTLY 519552 PMRB 7 FASTENED AND DOES NOT FLEX OR SHAKE. THE REMAINING TWO SCREWS WILL BE 519552 PMRB 8 CHANGED OUT DURING OMDP WHEN THE AVIONICS BOXES ARE REMOVED AND ACCESS 519552 PMRB 9 IS AVAILABLE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAIN POSITIVE 519552 PMRB 10 ON THIS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. THIS MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 519552 PMRB 11 CERTIFICATION NOR DOES IT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD 519552 PMRB 12 CONTROLS. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED 519552 PMRB 13 LIFE UNTIL J2 OMDP. 05/16/95 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT 519552 PMRB 14 (OMDP-2) OF OV-103. 519552 1 1 A SMOKE DETECTOR MOUNT ON THE FWD BULKHEAD OF AV BAY 1 WAS FOUND TO BE L 519552 1 2 OOSE DUE TO SHANKED OUT SCREWS. TWO SCREWS WERE REPLACED IMMEDIATELY WIT 519552 1 3 H SHORTER SCREWS. 2 OTHER SCREWS COULD NOT BE ACCESSED WHILE AN LRU WAS 519552 1 4 INSTALLED AND THEY WERE DEFERRED FOR ONE FLIGHT. DURING OMDP THESE SCREW 519552 1 5 S WERE ALSO REPLACED WITH SHORTER ONES. THE BRACKET IS NOW SECURELY MOUN 519552 1 6 TED. PROBABLE CAUSE: MFG TOLERANCE BUILDUP. 519609 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT BACKSHELL TANG ON CONNECTO P 519609 1 2 2 WAS LOOSE. SET SCRWE ON BACKSHELL WAS TORQUED 8-12 IN-OZ. PROBABLE CAU 519609 1 3 SE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 519691 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTS OUT OF TOLERANCE GAPS BETWEEN THE V070-198899-002 AND 519691 1 2 V070-199867-002 INSULATORS ON THE R/H RCC NUMBER 9. THE UPPER OUTBOARD I 519691 1 3 NSULATOR ON RH RCC NUMBER 9 WAS REMOVED, SHIMS WERE ADJUSTED TO ACCOMMOD 519691 1 4 ATE FIT OF REPLACEMENT LOWER INSULATOR (INSTALLED PER TES-3-21-016) AND 519691 1 5 THEN INSULATOR WAS RE-INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCESS TOLERANCE. NO F 519691 1 6 URTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 520061 1 1 ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1: THE V070-390022 WINDOW NUMBER 5 OUTER FRAME RETAINER W 520061 1 2 AS FOUND TO HAVE A FEW MINOR SCRATCHES. THE MINOR SCRATCHES WERE MR PAIN 520061 1 3 TED WITHOUT HEAT BAKE CURE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE C 520061 1 4 AUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 520255 1 1 ENGINEERING HAS INSPECTED THE DEFECT NOTED ON ITEM 1 AND HAS DETERMINED 520255 1 2 THAT IT IS NOT A DELAMINATION BUT INSTEAD, A SCRATCH. THIS SCRATCH IS O 520255 1 3 N THE INBOARD SIDE OF THE INBOARD ROTOR OF THE ROB BRAKE ASSY. RI SPEC M 520255 1 4 L0308-0029 ALLOWS (REF EO F07) SCRATCHES/GOUGES UP TO 0.060 IN DEEP. THE 520255 1 5 SCRATCH MEASURED 0.022 IN MAX DEPTH AND IS THEREFORE ACCEPTABLE FOR FLI 520255 1 6 GHT. NO REWORK REQUIRED. LIKE ITEMS ARE NOT AFFECTED AND NO RETEST IS RE 520255 1 7 QUIRED. NO PARTS OF THE BRAKE/WHEEL CONTACT THE SCRATCH OVER ITS ENTIRE 520255 1 8 LENGTH. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 520453 1 1 THE BULB SEAL WAS DAMAGED. AN LRU PR WAS INITIATED TO REWORK THE BULB SE 520453 1 2 AL AT THE HDA. A NEW BULB SEAL WAS PROCURED AND INSTALLED PER PRINT. NO 520453 1 3 FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 520453 1 4 ION. 520567 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT INNER MOLD LINE (IML) MEASUREMENTS OUT 520567 1 2 OF SPEC ON THE R/H VENT DOOR NUMBER 9 AFTER IT HAD BEEN REMOVED TO FACI 520567 1 3 LITATE CORROSION REPAIR PER PR STR-3-A0254. THE VENT DOOR WAS CYCLED TWO 520567 1 4 TIMES AND THE THERMAL BARRIER MASSAGED IN AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN MIL MEAS 520567 1 5 UREMENTS IN SPEC. ATTEMPTS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL AND MECHANICAL LINKAGE ADJU 520567 1 6 STMENTS WERE MADE TO RETURN IML MEASUREMENTS TO SPEC. LINKAGE OVERCENTER 520567 1 7 RIGGING WAS MAINTAINED AND VERIFIED AFTER RIGGIN ADJUSTMENT. MECHANICAL 520567 1 8 RETEST WAS PERFORMED PER V1322, RUN 4. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR 520567 1 9 DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. NO ADDITIONAL RETEST REQU 520567 1 10 IRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 520671 1 1 DURING ELEVON COVER CLOSEOUT INSPECTION, COATING DAMAGE WAS FOUND ON THE 520671 1 2 V070-198874-007 CURTAIN SEAL. THESE NICKS WERE REPAIRED PER MR DISPOSIT 520671 1 3 ION USING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 520671 1 4 . PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP 520671 1 5 OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 520672 1 1 DURING ELEVON COVE CLOSEOUT INSP, COATING DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND ON TH 520672 1 2 E V070-198874-036 CURTAIN SEAL. THESE NICKS WERE REPAIRED PER MR DISPO U 520672 1 3 SING MBO130-119 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PRO 520672 1 4 BABLE CAUSE FOR THE PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR EN 520672 1 5 GINEERING ACTION REQUIRED. 520700 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE OF THE IE HATCH, SEPARATED RTV WAS FOUND ON TWO 520700 1 2 LIMIT SWITCHES, 80A29 AND 80A30. THE LOOSE RTV WAS REMOVED AND 520700 1 3 REPLACED, AND A SUCCESSFUL RETEST OF THE MICROSWITCHES WAS PERFORMED 520700 1 4 PER V1058.003, I/E HATCH FUNCTIONAL. HOWEVER, A PAGE 1A WAS ADDED SINCE 520700 1 5 WHEN THE RTV WAS APPLIED THE LOT NUMBER, DATE AND TIME THE CATALYST WAS 520700 1 6 ADDED, ROOM TEMPERATURE AND RELATIVE HUMIDITY WERE NOT RECORDED AS 520700 1 7 REQUIRED PER MTO 103-502. THIS CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR 520700 1 8 UNRESTRICTED USE. NO ADDITIONAL RETEST REQUIRED. THIS CONDITION DOES 520700 1 9 NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. NO LONGER DOES A PR CONDITION EXISTS. 520700 1 10 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 520701 1 1 DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THE FLIPPER DOOR THE V070-146068-002 BOLT WAS 520701 1 2 FOUND TO BE STRIPPED. A NEW BOLT WAS ORDERED AND KITTED TO BE INSTALLED 520701 1 3 PER THE FLIPPER DOOR INSTALLATION JOB CARD. THE STIPPED BOLT WAS SENT T 520701 1 4 O NSLD FOR REWORK OR SCRAP. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 520799 1 1 THE ITEM 1 DISCREPANCY WAS ELIMINATED BY REMOVING THE DISCREPANT RTV FRO 520799 1 2 M THE GUIDE ASSY THEN REAPPLYING AND INSTALLING PER SPECIFICATION. PROBA 520799 1 3 BLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ERROR. 520819 1 1 THIS PR WAS PICKED UP DURING VISUAL INSPECTION WHEN IT WAS NOTED THAT TH 520819 1 2 E SCREWS THAT HOLD THE STOWAGE CONNECTOR RECEPTACLES TO THE MPM SHOULDER 520819 1 3 DUMMY CONNECTOR PLATE POSED A SHARP EDGE CONCERN. A FLIGHT CREW MEMBER 520819 1 4 INSPECTED SIMILAR HARDWARE ON OV-104 AND VALIDATED THE CONCERN. EO TO FO 520819 1 5 LLOW DISPOSITION WAS APPROVED TO COAT THE EXPOSED ENDS OF THE SCREWS WIT 520819 1 6 H SILICON RUBBER AND AN EO TO DRAWING V082-544624 WAS RELEASED. NO FURTH 520819 1 7 ER WORK OR RETEST IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. THIS CONDITION DOES AFFECT LI 520819 1 8 KE SERIAL NUMBERS AND IS BEING ADDRESSED ACCORDINGLY. PROBABLE CAUSE: 520819 1 9 DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 520830 1 1 THE MR STR-3-07-2050 SHIM BONDED TO THE V070-198320-001 PANEL AT THE INB 520830 1 2 OARD ATTACH POINT FOR THE V070-194123 CARRIER PANEL WAS FOUND TO BE DEBO 520830 1 3 NDED. A NEW SHIM WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED TO THE PANEL. PROBABLE CAUSE 520830 1 4 FOR THIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING A 520830 1 5 CTION REQUIRED. 521231 1 1 THIS SUSPECT PR WAS GENERATED FROM IPR 70V-0037. AC 3 PHASE B BUS TRIPPE 521231 1 2 D DUE TO AN OVERLOAD INDICATION. HOWEVER, DATA ANALYSIS DID NOT SHOW AN 521231 1 3 ACTUAL OVERLOAD ON THE BUS. T/S DETERMINED THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE 521231 1 4 A DISCREPANT OVERLOAD SENSING CIRCUIT IN IDCA 3. IDCA 3 OCN NO F58659 W 521231 1 5 AS REMOVED PER OMI V5C15.003 SEQ 1 AND ROUTED TO HDA FOR SHIPMENT TO VEN 521231 1 6 DOR FOR ANALYSIS. A NEW IDCA 3 OCN NO B33593 WAS INSTALLED PER OMI V5C15 521231 1 7 .003 SEQ 2. A FULL FUNCITONAL RETEST WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED PER TPS 521231 1 8 EPD-3-21-353 MOD 1 ON APRIL 20, 1995. AN EOTF WAS GENERATED TO ALLOW A - 521231 1 9 006 TO BE INSTALLED IN OV-103. CURRENTLY PER DWG V070-763380 HEX NOTE 521231 1 10 10 ONLY OV102 AND OV104 ARE ALLOWED TO HAVE A -006 INSTALLED. PER 521231 1 11 RI-DOWNEY A -006 CAN ALSO BE INSTALLED IN OV103. THE EOTF WILL CORRECT 521231 1 12 THE DWG TO ALLOW A -006 IDCA TO BE INSTALLED IN OV103. 521234 1 1 DURING V9001 (ORBITER POWER UP) AC3 PHASE B BUS TRIPPED DUE TO OVERLOAD 521234 1 2 INDICATION. IPR 70V0037 WAS INITIATED AND TROUBLESHOOTING WAS 521234 1 3 PERFORMED. TROUBLESHOOTING DID NOT ISOLATE THE DISCREPANCY AND THE 521234 1 4 ANOMALY HAS NOT REPEATED ITSELF. BEFORE UPGRADING IPR 70V0037 TO A UA 521234 1 5 IT WAS DETERMINED TO INITIATE SUSPECT PR'S AGAINST IDCA NO.3 (PR 521234 1 6 OEL-3-21-0613) AND INVERTER NO.8 AND ROUTE LRU'S TO RSC FOR INSPECTION. 521234 1 7 AFTER FURTHER RESEARCH IT WAS DETERMINED TO ONLY REMOVE IDCA NO.3. 521234 1 8 INVERTER NO.8 WILL ONLY BE REMOVED IF THE ANOMALY RE-OCCURS. A SIMILAR 521234 1 9 ANOMALY OCCURRED DURING OV103 FLT 17 (IPR 51V-0008/PR OEL-3-17-0413). 521234 1 10 THE INVERTER WAS CHANGED OUT BUT THE IDCA REMAINED IN THE VEHICLE. NSLD 521234 1 11 FOUND NOTHING WRONG WITH THE INVERTER. TROUBLESHOOTING OF INVERTER 8 ON 521234 1 12 IPR 70V-0037 PRODUCED NOMINAL RESULTS. NO OVERLOAD SIGNAL WAS EVER 521234 1 13 DETECTED USING A SCOPEMETER AND THE LINE NOISE ON THE SIGNAL PATH WAS 521234 1 14 SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN THE VOLTAGE REQUIRED BY THE IDCA TO TRIP THE 521234 1 15 BUS. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS BY JSC DETERMINED THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE TO 521234 1 16 BE A FAULTY IDCA NO.3 SENSING CIRCUIT. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 521234 1 17 NO ADDITIONAL DISPO OR RETEST REQUIRED. 521358 PMRB 1 DEFFERALL RATIONALE: MR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE 521358 PMRB 2 "AS-IS" USE OF THE V070-198863-005 SEAL UNTIL THE NEXT PRIMARY SEAL 521358 PMRB 3 PANEL REMOVAL. THE SEAL WAS FOUND TO HAVE SOME OF THE MATERIAL REMOVED 521358 PMRB 4 DUE TO ITS CONTACT WITH THE HINGE FITTING. THE DEGRADED MATERIAL IS 521358 PMRB 5 TEFLON FILM COVERING THE NON SEALING SURFACE AREA. THE TEFLON IS MEANT 521358 PMRB 6 TO REDUCE THE FRICTION BETWEEN THE SEAL AND THE ADJACENT HINGE 521358 PMRB 7 FITTING. THIS DAMAGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE SEALS CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE A 521358 PMRB 8 SECONDARY BARRIER TO FLOW AT THIS LOCATION. SEAL INTEGRITY IS 521358 PMRB 9 MAINTAINED. THIS IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. IT WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION 521358 PMRB 10 PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. MR ID WAS 521358 PMRB 11 ACCOMPLISHED ABOVE. POST FLIGHT DISPO WILL REMOVE & REPLACE SEAL. WHEN 521358 PMRB 12 ACCESS BECOMES AVAILABLE (PRIMARY SEAL PANEL REMOVAL). THIS MR ACTION 521358 PMRB 13 DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS 521358 PMRB 14 MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. 05/02/95, 521358 PMRB 15 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE FLT (PRIMARY SEAL PANEL REMOVAL) 521358 PMRB 16 OF OV-103. 521358 1 1 OPERATION 1 REMOVED LOOSE MATERIAL FROM THE V070-198863-005 SEAL AND SUR 521358 1 2 ROUNDING AREA. THIS PR WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR RESTRICTED USE 'AS IS' AND TR 521358 1 3 ANSFERRED TO THE FUTURE FLIGHT TAIR INDEX. OPERATION 2 VERIFIED REWORK O 521358 1 4 F SEAL AND CLOSED PR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATIO 521358 1 5 N/WEAROUT. 521465 1 1 THE V070-358375-013 SILICONE RUBBER SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE DEBONDED FROM T 521465 1 2 HE V070-358375 DOOR IN SEVERAL PLACES. AFTER THE INITIAL REPAIR (OPERATI 521465 1 3 ON 1) 3 ADDITIONAL DEBONDS AND TWO VOIDS WERE FOUND. THESE WERE REPAIRED 521465 1 4 IN OPERATION 2. IN ALL OPERATIONS, REBONDING OF THE SILICONE RUBBER SEA 521465 1 5 L WAS ACCOMPLISHED USING RTV 560 ADHESIVE IN ACCORDANCE WITH MR APPROVED 521465 1 6 PROCEDURE. THE REPAIR IS MR APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER E 521465 1 7 NGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 521500 PMRB 1 DEFERRAL/MR RATIONALE: MRB CONCURRENCE IS REQUESTED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE 521500 PMRB 2 OF ONE 1170656-3 NLG AXLE NUT AS DESCRIBED PER ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1, 521500 PMRB 3 "AS-IS" FOR ONE FLIGHT. THIS REQUEST WILL ALLOW INSTALLATION AND 521500 PMRB 4 TORQUING OF THE DISCREPANT NUT WITH A BARE METAL LOAD BEARING SURFACE 521500 PMRB 5 (SHOULD HAVE A DRYLUBE LAYER 0.0002" - 0.0005" THICK). THE THREADS ON 521500 PMRB 6 THE DISCREPANT 1170656-3 NLG AXLE NUT HAVE SUFFICIENT DRYLUBE APPLIED 521500 PMRB 7 TO PREVENT ANY DAMAGE TO NLG AXLE THREADS. THE AXLE NUT BEARING SUFACE 521500 PMRB 8 IS HEAT TREATED CRES AND INTERFACES WITH A WASHER COMPOSED OF A 521500 PMRB 9 BERYLLIUM-COPPER ALLOY. THIS WASHER ALSO INTERFACES WITH A DRYLUBE 521500 PMRB 10 COATED CONICAL BUSHING WHICH CENTERS THE NLG WHEEL ON THE AXLE. THE 521500 PMRB 11 INSTALLATION PROCEDURE TORQUES THE NUT TO 500 FT-LBS, BACKS THE NUT OFF 521500 PMRB 12 TO ZERO TORQUE AND THEN RETORQUES TO 425 FT-LBS. ONCE TORQUED, THERE IS 521500 PMRB 13 NO RELATIVE MOTION BETWEEN THESE PARTS. A BARE METAL SURFACE ON THE NLG 521500 PMRB 14 AXLE NUT INTERFACE WILL HAVE A MINIMAL AFFECT TO THE SEATING AND TORQUE 521500 PMRB 15 VALUES USED DURING INSTALLATION AS OPPOSED TO ONE WITH DRYLUBE APPLIED. 521500 PMRB 16 THIS MR CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT SAFETY THE FIT, FORM OR FUNCTION OF 521500 PMRB 17 THIS ITEM FOR IT'S INTENDED PURPOSE. MR-ID IS REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION 521500 PMRB 18 DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR DOES NOT 521500 PMRB 19 IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD 521500 PMRB 20 CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS RESTRICTED LIFE, ONE FLIGHT. DEFERRAL OF 521500 PMRB 21 THIS PR IS REQUESTED FOR ONE FLIGHT TO TRACK REPLACEMENT OF THE 521500 PMRB 22 MR-ACCEPTED 1170656-3 NLG AXLE NUT, WITH A VENDOR REPAIRED ITEM. 521500 PMRB 23 4/28/95, PMRB APPOVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. 521500 1 1 ITEM 1 OF THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT BOTH NLG AXLE NUTS MISSING D 521500 1 2 RYLUBE ON THE BEARING SURFACES THAT INTERFACED WITH THE ADJ WASHER AND C 521500 1 3 ONICAL BUSHING. NEW AXLE NUTS WERE ORDERED, BUT ONLY ONE IN STOCK HAD PE 521500 1 4 R PRINT DRYLUBE APPLIED. THE PER PRINT AXLE NUT WAS INSTALLED AND A DISC 521500 1 5 REPANT ONE WAS MR APPROVED AS IS AND INSTALLED FOR ONE FLIGHT ONLY, FLIG 521500 1 6 HT 21 OF OV-103. THE REMAINING AXLE NUTS (4 EA) WERE ROUTED TO HDA TO BE 521500 1 7 REWORKED OR REPLACED. DURING FLIGHT 22 PROCESSING BOTH AXLE NUTS WERE R 521500 1 8 EMOVED. THE PER PRINT AXLE NUT HAD MISSING DRYLUBE ON LOAD BEARING SURFA 521500 1 9 CE. ITEM 3 WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT DISCREPANCY. TWO NEW AXLE NUTS 521500 1 10 WERE INSTALLED. BOTH DISCREPANT AXLE NUTS WERE ROUTED TO HDA FOR DISPO. 521500 1 11 PR CONDITIONS NO LONGER EXIST. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE EICN NOS. 521500 1 12 NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 2, NOT PER PRINT H/W, 1,3 NORMAL 521500 1 13 WEAR AND TEAR. 521613 1 1 RCC PANEL 9 WAS REMOVED SO THAT 8 COULD ALSO BE REMOVED. RCC 9 WAS REINS 521613 1 2 TALLED AFTER 8 WAS PUT BACK IN PLACE. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDURAL ADJUSTM 521613 1 3 ENT. 522024 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT 5 OF 18 I/E HATCH LATCHES BEING OUT OF 522024 1 2 RIG (LATCH BELLCRANK-TO-PEDESTAL STOP GAPS > 0.030"). THIS CONDITION WA 522024 1 3 S DETECTED DURING TPS MEQ-3-21-232. RIGGING ADJUSTMENTS WERE MADE TO COR 522024 1 4 RECT THE NOTED LATCHES, PLUS ONE OTHER THAT WAS CLOSE TO THE MAXIMUM ALL 522024 1 5 OWABLE GAP. FINAL HATCH LATCH GAP MEASUREMENTS SHOWED ALL 18 TO BE RIGGE 522024 1 6 D PER SPEC (GAPS EQUAL TO OR LESS THAN 0.030"). REFER TO TABLE 2-1 FOR D 522024 1 7 ATA. HATCH MICROSWITCH RIGGING WAS PERFORMED. FASTENERS ON ADJUSTED HARD 522024 1 8 WARE WERE RE-POTTED. OMI V1058.003, I/E HATCH FUNCTIONAL - HORIZONTAL SU 522024 1 9 UCCESSFULLY RETESTED ADJUSTMENTS TO I/E HATCH RIGGING. NO PR CONDITION 522024 1 10 EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE 522024 1 11 CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 522163 1 1 (REF ITEM 1 ON PG 1): THIS PR DOCUMENTS A HI-LOK WITH A GAP UNDER THE HE 522163 1 2 AD. THE FASTENER ATTACHES THE VENT DOOR 8 PLENUM TO THE XO1421 FRAME. TH 522163 1 3 E FASTENER HOLE WAS DRILLED 0.0574" INTO THE AFT EDGE OF THE XO1421 FRAM 522163 1 4 E, THE HI-LOK COLLAR COULD NOT BEAR UPON A FLAT SURFACE. AN MR SPACER WA 522163 1 5 S FABRICATED TO FILL-IN THE 0.225" STEP SO AS TO PROVIDE PROPER SURFACE 522163 1 6 TO ACHIEVE SUFFICIENT BEARING SURFACE. THE SPACER AND OVERSIZED HI-LOK W 522163 1 7 AS INSTALLED PER UNRESTRICTED MR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS BU 522163 1 8 ILD UP OF TOLERANCE. NO FURTHER SHOP OR ENG ACTION REQUIRED. 522196 1 1 THE WIRE HARNESS WAS CHANGED OUT PER SUSPECT PR OEL-3-21-0626. ALCA2 WAS 522196 1 2 CHANGED OUT PER SUSPECT PR OEL-3-21-0625. MPS SCAN RETEST OF THEIR LV62 522196 1 3 VALVE CIRCUIT WAS SUCCESSFULL AND THERE HAS BEEN NO RECURRENCE OF THIS 522196 1 4 ANOMALY. 522223 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: DURING FINAL RADIATOR INSPECTION A TINY METEORITE IMPACT 522223 PMRB 2 WAS FOUND ON LH RADIATOR NUMBER 2. THE TAPE AROUND THE IMPACT WAS 522223 PMRB 3 LIFTED AND MOLDS WERE TAKEN. IT HAS A SMOOTH BOTTOM WITH DIMENSIONS OF 522223 PMRB 4 .016" DIA X .002" DEEP AND IT IS 1-1.5" FROM THE NEAREST FREON TUBE. 522223 PMRB 5 THE EXPOSED FACESHEET WILL BE CORROSION PROTECTED WITH KORPOM AND THE 522223 PMRB 6 TAPE WILL BE PRESSED BACK. REQUEST MRB CONCURRENCE TO ACCEPT ITEM 1 FOR 522223 PMRB 7 UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. THE DEFECT DOES NOT AFFECT THE FORM, FIT, 522223 PMRB 8 FUNCTION OR SAFETY OF THE RADIATOR. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE 522223 PMRB 9 THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL 522223 PMRB 10 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. THE 522223 PMRB 11 RADIATOR IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. DEFERRAL RATIONALE: MRB CONCURRENCE IS 522223 PMRB 12 REQUESTED TO DEFER KOROPON TOUCH-UP OF THE DISCREPANT RADIATOR 522223 PMRB 13 METEORITE IMPACT UNTIL FLIGHT 22 PROCESSING OF OV-103. CONTAMINATION 522223 PMRB 14 CONCERNS AND ACCESS REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO PAYLOAD INSTALLATION AT 522223 PMRB 15 THE PAD (TDRS-G) MAKE PAINT APPLICATION HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE. PAINT 522223 PMRB 16 TOUCH-UP WAS NOT PERFORMED IN THE OPF DUE TO LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE 522223 PMRB 17 PRIOR TO RADIATOR CLEANING AND PAYLOAD BAY DOOR CLOSURE. DECISION TO 522223 PMRB 18 PERFORM PAINT TOUCH-UP AT THE PAD WAS MADE BY LSOC-MEQ, NASA-STR AND 522223 PMRB 19 RI-MEQ. AFTER PLBD'S WERE CLOSED, WAS ADVISED BY LSOC PAYLOADS THAT 522223 PMRB 20 PAINT TOUCH-UP WORK AT THE PAD WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE. NO SAFETY OF 522223 PMRB 21 FLIGHT OR CORROSION CONCERNS REQUIRE PRE-FLIGHT PAINT TOUCH-UP TO THE 522223 PMRB 22 DISCREPANT RADIATOR METEORITE IMPACT, DUE TO ITS SMALL SIZE. 05/05/95 522223 PMRB 23 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. 522223 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING PRE-CLOSEOUT INSPECTIONS OF THE PLBD 522223 1 2 RADIATORS PRIOR TO OPF ROLLOUT OF OV-103/FLIGHT 21 (STS-70) TO DOCUMENT 522223 1 3 A METEORITE STRIKE TO RADIATOR L-2 THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY UNDETECTED. MOLD 522223 1 4 IMPRESSIONS WERE TAKEN TO OBTAIN DEFECT DIMENSIONS. MRB CONCURRENCE WAS 522223 1 5 GIVEN TO ALLOW UNRESTRICTED USE "AS IS" OF THE DISCREPANT DEFECT. 522223 1 6 KOROPON PAINT TOUCHUP OF THE DEFECT WAS DEFERRED FOR ONE FLIGHT, DUE TO 522223 1 7 CONTAMINATION CONCERNS PAYLOAD CHANGEOUT ROOM WITH THE PAYLOAD 522223 1 8 (TDRS-G). PAINT TOUCHUP WAS COMPLETED DURING PRE-PALMDALE OPF 522223 1 9 PROCESSING. PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE 522223 1 10 END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 522223 1 11 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 522224 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: DURING FINAL RADIATOR INSPECTION A TINY METEORITE IMPACT 522224 PMRB 2 WAS FOUND ON RH RADIATOR NUMBER 1. THE TAPE AROUND THE IMPACT WAS 522224 PMRB 3 LIFTED AND MOLDS WERE TAKEN. IT HAS A SMOOTH BOTTOM WITH DIMENSIONS OF 522224 PMRB 4 .03" DIA X .003" DEEP AND IT IS 1-1.5" FROM THE NEAREST FREON TUBE. THE 522224 PMRB 5 EXPOSED FACESHEET WILL BE CORROSION PROTECTED WITH KORPON AND THE TAPE 522224 PMRB 6 WILL BE PRESSED BACK. REQUEST MRB CONCURRENCE TO ACCEPT ITEM 1 FOR 522224 PMRB 7 UNRESTRICTED USE AS IS. THE DEFECT DOES NOT AFFECT THE FORM, FIT, 522224 PMRB 8 FUNCTION OR SAFETY OF THE RADIATOR. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE 522224 PMRB 9 THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL 522224 PMRB 10 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. THE 522224 PMRB 11 RADIATOR IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. DEFERRAL RATIONALE: MRB CONCURRENCE IS 522224 PMRB 12 REQUESTED TO DEFER KOROPON TOUCH-UP OF THE DISCREPANT RADIATOR 522224 PMRB 13 METEORITE IMPACT UNTIL FLIGHT 22 PROCESSING OF OV-103. CONTAMINATION 522224 PMRB 14 CONCERNS AND ACCESS REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO PAYLOAD INSTALLATION AT 522224 PMRB 15 THE PAD (TDRS-G) MAKE PAINT APPLICATION HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE. PAINT 522224 PMRB 16 TOUCH-UP AT THE PAD WAS MADE BY LSOC-MEQ, NASA-STR AND RI-MEQ. AFTER 522224 PMRB 17 PLBD'S WERE CLOSED, WAS ADVISED BY LSOC PAYLOADS THAT PAINT TOUCH-UP 522224 PMRB 18 WORK AT THE PAD WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE. NO SAFETY OF FLIGHT OR 522224 PMRB 19 CORROSION CONCERNS REQUIRE PRE-FLIGHT PAINT TOUCH-UP TO THE DISCREPANT 522224 PMRB 20 RADIATOR METEORITE IMPACT, DUE TO IT'S SMALL SIZE. 05/05/95 PMRB 522224 PMRB 21 APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FLT 22 OF OV-103. 522224 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING PRE-CLOSEOUT INSPECTIONS OF THE PLBD RADIAT 522224 1 2 ORS PRIOR TO OPF ROLLOUT OF OV-103/FLIGHT 21 (STS-70) TO DOCUMENT A METE 522224 1 3 ORITE STRIKE TO RADIATOR R-1 THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY UNDETECTED. MOLD IMPRES 522224 1 4 SIONS WERE TAKEN TO OBTAIN DEFECT DIMENSIONS. MRB CONCURRENCE WAS GIVEN 522224 1 5 TO ALLOW UNRESTRICTED USE 'AS IS' OF THE DISCREPANT DEFECT. KOROPON PAIN 522224 1 6 T TOUCHUP OF THE DEFECT WAS DEFERRED FOR ONE FLIGHT, DUE TO CONTAMINATIO 522224 1 7 N CONCERNS PAYLOAD CHANGEOUT ROOM WITH THE PAYLOAD (TDRS-G). PAINT TOUCH 522224 1 8 UP WAS COMPLETED DURING PRE-PALMDALE OPF PROCESSING. PR CONDITION NO 522224 1 9 LONGER EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. NO 522224 1 10 RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 522575 1 1 DURING S0004, SEQUENCE 02-444, IT WAS NOTICED THAT LH2 UPPER MONOBALL SE 522575 1 2 AL HAD A 1/2" TEAR LOCATED AT CONNECTOR P526. A NEW SEAL WAS OBTAINED TO 522575 1 3 REPLACE DISCREPANT SEAL AND THE DISCREPANT SEAL WAS SENT TO VENDOR FOR 522575 1 4 REFURBISHMENT. THIS RETURNS THE SEAL TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. NO RETEST O 522575 1 5 R FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND 522575 1 6 TEAR. 522748 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 3U46BB20-2 HAD CONDUCTOR 522748 1 2 DAMAGE AT 50P9931 BACKSHELL TANG. CABLE 3U46BB20 WAS REPAIRED BY CUTTIN 522748 1 3 G BEYOND THE DAMAGED AREA AND SPLICING IN A NEW SECTION OF CABLE USING K 522748 1 4 SC SPLICES KSC-0683, 0684, AND 0685 AND RETERMINATING NEW SECTION OF 3U4 522748 1 5 6BB20 TO 50P9931. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. REPAIR RET 522748 1 6 URNS CABLE 3U46BB20 TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 522748 1 7 RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK. 522856 1 1 THE SPRINGS WHICH HOLD IN THE INSERT ON THE LH2 SIDE ET ATTACH FITTING W 522856 1 2 ERE SPRUNG. THEY WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. NO FURTHER WORK TO 522856 1 3 BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 522873 1 1 A SUPERFICIAL GOUGE WAS FOUND AROUND A BOLT HOLE ON THE V070-390072-035 522873 1 2 CARRIER PANEL. THE GOUGE WAS BURNISHED/BLENDED AND CORROSION PROTECTED. 522873 1 3 MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED LIFE WAS GRANTED TO ACCEPT GOUGE AS REPAIRE 522873 1 4 D. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. NO FURTHER ANOMALIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPE 522873 1 5 RATIONAL DEGRADATION. 522891 1 1 DURING V73-10001, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT MONOBALL CONNECTOR 50P535 HAD D 522891 1 2 AMAGED LOCKING TEETH. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO APPLY THREE BEADS OF E 522891 1 3 POXY TO THE CONNECTOR AND THE EXTENSION AND A CONTINUOUS STRIP 360 DEGRE 522891 1 4 ES AROUND THE CONNECTOR EXTENSION COUPLING RING. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RE 522891 1 5 TEST IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 522894 1 1 DURING V76-10002, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT MONOBALL CONNECTOR 50P505 HAD D 522894 1 2 AMAGED LOCKING TEETH. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO APPLY THREE BEADS OF E 522894 1 3 POXY TO THE CONNECTOR AND THE EXTENSION AND A CONTINUOUS STRIP 360 DEGRE 522894 1 4 ES AROUND THE CONNECTOR EXTENSION COUPLING RING. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RE 522894 1 5 TEST IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND T 522894 1 6 EAR. 522895 1 1 WHILE WORKING JOB CARD V76-10002 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR 50P526 522895 1 2 HAD A TEAR IN THE GROMMET AT PIN S. CONNECTOR 50P526 LOT NUMBER 9K57948 522895 1 3 26-24 WAS REMOVED AND A NEW CONNECTOR, LOT NUMBER 9A810-8711-25 WAS INST 522895 1 4 ALLED. A CONTINUTIY CHECK WAS PERFORMED AND SUCCESSFUL. PROBABLE CAUSE: 522895 1 5 UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. THIS RETURNS WIRE HARNESS ASSE 522895 1 6 MBLY TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK OF DEMATE/M 522895 1 7 ATED CONNECTORS. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 522896 1 1 DURING V76-10002, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT MONOBALL CONNECTOR 50P503 HAD D 522896 1 2 AMAGED LOCKING TEETH. MR APPROVAL WAS OBTAINED TO APPLY THREE BEADS OF E 522896 1 3 POXY TO THE CONNECTOR AND THE EXTENSION AND A CONTINUOUS STRIP 360 DEGRE 522896 1 4 ES AROUND THE CONNECTOR EXTENSION COUPLING RING. NO FURTHER ACTION OR RE 522896 1 5 TEST IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND T 522896 1 6 EAR. 522948 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTED A CAPSCREW ON THE LH INBD CARBON BRAKE ASSY THAT WOUL 522948 1 2 D NOT SEAT PROPERLY WHEN TORQUED FOR FLIGHT. EFFORTS TO LOOSEN FIVE REMA 522948 1 3 INING CAPSCREWS AND INSTALL A NEW CAPSCREW WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. THE MC621- 522948 1 4 0075-0001 CARBON BRAKE ASSY IS AN LRU-ITEM. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ENTIRE BRA 522948 1 5 KE ASSY (S/N -13) WAS REMOVED AND ROUTED TO THE NSLD. AT THE NSLD, THE B 522948 1 6 RAKE ASSY WAS DISASSEMBLED AND THE DISCREPANT THREADED INSERT IN THE PLA 522948 1 7 TE ASSY OF THE BRAKE WAS REPAIRED OR REPLACED. THE BRAKE ASSY WAS REASSE 522948 1 8 MBLED RETURNED AND REINSTALLED ON OV-102. ALL 6 CAPSCREWS WERE TORQUED F 522948 1 9 OR FLIGHT NORMALLY. THIS PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. THIS PR DOES 522948 1 10 NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM S/N'S. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 522948 1 11 NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 522956 1 1 WHILE WORKING JC V76-10001, SOCKET A OF CONNECTOR 50P515 FAILED PIN RETE 522956 1 2 NTION TEST. THE SOCKET WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW SOCKET. SOCKE 522956 1 3 T GIVEN TO CAE FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS. LRU PR WRITTEN. A CONTINUITY TEST W 522956 1 4 AS PERFORMED AND SUCCESSFUL. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 522956 1 5 REPAIR RETURNS ASSEMBLY TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. RETEST WILL BE PER SC 522956 1 6 AN TRACK OF DEMATED/MATED CONNECTOR. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. 522969 1 1 REF ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1. THIS PR DOCUMENTS THREE BLIND FASTENERS WITH MISSI 522969 1 2 NG LOCKING COLLARS IN THE R/H WING. THE RIVETS ARE LOCATED AT XW1170 AND 522969 1 3 YW167. THE FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER DRAWING AND SPECIFIC 522969 1 4 ATION REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. NO 522969 1 5 FURTHER SHOP OR ENGINEERING ACTION REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. 523026 1 1 DURING IPR TROUBLESHOOTING ON 70V0042 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE AFT LCA 523026 1 2 2 HAD A DISCREPANT DRIVER. AFT LCA 2 OCN MYF0006 WAS REMOVED AND SPARE L 523026 1 3 CA OCN 94756-MYF0004 WAS INSTALLED. DISCREPANT LCA WAS ROUTED TO HDA FOR 523026 1 4 REPAIR BY VENDOR. EPD RETEST OF LCA WAS PERFORMED AND SUCCESSFUL. NO AD 523026 1 5 DITIONAL DISPO REQUIRED FOR THIS PR. RETEST OF DEMATED CONNECTORS WILL B 523026 1 6 E PER SCAN TRACK. PROBABLE CAUSE: EXPOSED CONDUCTOR ON WIRE 2P774B20 SHO 523026 1 7 RTING AGAINST STR CAUSING THE LCA DRIVER TO FAIL (REF OEL-3-21-0626). 523028 1 1 DURING IPR 70V-0042 TROUBLESHOOTING IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT AFT LCA NO.2 523028 1 2 HAD A BAD DRIVER. PR OEL-3-21-0626 WAS INITIATED BECAUSE OF SUSPECT SHOR 523028 1 3 T ON WIRE 2P774A20 AND/OR 2P774B20. ENGINEERING INSPECTION FOUND CONDUCT 523028 1 4 OR DAMAGE ON WIRE 2P774B20 APPROXIMATELY THREE FEET FROM LH SIDE WALL. 523028 1 5 WIRE 2P774B20 WAS CUT AT LH SIDE WALL AND A NEW WIRE SEGMENT SPLICED IN 523028 1 6 FROM LH SIDE WALL TO CONNECTOR 50P769 USING KSC SPLICE KSC-0677. WIRE SE 523028 1 7 GMENT 2P774B20 AND THREE CLAMPS WERE SENT TO FAILURE ANALYSIS TO DETERMI 523028 1 8 NE IF THE DAMAGED WIRE WAS WHAT CAUSED THE LCA DRIVER TO FAIL. 523028 1 9 WHILE WORKING THIS PR IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 2P859B20 HAD EXPOSED 523028 1 10 CONDUCTOR (ITEM 2). WIRE 2P859B20 WAS REPAIRED BY SHRINKING INSULATOR 523028 1 11 SLEEVE OVER THE DAMAGED AREA PER SRP V-EL-0029. 523028 1 12 WHILE WORKING THIS PR IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BACKSHELL TANG ON 523028 1 13 50P769 WAS BROKEN (ITEM 3). THE DAMAGED BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND A 523028 1 14 SPLIT BACKSHELL INSTALLED PER SRP V-EL-0001. 523028 1 15 WHILE WORKING THIS PR IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE P775D22 GOING TO 523028 1 16 50P769 HAD EXPOSED CONDUCTOR AT THE GND LUG (ITEM 4). THE WIRE WAS CUT 523028 1 17 BEYOND THE DAMAGED AREA AND A NEW GND LUG INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE 523028 1 18 (ITEM 1,2,3,4): UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO ADDITIONAL 523028 1 19 DISPO OR RETEST REQUIRED. RETEST OF DEMATED CONNECTORS WILL BE PER SCAN 523028 1 20 TRACK. 523047 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRES T171A26 HAD KAPTON DAMA 523047 1 2 GE AND SHIELD DAMAGE (ITEM 2). CABLE T171A26 WAS REPAIRED BY WRAPPING TH 523047 1 3 E DAMAGED AREA WITH MYSTIC 7503 TEFLON TAPE PER SRP V-EL-0007-F. IT WAS 523047 1 4 ALSO DISCOVERED THAT T167A26, T174A26 AND T172A26 HAD KAPTON DAMAGE (ITE 523047 1 5 M 1) WITH NO SHIELD DAMAGE (MLO303-0014 EO GO-3). CONVOLUTED TUBING WAS 523047 1 6 INSTALLED ON WIRE HARNESS BUNDLE FROM LH SIDE WALL TO PAST THE 5TH CLAMP 523047 1 7 FROM THE SIDE WALL. CONVOLUTED TUBING WILL PROTECT HARNESS AGAINST ANY 523047 1 8 FUTURE CHAFING DAMAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE DUE TO NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO 523047 1 9 ADDITIONAL DISPO OR RETEST REQUIRED. 523084 1 1 THE DISCREPANT BLINE RIVET WAS REMOVED AND A HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED IN ITS 523084 1 2 PLACE WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DON 523084 1 3 E ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 523100 1 1 DURING V35-10010, WIRE T217A26 WAS THOUGHT TO HAVE CONDUCTOR DAMAGE. END 523100 1 2 INSPECTION BY LSOC & NASA OEL REVEALED THAT WIRE T217A26 HAD ONLY COSME 523100 1 3 TIC DAMAGE AND IS NOT A PR CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO THE NO D 523100 1 4 ISCREPANCY. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. 523114 1 1 NOT A PR CONDITION. 523140 1 1 THE GROUNDING SPRING ON THE V070-855059-001 SHELL ASSEMBLY WAS INSTALLED 523140 1 2 WITH THE SEAM FACING AFT INSTEAD FWD ON A VENDOR MR FL5384-000M. THE SH 523140 1 3 ELL WAS ID'D TO REFLECT THIS. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PRO 523140 1 4 BABLE CAUSE: VENDOR MR. 523229 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AFTER I/E HATCH CLOSURE FOR ROLL TO THE VAB. 523229 1 2 PARTIAL HATCH CLOSURE IS REQUIRED TO INSERT THE HATCH ACTUATOR T-TOOL. 523229 1 3 IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT THE I/E HATCH HOLD-OPEN PAWL MAY HAVE BECOME 523229 1 4 ENGAGED AFTER THE HATCH ACTUATOR T-TOOL WAS INSERTED AND ROTATED TO THE 523229 1 5 UNLATCHED POSITION. IF ENGAGED, THE HOLD-OPEN PAWL COULD HAVE BEEN 523229 1 6 DAMAGED WHEN THE HATCH WAS CLOSED. THE I/E HATCH HOLD-OPEN PAWL WAS 523229 1 7 INSPECTED UPON OPENING IN THE VAB BY A TECHNICIAN AND LSOC AND NASA 523229 1 8 MECHANISMS ENGINEERS. NO DAMAGES WERE NOTED TO THE PAWL ASSEMBLY OR TO 523229 1 9 THE RACHET CAMS THAT INTERFACE THE PAWL. THE PAWL WAS CYCLED (ENGAGED 523229 1 10 AND RELEASED) SEVERAL TIMES WITH NO ANOMALIES. THE PROCEDURE THAT 523229 1 11 CLOSES THE I/E ATCH FOR ROLLOUT (OMI V5067) HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND 523229 1 12 MODIFIED TO REDUCE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO THE I/E HATCH HOLD-OPEN PAWL. NO 523229 1 13 PR CONDITIONS EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL 523229 1 14 NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 523582 1 1 DURING LO2 MONOBALL INSPECTION ON S0004, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THERE WA 523582 1 2 S EXPOSED CONDUCTOR AT A PREVIOUS CLAMSHELL REPAIR AT CONNECTOR 50P537 ( 523582 1 3 NOT 50P502, LH2 CONNECTOR). ENGINEERING EVALUATION REVEALED THAT THE ONL 523582 1 4 Y DAMAGE PRESENT IS PAINT DAMAGE WITH NO EXPOSED CONDUCTOR WHICH IS COSM 523582 1 5 ETIC ONLY AND NOT A REASON FOR A DR/PR SQUAWK. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTI 523582 1 6 ON REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NONE. 523583 1 1 DURING LH2 MONOBALL INSPECTION ON S0004, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THERE WA 523583 1 2 S EXPOSED CONDUCTOR AT GROUND LUGS FOR CONNECTORS 50P502, 50P503 AND 50P 523583 1 3 516. ENGINEERING EVALUATION REVEALED THAT THE ONLY DAMAGE PRESENT IS PAI 523583 1 4 NT DAMAGE WITH NO EXPOSED CONDUCTOR WHICH IS COSMETIC ONLY AND NOT A REA 523583 1 5 SON FOR A DR/PR SQUAWK. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. 523583 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE: NONE. 523617 1 1 DURING V5029.001 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BACKSHELL ON CONNECTOR 50P81 523617 1 2 6 WAS LOOSE. THE BACKSHELL WAS TORQUED TO SPECIFICATION ML0303-0040. PRO 523617 1 3 BABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO ADDITIONAL DIS 523617 1 4 PO OR RETEST REQUIRED. 523684 1 1 DURING S0004, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE KEYED WASHERS ON THE FWD TURNBUCKLE 523684 1 2 ASSEMBLY WAS INSTALLED REVERSED SO THE TEETH WOULD NOT MESH WITH THE TAB 523684 1 3 WASHER TEETH. SAFETY WIRE WAS USED TO SECURE THE UPPER ROD END NUT TO T 523684 1 4 HE UPPER ROD END JAM NUT. THIS WILL PREVENT THE TURNBUCKLE FROM ROTATING 523684 1 5 . NO FURTHER ACTION OR RETEST IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS 523684 1 6 DUE TO WORKMANSHIP. 523749 1 1 DURING S0004 IT WAS DISCOVERED THE BACKSHELL TANG ON 50P512 WAS BROKEN. 523749 1 2 THE DISCREPANT BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND A SPLIT BACKSHELL, P/N ME127-01 523749 1 3 06-0122, INSTALLED PER SRP V-EL-0001-E-0. NO ADDITIONAL DISPOSITION OR R 523749 1 4 ETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER 523749 1 5 . THIS RETURNS ASSEMBLY TO A NON-DESIGN CONDITION THAT DOES NOT ADVERSEL 523749 1 6 Y AFFECT SAFETY, RELIABILITY, DURABILITY, PERFORMANCE, OR INTERCHANGEABI 523749 1 7 LITY. 523758 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRES 2M76C26 AND 2M70D26 WER 523758 1 2 E NOT TERMINATED. PER V070-775992 WIRES 2M76C26 AND 2M70D26 SHOULD BE CA 523758 1 3 P AND STOWED. WIRES WERE CAP AND STOWED PER ML0303-0033. PROBABLE CAUSE: 523758 1 4 WORKMANSHIP. NO ADDITIONAL DISPO OR RETEST REQUIRED. 524686 1 1 THIS PR/IPR WAS THE RESULT OF THE BODYFLAP CHANNEL 4 POSITION TRANSDUCER 524686 1 2 INDICATING 5.43 DEGREES AT FLIGHT CONTROL POWER UP. THE OTHER THREE CHA 524686 1 3 NNELS WERE APPROXIMATELY ZERO DEGREES. THE CHANNEL 4 VALUE CORRESPONDS T 524686 1 4 O THE ELECTRICAL NULL AND IS INDICATIVE OF AN OPEN CIRCUIT CONDITION. IN 524686 1 5 SPECTION OF 50J43 FOUND WIRE 2 HAD BEEN PULLED FROM ITS SOCKET AND THE B 524686 1 6 ACKSHELL HAD BEEN BROKEN. THE SOCKET WAS REMOVED AND A NEW CONTACT CRIMP 524686 1 7 ED ONTO THE WIRE. THE NEW SOCKET WAS REINSERTED INTO THE CONNECTOR AND T 524686 1 8 HE BACKSHELL REPLACE. RETEST WAS SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED AS PART OF S0017 524686 1 9 GNC FLIGHT CONTROL POWER UP (V1123). THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS DISCREPA 524686 1 10 NCY IS WEAR AND TEAR ASSOCIATED WITH VEHICLE PROCESSING. THIS PR MAY BE 524686 1 11 CLOSED. 524702 1 1 THE DOOR WAS REPAIRED BY REMOVING THE OLD PLUG AND DRILLING UP THE HOLE 524702 1 2 WITH A SHOULDER ON THE PROPER SIDE. A NEW PLUG WAS FABRICATED AND PRESS 524702 1 3 FIT IN THE DOOR WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER WORK 524702 1 4 TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS MR, OPERATIONAL DEGRADAT 524702 1 5 ION. 524766 1 1 WAIVER NUMBER WK03294 WAS APPROVED AT THE PERB ON 6/2/95 AND THE PRCB ON 524766 1 2 6/12/95. THIS WAIVER ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT OMRSD V34AB0.010 WAS NOT AC 524766 1 3 COMPLISHED ON THE NOTED FLIGHTS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CA 524766 1 4 USE: PROCEDURE ERROR. 524961 1 1 THIS PR REMOVED THE FRSI PLUGS IN QUESTION THAT WERE INSTALLED DURING V8 524961 1 2 0-95933. THE FRSI PLUGS WERE THEN REINSTALLED WITH NASA INSPECTION AS RE 524961 1 3 QUIRED. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED OF THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCEDUR 524961 1 4 AL ERROR. (QE) A DEV HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO CORRECT THE J/C. 524966 1 1 DURING S0017 THE AFT MCA 1 OP STAT 4 WAS OFF S/B ON. THROUGH TROUBLESHOO 524966 1 2 TING IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT RELAY K49 WAS NOT CYCLING. AFT MCA, P/N V070 524966 1 3 -765410-003, WAS REPLACED PER OMI V5C12.001. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR 524966 1 4 AND TEAR. NO ADDITIONAL DISPOSITION REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN T 524966 1 5 RACK. 525008 1 1 THIS PR WAS UPGRADED FROM AN IPR PICKED UP DURING S0017 AT APPROX T-19 525008 1 2 MINUTES AFTER FORMAT CHANGE. THE ET DOOR FWD CENTERLINE LATCH LOCKED 525008 1 3 INDICATION 1 AND 2 WERE OFF AND SHOULD BE ON. PRE-PLANNED 525008 1 4 TROUBLESHOOTING WAS PERFORMED PER S0007 VOLUME 5 SEQ 116. LOCK COMMANDS 525008 1 5 WERE SENT AND MOTOR 1 OPERATED UNTIL BOTH LIMIT SWITCHES WERE PICKED 525008 1 6 UP. THE CENTERLINE LATCHES WERE MANUALLY LOCKED IN THE OPF AND THE 525008 1 7 LIMIT SWITCHES VERIFIED ON 3/15/95. DATA REVIEW SHOWS THE LAST TIME 525008 1 8 THESE LIMIT SWITCHES WERE ON WAS 4/12/95. ALTHOUGH THIS DOES NOT 525008 1 9 INDICATE WHEN THESE LIMIT SWITCHES TRANSITIONED TO OPF SINCE POWER IS 525008 1 10 NOT ALWAYS ACTIVE TO THESE INDICATIONS. ADDITIONAL TROUBLESHOOTING WAS 525008 1 11 PERFORMED AT THE PAD WHICH DETERMINED THAT THIS CENTERLINE LATCH 525008 1 12 EXHIBITS BACKLASH IF NOT FULLY LOCKED. WHEN FULLY LOCKED THE LATCH 525008 1 13 SHOWED NO SIGN OF BACKLASH WHEN AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ROTATE IT AND 525008 1 14 THE LIMIT SWITCHES STAYED ON. WHEN NOT FULLY LOCKED THE LATCH EXHIBITED 525008 1 15 SOME BACKLASH/FREE PLAY AND A LIMIT SWITCH WENT OFF. IF NOT FULLY 525008 1 16 LOCKED WITH LATCH COULD HAVE BACKED OFF THE LIMIT SWITCHES WHEN THE 525008 1 17 ORBITER WAS ROLLED OUT AND MATED TO THE ET OR DURING ROLLOUT TO THE 525008 1 18 PAD. RECURRENCE CONTROL WILL BE INITIATED TO ASSURE CENTERLINE LATCHES 525008 1 19 ARE FULLY LOCKED IN THE OPF (A BULLETIN WILL BE ISSUED TO THE SHOP). 525008 1 20 THERE IS NO HARDWARE DISCREPANCIES WITH THIS LATCH. THE 525008 1 21 BACKLASH/FREEPLAY EXHIBITED WHEN THE LATCH IS NOT FULLY LOCKED IS 525008 1 22 NORMAL. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS WORKMANSHIP. NO RETEST IS 525008 1 23 REQUIRED. THIS PR WILL NOT AFFECT LIKE S/N'S. 525483 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ACCESS TO THE ET DOOR RTL PAD 525483 1 2 DLES BECAUSE BAGGIES WERE INSTALLED. ACCESS WAS REQUIRED FOR MCA RETEST 525483 1 3 PER MEQ-3-21-233. THE BAGGIES WERE CUT FOR ACCESS THEN REPAIRED PER SRP 525483 1 4 V-ST-0009-A. ALL WORK IS COMPLETE AND PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PRO 525483 1 5 BABLE CAUSE FOR PR WAS AREA ALREADY CLOSED OUT FOR FLIGHT. NO RETEST IS 525483 1 6 REQUIRED. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE SERIAL NUMBERS. 526640 1 1 WHILE TROUBLESHOOTING ON IPR 70V-0070, HIPOT CHECK FROM 50P411 PIN 1 TO 526640 1 2 GND FAILED. IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT WIRE HARNESS V070-775980-001 WAS DISCR 526640 1 3 EPANT. THE WIRE HARNESS WAS REMOVED AND ROUTED TO HDA FOR FAILURE ANALYS 526640 1 4 IS OF HARNESS BY NSLD (ITEM 1). AFTER INSTALLATION NEW WIRE HARNESS A SE 526640 1 5 COND HIPOT WAS PERFORMED AND FAILED FROM 50P411 PIN 1 TO PIN 2 AND GND. 526640 1 6 INSPECTION FOUND CABLE 3F250BB22 WITH SHIELD DAMAGE APPROXIMATELY EIGHT 526640 1 7 FEET FROM 50J552. THE CABLE WAS CUT AT THE DAMAGED AREA AND A NEW SECTIO 526640 1 8 N OF CABLE ROUTED IN FROM DAMAGED AREA TO 50J552 (ITEM 2 PAGE 1A). WHILE 526640 1 9 PERFORMING CONTINUITY CHECK ON PR OEL-3-21-0641 STEP 3-4 CONTINUITY 526640 1 10 FAILED FOR PINS T (17) AND U (18) AT 50P411. INSPECTION OF 50J552 FOUND 526640 1 11 CABLE 3F251BB22-1 AND -2 MISSED PINNED. CABLE WAS EXTRACTED AND PINNED 526640 1 12 CORRECTLY (ITEM 3/4 PAGE 1B). CONNECTOR 50P411 COULD NOT BE MATED DUE 526640 1 13 TO THE CLOCKING OF THE CONNECTOR BACKSHELL ASSEMBLY. THE COUPLING RING 526640 1 14 ON THE CONNECTOR BACKSHELL ASSEMBLY WAS LOOSENED AND ASSEMBLY CLOCKED 526640 1 15 CORRECTLY SO CONNECTOR COULD BE MATED (ITEM 5 PAGE 1C). PROBABLE CAUSE 526640 1 16 ITEM 1: SUSPECT V070-775980-001 TO BE DAMAGED. PROBABLE CAUSE ITEM 2: 526640 1 17 NORMAL WEAR TEAR. PROBABLE CAUSE ITEM 3 & 4: WORKMANSHIP. PROBABLE 526640 1 18 CAUSE ITEM 5: VENDOR. NO ADDITIONAL DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER 526640 1 19 SCAN TRACK OF DEMATED CONNECTORS. 527331 1 1 WHILE WORKING IPR 70V-0070 IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT RECEPTACLE 50J552 COULD 527331 1 2 BE DISCREPANT CAUSING AN OPEN ON TERM 1 OR 2 AND 17 OR 18. RECEPTACLE 5 527331 1 3 0J552 WAS REMOVED AND ROUTED TO HDA FOR FAILURE ANALYSIS. CONTACTS ON TH 527331 1 4 E WIRE TERMINATED TO 50J552 WERE ALSO REMOVED AND ROUTED TO HDA FOR FAIL 527331 1 5 URE ANALYSIS. CONTACTS ON THE WIRES TERMINATED TO 50J552 WERE ALSO REMOV 527331 1 6 ED AND ROUTED TO HDA. NEW RECEPTACLE AND CONTACTS WERE INTALLED. PROBABL 527331 1 7 E CAUSE: SUSPECT PR. NO FURTHER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRAC 527331 1 8 K OF DEMATED CONNECTOR (50P522/J552 WAS DEMATED ON OEL-3-21-0641). 527731 1 1 DURING IPR TROUBLESHOOTING ON 70V-0070 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 3F251 527731 1 2 BB22-1 HAD PAINT DAMAGE AND SCUFFED INSULATION. WIRES 3F251BB22-1 AND -2 527731 1 3 WILL BE REPAIRED PER SRP V-EL-0029-A BY HEAT SHRINKING INSULATOR SLEEVE 527731 1 4 OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. NO FURT 527731 1 5 HER DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE SCAN TRACK OF DEMATED CONNECTOR 50P41 527731 1 6 1 ON IPR 70V-0070. 527783 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BACKSHELL ON CONNECTOR 50 527783 1 2 P13 WAS BROKEN. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS ADDRESSED BY PERFORMING MR APPROVED 527783 1 3 SRP V-EL-0001 TO REMOVE AND REPLACE THE BACKSHELL WITH A SPLIT TYPE. WH 527783 1 4 ILE WORKING THIS PR IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT 50J43 GROMMET WAS TORN FROM P 527783 1 5 IN 2 TO OUTER CIRCUMFERENCE OF THE GROMMET (ITEM 2). 50J43 WAS REPAIRED 527783 1 6 PER SRP V-EL-0013 BY APPLYING RTV TO THE TORN AREA. THIS RETURNS THE CON 527783 1 7 NECTOR TO DESIGN INTENT. NO RETEST OR FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS WA 527783 1 8 D. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 528798 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE WIRES T217A26-1 AND T217A26-3 WERE FOUND TO HAVE EXP 528798 1 2 OSED CONDUCTOR AT THE TANG OF CONNECTOR 50P658. THE NOTED CABLE WAS CUT 528798 1 3 TO ELIMINATE DAMAGED AREA AND NEW CONTACTS WERE INSTALLED. THE CABLE WAS 528798 1 4 THEN REINSERTED INTO 50P658 RETURNING IT TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. RETEST 528798 1 5 WILL BE SCAN TRACKED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS WAD. PROBAB 528798 1 6 LE CAUSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 528832 1 1 DURING WALKDOWN THE SPLIT BACKSHELL ON 50P741 WAS FOUND BROKEN. BACKSHEL 528832 1 2 L WAS REPLACED PER SRP-0001. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMAN 528832 1 3 SHIP. 528856 1 1 WHILE WORKING IPR 70V-0077 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT SOCKET 25 (WIRE 3P1045 528856 1 2 D26) WAS RECESSED ON CONNECTOR 50P324. AFTER EXTRACTING THE WIRE OUT IT 528856 1 3 WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE CONTACT WAS CRIMPED ON INCORRECTLY. WIRE 3P1045D 528856 1 4 26 WAS CUT APPROXIMATELY FOUR INCHES BACK AND A SEGMENT OF WIRE SPLICED 528856 1 5 ON TO EXISTING WIRE (KSC SPLICE 0689) AND NEW CONTACT CRIMPED ON AND REI 528856 1 6 NSERTED TO 50P324. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. NO ADDITIONAL DISPO REQU 528856 1 7 IRED. RETEST WILL BE PER IPR 70V-0077 AND SCAN TRACK OF DEMATED CONNECTO 528856 1 8 R. 530264 1 1 THE MPS LO2 MANIFOLD WAS PRESSURIZED TO 55 +/-5 PSIG. LO2 DP TRANSDUCER 530264 1 2 (MEAS V41P1464A1) INDICATED CORRECTLY. HARD COPY OF CDS DATA IS ATTACHED 530264 1 3 . PROB CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 531804 1 1 DURING V76-5000 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR SAVER P/N: ME414-0630-1 531804 1 2 001 FOR 50V77W1J71 WAS CLOCKED ONE PIN OFF. CONNECTOR SAVER WAS REMOVED 531804 1 3 AND ROUTED TO HDA FOR REPAIR. NEW CONNECTOR SAVER OCN C515037-11 WAS INS 531804 1 4 TALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. NO FURTHER DISPO OR RETEST REQUIRED. 531879 1 1 DURING V76-40001 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONNECTOR SAVER P/N: ME414-0630- 531879 1 2 1003 FOR 50V77W1J53 WAS CLOCKED ONE PIN OFF. CONNECTOR SAVER WAS AND ROU 531879 1 3 TED TO HDA FOR REPAIR. NEW CONNECTOR SAVER WAS INSTALLED PER V76-40001. 531879 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING. NO FURTHER DISPO OR RETEST 531879 1 5 REQUIRED. 531885 1 1 THE DOOR WAS COUNTERSUNK IN THE WRONG LOCATION. A CONICAL WASHER WAS BON 531885 1 2 DED INTO THE COUNTERSINK TO BRING IT UP TO FLUSH. MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRES 531885 1 3 TRICTED USE WAS OBTAINED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABL 531885 1 4 E CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 531974 1 1 V070-565371-007 LH2 ET CURTAIN WAS FOUND TO HAVE A 1" DIAMETER HOLE. THE 531974 1 2 HOLE WAS COMPARED TO FIGURE FROM PR STR-3-20-4925 THAT DOCUMENTS ALL KN 531974 1 3 OWS DISCREPANCIES WITH MESH IN THIS CURTAIN. THIS PR ITEM WAS ALREADY AC 531974 1 4 CEPTED AS HOLE 1 PER PR STR-3-19-4796 (REFERENCE ATTACHED COPY OF FIGURE 531974 1 5 ). PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 532193 1 1 POSSIBLE OVERHEATING OF FORWARD ET ATTACH POINT BEARING PLATE WAS EVALUA 532193 1 2 TED BY ABRADING AREAS WITH BEAR-TEX TO VERIFY ON SURFACE ONLY. RESULTS S 532193 1 3 HOWS DISCOLORATION ON SURFACE ONLY AND WAS REMOVED WITH BEAR-TEX. NO FUR 532193 1 4 THER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS FLIGHT DAMAGE. 532698 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO INSPECT SUSPECTED DAMAGED OR WORN THREADED 532698 1 2 FASTENERS ON THE ORBITER I/E HATCH. THIS INSPECTION WAS IN PARALLEL 532698 1 3 WITH A GSE-PR AGAINST THE A70-0719 I/E HATCH HANDLE. THE THREADED 532698 1 4 FASTENERS ON THE ORBITER I/E HATCH WERE INSPECTED AND NO DISCREPANCIES 532698 1 5 WERE NOTED. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE CAPTIVE FASTENERS ON THE A70-0719 I/E 532698 1 6 HATCH HANDLE WERE ONE GRIP LENGTH TOO LONG. THESE WERE REPLACED WITH 532698 1 7 CORRECT GRIP-LENGTH FASTENERS PER PR A70-0719-01-001-0008. THE A70-0719 532698 1 8 I/E HATCH HANDLE WAS INSTALLED ON THE ORBITER I/E HATCH, USING THE NEW 532698 1 9 CAPTIVE FASTENERS. GSE FIT WAS GOOD, WITH NO GAPS BETWEEN GSE AND THE 532698 1 10 ORBITER I/E HATCH. NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE 532698 1 11 END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: SUSPECT 532698 1 12 CONDITION. 533287 1 1 THIS WAD WAS INITIATED AS A DR TO DOCUMENT DEFECTS ON THE L/H MLG STRUT. 533287 1 2 ITEMS NUMBER 1 AND NUMBER 2 WERE ADDRESSED BY DR DISPOSITION. ITEM 3 DO 533287 1 3 CUMENTED PAINT CHIPS DOWN TO BARE METAL ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE L/H MLG 533287 1 4 STRUT. INSPECTION AND MOLD IMPRESSION ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED EIGHT PAINT CH 533287 1 5 IPS (REF FIG 1-1 AND TABLES 1-1 AND 2-1). NONE WERE OBSERVED TO INTRUDE 533287 1 6 INTO THE METAL OF THE STRUT. PAINT CHIPS WERE CORROSION PROTECTED WITH W 533287 1 7 HITE GLOSS POLYURETHANE PAINT. PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. THIS PR DO 533287 1 8 ES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE 533287 1 9 CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION-TIRE/RUNWAY DEBRIS ON LANDING. 533289 1 1 WHILE WORKING IPR 082V-0002 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 1P628A22-1 HAD I 533289 1 2 NSULATION DAMAGED AT CONNECTOR 50P784 BACKSHELL. WIRES 1P628A22-1/-2 AND 533289 1 3 1P629A22-1/-2 WERE EXTRACTED FROM 50P794 AND CUT BEYOND THE DAMAGED ARE 533289 1 4 A. NEW CONTACTS WERE CRIMPED ON AND WIRES REINSERTED INTO NEW CONNECTOR 533289 1 5 50P784 P/N NC2E10-5SN. AN LRU PR WAS WRITTEN AGAINST OLD CONNECTOR 50P78 533289 1 6 4 AND ROUTED TO HDA FOR POSSIBLE REFURBISHMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL W 533289 1 7 EAR AND TEAR. NO ADDITIONAL DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRAC 533289 1 8 K OF DEMATED CONNECTOR. 534042 1 1 DURING V5B05 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE DUST BOOT ON THE RMS WRIST ELBOW 534042 1 2 PORT AND TV DOWNLINK ENABLE ON PANEL A7U WERE TORN. ENGINEERING INSPECT 534042 1 3 ION BY OEL, NASA AND RI DETERMINED THAT THE DISCREPANCIES FALL WITHIN TH 534042 1 4 E LIMITATIONS OF MLO303-0018, PARAGRAPH 7.4.2. "REPAIR OF TOGGLE SWITCH 534042 1 5 BOOTS SHELL BE CONDUCTED ON PANEL ATTRITION BASIS ONLY. IN GENERAL TOGGL 534042 1 6 E SWITCH BOOT REPAIRS WILL ONLY BE PERFORMED WHEN THE PANEL ASSEMBLY IS 534042 1 7 RETURNED FOR OTHER THAN BOOT REPAIR." PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TE 534042 1 8 AR. NO RETEST OR ADDITIONAL DISPO REQUIRED. 534353 1 1 V070-390458-002 CARRIER PANEL FOR 27-01 DOOR WAS WRITTEN UP HAS HAVING B 534353 1 2 ENT CORNER. THE CORNER WAS BENT BACK PER MR DISPO AND DYE PENETRANT INSP 534353 1 3 ECTED TO VERIFY NO CRACKS EXISTED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADA 534353 1 4 TION. 534372 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: REQUEST MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE 534372 PMRB 2 V070-338915-001 FITTING. IT HAD AN AREA APPROXIMATELY 1/4 INCH SQUARE 534372 PMRB 3 WITH RAISED METAL AND GOUGES .008" DEEP. THESE WERE BURNISHED OUT TO 534372 PMRB 4 LEAVE A SMOOTH METAL. A DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED AND 534372 PMRB 5 SHOWED NO EVIDENCE OF CRACKING. THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED WITH 534372 PMRB 6 CHEM FILM, KOROPON AND GREY TOPCOAT IN LIEU OF THE GRAY ANODIZE 534372 PMRB 7 CALLED OUT ON THE DRAWING. THE INSPECTION YIELDED NO EVIDENCE OF 534372 PMRB 8 CRACKING. THE FITTING IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. IT WILL CONTINUE TO 534372 PMRB 9 FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. NO MR ID 534372 PMRB 10 REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT AFFECT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR 534372 PMRB 11 HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 534372 PMRB 12 CERTIFICATION. 09/12/95 PMRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED "USE AS 534372 PMRB 13 REPAIRED". 534372 1 1 ITEM 1 - THE GOUGE WAS BURNISHED OUT, DYE PEN'ED AND CORROSION PROTECTED 534372 1 2 WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 2 - THE PART WAS REIDENTIF 534372 1 3 IED WITH THE CORRECT PART NUMBER. ITEM 3 - THE THREAD MARKS IN THE HOLE 534372 1 4 WERE BURNISHED OUT. THE HOLE WAS MEASURED AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICT 534372 1 5 ED USE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE - OPERATIONAL 534372 1 6 DEGRADATION. 534508 1 1 THE V070-291495-013 AND THE V070-291494-001 CARRIER PANELS WERE ACCIDENT 534508 1 2 LY REMOVED DURING REMOVAL OF THE 74-01 DOOR. THEY WERE REINSTALLED PER J 534508 1 3 OB CARD. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP 534509 1 1 THE V070-291495-013 AND THE V070-291494-001 CARRIER PANELS WERE ACCIDENT 534509 1 2 LY REMOVED DURING REMOVAL OF THE 74-01 DOOR. THEY WERE REINSTALLED PER J 534509 1 3 OB CARD IN ACCORDANCE WITH STR-3-22-5149. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON 534509 1 4 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 534930 1 1 ITEM 1, WHILE WORKING TPS CE-3-22-173 THE SED39110201-301 CONTAINER DID 534930 1 2 NOT FIT THE ATTACHING RACK. A DIFFERENT CONTAINER WAS TRIED WITH THE SAM 534930 1 3 E RESULTS. THIS PR WAS CHANGED TO A STRUCTURES PR STR-3-22-5169 BECAUSE 534930 1 4 IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE FRAMES WERE BENT AND CAUSING THE PRELOAD. A I 534930 1 5 NTERIM DISPO TO REMOVE THE R11 CONSOLE AND RECORD THE MAX DEVIATION AT T 534930 1 6 HE CENTER OF THE FRAME MEASURED .12". MEASURED THE OTBD PINS AND HOLE. T 534930 1 7 HE BUSHING MEASURED .5002 AND PIN MEASURED .498. CONTINUED MEASURING THE 534930 1 8 BUSHINGS FOR R12 AND R11, RECORDED AS FOLLOWS: R12 FWD .5002, R11 AFT . 534930 1 9 5000, FWD .5002. THE PINS MESAURED R12 FWD .497, R11 AFT .4955 AND FWD 534930 1 10 .497. THE BUSHINGS WERE REAMED TO . 534930 1 11 -5045-.5052 ON R11/R12 CONSOLES. ITEM 002, THE BUSHINGS WERE OUT OF 534930 1 12 ALIGNMENT WHICH WAS CAUSING THE TWISTED CONDITION. ADDITIONAL 534930 1 13 MEASUREMENTS WERE REQUESTED AND RECORDED ON PG 14 AND 15 OF THIS PR 534930 1 14 WITH DIRECTION TO REMOVE FASTENERS AS REQUIRED. VOIDED PGS 16-18. A 534930 1 15 REVIEW OF THE DIMENSIONAL DATA ON PG 15 MADE IT NECESSARY TO ELONGATE 534930 1 16 THE HOLE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE MISS MATCH AS SHOWN ON PG 21. 534930 1 17 REINSTALLED V070-333806 PINS MD114-3001-1008 NUT AND NAS1587 WASHER 2 PL 534930 1 18 ACES RECORDED TORQUED TO 350" LBS. ITEM 003, UNAUTHORIZED WORK WAS DONE 534930 1 19 BY TECH S14 WITHOUT NASA QA OR ROCKWELL QC CONCURRENCE ON SEQ 13, 534930 1 20 CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THIS OVER SIGHT WAS THE EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN TOLD OF 534930 1 21 THE PROCEDURE ONE MUST GO THRU AND TO REVIEW THE DISPO INSTRUCTIONS. 534930 1 22 THE V070-339607 AND V070-339623 CONTAINER COULD BE ASSEMBLED. A FIT 534930 1 23 CHECK IN SIDE THE VEHICLE WITH THE CLOSE OUT COVERS, R11, R12 534930 1 24 CONTAINERS AND THE FRAME ASSY WAS NECESSARY TO VERIFY THE FIT. INTERIM 534930 1 25 DISPO TO USE THE TOOLING TO VERIFY THE HOLE ALIGNMENT COULD NOT BE 534930 1 26 PERFORMED BECAUSE OF THE ASSEMBLED STATE OR SEQUENCE OF ASSY. SINCE THE 534930 1 27 TOOLING WAS NOT AVAILABLE THE SUPPORTING STRUCTURE WAS DISASSEMBLED 534930 1 28 INSIDE THE VEHICLE A PIECE AT A TIME UNTIL AN EXAMINATION OF THE 534930 1 29 STRUCTURE REVEALED A SUSPECTED NON CONFORMANCE CONDITION. THE FOLLOWING 534930 1 30 FASTENERS AND PARTS WERE LOOSENED AND RETAINED FOR REINSTALLATION. (1) 534930 1 31 MD111-4001-0409 BOLT, NAS1587-4 WASHER, PINS V070-333806, STRUTS 534930 1 32 V070-339608, (1) MD114-1002-0513 SCREW, NAS 1578-5 WASHER AND 534930 1 33 MD14-1002-0005 NUT. MEASURED THE FOLLOWING LENGTH OF THE STRUTS, 22.5" 534930 1 34 (AFT STRUT), TEMPORARILY INSTALLED THE AFT STRUT TO DISENGAGE THE FWD 534930 1 35 STRUT AND MEASURE ITS LENGTH TO 22.4". TEMPORARILY INSTALLED FASTENERS 534930 1 36 TO HOLD ASSY IN PLACE. FROM THE FWD STRUT REMOVE FASTENERS AS REQUIRED 534930 1 37 ATTACHING V719-79311 BRACKET AND FROM THE AFT SECTION ON THE R-13 534930 1 38 PANEL. ADJUST STRUT AS REQUIRED TO PERMIT R-12 CONTAINER TO FIT WITHOUT 534930 1 39 ANY INTERFERENCE. WITH THE STRUTS LOOSENED THE R-12 CONTAINER FITS. 534930 1 40 REMOVE THE R-13 AND ASSOCIATED LRU EQUIPMENT RETAINING H/W FOR 534930 1 41 REINSTALLATION. ATTACH 'D' DESCRIBES THE DEMATE FOR R-13. REMOVED 534930 1 42 V070-339646-001 STRUT, PLUGGED THE INBD AFT DIAGONAL STRUT FLUSH AND 534930 1 43 INDEXED THE MISALIGNED HOLE ON THE STRUT. THE STRUT WA TRIMMED IN HJALF 534930 1 44 TO EXTEND IT TO THE LENGTH TO REMOVE THE PRELOAD. THIS EXTENSION HAD TO 534930 1 45 BE APPROVED BY PMRB ACTION. FABRICATED THREE DOUBLERS AND RIVETED TO 534930 1 46 THE STRUT AFTER DETERMINING THE PROPER LENGTH. THE RECORDED EXTENSION 534930 1 47 IS .25". THIS REPAIR RESTRICTED THIS PART TO THE OV-103 ONLY. REDRILLED 534930 1 48 .190-.194 INBD SIDE THRU THE INDEX MARK AND INSTALLED H/W TORQUED TO 30" 534930 1 49 ED HOLES. INSTATED WRAPPING WAS CAUSED BY MR BC0144-000M. PLUGGED THE 534930 1 50 EXISTING .250 HOLD AFT ATTACH (V070-333705) AND V070-338607 AND 534930 1 51 INSTALLED MD111-3001-0408 SCREW AND NAS 1587-4 WASHER. TORQUE TO 53" 534930 1 52 LBS. REINSTALLED R-11 MATE PER ATTACH 'C' TORQUED FASTENERS TO 30" LBS. 534930 1 53 INSTALLED 4 CLAMPS ON DIAGONAL TORQUED SCREWS TO 30" LBS. REINSTALLED 534930 1 54 THE FOLLOWING LRU'S REMOVED PER STEP 41.1 TORQUED FASTENERS PER 76" 534930 1 55 LBS: 2294824-506, 2294823-502, MC434-0283-0003, AND CLAMPS REMOVED PER 534930 1 56 STEP 41.2 WAS TORQUED TO 30" LBS. REINSTALLED H/W THAT WAS TEMPORARILY 534930 1 57 INSTALLED ON V070-339608 ITEM 57 & 58. RETORQUED V070-333808 534930 1 58 TEMPORARILY INSTALLED 2 PLACES TO RECORDED TO TORQUE OF 350" LBS 534930 1 59 REAPPLIED CONFORMAL COATING PER MAO106-330. REINSTALLED FASTENERS FOR 534930 1 60 V070-339646 TORQUING TO 30" LBS. PMRB APPROVED: ITEM 004: THE PANEL 534930 1 61 V070-339616 HAS A RIDING CONDITION ON TOP FLANGE. REMOVE THE RIGING 534930 1 62 CONDITION FOR OV-103 ONLY. REVISED BLOCK 6,7,8,11 TO REFLECT 534930 1 63 V070-339602-045 AS REQUIRED. THE V070-333705 FRAME WAS TRIMMED A 534930 1 64 MINIMAL AMOUNT TO PERMIT THE PANEL TO BE INSTALLED WITHOUT 534930 1 65 INTERFERENCE. CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO601-301. ITEM 005: UPPER EDGE 534930 1 66 OF PANEL HAS AN OVERLAP WHICH WOULD NOT PERMIT THE PANEL TO BE 534930 1 67 INSTALLED. TRIM THE UPPER EDGE OF PANEL A MIN AMOUNT TO REMOVE THE 534930 1 68 RIDING CONDITION. CORROSION PROTECTION PER MAO104-301. ITEM 006: AFTER 534930 1 69 REWORKING THE PANEL (V070-333705) 8 HOLES WERE MISALIGNED TO THE 534930 1 70 STRUCTURES RECEPTACLES. ON V070-339607 FRAME THE RECEPTACLES WERE 534930 1 71 REMOVED AND SCRAPPED LOCALLY EXCEPT ME128-0034-0805 (NOT IN STOCK) WAS 534930 1 72 RETAINED FOR REINSTALLATION. OBTAINED 2 ME128-0034-0806, 2 534930 1 73 ME128-0034-0803 AND 3 ME128-0028-0803 RECEPTACLES FOR INSTALLATION. 534930 1 74 HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH 8 MD121-0002-08XX AND 16 MD121-0002-03XX CSUNK 534930 1 75 LIGHTLY AND INSTALLED FLUSH BOTH SIDE. CORROSION PROTECTION PER 534930 1 76 MAO608-301. FABRICATED 4 MR DOUBLER 2 MR -005, 1 MR -007 AND 1 MR -009 534930 1 77 MADE FROM 2024-T3 QQ-A-250/4. ID BAG AND TAG. DOUBLER WAS BONDED PER 534930 1 78 MAO106-305 USING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE GRADE 'B'. SHORE 'D' HARDNESS 534930 1 79 REQUIRED MINIS 70, RECORDED A ACCEPTABLE 78. THE V070-339614 PANEL WAS 534930 1 80 INSTALLED IN PLACE TEMPORARILY TO LOCATE THE FASTENER HOLE AND DRILL 534930 1 81 THRU TO RELOCATE THE MISALGN 534930 1 82 ED HOLES. INSTALLED THE RECEPTACLES OBTAINED AND RETAINED WITH 16 534930 1 83 MD121-0002-03XX RIVETS. CORROSION PROTECTION PER MAO608-301 AND 534930 1 84 IDENTIFIED WITH THIS MR NUMBER. PROBABLE CAUSE: INITIAL BUILD UP TO 534930 1 85 AVOID QE INTERFERING WITH OTHER ITEMS (REF BC0144-000M). 534983 1 1 ITEM 1: LUMINOUS CEILING PANEL FASTENER AT LOCATION 123 WAS FOUND TO BE 534983 1 2 TOO SHORT. A LONGER FASTENER WAS INSTALLED WHICH IS AUTHORIZED BY DRAWIN 534983 1 3 G V070-730031, EO E03. ITEM 2: THIS ITEM DOCUMENTS TOO LONG A FASTENER I 534983 1 4 NSTALLED AT LOCATION 108. DRAWING V070-730031 EO E03 AUTHORIZES GOING UP 534983 1 5 OR DOWN 2 GRIP LENGTH PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR. 535598 1 1 CHIPPED POLYIMIDE SEAL AT -YW212 WAS SCRAPPED AND REPLACED. IT WAS REMOV 535598 1 2 ED AND INSTALLED PER STR-3-22-715. PROBABLE CAUSE: FLIGHT DAMAGE. 535599 1 1 THE CONDITIONS NOTED AS ITEMS 1 AND 2 WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED U 535599 1 2 SE. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL D 535599 1 3 EGRADATION. 535675 1 1 THE CONDITIONS NOTED AS ITEMS 1 & 2 WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED US 535675 1 2 E. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DE 535675 1 3 GRADATION. 535677 1 1 DEGRADED POLYIMIDE SEAL SET WAS ROUTED TO HDA FOR DISPO AND NEW PART V07 535677 1 2 0-198546-002 WAS ORDERED AND KITTED WITH PRIMARY SEAL FOR INSTALLATION. 535677 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE IS FLIGHT. 535678 1 1 THE LH OUTBOARD ELEVON BLOCK SEAL WAS GRADED (ITEM 1). AN LRU PR WAS INI 535678 1 2 TIATED TO DISPOSE OF THE SEAL WHILE A REPLACEMENT WAS OBTAINED AND INSTA 535678 1 3 LLED PER STR-3-22-706. PROBABLE CAUSE: FLIGHT. POTENTIAL FLOW PATHS WERE 535678 1 4 EVIDENT AFTER INSTALLATION PER ENGINEERING EVALUATION. MRB APPROVAL WAS 535678 1 5 OBTAINED TO SLIT THE SEAL AT THE POLY SEAL/HOUSING INTERFACE. THE ENDS 535678 1 6 WERE ALSO SCREEDED PER THE PRINT REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE 535678 1 7 BUILD UP "O" CAUSE CODE. 535822 1 1 THE V070-855059-001 LINER, OCN EW1826, HAS 2 GROUNDING CLIPS BROKEN OFF 535822 1 2 AND FLATTENED CLIPS. THESE CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED BY 535822 1 3 STR-5-07-1314. THIS MR NUMBER IS STAMPED ON THE SHELL. 535838 1 1 THE DISCREPANT COLUMBIUM SEAL SET NOTED IN ITEM 1 ON PAGE 1 WAS REMOVED 535838 1 2 AND REPLACED WITH A NEW V070-198771-002 SEAL SET. THE FIXED HALF OF THE 535838 1 3 SEAL SET WAS INSTALLED WITH HARDWARE PER MA0101-301, AND CORROSION PROTE 535838 1 4 CTED PER MA0608-301 CODE 08-AA-28-XX. THE FLOATING HALF WAS KITTED TO BE 535838 1 5 INSTALLED PER STR-3-22-706. A LRU PR WAS INITIATED ON THE DISCREPANT SE 535838 1 6 AL SET WITH A RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION TO ROUTE IT TO THE NSLD FOR COATIN 535838 1 7 G REFURBISHMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISCREPANCY IS FLIGHT. 535842 1 1 DEGRADED POLYIMIDE SEAL SET WAS ROUTED TO HDA FOR DISPO AND NEW PART V07 535842 1 2 0-198546-001 WAS ORDERED AND KITTED WITH PRIMARY SEAL FOR INSTALLATION. 535842 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE IS FLIGHT. 535845 1 1 THE CONDITION NOTED AS ITEM 1 WAS PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTE 535845 1 2 D USE ON STR-3-17-4619. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. THE SAME 535845 1 3 SEAL IS NOTED IN BOTH PR'S. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS MR. 535846 1 1 THE CONDITION NOTED AS ITEM 1 WAS PREVIOUSLY MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTE 535846 1 2 D USE ON STR-3-16-4505. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE 535846 1 3 CAUSE: PREVIOUS MR. 535884 1 1 V070-198707-008 INBOARD SIDE SEAL FOR FLIPPER DOOR 12 WAS FOUND TO HAVE 535884 1 2 MINOR CRIMPED AREA ON SEAL LEADING EDGE RADIUS THAT WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR 535884 1 3 UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 535888 1 1 THE DISCREPANT BULKHEAD STAND-OFF BRACKET (P/N: T01P31371-005) WAS REMOV 535888 1 2 ED AND LOCALLY SCRAPPED. A NEW BRACKET HAS BEEN INSTALLED. THIS PR HAS R 535888 1 3 ETURNED THE VEHICLE TO PRINT AND NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 535888 1 4 WORKMANSHIP. 535889 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING TPS MEQ-3-22-241 TO DOCUMENT MINOR RADIATOR 535889 1 2 TAPE DAMAGE INCURRED DURING RADIATOR DRIVE LINK REMOVAL. ITEM 1 IS NO L 535889 1 3 ONGER A PR CONDITION DUE TO THE NEW REV OF MF0004-092 FAIR WEAR AND TEAR 535889 1 4 SPEC AND HAS BEEN LOGGED INTO THE DATA BASE AND DING MAP. RADIATOR TAPE 535889 1 5 DEFECT TO BE REPAIRED AT PALMDALE DURING OMDP. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANS 535889 1 6 HIP. 536136 1 1 MODAL TESTING RESULTS INDICATED AN INCREASE IN FREQUENCY RESPONSE FOR TH 536136 1 2 E LOCAL ROTATION MODE OF THE BODY FLAP. THE INCREASE WAS APPROXIMATELY 1 536136 1 3 4.2% FROM THE BASELINE FREQUENCY WHICH EXCEEDED THE OMRSD CRITERIA OF NM 536136 1 4 T +/- 10% DEVIATION. UNRESTRICTED MR ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE WAS DEVELOPED 536136 1 5 FOR THIS CONDITION BASED ON SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH ASSURE THAT NO ACTUAL 536136 1 6 STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION IS INDICATED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS THE RERIGGING OF 536136 1 7 THE ACTUATOR SYSTEM. 536388 1 1 ITEM 1 IS A PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED ON PR MEQ-3-A0076 AND IT WILL BE ADDRE 536388 1 2 SSED ON THAT PR. ITEM 2 IS NO LONGER A PR CONDITION DUE TO A NEW REV OF 536388 1 3 MF0004-092 FAIR WEAR AND TEAR SPEC AND HAS BEEN LOGGED INTO THE DATABASE 536388 1 4 AND DING MAP. RADIATOR TAPE DEFECTS WILL BE REPAIRED/ADDRESSED AT OMDP 536388 1 5 IN PALMDALE: PROBABLE CAUSE: FLIGHT DAMAGE. 536391 1 1 SILVER TAPE WAS REMOVED TO EXPOSE DAMAGE TO FACE SHEET. MR MEQ-3-22-0887 536391 1 2 -001 DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED OVER FACE SHEET DAMAGE. NEW SILVE 536391 1 3 R TAPE WAS APPLIED COVERING REPAIRED AREA. TORN TAPE WAS REMOVED AND REP 536391 1 4 LACED WITH NEW TAPE. REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CAU 536391 1 5 SE: WEAR AND TEAR. 536596 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT CHIPS AND CRACKS NOTED IN THE CARBON 536596 1 2 ROTORS OF THE L/H INBD BRAKE ASSEMBLY ON OV-103 (MC621-0075-0001 S/N 536596 1 3 0033). THE DEFECTS WERE MEASURED AND RECORDED IN TABLE 1-1. THE BRAKE 536596 1 4 ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED FOR STANDARD PRE-PALMDALE OMDP PREPARATIONS TO 536596 1 5 DELIVER THE BRAKE TO THE NSLD FOR RECERTIFICATION. A LRU-PR WAS 536596 1 6 INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE DISCREPANT CONDITIONS. A LRU-PR WAS INITIATED 536596 1 7 TO DOCUMENT THE DISCREPANT CONDITIONS AND ALERT THE NSLD TO ADDRESS 536596 1 8 THESE CONDITIONS BY EITHER MR ACCEPTANCE PER MLO308-0029, EO F07, OR 536596 1 9 RETURN TO VENDOR FOR REPAIR/REPLACEMENT OF CARBON COMPONENTS. NO 536596 1 10 ORBITER PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR DOES AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL 536596 1 11 NUMBERS THAT ARE DOCUMENTED BY SEPARATE PR'S. NO RETEST REQUIRED. 536596 1 12 PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR/OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 536598 1 1 SILVER TAPE WAS REMOVED TO EXPOSE DAMAGE TO FACE SHEET. MR MEQ-3-22-0889 536598 1 2 -001 COUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED OVER FACE SHEET DAMAGE. NEW SILVE 536598 1 3 R TAPE WAS APPLIED COVERING REPAIRED AREA. PEELING TAPE WAS REMOVED AND 536598 1 4 REPLACED WITH NEW TAPE. REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 536598 1 5 CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 536612 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BACKSHELL TANG WAS BROKEN 536612 1 2 ON CONNECTOR 90V77W1P419. THE BROKEN BACKSHELL WAS REPLACED WITH A SPLI 536612 1 3 T TYPE, P/N ME127-0106-4110, PER SRP V-EL-0001-E-0. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAV 536612 1 4 OIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO FURTHER DISPO OR RETEST REQUIRE 536612 1 5 D. 536616 1 1 TAPE WAS REMOVED FROM RADIATOR PANEL TO EXPOSE DAMAGE NOTED IN NONCONFOR 536616 1 2 MANCE ON PG 1. MR MEQ-3-J2-0890-001 DOUBLERS WERE FABRICATED AND BONDED 536616 1 3 OVER SKIN DAMAGE. SILVER TAPE (207-9-428 TYPE 4) WAS REPLACED OVER REWOR 536616 1 4 KED AREA. REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CAUSE: WEAR AN 536616 1 5 D TEAR. 536649 1 1 GALLED BOLT WAS SCRAPPED LOCALLY. A NEW BOLT WAS OBTAINED AND RETAINED W 536649 1 2 ITH POD HARDWARE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 536651 1 1 GALLED BOLT WAS SCRAPPED LOCALLY. A NEW BOLT WAS OBTAINED AND RETAINED W 536651 1 2 ITH POD HARDWARE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 536663 1 1 GALLED BOLT WAS SCRAPPED LOCALLY. A NEW BOLT WAS OBTAINED AND RETAINED W 536663 1 2 ITH POD HARDWARE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 536749 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT CHIPS, SCRATCHES AND DISCOLORATION 536749 1 2 NOTED IN/ON THE CARBON ROTORS OF THE L/H OUTBD BRAKE ASSEMBLY ON OV-103 536749 1 3 (MC621-0075-0001 S/N 0029). THE DEFECTS WERE MEASURED AND RECORDED IN 536749 1 4 TABLE 1-1. THE BRAKE ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED FOR STANDARD PRE-PALMDALE 536749 1 5 OMDP PREPARATIONS TO DELIVER THE BRAKE TO THE NSLD FOR RECERTIFICATION. 536749 1 6 A LRU-PR WAS INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE DISCREPANT CONDITIONS AND ALERT 536749 1 7 THE NSLD TO ADDRESS THESE CONDITIONS BY EITHER MR ACCEPTANCE PER 536749 1 8 MLO308-0029, EO F07, OR RETURN TO VENDOR FOR REPAIR/REPLACEMENT OF 536749 1 9 CARBON COMPONENTS. NO ORBITER PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR DOES AFFECT 536749 1 10 LIKE END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS THAT ARE DOCUMENTED BY SEPARATE PR'S. NO 536749 1 11 RETEST REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR/OPERATIONAL 536749 1 12 DEGRADATION. 536804 1 1 WHILE WORKING WWM-3-22-004, TANK D OUTLET VALVE DID NOT CYCLE OPEN. THRO 536804 1 2 UGH TROUBLESHOOTING IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 1E382B22-1 WAS CUT IN HA 536804 1 3 LF AT 90P408. WIRES GOING TO 90P408 WERE CUT EVEN WITH 1E383B22-1 AND WI 536804 1 4 RES RETERMINATED TO 904P08. DURING REMOVAL OF 90P408 BACKSHELL THE BACKS 536804 1 5 HELL WAS DAMAGED. THE DAMAGED BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED AND NEW BACKSHELL NL 536804 1 6 S-RCT-10 WAS INSTALLED. RETEST OF THE TANK D OUTLET VALVE WAS PERFORMED 536804 1 7 AND VALVE FUNCTIONED NOMINALLY. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCES 536804 1 8 SING THE ORBITER. 536805 1 1 ITEM 1 PG 1: 2 EA 70C6638-1 BRACKETS WERE WRITTEN UP AS BEING DAMAGED. B 536805 1 2 RACKETS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. ITEM 2 PG 1: 2 EA 70C6638-1 536805 1 3 BRACKETS WERE WRITTEN UP AS BEING DAMAGED. BRACKETS WERE REMOVED AND RE 536805 1 4 PLACED PER PRINT. ITEM 3 PG 1A: 1 EA 70C6638-1 BRACKET WAS WRITTEN UP AS 536805 1 5 BEING DAMAGED. BRACKET WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. PROBABLE CAU 536805 1 6 SE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 536843 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: THE SRP WILL TAPE THE BULB SEAL TO THE FOOT USING TEFLON 536843 PMRB 2 TAPE. THIS WILL REPLACE THE PARTIAL LOSS OF THE BOND LINE FOR THE BULB 536843 PMRB 3 SEAL. ITEM 15 IS LESS THAN 2 INCHES IN LENGTH. THE REPAIR OF THE TUBE 536843 PMRB 4 TO FOOT DEBOND USING THE SRP WILL RETURN THE SEAL TO AN ACCEPTABLE BUT 536843 PMRB 5 NOT PER PRINT CONDITION. THIS MR CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT THE FIT, 536843 PMRB 6 FUNCTION OR SAFETY OF THIS ITEM FOR ITS INTENDED PURPOSE. NO MR ID IS 536843 PMRB 7 REQUIRED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 536843 PMRB 8 CERTIFICATION. THIS MR DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) 536843 PMRB 9 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. THIS MR ACTION IS FOR 536843 PMRB 10 UNRESTRICTED USE. 01/14/97 PMRB APPROVED FOR UNRESTRICTED "USE AS 536843 PMRB 11 REPAIRED". 536843 1 1 REF ITEM 1, THE DEBONDED SPLICES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER THE LRU 536843 1 2 OMI. THE SPLIT TUBE WAS REPAIRED PER SRP TAPE REPAIR AND THE WRINKLE IS 536843 1 3 ACCEPTABLE PER FAIR WEAR AND TEAR SPEC. REF ITEM 2,4,6,7 AND 9,ALL WERE 536843 1 4 REPAIRED USING SRP TAPE REPAIRS. REF ITEM 3 AND 5, BOTH ARE DEBONDED 536843 1 5 SPLICES WHICH WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER THE LRU OMI. REF ITEM 8, 536843 1 6 WIRE MESH WAS BENT TORWARD THE CENTER OF THE TUBE AND THE PUNCTURE WAS 536843 1 7 MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. REF ITEM 10,11,15 AND 17, MR 536843 1 8 ACCEPTANCE WAS OBTAINED TO REPAIR PER THE SRP TAPE REPAIR AND TO EXCEED 536843 1 9 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE SRP. CHANGES ARE IN THE APPROVAL LOOP TO 536843 1 10 INCORPORATE ALL THE EXCEPTIONS INTO THE SRP'S. REF ITEM 12, 13 AND 14, 536843 1 11 THE DEBONDED MALE BULB SEAL FOOT AT EACH LOCATION WAS FULLY DEBONDED 536843 1 12 AND REBONDED PER PRINT. REF ITEM 16, THE DELAMINATIONS IN THE PLBD BULB 536843 1 13 SEAL RETAINERS WERE REPAIRED PER MR APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. REF 536843 1 14 ITEM 17, REPAIRED BY MR. NO FURTHER ENGINEERING IS REQUIRED. PLBD'S 536843 1 15 WERE RETESTED PER V9023.001. THIS PR IS UNIQUE TO THIS VEHICLE. 536843 1 16 PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 536882 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED DURING OMI V5K06.001, A SUBTASK TO TPS MEQ-3-22-23 536882 1 2 9, "L/H FORWARD PAYLOAD BAY DOOR R-T-L SWITCH MODULE MODS". DURING BENCH 536882 1 3 CHECK OF THE V070-594222-010 PLBD R-T-L SWITCH MODULE, THE RESISTANCE C 536882 1 4 HECKS ON CONNECTOR 40V37A21J3 PINS 3 AND 5, WERE OPPOSITE OF THOSE EXPEC 536882 1 5 TED. THE DISCREPANT SWITCH MODULE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM THE NSLD WHERE 536882 1 6 MODS HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED. ENGINEERING RESEARCH INDICATED THAT SWITCH S4 536882 1 7 HAD IT'S WIRES CROSSED. THE V070-594222-010 PLBD R-T-L SWITCH MODULE WA 536882 1 8 S RETRUNED TO THE NSLD AND THE CROSSED WIRE CONDITION WAS CORRECTED. THI 536882 1 9 S PR PERFORMED A SECOND BENCH CHECK AND THE RESULTS WERE AS EXPECTED. 536882 1 10 PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM 536882 1 11 SERIAL NUMBERS. NO ADDITIONAL RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 536882 1 12 WORKMANSHIP (NSLD). 537451 1 1 THE DISCREPANIES AT EACH OF THE 7 LOCATIONS WERE REPAIRED BY REMOVING TH 537451 1 2 E RAISED METAL AND SHARP EDGES WITH MRB APPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. T 537451 1 3 HE THREAD MARKS WERE PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON 537451 1 4 THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 537485 1 1 ITEM 1: 2 ROSAN INSERTS ON WINDOW 4 BACKED OUT WITH SCREWS AT 2 LOCATION 537485 1 2 . INSERTS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. ITEM 2: 1 ROSAN INSERTS O 537485 1 3 N WINDOW 4 HAS STRIPPED THREADS AT 1 LOCATION. INSERT WAS REMOVED AND RE 537485 1 4 PLACED PER PRINT. ITEM 3: 1 ROSAN WOULD NOT BACK OUT USING REMOVAL TOOL. 537485 1 5 PAPER WAS ADDED TO REMOVE WITH EASY OUT. ITEM 4: ROSAN FROM ITEM 3 WOUL 537485 1 6 D NOT REMOVE WITH EASY OUT. PAPER WAS ADDED TO REMOVE BY DRILLING OUT AN 537485 1 7 D FOLDING IN INSERT TO REMOVE. PROBABLE CAUSE OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 537488 1 1 THIS PR DOCUMENTED DETERIORATION OF THE V075-593365-001 BUMPER FROM THE 537488 1 2 B-HATCH HOLD-OPEN CATCH ASSEMBLY. THE REMNANTS OF THE EXISTING V075-5933 537488 1 3 65-001 BUMPER WAS REMOVED AND THE SURFACE CLEANED. A NEW V075-593365-001 537488 1 4 BUMPER WAS OBTAINED AND BONDED IN PLACE. PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. 537488 1 5 THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM SERIAL NUMBERS. NO RETEST REQUIRE 537488 1 6 D. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 537586 1 1 ITEM 1 BOLT WAS SCRAPED AND NEW HARDWARE OBTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPE 537586 1 2 RATIONAL DEGRADATION. 537587 1 1 ITEM 1 BOLT WAS SCRAPED AND NEW HARDWARE OBTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPE 537587 1 2 RATIONAL DEGRADATION. 537666 1 1 DURING PAPER REVIEW BY CVAS IT WAS DISCOVERD THAT THE OCN RECORDED FOR C 537666 1 2 ONNECTOR SAVER ME414-0630-1001 AT 50J64 DID NOT EXIST. THE CONNECTOR SAV 537666 1 3 ER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW CONNECTOR INSTALLED. THE DISCREPANT CONNECTOR S 537666 1 4 AVER WILL BE ROUTED TO HDA FOR VENDOR TO REIDENTIFY OCN ON CONNECTOR SAV 537666 1 5 ER. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR (OCN IS ILLEGIBLE). NO ADDITIONAL DISPO REQUI 537666 1 6 RED. 537669 1 1 DURING PAPER REVIEW BY CVAS IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE OCN RECORDED FOR 537669 1 2 CONNECTOR SAVER ME414-0630-1001 AT 50J56 WAS A DUPLICATE OCN FOR CONNECT 537669 1 3 OR SAVER INSTALLED ON OV-105. THE CONNECTOR SAVER WAS REMOVED AND A NEW 537669 1 4 CONNECTOR INSTALLED. THE DISCREPANT CONNECTOR SAVER WILL BE ROUTED TO HD 537669 1 5 A FOR VENDOR TO REIDENTIFY OCN ON CONNECTOR SAVER. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDO 537669 1 6 R (OCN IS A DUPLICATE) NO ADDITIONAL DISPO REQUIRED. 537676 1 1 THREAD IMPRESSIONS/RAISED AREA WAS BLENDED AND HOLE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRE 537676 1 2 STRICTED USE. MINOR GOUGE IN NUTPLATE WAS REPAIRED BY REPLACING NUT. PRO 537676 1 3 BABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 537716 1 1 THE SHIM BECAME DEBONDED DURING FRCS REMOVAL. IT WAS REBONDED WITH MRB A 537716 1 2 PPROVAL FOR UNRESTRICTED USE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL MR BJ6271-0 537716 1 3 00M. NO FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 537716 1 4 DEGRADATION. 537963 1 1 DURING V5046.003, INSPECTION REVEALED THAT HARNESS V082-774005-003 WAS M 537963 1 2 ISSING THREE PYRO CONNECTORS. HOWEVER, THE CONNECTORS WERE LATER FOUND I 537963 1 3 N LOGISTICS STOCK. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE CONNECTORS WERE INSTALLED WITH THE 537963 1 4 REMAINING PORTION OF THE HARNESS. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS 537963 1 5 PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: LOGISTIC FAILURE TO CONSOLIDATE ALL OF THE HARDWARE. 538231 1 1 DURING ENG INSPECTION, CONNECTOR 50P409 AND 50P410 BACKSHELLS WERE CLOCK 538231 1 2 ED INCORRECTLY. THE BACKSHELLS INTERFERED WITH THE ACTUATOR COVERS. THE 538231 1 3 CONNECTORS WERE DEMATED. THE BACKSHELL ON BOTH CONNECTORS WERE OPENED AN 538231 1 4 D THEN THE BACKSHELLS WERE RE-CLOCKED SO THAT THEY NO LONGER INTERFERE W 538231 1 5 ITH THE ACTUATOR COVERS. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. R 538231 1 6 ETEST WILL BE TRACKED BY SCAN. 538343 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE WAS PULLED FROM DESIGN S 538343 1 2 PLICE 50SP398 WITH INSUFFICIENT SLACK TO REPLACE SPLICE. A NEW SECTION O 538343 1 3 F WIRE 2H61H22 WAS INSTALLED FROM 50P2 TO SPLICE AREA AND A NEW SPLICE 5 538343 1 4 0SP398 INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBIT 538343 1 5 ER. NO ADDITIONAL DISPO REQUIRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK OF DEMAT 538343 1 6 ED/MATED CONNECTOR 50P2. 538414 1 1 THIS PR DOCOMENTS UNABLE TO VERIFY CORRECT INSTALLATION OF MD153-0016-20 538414 1 2 05 WASHER PER DRAWING V070-353500 ZONE 18C. A EO WAS RELEASED DUE TO CHA 538414 1 3 NGE OF CALL OUT FOR HI-LOK PIN AND HI-LOK NUT. THE WASHER FOR BOTH THE " 538414 1 4 IS" AND "WAS" CONDITION REMAINS THE SAME. THE PROPER HARDWARE WAS FOUND 538414 1 5 TO BE INSTALLED. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR 538414 1 6 . PER V070-353500 EO ALL "PHYSICAL VERIFICATION" WAS REQUIRED FOR THE HI 538414 1 7 -LOK SCREW & HI-LOK NUT ONLY. THE EO DOES NOT REQUIRE VERIFICATION OF TH 538414 1 8 E WASHER. THE STEP IN THE TPS (STR-3-22-680, STEP 1-2) DID NOT NEED TO 538414 1 9 VERIFY THE P/N OF THE WASHER. THE EO CAN BE CVR'D BASED ON THE 538414 1 10 VERIFICATION OF THE HI-LOK SCREW & HI-LOK NUT AS CALLED FOR BY THE E.O. 538414 1 11 NO DISCREPANCY EXIST. 538846 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1: NUMEROUS DEBONDS WERE FOUND TO LOWER EDGE SEAL ON 50-0 538846 1 2 1 DOOR. SEAL WAS REMOVED AND NEW SEAL BONDED ON.ITEM 2, PAGE 1A: DOOR 538846 1 3 WAS WRITTEN UP AS HAVING SHIM DELAMINATING AND PEELING FOR .13 X.13 ARE 538846 1 4 A. MISSING AREA WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 3, PAGE 1A: 538846 1 5 KOROPON WAS FOUND TO BE MISSING AREAS WERE TOUCHED UP PER V9050. PROBAB 538846 1 6 LE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 538847 1 1 FOLLOWING REMOVAL OF 50-2 DOOR, SEVERAL DEBOND/DAMAGES WERE FOUND ON THE 538847 1 2 EDGE OF THE DOOR SEAL. THE LOWER SEAL, V070-358375-003, WAS DETERMINED 538847 1 3 TO BE DAMAGED BEYOND REPAIR. THE DISCREPANT LOWER SEAL WAS REMOVED AND A 538847 1 4 REPLACEMENT LOWER SEAL WAS BONDED. ALL OTHER DAMAGED SEAL LOCATIONS WER 538847 1 5 E REPAIRED PER SRP-V-ST-0032. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. THE CAUSE OF T 538847 1 6 HIS PR IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 539022 1 1 ITEM 1: V070-337822-002 BRACKET WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED IN FOUR PLACES. 539022 1 2 A NEW BRACKET WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED. ITEM 2: NEW BRACKET COULD NOT 539022 1 3 BE INSTALLED WITH RIVETS DUE TO ACCESS. MR ACTION WAS TAKEN TO INSTALL B 539022 1 4 RACKET WITH HI-LOKS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL 539022 1 5 DEGRADATION. 539257 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2 WERE RESOLVED BY OHE/ENG REF MVO-074A-1-0439 BEFORE ORBITE 539257 1 2 R FLIGHT TO PALMDALE FOR OMDP. REF ITEM 3, THE PURPOSE OF OPS 3 WAS TO R 539257 1 3 EMOVE AND REPLACE THE V070-305005-001 RETAINER NUT FOR THE LEFT OMS POD 539257 1 4 ATTACH POINT 7. THIS RETURNED THE ATTACH POINT TO PRINT. THIS IS SECONDA 539257 1 5 RY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 539285 1 1 ATTACH POINT 1 BOLT WAS TORQUED TO ATTACH POINT 2 RANGE OF 4000 TO 4400 539285 1 2 IN LB RESULTING IN ATTACH POINT 1 BREAKING PRIOR TO REACHING TORQUE. STR 539285 1 3 UCTURE WAS INSPECTED AND NO SIGNS OF DAMAGE WAS DETECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE 539285 1 4 IS WORKMANSHIP. 539589 1 1 6 LOOSE BOLTS WERE FOUND TO BE NOT TORQUED. BOLTS WERE INSTALLED PER SPE 539589 1 2 CIFICATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 539673 1 1 LH ATTACH POINT 8 NUTPLATE WAS FOUND TO BE DISCREPANT. A WRENCH WAS USED 539673 1 2 ON NUT TO INSTALL BOLT FOR FERRY TO PALMDALE. NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND 539673 1 3 REPLACED AFTER RETURN TO KSC. PROBABLE CAUSE IS OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 539875 1 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT GND LUG ATTACHED TO 81P320 BA 539875 1 2 CKSHELL TANG WAS BROKE. THE DISCREPANT LUG WAS REMOVED AND A NEW LUG CRI 539875 1 3 MPED ON WIRE C116A24-2 AND ATTACHED TO 81P320 BACKSHELL TANG. PROBABLE C 539875 1 4 AUSE: UNAVOIDABLE WHILE PROCESSING THE ORBITER. NO ADDITIONAL DISPO REQU 539875 1 5 IRED. RETEST WILL BE PER SCAN TRACK OF DEMATED CONNECTOR 81P320. 540153 1 1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISPO WAS TO INSTALL 4 HI-LOKS IN THE V070-354484-00 540153 1 2 1 WIRE HARNESS SUPPORT. THE PER PRINT RIVETS WERE NOT INSTALLED DURING M 540153 1 3 ANUFACTURE OF THE SUPPORT. THE HI-LOKS WERE SUBSTITUTED BY AN UNRESTRICT 540153 1 4 ED MR BECAUSE OF A LACK OF ACCESS TO BUCK RIVETS AT THIS TIME. THIS IS S 540153 1 5 ECONDARY STRUCTURE. THE CAUSE OF THE DISCREPANCY WAS THE VENDOR. 540586 1 1 ITEMS 1 AND 2: THERE WERE DEBONDED AND MISSING SHIMS ON THE 50-01 DOOR. 540586 1 2 THESE SHIMS COULD NOT BE FOUND. NO MR DOCUMENTATION OR PRINT CALLOUTS CO 540586 1 3 ULD BE FOUND TO VERIFY THAT THESE SHIMS EXIST. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR TH 540586 1 4 IS PR IS NO DISCREPANCY. 540591 1 1 THERE WERE DEBONDED AND MISSING SHIMS ON THE 50-02 DOOR. THESE SHIMS COU 540591 1 2 LD NOT BE FOUND. NO MR DOCUMENTATION OR PRINT CALLOUTS COULD BE FOUND TO 540591 1 3 VERIFY THAT THESE SHIMS EXIST. THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS PR IS NO DIS 540591 1 4 CREPANCY 540618 1 1 LAF WAS GENERATED, SEARCH LASTED 30 MIN, FASTENER WAS NOT FOUND. NEW ME1 540618 1 2 28-0066-4004 SLEEVE BOLT WAS INSTALLED PER DWG V070-339885 ZONE 7F. DESI 540618 1 3 GN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY 540618 1 4 REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNKNOWN. 541060 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: MR APPROVAL FOR FERRY FLIGHT TO PALMDALE, CA. IS 541060 PMRB 2 REQUESTED. THE PR DISCREPANCY WILL BE ADDRESSED AND CORRECTED TO 541060 PMRB 3 DRAWING CONFIGURATION DURING THE OMDP FLOW MOD PERIOD. DURING THE 541060 PMRB 4 INSTALLATION OF THE SHROUD P/N: V074-355133-001 THAT SUPPORTS 541060 PMRB 5 ORBITER/SCA POWER CABLE INSTALLATION; SCREWS P/N MD112-1003-0416 WERE 541060 PMRB 6 INSTALLED INADVERTANTLY RATHER THAN MD112-1002-0308 SCREWS. AS A 541060 PMRB 7 RESULT, THE SCREWS ARE APPROXIMATELY .5 INCHES LONGER THAN SPECIFIED ON 541060 PMRB 8 THE INSTALLATION DRAWING. HOWEVER, THE EXCESSIVE LENGTH DOES NOT 541060 PMRB 9 CONTACT OR INTERFERE WITH OTHER HARDWARE. NO MR ID TAG IS REQUIRED. 541060 PMRB 10 "THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION." "THIS 541060 PMRB 11 MR ACTION DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION 541060 PMRB 12 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS." "THIS MR ACTION IS RESTRICTED TO ONE 541060 PMRB 13 FERRY FLIGHT." 09/26/95 PMRB APPROVED FOR RESTRICTED LIFE, FERRY FLIGHT 541060 PMRB 14 ONLY. 541060 1 1 DURING INSTALLATION OF SHROUD P/N V074-355133-001 THAT SUPPORTS ORBITER/ 541060 1 2 SCA POWER CABLE INSTALLATION SCREWS P/N: MD112-1003-0416 WERE INSTALLED 541060 1 3 INADVERTANTLY RATHER THAN SCREWS MD112-1002-0308 SCREWS. AS A RESULT, TH 541060 1 4 E SCREWS WERE APPROX .5" LONGER THAN SPECIFIED ON THE INSTALLATION DWG. 541060 1 5 THIS MR WAS RESTRICTED TO ONE FERRY FLIGHT FROM KSC TO PALMDALE. ONCE AT 541060 1 6 PALMDALE THE SHROUD AND SCREWS P/N: MD112-1003-0416 WERE REMOVED. VERIF 541060 1 7 ICATION FROM ROCKWELL LOG HAS THE 33 MD112-1002-0308 SCREWS WERE KITTED 541060 1 8 UP FOR SHROUD INSTALLATION ON S5045 S05-015. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DUE TO P 541060 1 9 APER ERROR IN THE V1032.003 WHICH A DEV WILL BE WRITTEN FORM. NO R/T 541060 1 10 REQUIRED 542023 1 1 STOP DRILLED END OF CRACK WITH .098 DIA HOLE. SANDED CRACKED AREA FOR RE 542023 1 2 MOVAL OF FINISH 1 INCH AROUND CRACK. WIPED AREA CLEAN WITH ISOPROPYL ALC 542023 1 3 OHOL AND CLEAN WIPER. PREPARED PART FOR BONDING PER MPP110M305M08. BONDE 542023 1 4 D PER MA0106-336 GRADE B USING MBO120-079 ADHESIVE. PREPARED ADHESIVE AN 542023 1 5 D IMPREGNATED MBO135-009 TYPE B FINISH B NO 120 GLASS FABRIC WITH MBO120 542023 1 6 -079 ADHESIVE. CUT 1 PIECE OF FABRIC TO COVER DAMAGED AREA AND EXTEND 1 542023 1 7 INCH AROUND CRACK. PLUGGED HOLE WITH MBO120-079, FLUSH ON BOTH SIDES. AP 542023 1 8 PLIED 1 LAYER OF FABRIC TO COVER CRACKED AREA, COVERED REPAIR AREA WITH 542023 1 9 MYSTIC 7503. CURED AT ROOM TEMPERATURE UNTIL SPECIMEN REACHED SHORE "D" 542023 1 10 85. REMOVED TAPE AND CLEANED WITH MEK. THIS REPAIR RESTORES PART TO 542023 1 11 ORIGINAL CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 542114 1 1 SMOOTHING OVER THE DAMAGED AREA AND APPLYING CORROSION PROTECTION RESTOR 542114 1 2 ES FITTING TO SATISFY ENGINEERING RQMTS. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY NOT DEGRAD 542114 1 3 ED. ACTUATOR ONLY REQ'D PAINT TOUCH-UP. ACTUATOR CONTACTS THE STRUCTURE 542114 1 4 WHEN DISCONNECTED FROM THE MAIN GEAR AND SWUNG UPWARD AND TIED IN PLACE 542114 1 5 DURING REWORK. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 542116 1 1 SMOOTHING OVER THE DAMAGED AREA AND APPLYING CORROSION PROTECTION RESTOR 542116 1 2 ES FITTING TO SATISFY ENGR RQMTS. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY NOT DEGRADED. ACT 542116 1 3 UATOR ONLY REQ'D PAINT TOUCH UP. ACTUATOR CONTACTS THE STRUCTURE WHEN DI 542116 1 4 SCONNECTED FROM THE MAIN GEAR AND SWUNG UPWARD AND TIED IN PLACE DURING 542116 1 5 RWK. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 542119 1 1 NOTED DISCREPANCIES AGAINST THE RTV SEAL ON THE BACKSIDE OF THE 50-01 DO 542119 1 2 OR HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED ON STR-3-J2-5205. PROBABLE CAUSE: DUPLICATE PR. 542121 1 1 NOTED DISCREPANCIES AGAINST THE RTV SEAL ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE DOOR WI 542121 1 2 LL BE DISPOSITIONED ON STR-3-22-5195 AT KSC. PROBABLE CAUSE: DUPLICATION 542121 1 3 OF PR. 542137 1 1 REPAIRING DISCREPANT AREA RESTORES CLOSEOUT PANEL TO SATISFY ENGINEERING 542137 1 2 RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 542139 1 1 REPAIRING DISCREPANT AREA RESTORES CLOSE-OUT PANEL TO SATISFY ENGINEERIN 542139 1 2 G RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 542143 1 1 WIPED AREA CLEAN WITH TT-1-735 ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND CLEAN WIPER. PREPAR 542143 1 2 ED PART FOR BONDING PER MPP110M305M08. BONDED PER MAO106-336 GRADE B USI 542143 1 3 NG MBO120-079 ADHESIVE. PREPARED ADHESIVE AND IMPREGNATED (2) PIECES OF 542143 1 4 MBO135-009 TYPE B FINISH B NO 120 GLASS FABRIC WITH MBO120-079 ADHESIVE. 542143 1 5 CUT 2 PIECE OF FABRIC TO COVER DAMAGED AREA AND EXTEND 1 INCH BEYOND DA 542143 1 6 MAGE. FILLED DAMAGED AREA WITH ADHESIVE. APPLIED THE (2) LAYERS OF FABRI 542143 1 7 C TO COVER DAMAGED AREA, COVERED REPAIR AREA WITH SARAN AND TAPED TIGHT 542143 1 8 WITH MYSTIC 7503. CURED AT ROOM TEMPERATURE UNTIL SPECIMEN REACHED SHORE 542143 1 9 "D" 85. REMOVED TAPE AND CLEANED WITH MEK. THIS REPAIR RESTORES PART TO 542143 1 10 ORIGINAL CONDITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 542169 1 1 REF ITEM 001, THE WIRE PROTECTION INSTALLED PER SPECIFICATION MLO303-001 542169 1 2 4 RETURNED THE WIRE HARNESS TO DWG RQMTS. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PR 542169 1 3 OBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 542192 1 1 MOPPED UP WATER PER MF004-059. RECORDED TOTAL AMOUNT OF WATER REMOVED. D 542192 1 2 RIED AREA USING CLEAN WIPERS. MANUALLY EXTENDED ET DOOR CENTERLINE LATCH 542192 1 3 ES PER MEQ-3-J2-235. INSPECTED LATCH SHAFT AND VERIFIED NO MOISTURE. MAN 542192 1 4 UALLY RETRACTED ET DOOR CENTERLINE LATCHES PER MEQ-3-J2-235. THE INTEGRI 542192 1 5 TY OF THE VEHICLE IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: RAIN INTRUSION. 542315 1 1 NOTED CONFIGURATION OF SUPT BRACKET AS INSTALLED NOT CONSIDERED DEGRADIN 542315 1 2 G TO DESIGN RQMTS. PROPER INTERFACE MAINTAINED FOR ATTACHING CLOSEOUT PA 542315 1 3 NEL NON STRUCTURAL ITEM. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 542316 1 1 THE DISCREPANT MARKS DO NOT DEGRADE THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT OR AFFECT T 542316 1 2 HE FUNCTIONALITY OF THE ASSOCIATED ASSEMBLY. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INV 542316 1 3 ALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITE 542316 1 4 MS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WO 542316 1 5 RKMANSHIP. 542317 1 1 USED 400 OR FINER GRIT ABRASIVE CLOTH TO LOCALLY POLISH THE DEFECT AREA. 542317 1 2 CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-CF-20-XX THE REPAIR/DEFECT 542317 1 3 AREA ONLY. MR IDENTIFIED STRUCTURE ADJACENT TO ROLLER PER MAO104-301, CO 542317 1 4 DE BL-08-NG-13 WITH "MR STR-3-J2-5243". THE DEFECT AREA ON THE HATCH CEN 542317 1 5 TERING ROLLER IS MINOR AND SUPERFICIAL IN NATURE. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRI 542317 1 6 TY OF THE ROLLER IS NOT DEGRADED. MS REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: W 542317 1 7 EAR AND TEAR. 542435 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS WEAR MARKS ON THE NLG LH BUNGEE ROLLER WA 542435 1 2 S ACCEPTED PER MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE WEAR IS CONSIDERED MINOR WIT 542435 1 3 H MAX DEPTH BEING .001. NO FURTHER REWORK REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL 542435 1 4 WEAR AND TEAR. 542441 1 1 REWORK OF THE CONFORMAL COATING ON 62TB2, TO FILL THE VOIDS PER THE ABOV 542441 1 2 E STEPS, HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NOR 542441 1 3 MAL WEAR AND TEAR. 542443 1 1 CONN 62V77W56P58 WAS DEMATED; BACKSHELL AND ADAPTER WERE OPENED, LOCTITE 542443 1 2 D, CLOSED, TORQUED, AND CONNECTORS REMATED. THE ABOVE STEPS HAVE RETURNE 542443 1 3 D THE CONN INSTALLATION TO DWG CONFIGURATION. THE SCAN TRACKING SYSTEM W 542443 1 4 ILL PROVIDE RETEST FOR CONN 62V77W56P58 DEMATED/MATED THIS PR. CERT IS N 542443 1 5 OT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 542444 1 1 REWORK OF THE CONFORMAL COATING ON 62TB1, TO FILL THE VOIDS PER THE ABOV 542444 1 2 E STEPS, HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NOR 542444 1 3 MAL WEAR AND TEAR. 542445 1 1 THE CLAMPS WERE REMOVED, CONVOLUTED TUBING INSTALLED CONTINUOUSLY THROUG 542445 1 2 H THE AFFECTED CLAMPS. THE CLAMPS WERE THEN INSTALLED AND TORQUED, TO DW 542445 1 3 G RQMT. THE ABOVE WORK WAS REPEATED, AS THE CUSTOMER WAS BY-PASSED ON TH 542445 1 4 E ORIGINAL OK INSTALL. CERTIFICATION HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAU 542445 1 5 SE: WORKMANSHIP. 542446 1 1 BLOCKS 7 AND 11 WERE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS, #7 MD411-4002-0800 AND #11 V070 542446 1 2 -510601-046. ELECTRICAL BOND AND TEST FROM HINGE ON DOOR TO STRUCTURE AC 542446 1 3 ROSS THE DAMAGED GROUND STRAP IS PER MAO113-306. RECORDED RESTISTANCE 1. 542446 1 4 33. CONFORMAL COATING WAS APPLIED OVER BROKEN STRANDS AND BONDED PER MAO 542446 1 5 106-380 GRADE B, USING MBO130-085 SILICONE RUBBER. SHORE "A" HARDNESS MI 542446 1 6 NIMUM ACCEPTABLE IS 55 RECORDED SHORE "A" HARDNESS IS 57. AREA HAS BEEN 542446 1 7 ID'D WITH THIS MR NUMBER. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 542462 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WHICH DOCUMENTS THAT METAL DEBRIS AND PAINT CHIPS WERE F 542462 1 2 OUND WHEN THE RH MLG HUB CAPS WERE REMOVED WAS PICKED UP DURING V31 INSP 542462 1 3 ECTIONS OF THE MLG. THE DEBRIS WAS CAUSED BY THE AXLE NUT CROSS BOLTS BE 542462 1 4 ING INSTALLED 180 DEG. FROM PRNT CALLOUT AND THE COTTER PIN WAS SCRAPING 542462 1 5 ON THE HUB CAP AS THE WHEEL TURNED, ITEM 2, PAGE 1A. THE DEBRIS WAS CLE 542462 1 6 ANED AND THE CROSS BOLTS WERE REMOVED AND REINSTALLED PER PRINT RQMTS. P 542462 1 7 R'S STR-3-J2-5278, 5279, 5280 AND 5281 ADDRESS THE DAMAGE TO THE HUB CAP 542462 1 8 S. ITEMS 1 & 2 HAVE BEEN RESOLVED PER PR DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: IMPROPER 542462 1 9 INSTALLATION. 542463 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WHICH DOCUMENTS THAT METAL DEBRIS AND PAINT CHIPS WERE F 542463 1 2 OUND WHEN THE LH MLG HUB CAPS WERE REMOVED WAS PICKED UP DURING V31 INSP 542463 1 3 ECTIONS OF THE MLG. THE DEBRIS WAS CAUSED BY THE AXLE NUT CROSS BOLTS BE 542463 1 4 ING INSTALLED 180 DEGREES FROM PRINT CALLOUT AND THE COTTER PIN WAS SCRA 542463 1 5 PING ON THE HUB CAP AS THE WHEEL TURNED, ITEM 2, PAGE 1A. THE DEBRIS WAS 542463 1 6 CLEANED AND THE CROSS BOLTS WERE REMOVED AND REINSTALLED PER PRINT RQMT 542463 1 7 S. PR'S STR-3-J2-5278, 5279, 5280 AND 5281 ADDRESS THE DAMAGE TO THE HUB 542463 1 8 CAPS. ITEMS 1 & 2 HAVE BEEN RESOLVED PER PR DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE 542463 1 9 : IMPROPER INSTALLATION. 542567 1 1 THE CLAMPS WERE REMOVED, CONVOLUTED TUBING INSTALLED CONTINUOUSLY THROUG 542567 1 2 H THE AFFECTED CLAMPS. THE CLAMPS WERE THEN REPLACED AND TORQUED TO DWG 542567 1 3 RQMT. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 542702 1 1 BURNISHED DISCREPANT AREA WITH 400 OR FINER GRIT ABRASIVE PAPER. CORROSI 542702 1 2 ON PROTECTED AREA PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-CF-20-XX. IDENTIFIED PER MAO104 542702 1 3 -301 CODE BL-08-NG-13 WITH MR STR-3-J2-5252. THE BURR IS MINOR AND SUPER 542702 1 4 FICIAL IN NATURE. THE HATCH GUIDE FITTING WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER 542702 1 5 DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 542702 1 6 OF THE VEHICLE IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 542704 1 1 BURNISHED DISCREPANT AREA WITH 400 OR FINER GRIT ABRASIVE PAPER. CORROSI 542704 1 2 ON PROTECTED AREA PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-CF-20-XX. IDENTIFIED PER MAO104 542704 1 3 -301 CODE BL-08-NG-13 WITH MR STR-3-J2-5253. THE BURR IS MINOR AND SUPER 542704 1 4 FICIAL IN NATURE. THE HATCH GUIDE FITTING WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER 542704 1 5 DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 542704 1 6 OF THE VEHICLE IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 542722 1 1 THE GAP OF .015 INCHES UNDER THE HEAD OF THE HILOK DOES NOT AFFECT THE L 542722 1 2 OAD CARRYING CAPACITY OF THE FASTENER NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE STRENGTH OF 542722 1 3 THE SHANK. THIS CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE 542722 1 4 CAUSE: THIS CONDITION EXISTED SINCE THE INITIAL INSTALLATION OF THE FAST 542722 1 5 ENER. DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE 542722 1 6 OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 542807 1 1 THE SEAL DEFECT IS COSMETIC IN NATURE. TRIMMED THE FRAYED ENDS OF THE ME 542807 1 2 TAL BRAID. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE IS MAINTAINED. PROBAB 542807 1 3 LE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 542815 1 1 REPAIRED CRACKED PANEL PER STR SRP-V-ST-0015-B TCN NO 326-013. USED "BON 542815 1 2 DING WITH TWO PART EPOXY ADHESIVE PROCEDURE" PER MAO106-336. STOP DRILLE 542815 1 3 D ENDS OF CRACK. SANDED AS REQUIRED ALL SIDES OF CRACK. FABRICATED PATCH 542815 1 4 ES FROM MBO135-009 TYPE 6 FINISH B GLASS FABRIC. PREPARED MBO120-079 TYP 542815 1 5 E I OR TYPE II ADHESIVE AND A HARDNESS SPECIMEN. CURED PATCHES/HARDNESS 542815 1 6 SPECIMEN TO SHORE D HARDNESS 80. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 542816 1 1 THE SEVEN DISCREPANT AREAS HAVE BEEN REPAIRED BY THE STANDARD REPAIR PRO 542816 1 2 CEDURE NUMBER SRP-V-ST-0015-B. THE PROCEDURE SANDS THE AREA, ALCOHOL WIP 542816 1 3 ES AND COVERED WITH GLASS FABRIC USING MBO120-079 ADHESIVE. THE SHORE "D 542816 1 4 " HARDNESS OF 82 EXCEEDS THE MINIMUM REQUIRED OF 60. THEREFORE, THE PANE 542816 1 5 L IS BROUGHT TO ITS ORIGINAL DESIGN STRENGTH AND ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRI 542816 1 6 CTED USE. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR A 542816 1 7 ND TEAR. 542817 1 1 REPAIRED CRACKED PANEL PER STR SRP-V-ST-0015-8 TCN NO 326-013. USED "BON 542817 1 2 DING WITH TWO PART EPOXY ADHESIVE PROCEDURE" PER MAO106-336. STOP DRILLE 542817 1 3 D ENDS OF CRACK. SANDED AS REQUIRED ALL SIDES OF CRACK. FABRICATED PATCH 542817 1 4 ES FROM MBO135-009 TYPE 6 FINISH B GLASS FABRIC. PREPARED MBO120-079 TYP 542817 1 5 E 1 OR TYPE II ADHESIVE AND A HARDNESS SPECIMEN. CURED PATCHES/HARDNESS 542817 1 6 SPECIMEN TO SHORE D HARDNESS 75. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 542869 1 1 THE REMOVAL, REPLACEMENT & RETERMINATION OF THE DISCREPANT GROUND LUG AT 542869 1 2 CONN 67P161, PER THE ABOVE STEPS HAS RETURNED THE CONN TO DWG CONFIGURA 542869 1 3 TION. CERT IS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 542873 1 1 REMOVED CONFORMAL COATING FROM GROUND POINT AND ASSOCIATED TERMINAL LUGS 542873 1 2 AND SHIELDED TERMINATION WIRES. DRY-SANDED TO REMOVE "GLOSS" AND ROUGHE 542873 1 3 N THE RTV SURFACE. DRY-WIPED USING CLEAN CHEESECLOTH. APPLIED MBO125-050 542873 1 4 PRIMER TO ALL SURFACES, EXCEPT THOSE COATED WITH SILICONE RUBBER. PREPA 542873 1 5 RED A MIXTURE OF MBO130-085 SILICONE RUBBER PER MAO106-330. FILLED AN AL 542873 1 6 UMINUM TARE CUP WITH A PORTION OF THE MIXTURE FOR HARDNESS SAMPLE AND CU 542873 1 7 RED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE REPAIR. CURED PER MAO106-330 GRADE "B". CA 542873 1 8 REFULLY APPLIED THE MIXTURE FILLING ALL CRACKS, VOIDS AND BUBBLES. APPLI 542873 1 9 ED A UNIFORM FILM OF MBO130-085 SILICONE RUBBER TO EACH FAYING SURFACE. 542873 1 10 CURED RTV REPAIR AT AMBIENT UNTIL A SHORE "A" HARDNESS OF 60 WAS ACHIEV 542873 1 11 ED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 542902 1 1 COIN TAP OF THE AREA INDICATED NO DEBOND. CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608 542902 1 2 -301, CODE 00-AF-21-XN. IDENTIFIED PER MAO104-301 CODE BL-00-NG-13 WITH 542902 1 3 THIS MR NUMBER MR STR-3-J2-5261. DENTS DO NOT AFFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTE 542902 1 4 GRITY OF THE PANEL. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: W 542902 1 5 EAR AND TEAR. 542904 1 1 THE DENT IS ACCEPTABLE AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AFTER COIN TAPPING IND 542904 1 2 ICATED THERE WAS NO DEBOND OF THE FACE SHEET TO CORE. THE DENTS DO NOT A 542904 1 3 FFECT THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE PANEL. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAIN 542904 1 4 S POSITIVE. THE CORROSION PROTECTION WAS NOT PERFORMED ON THIS MR BUT CO 542904 1 5 MPLETED ON THE FAIR WEAR AND TEAR BOOK SQUAWK NUMBER 065. THE WORK HAS B 542904 1 6 EEN IDENTIFIED AS STR-3-J2-5262. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP AND FAIR WE 542904 1 7 AR AND TEAR. 542935 1 1 BURNISHED DISCREPANT AREA WITH 250-300 GRIT ABRASIVE PAPER. CLEANED AREA 542935 1 2 WITH TT-1-723 ALCOHOL AND CLEAN WIPE. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE V 542935 1 3 EHICLE IS MAINTAINED. THE MS REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND 542935 1 4 TEAR. 542941 1 1 NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS. THE TECH ORDER INSTALLATION FOR THE OEX RECORDERS 542941 1 2 THAT MOUNT ON THIS SHELF (M072-703008) REQUIRES AN ELECTRICAL BOND AND 542941 1 3 TEST FOR OEX INSTALLATION. THE ELECTRICAL BOND IS ACHIEVED THRU FAYING S 542941 1 4 URFACES (REF FLAG NOTE 2 AT THREE LOCATIONS SPECIFIED ON THE DWG (REF ZO 542941 1 5 NE 11E). THE EXPOSED METAL HAS BEEN CORROSION PROTECTED WITH CHEMFILM PE 542941 1 6 R SPEC. 542945 1 1 V070-731876-019 LUMINOUS PANEL WAS CRACKED IN 3 PLACES. CRACK DEFECTS NU 542945 1 2 MBERED 1 AND 2 WERE REPAIRED PER SRP-V-ST-0014-A, METHOD 2 "CRACK REPAIR 542945 1 3 WITH A DOUBLER." REPAIR WAS NOT REQUIRED ON CRACK DEFECT NUMBER 3. PROB 542945 1 4 ABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 543045 1 1 NOTED V070-742560-017 ANTENNA COVER WAS REMOVED. DELAMINATED EDGE WAS RE 543045 1 2 WORKED TO DWG RQMTS. ANTENNA COVER WAS REINSTALLED. A FUNCTIONAL TEST WA 543045 1 3 S PERFORMED OF THE ANTENNA AFTER THE COVER WAS REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAU 543045 1 4 SE: WEAR AND TEAR (MULTIPLE REMOVALS OF TPS). 543065 1 1 THE EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION REVEALS NO CRACK IN THE DISCREPANT AREA, THE 543065 1 2 PAINT IS SCRATCHED AND IT HAS BEEN CORROSION PROTECTED PER THE DWG RQMT 543065 1 3 S. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR & TEAR. 543068 1 1 THE DISCOLORATION IS SUPERFICIAL RESIDUE OF A "FAIR WEAR AND TEAR" NATUR 543068 1 2 E RESULTING FROM FLIGHT EXPOSURE. IT WAS REMOVED BY SCRUBBING WITH ISOPR 543068 1 3 OPYL ALCOHOL. 543070 1 1 COIN TAP REVEALS THERE IS NO DEBONDING BETWEEN THE UPPER FACE SHEET AND 543070 1 2 HONEYCOMB CORE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS NOT DEGRADED. DENT IS SMOOTH WIT 543070 1 3 H NO SHARP EDGES. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT I 543070 1 4 NVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL I 543070 1 5 TEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 543071 1 1 COIN TAP REVEALS THERE IS NO DEBONDING BETWEEN THE UPPER FACE SHEET AND 543071 1 2 HONEYCOMB CORE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS NOT DEGRADED. DENT IS SMOOTH WIT 543071 1 3 H NO SHARP EDGES. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT I 543071 1 4 NVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL I 543071 1 5 TEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 543072 1 1 THE SEALANT WAS REQUIRED FOR THE INITIAL BONDING OF THE TILE TO MAINTAIN 543072 1 2 VACUUM. IT IS NOT REQ'D PER DWG TO REPLACE THE SEALANT. PROBABLE CAUSE: 543072 1 3 NOT A PR CONDITION. 543079 1 1 PANEL HAS BEEN VERIFIED THAT IT WAS REMOVED AND ACCESSIBLE WITH CORRECT 543079 1 2 REIDENTIFICATION. PANEL IS TO DWG RQMTS AND MEETS THE -004 RQMTS. REIDEN 543079 1 3 TIFIED THE PANEL ASSY TO A DASH 004 PER DWG AND MAO104-301 SPEC. VERIFIE 543079 1 4 D AND RECORDED WAD NUMBER THAT REINSTALLS THE PANEL (#V80-90123) CONFIGU 543079 1 5 RATION MGMT VERIFIED DATA BASE AND INDICATES THE DASH 004 RQMTS DEFINED 543079 1 6 BY THE PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 543106 1 1 THE GAP IS ACCEPTABLE AS INSTALLED BETWEEN THE NUT AND STRUCTURE; THE SH 543106 1 2 EAR LOAD IS NOT REACTED ON THE NUT. NO TENSION LOAD IS PRESENT. THERE IS 543106 1 3 NO EVIDENCE OF THE NUT BACKING OFF; THE LOCKING DEVICE ON THE NUT IS AC 543106 1 4 TIVE. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THIS JOINT (INTERFACE) IS NOT DEGRADED 543106 1 5 . MS REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. THIS MR ACTION DOES 543106 1 6 NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS 543106 1 7 LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 543107 1 1 GASKET MATERIAL WAS FOUND MISSING FROM ORBITER SIDE OF CURTAIN ATTACH PL 543107 1 2 ATE. THE MISSING MATERIAL WAS REPLACED WITH MBO130-119 TYPE I ADHESIVE P 543107 1 3 ER MAO106-303. ACCEPTABLE SHORE HARDNESS RESULTS WERE OBTAINED. ASSY WAS 543107 1 4 RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION PER V070-415322 G/N <5>. NO FURTHER ACT 543107 1 5 ION REQ'D ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 543185 1 1 THE BROKEN GROUND LUG ON CONN 50P760 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER THE AB 543185 1 2 OVE STEPS. THIS HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. THE SCAN TRA 543185 1 3 CK SYSTEM WILL SATISFY RETEST RQMTS FOR CONN 50P760. PROBABLE CAUSE: NOR 543185 1 4 MAL WEAR AND TEAR. 543191 1 1 THE 4 DENTS IN THE LH WING GLOVE BOX WERE CHECKED FOR CRACKS AND DELAMIN 543191 1 2 ATIONS WITH 10X MAGNIFICATION, EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION AND COIN TAP TEST 543191 1 3 S. NO CRACKS OR DELAMINATIONS WERE FOUND. MR UNRESTRICTED ACCEPTANCE WAS 543191 1 4 OBTAINED FOR ITEMS 002, 003 & 004 "AS IS" BASED ON THE MINOR DEPTHS OF 543191 1 5 THE DENTS. ITEM 001 WAS ACCEPTED MR UNRESTRICTED WITH THE ADDITION OF A 543191 1 6 DOUBLER OVER THE DENT IN THE FACE SHEET USING MBO120-048 ADHESIVE. THE D 543191 1 7 ENTS AND DOUBLER WERE MR ID'D. THE LH WING GLOVE HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN 543191 1 8 ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 543191 1 9 OPERATIONAL WEAR. 543368 1 1 THE DISCREPANT AREA HAS BEEN SANDED AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-3 543368 1 2 01 AND MR IDENTIFIED PER MAO104-301. THE SCORING WAS SUPERFICIAL AND MIN 543368 1 3 OR. THE BOLTS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED PER PRINT (STR-3-J2-5247 AND STR-3-J2 543368 1 4 -5248 REF). THE HUB WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT AND THE 543368 1 5 MARGIN OF SAFETY IS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 543369 1 1 THE DISCREPANT AREA HAS BEEN SANDED AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-3 543369 1 2 01 AND MR IDENTIFIED PER MAO104-301. THE SCORING WAS SUPERFICIAL AND MIN 543369 1 3 OR. THE BOLTS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED PER PRINT (STR-3-J2-5247 AND STR-3-J2- 543369 1 4 5248 REF). THE HUB WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT AND THE M 543369 1 5 ARGIN OF SAFETY IS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 543370 1 1 BURNISHED DISCREPANT AREA WITH 400 OR FINER GRIT ABRASIVE PAPER. CORROSI 543370 1 2 ON PROTECTED AREA PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-CF-33-XX. IDENTIFIED INSIDE THE 543370 1 3 HUB CAP ASSY PER MAO104-301 CODE BL-08-NG-13 WITH MR STR-3-J2-5280. THE 543370 1 4 SCORING IS MINOR AND SUPERFICIAL IN NATURE. THE HUB CAPS WILL CONTINUE 543370 1 5 TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE STRU 543370 1 6 CTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: REVERSE I 543370 1 7 NSTALLATION OF BOLTS. 543371 1 1 BURNISHED DISCREPANT AREA WITH 400 OR FINER GRIT ABRASIVE PAPER. CORROSI 543371 1 2 ON PROTECTED AREA PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-CF-33-XX. IDENTIFIED INSIDE THE 543371 1 3 HUB CAP ASSY PER MAO104-301 CODE BL-08-NG-13 WITH MR STR-3-J2-5280. THE 543371 1 4 SCORING IS MINOR AND SUPERFICIAL IN NATURE. THE HUB CAPS WILL CONTINUE 543371 1 5 TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE STRU 543371 1 6 CTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: REVERSE I 543371 1 7 NSTALLATION OF BOLTS. 543570 1 1 THE DENT IN THE AVIONICS BAY #5 DOOR WAS CHECKED FOR CRACKS WITH AN EDDY 543570 1 2 CURRENT INSPECTION AND NO CRACKS WERE FOUND. MR UNRESTRICTED ACCEPTANCE 543570 1 3 WAS OBTAINED FOR THE FOLLOWING: 2 PILOT HOLES DRILLED IN THE AREA OF TH 543570 1 4 E SKIN DAMAGE, MBO120-008 ADHESIVE TO FILL DELAMINATED AREA, FABRICATION 543570 1 5 AND INSTALLATION OF AN ALUMINUM DOUBLER OVER THE DAMAGE FACE SHEET USIN 543570 1 6 G MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. THE DOOR WAS MR ID'D. THE DOOR HAS BEEN RETURNED 543570 1 7 TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAU 543570 1 8 SE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 543694 1 1 ULTRASONIC INSPECTION REVEALS THAT THERE IS NO DEBONDING BETWEEN THE COR 543694 1 2 E AND FACESHEET. DENT IS SMALL (0.30" DIA X 0.001" DEEP). DENT IS SMOOTH 543694 1 3 WITH NO SHARP EDGES. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS NOT DEGRADED. PROBABLE CAU 543694 1 4 SE: WORKMANSHIP. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIF 543694 1 5 ICATION AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATI 543694 1 6 ONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 543729 1 1 THE STRUCTURAL LOAD IS LOW AND MARGIN OF SAFETY HIGH. DENTS DO NOT AFFEC 543729 1 2 T LOAD PATH. DENTS DO NOT AFFECT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE. PR 543729 1 3 OBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS 543729 1 4 BOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RAT 543729 1 5 IONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 543812 1 1 THE DISCREPANT WIRE RESTRAINTS (BAND AIDS) WERE REMOVED, NEW RESTRAINTS 543812 1 2 WERE INSTALLED PER SPEC TO RETURN THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. CERT HA 543812 1 3 S NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 543813 1 1 THE INITIAL SQUAWK WAS FOR THE DAMAGED INSULATION ON TWO OF THE FOUR STR 543813 1 2 AIN GAGE WIRES LOCATED ON THE RH HEAT SHIELD SUPT STRUT (REF ITEM 001). 543813 1 3 ENGINEERING REQUESTED THE ADDITION OF MSMT #, WIRE ID & SPLICE #'S TO BL 543813 1 4 K 17 AND TO ALSO REVISE BLK'S 6, 7, & 11 TO REFLECT THE STRAIN GAGE AS T 543813 1 5 HE SQUAWKED ITEM ON PG 1 (THIS CHANGED PR FROM "STR" TO "OEL"). TO REPAI 543813 1 6 R THE DAMAGED WIRE INSULATION (REF ITEM 001) AND THE SEVERED WIRE (REF I 543813 1 7 TEM 002 & PG 9), THE DISPOSITION CONSISTED OF STEPS 3 THRU 47. HOWEVER, 543813 1 8 IT WAS LATER DETERMINED THAT THE ACTUAL WIRE SEGMENTS SQUAWKED WERE THE 543813 1 9 MSMT'S VENDOR LEADS AND NOT THE VEHICLE WIRE, DF729A22 (REF ITEM 003 & 543813 1 10 004). IN RESPONSE TO ITEMS 001, 002, 003 & 004, STEPS 51 THRU 68 WERE 543813 1 11 DISPOSITIONED TO CORRECT THE NOTED DISCREPANCIES. TO FACILITATE THE 543813 1 12 REPAIRS, STEPS 23, 24 & 35 THRU 47 WERE DELETED AND THE INITIAL STEPS 543813 1 13 25 THRU 33 WERE USED. THE VENDOR LEADS BETWEEN THE FIRST RESTRAINT FROM 543813 1 14 THE MSMT V08G9091A TO THE VEHICLE SPLICES, WERE REPLACED WITH 4-COND. 543813 1 15 TW 26 GA WIRE, P/N MP572-0306-0001. MR SPLICE KSC0695, KSC0700, KSC0701 543813 1 16 & KSC0702 WERE UTILIZED AT THE MSMT END AND VEHICLE SPLICES 50SP5191, 543813 1 17 50SP5192, 50SP5193 & 50SP5194 WERE REWORKED AT THE DF727A22 WIRE END. 543813 1 18 DURING STEP 65, VENDOR LEAD #4 BETWEEN THE MSMT AND FIRST RESTRAINT WAS 543813 1 19 FOUND WITH THE INSULATION CUT, EXPOSING THE CONDUCTOR (REF ITEM 005). 543813 1 20 THE CONDUCTOR WAS VERIFIED AS HAVING NO DAMAGE. THE WIRE SEGMENT WAS 543813 1 21 REPAIRED USING RTV PER STEPS 69 THRU 77. THE REPAIRS PER THE ABOVE 543813 1 22 STEPS HAVE RETURNED THE STRAIN GAGE & WIRE INSTALLATION TO A 543813 1 23 CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR 543813 1 24 UNRESTRICTED USAGE. FUNCTIONAL TEST WILL BE PERFORMED PER INS-3-J2-220, 543813 1 25 ATTACH #2, TABLE 2-1 (REF STEP 68). PROBABLE CAUSE: MATERIAL 543813 1 26 DEGRADATION (ITEM 001, 002 & 005). NO PR CONDITION (ITEM 003 & 004). 543818 1 1 THE DISCREPANT AREA HAS BEEN REPAIRED BY THE STANDARD REPAIR PROCEDURE V 543818 1 2 -ST-0015-B. THE CRACK WAS STOP DRILLED, THEN THE AREA WAS SANDED AND ALC 543818 1 3 OHOL WIPED. THE DISCREPANT AREA WAS COVERED WITH GLASS FABRIC USING MBO1 543818 1 4 20-079 ADHESIVE. THE HARDNESS SPECIMEN HAD A SHORE "D" HARDNESS OF 73 WH 543818 1 5 ICH EXCEEDS THE MINIMUM REQUIRED OF 60. THEREFORE, THE PANEL IS BROUGHT 543818 1 6 TO ITS ORIGINAL DESIGN STRENGTH AND ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE 543818 1 7 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 543823 1 1 TORQUING OF THE LOOSE GROUND LUG AT E-POINT 81E11 (REF ITEM 001) WAS PER 543823 1 2 FORMED PER STEPS 1 THRU 9. THESE STEPS ALSO INCLUDED THE RETEST (ELECTRI 543823 1 3 CAL BOND) AND CONFORMAL COATING TO COMPLETE THE REWORK. HOWEVER, DURING 543823 1 4 STEP 9, THE CONFORMAL COATING APPLICATION WAS FOUND NOT TO BE PER DWG RQ 543823 1 5 MTS (VOIDS IN RTV AND RTV ENCAPSULATES ADJACENT CLAMP, REF ITEM 002). TH 543823 1 6 EREFORE, STEPS 10 THRU 22 WERE THEN INITIATED TO CORRECT THIS NOTED PR C 543823 1 7 ONDITION FOR ITEM 002. THE DISCREPANT/EXCESSIVE RTV AND RTV ENCAPSULATED 543823 1 8 CLAMP WERE REMOVED. A NEW CLAMP WAS INSTALLED AND THE CONFORMAL COATING 543823 1 9 WAS REAPPLIED AT 81E11 PER DWG RQMTS. THIS RWK, PER THE ABOVE STEPS, HAS 543823 1 10 RETURNED THE E-POINT (81E11) INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: 543823 1 11 WORKMANSHIP (ITEMS 001 & 002). 543825 1 1 INITIALLY, THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELL CONDITION (REF ITEM 001) WAS WRITTEN AS 543825 1 2 A "DR" CONDITION. HOWEVER, UPON DISSASEMBLY OF THE CONNECTOR PER STEP 0 543825 1 3 03, ITEMS 002 & 003 WERE NOTED. ALSO, SEVERAL "RADIAL CRACKS" WERE OBSER 543825 1 4 VED WHERE THE WIRE IS "FLEXED" DURING MATING/DEMATING (REF ITEM 004). TH 543825 1 5 EREFORE, THE DR WAS UPGRADED TO A "PR" (REF STEP 011) AND STEPS 004 THRU 543825 1 6 009 WERE DELETED PER STEP 010. DURING THE DISASSEMBLY OF THE CONN, THE 543825 1 7 BASKCHELL ASSY (SHIELD TERMINATOR SHELL) SUFFERED DAMAGE (REF ITEM 003). 543825 1 8 THIS MAY HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF THE PLUGS EXCESSIVELY WORN REAR "TEETH 543825 1 9 H" (REF ITEM 002). IN ADDITION, THE WIRE SEGMENTS EXITING FROM THE REAR 543825 1 10 OF THE PLUG WERE OBSERVED BY ENGINEERING TO BE "EXCESSIVELY" TWISTED 543825 1 11 AND HENCEFORTH, RAISED CONCERN TO THE CONDITION OF THE WIRE/CONTACT 543825 1 12 CRIMPS. TO ADDRESS THE CONCERN BY ENGINEERING, THE WIRE SEGMENTS/CRIMPS 543825 1 13 WERE INSPECTED FOLLOWING EXTRACTION. NO ANOMALIES WERE OBSERVED AND 543825 1 14 THEREFORE THE CONTACTS WERE NOT REPLACED (REF STEPS 16 THRU 22). REF 543825 1 15 ITEM 004: PERMANENT WIRE PROTECTION BETWEEN THE SHIELD FINISH AT THE 543825 1 16 CONN END AND THROUGH THE FIRST CLAMP WAS INSTALLED PER MLO303-0014, PP 543825 1 17 4.1.3.2.8. (REF STEPS 23 THRU 29). REF ITEMS 001, 002 & 003: (REF STEPS 543825 1 18 30 THRU 33). THE CONN PLUG AND BACKSHELL WERE REPLACED (REF ITEMS 002 & 543825 1 19 003, RESPECTIVELY). THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY THE CLOSING OF THE CONN (REF 543825 1 20 ITEM 001). SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY & HY-POT TESTS WERE PERFORMED PER 543825 1 21 STEPS 35 THRU 42 & 45 THRU 47 (REF PG 10 RESUBMITTAL). THIS REWORK, PER 543825 1 22 THE ABOVE STEPS, HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE 543825 1 23 CAUSE: ITEM 001, 002 & 004: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 003: WORKMANSHIP. 543836 1 1 CONNECTORS 83P24, 83P25 & 83P29, LISTED ON ITEM 001, WERE DEMATED TO SUP 543836 1 2 PORT THE BAY 3A SHELF RWK AND WILL BE MATED PER THE EXISTING TPS PERFORM 543836 1 3 ING THE RWK. SINCE THE CONNECTORS WERE DEMATED, THE REWORK ON CONNECTORS 543836 1 4 83P24, 83P25 & 83P29 WAS INITIATED AS A "DR". THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELLS FO 543836 1 5 R CONNECTORS 83P25 & 83P29 WERE RETURNED TO DWG RQMTS PER STEPS 009 THRU 543836 1 6 024. HOWEVER, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE "PIGTAIL" FOR CONN 83P24 HAD A 543836 1 7 PPROXIMATELY 75% OF ITS SHIELD STRANDS BROKEN (REF ITEM 002). THEREFORE, 543836 1 8 THE "DR" WAS UPGRADED TO A "PR" (REF STEP 027) AND THE DAMAGED "PIGTAIL 543836 1 9 FOR CONN 83P24 WAS REPAIRED PER ESRD EL.101.15 (REF STEPS 029 THRU 543836 1 10 044). TO FACILITATE THE REPAIRS, THE UNUSED STEPS 005 THRU 044). TO 543836 1 11 FACILITATE THE REPAIRS, THE UNUSED STEPS 005 THRU 008 WERE DELETED PER 543836 1 12 STEP 028. SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY AND HYPOT TESTS WERE PERFORMED PER 543836 1 13 STEPS 045 THRU 052. THIS HAS RETURNED THE CONN TO A CONFIGURATION THAT 543836 1 14 WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. 543836 1 15 PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR & TEAR (ITEM 001) WORKMANSHIP (ITEM 002). 543855 1 1 RETORQUING OF THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELLS FOR CONNS 81V77W8P317 (ITEM 001) & 543855 1 2 81V77W8P43 (ITEM 003), PER STEPS 3 THRU 7 & STEPS 13 THRU 17, RESPECTIVE 543855 1 3 LY, HAS RETURNED THE CONNS TO DWG RQMTS. OPENING AND CLOSING OF CONN 81V 543855 1 4 77W8P114 PER ML0303-0040 (REF STEPS 8 THRU 12), CORRECTED THE NOTED PR C 543855 1 5 ONDITION (LOOSE SPOT TIE) FOR ITEM 002, AND HAS RETURNED THE CONN TO DWG 543855 1 6 RQMTS. SCAN TRACKING FOR THE DEMATED CONNS WILL SATISFY RETEST RQMTS. S 543855 1 7 CAN TRACKING FOR THE DEMATED CONNS WILL SATISFY RETEST RQMTS. PROBABLE C 543855 1 8 AUSE: FAIR WEAR & TEAR (ITEMS 001 & 003); WORKMANSHIP (ITEM 002). 543858 1 1 THE NOTED "DAMAGE" WAS DISCOVERED AFTER TANK REMOVAL. DUE TO THE CONFIGU 543858 1 2 RATION OF THE BUSHING INSTALLATION, QC WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN MOLD IMPRESS 543858 1 3 IONS. HOWEVER, THE DAMAGE IS SLIGHT AND WAS ESTIMATED BY QC TO BE APPROX 543858 1 4 .001. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE INTERFACING BOLTS FOR EVI 543858 1 5 DENCE OF DAMAGE. SINCE NO DAMAGE WAS FOUND ON THE BOLTS, WHICH WAS THE M 543858 1 6 ECHANISM FOR THE MARKS, THE MARKS ARE LESS THAN .001 AND THEREFORE, ARE 543858 1 7 COSMETIC IN NATURE. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIO 543858 1 8 N DEGRADATION. 543860 1 1 BURNISHED DISCREPANT AREA WITH 250-350 GRIT ABRASIVE PAPER. WIPED AREA C 543860 1 2 LEAN WITH ALCOHOL AND DRIED WITH A CLEAN WIPE. CORROSION PROTECTED AREA 543860 1 3 PER MAO608-301 CODE 01-AA-21-XX. IDENTIFIED PER MAO104-301 CODE BL-00-NG 543860 1 4 -13 WITH STR-3-J2-5287. THE DISCREPANT AREA IS ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF T 543860 1 5 HE HOLE DIAMETER. THE DOOR WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT W 543860 1 6 ITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE 543860 1 7 IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 543915 1 1 THE REMOVAL, REPLACEMENT, AND RETERMINATION OF BROKEN GROUND LUG FROM WI 543915 1 2 RE P542E22 AT 50P782, PER THE ABOVE STEPS FOLLOWED BY A SUCCESSFUL CONTI 543915 1 3 NUITY TEST, HAS RETURNED THE WIRE & GROUND LUG INSTALLATIONS TO DWG CONF 543915 1 4 IGURATION. CERT IS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 543920 1 1 THIS INSTALLATION HAS EXISTED SINCE THE CREW MODULE WAS BUILT IN DOWNEY 543920 1 2 IN THE EARLY 1980'S, AND HAS FLOWN ALL OF ITS MISSIONS IN THIS CONFIGURA 543920 1 3 TION IN THE KNOWN DENIGN ATMOSPHERE OF THE CREW MODULE WITH NO PROBLEMS 543920 1 4 NOTED OR ATTRIBUTED TO THE LACK OF CONFORMAL COATING. THE DEGREE OF DISA 543920 1 5 SSEMBLY REQ'D TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS RWK IS EXTENSIVE. IT I 543920 1 6 NCLUDES THE DEMATE OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS, THE 543920 1 7 REMOVAL OF LRU'S AND A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF DISASSEMBLY AND REINSTALLA 543920 1 8 TION WORK, ENDING IS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF RETEST, ALL OF WHICH IS UNW 543920 1 9 ARRANTED. MR ID IS NOT REQ'D/POSSIBLE. CERT WAS NOT AFFECTED, AND DOES 543920 1 10 NOT IMPACT CRITICAL ITEMS LIST, RETENTION OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE 543920 1 11 CAUSE: PLANNING ERROR IN THE ORIGINAL FAB SEQUENCES. COORDINATED WITH W. 543920 1 12 T. DEAN, D/292, X2932. 543963 1 1 THE STRUCTURAL LOAD IS LOW AND MARGIN OF SAFETY HIGH. DENT DOES NOT AFFE 543963 1 2 CT THE LOAD PATH. DENT DOES NOT AFFECT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHIC 543963 1 3 LE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 543963 1 4 BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTI 543963 1 5 ON RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 543972 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS LH & RH UPPER AND LOWER WIRE TRAYS AT XO636 - X 543972 1 2 O1249 HAVE SCRATCHES, PEELING & CHIPPED PAINT. DISPO WAS ADDED TO REFINI 543972 1 3 SH THE WIRE TRAY COVERS TO PRINT RQMTS. NO FURTHER REWORK REQUIRED. PROB 543972 1 4 ABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 544052 1 1 THE RWK BLENDED THE RAISED METAL ON THE RH OUTBD ELEVON ACTUATOR, AMOUNT 544052 1 2 OF MATERIAL REMOVED IS INSIGNIFICANT, IT WILL NOT EFFECT FORM, FIT OR N 544052 1 3 EXT ASSY RQMTS. DESIGN INTENT AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MA 544052 1 4 RGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 544053 1 1 RETORQUING OF THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELL FOR CONN 82V77W9P163, PER THE ABOVE 544053 1 2 STEPS, HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. SCAN TRACKING FOR DEM 544053 1 3 ATED CONN WILL SATISFY RETEST RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 544061 1 1 THE EO V075-000002 G10 AND EO M072-332401 B08 HAVE BEEN RELEASED WITH TH 544061 1 2 E CORRECT HARDWARE CALLOUT. THE MANUFACTURING ACCESS PANEL HARDWARE HAS 544061 1 3 BEEN INSTALLED PER EO. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. PRO 544061 1 4 BABLE CAUSE: DWG OVERSIGHT. 544067 1 1 DURING REMOVAL OF MC282-0063-0200 PRSD LH2 TANK (S/N 0015), ONE TRUNNION 544067 1 2 BOLT BUSHING WAS NOTED AS HAVING SURFACE DEFECTS TO ITS INSIDE DIAMETER 544067 1 3 IN THE FORM OF SCRATCHES ESTIMATED AT .002 INCH DEPTH WITH SLIGHT ROUGH 544067 1 4 /RAISED METAL PRESENT. CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN TO POLISH THE ID OF T 544067 1 5 HE BUSHING TO REMOVE THE ROUGH/RAISED METAL. PER STEP 6.0 AND SUBSEQUENT 544067 1 6 TO BUSHING REWORK, BUSHING ID DIMENSIONS WERE VERIFIED WITHIN TOLERANCE 544067 1 7 . A MOLD IMPRESSION OBTAINED SUBSEQUENT TO POLISHING HAS VERIFIED THAT N 544067 1 8 O UNACCEPTABLE DEFECTS REMAIN ON THE BUSHING INSIDE DIAMETER. THE TRUNNI 544067 1 9 ON BOLTS REMOVED FROM THIS TANK HAVE BEEN INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE WITH NO 544067 1 10 DAMAGE REPORTED. PER ENGINEERING INSPECTION AND EVALUATION, POLISHING 544067 1 11 HAS RESTORED THE BUSHING SURFACE FINISH TO WITHIN ACCEPTABLE AND DESIGN 544067 1 12 LIMITS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 544068 1 1 DURING REMOVAL OF MC282-0063-0200 PRSD LO2 TANK (S/N 0016), THE TANK TRU 544068 1 2 NNION BOLT BUSHINGS (QTY 2) WERE NOTED AS HAVING SURFACE DEFECTS ON THEI 544068 1 3 R INSIDE DIAMETERS. THE DEFECTS WERE ESTIMATED AT .001 INCH DEEP. PER EN 544068 1 4 GINEERING INPSECTION, ONE OF THE TWO BUSHINGS WERE CONSIDERED TO BE COSM 544068 1 5 ETIC DEFECTS (SURFACE FINISH WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS) AND REQ'D NO CORR 544068 1 6 ECTIVE ACTION. THE OTHER BUSHING HAD SOME ROUGH/RAISED METAL. CONSEQUENT 544068 1 7 LY, CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN TO POLISH THE INSIDE DIAMETER OF THE BUS 544068 1 8 HING TO REMOVE ANY ROUGH OR RAISED METAL THUS RESTORING THE SURFACE FINI 544068 1 9 SH TO WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. PROBABLE CAUSE: DEFECTS CAUSED BY/DURING 544068 1 10 BOLT REMOVAL/INSTALLATION OPERATIONS. 544148 1 1 THE S.M.C.H. WIRE TRAY COVERS WERE REFINISHED PER PRINT. THE TRAY COVERS 544148 1 2 HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. NO ADDITIONAL WORK IS REQ'D. 544148 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 544149 1 1 BRACKET V712-794026-001 WAS OBSERVED TO HAVE THREE CRACKS. THIS DISPO RE 544149 1 2 MOVED AND REPLACED THE BRACKET AND IT'S FOUR SECURING RIVETS (MS20426A5) 544149 1 3 . THE RIVETS WERE NOT AVAILABLE ON SITE. MD121-0001-05XX WAS ACCEPTED IN 544149 1 4 LIEU OF B/P RIVET MS20426A5 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. RIVET SUBSTITUTION WI 544149 1 5 LL NOT AFFECT DESIGN INTENT AND MARGINS OF SAFETY REMAIN POSITIVE. PROBA 544149 1 6 BLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 544201 1 1 APPLICATION OF CORROSION PROTECTION PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-CF-21-XX REST 544201 1 2 ORES THE TRAY ASSY TO THE DWG RQMTS AND THE DESIGN INTENT. PROBABLE CAUS 544201 1 3 E: WORKMANSHIP. 544282 1 1 BRACKET V712-794026-001 WAS OBSERVED TO BE CRACKED IN TWO PLACES AND CHI 544282 1 2 PPED IN THREE PLACES. A DISPO REMOVED AND REPLACED THE BRACKET AND ITS F 544282 1 3 OUR SECURING RIVETS (MS20426A5) ON V712-794034-002 ASSY. THE RIVETS WERE 544282 1 4 NOT AVAILABLE ON SITE. MD121-0001-05XX WAS ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF B/P RIVE 544282 1 5 T MS20426A5 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. RIVET SUBSTITUTION WILL NOT AFFECT DES 544282 1 6 IGN INTENT AND MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMA 544282 1 7 NSHIP. 544284 1 1 BRACKET V712-794037-001 WAS OBSERVED TO BE CRACKED ON SIDEWALL. A DISPO 544284 1 2 REMOVED AND REPLACED THE BRACKET AND ITS TWO SECURING RIVETS (MS20426A5) 544284 1 3 ON V712-794034-002 ASSY. THE RIVETS WERE NOT AVAILABLE ON SITE. MD121-0 544284 1 4 001-05XX WAS ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF B/P RIVET MS20426A5 FOR UNRESTRICTED US 544284 1 5 E. RIVET SUBSTITUTION WILL NOT AFFECT DESIGN INTENT AND MARGINS OF SAFET 544284 1 6 Y REMAIN POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 544285 1 1 THE 5 HOLES, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, THAT WERE NOT CORROSION PROTE 544285 1 2 CTED, HAVE BEEN CORROSION PROTECTED PER THE PRINT RQMTS. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 544285 1 3 HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NOR 544285 1 4 MAL WEAR AND TEAR. 544287 1 1 THE 6 HOLES, DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 1, PAGE 1, THAT WERE NOT CORROSION PROTE 544287 1 2 CTED HAVE BEEN CORROSION PROTECTED PER THE PRINT RQMTS. ITEM 1, PAGE 1 H 544287 1 3 AS BEEN RESOLVED AND PR CONDITION NO LONGER EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORM 544287 1 4 AL WEAR AND TEAR. 544289 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY CORROSION PROTECTING THE 6 DISCREPANT HOL 544289 1 2 ES PER DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A 544289 1 3 WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND CORROSION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED. 544289 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP DURING INITIAL INSTALLATION OF RIVETS. 544290 1 1 PRR WAS ISSUED FOR VENDOR (HI-TEMP) TO REPAIR THE INSULATOR V070-190306- 544290 1 2 001. HI-TEMP REPORTED ON-SITE AND REPAIRED THE INSULATOR. DOCUMENTATION 544290 1 3 IS ATTACHED TO THIS PR. PRR NO 95673K IS CLOSED AND A COPY ATTACHED. CAU 544290 1 4 SE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 544323 1 1 CRACKED BRACKET WAS REMOVED AND NEW BRACKET WAS INSTALLED PER DWG RQMTS. 544323 1 2 MR ACTION SUBSTITUTED MD121-00105XX RIVETS IN LIEU OF B/P RIVET MS20426 544323 1 3 A5-6. THE B/P RIVETS ARE NOT AVAILABLE ON SITE. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. 544323 1 4 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROB 544323 1 5 ABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 544333 1 1 CRACKED BRACKETS WERE REMOVED AND NEW BRACKETS WERE INSTALLED. MR SUBSTI 544333 1 2 TUTION OF FASTENERS DOES NOT AFFECT DESIGN INTENT. DESIGN INTENT RESTORE 544333 1 3 D. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE 544333 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 544334 1 1 PRR WAS ISSUED FOR VENDOR (HI-TEMP) TO REPAIR THE INSULATOR V070-190307- 544334 1 2 001. HI-TEMP REPORTED ON SITE AND REPAIRED THE INSULATOR. DOCUMENTATION 544334 1 3 IS ATTACHED TO THIS PR. PRR NO 95673K IS CLOSED AND A COPY ATTACHED. CAU 544334 1 4 SE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 544339 1 1 THE CHAFFING ON THE SUPT STRUT WAS SUPERFICIAL PAINT DAMAGE ONLY. THE PA 544339 1 2 INT WAS TOUCHED UP WHICH RETURNED THE STRUT TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. 544339 1 3 NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 544340 1 1 THE CHAFFING ON THE SUPT STRUT WAS SUPERFICIAL PAINT DAMAGE ONLY. THE PA 544340 1 2 INT WAS TOUCHED UP WHICH RETURNED THE STRUT TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. 544340 1 3 NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 544343 1 1 THE CHAFFING ON THE SUPT STRUT WAS SUPERFICIAL PAINT DAMAGE ONLY. THE PA 544343 1 2 INT WAS TOUCHED UP WHICH RETURNED THE STRUT TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION. 544343 1 3 NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 544345 1 1 THE DAMAGED CONN BACKSHELL, P/N NB-SCT-10 (REF ITEM 001), WAS REPLACED W 544345 1 2 ITH A SPLIT BACKSHELL, P/N ME127-0106-0110, FOR CONN 50P637, PER ENGINEE 544345 1 3 RING STANDARD REPAIR DISPOSITION E.EL101.17. THIS HAS RETURNED THE CONN 544345 1 4 TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR 544345 1 5 UNRESTRICTED USAGE. SCAN TRACKING SYSTEM WILL FULFILL RETEST RQMTS FOR 544345 1 6 CONN 50P637. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 544361 1 1 THE CRACK IS IN THE CENTER WEB OF THE PLASTIC MOLDED SPACER CALLED BRACK 544361 1 2 ET IT IS NOT DETRIMENTAL TO THE FIT FUNCTION AND DESIGN INTENT. TO BLEND 544361 1 3 THE CRACK WOULD REQUIRE REMOVAL OF THE BRACKET. THE BRACKET WILL PERFOR 544361 1 4 M AS DESIGN INTENDED. THE BRACKET IS ATTACHED WITH TWO RIVETS. THE CRACK 544361 1 5 IS SUPERFICIAL AND IT IS NOT DETRIMENTAL TO THE FUNCTION AND DESIGN INT 544361 1 6 ENT OF THE PART. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR & TEAR. MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 544361 1 7 BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENT 544361 1 8 ION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 544436 1 1 THIS PR NOT REQD, NUTPLATE PREVIOUSLY DOCUMENTED ON STR-3-A0193 AND WILL 544436 1 2 BE DISPOSITIONED TO REPLACE NUTPLATE. PROBABLE CAUSE: DUPLICATE PR. 544473 1 1 THE CUTTING OF EXCESS WIRE FROM C116A24 SEG 1, LEFT SUFFICIENT SHIP WIRE 544473 1 2 FOR PROPER PINNING OF SEGMENT 1 AND INSTALLATION OF SEG 2 GND LUG AT CO 544473 1 3 NN 81P320. REPLACEMENT OF GND LUG ON WIRE C116A24 AND TERMINATED AT 81P3 544473 1 4 20 PER THE ABOVE STEPS HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. PROBA 544473 1 5 BLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 544493 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS ACCEPTED PER MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND CORROSION PR 544493 1 2 OTECTION WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP DURING INITIAL INSTALL 544493 1 3 ATION OF RIVETS. 544494 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS ACCEPTED PER MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND CORROSION PR 544494 1 2 OTECTION WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP DURING INITIAL INSTALL 544494 1 3 ATION OF RIVETS. 544496 1 1 EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION SHOWS THAT THERE ARE NO CRACKS IN THE SUSPECT AR 544496 1 2 EA. THE DEFECT IS A SCRATCH IN THE VERY THICK PAINT ONLY. THIS COSMETIC 544496 1 3 DEFECT WILL BE TOUCHED UP TO PREVENT FUTURE SQUAWKS. PROBABLE CAUSE: FAI 544496 1 4 R WEAR AND TEAR. 544588 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS ACCEPTED PER MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND CORROSION PR 544588 1 2 OTECTION WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP DURING INITIAL INSTALL 544588 1 3 ATION OF RIVETS. 544618 1 1 THE DISCREPANT AREA HAS BEEN SMOOTHED USING 250-350 GRIT ABRASIVE MATERI 544618 1 2 AL AND CLEANED WITH IPA. THE AREA HAS BEEN CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO60 544618 1 3 8-301 CODE 00-CF-21-XX AND IDENTIFIED PER MAO104-301 CODE BL-00-NG-13 WI 544618 1 4 TH NUMBER "MR STR-3-J2-5317". REWORK IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 544618 1 5 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 544649 1 1 THE CRACKED CLOSEOUT PANEL HAS BEEN REPAIRED PER STANDARD REPAIR PROCEDU 544649 1 2 RE SRP-V-ST-0015-B. THE REPAIR RESTORED THE CLOSEOUT PANEL TO ITS ORIGIN 544649 1 3 AL STRENGTH. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 544729 1 1 SMOOTH DISCREPANT AREA USING 400-600 ABRASIVE MATERIAL, WIPED WITH IPA. 544729 1 2 CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301 CODE 01-CF-20-XX AND IDENTIFIED PER M 544729 1 3 AO104-301 CODE BL-00-NG-13. REWORK IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. S 544729 1 4 TRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 544752 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED DUE TO AN EXCESSIVE COMBINED GAP MSMT AT THE SHEAR 544752 1 2 TIE BUTTONS WHILE PERFORMING STRUCTURAL INSPECTIONS. THE DISPO RE-PERFO 544752 1 3 RMED THE STRUCTURAL INSPECTION AND THE GAPS WERE RE-MEASURED. THE COMBIN 544752 1 4 ED GAPS WERE LESS THAN THE OMRSD MAX GAP RQMT OF .015. NO FURTHER DISCRE 544752 1 5 PANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 544754 1 1 PER OMRSD V37AK0.010 AND V31CCZ.020 THE MSMTS WERE TAKEN WITH THE RADIAT 544754 1 2 OR STOWED. THE RECORDED CLEARANCE BETWEEN PAIRED FLAT INDEX HINGE SHEAR 544754 1 3 TIE BUTTON AND CURVED BERYLLIUM AND COPPER BUTTONS IS WITHIN THE ACCEPTA 544754 1 4 BLE RANGE. THE RESULTS ARE WITHIN TOLERANCE. THE RADIATORS POSITION IS A 544754 1 5 CCEPTABLE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NONE (WITHIN TOLERANCE). 544756 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED DUE TO AN EXCESSIVE COMBINED GAP MSMT AT THE SHEAR 544756 1 2 TIE BUTTONS WHILE PERFORMING STRUCTURAL INSPECTIONS. THE DISPO RE-PERFO 544756 1 3 RMED THE STRUCTURAL INSPECTION AND THE GAPS WERE RE-MEASURED (IN STOWED 544756 1 4 POSITION). THE COMBINED GAPS WERE LESS THAN THE OMRSD MAX GAP RQMT OF .0 544756 1 5 15. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 544758 1 1 PER OMRSD V37AKO.010 AND V31CBZ.020 THE MSMTS WERE TAKEN WITH THE RADIAT 544758 1 2 OR STOWED. THE RECORDED CLEARANCE BETWEEN PAIRED FLAT INDEX HINGE SHEAR 544758 1 3 TIE BUTTON AND CURVED BERYLLIUM AND COPPER BUTTONS IS WITHIN THE ACCEPTA 544758 1 4 BLE RANGE. THE RESULTS ARE WITHIN TOLERANCE. THE RADIATOR POSITION IS AC 544758 1 5 CEPTABLE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NONE (MSMTS WITHIN DWG TOLERANCE). 544760 1 1 PER OMRSD V37AKO.010 AND V31CAZ.020 THE MSMTS WERE TAKEN WITH THE RADIAT 544760 1 2 OR STOWED. THE RECORDED CLEARANCE BETWEEN PAIRED FLAT INDEX HINGE SHEAR 544760 1 3 TIE BUTTON AND CURVED BERYLLIUM AND COPPER BUTTONS IS WITHIN THE ACCEPTA 544760 1 4 BLE RANGE. THE RESULTS ARE WITHIN TOLERANCE. THE RADIATOR POSITION IS AC 544760 1 5 CEPTABLE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NONE (MSMTS WITHIN DWG TOLERANCE). 544908 1 1 ITEM 002 WAS DISPOSITIONED AND WORKED PRIOR TO DISPOSITION OF ITEM 001. 544908 1 2 V070-333758-003 AND SURROUNDING PARTS WERE TRIMMED TO A .44 INCH RADIUS, 544908 1 3 CORROSION PROTECTED AND ID'D. .25-.30 CLEARANCE WAS NOT PROVIDED TO ALL 544908 1 4 POSITIONS OF THE CONTROL ROD. ITEM 001 WAS DISPOSITIONED TO TRIM V070-3 544908 1 5 33758 AND V070-333757 PARTS TO PROVIDE A MIN .190 CLEARANCE TO THE CONTR 544908 1 6 OL ROD IN ALL POSITIONS. ALL TORQUE TUBES WERE BURNISHED AND CORROSION P 544908 1 7 ROTECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSUFFICIENT CLEARANCE AND WEAR AND TEAR. 544978 1 1 THE NOTED DISCREPANCY FOR THE CONN LISTED ON PG 1, REF ITEM 001, OCURRED 544978 1 2 DURING "INITIAL" BUILD OR "PREVIOUS" MODS OF THE ORBITER, AND IS THEREF 544978 1 3 ORE APPLICABLE TO MLO303-0014, SECTION 6, "MODIFICATION/REPAIR OF DELIVE 544978 1 4 RED/FLOWN HARDWARE". ENGINEERING REVIEWED THE NOTED DISCREPANCY AND EVAL 544978 1 5 UATED THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS TO THE "SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE 544978 1 6 " IN PARA 6.7.2 OF THE NOTED SECTION. ENGINEERING HAS DETERMINED THAT TH 544978 1 7 IS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT "SAFETY OF FLIGHT" AND THEREFORE REQUIRES N 544978 1 8 O REWORK/REPAIR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 544995 1 1 THE RESIDUE DETECTED IS A LIGHT, SUPERFICIAL OXIDATION OF THE DRY FILM L 544995 1 2 UBE, ASSOCIATED WITH NORMAL FAIR WEAR AND TEAR FROM NORMAL FLIGHT OPERAT 544995 1 3 IONAL EXPOSURE. THE RESIDUE WAS WIPED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND INSPECT 544995 1 4 ED TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING OR SURFACE DEGRADATION 544995 1 5 . CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 544997 1 1 THE RESIDUE DETECTED IS A LIGHT, SUPERFICIAL OXIDATION OF THE DRY FILM L 544997 1 2 UBE, ASSOCIATED WITH NORMAL FAIR WEAR AND TEAR FROM NORMAL FLIGHT OPERAT 544997 1 3 IONAL EXPOSURE. THE RESIDUE WAS WIPED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND INSPECT 544997 1 4 ED TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING OR SURFACE DEGRADATION 544997 1 5 . CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 545000 1 1 THE RESIDUE DETECTED IS A LIGHT, SUPERFICIAL OXIDATION OF THE DRY FILM L 545000 1 2 UBE, ASSOCIATED WITH NORMAL FAIR WEAR AND TEAR FROM NORMAL FLIGHT OPERAT 545000 1 3 IONAL EXPOSURE. THE RESIDUE WAS WIPED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND INSPECT 545000 1 4 ED TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING OR SURFACE DEGRADATION 545000 1 5 . CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 545003 1 1 THE RESIDUE DETECTED IS A LIGHT, SUPERFICIAL OXIDATION OF THE DRY FILM L 545003 1 2 UBE, ASSOCIATED WITH NORMAL FAIR WEAR AND TEAR FROM NORMAL FLIGHT OPERAT 545003 1 3 IONAL EXPOSURE. THE RESIDUE WAS WIPED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND INSPECT 545003 1 4 ED TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING OR SURFACE DEGRADATION 545003 1 5 . CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 545022 1 1 DURING REMOVAL OF MC282-0063-0200 PRSD LH2 TANK (S/N 0013), THE TANK TRU 545022 1 2 NNION BOLT BUSHINGS (QTY 3) WERE NOTED AS HAVING SURFACE DEFECTS ON THEI 545022 1 3 R INSIDE DIAMETERS. THE DEFECTS WERE ESTIMATED AT .001 INCH DEEP. PER EN 545022 1 4 GINEERING INSPECTION, TWO OF THE THREE BUSHINGS WERE CONSIDERED TO BE CO 545022 1 5 SMETIC DEFECTS (SURFACE FINISH WITHIN DESIGN RQMTS). THE OTHER BUSHING H 545022 1 6 AD VERY SLIGHT RAISED METAL. CONSEQUENTLY, CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN T 545022 1 7 O POLISH THE INSIDE DIAMETER OF THE BUSHING TO REMOVE ANY ROUGH OR RAISE 545022 1 8 D METAL THUS RESTORING THE SURFACE FINISH RQMT TO WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMI 545022 1 9 TS. PROBABLE CAUSE: DEFECTS CAUSED BY/DURING BOLT REMOVAL/INSTALLATION 545022 1 10 OPERATIONS. 545066 1 1 THE RESIDUE DETECTED IS A LIGHT, SUPERFICIAL OXIDATION OF THE DRY FILM L 545066 1 2 UBE, ASSOCIATED WITH NORMAL FAIR WEAR AND TEAR FROM NORMAL FLIGHT OPERAT 545066 1 3 IONAL EXPOSURE. THE RESIDUE WAS WIPED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND INSPECT 545066 1 4 ED TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING OR SURFACE DEGRADATION 545066 1 5 . CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 545067 1 1 THE RESIDUE DETECTED IS A LIGHT, SUPERFICIAL OXIDATION OF THE DRY FILM L 545067 1 2 UBE, ASSOCIATED WITH NORMAL FAIR WEAR AND TEAR FROM NORMAL FLIGHT OPERAT 545067 1 3 IONAL EXPOSURE. THE RESIDUE WAS WIPED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND INSPECT 545067 1 4 ED TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING OR SURFACE DEGRADATION 545067 1 5 . CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 545068 1 1 THE RESIDUE DETECTED IS A LIGHT, SUPERFICIAL OXIDATION OF THE DRY FILM L 545068 1 2 UBE, ASSOCIATED WITH NORMAL FAIR WEAR AND TEAR FROM NORMAL FLIGHT OPERAT 545068 1 3 IONAL EXPOSURE. THE RESIDUE WAS WIPED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND INSPECT 545068 1 4 ED TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING OR SURFACE DEGRADATION 545068 1 5 . CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 545069 1 1 THE RESIDUE DETECTED IS A LIGHT, SUPERFICIAL OXIDATION OF THE DRY FILM L 545069 1 2 UBE, ASSOCIATED WITH NORMAL FAIR WEAR AND TEAR FROM NORMAL FLIGHT OPERAT 545069 1 3 IONAL EXPOSURE. THE RESIDUE WAS WIPED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND INSPECT 545069 1 4 ED TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING OR SURFACE DEGRADATION 545069 1 5 . CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 545070 1 1 THE LOOSE/CRACKED PIECES HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND CLEANED. THE CAVITY WAS F 545070 1 2 ILLED WITH EPOXY PASTE AND CURED TO SHORE "D" 89. REPAIR RESTORED THE PA 545070 1 3 NEL TO THE DESIGN INTENT, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE C 545070 1 4 AUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 545071 1 1 TWO ITEMS WERE ADDRESSED ON THIS PR. THE FIRST ITEM REQ'D MR ACTION TO R 545071 1 2 EPAIR PANEL V070-335097-010 WHICH HAD BEEN TORN BY INSTALLATION OF TWO S 545071 1 3 CREWS. THE AREA WAS COUNTERBORED 0.500 DIA, CLEANED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOH 545071 1 4 OL, AND FILLED WITH AN MBO120-008 EPOXY PASTE. THE SHORE "D" HARDNESS RE 545071 1 5 ACHED A VALUE OF 89 VERSUS THE MIN ACCEPTABLE OF 75. THE SECOND ITEM REM 545071 1 6 OVED PAINT FROM A SUSPECTED CRACK AREA ON THE SAME PANEL USING 200 GRIT 545071 1 7 ABRASIVE PAPER AND CLEANED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL. NO CRACK WAS FOUND AN 545071 1 8 D THE AREA WAS TOUCHED UP PER MAO608-301. THESE ACTIONS RETURN THE PANEL 545071 1 9 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE 545071 1 10 WEAR AND TEAR. 545072 1 1 THE LOOSE/CRACKED PIECES HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND CLEANED. THE CAVITY WAS F 545072 1 2 ILLED WITH EPOXY PASTE AND CURED TO SHORE "D" 89. REPAIR RESTORED THE PA 545072 1 3 NEL TO THE DESIGN INTENT, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE C 545072 1 4 AUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 545210 1 1 RETORQUING OF THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELL FOR CONNECTORS 83V77W4P16 (ITEM 001) 545210 1 2 & 83V77W4P17 (ITEM 002), PER THE ABOVE STEPS, HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLA 545210 1 3 TION TO DWG RQMTS. SCAN TRACKING FOR DEMATED CONN WILL SATISFY RETEST RQ 545210 1 4 MTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: FAIR WEAR & TEAR (ITEMS 001 & 002). 545211 1 1 THE RH LOWER RUDDER SPEED BRAKE SKIN PANEL WAS REPAIRED BY DRILLING A .4 545211 1 2 4 INCH DIA HOLE IN THE FACE SHEET TO REMOVE THE CRACK, THE CORE WAS FILL 545211 1 3 ED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE, A 2.25 INCH DIA DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND 545211 1 4 INSTALLED OVER THE AREA USING MBO120-048 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND THE AREA 545211 1 5 WAS REPAINTED PER CHIT 4610. THE SKIN PANEL REPAIR WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR U 545211 1 6 NRESTRICTED USAGE. THE PANEL WAS MR ID'D. THE SKIN PANEL HAS BEEN RETURN 545211 1 7 ED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAU 545211 1 8 SE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 545212 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED DURING INSPECTION PER OMRSD RQMT V30-AEO.205 AND J 545212 1 2 C V30-13329. THIS RQMT INSPECTS ACCESSIBLE AREAS OF THE CREW MODULE AND 545212 1 3 FWD FUSELAGE LOWER & SIDE SKIN PANELS & STRINGERS AT XO475 TO XO535. ALL 545212 1 4 ACCESSIBLE AREAS HAVE BEEN INSPECTED ARE SHADED IN FIGURES 1-4. THE RQ 545212 1 5 MT HAS BEEN MET BY INSPECTING ALL ACCESSIBLE AREAS AND MAPPING AND NO PR 545212 1 6 CONDITION EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO PR CONDITION. 545213 1 1 ITEM 001 - UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE V30AEO.430 INSPECTION DUE TO INACCESSI 545213 1 2 BILITY. EXCEPTION/WAIVER HAS BEEN GENERATED TO DOCUMENT NONCOMPLIANCE. A 545213 1 3 N RCN WILL BE GENERATED BY THE JSC SUBSYSTEM MANAGER TO PRECLUDE RECURRE 545213 1 4 NCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: RQMT NO PROPERLY DEFINED. 545236 1 1 EDDY CURRENT INSPECTED NOTED DEFECTS PER MT0501-513. RECORDED FINDINGS. 545236 1 2 REMOVED THE TWO RIVETS ADJACENT TO INDENTATIONS. EDDY CURRENT INSPECTED 545236 1 3 BOLT HOLES AND RECORDED FINDINGS. DETERMINED REQUIRED BLIND RIVET GRIP L 545236 1 4 ENGTH. INSTALLED TWO MD121-0004-0504 BLIND RIVETS PER MAO601-301. CORROS 545236 1 5 ION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301, CODE 08-AA-28-XX. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANS 545236 1 6 HIP. EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION DETECTED NO CRACKS. THE REINSTALLED RIVETS 545236 1 7 RESTORE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF PART. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE 545236 1 8 THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CIL RETENTION RATIONALE OR H 545236 1 9 AZARD CONTROLS. 545246 1 1 THE NAS1581CAT13 BOLT WAS SHANKED OUT. THE NUT WAS REMOVED. AN ADDITIONA 545246 1 2 L RD153-1002-0004 WASHER AND A REPLACEMENT MD114-1001-0005 NUT WERE INST 545246 1 3 ALLED PER MAO101-301. THE INSTALLATION WAS RETURNED TO A PER PRINT CONDI 545246 1 4 TION. NO ADDITIONAL WORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 545252 1 1 PR WRITTEN IN ERROR - INSTALLATION CONFORMS TO DWG V070-594160, ZN26F, 545252 1 2 SECTION F-F. 545310 1 1 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF MEQ-3-J2-250, STEP 7, THE MANUFACTURING ACCESS 545310 1 2 PANEL DUAL SEAL FAILED LEAK TEST. THE DECAY RATE WAS 1.5 PSIG/MIN (S/B 545310 1 3 1.0 OR LESS). THE GSE WAS CHECKED AND SHOWN TO BE OPERATING PROPERLY. AN 545310 1 4 ULTRASONIC CHECK OF THE AREA DID NOT DETECT ANY STRUCTURAL DAMAGE THAT 545310 1 5 MIGHT PERMIT THE STRUCTURE TO LEAK. A HELIUM PRESSURE TEST WAS USED TO L 545310 1 6 OCATE THE SOURCE OF THE LEAK IN THE MID BODY BAY 1. MASS SPEC LEAK CHECK 545310 1 7 S WERE DONE IN THE CREW COMPARTMENT AND MID-BODY. THERE WERE NO LEAKS DE 545310 1 8 TECTED TO INTERIOR OF THE CREW MODULE. SEVERAL LEAK PATHS WERE FOUND IN 545310 1 9 THE MID BODY SIDE. THE BOLTS WERE MR RETORQUED TO A CLASS 2 CONDITION. 545310 1 10 THE RETEST ALSO FAILED. BOTH SEALS NEW (RED AND OLD (GREY) WERE 545310 1 11 INSPECTED. THE OUTSIDE DIAMETER OF THE GREY SEALS V070-332365-001 & 545310 1 12 0=-002 WERE MEASURED FO ROUNDNESS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF ANY 545310 1 13 PERMANENT SET OCURRED. THE SEALS MSMTS WERE WITHIN SPECIFICATION. 545310 1 14 ALLOWABLES: HEIGHT MSMTS OF THE RED SEALS TO THE HATCH SURFACE WERE 545310 1 15 TAKEN AND RECORDED. THESE SEALS WERE THEN REMOVED AND THE OLD GRAY 545310 1 16 SEALS WERE REINSTALLED ON THE HATCH AND THE SAME HEIGHT MSMTS WERE 545310 1 17 TAKEN AND RECORDED. THE OLD SEAL HEIGHT MSMTS WERE SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN 545310 1 18 THOSE OF THE NEW RED SEALS. DIAMETER MSMTS OF THE NEW SEAL WERE ON THE 545310 1 19 LOWER END OF THE ALLOWABLE TOLERANCE. PRIOR TO REINSTALLATION OF THE 545310 1 20 OLD SEAL THE SEALING SURFACES AND FASTENER HOLES WERE CLEANED WITH 545310 1 21 ALCOHOL IN RESPONSE TO THE DEBRIS AND DISCOLORATION (ITEM 004) 545310 1 22 REPORTED. IN RESPONSE TO ITEMS 002 & 003 THE AREAS WERE POLISHED AND 545310 1 23 SCREEDED FLUSH TO THE SEALING SURFACE OF THE HATCH OPENING. NO RUNNING 545310 1 24 TORQUE VALUES COUPLED WITH A DAMAGED HOLE (ITEM 005) LEAD TO THE 545310 1 25 REPLACEMENT OF 47 INSERTS. PRIOR TO HATCH INSTALLATION NASA KSC 545310 1 26 INSISTED ON PMRD APPROVAL TO RE-USE THE OLD SEAL. THE SEALS EVEN WITH 545310 1 27 MINOR COSMETIC MRS STILL MET DWG RQMTS. THE BOARD APPROVED THE 545310 1 28 REINSTALLATION. THE HATCH WAS REINSTALLED AND THE FASTENERS WERE 545310 1 29 PROPERLY TORQUED. THE LEAK RETEST PASSED AT A RATE OF .2 PSIG/MIN. ALL 545310 1 30 RESINSTALLATIONS MEET DWG RQMTS AND THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE 545310 1 31 VEHICLE WAS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: LOW TOLERANCE LEVELS COUPLED 545310 1 32 WITH STRUCTURAL WAVINESS AND FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 545332 1 1 REWORK OF EXISTING HEATSINK MATL NOT REQ;D. HEAT SINK (RTV) IN BAY 8A IS 545332 1 2 BEING REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW HEATSINK MATL PER TPS STR-3-J2-644, 545332 1 3 SEQ 1. PROBABLE CAUSE; ENGR CHANGE. 545339 1 1 THE DISCREPANT THERMAL BARRIER AND SEAL WERE REMOVED AND ROUTED TO HDA F 545339 1 2 OR DISPOSITION. NEW BARRIER AND SEAL WERE OBTAINED AND INSTALLED PER TPS 545339 1 3 -3-J2-698. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 545340 1 1 THE DISCREPANT THERMAL BARRIER AND SEAL WERE REMOVED AND ROUTED TO HDA F 545340 1 2 OR DISPOSITION. NEW BARRIER AND SEAL WERE OBTAINED AND INSTALLED PER TPS 545340 1 3 -3-J2-698. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 545341 1 1 THE DISCREPANT THERMAL BARRIER AND SEAL WERE REMOVED AND ROUTED TO HDA F 545341 1 2 OR DISPOSITION. NEW BARRIER AND SEAL WERE OBTAINED AND INSTALLED PER TPS 545341 1 3 -3-J2-698. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 545343 1 1 THE DISCREPANT THERMAL BARRIER AND SEAL WERE REMOVED AND ROUTED TO HDA F 545343 1 2 OR DISPOSITION. NEW BARRIER AND SEAL WERE OBTAINED AND INSTALLED PER TPS 545343 1 3 -3-J2-698. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 545396 1 1 MR ACTION WAS REQ'D TO REWORK LOOSE & MISSING HEAT SINK MATERIAL IN BAY 545396 1 2 7 OF THE MID FUSELAGE BETWEEN X919 AND X979. DISCREPANT AREAS WERE BONDE 545396 1 3 D PER MAO106-330 USING MBO125-050 PRIMER AND MBO130-085 ADHESIVE. SHORE 545396 1 4 "A" HARDNESS MET MINIMUM HARDNESS OF 55. AREA WAS IDENTIFIED WITH MR STR 545396 1 5 -3-J2-5332 PER MAO104-301, CODE BL-00-NG-13. ORIGINAL DESIGN INTENT WAS 545396 1 6 RESTORED AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AN 545396 1 7 D TEAR. 545399 1 1 THE REWORK INSTALLED NEW MD115-2002-0800 INSERT PER MAO101-304 AND CORRO 545399 1 2 SION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301 CODE 08-AA-23-XX. THE REWORK RESTORED THE 545399 1 3 CHARGE HOLDER TO THE ENGINEERING DWG RQMTS. DESIGN INTENT & STRUCTURAL 545399 1 4 INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAU 545399 1 5 SE: WEAR AND TEAR. 545450 1 1 SQUAWKS 001 & 002 ON PAGES 1 & 1A: RESIDUES ARE AN ACCUMULATION OF LIGHT 545450 1 2 SURFACE OXIDATION AND DEBRIS DUE TO EXPOSURE TO THE FLIGHT OPERATIONAL 545450 1 3 ENVIRONMENT. THE RESIDUE WAS ALL WIPED CLEAN WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL, WIT 545450 1 4 H VERIFICATION THAT THERE ARE NO SIGNS OF ACTIVE CORROSION, OR PITTING 545450 1 5 DUE TO CORROSION. 545465 1 1 70B2010-4 STABILIZER STRUT HAS A DENT APPROXIMATELY .200X.300X.010 DEEP. 545465 1 2 EDDY CURRENT OF BORON/ALUMINUM STRUT FOUND NO CRACKS. STRUT WILL CONTIN 545465 1 3 UE TO FUNCTION PER DESIGN INTENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. STRUT 545465 1 4 IS PRIMARY STRUCTURE. MR ID WAS APPLIED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALI 545465 1 5 DATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL 545465 1 6 ) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 545476 1 1 ACCESS WAS GAINED FOR THE STRUCTURAL INSPECTION BY REMOVING THE V070-340 545476 1 2 860-002 SUPT AND THE MD111-4024-0515 BOLTS. THE BOLTS WERE RE-INSTALLED 545476 1 3 IN THE REVERSE DIRECTION AND ENGINEERING WAS RELEASED TO COVER THE REVER 545476 1 4 SE INSTALLATION. THE SUPT WAS RE-INSTALLED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIR 545476 1 5 ED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCESS LIMITATIONS. 545492 1 1 THE MINOR CORROSION PRESENT IS SUPERFICIAL, AND IS DUE TO NORMAL OPERATI 545492 1 2 ONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE. THE AFFECTED SURFACES WERE CLEANED WITH IPA 545492 1 3 AND COATED WITH "KRYTOX" GREASE (MBO140-010, TYPE II). THE REMAINING PI 545492 1 4 TTING AND SURFACE DEGRADATION WAS ACCEPTED BY MR DISPOSITION AND STRESS 545492 1 5 ENGINEERING APPROVAL AS SUPERFICIAL. 545496 1 1 THE STRUT WITH THE GOUGE OF .002 DEEP IN A FULL CIRCLE AT THE BOTTOM WAS 545496 1 2 BURNISHED WITH A 400 GRIT ABRASIVE MATERIAL AND ALCOHOL WIPED WITH TT-1 545496 1 3 -735 ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL. IDENTIFIED PER MAO104-301 AND ACCEPTED FOR UNRES 545496 1 4 TRICTED USE. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE IS MAINTAINED. PROB 545496 1 5 ABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 545497 1 1 THE FITTING WITH SEVERAL GOUGES APPROX .009" DEEP HAS BEEN REPAIRED FOR 545497 1 2 UNRESTRICTED USE WAS BURNISHED WITH A 400 GRIT ABRASIVE MATERIAL AND ALC 545497 1 3 OHOL WIPED WITH TT-1-735 ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL. IDENTIFIED PER MAO104-301. T 545497 1 4 HE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WO 545497 1 5 RKMANSHIP. 545665 1 1 AREAS OF MISSING KOROPON WERE CAUSED BY OPERATIONAL EXPOSURE. AFFECTED A 545665 1 2 REAS WERE CLEANED AND COATED WITH NEW KOROPON, WITH NO EVIDENCE OF PITTI 545665 1 3 NG OR OTHER MATERIAL DEGRADATION DUE TO CORROSION. 545794 1 1 LOOSE HEATSINK MATERIAL WAS REWORKED IN BAY 6 OF THE MID FUSELAGE BETWEE 545794 1 2 N X864 AND X917. DISCREPANT AREAS WERE BONDED PER MAO106-330 USING MBO12 545794 1 3 5-050 PRIMER AND MBO130-085 ADHESIVE. SHORE "A" HARDNESS MET MINIMUM HAR 545794 1 4 DNESS OF 55. ORIGINAL DESIGN INTENT WAS RESTORED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR A 545794 1 5 ND TEAR. 545810 1 1 THE DAMAGED CONN BACKSHELL, P/N NLS-FCT-24 (REF ITEM 001) WAS REPLACED W 545810 1 2 ITH A SPLIT BACKSHELL, P/N ME127-0106-6124, FOR CONN 30P608, PER ENGINEE 545810 1 3 RING STANDARD REPAIR DISPO E.EL101.17. THIS HAS RETURNED THE CONN TO A C 545810 1 4 ONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRES 545810 1 5 TRICTED USAGE. SCAN TRACKING SYSTEM WILL FULFILL RETEST RQMTS FOR CONN 3 545810 1 6 0P608. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 546074 1 1 THE WORN AND TORN AREAS HAVE BEEN CLEANED USING CLOTH DAMPENED WITH IPA. 546074 1 2 ONE INCH WIDE MYSTIC TEFLON TAPE WAS APPLIED OVER THE WORN AND TORN ARE 546074 1 3 AS. THE REPAIR RESTORED THE WALL TO THE DESIGN INTENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: W 546074 1 4 EAR AND TEAR. 546075 1 1 ITEM 001 - UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE V30ADO.420 INSPECTION DUE TO INACCESSI 546075 1 2 BILITY. EXCEPTION/WAIVER HAS BEEN GENERATED TO DOCUMENT NONCOMPLIANCE. A 546075 1 3 N RCN WILL BE GENERATED BY THE JSC SUBSYSTEM MANAGER TO PRECLUDE RECURRE 546075 1 4 NCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: RQMT NOT PROPERLY DEFINED. 546410 1 1 ITEM 001 - UNABLE TO COMPLETE INSPECTION FOR V30ADO.420 DUE TO INACCESSI 546410 1 2 BILITY. EXCEPTION/WAIVER HAS BEEN GENERATED TO DOCUMENT NONCOMPLIANCE. A 546410 1 3 N RCN WILL BE GENERATED BY THE JSC SUBSYSTEM MANAGER TO PRECLUDE RECURRE 546410 1 4 NCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: RQMT NOT PROPERLY DEFINED. 546419 1 1 TORQUE RE-CHECK OF BODY FLAP ACTUATOR ATTACH FITTINGS BOLTS, TPS STR-3-J 546419 1 2 2-677, FOUND SEVEN BOLTS UNDER THE MINIMUM OF 460 IN/LBS BREAKING TORQUE 546419 1 3 PER DWG RQMTS. THIS REPAIR RESTORES THE INSTALLATION OF BODY FLAP ACTUAT 546419 1 4 OR ATTACH FITTINGS TO THE DESIGN INTENT AND DWG RQMTS. STRUCTURAL INTEGR 546419 1 5 ITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 546420 1 1 THE RESIDUE WAS SURFACE OXIDATION CAUSED BY NORMAL, FAIR WEAR AND TEAR D 546420 1 2 UE TO OPERATIONAL EXPOSURE. IT WAS REMOVED BY LIGHT ABRASION AND SCRUBBI 546420 1 3 NG AND WIPING WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL, WITH VERIFICATION THAT THERE WERE 546420 1 4 NO REMAINING SIGNS OF ACTIVE CORROSION OR PITTING DUE TO CORROSION. 546603 1 1 THE DISCREPANT AREA HAS BEEN SMOOTHED. THE AREA HAS BEEN CORROSION PROTE 546603 1 2 CTED PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-CF-21-XX AND IDENTIFIED PER MAO104-301 CODE 546603 1 3 BL-001-NG-13 WITH NUMBER "MR STR-3-J2-5349". REWORK IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UN 546603 1 4 RESTRICTED USE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORK 546603 1 5 MANSHIP. 546865 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN BECAUSE IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT THE FOAM INSULATION (M 546865 1 2 BO130-146) THAT INSULATES THE HYDROGEN RELIEF LINE (V544-454139-027) WAS 546865 1 3 DEFECTED THRU ENGINEERING INSPECTION: THE INTEGRITY OF THE KEVLAR SLEEV 546865 1 4 ING AND FIRE BARRIER IS SOUND, THUS THE TUBE (V544-454139-027) REMAINS S 546865 1 5 EALED AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: COMPRESSION OF FOAM DUE T 546865 1 6 O HIGH TRAFFIC WORK AREA. 546871 1 1 DURING MID BODY VEHICLE INSPECTION, THE V544-454140-016 PRSD LO2 FEED LI 546871 1 2 NE WAS NOTED TO HAVE 2" X 20" DAMAGED INSULATION SECTION. THE DAMAGED IN 546871 1 3 SULATION WAS REMOVED AND THE TUBE INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE WITH NO DAMAGE TO 546871 1 4 THE TUBE VERIFIED PER STEP 3.0. POUR FOAM INSULATION, KEVLAR, AND LT-80 546871 1 5 FIRE BARRIER WAS INSTALLED, RETURNING THE PRSD SYSTEM TUBING BACK TO WI 546871 1 6 THIN DWG/DESIGN RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: DEGRADATION DUE TO WORKER TRAFFIC 546871 1 7 . 546874 1 1 A 1.0" DIA HOLE WAS CUT IN THE FACE SHEET OF THE ELEVON TRAILING EDGE, L 546874 1 2 OWER SECTION, FOR A CORROSION INSPECTION. NO CORROSION OR DEBONDING WAS 546874 1 3 NOTED. AN MR FILLER AND DOUBLER WERE BONDED TO REPAIR THE HOLE CUT IN TH 546874 1 4 E TRAILING EDGE. THE REPAIR AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND THE REPAIR 546874 1 5 WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. NO MR ID WAS REQUIRED. ALTHOUGH HEA 546874 1 6 TING TIME FELL SHORT, THE LAP SHEARS PASSED WITH AN ACCEPTABLE VALUE. PR 546874 1 7 OBABLE CAUSE: CHIT P4601 INSPECTION. 546876 1 1 ULTRASONIC INSPECTION OF THE LOWER FACE SHEET SHOWED NO DEBONDS IN THE S 546876 1 2 USPECT AREA. ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF CORE INDICATES NO CORROSION OF TH 546876 1 3 E CORE. FILLER AND DOUBLER PARTS HAVE BEEN BONDED IN PLACE TO RESTORE CO 546876 1 4 RE TO FACE SHEET ATTACHMENT. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. REWORK 546876 1 5 IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: EXPOSURE TO CORROSIV 546876 1 6 E ENVIRONMENT. 546877 1 1 ULTRASONIC INSPECTION OF THE LOWER FACE SHEET SHOWED NO DEBOND IN THE SU 546877 1 2 SPECT AREA. ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF CORE INDICATES NO CORROSION OF THE 546877 1 3 CORE. FILLER AND DOUBLER PARTS HAVE BEEN BONDED IN PLACE TO RESTORE COR 546877 1 4 E TO FACE SHEET ATTACHMENT. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. REWORK I 546877 1 5 S ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: EXPOSURE TO CORROSIVE 546877 1 6 ENVIRONMENT. 546878 1 1 ULTRASONIC INSPECTION OF THE LOWER FACE SHEET SHOWED NO DEBONDS IN THE S 546878 1 2 USPECT AREAS. ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF CORE INDICATES NO CORROSION OF T 546878 1 3 HE CORE. FILLER AND DOUBLER PARTS HAVE BEEN BONDED IN PLACE TO RESTORE C 546878 1 4 ORE TO FACE SHEET ATTACHMENT. LAP SHEAR RESULTS INDICATE ACCEPTABLE BOND 546878 1 5 STRENGTH WAS ACHIEVED WITH THE REDUCED VACUUM LEVEL (REF ATTACHED LAB F 546878 1 6 ILE NO. P96-021). STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. REWORK IS ACCEPTAB 546878 1 7 LE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: EXPOSURE TO CORROSIVE ENVIRONME 546878 1 8 NT. THE MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IM 546878 1 9 PACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROL 546878 1 10 S. 546921 1 1 RETORQUING OF THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELLS FOR CONNECTORS 90V77W8P51 (ITEM 001 546921 1 2 ), 90V77W8P53 (ITEM 002), 90V77W8P57 (ITEM 004), 90V77W8P63 (ITEM 005) & 546921 1 3 90V77W8P64 (ITEM 006), PER THE ABOVE STEPS, HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATI 546921 1 4 ON TO DWG RQMTS. ITEMS 003 (W7) & 007 (W10) HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO PRS 546921 1 5 OEL-3-J2-0757 & OEL-3-J2-0758, RESPECTIVELY. SCAN TRACKING FOR THE DEMA 546921 1 6 TED/MATED CONN WILL SATISFY RETEST RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND 546921 1 7 TEAR (ITEMS 001, 002, 004, 005 & 006). 546923 1 1 RETORQUING OF THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELL FOR CONN 90V77W5J617, PER THE STEPS 546923 1 2 1 THRU 14 (REF PGS 2 & 3), HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. D 546923 1 3 URING PREPARATION FOR THE REWORK, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE INCORRECT C 546923 1 4 ONN REF DES # HAD BEEN RECORDED FOR ITEM 001 (REF PG 1). THIS WAS CORREC 546923 1 5 TED PER PGS 4 & 5. PROBABLE CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 546925 1 1 REF ITEM 001: RETORQUING OF THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELL FOR CONN 45P555 PER ST 546925 1 2 EPS 1 THRU 13 HAVE RESTORED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. REF ITEM 002: 546925 1 3 REPAIR OF DAMAGED SHIELD BRAID ON WIRE DF209D24 PER ENGINEERING STANDAR 546925 1 4 D REPAIR DISPOSITION E.EL101.15 HAS RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION 546925 1 5 THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. THIS INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UN 546925 1 6 RESTRICTED USE. CONTINUITY TEST PERFORMED AND FUNCTIONAL RETEST WILL BE 546925 1 7 PERFORMED BY SCAN. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR (ITEM 001) WORKM 546925 1 8 ANSHIP (ITEM 002). 547001 1 1 INTERFERENCE NOTED ON PAGE 2 WHERE THE BOLT DIA WAS MAX AND THE BORE DIA 547001 1 2 WAS MIN WAS RESOLVED BY BURNISHING THE BOLT DIA WITH 400-600 GRIT ABRAS 547001 1 3 IVE AND WIPED WITH ALCOHOL. BOLT/BORE INTERFERENCE WAS ELIMINATED WITH A 547001 1 4 LL PARTS BEING WITHIN B/P TOLERANCE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR & REQUIRED TIG 547001 1 5 HT TOLERANCES OF BORE AND BOLT DIA. 547006 1 1 THE BEARING WAS CLEANED USING WIPES DAMPENED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND 547006 1 2 WIPED DRY. AFTER CLEANING, THE BEARING WAS CHECKED FOR ROTATION AND FOUN 547006 1 3 D TO ROTATE FREELY. DISPO FOR INTERFERENCE NOTED ON PAGE 2 WEHRE THE BOL 547006 1 4 T DIA WAS MAX AND THE BORE DIA WAS MIN WAS RESOLVED BY BURNISHING THE BO 547006 1 5 LT DIA WITH 400-600 GRIT ABRASIVE AND WIPED WITH ALCOHOL. BOLT/BORE INTE 547006 1 6 RFERENCE WAS ELIMINATED WITH ALL PARTS BEING WITHIN B/P TOLERANCE. CAUSE 547006 1 7 : WEAR AND TEAR & REQUIRED TIGHT TOLERANCES OF BORE AND BOLT DIA. 547253 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN BECAUSE IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT THE FOAM INSULATION (M 547253 1 2 BO130-146) THAT INSULATES THE HYDROGEN RELIEF LINE (V544-454140-029) WAS 547253 1 3 DEFECTED. THRU ENGINEERING INSPECTION: THE INTEGRITY OF THE KEVLAR SLEE 547253 1 4 VING AND FIRE BARRIER IS SOUND, THUS THE TUBE (V544-454140-029) REMAINS 547253 1 5 SEALED AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: COMPRESSION OF FOAM DUE 547253 1 6 TO HIGH TRAFFIC WORK AREA. 547254 1 1 ITEM 001: THE PUNCTURE IN THE PLBD GRAPHITE EPOXY OUTER SKIN WAS REPAIRE 547254 1 2 D MR UNRESTRICTED AS FOLLOWS: AN OVAL SECTION OF THE SKIN 1.1" LONG X .7 547254 1 3 8" WIDE X .033 DEEP WAS REMOVED. EXPOSED HONEYCOMB CORE CELLS WERE FILLE 547254 1 4 D WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE, A GRAPHITE EPOXY DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND 547254 1 5 INSTALLED OVER THE REPAIRED AREA USING MBO120-048, TYPE II ADHESIVE. ITE 547254 1 6 M 002: THE CUT OUT TO REMOVE THE DAMAGE FROM THE PLBD WAS TO BE .019" DE 547254 1 7 EP. HOWEVER, THE CUT MADE WAS .033" DEEP TO REMOVED ALL OF THE DAMAGED S 547254 1 8 KIN AND WAS ACCEPTED MR UNRESTRICTED. THE DOOR DID NOT REQUIRE MR ID. TH 547254 1 9 E PLBD HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK 547254 1 10 IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 547333 1 1 FWD FLANGE OF THE V070-339757-002 SUPT BRACKET WAS PARTIALLY DEBONDED FR 547333 1 2 OM STRUCTURE. MR ACTION WAS REQ'D TO REBOND THE SUPT FOR UNRESTRICTED US 547333 1 3 E. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 547334 1 1 DURING AFRSI REMOVAL FROM PLBD AN UNKNOWN PIECE OF MATERIAL DEBONDED FRO 547334 1 2 M IML OF AFRSI BLANKET. ENGINEERING DETERMINED THE MATERIAL TO BE THE GR 547334 1 3 OUNDING SCREEN AND OUTER GR/E PLY. PMRB ACTION WAS REQ'D TO REPAIR THE N 547334 1 4 OTED AREA FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 547335 1 1 THE BROKEN GROUND LUG ON RECEPTACLE 62J92 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER T 547335 1 2 HE ABOVE STEPS. THIS HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. PROBABL 547335 1 3 E CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 547612 1 1 THE MISSING NUTPLATE HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH NEW ME114-0046-0003 NUTPLATE 547612 1 2 . THE NEW NUTPLATE IS EQUIVALENT TO THE ORIGINAL NUTPLATE. THE ORIGINAL 547612 1 3 NUTPLATE IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE. REPAIR RESTORED THE SUPPORT TO THE DESI 547612 1 4 GN INTENT, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS 547612 1 5 POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNKNOWN. 547682 1 1 CONN 90V77W7P56 (ITEM 001 OF THIS PR) TRANSFERRED FROM PR OEL-3-J2-0749, 547682 1 2 REF ITEM 003. RETORQUING OF THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELL FOR CONN 90V77W7P56, P 547682 1 3 ER THE ABOVE STEPS, HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. SCAN TRA 547682 1 4 CKING FOR THE DEMATED/MATED CONN WILL SATISFY RETEST RQMTS. PROBABLE CAU 547682 1 5 SE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 547683 1 1 CONN 90V77W10P78 WAS INITIALLY SQUAWKED AND DISPOSITIONED AS HAVING A "L 547683 1 2 OOSE" BACKSHELL (REF ITEM 001). HOWEVER, AFTER OPENING THE CONN PER STEP 547683 1 3 6, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WIRE 5ZK414A24 HAD APPROX 35% OF ITS SHIELD B 547683 1 4 RAID DAMAGED/BROKEN (REF ITEM 002). ESRD 101.15 WAS INVOKED AND INTEGRAT 547683 1 5 ED INTO THE EXISTING DISPOSITION TO REPAIR THE DAMAGED SHIELD BRAID (REF 547683 1 6 ITEM 002). FOLLOWING THE CLOSING OF THE CONNECTOR (REF ITEM 001), SUCCE 547683 1 7 SSFUL CONTINUITY & HY-POT TESTS WERE PERFORMED. THIS HAS RETURNED CONN 9 547683 1 8 0P78 TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABL 547683 1 9 E FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR & TEAR (ITEM 001) WORKMAN 547683 1 10 SHIP (ITEM 002). 547884 1 1 REPLACEMENT OF THE DAMAGED PLATE NUT REQ'D REMOVAL OF THE MDM COLDPLATE 547884 1 2 PRIOR TO REMOVAL OF THE COLDPLATE ECL ENGRG VERIFIED THAT ARS COOLANT L 547884 1 3 OOPS 1 & 2 WERE DESERVICED AND DRY. TWO FLUID MANIFOLDS WERE DISCONNECTE 547884 1 4 D BY REMOVING HARDWARE FROM THE COLDPLATE. (4) 2-017E688-70 O-RING WERE 547884 1 5 LOCALLY SCRAPPED. SCREWS WASHERS, AND NUTS WERE RETAINED FOR REINSTALLAT 547884 1 6 ION. OPEN PORTS ON MANIFOLD AND COLD PLATE WERE SEALED. NEW PLATE NUT MD 547884 1 7 114-5005-0403 WAS INSTALLED. COLDPLATE WAS INSTALLED ON THE MDM PLATE WI 547884 1 8 TH RETAINED HARDWARE. FASTENERS WERE TORQUED TO DWG RQMTS. FLUID MANIFOL 547884 1 9 LDS WERE CONNECTED TO THE COLDPLATE USING RETAINED HARDWARE AND 4 NEW 547884 1 10 O-RINGS. FASTENERS WERE TORQUED TO 85-105 IN LBS. ECL RETESTED (LEAK 547884 1 11 CHECK) COLDPLATE MANIFOLD CONNECTIONS 2 PLACES. RETEST DOCUMENT NO 547884 1 12 ECL-3-J2-407. COLDPLATE INSTALLATION RESTORED TO THE DWG RQMTS. 547884 1 13 PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 547889 1 1 THE RWK INSTALLED NEW ME112-0010-0017 CAPTIVE FASTENER. THE RWK RESTORED 547889 1 2 THE MULTIPLEXER INSTL TO THE ENGRG DWG RQMTS. DESIGN INTENT & STRUCTURA 547889 1 3 L INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE C 547889 1 4 AUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 547911 1 1 THE DISCREPANT GROUND LUG FOR WIRE L570A12 TERMINATED AT GROUND POINT 40 547911 1 2 E132 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER THE ABOVE STEPS. A SUCCESSFUL ELECTRIC 547911 1 3 AL BOND TEST WAS PERFORMED TO FULFILL RETEST RQMTS AND WAS FOLLOWED BY T 547911 1 4 HE APPLICATION OF CONFORMAL COATING. THIS HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION 547911 1 5 TO DWG RQMTS. THE USE OF THE INCORRECT CLEANING AGENT DID NOT DEGRADE TH 547911 1 6 E CONFORMAL COAT INSTALLATION. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 547971 1 1 STAR TRACKER DOOR WAS BEING REMOVED & REINSTALLED FROM ORBITER AND STAGE 547971 1 2 D IN CONTROLLED WORK AREA PRIOR TO BACKSHELL REWORK. WITHOUT DEMOUNTING 547971 1 3 THE RECEPTACLE, SAFETY WIRE WAS REMOVED, BACKSHELL TIGHTENED UNTIL FULLY 547971 1 4 SEATED & WAS CLOSED TO DWG RQMT. SAFETY WIRE INSTALLED AFTER TIGHTENING 547971 1 5 BACKSHELL. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 548067 1 1 V070-382158-001 BRACKET WAS BROKEN IN HALF. BRACKET HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY 548067 1 2 MR REWORKED BY MR BD0649-000M. THIS DISPO FABRICATED ANOTHER MR -001 PLA 548067 1 3 TE AS WAS DONE ON THE PREVIOUS MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. BRACKET WILL ADE 548067 1 4 QUATELY SUPT THE DUCT. BRACKET WAS REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANS 548067 1 5 HIP. 548135 1 1 NOTED CONDITION OF SEAL NOT CONSIDERED DEGRADING TO DESIGN RQMTS. DOOR S 548135 1 2 EAL INTERFACE WITH STRUCTURE MAINTAINS SEALING RQMTS AGAINST MOISTURE & 548135 1 3 DEBRIS. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES N 548135 1 4 OT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CO 548135 1 5 NTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 548136 1 1 NOTED CONDITION OF SEAL NOT CONSIDERED DEGRADING TO DESIGN RQMTS. DOOR S 548136 1 2 EAL INTERFACE WITH STRUCTURE MAINTAINS SEALING RQMTS AGAINST MOISTURE & 548136 1 3 DEBRIS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDAT 548136 1 4 E THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST(CIL) RE 548136 1 5 TENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 548148 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE "Y" AXIS ACTUATOR OF THE STARTRACKER D 548148 1 2 OOR (MC621-0066-0008). SQUAWK -001 IDENTIFIES SPORADIC SPOTS OF PITTING 548148 1 3 ON THE SEALING SURFACE AND -002 IDENTIFIES CORROSION IN THE AREA ADJACEN 548148 1 4 T TO THE SEAL SURFACE. DISPOSITION OF THE NOTED SQUAWKS REQUIRED SHIPMEN 548148 1 5 T TO NSLD FOR DETAILED INSPECTION AND REPAIR. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS PARTS 548148 1 6 REWORK AND REPLACEMENT (PRR) 95687 K AND CHIP P4612. DURING THE RWK PROC 548148 1 7 ESS, ADDITIONAL CORROSION AND PITTING WAS DEVELOPED, REWORKED AND ACCEPT 548148 1 8 ED ON MR'S NR 500394, 500395 AND 500396. ALL ANOMALIES HAVE BEEN IDENTIF 548148 1 9 IED AND CORRECTED OR ACCEPTED. DOOR ASSY IS READY FOR REASSEMBLY AND REI 548148 1 10 NSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 548166 1 1 THE RESIDUE DETECTED IS A LIGHT, SUPERFICIAL OXIDATION OF THE DRY FILM L 548166 1 2 UBE, ASSOCIATED WITH NORMAL FAIR WEAR AND TEAR FROM NORMAL FLIGHT OPERAT 548166 1 3 IONAL EXPOSURE. THE RESIDUE WAS WIPED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND INSPECT 548166 1 4 ED TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING OR SURFACE DEGRADATION 548166 1 5 . CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 548273 1 1 MR ACTION WAS REQ'D TO REPAIR THE SCRAPES, SCRATCHES AND MISSING RTV ON 548273 1 2 THE V070-311047 BEAM IN THE CREW MODULE. THE SCRAPED AND SCRATCHED AREAS 548273 1 3 WERE SANDED, CLEANED AND CORROSION PROTECTED. REPLACING THE RTV RETURNE 548273 1 4 D THE SEALANT TO ORIGINAL CONDITION. THE DISCREPANCIES ARE MINOR AND THE 548273 1 5 CORRECTIVE ACTION RETURNS THE STRUCTURE TO SERVICE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 548273 1 6 . STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 548286 1 1 AN INTERIM DISPO AUTHORIZED THE REMOVAL OF THE INTERFERING BRACKET V070- 548286 1 2 336910-001 AND V070-336909-002 (ITEM 002) AND DOUBLER V070-334278-007 (I 548286 1 3 TEM 001). THE PREFIT OF THE V070-338379-001 INTO THE FLOOR BEAM INDICATE 548286 1 4 S A CONSTANT GAP OF .097 AND THE DOUBLER WAS TRIMMED BY .015 INCHES WITH 548286 1 5 THE PRIMARY BOARD'S APPROVAL (PMRB). THIS DOUBLER WAS HOT BONDED PER MAO 548286 1 6 101-301 BACK TO THE ORIGINAL LOCATION PER DWG RQMTS. ENGINEERING WAS REQ 548286 1 7 UESTED TO CHANGE THE FASTENERS FROM RIVETS TO HI-LOK WITH EO TO FOLLOW F 548286 1 8 OR V070-336901 AND V070-336910. BOTH WERE RELEASED ON 12-5-95 AND VERIFI 548286 1 9 ED BY R. LANGLEY. ALL REMOVED EXCEPT V070-336910 DELETED PER EO A02 AND 548286 1 10 PARTS WERE THEN CORROSION PROTECTED. ALL REWORK DID NOT DEGRADE THE 548286 1 11 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE NOR AFFECT THE FIT OR FUNCTION OF 548286 1 12 THE PRIMARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 548287 1 1 ITEMS 1 & 2 PAGE 1 DOCUMENT INABILITY TO INSTALL V070-338379-002 FITTING 548287 1 2 DUE TO INTERFERENCES WITH DOUBLER V070-334278-006 & SUPT ASSY V070-3364 548287 1 3 02-001. INTERFERENCE WITH THE DOUBLER WAS ELIMINATED BY TRIMMING THE DOU 548287 1 4 BLER PER MR WITH PRIMARY MATERIAL REVIEW BOARD'S APPROVAL. THE INTERFERE 548287 1 5 NCE WITH THE SUPT ASSY WAS FIRST DISPOSITIONED PER EOTF ON 12-6-95 TO TR 548287 1 6 IM THE V070-336402-001 SUPT ASSY. THE SUPT WAS TRIMMED ON 12-11-95 AND T 548287 1 7 HE TRIM WAS NOT ENOUGH TO ELIMINATE THE INTERFERENCE. ITEM 3, PAGE 1A WA 548287 1 8 S WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT AFTER FIRST TRIM THE INTERFERENCE STILL EXISTED. A 548287 1 9 DDITIONAL EOTF DISPOSITION WAS ADDED TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE TRIM ON 548287 1 10 12-13-95. THE PART WAS TRIMMED ON 12-14-95 AND FIT. EO A03 TO DWG V070-3 548287 1 11 36402 WAS RELEASED ON 12-21-95 AND WAS VERIFIED ON 12-21-95 TO REFLECT 548287 1 12 THE LARGER TRIM WORK PERFORMED IN STEP 9.0. NO FURTHER RWK REQ'D. PROBAB 548287 1 13 LE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 548288 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING SUPT ASSY V070-336405-009 AND TR 548288 1 2 IMMING PER EOTF DISPO (EO C03) AND ESTABLISHING A V070-336405-011 ASSY. 548288 1 3 DURING INSTALLATION OF V070-336405-001 SUPT ASSY, INTERFERENCE STILL EXI 548288 1 4 STED DOCUMENTED BY ITEM 3, PAGE 1B. ADDITIONAL TRIMMING WAS PERFORMED TO 548288 1 5 ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE ON SUPT ASSY V070-336405-011 PER EOTF DISPO (EO 548288 1 6 C04) ESTABLISHING ASSY V070-336405-013. FITTING V070-338376-001 WAS INST 548288 1 7 ALLED PER PRINT PER STR-3-J2-670. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVI 548288 1 8 NG ASSY V070-336375-001 AND RELOCATING IT PER EOTF DISPO (V070-336502 EO 548288 1 9 K11) AND ESTABLISHING INSTALLATION V070-336502-042. FITTING V070-338276- 548288 1 10 001 WAS INSTALLED PER PRINT PER STR-3-J2-670. ITEM 4, PAGE 1C WAS RESOLV 548288 1 11 ED BY RE-IDENTIFYING THE SUPT ASSY WITH THE ASSY PART NUMBER, V070-33640 548288 1 12 5-013. ITEMS 1-4 HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AND NO FURTHER REWORK IS REQ'D. PROB 548288 1 13 ABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 548290 1 1 CHIPPED ELECT COIN BOND SIX PLACES ON THE O/B EDGE OF THE PANEL ASSY HAV 548290 1 2 E BEEN SMOOTHED OVER USING 400 GRID ABRASIVE TO REMOVE RAISED MATERIAL. 548290 1 3 THE AREAS WERE CLEANED AND WIPED DRY AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608- 548290 1 4 301 CODE 01-CF-27-XX NOTED DISCREPANCIES IN THE ELECT COIN STRIP IS NOT 548290 1 5 DEGRADING TO THE DESIGN RQMT. REMAINDER OF THE STRIP IS MORE THAN ADEQUA 548290 1 6 TE TO SATISFY GROUNDING RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 548297 1 1 UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE V30ADO.420 INSPECTION DUE TO INACCESSIBILITY. EXC 548297 1 2 EPTION/WAIVER HAS BEEN GENERATED TO DOCUMENT NONCOMPLIANCE. AN RCN WILL 548297 1 3 BE GENERATED BY THE JSC SUBSYSTEM MANAGER TO PRECLUDE RECURRENCE. PROBAB 548297 1 4 LE CAUSE: RQMT NOT PROPERLY DEFINED. 548346 1 1 THE DAMAGED LUG ON THE GND WIRE WAS REPLACED. THE GND POINT WAS ELECTRIC 548346 1 2 ALLY BONDED AND CONFORMAL COATED PER DWG RQMTS. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECT 548346 1 3 ED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 548352 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY LISTED ON PAGE 1 OF THIS PR WAS ADDRESSED ON PR STR-3-06 548352 1 2 -0955 AND ACCEPTED "AS-IS" FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. ADDITIONALLY, THE ARE 548352 1 3 A IS MR ID'D AT EACH LOCATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: PR WRITTEN IN ERROR. 548357 1 1 COUNTERSINK ON THE SIX NOTED HOLES STILL MAINTAINS A POSITIVE MARGIN OF 548357 1 2 SAFETY ON THE DOOR ASSY (COORDINATED WITH MR. ROBIN UNDERWOOD OF DOWNEY 548357 1 3 STRESS). THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE IS MAINTAINED. THIS MR 548357 1 4 ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CR 548357 1 5 ITICAL ITEMS LIST 9CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE 548357 1 6 CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 548363 1 1 THIS PR WAS INITIATED AGAINST THE "Z" AXIS ACTUATOR ASSY OF THE STARTRAC 548363 1 2 KER DOOR (MC621-0066-0009). SQUAWKS -001 IDENTIFIES PITTING AND DISCOLOR 548363 1 3 ATION ON THE SEALING SURFACE, -002 NOTED SURFACE CORROSION IN THE AREA A 548363 1 4 DJACENT TO THE SEALING SURFACE AND -003 DOCUMENTS A MACHINED CUT IN THE 548363 1 5 SEAL SURFACE. THE MACHINED CUT IS PER DWG RQMTS (REF VENDOR DWG A1047A14 548363 1 6 1). DISPO OF THE NOTED SQUAWKS REQ'D SHIPMENT TO NSLD FOR DETAILED INSPE 548363 1 7 CTION AND REPAIR IN CONJUNCTION WITH RELATED WORK TO CORRECT ANOMALIES. 548363 1 8 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS, P-CHIT P4612, PARTS REWORK REPLACEMENT (PRR 95686K) 548363 1 9 DURING THE REWORK PROCESS ADDITIONAL CORROSION WAS DETECTED, DOCUMENTED 548363 1 10 ON MR'S NR 500397 AND 500398. ALL ANOMALIES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND COR 548363 1 11 RECTED OR ACCEPTED. DOOR ASSY IS READY FOR REASSEMBLY AND REINSTALLATION 548363 1 12 PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 548491 1 1 THE BROKEN, BENT AND SLIPPED OUT TANGS ONTHE GROUND CLIPS AT YO-41.5, YO 548491 1 2 -85.0 AND YO-102.0 WERE TRIMMED. THE ONE REMAINING GROUND TANG AT YO-85. 548491 1 3 0 WAS ALSO TRIMMED BY MISTAKE. BONDING STRAPS WERE THEN INSTALLED IN PLA 548491 1 4 CE OF THE REMOVED GROUND TANGS, AT BOTH THE YO-85.0 AND YO-102.0 LOCATIO 548491 1 5 NS. AFTER CONCERNS WERE RAISED REGARDING THE CONTINUITY OF THE BOND STRA 548491 1 6 PS, THE STRAPS WERE CUT IN THE MIDDLE AND CONTINUITY WAS CHECKED ACROSS 548491 1 7 EACH HALF OF THE BOND JUMPER. AFTER THE ELECTRICAL PATH WAS VERIFIED PER 548491 1 8 PMRB DISPOSITION. THE BOND JUMPER HALVES WERE SPLICED BACK TOGETHER AND 548491 1 9 COATED WITH HEAT SHRINK TUBING. SUFFICIENT GROUNDING REDUNDANCY EXISTED 548491 1 10 AT THE YO-41.5 SO THAT NO ADDITIONAL BOND STRAP WAS REQ'D AT THAT LOCAT 548491 1 11 ION. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR AND 548491 1 12 TEAR. 548494 1 1 THIS PR TRIMS 7 OF 16 FINGERS ON THE 2 EA V070-398436-007 STRAPS AT THE 548494 1 2 EXPANSION JOINT (XO758.64). RE-EVALUATION INDICATES THAT THE PREVIOUS MR 548494 1 3 'S HAVE ADDRESSED THE AREAS NOTED FOR MISLOCATED FINGERS AND THE ADDITIO 548494 1 4 NA OF A GROUND STRAP PER STR-3-A0215 AND STR-3-07-1487 FOR UNRESTRICTED 548494 1 5 USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 548495 1 1 THE BROKEN TANG ON THE V070-398582 STRAP WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED U 548495 1 2 SAGE "AS-IS". FURTHER RESEARCH OF THE PLBD DWGS HAVE PRODUCED NO RQMTS F 548495 1 3 OR ELECTRICAL PATH ONLY (PER MC621-0030 ON THE V070-398436 STRAPS TO THE 548495 1 4 T01P11002 BONDING PADS ON THE PLBD SECTIONS. ADDITIONALLY, IT IS NOT FE 548495 1 5 ASIBLE TO OBTAIN A CLASS R (2.5 MILLIOHM MAX) BOND FROM FRICTIONAL ELEME 548495 1 6 NTS SUCH AS THESE. PLMD ENGINEERING HAS COORDINATED WITH DOWNEY DESIGN A 548495 1 7 ND AS LONG AS FINGERS EXIST ON THE V070-398436 STRAPS NO BOND VERIFICATI 548495 1 8 ON IS REQ'D, PER DOWNEY DESIGN, PHYLLIS BENNET, DEPT 292/400, X2324. REF 548495 1 9 DWGS T01R31126, T01P31126, T01P31007, T01P31001, V070-398582 AND V070-39 548495 1 10 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 548502 1 1 THE REMOVAL & REPLACEMENT OF DAMAGED BACKSHELL FOR 45V77W429J105, PER EN 548502 1 2 GINEERING STANDARD REPAIR DISPOSITION E.EL101.17 HAS RETURNED THE CONN T 548502 1 3 O A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. THIS INSTALLATION IS 548502 1 4 ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. CERT NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: MA 548502 1 5 TERIAL DEGRADATION. 548734 1 1 DURING HARDWARE VERIFICATION OF EO V070-794361-C23 (REL DATE: 3-5-87) PE 548734 1 2 R TRANSFERRED TPS OEL-3-A004, IT WAS DISCOVERED A NUTPLATE (IN LIEW OF A 548734 1 3 NUT) WAS USED TO INSTALL THE CLAMP SHOWN ON SHT 4 OF THE EO. THIS EO VI 548734 1 4 EW HAS BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE DWG AS VIEW "BM" @ ZN76F. SINCE THE NU 548734 1 5 T IS NOT REQUIRED, AN EO WAS RELEASED TO REMOVE THE NUT, ONE (1) P/N ME 548734 1 6 114-0044-0030, FROM THE P/L AND F/D @ VIEW "BM" TO REFLECT THE "AS-BUILT 548734 1 7 " INSTALLATION. DOWNEY COORDINATION: W. MCDONALD (INSTLN) D/292, X-5238. 548734 1 8 PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY. 548773 1 1 THE CONFORMAL COATING WAS REMOVED FROM THE GROUND POINT AND DRY-SANDED T 548773 1 2 O REMOVE GLOSS AND/OR ROUGHEN THE RTV SURFACES SO THAT THE SURFACE AREA 548773 1 3 IS ABRADED TO A FRESH DULL SURFACE. THE SILICONE RUBBER WAS ADDED PER MA 548773 1 4 O106-330. THE CRACKS, VOIDS AND BUBBLES WERE ALSO FILLED USING A BRUSH/S 548773 1 5 PATULA OR OTHER MEANS. THE SHORE "A" HARDNESS OF 55 MINIMUM WAS MEASURED 548773 1 6 AND RECORDED AS 60. COATING IS PER THE DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKM 548773 1 7 ANSHIP. 548774 1 1 RESIDUES ARE AN ACCUMULATION OF LIGHT SURFACE OXIDATION AND DEBRIS DUE T 548774 1 2 O EXPOSURE TO THE FLIGHT OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE RESIDUE WAS ALL WI 548774 1 3 PED CLEAN WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL, WITH VERIFICATION THAT THERE ARE NO SI 548774 1 4 GNS OF ACTIVE CORROSION, OR PITTING DUE TO CORROSION. 548957 1 1 THE EXCESS FREEPLAY FORE AND AFT (.003, .004, .002 INCHES) IS NOT CONSID 548957 1 2 ERED EXCESSIVE AND NOT DETRIMENTAL TO THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VE 548957 1 3 HICLE. COORDINATED WITH MR. DAN MONTOYA M & P DOWNEY (EXT 2-4949). THIS 548957 1 4 MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITIC 548957 1 5 AL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAU 548957 1 6 SE: WEAR AND TEAR. 548968 1 1 THE RESIDUE DETECTED IS A LIGHT, SUPERFICIAL OXIDATION OF THE DRY FILM L 548968 1 2 UBE, ASSOCIATED WITH NORMAL FAIR WEAR AND TEAR FROM NORMAL FLIGHT OPERAT 548968 1 3 IONAL EXPOSURE. THE RESIDUE WAS WIPED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND INSPECT 548968 1 4 ED TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING OR SURFACE DEGRADATION 548968 1 5 . CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 549032 1 1 THERE IS NO SPEC FOR AXIAL FREEPLAY IN THIS BEARING. THE ALLOWABLE MOVEM 549032 1 2 ENT FOR THIS BEARING IS .002 INCHES IN THE RADIAL DIRECTION PER VENDOR S 549032 1 3 PECIFICATION. PER COORDINATION WITH THE VENDOR, THREE TIMES THAT RADIAL 549032 1 4 FREEPLAY, OR .006 INCHES, IS ACCEPTABLE IN THE AXIAL DIRECTION FOR A NEW 549032 1 5 BEARING OF THIS SIZE AND DESIGN. USE OF THESE LIMITS ON USED BEARING PR 549032 1 6 OVIDES CONSERVATIVE MSMT ON PAGE 1A ARE NO MORE THAN .006 INCHES IN THE 549032 1 7 AXIAL DIRECTION SO THE BEARINGS ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. RI 549032 1 8 DOWNY COORDINATION: GAIL SALTZ (X0361) OF DOWNEY STANDARDS GROUP. PROBAB 549032 1 9 ABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 549046 1 1 FOUR HOLES WITH DIAMETERS MEASURING .190 INCHES AND LESS WERE DRILLED TO 549046 1 2 .190 DIA AND PLUGGED WITH ME112-0013-0603 PINS AND ME114-0022-0106 COLL 549046 1 3 ARS. THE .194 DIA HOLE WAS CLEANED OUT WITH A NO 10 DRILL AND LIGHTLY C' 549046 1 4 SUNK BOTH SIDES AND PLUGGED WITH THE SHANK OF A MD121-0003-06XX RIVET. T 549046 1 5 HE PLUGGED HOLES WERE CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301, CODE 08-AA-28- 549046 1 6 XX. THE PLUGGED HOLES RESTORES THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND DOES NOT AFF 549046 1 7 ECT THE FIT OR FUNCTION OF THE DESIGN. THIS REPAIR IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNR 549046 1 8 ESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCESSIBILITY OF THE AREA/WORKMANSHIP. 549062 1 1 TWO HOLES WITH DIAMETERS MEASURING .160 INCHES AND LESS WERE DRILLED TO 549062 1 2 .164 DIA AND PLUGGED WITH ME112-0013-0503 PINS AND ME114-0022-0105 COLLA 549062 1 3 RS PER MAO101-301. TWO OTHER HOLES WERE TRIMMED OFF BY PR STR-3-J2-5370. 549062 1 4 THE PLUGGED HOLES WERE CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301, CODE 08-AA-2 549062 1 5 8-XX. THE PLUGGED HOLES RESTORES THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND DOES NOT A 549062 1 6 FFECT THE FIT OR FUNCTION OF THE DESIGN. THIS REPAIR IS ACCEPTABLE FOR U 549062 1 7 NRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCESSIBILITY OF THE AREA. 549067 1 1 THE REPAIR OF THE BROKEN WIRE 3P1212B26 BY UTILIZATION OF KSC0694 SPLICE 549067 1 2 AND THE SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY TEST FROM 56J44 TO 56J69 HAS RETURNED THE 549067 1 3 WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. THIS REPAIR IS 549067 1 4 ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 549445 1 1 THE REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF GND LUG ON WIRE H423A20 AND TERMINATED AT 549445 1 2 40E18 PER THE ABOVE STEPS HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. P 549445 1 3 ROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 549694 1 1 THE RESIDUE DETECTED (ITEM 001 ON PAGE 1) IS A LIGHT, SUPERFICIAL OXIDAT 549694 1 2 ION OF THE DRY FILM LUGE, ASSOCIATED WITH NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR FROM NORM 549694 1 3 AL FLIGHT OPERATIONAL EXPOSURE. THE NICKS AND DEPRESSION (ITEM 002 ON PA 549694 1 4 GE 1A) ARE ALSO CAUSED BY NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR OF NORMAL FLIGHT OPERATIO 549694 1 5 NAL EXPOSURE. THE RESIDUE WAS WIPED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND INSPECTED 549694 1 6 TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING OR SURFACE DEGRADATION. 549694 1 7 THE NICKS AND DEPRESSION WERE ACCEPTED BY MR DISPOSITION FOR UNRESTRICTE 549694 1 8 D USE, WITH STRESS ENGINEERING CONCURRENCE, AS BEING STRUCTURALLY NEGLIG 549694 1 9 IBLE IN SIZE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 549722 1 1 THE TWO HOLES (ONE .128 AND THE OTHER .093 DIAMETER) HAVE BEEN PLUGGED U 549722 1 2 SING THE SHANK OF THE MD121-0003-03XX AND -04XX RIVET SLIGHTLY C'SUNK ON 549722 1 3 BOTH SIDES. PLUGGING OF THE HOLES MAINTAINS THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF 549722 1 4 THE PART. THE PLUG HAS BEEN CORROSION PROTECTED AND IDENTIFIED WITH THI 549722 1 5 S MR NUMBER. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 549737 1 1 EACH ID SLEEVE IS ADJACENT TO ITS RESPECTIVE SPLICE. THE NOTED CONDITION 549737 1 2 IN ITEM 001 OCCURRED DURING "INITIAL" BUILD OR "PREVIOUS" MODS OF THE O 549737 1 3 RBITER AND DOES NOT AFFECT "SAFETY OF FLIGHT". THEREFORE, IT IS APPLICAB 549737 1 4 LE TO ML0303-0014, SECTION 6, "MODIFICATION/REPAIR OF DELIVERED/FLOWN HA 549737 1 5 RDWARE" AND REQUIRES NO REWORK/REPAIR. NO MR ID IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CA 549737 1 6 USE: WORKMANSHIP. 550141 1 1 ON FACE OF DWG V070-794321 A VIEW WAS CALLED THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN. 550141 1 2 THIS VIEW ADDED HARDWARE THAT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ROUTE THE HARNESS FOR 550141 1 3 GPS. AN EO WAS WRITTEN TO REMOVE THIS "SEE VIEW" CALLOUT WHICH SHOWS 3 C 550141 1 4 LAMPS, THE TRUE VIEW SHOWS 2 CLAMPS. THIS IS A DWG CLARIFICATION AND DOE 550141 1 5 S NOT REQUIRE A CONFIGURATION CHANGE OR ANY ADDITIONAL MOD SHEETS. CERT 550141 1 6 HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING. 550145 1 1 THE DISCREPANCY EXISTS BETWEEN A FITTING THAT IS ATTACHED TO THE INBD FR 550145 1 2 AME CAP AND AN ANGLE THAT SUPPORTS ONE LEG OF THE HYD FLEXLINE ISOLATOR. 550145 1 3 THERE IS NO VISIBLE JOINT DETERIORATION. DESIGN INTENT AND STRUCTURAL I 550145 1 4 NTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUS 550145 1 5 E: PARTS ASSY SEQUENCE, WORKMANSHIP. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE 550145 1 6 THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RET 550145 1 7 ENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 550146 1 1 ITEM 001: (4) 3/16" DIA RIVETS ATTACH A CORNER FITTING TO THE INBD FRAME 550146 1 2 CAP THAT SUPPORTS AN ANGLE THAT SUPPORTS ONE LEG OF THE HYD FLEX LINE I 550146 1 3 SOLATOR. ITEM 002: ONE LEG OF THE HYD FLEX LINE ISOLATOR IS ATTACHED TO 550146 1 4 A CHANNEL CALLED STRUT AND A FITTING THAT BOTH ARE ATTACHED TO A FRAME W 550146 1 5 EB WITH 23 RIVETS AND 2 HILOKS. ITEM 003: A CORNER FITTING 2 PLACES IS A 550146 1 6 TTACHED TO AN INBD FRAME CAP WITH (2) RIVETS AND (2) HILOKS. ITEMS 001, 550146 1 7 002 & 003 SATISFY DESIGN RQMTS. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED, MARG 550146 1 8 IN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. THIS MR ACTI 550146 1 9 ON DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITIC 550146 1 10 AL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 550197 1 1 R&R OF GIMBLE BOLTS ON ENGINES 1, 2 & 3 WAS PERFORMED PER OMI V5E29 WITH 550197 1 2 OUT APPROPRIATE MIP POINTS AS STATED ON PAGES 1, 1A & 1B OF THIS PR. THE 550197 1 3 OMI WAS REOPENED AND THE APPROPRIATE SEQUENCES CODED WITH REQUIRED MIPS 550197 1 4 PER THE QPRD. BECAUSE RI QC AND NASA QC WERE ON HAND DURING V5E29 RUN 1 550197 1 5 , BOTH AGREED TO STAMP V5E29 AS REQ'D THUS VERIFYING THE OMI WAS PERFORM 550197 1 6 ED CORRECTLY. PROBABLE CAUSE: OMI NOT CODED PER QPRD RQMTS. 550265 1 1 THE RESIDUE DETECTED IS A LIGHT, SUPERFICIAL OXIDATION OF THE DRY FILM L 550265 1 2 UBE, ASSOCIATED WITH NORMAL FAIR WEAR AND TEAR FROM NORMAL FLIGHT OPERAT 550265 1 3 IONAL EXPOSURE. THE RESIDUE WAS WIPED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AND INSPECT 550265 1 4 ED TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF PITTING OR SURFACE DEGRADATION 550265 1 5 . CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 550592 1 1 REF ITEM 001: RETORQUING OF THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELL FOR CONN 45V77426P539 550592 1 2 PER STEPS 1 THRU 13 HAVE RESTORED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. REF ITE 550592 1 3 M 002: THE REPAIR OF DAMAGED SHIELD BRAID ON WIRE DF654E24, PER ENGINEER 550592 1 4 ING STANDARD REPAIR DISPO E.EL101.15, HAS RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGU 550592 1 5 RATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. THIS INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE 550592 1 6 FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. CONTINUITY TEST PERFORMED AND FUNCTIONAL RETEST 550592 1 7 WILL BE PERFORMED BY SCAN. REF ITEM 003: THE MR REPAIR OF INSULATION DAM 550592 1 8 AGE ON WIRE DF654E24, SEG 1 & 2 MAINTAINS DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABL 550592 1 9 E FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. MR ID NOT REQ'D DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SPACE. THI 550592 1 10 S MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT T 550592 1 11 HE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PRO 550592 1 12 BABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR (ITEM 001, ITEM 002 AND ITEM 003) CERT IS NOT 550592 1 13 AFFECTED. 550650 1 1 NOTED DOOR PANEL DISCREPANCY NOT CONSIDERED DETRIMENTAL TO DESIGN RQMTS. 550650 1 2 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MAINTAINED. DOOR PANEL RWK OCCURED DURING INITIAL 550650 1 3 FABRICATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALI 550650 1 4 DATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL 550650 1 5 ) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 550663 1 1 ALL REWORK INSTALLATION WAS RESTRICTED TO OV-103 ONLY, WITH THE APPROVAL 550663 1 2 OF THE PMRB. THE REWORK OF TRIMMING THE V070-851739-002 AND V070-851735 550663 1 3 -002 (FOR ITEMS 001, 002, 003, 005 AND 007) AND THE ADDITION OF THE SHIM 550663 1 4 (-001) PERMITTED THE BRACKET TO CLEAR THE BORON STRUT. TRIMMING OF THE 550663 1 5 V070-851740-002 CLIP AND V070-851739-001/002 PERMITTED THE BORON TUBE TO 550663 1 6 CLEAR THE STRUCTURE BY .25" (ITEM 004, 006 & 009). ITEM 008, RELOCATED 550663 1 7 V070-851740-002 AND ADDED MR 002 STIFFENER TO REPLACE THE STIFFNESS THAT 550663 1 8 WAS TRIMMED. THE MR -002 STIFFENER REPLACES SOME OF THE REQUIRED INERTI 550663 1 9 A OF THE BRACKET ASSY. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE IS 550663 1 10 MAINTAINED BY THE REWORK. COORDINATED WITH MR. VICTOR UNG 550663 1 11 (DOWNEY-STRESS EXT 1168). PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 550674 1 1 POTENTIAL CRACKS WERE FOUND ADJACENT TO TWO HILOKS ON THE RH AFT PLBD. T 550674 1 2 HE TWO HILOKS WERE REMOVED, AND AN INSPECTION OF THE AREA USING 10X MAGN 550674 1 3 IFICATION INDICATED THAT THERE WERE NO CRACKS IN THE SUBSTRATE. THIS FIN 550674 1 4 DING WAS THEN VERIFIED BY THE USE OF A BORESCOPE. THE SURFACE IMPERFECTI 550674 1 5 ONS ARE CONFINED TO THE ALUMINIZED WIRE MESH TOP LAMINATE AND DO NOT PRO 550674 1 6 PAGATE INTO THE GRAPHITE/EPOXY SUBSTRUCTURE OF THE DOOR. DOOR WAS MR ACC 550674 1 7 EPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE SINCE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND FULL DESIGN CA 550674 1 8 PABILITY IS MAINTAINED. HILOKS WERE REINSTALLED AND CONFORMAL COATING WA 550674 1 9 S APPLIED. MR ID WAS APPLIED. NOTE: ACCEPTANCE OF THIS CONDITION WAS 550674 1 10 COORDINATED WITH THE FOLLOWING: NASA/SE AT PALMDALE, NASA/QE AT 550674 1 11 PALMCALE, NASA STR SUBSYSTEM MGR AT JSC, RI/NDE AT PALMDALE, RI/DESIGN 550674 1 12 ENG AT PALMDALE AND DOWNEY, RI/STRESS AT PALMDALE AND DOWNEY, RI/M&P AT 550674 1 13 PALMDALE AND DOWNEY, NASA/ENGR MGR AT PALMDALE, RI/ENG MGR AT PALMDALE. 550674 1 14 IN ADDITION, ENGINEERING OBSERVATION OF 13 HOLES DRILLED ON PR 550674 1 15 STR-33-J2-5404 FOR THE INSTALLATION OF HILOKS USED TO REPAIR A DEBONDED 550674 1 16 AREA OF THE AFT RH DOOR SHOWED SIMILAR SURFACE IRREGULARITIES ADJACENT 550674 1 17 TO THE HOLES. PROBABLE CAUSE: DRILLING OF HOLES FOR HILOK INSTALLATION. 551082 1 1 THIS WAD WAS INITIATED AS A SUSPECT PR WHILE OV-103 WAS UNDERGOING 551082 1 2 OMDP-2 AT PALMDALE. THE ORIGINAL CONDITION WAS DISCOVERED ON OV-105, 551082 1 3 AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DOCUMENTED ON OV-102 AND OV-104. UPON RETURN FROM 551082 1 4 PALMDALE, THE WASHER INSTALLATION AT THE NOTED V070-510763-001 LINK 551082 1 5 CONNECTION WAS VERIFIED TO BE PER PRINT. THE LINK WAS DYE-PENTRANT 551082 1 6 INSPECTED FOR POTENTIAL STRESS DAMAGE. NO STRESS DAMAGE WAS NOTED. THE 551082 1 7 "RELAXED" DIMENSION OF THE CLEVIS END OF THE V070-510763-001 LINK WAS 551082 1 8 VERIFIED TO BE PER-PRINT. THE LINK WAS CORROSION PROTECTED, RE-ID'D AND 551082 1 9 REINSTALLED. PAGE 1A DOCUMENTED THAT DIMENSIONAL MEASUREMENTS OF THE 551082 1 10 WRONG CLEVIS END OF THE V070-510763-001 LINK WAS RECORDED IN STEP 1-2 551082 1 11 (TORQUED DIMENSIONS OF SUSPECT CLEVIS). HOWEVER, SINCE THE WASHER 551082 1 12 INSTALLATION AND DYE-PEN INSPECTION CONFIRMED NO DAMAGE TO THE 551082 1 13 V070-510763-001 LINK, THERE IS NO CONCERN. THE CORRECT DIMENSIONAL 551082 1 14 MEASUREMENTS WERE RECORDED IN STEP 1-15 (TORQUED, NO BINDING ON 551082 1 15 CLEVIS). NO PR CONDITION EXISTS. THIS PR DOES NOT AFFECT LIKE END ITEM 551082 1 16 SERIAL NUMBERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: SUSPECT CONDITION DUE TO FINDINGS ON 551082 1 17 OTHER ORBITERS. RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED PER V1048.001 BUNGEE FIRING. 551087 1 1 FOR NOTED DISCREPANCIES, ITEMS 001A-E, 002 A&B AND 003, THESE OCCURRED D 551087 1 2 URING SEAL MANUFACTURE AND ARE IN THE AS-MOLDED CONDITION AND CONSIDERED 551087 1 3 COSMETIC. AFTER REMOVAL OF PARTICLE, ITEM 004, RESULTING INDICATION NOT 551087 1 4 DEGRADING TO SEALING RQMTS. O-RING IS SOLID CROSS-SECTION AND IS NOT AS 551087 1 5 SENSITIVE TO SURFACE IMPERFECTIONS AS HOLLOW "TUBE" SEALS. PROPER SEAL 551087 1 6 INTERFACE WITH BUIKHEAD MAINTAINED SATISFYING ENGINEERING RQMTS. THIS MR 551087 1 7 ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION AND DOES NOT IMP 551087 1 8 ACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS 551087 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 551089 1 1 FOR NOTED DISCREPANCIES, ITEMS 001 & 003, THESE OCCUREED DURING SEAL MAN 551089 1 2 UFACTURE AND ARE IN THE AS MOLDED CONDITION AND CONSIDERED COSMETIC. AFT 551089 1 3 ER REMOVAL OF PARTICLE, ITEM 002, RESULTING INDICATION NOT DEGRADING TO 551089 1 4 SEALING RQMTS. O-RING IS SOLID CROSS-SECTION AND IS NOT AS SENSITIVE TO 551089 1 5 SURFACE IMPERFECTIONS AS HOLLOW "TUBE" SEALS. PROPER SEAL INTERFACE WITH 551089 1 6 BULKHEAD MAINTAINED SATISFYING ENGINEERING RQMTS. THIS MR ACTION DOES N 551089 1 7 OT IMVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS 551089 1 8 LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR 551089 1 9 AND TEAR. 551122 1 1 A MD113-0001-0001 STUD WAS DEBONDED FROM THE LOWER TORQUE ARM OF THE NOS 551122 1 2 E LANDING GEAR. BOTH BONDING SURFACES WERE CLEANED WITH 320 GRIT, ISOPRO 551122 1 3 PYL ALCOHOL AND WIPED DRY. MBO120-079 ADHESIVE WAS USED TO REBOND THE ST 551122 1 4 UD. A SHORE "D" HARDNESS OF 75 WAS ACHIEVED WITH A MINIMUM REQUIRED OF 7 551122 1 5 0. THE ME127-0071-3008 CLAMP WAS THEN ATTACHED TO THE STUD WITH A ME114- 551122 1 6 0044-0030 NUT. THE AREA WAS TOUCHED UP PER MAO608-301, CODE 00-AA-21-XG. 551122 1 7 THE PART IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MA 551122 1 8 INTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 551125 1 1 THE CHIPPED PAINT WAS CAUSED BY OPERATIONAL HANDLING AND EXPOSURE, AND W 551125 1 2 AS REPAIRED BY FEATHERING, PRIMING AND REPAINTING PER DWG RQMTS. 551126 1 1 THE CHIPPED PAINT WAS CAUSED BY OPERATIONAL HANDLING AND EXPOSURE, AND W 551126 1 2 AS REPAIRED BY FEATHERING, PRIMING AND RE-PAINTING PER DWG RQMTS. 551129 1 1 THE CHIPPED PAINT WAS CAUSED BY OPERATIONAL HANDLING AND EXPOSURE, AND W 551129 1 2 AS REPAIRED BY FEATHERING, PRIMING AND REPAINTING PER DWG RQMTS. 551130 1 1 SILVER TAPE WAS REMOVED TO EXPOSE DAMAGE TO FACE SHEET. MR MEQ-3-J2-0927 551130 1 2 -001 DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED OVER FACE SHEET DAMAGE. NEW SILVE 551130 1 3 R TAPE WAS APPLIED COVERING REPAIRED AREA. RWK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR UN 551130 1 4 RESTRICTED USE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 551340 1 1 THE REPAIR OF THE BROKEN WIRE U446A20 BY UTILIZATION OF KSC0696 SPLICE H 551340 1 2 AS RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. 551340 1 3 NO RETEST WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE WIRE U446A20 IS CURRENTLY STOWED, UTILIZ 551340 1 4 ATION OF WIRE WILL REQUIRE RESTEST AT THAT TIME. THIS REPAIR IS ACCEPTAB 551340 1 5 LE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 551347 1 1 REWORK PER THE ABOVE STEPS OBTAINED SUFFICIENT WIRE "SLACK" FOR WIRE DF2 551347 1 2 79B24, TO CORRECT THE DISTORTING OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL NOTED FOR ITE 551347 1 3 M 001. THIS HAS RETURNED THE ISNTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: 551347 1 4 WORKMANSHIP. 551350 1 1 ITEM 001, CABLE DF590A24 WAS INSPECTED WITH NO ADDITIONAL DAMAGE FOUND. 551350 1 2 THE REPAIR OF THE CABLE JACKET USING TAPE WRAP AHS RETURNED THE CABLE (D 551350 1 3 ISCREPANT AREA) TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND I 551350 1 4 S ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. MR ID WAS PLACED ADJACENT TO THE NO 551350 1 5 TED DISCREPANCY FOR ID. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 551456 1 1 ITEM 001 OF THIS PR ADDRESSED THE FACT THREE OF THE FOUR ISOLATORS ON TH 551456 1 2 E 02 PRESSURE RELIEF PANEL WERE OFF CENTER AND NOT ISOLATING/SUPPORTING 551456 1 3 THE PANEL EQUILATERALY. STRAPS SECURING TUBES TO THE SUPTS ADJACENT TO T 551456 1 4 HE PANEL WERE REMOVED IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE IF THE LINES ATTACHED TO 551456 1 5 THE PANEL WERE CAUSING A PRELOAD. THE RESULTS WERE INCONCLUSIVE, SO THE 551456 1 6 LINES WERE DISCONNECTED FROM THE PANEL. THIS AUCTION ALLOWED THE PANEL 551456 1 7 TO REALIGN ITSELF. ALL FOUR PANEL ISOLATORS WERE REMOVED AND REWORKED (N 551456 1 8 EW SPRINGS INSTALLED). DURING ISOLATOR REMOVAL, IT WAS NOTED ON PAGE 1A 551456 1 9 THAT A DOUBLER HAD DEBONDED FROM THE MILKSTOOL STRUCTURE WHERE THE 551456 1 10 ISOLATOR ASSEMBLIES ONTO THAT STRUCTURE. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS 551456 1 11 DISCREPANCY WAS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ORIGINAL DISCREPANT CONDITION OF 551456 1 12 PANEL MISALIGNMENT. THE SPACER WAS REBONDED TO THE MILKSTOOL PER STEP 551456 1 13 19 OF THIS PR. THE REWORKED ISOLATORS WERE REINSTALLED. ALL MOUNTING 551456 1 14 HARDWARE AND TUBING WAS INSTALLED/CONNECTED AND NO PRELOAD ON THE PANEL 551456 1 15 WAS OBSERVED. THE TUBING CONNECTIONS WERE LEAK TESTED PER MX-3-J2-008 551456 1 16 WITH NOMINAL RESULTS. PRSD SYSTEM INSTALLATION RQMTS ARE SATISFIED. NO 551456 1 17 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED PER THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL 551456 1 18 DEGRADATION. 551570 1 1 THE REPAIR OF DAMAGED SHIELD BRAID ON WIRE YX5003A24, PER ENGINEERING ST 551570 1 2 ANDARD REPAIR DISPOSITION E.EL101.7 HAS RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURA 551570 1 3 TION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. THIS INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FO 551570 1 4 R UNRESTRICTED USAGE. CONTINUITY TEST AND HYPOT TEST PERFORMED SATISFACT 551570 1 5 ORILY. AN ID PLATE MARKED "MR OEL-3-J2-0788" WAS PLACED OVER (OR ADJACEN 551570 1 6 T TO) THE REPAIRED AREA FOR IDENTIFICATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 551611 1 1 THE DISCREPANT HOLE WAS PLUGGED WITH MD121-0002-03 RIVET FLUSH BOTH SIDE 551611 1 2 S. THE XO1307 BULKHEAD WAS REPAIR RESTORED TO THE DESIGN INTENT, STRUCTU 551611 1 3 RAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE 551611 1 4 CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 551632 1 1 CONN 40V77W98J64 WAS INITIALLY SQUAWKED AND DISPOSITIONED AS HAVING A "L 551632 1 2 OOSE" BACKSHELL (REF ITEM 001 STEPS 1 THRU 13). HOWEVER, THE BACKSHELL B 551632 1 3 ARREL WAS SUSPECT OF BEING LOOSE BECAUSE "N/A'S" WERE ENTERED TO RECORD 551632 1 4 THE SHELL/BARREL TORQUE IN STEP 9 (REF ITEM 002). TO ADDRESS THE CONCERN 551632 1 5 FOR ITEM 002, STEPS 15 THRU 23 WERE INITIATED TO CORRECT THE OMISSION O 551632 1 6 F THE TORQUE RECORDING. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING ENGINEERING DISCUSSION WITH T 551632 1 7 HE SHOP, IT WAS THEN SUSPECT THAT THE SHELL/BARREL WAS NOT REMOVED IN ST 551632 1 8 EP 6. THE OPENING OF THE "TAG-RING" CONN WITHOUT FIRST REMOVAL OF THE SH 551632 1 9 ELL/BARREL WILL USUALLY RESULT IN DAMAGE TO THE SECURED "PIGTAILS". 551632 1 10 THIS DAMAGE MAY RANGE FROM BROKEN STRANDS TO A COMPLETELY SEVERED 551632 1 11 "PIGTAIL". ENGINEERING REQUESTED THE PR RETURNED TO CHANGE THE DISPO 551632 1 12 FOR ITEM 002. MFG RETURNED THE PR WITH ITEM 03. THIS SQUAWK WAS NOT 551632 1 13 REQ'D FOR THE CHANGES IN THE DISPOSITION (ALSO "UNCLEAR"). THEREFORE, 551632 1 14 ITEM 003 WAS DELETED. STEPS 16 THRU 23 WERE THEN DELETED PER STEP 24. 551632 1 15 STEPS 25 THRU 31 WERE INITIATED TO OPEN THE CONN AND INSPECT THE SHIELD 551632 1 16 BRAID "PIGTAIL" FOR DAMAGE. THE SHIELD BRAID "PIGTAIL" DAMAGE WAS NOTED 551632 1 17 ON STEP 29. THE SINGLE (1) BROKEN STRAND IS WITHIN MLO303-0014, PARA 551632 1 18 4.15, SPECIFICATIONS AND IS ACCEPTABLE PER DWG RQMTS. ALSO FOUND WERE 551632 1 19 THE TEETH ON THE REAR OF THE CONN "ROUNDED OFF" (REF ITEM 004). THE 551632 1 20 CONN PLUG (REF ITEM 004) WAS ACCEPTED "AS IS" WITH MR SIGNATURE 551632 1 21 AUTHORITY. STEPS 32 THRU 46 RE-ASSEMBLED AND CLOSED CONN 40J64 TO 551632 1 22 RETURN IT TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS 551632 1 23 ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR & TEAR 551632 1 24 (ITEM 001); WORKMANSHIP (ITEMS 002 & 004); NO PR CONDITION (REF ITEM 551632 1 25 003). 551647 1 1 REWORK NOT REQ'D. TPS STR-3-J2-644 REMOVES AND REPLACES HEATSINK MAT'L I 551647 1 2 N BAY 9 LH & RH SIDE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 551649 1 1 A ONE INCH LONG GOUGE WAS FOUND IN THE V070-302018-002 DRAG ANGLE. IT WA 551649 1 2 S APPROX .002 DEEP, AND HAD A DEFINABLE RIDGE ALONG IT'S LENGTH. THE GOU 551649 1 3 GE WAS LOCATED AT THE RH BASE OF THE VERTICAL TAIL (FWD) AT THE JUNCTION 551649 1 4 OF THE OMI. THE AREA WAS BURNISHED OUT AND MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED 551649 1 5 USE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 551776 1 1 DURING MID-BODY VEHICLE INSPECTION, V070-454865-006 PRSD 02 LINE WAS NOT 551776 1 2 ED TO HAVE DAMAGED INSULATION BY EVIDENCE OF 1 X 4 INCH SOFT AREA. THE D 551776 1 3 EFECTED INSULATION WAS REMOVED AND THE TUBE INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE WITH NO 551776 1 4 DAMAGE TO TUBE VERIFIED PER STEP 3.0. POUR FOAM INSULATION, KEVLAR, AND 551776 1 5 L-T-80 FIRE BARRIER WAS INSTALLED IN THE VOIDED AREA RETURNING THE PRSD 551776 1 6 SYSTEM TUBING BACK TO WITHIN DWG/DESIGN RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: DEGRADAT 551776 1 7 ION DUE TO WORKER TRAFFIC. 551844 1 1 THE ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS WHICH CONFLICTED WITH THE HARNESS DWG WAS CHAN 551844 1 2 GED BY EO TO FOLLOW. THE EO TRANSPOSED THE RECEPTACLE LABEL TO MATCH A.W 551844 1 3 .L. AND HARNESS DWG. THE EO V070-384332 A07 WAS RELEASED BY FRANK PAGOLA 551844 1 4 (1-19-96) AND VERIFIED BY R. LANGLEY (2-23-96). THE PLATE WAS REIDENTIF 551844 1 5 IED AS V070-384332-013 THRU -018. ASSEMBLY IS PER DESIGN INTENT. PROBABL 551844 1 6 E CAUSE: ENG OVERSIGHT. 551943 1 1 RETORQUING OF THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELL FOR CONN 40V59A17P1, PER THE ABOVE S 551943 1 2 TEPS, HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. SCAN TRACKING FOR THE 551943 1 3 DEMATED CONNECTOR WILL SATISFY RETEST RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: FAIR WEAR A 551943 1 4 ND TEAR. 551950 1 1 AN ENGINEERING ORDER A01 WAS CREATED ON DWG V070-147101 TO CORRECT THE I 551950 1 2 NSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE -001 AND -002 FITTING. THE CALLOUTS WER 551950 1 3 E REVERSED AT LOCATIONS YW374.372 AND YW401.342. THE PARTS ARE ACCEPTABL 551950 1 4 E FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAU 551950 1 5 SE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 551967 1 1 A DEBOND WAS LOCATED IN THE AFT END OF THE RH AFT PLBD AT 20.3" FROM THE 551967 1 2 C/L AND 3" FROM THE END OF THE DOOR. THE DEBOND WAS APPROX .052 FROM TH 551967 1 3 E UPPER SURFACE AND MEASURED 5.45 IN LENGTH (MAX) BY 1.85" IN WIDTH. DEB 551967 1 4 OND WAS DETECTED USING SHEAROGRAPHIC INSPECTION METHOD AND VERIFIED USIN 551967 1 5 G ULTRASONIC TECHNIQUES. THE DEBOND WAS MR REPAIRED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 551967 1 6 BY INSTALLING 16 EA HILOCKS, TO RESTORE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND PREVEN 551967 1 7 T FURTHER PROPAGATION. PRIMARY STRUCTURE MR ID WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAU 551967 1 8 SE: FLIGHT DAMAGE. 551999 1 1 MR ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO TRIM ONE V070-147017-017 ISOLATOR TO REMOVE AN 551999 1 2 INTERFERENCE WITH THE V070-147020-001 VENT PANEL ON THE V070-147013-001 551999 1 3 FLIPPER DOOR. ISOLATOR WILL FUNCTION AS REQUIRED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. S 551999 1 4 TRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCUMULATION OF TOLER 551999 1 5 ANCE BETWEEN VENT PANEL AND ISOLATOR. 552034 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: TWO INBOARD ISOLATORS LOCATED ON THE BAY 6 RH RELIE 552034 001 2 F PANEL WER NOT INSTALLED PER DWG M072-454006 ZONE 34E. THE ISOLATORS W 552034 001 3 ERE OFF-CENTERED AND 95% COMPRESSED. THE STRAPS WERE REMOVED FROM THE V 552034 001 4 525-454163-145, -143, -147, AND -148 TUBES ATTACHED TO THE V525-454179-0 552034 001 5 04 H2 RELIEF PANEL. THIS WAS DONE TO DETERMINE IF THE DISCREPANT CONDIT 552034 001 6 ION WAS DUE TO PRELOAD FROM THE TUBES. PER ENGINEERING INSPECTION, THE 552034 001 7 TUBES WERE NOT PRELOADING THE ISOLATORS. DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF THE M 552034 001 8 E196-0017-0001 ISOLATOR ASSEMBLIES, THE DISCREPANT ASSEMBLIES WERE REWOR 552034 001 9 KED. THE 14-550 SPRINGS (4 REQD) WERE REMOVED, AND NEW SPRINGS INSTALLE 552034 001 10 D INTO THE -0001 ISOLATORS. THE REWORKED ISOLATORS WERE THEN INSTALLED 552034 001 11 AS SHOWN ON DWG M072-454006 ZONE 34E PER MLO301-0006. THE ISOLATOR INST 552034 001 12 ALLATION PASSED THE 'GO-NO-GO' GAGE TESTING SPECIFIED IN MLO301-0006. T 552034 001 13 HE STRAPS WERE RE-INSTALLED ON THE -145, -143, -147 AND -148 TUBES. PRS 552034 001 14 D SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS ARE SATISFIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ISOLATOR SPRING R 552034 001 15 ELAXMENT. 552189 1 1 MANUFACTURING WAS UNABLE TO INSTALL BLIND RIVETS PER DWG RQMTS AND REQUE 552189 1 2 STED A CHANGE TO JO-BOLTS. WHEN THE V070-351054-001 BRACKET WAS LOCATED 552189 1 3 PER DWG RQMTS A GAP OF .15 EXISTED BETWEEN THE BRACKET AND THE HYDRAULIC 552189 1 4 TUBES. MR ACTION WAS REQ'D TO CHANGE THE FASTENERS FROM RIVETS TO JO-BO 552189 1 5 LTS AND TO INSTALL AN MR SHIM IN THE GAP BETWEEN PARTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: 552189 1 6 INACCESSIBILITY AND BUILD UP OF TOLERANCES. 552235 1 1 REF ITEM 001, PG 1. THE CONDITION DESCRIBED IN 001 IS APPLICABLE TO MLO3 552235 1 2 03-0014, SECTION 6, "MODIFICATION/REPAIR OF DELIVERED/FLOWN HARDWARE." T 552235 1 3 HIS INSTALLATION DOES NOT AFFECT "SAFETY OF FLIGHT" (REF PARA 6.7.2) AND 552235 1 4 REQUIRES NO REWORK/REPAIR. THE THREE CLAMPS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE IN 552235 1 5 THE P/L AND F/D WHICH WERE MISSING HAVE BEEN ADDED TO ESTABLISH THE A1 & 552235 1 6 B1 RUNS. SEGMENTS 1D1853B24, 1D1854B24, 1D1881B24, 1D1882B24, 2D1882B24 552235 1 7 , 2D1853B24, 2D1881B24, 2D1854B24, 2D1888D24, 2D1889D24 AND D1890D24 WER 552235 1 8 E ROUTED AS SHOWN ON V070-793811 VIEW "V" ZONE 205 EOE14. NO ATTEMPT WAS 552235 1 9 MADE TO FIND AND REROUTE THE OLD EXISTING WIRES THAT WERE SUPPOSED TO 552235 1 10 ORIGINALLY BE IN A1 AND B1 RUNS. REF ITEM 002 AND 003, PAGE 1A: WIRES 552235 1 11 YT3877A24 AND YT3903A24 WERE REPLACED IN ORDER TO CORRECT THE PR 552235 1 12 CONDITION. THE DISCREPANT WIRES YT3877A24 AND YT3903A24 WERE REMOVED 552235 1 13 AND NEW WIRES & CONTACTS WERE INSTALLED TO DWG RQMTS. ALL REWORK WAS 552235 1 14 WORKED CONCURRENTLY WITH OEL-3-J2-390. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP 552235 1 15 (ITEM 001) ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY (ITEM 002 & 003). 552258 1 1 UNSEATED SPRING COULD NOT BE FOUND BY ENGINEERING. SPRING WAS VERIFIED T 552258 1 2 O BE PROPERLY SEATED. NO DISCREPANCY EXISTS WITH THE SPRING. 552367 1 1 THE REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF GND LUG AND JUMPER WIRE U268A26, ON 30P60 552367 1 2 8 PER THE ABOVE STEPS HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. PROBAB 552367 1 3 LE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 552369 1 1 THE DISCREPANT WIRE RESTRAINTS (BAND AIDS) WERE REMOVED, NEW RESTRAINTS 552369 1 2 WERE INSTALLED PER SPECIFICATION TO RETURN THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS 552369 1 3 . CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 552377 1 1 THE #30 MISLOCATED HOLE IN THE V070-346178-001 SUPT WAS PLUGGED USING MA 552377 1 2 O106-336 GRADE B ADHESIVE. THE #30 HOLE IN THE 70W2137 WEB WAS PLUGGED U 552377 1 3 SING A DOUBLE FLUSHED MD121-0002-04XX RIVET. THE PLUGGING OF THE HOLES W 552377 1 4 AS ACCEPTED MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. THE SUPT WAS MR ID'D. THE SUPT AN 552377 1 5 D WEB HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK 552377 1 6 IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 552551 1 1 ITEM 1: O/T GAP BETWEEN NEW DOME RING COVERS WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRIC 552551 1 2 TED USE. ITEM 2: HOLES WITH BELOW MAXIMUM EDGE DISTANCE ON RH DOME HEATS 552551 1 3 HIELD 2 WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 3: HOLES WITH BELOW MI 552551 1 4 NIMUM EDGE DISTANCE ON LH DOME HEATSHIELD 2 WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICT 552551 1 5 ED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: PROCESS TOLERANCE. 552570 1 1 LOOSE HEATSINK MAT'L WAS REWORKED IN BAY 10 OF THE MID FUSELAGE BETWEEN 552570 1 2 X1091 AND X1139. DISCREPANT AREAS WERE BONDED PER MAO106-330 USING MBO12 552570 1 3 5-050 PRIMER AND MBO130-085 ADHESIVE. SHORE "A" HARDNESS MET MINIMUM HAR 552570 1 4 DNESS OF 55. ORIGINAL DESIGN INTENT WAS RESTORED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR A 552570 1 5 ND TEAR. 552572 1 1 DEFECTIVE VIBRATION MOUNT (ISOLATOR) WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. ADJACENT 552572 1 2 VIBRATION MOUNT WAS REMOVED FOR ACCESS AND REINSTALLED. APPLIED TORQUE W 552572 1 3 AS RECORDED AS 17 IN-LBS. DISCREPANT VIBRATION MOUNT WAS SENT TO HDA FOR 552572 1 4 DISPOSITION. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 552573 1 1 THIS ISOLATOR WAS COMPRESSED AND WAS IN VIOLATION OF MLO301-0006. NEW IS 552573 1 2 OLATION ASSEMBLIES WERE INSTALLED. THE ISOLATORS WERE THEN VERIFIED AND 552573 1 3 THEY WERE FOUND NO LONGER DISCREPANT. PROBABLE CAUSE: ISOLATOR SPRING DE 552573 1 4 GRADATION. 552574 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: THE INSTALLTION WAS SQWACKED FOR HAVING A SINGLE SP 552574 001 2 RING ISOLATOR ASSEMBLY COMPRESSED TO 90%. SINCE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO H 552574 001 3 AVE A PANEL SUPPORED BY FOUR SPRING ISOLATORS WHERE ONE IS COMPRESSED 90 552574 001 4 %, DIMENSIONS FOR ACTUAL CLEARANCE WERE REQUESTED. NO CRITERIA EXISTS F 552574 001 5 OR ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION OF THIS ISOLATOR CONFIGURATION. MLO301-0006 552574 001 6 WAS USED AS A GUIDE. THIS IS CONSERVATIVE SINCE ITS ISOLATORS ARE A "LI 552574 001 7 GHTER CONFIGURATION". THE REQUESTED DIMENSIONS CAME BACK .475, .476, .4 552574 001 8 75, AND .638. THOUGH THESE NUMBERS (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE .638 DIME 552574 001 9 NSION WHICH IS .003 OVER THE .635 LIMIT) SATISFIED THE MIX/MAX NO-LOS 552574 001 10 REQUIREMENTS. THE DIMENSIONS WERE STILL NOT REASONABLE. DISPOSITION 552574 001 11 WAS WRITTEN TO BREAK THE TIE-STRAPS FROM ALL THE ASSOCIATED TUBE 552574 001 12 SUPPORTS TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANY LOADING CONDITIONS AND TO REPERFORM 552574 001 13 THE MEASUREMENTS. MANUFACTURING RESUBMITTED SAYING THREE OUT OF SEVEN 552574 001 14 TUBE SUPPORTS WERE INACCESSIBLE DUE TO THE H2 TANK 1 INSTALLATION. THE 552574 001 15 STEP REMOVING THE STRAPS WAS DELETED. SINCE THERE IS NO HARD CRITERIA 552574 001 16 AND CONSERVATIVE CRITERIA WAS APPLIED, THE MEASUREMENTS THAT WERE 552574 001 17 RESUBMITTED WERE WELL WITHIN THE NOMINAL AND IN FACT INDICATED SOME 552574 001 18 NONIMAL TUBE INDUCED LOAD EXISTED. THIS AGREES WITH AN INFORMAL 552574 001 19 ENGINEERING INSPECTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP RESULTING FROM 552574 001 20 POOR ACCESS CONDITIONS (CRYO TANK). 552619 1 1 THE OBSERVED CONDITION ON THE VENDOR PART IS APPLICABLE TO MLO303-0014, 552619 1 2 SECTION 6, "MODIFICATION/REPAIR OF DELIVERED/FLOWN HARDWARE." THIS INSTA 552619 1 3 LLATION DOES NOT AFFECT "SAFETY OF FLIGHT" (REF PARA 6.7.2) AND REQUIRES 552619 1 4 NO REWORK/REPAIR. THE CONN P8 BACKSHELL WAS ORIGINALLY CLOSED AND SAFET 552619 1 5 Y WIRED IN BOTH DIRECTIONS BY THE VENDOR. ALTHOUGH THE BACKSHELL IS LOOS 552619 1 6 E, THE SAFETY WIRE PREVENTS THE BACKSHELL FROM COMING OFF. PROBABLE CAUS 552619 1 7 E: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 552680 1 1 POTENTIAL CRACKS WERE FOUND ADJACENT TO SEVERAL HILOCKS ON THE RH AFT PL 552680 1 2 BD. THIS CONDITION IS SIMILAR TO SURFACE INDICATION ON PR STR-3-J2-5390, 552680 1 3 WHERE HILOCKS WERE REMOVED AND NO CRACKS FOUND IN THE SUBSTRATE. INSPEC 552680 1 4 TION OF THE AREA USING 10X MAGNIFICATION INDICATED THAT THERE WERE NO CR 552680 1 5 ACKS IN THE SUBSTRATE. THE SURFACE IMPERFECTIONS ARE CONFINED TO THE ALU 552680 1 6 MINIZED WIRE MESH TOP LAMINATE AND DO NOT PROPAGATE INTO THE GRAPHITE/EP 552680 1 7 OXY SUBSTRUCTURE OF THE DOOR. DOOR WAS MR ACCEPTED OK AS IS FOR UNRESTRI 552680 1 8 CTED USE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND FULL DESIGN CAPABILITY IS MAINTAINED 552680 1 9 . MR ID WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: HILOCK INSTALLATION. 552747 1 1 POTENTIAL CRACKS WERE FOUND ADJACENT TO SEVERAL HILOKS ON THE LH AFT PLB 552747 1 2 D. THIS CONDITION IS SIMILAR TO SURFACE INDICATIONS ON PR STR-3-J2-5390, 552747 1 3 WHERE HILOKS WERE REMOVED AND NO CRACKS FOUND IN THE SUBSTRATE. INSPECT 552747 1 4 ION OF THE ARE USING 10X MAGNIFICATION INDICATED THAT THERE WERE NO CRAC 552747 1 5 KS IN THE SUBSTRATE. THE SURFACE IMPERFECTIONS ARE CONFINED TO THE ALUMI 552747 1 6 NZED WIRE MESH TIP LAMINATE AND DO NOT PROPAGATE INTO THE GRAPHITE/EPOXY 552747 1 7 SUBSTRUCTURE OF THE DOOR. DOOR WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ST 552747 1 8 RUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND FULL DESIGN CAPABILITY IS MAINTAINED. MR ID WAS A 552747 1 9 PPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: HI-LOK INSTALLATION. 552798 1 1 BENT AND BROKEN SCREENS THAT WERE REMOVED FOR INSPECTION OF SPEED BRAKE 552798 1 2 INTERIOR WERE SCRAPPED. NEW SCREENS WERE OBTAINED AND INSTALLED PER JOB 552798 1 3 CARD V30-15382 SEQ 14. DESIGN INTENT IS RESTORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY I 552798 1 4 S MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 552801 1 1 CONN 40V77W10P481 DID NOT REQUIRE TO BE DEMATED/OPEN PER RESUBMITTAL SHE 552801 1 2 ET 3. THE TIGHTENING WAS ACCOMPLISHED ONLY BY MANUALLY ROCKING/TWISTING 552801 1 3 THE BACKSHELL, ASSURING THE TEETH FULLY MESHED, THEN TORQUING THE BACKSH 552801 1 4 ELL WITH A STRAP WRENCH WHILE STILL MATED. THE ABOVE STEPS HAVE RETURNED 552801 1 5 THE CONN INSTALLATION TO DWG CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TE 552801 1 6 AR. 552855 1 1 DURING VEHICLE STRUCTURAL INSPECTION OF MIDBODY, V070-454502-001 SINGLE 552855 1 2 TUBE SUPT FAILED THE 'GO-NO-GO' GAGE TEST PER MLO301-0006 INDICATING THA 552855 1 3 T THE VIBRATION ISOLATOR(S) WERE IN COMPRESSION PER ENGINEERING EVALUATI 552855 1 4 ON, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE V070-454705-060 PRSD RELIEF LINE WAS INDU 552855 1 5 CING A MINOR LOAD ON THE SUPT AND THUS CONTRIBUTING TO THE COMPRESSED IS 552855 1 6 OLATOR CONDITION. MINIMUM CLEARANCE RQMTS FOR ME196-0024-0001 ISOLATORS 552855 1 7 IS 0.475 INCH PER MLO301-0006 PG 14. MEASURED CLEARANCE PER STEP 3.0 WAS 552855 1 8 0.468 INCH. THROUGH ENGINEERING INSPECTION AND EVALUATION, IT WAS DETER 552855 1 9 MINED THAT AN ACCEPTABLE MARGIN OF ISOLATION EXISTED TO SUFFICIENTLY 552855 1 10 ISOLATE THE LINE RUN ACROSS THE V070-454502 SUPT. IN THIS INSTANCE, 552855 1 11 CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS NOT JUSTIFIED (R&R TUBE) AND THE CONDITION WAS 552855 1 12 ACCEPTED 'AS IS' BY MR APPROVAL. PROBABLE CAUSE: ISOLATOR COMPRESSED 552855 1 13 DUE TO COMBINATION OF SPRING RELAXMENT AND LINE LOAD. 552865 1 1 THE REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF GND LUG ON 50P6 PER THE ABOVE STEPS HAS R 552865 1 2 ETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 552867 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION; DURING SURVEILLANCE IT WAS NOTED THAT THE V070-4545 552867 001 2 00-042 TUBE APPEARED TO BE BENT AND RIDING ON AN ADJACENT TUBE IN BAY 3 552867 001 3 LEFT HAND SIDE, NEAR STRINGER 18. ENGINEERING INSPECTION DETERMINED THE 552867 001 4 "BENT" CONDITION TO BE AN AS FABRICATED/INSTALLED CONDITION. THE MOCK- 552867 001 5 UP WAS UNAVAILABLE TO VERIFY THIS, HOWEVER, PER THE MANUFACTURING NOTE O 552867 001 6 N PAGE 3, ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT THIS IS A MANUFACTURED BEND. THE "RI 552867 001 7 DING" CONDITION STATED IN THE ITEM 001 SQUAWK AT STRINGER 18 DOES NOT EX 552867 001 8 IST. SUFFICIENT POSITIVE CLEARANCE BETWEEN THE -042 TUBE AND THE FIBROU 552867 001 9 S INSULATION ON THE ADJACENT TUBE WAS OBSERVED DURING ENGINEERING INSPEC 552867 001 10 TION. QUALITY VERIFICATION OF THIS NONEXISTENT CONDITION WAS RECORDED I 552867 001 11 N STEP 2 AND ON PAGE 3. THE V070-454500-042 TUBE IS PER DRAWING AND NO 552867 001 12 DISCREPANCY EXISTS. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE C 552867 001 13 AUSE: NO DISCREPANCY. 552976 1 1 TWO (2) ME196-0017-0001 ISOLATOR ASSEMBLIES WERE FOUND COMPRESSED DURING 552976 1 2 VEHICLE STRUCTURAL INSPECTION OF THE V070-454848-002 H2 CONTROL PANEL. 552976 1 3 THROUGH TROUBLESHOOTING (TUBE STRAP REMOVAL) AND ENGINEERING EVALUATION, 552976 1 4 IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE ISOLATOR SPRINGS WERE RELAXED AND THUS DEFEC 552976 1 5 TIVE. THE TWO DEFECTIVE ISOLATORS WERE REMOVED AND REWORKED BY REPLACING 552976 1 6 THE 14-550 SPRINGS PER MLO301-0006. THE REPLACEMENT ISOLATOR ASSEMBLIES 552976 1 7 MET GO-NO-GO RQMTS. AFTER ISOLATOR INSTALLATION, STRAPS WERE REINSTALLE 552976 1 8 D PER MLO301-0022. PROBABLE CAUSE: DEFECTIVE SPRINGS. 552978 1 1 V070-454866-111 TUBE WAS FOUND VOID OF MBO120-065 FIRE BARRIER AT TWO LO 552978 1 2 CATIONS. VOID AREAS MEASURED APPROX ONE SQUARE INCH (EACH PLACE). THE IM 552978 1 3 PREGNATED KEVLAR SLEEVING WAS NOT DAMAGED. L-T-80 TAPE BEING AN ACCEPTAB 552978 1 4 LE SUBSTITUTE FOR MBO120-065 FIRE BARRIER, WAS USED TO WRAP AND PROTECT 552978 1 5 THE TUBE/SYSTEM AT THE DISCREPANT AREAS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 552979 1 1 THE MAJORITY OF ALL FLUID LINES IN THE MIDBODY ARE SUPPORTED AND VIBRATI 552979 1 2 ON ISOLATED (2 OR 4 ISOLATORS PER SUPPORT) EVERY 12-20 INCHES OF LINE SP 552979 1 3 AN. CONSEQUENTLY, NO ONE ISOLATOR OR SUPT IS A SINGLE SOURCE OF ISOLATIO 552979 1 4 N. V070-454701-001 LINE SUPT IS ISOLATED WITH FOUR ME196-0025-0001 VIBRA 552979 1 5 TION ISOLATORS. MINIMUM CLEARANCE RQMTS FOR ME196-0025-0001 ISOLATORS IS 552979 1 6 0.475 INCH PER MLO301-0006 PG 14. MEASURED CLEARANCE PER STEP 1.0 WAS 0 552979 1 7 .437 INCH MAKING THE CONDITION OUT BY 0.038 INCH. THROUGH ENGINEERING IN 552979 1 8 SPECTION AND EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN ACCEPTABLE MARGIN OF 552979 1 9 ISOLATION EXISTS TO SUFFICIENTLY ISOLATE THE LINE RUNS THAT CROSS THE 552979 1 10 V070-454701 SUPT. IN THIS INSTANCE, CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS NOT JUSTIFIED 552979 1 11 AND THE CONDITION FOUND ACCEPTABLE AS IS BY MR APPROVAL. PROBABLE 552979 1 12 CAUSE: COMBINATION OF MINOR LINE LOAD AND ISOLATOR RELAXMENT. 552981 1 1 THE DAMAGED CONN BACKSHELL, P/N NLS-SCT-10, WAS REPLACED WITH A SPLIT BA 552981 1 2 CKSHELL, P/N ME127-0106-4110, FOR CONNECTOR 90P411, PER ENGINEERING STAN 552981 1 3 DARD REPAIR DISPOSITION EL101.17. THIS HAS RETURNED THE CONNECTOR TO A C 552981 1 4 ONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRES 552981 1 5 TRICTED USAGE. SCAN TRACKING SYSTEM WILL FULFILL RETEST RQMTS FOR CONN 9 552981 1 6 0P411. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 552983 1 1 TWO RIVETS WERE NOT ABLE TO BE INSTALLED ON THE V070-334902-001 SUPT ASS 552983 1 2 Y DUE TO THE AREA BEING INACCESSIBLE. AN EO TO FOLLOW DISPOSITION WAS WR 552983 1 3 ITTEN TO ALLOW BLIND RIVETS TO BE INSTALLED IN LIEU OF THOSE PER DWG. EO 552983 1 4 E01 WAS RELEASED AGAINST DWG V070-334802 AND WAS VERIFIED THAT IT REFLE 552983 1 5 CTED THE EO TO FOLLOW DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING ERROR. 552984 1 1 BROKEN WIRE HARNESS SUPT BRACKET WAS REMOVED AND NEW BRACKET WAS INSTALL 552984 1 2 ED PER DWG RQMTS. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTA 552984 1 3 INED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 553091 1 1 NONCONFORMANCE NOTED ON PAGE 1 WAS ELIMINATED WITH AN EO TO FOLLOW AGAIN 553091 1 2 ST V070-198602 DWG WHICH MACHINED A NOTCH IN THE UPSTANDING LEG THAT WAS 553091 1 3 PREVENTING THE PLATE TO PROPERLY SEAT IN IT'S DESIGNED LOCATION. THE IN 553091 1 4 TERFERENCE WAS THE RESULT OF A REDESIGN OF THE FLIPPER DOORS. EO V070-19 553091 1 5 8601-C01 WAS RELEASED 7/FEB/96 AND VERIFIED BY DEPT 278 ENGR. CAUSE: ENG 553091 1 6 INEERING OVERSIGHT. 553139 1 1 TAPE WAS REMOVED FROM RADIATOR PANEL TO EXPOSE DAMAGE NOTED IN NONCONFOR 553139 1 2 MANCE ON PAGE 1. MR MEQ-3-J2-0890-001 DOUBLERS WERE FABRICATED AND BONDE 553139 1 3 D OVER SKIN DAMAGE. SILVER TAPE (207-9-428 TYPE 4) WAS REPLACED OVER REW 553139 1 4 ORKED AREA. REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CAUSE: WEAR 553139 1 5 AND TEAR. 553143 1 1 AB94052-3 REWORK ANGLE INSTALLED BY GEN DYNAMICS ON ORIGINAL BUILD OF TH 553143 1 2 IS VEHICLE INTERFERED WITH INSTALLATION OF V070-346182-001 ANGLE SUPPORT 553143 1 3 . PMRB ACTION WAS REQUESTED TO REPLACE THE MR ANGLE AND THE V070-346182- 553143 1 4 001 ANGLE WITH MR STR-3-J2-5422-001 FOR RESTRICTED USE ON 103 ONLY. AB94 553143 1 5 052-3 BRACKET WAS REMOVED AND MR STR-3-J2-5422-001 WAS INSTALLED IN LIEU 553143 1 6 OF V070-346182-001. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE ASSY WAS MAINTAINED. CA 553143 1 7 USE: DESIGN OVERSIGHT. 553169 1 1 DURING STRUCTURAL ZONAL INSPECTION OF MIDBODY, THE ME196-0017-0001 VIBRA 553169 1 2 TION ISOLATORS (4 REQ'D) INSTALLED ON V070-454389-004 PRSD RELIEF PANEL 553169 1 3 WERE NOTED TO BE COMPRESSED INDICATING THAT A LOAD WAS BEING APPLIED TO 553169 1 4 THE PANEL AND/OR THE ISOLATION SPRINGS HAVE RELAXED. THE WORST CASE COMP 553169 1 5 RESSION WAS APPROX 60%. ALL INTERFACING TUBING TO THE PANEL WAS RELIEVED 553169 1 6 FROM THE ADJACENT SUPPORTS (STRAP REMOVAL) TO DETERMINE IF THE TUBING W 553169 1 7 AS RESPONSIBLE FOR A LOADING CONDITION. MSMTS TAKEN SUBSEQUENT TO STRAP 553169 1 8 REMOVAL SHOWED AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE COMPRESSION INDICATING THAT THE TUB 553169 1 9 ING WAS SLIGHTLY LOADING THE PANEL. PER ENGINEERING INSPECTION AND 553169 1 10 EVALUATION, THE V070-454865-128 LINE WAS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR 553169 1 11 LOADING THE PANEL (REF ENGINEERING NOTE ON PAGE 4.0). PER PR 553169 1 12 FCP-3-J2-0337, THE -128 LINE WAS REWORKED TO RELIEVE THE PRELOAD 553169 1 13 CONDITION. SUBSEQUENT TO THIS REWORK, THE TUBING WAS RESECURED TO THE 553169 1 14 PANEL AND RESULTANT MSMST (STEP 9.0) SHOWED AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE 553169 1 15 COMPRESSION. PER MLO301-0006 ISOLATOR INSTALLATION SPECIFICATION, NO 553169 1 16 MAX/MIN CRITERIA EXIST FOR THE ME196-0017 ISOLATORS THUS, UNLESS THE 553169 1 17 ISOLATOR IS FULLY COMPRESSED, THE CONDITION COULD BE INTERPRETED AS 553169 1 18 ACCEPTABLE. IN ADDITION, THE CRITERIA USED TO VALIDATE THIS PR 553169 1 19 CONDITION, USING A GO-NO-GO GAGE PER MLO301-0006 4.2.2 DOES NOT APPLY 553169 1 20 TO THE ME196-0017 ISOLATORS. HOWEVER, PER ENGINEERING JUDGEMENT AND 553169 1 21 COMPARING TO THE MAX ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR OTHER ISOLATOR DASH 553169 1 22 NUMBERS PER MLO301-0006, THE FINAL MSMTS TAKEN PER STEP 9.0 INDICATE 553169 1 23 THAT A SUFFICIENT MARGIN OF ISOLATION EXIST AT THE V070-454389-004 553169 1 24 VALVE PANEL AND IS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. PROBABLE CAUSE: 553169 1 25 COMBINATION OF ISOLATOR RELAXMENT AND LINE PRELOAD. 553250 1 1 THREE ITEMS WERE ADDRESSED ON THIS PR. ITEM 1: TO PERMIT INSTALLATION OF 553250 1 2 THE V070-346174-003 FITTING, STIFFENER V070-346189-001 WAS REMOVED AND 553250 1 3 REPLACED WITH STIFFENER V070-346213-001. EO B08 WAS WRITTEN AGAINST DWG 553250 1 4 V070-346190 TO INCORPORATE THIS CHANGE. ITEM 2: MR ACTION WAS REQ'D TO P 553250 1 5 ROPERLY LOCATE SUPT V070-346213-001 ON TANK FITTING V070-346174-001. SEV 553250 1 6 ERAL NEW FASTENER HOLES WERE DRILLED AND HI-LOKS WERE INSTALLED PER MAO1 553250 1 7 01-301 AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301, CODE 08-AA-28-XX. EXISTIN 553250 1 8 G FASTENER HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH FLUSH HEAD AND PROTRUDING HEAD HI-LOK 553250 1 9 S. IN ADDITION, THE FLANGE ON V070-346185-001 WAS TRIMMED A MINIMUM 553250 1 10 AMOUNT TO ALLOW CLEARANCE FOR A FASTENER HEAD. THIS REWORK ALLOWS 553250 1 11 PROPER TANK FITTING INSTALLATION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 3: MR 553250 1 12 ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO INSTALL A FLUSH HEAD OVERSIZE HI-LOK 553250 1 13 ME112-0021-0606 TO FILL ELONGATED HOLE. THE HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED PER 553250 1 14 MAO101-301 AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301, CODE 08-AA-28-XX. 553250 1 15 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED AND EDGE DISTANCE REMAINS ADEQUATE. 553250 1 16 REWORK IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 553280 1 1 DURING MIDBODY ZONAL INSPECTION, THE ME196-0024-0001 ISOLATORS FOR V070- 553280 1 2 454512-001 SUPT WERE FOUND TO BE SLIGHTLY COMPRESSED. PER ENGINEERING EV 553280 1 3 ALUATION. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE ISOLATOR SPRINGS HAD RELAXED AND NE 553280 1 4 CESSITATED REPLACEMENT. THE TWO ISOLATORS ON THE -001 SUPT WERE R&R'D WI 553280 1 5 TH SUBSEQUENT MSMTS FOR CLEARANCE FOUND TO BE WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. 553280 1 6 PRSD FLUID SYSTEM INSTALLATION RQMTS ARE SATISFIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: COMB 553280 1 7 INATION OF ISOLATOR RELAXMENT AND MINOR LINE LOAD. 553281 1 1 THE ISOLATORS FOR TUBES HAVE A MAX AND MIN CLEARANCE RQMT. AN ASSY WITH 553281 1 2 TWO ISOLATORS WAS FOUND WITH ONE ISOLATOR COMPRESSED. THE CLEARANCE MSMT 553281 1 3 OF THE COMPRESSED ISOLATOR WAS MARGINALLY BELOW THE MINIMUM. THE OTHER 553281 1 4 ISOLATOR'S CLEARANCE WAS BETWEEN THE MAX AND MIN. ONE ISOLATOR IS NOT TH 553281 1 5 E SINGLE SOURCE OF ISOLATION. THEREFORE, THE ISOLATOR ASSY IS STILL EFFE 553281 1 6 CTIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 553282 1 1 THIS ISOLATOR WAS COMPRESSED AND WAS IN VIOLATION OF MLO301-0006. NEW IS 553282 1 2 OLATION ASSYS WERE INSTALLED. THE ISOLATORS WERE THEN VERIFIED AND THEY 553282 1 3 WERE FOUND NO LONGER DISCREPANT. PROBABLE CAUSE: ISOLATOR SPRING DEGRADA 553282 1 4 TION. 553346 1 1 DURING 'GO NO-GO' TESTING OF VIBRATION ISOLATOR INSTALLATIONS, V070-4548 553346 1 2 25-003 SUPT ASSY (ME196-0024 ISOLATOR) WAS FOUND TO FAIL THE GAGE TEST P 553346 1 3 ER MLO301-0006. MINIMUM CLEARANCE RQMTS FOR ME196-0024-0001 ISOLATORS IS 553346 1 4 0.475 INCH PER MLO301-0006 PAGE 14. MEASURED CLEARANCE PER STEP 3.0 WAS 553346 1 5 0.391 INCH. THROUGH ENGINEERING INSPECTION AND EVALUATION, IT WAS DETER 553346 1 6 MINED THAT AN ACCEPTABLE MARGIN OF ISOLATION EXISTS TO SUFFICIENTLY ISOL 553346 1 7 ATE THE LINE RUN AT AND AROUND THE -003 SUPT. NO EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE TO T 553346 1 8 HE LINES OR -003 SUPT ASSY WAS FOUND. DISCREPANT CONDITION WAS ACCEPTED 553346 1 9 'AS IS' ON AN MR BASIS. PROBABLE CAUSE: COMBINATION OF MINOR LINE LOAD 553346 1 10 AND ISOLATOR RELAXMENT. 553355 1 1 SILVER TAPE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW TAPE. DESIGN INTENT IS MAI 553355 1 2 NTAINED WITH THE REPAIRED TAPE. REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR UNRESTRICT 553355 1 3 ED USE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 553359 1 1 RETORQUING OF THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELL FOR CONNECTORS 30V77W1J652, 30V77W1J 553359 1 2 658, 30V77W1J664 AND 30V77W1J666 PER STEPS 1 THRU 38 HAVE RESTORED THE I 553359 1 3 NSTALLATION TO DRAWING RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 553360 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS 1 V070-346517-001 BRACKET COULD NOT BE INSTALLE 553360 1 2 D DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH ELECTRICAL BRACKETS 70C6402. EOTF DISPOSITION 553360 1 3 WAS ADDED TO RELOCATE THE 70C6402 BRACKETS PER EO C49 TO DWG V070-34000 553360 1 4 8 VERIFIED ON 3-12-96 AND TO PLUG THE OPEN HOLES WITH HI-LOCKS PER EO C5 553360 1 5 0 VERIFIED ON 4-10-96. REMAINING EO INFORMATION ON EO C49 PERTAINING TO 553360 1 6 PLUGGING OPEN RIVET HOLES AND BONDING 70C6648-004 TO FRAME IS ASSOCIATED 553360 1 7 WITH PR STR-3-J2-5503 & TPS STR-3-J2-649. NO FURTHER REWORK REQUIRED. P 553360 1 8 ROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 553361 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: 7 EACH 70A2804-12 SUPPORT BRACKETS ARE CURRENTLY RE 553361 001 2 QUIRED IN THESE LOCATIONS IN THE ORBITER MIDBODY PER DRAWING 70E2802. A 553361 001 3 N EO TO THE V070-346269 DRAWING WAS RELEASED. REMOVE THE DUPLICATE REQU 553361 001 4 IREMENT FOR THE 7 EACH SUPPORT BRACKETS AND THE ATTACH HARDWARE. (REF. 553361 001 5 STR-3-J2-673 MOD 005) PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 553425 1 1 THE REPAIR OF DAMAGED WIRE N263B24, PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR DISP 553425 1 2 OSITION E.EL 101.4, HAS RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL F 553425 1 3 ULFILL DESIGN INTENT. THIS INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED U 553425 1 4 SAGE. CONTINUITY, ISOLATION, AND HIGH POTENTIAL TESTS WERE COMPLETED SAT 553425 1 5 ISFACTORILY. CERT IS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 553427 1 1 SILVER TAPE WAS REMOVED TO EXPOSE DAMAGE TO FACE SHEET. MR MEQ-3-J2-0932 553427 1 2 -001 DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED OVER FACE SHEET DAMAGE. NEW SILVE 553427 1 3 R TAPE WAS APPLIED COVERING REPAIRED AREA. REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR 553427 1 4 UNRESTRICTED USE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 553438 1 1 THE REPAIR OF THE DAMAGED WIRE INSULATION FOR JUMPER ASSY V070-524184-00 553438 1 2 1, PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR DISPOSITION E.EL101.6 HAS RETURNED TH 553438 1 3 E CABLE/JUMPER TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS 553438 1 4 ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. MR ID WAS PLACED ADJACENT TO THE NOT 553438 1 5 ED DISCREPANCY FOR ID. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 553441 1 1 REF ITEMS 001, 002, 003. THE DISCREPANT CONNECTOR 40P9381 AND BACKSHELL 553441 1 2 WERE REMOVED AND SENT TO ROCKWELL ENGINEERING DEPT 292 FOR EVALUATION. T 553441 1 3 HE WIRES WERE CUT OFF, NEW CONTACTS, CONNECTOR AND BACKSHELL INSTALLED. 553441 1 4 THE ABOVE REWORK HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG CONFIGURATION. FUN 553441 1 5 CTIONAL TEST WILL BE PERFORMED BY KSC SCAN RETEST. CERT IS NOT AFFECTED. 553441 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 553489 1 1 UPPER AND LOWER MISLOCATED MOUNTS HAVE BEEN REMOVED BY DRILLING OUT THE 553489 1 2 RIVETS, THE RIVET HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH MD121-0001-05XX RIVETS FLUSH B 553489 1 3 OTH SIDES. THE UPPER AND LOWER MOUNTS WERE RELOCATED AND INSTALLED PER D 553489 1 4 WG RQMTS. DESIGN INTENT RETORED, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MAR 553489 1 5 GIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 553490 1 1 THE REPOSITIONING OF WIRE L514B12 PER THE ABOVE STEPS CREATED SUFFICIENT 553490 1 2 WIRE SLACK TO THE LRU. THE ABOVE STEPS HAVE RETURNED THE WIRE HARNESS T 553490 1 3 O DWG INSTALLATION CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 553495 1 1 THE ENCLOSURE PANEL WAS TOUCHED UP USING WHITE RTV 577 PER MAO106-303. T 553495 1 2 HE BLANKET WAS RETURNED TO A PER PRINT CONDITION - NO ADDITIONAL WORK IS 553495 1 3 REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR & TEAR. 553496 1 1 THE METALLIC INSULATION BLANKET WAS REPAIRED USING RED RTV FOR UNRESTRIC 553496 1 2 TED USAGE. THE BLANKET WAS RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION NO ADDITI 553496 1 3 ONAL WORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR AND TEAR. 553541 1 1 TAPE WAS REMOVED FROM NONCONFORMANCES (001, 002, 003 & 004) AND NO SKIN 553541 1 2 DAMAGE REQUIRING DOUBLERS WAS FOUND. NEW SILVER TAPE (207-9-428 TYPE 4) 553541 1 3 WAS INSTALLED TO COVER AREA AND THE REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR UNREST 553541 1 4 RICTED USE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 553542 1 1 ENGINEERING HAS BEEN RELEASED TO ADD ELECTRICAL BONDING AREA AROUND MP03 553542 1 2 2-0009-0018 CUTOUT REF DWG V070-856395 EO E07. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN OM 553542 1 3 ISSION. 553543 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN BECAUSE THE ISOLATOR CLEARANCE WAS THOUGHT TO BE BEL 553543 1 2 OW THE MINIMUM GAUGE HEIGHT PER MLO301-0006. THE MSMT PER STEP 1.0 WAS . 553543 1 3 494. 'MIN GO' AND 'MAX GO' CLEARANCE RQMTS FOR ME196-0024-0001 ISOLATORS 553543 1 4 ARE 0.475 INCH AND 0.635 INCH PER MLO301-0006 PAGE 14. THE ISOLATOR CLE 553543 1 5 ARANCE IS IN THE ALLOWABLE RANGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: INITIAL MSMT WAS INCOR 553543 1 6 RECT. 553544 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: DURING MIDBODY BAY 3 INSPECTION, V070-454865-128 PR 553544 001 2 SD 02 SUPPLY LINE WAS NOTED TO BE NOT FULLY SEATED IN ITS V070-454615-00 553544 001 3 1 SUPPORT. THE STRAPS SECURING THE -128 LINE TO THE V070-454615-001 SUP 553544 001 4 PORT AND SUPPORTS LOCATED FWD AND AFT OF THE DISCREPANT LOCATION WERE RE 553544 001 5 MOVED TO INSPECT/QUANTIFY PRELOAD AND TUBE MISALIGNMENT. RESULTS SHOWED 553544 001 6 THAT A SLIGHT AXIAL MISALIGNMENT WS PRESENT IN ADDITION TO A GAP BETWEE 553544 001 7 N THE SUPPORT AND TUBE (APPROX. 0.10 INCH AND 0.57 INCH RESPECTIVELY). 553544 001 8 PER ENGINEERING EVALUATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN UNACCEPTABLE AMOUN 553544 001 9 T OF PRELOAD WAS REQD TO FULLY SEAT AND SECURE THE -128 LINE IN THE 553544 001 10 V070-454615-001 SUPPORT. RATHER THAN REWORK/REPLACE THE TUBE AND OPEN 553544 001 11 UP THE PRSD SYSTEM, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE INSTALLTION OF A MR SHIM TO 553544 001 12 BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN TUBE AND SUPPORT WOULD BE INSTALLED. THIS REQD 553544 001 13 THAT THE -001 SUPPORT BE REWORKED TO ACCOMMODATE THE INSTALLATION OF 553544 001 14 THE SHIM (REMOVAL OF POINTED EDGE TO PREVENT CUTTING INTO SHIM - REF 553544 001 15 FIGURE ON PAGE 7.0). FOLLOWING SUPPORT REWORK AND REINSTALLATION, 553544 001 16 ENGINEERING INSPECTION OF THE INSTALLATION FOR SHIM SIZING NOTED THAT 553544 001 17 THE -128 LINE WITH SHIM INSTALLED WOULD RESULT IN INTERFERENCE/CONTACT 553544 001 18 CONDITION WITH AN ADJACENT GN2 LINE. CONSEQUENTLY, IT WAS DETERMINED 553544 001 19 THAT -128 LINE REMOVAL COULD NOT BE AVOIDED AND A NEW CORRECTIVE ACTION 553544 001 20 APPROACH WAS TAKEN THAT DISCONNECTED BOTH ENDS OF THE -128 LINE 553544 001 21 (DYNATUBE FTGS) IN AN ATTEMPT TO REPOSITION/ADJUST THE LINE (NO BENDING 553544 001 22 INVOLVED) TO PROPERLY SEAT/ALIGN THE TUBE. PAD PRESSURE FROM PRSD 02 553544 001 23 TK2 SYSTEM WAS VENTED DOWN TO 5 PSI (MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT REWORK 553544 001 24 OPERATIONS) AND THE -128 TUBE DISCONNECTED FROM THE RELIEF AND CONTROL 553544 001 25 PANEL. REPOSITIONING AND REALIGNMENT OF THE -128 TUBE ALLEVIATED THE 553544 001 26 EXCESSIVE GAP AND PRELOAD CONDITION. ENGINEERING WAS PRESENT DURING 553544 001 27 TUBING ADJUSTMENT AND VERIFIED THAT THE REINSTALLATION OF THE -128 LINE 553544 001 28 SATISFIED THE REQMTS OF MAO102-306. PER ATTACHMENT 'B', THE LINE 553544 001 29 INTERFACES HAVE PASSED/SATISFIED LEAK CHECK REQMTS AND PAD PRESSURE HAS 553544 001 30 BEEN RE-ESTABLISHED. THE LINE HAS BEEN RESECURED AND INSULATION AT 553544 001 31 FILTER INTERFACES REINSTALLED. REWORK PERFORMED TO V070-454615-001 553544 001 32 SUPPORT DOES NOT DEGRADE THE ABILITY OF THE SUPPORT TO ADEQUATELY SEAT 553544 001 33 AND SECURE THE -128 LINE. PRSD SYSTEM INSTALLATION REQMTS ARE 553544 001 34 SATISFIED. NO FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTION REQD. PRSD OMRS V45DHO.030 IS 553544 001 35 SATISFIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: GAP CONDITION CAUSED BY INDUCED TORQUE 553544 001 36 IN LINE AS A RESULT OF IMPROPER -128 LINE TO FILTER CONNECTION (TUBE 553544 001 37 NOT HELD DOWN TO PREVENT TRANSLATED TORQUE). 553545 1 1 THE PROBLEM OF COMPRISED ME196-0025-0001 ISOLATORS INSTALLED IN A V070-4 553545 1 2 54507-001 LINE BLOCK WAS WRITTEN UP AS A "STUMBLE-ON" CONDITION. THE PRO 553545 1 3 BLEM DESCRIPTION DID NOT PROVIDE OR QUANTIFY THE AMOUNT OF SPRING COMPRE 553545 1 4 SSION IN EITHER ISOLATOR. THERE ARE TWO ISOLATORS IN THIS CONFIGURATION. 553545 1 5 DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO HAVE QC DETERINE THE AMOUNT OF COMPRESSION IN INCH 553545 1 6 ES BY ISOLATOR LOCATION. BASED ON THE RESULTS, ENGINEERING SUSPECTED THE 553545 1 7 TUBES MAY BE INDUCING ADDITIONAL COMPRESSION DUE TO THE NATURE OF TUBE 553545 1 8 INSTALLATION. DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO REMOVE THE ISULATION AND EXPOSE AFFEC 553545 1 9 TED TIE STRAPS FOR REMOVAL. THE TIE STRAPS WERE REMOVED AND THE NEW, 553545 1 10 RESULTANT CLEARANCE WAS DETERMINED. THE STRAP REMOVAL DID RESULT IN A 553545 1 11 CLEARANCE IMPROVEMENT WHICH INDICATED THAT THE TUBES WERE EXERTING A 553545 1 12 MINOR LOAD ON THE SUPT ASSY AND THE ISOLATOR SPRINGS MAY HAVE RELAXED 553545 1 13 TO THE POINT THAT THE SPRING COUNTERFORCE WAS NO LONGER SUFFICIENT. 553545 1 14 DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO R&R THE SPRINGS. DURING THIS TIME IT WAS 553545 1 15 DISCOVERED THAT THE SPACERS WERE DEBONDED FROM THE RODS. STEPS WERE 553545 1 16 WRITTEN TO REBOND THE CONDITION. THE PRELOAD CONDITION IMPROVED, BUT 553545 1 17 WAS STILL NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH MLO301-0006. THE MINOR DISCREPANCY 553545 1 18 THAT REMAINED WAS ACCEPTED BY MR ACTION. THE STRAPS AND INSULATION WAS 553545 1 19 REINSTALLED, RETURNING THE REST OF THE INSTALLATION TO A FLIGHT 553545 1 20 CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION (RESULTING FROM 553545 1 21 NOMINAL ALLOWABLE TUBE INSTALLATION PRELOAD). 553626 1 1 THE DAMAGED SHIELD TERMINATOR SHIELDS ("PIGTAIL") FOR WIRE E690D24, WAS 553626 1 2 REPAIRED PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR DISPO E.EL101.15. THIS REPAIR W 553626 1 3 AS PERFORMED CONCURRENTLY WITH TPS EPD-3-J2-379 TO FACILITATE THE REPAIR 553626 1 4 . A SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY TEST WAS PERFORMED FOLLOWING THE REPAIR. THIS 553626 1 5 HAS RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT 553626 1 6 AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 553628 1 1 DURING V30-14657 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE V070-454895-101 ISOLATOR WAS 553628 1 2 COMPRESSED 0.367", WHICH IS BELOW THE MINIMUM ALLOWABLE HEIGHT PER MLO3 553628 1 3 01-0006. THE INSULATION AND THE SECURING STRAPS OF THE TUBES ON THE V070 553628 1 4 -454707 SUPT WERE REMOVED. ALL FIVE LINES ON THE SUPT WERE EVALUATED FOR 553628 1 5 PRELOAD AND FOUND TO BE NOMINAL. THE SUPT ISOLATORS WERE REMOVED AND RE 553628 1 6 PLACED AND THE NEW DIMENSIONS WERE WITHIN TOLERANCE. THE LINE CLAMPS AND 553628 1 7 INSULATION WERE REINSTALLED PER THIS PR AND THE SYSTEM MEETS ALL DWG RQ 553628 1 8 MTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 553629 1 1 DURING INSPECTION OF MIDBODY, V070-454865-008 PRSD O2 RELIEF LINE WAS FO 553629 1 2 UND TO BE NOT FULLY SEATED IN V070-454542-001 LINE BLOCK SADDLE (0.25 GA 553629 1 3 P). STRAPS SECURING THE -008 LINE TO THE -001 SUPT (AND ADJACENT SUPS) W 553629 1 4 ERE REMOVED AND THE INSTALLATION INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE, PRELOAD, AND RESU 553629 1 5 LTING LINE POSITION. THE GAP INCREASED TO 0.426. PER ENGINEERING INSPECT 553629 1 6 ION, NO EVIDENCE OF TUBE OR SUPT DAMAGE IS PRESENT AND ONLY LIGHT PRESSU 553629 1 7 RE WAS REQ'D TO SEAT AND SECURE THE -008 TUBE IN THE -001 SUPT. NEGLIGIB 553629 1 8 LE MISALIGNMENT OF TUBE TO SEAT EXISTS. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT NO VIOLAT 553629 1 9 ION OF MAO102-306 (TUBING INSTL RQTMS) WAS PRESENT AND THE TUBE WAS 553629 1 10 RESECURED TO THE SUPTS. PRSD TUBING INSTALLATION RQMTS ARE SATISFIED. 553629 1 11 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP (-008 TUBE NOT ADEQUATELY SEATED IN SUPT 553629 1 12 WHEN PREVIOUSLY SECURED.) 553633 1 1 A MOLD IMPRESSION WAS MADE OF THE GOUGES FOUND ON THE FWD FACE OF THE ST 553633 1 2 RUT AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS MR. THE MSMTS ARE .900 INCHES LONG, .21 INCH 553633 1 3 ES WIDE AND .002 INCHES DEEP. THE GOUGES WERE BLENDED WITH A 400 GRIT AB 553633 1 4 RASION MATERIAL AND CLEANED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL, CORROSION PROTECTED 553633 1 5 AND MR IDENTIFIED WITH THIS MR NUMBER. THE REPAIR WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRES 553633 1 6 TRICTED USE. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE IS NOT DEGRADED. PR 553633 1 7 OBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 553637 1 1 THE DELAMINATION FOUND IN THE MRT014751-11 DOUBLER IN BAY 5 OF THE LH FW 553637 1 2 D PAYLOAD BAY DOOR WAS MR ACCEPTED UNRESTRICTED "AS-IS". ID WAS APPLIED. 553637 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 553695 1 1 THE RESIDUE IS AN UNKNOWN, EPOXY APPEARING SUBSTANCE ADHERING TO THE STR 553695 1 2 UCTURE SURFACE, WITH KOROPON PRIMER INTACT BENEATH THE RESIDUE. ATTEMPTS 553695 1 3 TO WIPE THE RESIDUE CLEAN WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. THE 553695 1 4 RE ARE NO SIGNS OF ANY CORROSION ACTIVITY OR OVERTEMPERATURE IN THE AREA 553695 1 5 . AS SUCH, IT IS A COSMETIC IMPERFECTION ACCEPTABLE PER THE "FAIR WEAR A 553695 1 6 ND TEAR" CRITERIA OF MF0004-092, PARA 15.1.5. 553781 1 1 SILVER TAPE WAS REMOVED TO EXPOSE DAMAGE TO FACE SHEET. MR MEQ-3-J2-0932 553781 1 2 -001 DOUBLERS WERE FABRICATED AND BONDED OVER FACE SHEET DAMAGE. NEW SIL 553781 1 3 VER TAPE WAS APPLIED COVERING REPAIRED AREAS. REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR 553781 1 4 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 553790 1 1 THE DENT IN THE V070-326415-002 FRAME WAS BURNISHED LIGHTLY USING 400 GR 553790 1 2 IT AND CLEANED WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL. THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED 553790 1 3 PER MAO608-301. THESE ACTIONS RETURN THE FRAME FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. STR 553790 1 4 UCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 553791 1 1 RETORQUING OF THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELL FOR CONN 20V77W2J100 PER THE ABOVE S 553791 1 2 TEPS, HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. STEPS WERE PROVIDED FO 553791 1 3 R DEMOUNTING CONN 20J100 BUT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT ROOM FOR THE TORQUE TO 553791 1 4 OL. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 553793 1 1 IF THE V070-366572-001 PIN ASSY WERE TO HAVE BEEN INSTALLED PER DWG, THE 553793 1 2 PIN WOULD HAVE BEEN SHORT OF IT'S LOCKING POSITION BY .10 OF AN INCH. T 553793 1 3 HE PIN SUPT WAS TO BE LOCATED FROM THE END OF THE BEAM ALONG THE EDGE OF 553793 1 4 THE CONTAINER. THE BEAM HAD BEEN MISLOCATED. MR ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO 553793 1 5 INSTALL THE PIN A .10 OF AN INCH CLOSER TO THE EDGE OF THE CONTAINER TO 553793 1 6 ALL FULL ENGAGEMENT OF THE PIN. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 553814 1 1 ME624-0068-0001 DRAG BRACE STRUT WAS FOUND TO BE DENTED. DENT MEASURED 1 553814 1 2 .5 LONG X .60 WIDE X .040 DEEP. EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION FOUND NO CRACKS. 553814 1 3 STRUT WAS MR ACCEPTED AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. MR ID WAS APPLIED. PR 553814 1 4 OBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 553815 1 1 THE NOTED SCRATCHES FOR ITEM 1 WERE REWORKED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPEC MLO 553815 1 2 303-0014, PARAGRAPH 6.3.2.4. THIS HAS RETURNED THE CONN FEEDTHRU PLATE T 553815 1 3 O DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 553928 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: CARRIER PLATE ASSY WAS REMOVED BY REMOVING THE (4) 553928 001 2 FASTENERS THAT DID NOT HAVE THE PROPER THREAD LENGTH PROTRUDING BEYOND T 553928 001 3 HE END OF THE NUT ELEMENT PER THE THREADED FASTENER SPEC. MAO101-301, FA 553928 001 4 STENER GRIP LENGTH MAY BE INCREASED OR DECREASED (1) GRIP LENGTH IN ORDE 553928 001 5 R TO OBTAIN PROPER THREAD PROTRUSION INSTALLED (4) MD112-1002-0306 SCREW 553928 001 6 S IN LIEU OF MD112-1002-0305 SCREWS. FOR RE-INSTALLATION OF CARRIER PLA 553928 001 7 TE ASSY. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 553934 1 1 TWO 0.050 X 0.76 X 1.40 ALUM SHIMS USING 2024-T3 WERE FABRICATED TO INCR 553934 1 2 EASE THE MINIMUM GAP BETWEEN THE V070-852289-001 BRACE AND THE V070-4154 553934 1 3 91-006 MANIFOLD. THE SHIMS WERE INSTALLED BY REMOVING THE BRACE, LOCATIN 553934 1 4 G SHIMS BY MATCH DRILLING HOLES, AND REPLACING THE BRACE USING 2 MD128-0 553934 1 5 002-02 JO-BOLTS, 2 ME112-0014-0504 HI-LOKS AND 2 ME114-0022-0105 COLLARS 553934 1 6 . BOTH THE FASTENERS AND SHIMS WERE CORROSION PROTECTED. THE SHIMS PROVI 553934 1 7 DE THE MINIMUM 0.060 CLEARANCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSUFFICIENT CLEARANCE. 553993 1 1 THE ET DOOR FITTING IS NOT MACHINED PER DWG. THE FLANGE IS MACHINED FLAT 553993 1 2 WITH SLIGHT RADIUS ON THE AFT END. FLAT DOUBLER WAS REWORKED TO MATCH T 553993 1 3 HE CONTOUR OF THE FITTING FLANGE. THE FTG WITH THE DOUBLER WAS FIT CHECK 553993 1 4 ED ON THE ET DOOR WITH ADJACENT PARTS, THE DOUBLER LINED UP WITH THERMAL 553993 1 5 BARRIER SEALING THE GAP. THE DESIGN INTENT TO PRECLUDE HOT GAS FLOW BET 553993 1 6 WEEN THE THERMAL BARRIER AND THE ET DOOR FITTING HAS BEEN RESTORED. STRU 553993 1 7 CTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBA 553993 1 8 BLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 554003 1 1 MR ACTION WAS REQ'D TO REPAIR V070-326145-007 BOOT FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 554003 1 2 FRAYED AREA OF BOOT WAS REPAIRED USING MLO601-9026 PROCEDURE TPS312. PR 554003 1 3 OBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 554084 1 1 V070-351926-007 SPLICE PLATE COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO LOCATION OF F 554084 1 2 ASTENER HOLES AT SPLICE FOR LH DOME HEATSHIELD 2. A MR STR-3-22-5214-001 554084 1 3 SPLICE PLATE WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED WITH NEW WIDTH OF 2.50. PROBA 554084 1 4 BLE CAUSE: VENDOR. 554102 1 1 ITEM 1 PAGE 1: DURING MATCH DRILLING OPERATIONS (13) FASTENERS LOCATION 554102 1 2 WERE FOUND TO BE MISALIGNED. THE HOLES WERE DRILLED UP AND OVERSIZED OR 554102 1 3 NEXT SIZE HI-LOKS WERE INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 554102 1 4 ITEM 2 PAGE 1B: A DRILL TIP MARK NEAR HOLE NUMBER 41 WHEN DRILL GUIDE SL 554102 1 5 IPPED. THE MARK WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS 554102 1 6 WORKMANSHIP. ITEM 3 PAGE 1B: V070-351959 RING SEGMENT COULD NOT MAINTAIN 554102 1 7 DRAWING REQUIREMENT OF .12 +/- .06. RING SEGMENTS WERE MR ACCEPTED TO E 554102 1 8 QUALLY SPACE. .240 WAS MEASURED AS TO MAXIMUM GAP ON THE REPOSITIONED 554102 1 9 RING SEGMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS PROCESS TOLERANCE. ITEM 4 PAGE 1B: (1) 554102 1 10 V070-351959-003 RING SEGMENT WAS FOUND TO BE IDENTIFIED AS V070-351957- 554102 1 11 003. THE RING SEGMENT WAS PROPERLY IDENTIFIED. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 554127 1 1 ITEM 1: HI-LOKS LOCATION ON RH DOME HEATSHIELD 2 WAS FOUND TO BE MISALIG 554127 1 2 NED DURING DRILLING OF HOLES FROM NEW RING COVER. HOLE WAS DRILLED UP TO 554127 1 3 PROVIDE FOR PROPER INSTALLATION BY MR ACTION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. ITEM 554127 1 4 2: 1 LOWER SPLICE LINE NUT PLATE COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO NO EDGE 554127 1 5 DISTANCE TO MD114-5009-0401 CORNER NUT PLATE WAS INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAU 554127 1 6 SE: UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE. 554129 1 1 AXIAL FREE PLAY OF UP TO THREE TIMES THE RADIAL TOLERANCE OF .002 DOES N 554129 1 2 OT AFFECT DESIGN INTENT OF THE BEARING. ME131-0017-0006 BEARING WILL FUN 554129 1 3 CTION PROPERLY WITH FREE PLAY OF .006 MAX. COORDINATED WITH DOWNEY STAND 554129 1 4 ARDS GROUP GAIL SALTZ X0361. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASI 554129 1 5 S FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION R 554129 1 6 ATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. CAUSE: FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. 554136 1 1 THE RADIAL ALLOWABLE MOVEMENT FOR THESE BEARINGS IS .002. THE ACCEPTANCE 554136 1 2 AXIAL FREE PLAY FOR THESE SIZE BEARINGS IS THREE TIMES THE RADIAL ALLOW 554136 1 3 ABLE MOVEMENT OR .006. THE FREE PLAY MSMTS RECORDED ON PAGE 1A FOR BEARI 554136 1 4 NG AT XO609 IS WITHIN THIS LIMIT. THE BEARING FREE PLAY AT XO675 AND XO7 554136 1 5 41 ARE SLIGHTLY OUTSIDE THIS LIMIT BUT WILL NOT AFFECT THE STRUCTURAL IN 554136 1 6 TEGRITY, FIT OR FUNCTION OF THE RADIATOR ON THE PAYLOAD BAY DOOR. THIS M 554136 1 7 R ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE 554136 1 8 CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. COORDI 554136 1 9 NATION: LES GUERTIN (X4941) OF DOWNEY M&P GROUP. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AN 554136 1 10 D TEAR. 554138 1 1 DRAWING REVISED BY EO TO ADD NUTPLATES TO SUPT FOR ATTACHING DESICCANT M 554138 1 2 ANIFOLD. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGR OVERSIGHT. 554143 1 1 THE V070-346510-003 & V070-346510-004 BRACKET LOCATIONS WERE REVERSED PE 554143 1 2 R THE EOTF DISPOSITION. THE EO HAS BEEN RELEASED TO REVERSE THE BRACKET 554143 1 3 CALL OUTS. THE BRACKETS MAY NOW BE INSTALLED CORRECTLY. NO FURTHER WORK 554143 1 4 IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 554423 1 1 THIS PR WAS WRITTEN BECAUSE PLANNING WAS NOT PART OF THE LOOP TO REMOVE 554423 1 2 V070-454952-001 SUPT. AFTER REMOVAL OF -001 SUPT, RETAINED MD114-1001-00 554423 1 3 04 NUTS (2 REQ'D) AND NAS1587-3 WASHERS (2 REQ'D) FOR INSTALLATION OF V0 554423 1 4 70-454952-003 SUPT CONFIGURATION REWORK (V070-454952 A04). INSTALLED PER 554423 1 5 TPS FCP-3-J2-081. THIS NEW MOD HARDWARE UPDATES THE SUPT CONFIGURATION. 554423 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE: PLANNING OVERSIGHT. 554438 1 1 THERE IS NO SPEC FOR AXIAL FREEPLAY IN THIS BEARING. THE ALLOWABLE MOVEM 554438 1 2 ENT FOR THIS BEARING IS .002 INCHES IN THE RADIAL DIRECTION PER VENDOR S 554438 1 3 PECIFICATION. PER COORDINATION WITH THE VENDOR, THREE TIMES THAT RADIAL 554438 1 4 FREEPLAY, OR .006 INCHES, IS ACCEPTABLE IN THE AXIAL DIRECTION FOR A NEW 554438 1 5 BEARING OF THIS SIZE AND DESIGN. USE OF THESE LIMITS ON A USED BEARING 554438 1 6 PROVIDES CONSERVATIVE MSMTS ON PAGE 1A ARE NO MORE THAN .006 INCHES IN T 554438 1 7 HE AXIAL DIRECTION SO THE BEARINGS ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 554438 1 8 RI DOWNEY COORDINATION: GAIL SALTZ (X0361) OF DNY STANDARDS GROUP. PROBA 554438 1 9 BLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 554443 1 1 THERE IS NO SPEC FOR AXIAL FREEPLAY IN THIS BEARING. THE ALLOWABLE MOVEM 554443 1 2 ENT FOR THIS BEARING IS .002 INCHES IN THE RADIAL DIRECTION PER VENDOR S 554443 1 3 PECIFICATION. PER COORDINATION WITH THE VENDOR, THREE TIMES THAT RADIAL 554443 1 4 FREEPLAY, OR .006 INCHES, IS ACCEPTABLE IN THE AXIAL DIRECTION FOR A NEW 554443 1 5 BEARING OF THIS SIZE AND DESIGN. USE OF THESE LIMITS ON A USED BEARING 554443 1 6 PROVIDES CONSERVATIVE MSMTS ON PAGE 1A ARE NO MORE THAN .006 INCHES IN T 554443 1 7 HE AXIAL DIRECTION SO THE BEARINGS ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 554443 1 8 RI DOWNEY COORDINATION: GAIL SALTZ (X0361) OF DNY STANDARDS GROUP. PROBA 554443 1 9 BLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 554444 1 1 THE DOUBLER INTERFERENCE WAS ELIMINATED BY SPOTFACING THE TWO LOCATIONS 554444 1 2 ON THE DOUBLER AND REVERSING THE INSTALLATION OF THE HI-LOKS AT THE TWO 554444 1 3 LOCATIONS. THE REWORK WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE SPOTFACE 554444 1 4 D AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR ID WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: EN 554444 1 5 GINEERING OVERSIGHT. 554447 1 1 MILKSTOOL ID'D IN ITEM 001 WAS MOVED ONE STRINGER INBD TO ELIMINATE INTE 554447 1 2 RFERENCE WITH PREVIOUS VENDORS MR DOUBLER. EO V070-346269-D02 WAS RELEAS 554447 1 3 ED ON 2-16-96. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. 554449 1 1 MILKSTOOL ID'D IN ITEM 001 WAS NOT INSTALLED. DWG ERROR WAS CORRECTED BY 554449 1 2 V070-346269 D02, EO WAS RELEASED ON 2-16-96 TO USE EXISTING MILKSTOOL. 554449 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE: DWG ERROR. 554472 1 1 THE SYSTEM FOR TRACKING CONN MATES AND DEMATES (SCAN) REQUIRES MAINTAINI 554472 1 2 NG CONFIGURATION AND RETEST STATUS. CONNECTORS 40V73A31P1/40V77W801J9950 554472 1 3 WERE DEMATED WITHOUT DOCUMENTATION. THE CONNECTORS WERE ADDED TO TPS MX 554472 1 4 -3-J2-013 CONN DEMATES FOR ACCESS SHEET (SCAN TRACK NO 3-J2-0980). CONNE 554472 1 5 CTORS WILL BE MATED PER PLANNING MOD. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBAB 554472 1 6 LE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 554616 1 1 CONN 40V77W21P2 WAS DEMATED, BACKSHELL WAS OPENED, CLOSED AND TORQUED. T 554616 1 2 HE ABOVE STEPS HAVE RETURNED THE CONN INSTALLATION TO DWG CONFIGURATION. 554616 1 3 THE SCAN TRACKING SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE RETEST FOR CONN 40V77W21P2 DEMATE 554616 1 4 D/MATED THIS PR. CERT IS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND T 554616 1 5 EAR. 554692 1 1 THE REMOVAL, REPLACEMENT & RETERMINATION OF THE SOLDER SLEEVE, SHIELD JU 554692 1 2 MPER & GROUND LUG FOR WIRE 1F56C22, FOLLOWED BY THE REINSTALLATION OF TH 554692 1 3 E GROUND LUG AT CONN 50P11, PER THE ABOVE STEPS, HAS RETURNED THE INSTAL 554692 1 4 LATION TO DWG CONFIGURATION. A SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY TEST WAS PERFORMED. 554692 1 5 CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 554697 1 1 PANEL ASSY WAS TRIMMED TO ELIMINATE THE INTERFERENCE BETWEEN V070-198202 554697 1 2 -001 AND V070-147001-001. PART WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND IDENTIFIED WI 554697 1 3 TH THIS MR NO. AMOUNT OF REMOVAL WAS LESS THAN .040". PROBABLE CAUSE: AC 554697 1 4 CUMULATION OF TOLERANCES. 554698 1 1 TAPE WAS REMOVED FROM NONCONFORMANCES (001 & 002) AND NO SKIN DAMAGE REQ 554698 1 2 UIRING DOUBLERS WAS FOUND. NEW SILVER TAPE (207-9-428 TYPE 4) WAS INSTAL 554698 1 3 LED TO COVER AREA AND THE REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 554698 1 4 . CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 554834 1 1 DURING TPS REMOVAL PROCESSES IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE "J-2" MODIFICATION 554834 1 2 PROGRAM AT PALMDALE, PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DELAMINATIONS WERE DISCOVERED BENE 554834 1 3 ATH THE INSTALLED TPS. THE DAMAGE WAS REPAIRED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE BY M 554834 1 4 R DISPOSITION WHICH COATED THE AFFECTED AREAS FLUSH PER MAO106-305 WITH 554834 1 5 MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. CAUSE: WEAR & TEAR. 554859 1 1 SILVER TAPE WAS REMOVED TO EXPOSE DAMAGE TO FACE SHEET. MR MEQ-3-J2-0942 554859 1 2 -001 DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED OVER FACE SHEET DAMAGE. NEW SILVE 554859 1 3 R TAPE WAS APPLIED COVERING REPAIRED AREA. REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR 554859 1 4 UNRESTRICTED USE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 554866 1 1 THE BOND ATTACHES THE SUPT TO THE 70C6162 MILK STOOL WHICH IS ALSO FASTE 554866 1 2 NED WITH 3 3/16 HUCK BOLTS. THE HUCK BOLTS WILL CARRY THE LOADS. THE STR 554866 1 3 UCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 554866 1 4 BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTI 554866 1 5 ON RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR & TEAR. 554871 1 1 IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE DOUBLERS WERE NOT REQ'D ON THIS INSTALLATION 554871 1 2 AND THAT THE BRACKET PROVIDED SUFFICIENT STIFFNESS ON ITS OWN. AN EO WAS 554871 1 3 RELEASED TO DELETE THE VR70-100049-001, -002 AND -003 DOUBLERS. PROBABL 554871 1 4 E CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 554872 1 1 IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE DOUBLERS WERE NOT REQ'D ON THIS INSTALLATION 554872 1 2 AND THAT THE BRACKET PROVIDED SUFFICIENT STIFFNESS ON ITS OWN. AN EO WAS 554872 1 3 RELEASED TO DELETE THE VR70-100049-001, -002 AND -003 DOUBLERS. PROBABL 554872 1 4 E CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 554874 1 1 THE GOUGE ON THE R-2 RADIATOR PANEL FWD AND AFT ROLLER SUPT HAS BEEN BUR 554874 1 2 NISHED WITH A 300 GRIT ABRASION MATERIAL TO OBTAIN A SMOOTH SURFACE. THE 554874 1 3 REWORKED AREA HAS BEEN CORROSION PROTECTED AND ID IS NOT REQ'D BECAUSE 554874 1 4 OF CREW VISIBILITY WHEN THE DOORS ARE OPENED. THIS RWK DOES NOT AFFECT T 554874 1 5 HE DESIGN INTENT AND FUNCTION. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. P 554874 1 6 ROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 554875 1 1 THE GOUGE ON THE L-1 RADIATOR PANEL CENTER ROLLER SUPT HAS BEEN BURNISHE 554875 1 2 D WITHA 300 GRIT ABRASION MATERIAL TO OBTAIN A SMOOTH SURFACE. THE REWOR 554875 1 3 KED AREA HAS BEEN CORROSION PROTECTED AND ID IS NOT REQ'D BECAUSE OF CRE 554875 1 4 W VISIBILITY WHEN THE DOORS ARE OPENED. THIS RWK DOES NOT AFFECT THE DES 554875 1 5 IGN INTENT AND FUNCTION. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABL 554875 1 6 E CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 554876 1 1 THE GOUGE ON THE L-1 RADIATOR PANEL FWD AND AFT ROLLER SUPT HAS BEEN BUR 554876 1 2 NISHED WITH A 300 GRIT ABRASION MAT'L TO OBTAIN A SMOOTH SURFACE. THE RE 554876 1 3 WORKED AREA HAS BEEN CORROSION PROTECTED AND ID IS NOT REQ'D BECAUSE OF 554876 1 4 CREW VISIBILITY WHEN THE DOORS ARE OPENED. THIS RWK DOES NOT AFFECT THE 554876 1 5 DESIGN INTENT AND FUNCTION. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROB 554876 1 6 ABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 554983 1 1 SILVER TAPE WAS REMOVED TO EXPOSE DAMAGE TO FACE SHEET. MR MEQ-3-J2-0943 554983 1 2 -001 DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND BONDED OVER FACE SHEET DAMAGE. NEW SILVE 554983 1 3 R TAPE WAS APPLIED COVERING REPAIRED AREA. REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR 554983 1 4 UNRESTRICTED USE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 555021 1 1 THE REPAIR OF THE BROKEN WIRE 2P1176B26 BY UTILIZATION OF A SPLICE HAS R 555021 1 2 ETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. SUC 555021 1 3 CESSFUL CONTINUITY WAS PERFORMED AT STEP 13. THE QUESTION AS TO THE TYPE 555021 1 4 OF INSULATOR/SEALING SLEEVE USED IN THE SPLICE REPAIR, AS NOTED ON PAGE 555021 1 5 1A (A-1001 AS CALLED OUT IN STEP 3, VS THE CORRECT -2001 SLEEVE REQUIRE 555021 1 6 D FOR THE AREA OF APPLICATION) WAS ADDRESSED IN STEP 35, HAS BEEN RESOLV 555021 1 7 ED BY PHYSICAL INSPECTION OF THE SPLICE AND THE DETERMINATION THAT THE C 555021 1 8 ORRECT INSULATOR/SEALING SLEEVE, FROM A -2001 SPLICE KIT, WAS IN FACT US 555021 1 9 ED. PROBABLE CAUSE OF DAMAGE: WORKMANSHIP. PROBABLE CAUSE OF CONFUSION I 555021 1 10 N WORK DONE; ENGINEERING. 555026 1 1 (5) V070-346108-001 CLIPS COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE WIT 555026 1 2 H LINE BRACKETS. THE BRACKETS WERE RELOCATED TO ALLOW FOR INSTALLATION W 555026 1 3 ITH AN EO TO FOLLOW DISPOSITION. THE DWG WAS REVISED BY EO TO RELOCATE T 555026 1 4 HE V070-356108-001 BRACKETS TO ALLOW THEM TO BE INSTALLED. THE RELEASED 555026 1 5 EO WAS VERIFIED BY ENGINEERING TO REFLECT THE EO TO FOLLOW BY ENGINEERIN 555026 1 6 G TO REFLECT THE EO TO FOLLOW DISPOSITION ON THE PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENG 555026 1 7 INEERING OVERSIGHT. 555027 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS NEW V070-338380-001 BEAM COULD NOT BE INSTALLED 555027 1 2 DUE TO EXISTING FLOOR CONFIGURATION. BEAM WAS MACHINED PER EOTF DISPO T 555027 1 3 O SHORTEN THE BEAM TO ALLOW INSTALLATION. REWORK DOUBLERS WERE ALSO FABR 555027 1 4 ICATED AND BONDED ONTO THE BEAM DUE TO THE TRIM. EO A02 TO DWG V070-3383 555027 1 5 80 WAS RELEASED 2-2-96 AND VERIFIED 2-4-96. REWORK EOS M120574 & M120575 555027 1 6 WERE RELEASED TO DWG V070-338380 RELEASED 2-2-96 AND VERIFIED 2-4-96. P 555027 1 7 ROBABLE CAUSE: INSTALLATION SEQUENCE. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A DOCUMENTS THAT EXI 555027 1 8 STING HOLES COULD NOT BE PICKED UP TO INSTALL BEAM V070-338380-001. HOLE 555027 1 9 S WERE PLUGGED PER EOTF. DISPOSITION AND DELETED HI-LOK CALL OUT, 4 ON 555027 1 10 RH SIDE AND 3 ON LH SIDE. EO F01 TO DWG V070-332997 WAS RELEASED 2-6-96 555027 1 11 AND VERIFIED 2-10-96. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN. ITEM 3, PAGE 1B DOCUMENTS 555027 1 12 BEAM COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH 12 HI-LOKS. THE 555027 1 13 HI-LOKS WERE REMOVED AND THEN REINSTALLED AFTER INSTALLATION OF BEAM. 555027 1 14 PROBABLE CAUSE: INSTALLATION SEQUENCE. ITEM 4, PAGE 1C DOCUMENTS A 555027 1 15 0.050 GAP EXISTS AT BOTH ENDS OF BEAM WHEN INSTALLED. TWO SHIMS WERE 555027 1 16 FABRICATED PER EOTF DISPO AND INSTALLED WITH THE BEAM PER TPS 555027 1 17 STR-3-J2-662 SEQ 1346 PAGE 253. EO D04 TO DWG V070-338204 WAS RELEASED 555027 1 18 3-14-96 AND VERIFIED 3-15-96. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN. ITEM 5, PAGE 1D 555027 1 19 DOCUMENTS THAT REWORK EO M120574 NOTE 2 CALLS OUT TO PRIME WITH 555027 1 20 MBO120-078. ITEM 6, PAGE 1D DOCUMENTS THAT PR CALLS OUT TO CORROSION 555027 1 21 PROTECT PER CODE 01-CF-21-XN AND REWORK EO CALLS RQMT TO PRIME 555027 1 22 MBO120-078 AND TO CORRECT CORROSION PROTECTION CODE TO 01-CF-21-XN. 555027 1 23 REWORK EO M121100 WAS RELEASED TO DWG V070-338380 RELEASED 4-9-96 AND 555027 1 24 VERIFIED 4-9-96. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN. ITEM 7, PAGE 1E DOCUMENTS THAT 555027 1 25 DWG V070-338204 EO D04 SHEET 2 READS A04 AND S/B D04. INTERNAL LETTER 555027 1 26 NO 296-DJE-96-11 WAS ISSUED FOR CORRECTING REVISION SEQ ON EO D04 SHEET 555027 1 27 2. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN. ALL ITEMS ADDRESSED, NO FURTHER REWORK 555027 1 28 REQUIRED. 555100 1 1 ONE WASHER WAS MISSING FROM THE BUCKTAIL SIDE OF A RIVET THAT WAS NOT PR 555100 1 2 OPERLY INSTALLED. ANOTHER RIVET HAD A GAP UNDER THE BUCKTAIL SIDE. QUALI 555100 1 3 TY HAD ORIGINALLY DISPOSITIONED THE RIVETS TO BE REMOVED AND INSTALLED P 555100 1 4 ROPERLY WITH THE WASHERS PER DWG RQMTS. THE INSTALLATION OF RIVETS WAS N 555100 1 5 OT POSSIBLE DUE TO ACCESS PROBLEMS. THEREFORE, MR ACTION WAS REQ'D TO IN 555100 1 6 STALL HI-LOKS IN LIEU OF RIVETS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WO 555100 1 7 RKMANSHIP. 555103 1 1 DUE TO INACCESSIBILITY TO INSTALL RIVETS, HI-LOKS WERE INSTALLED WITH AN 555103 1 2 EO TO FOLLOW DISPOSTION. AN EO WAS WRITTEN, RELEASED AND VERIFIED. PROB 555103 1 3 ABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 555104 1 1 THE MISLOCATED V070-334855-002 BRACKETS WERE REMOVED, THE HOLE WAS PLUGG 555104 1 2 ED WITH RIVETS AND WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. THE BRACKETS WER 555104 1 3 E LOCATED CORRECTLY AND REINSTALLED. THE AREA OF THE PLUGGED HOLES WAS C 555104 1 4 ORROSION PROTECTED AND MR ID WAS APPLIED. ITEMS 002 & 003: THE 4 EA ELON 555104 1 5 GATED HOLES IN THE V070-334855-002 BRACKETS WERE CLEANED UP BY ENLARGING 555104 1 6 THREE OF THE HOLES TO .191 AND THE FOURTH HOLE TO .208. THE ENLARGED HO 555104 1 7 LES WERE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. THE BRACKETS WERE CORROSION PR 555104 1 8 OTECTED AND MR ID WAS APPLIED. ITEM 004: THE 2 EA V070-334855-002 BRACKE 555104 1 9 TS WERE INSTALLED WITH MD128-0002-0302 JO-BOLTS IN PLACE OF 555104 1 10 MD121-0003-06XX RIVETS. THE INSTALLATION USING JO-BOLTS WAS ACCEPTED 555104 1 11 FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE AND MR ID WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 555104 1 12 WORKMANSHIP. 555117 1 1 ITEM 001 EO 039 CODES 1, 2, 3 HAVE BEEN CORRECTED TO CODES X, Y, Z BY EO 555117 1 2 V070-340008 C45. ITEM 002 EO 039 DASH NO'S HAVE BEEN CORRECTED ON EO V0 555117 1 3 70-340008 C45. ITEM 2 NO CORRECTION REQUIRED NOTE Z IS CALLED OUT TWO PL 555117 1 4 ACES FOR A TOTAL OF 18 HOLES PLUGGED. EO V070-340008 C45 WAS RELEASED ON 555117 1 5 JAN 19, 1996. CAUSE: ENGR ERROR. 555139 1 1 THE V070-334856 BRACKETS COULD NOT BE INSTALLED USING THE HOT BOND PROCE 555139 1 2 SS, DUE TO ACCESS LIMITATIONS. AN EO WAS RELEASED TO INSTALL THE BRACKET 555139 1 3 S USING THE COLD BOND PROCESS. ADDITIONALLY, AT AMBIENT TEMPERATURES, CO 555139 1 4 LD BONDS HAVE A HIGHER SHEAR ALLOWABLE. THE BRACKETS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED 555139 1 5 AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCESS LIMITATIONS. 555176 1 1 V070-613404-010 DUCT ASSY HAD A .020 CLEARANCE WITH A V070-338558-002 SH 555176 1 2 ELF SUPT. THE DUCT ASSY ALSO HAD A CLEARANCE PROBLEM WITH 6 NO. 10 HILOK 555176 1 3 S. MR ACTION WAS REQ'D TO RWK THE V070-338558-002 SUPT TO PROVIDE CLEARA 555176 1 4 NCE. THE HI-LOKS WERE REMOVED AND NEW ONES INSTALLED WITH THE ORIENTATIO 555176 1 5 N OF INSTALLATION WITH THE ORIENTATION OF INSTALLATION REVERSED TO PROVI 555176 1 6 DE INSTALLATION CLEARANCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILDUP. 555177 1 1 ITEM 002) ENGINEERING INSPECTION OF CONN 81P29 DETERMINED THAT THE ROUND 555177 1 2 ED "TEETH" AT THE REAR OF THE CONN PLUG ARE A RESULT OF NORMAL WEAR & TE 555177 1 3 AR AND WERE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW ENGAGEMENT AND TORQUE OF THE BACKSHELL O 555177 1 4 NTO THE CONN PLUG PER DWG RQMTS. THE BACKSHELL "TEETH" WERE INSPECTED AL 555177 1 5 SO AND WERE FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO ENGINEERING STANDARDS. THEREFORE, 555177 1 6 NO REWORK ON CONN 81P29 WAS REQ'D. (ITEM 001) CONN 81P334 COULD NOT BE O 555177 1 7 PENED BECAUSE THE BACKSHELL AND PLUG "TEETH" WERE NOT ENGAGED. HEAT WAS 555177 1 8 APPLIED USING A HEAT GUN IN AN ATTEMPT TO ENGAGE THE PLUG & BACKSHELL "T 555177 1 9 EETH" BUT THIS FAILED. THE SHIELD TERMINATOR SHELL WAS THEN 555177 1 10 MECHANICALLY CUT IN HALF AND THE BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED. ENGINEERING 555177 1 11 INSPECTION OF THE THREADS REVEALED AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF LOCKTITE HAD 555177 1 12 BEEN USED TO SECURE THE BACKSHELL. RESULTS SHOWED (ITEM 003) THE 555177 1 13 LOCKING "TEETH" IN THE CONN AND SHIELD TERMINATOR SHELL WERE ROUNDED 555177 1 14 OFF. THE CONN 81P334 PLUG (P/N NB6GE22-5SWT2) AND BACKSHELL (P/N 555177 1 15 ME127-0081-0022) WAS THEN REMOVED AND WERE ROUTED WITH ASSOCIATED 555177 1 16 PHOTOS TO R. KRAHL (D292-200 DNY ENG) FOR ENG EVALUATION. THE CONN PLUG 555177 1 17 AND BACKSHELL WERE SCRAPPED AFTER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE 555177 1 18 THE LOT NUMBERS OF THESE PARTS (DUE TO ILLEGIBLE ID'S). INSPECTION OF 555177 1 19 THE WIRING AFTER CONN 81P334 WAS REMOVED (ITEM 004) REVEALED THE 555177 1 20 TERMINATOR SHIELDS ON A NUMBER OF WIRES HAD BEEN BROKEN, CUT AND 555177 1 21 OTHERWISE SUFFERED DAMAGE DURING REMOVAL OF THE BACKSHELL. A NEW CONN 555177 1 22 (P/N NB6GE22-5SWT2) WAS OBTAINED ALONG WITH A NEW BACKSHELL (P/N 555177 1 23 ME127-0081-0022 FOR CONN 81P334 (TO CORRECT PR CONDITIONS -001 & -003). 555177 1 24 WIRES WHICH WERE DETERMINED TO BE UNDAMAGED WERE THEN INSERTED INTO THE 555177 1 25 NEW CONN. THOSE WIRES WITH DAMAGED SHIELD TERMINATOR SHIELDS WERE 555177 1 26 REPAIRED PER ENG STD REPAIR EL 101.15 (TO CORRECT PR CONDITION 004). 555177 1 27 AFTER REPAIR OF THE SHIELDS THE REPAIRED WIRES WERE INSERTED INTO THE 555177 1 28 CONN AND 81P334 WAS CLOSED. AN MR ID LABELED "OEL-3-J2-0842" WAS THEN 555177 1 29 STAMPED ON THE SHIELD TERMINATOR BARREL PER MAO104-301. CONTINUITY 555177 1 30 TESTS WERE SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED ON CONN 81P334 AND HARNESS (W8) WAS 555177 1 31 RETURNED TO INSTL DWG RQMTS. THIS REPAIR (ITEM 004) HAS RETURNED CONN 555177 1 32 81P334 TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS 555177 1 33 ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 001 - 555177 1 34 WORKMANSHIP (EXCESSIVE LOCKTITE USED ON BACKSHELL). ITEM 002 - NO PR 555177 1 35 CONDITION. ITEM 003 - WEAR & TEAR. ITEM 004 - UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE DURING 555177 1 36 ORBITER PROCESSING. 555178 1 1 THE LISTED CONNECTORS THAT WERE SPOTTED THAT HAD AN UNRECOGNIZABLE GUMMY 555178 1 2 SUBSTANCE HAVE BEEN REMOVED PER THE METHOD USED IN THE DISPO. THE ABOVE 555178 1 3 STEPS HAVE RETURNED THE CONNECTORS/WIRE HARNESSES TO DWG INSTALLATION C 555178 1 4 ONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 555179 1 1 THE DAMAGED PRIMARY WIRE INSULATION FOR WIRE V325A24 WAS REPAIRED PER EN 555179 1 2 GINEERING STANDARD REPAIR DISPOSITION E.EL 101.14, METHOD "B". THIS HAS 555179 1 3 RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND 555179 1 4 IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 555181 1 1 THE INSERTS WERE OBTAINED (MD115-2002-0003) WITH NAS1003-1 BOLTS AND RD1 555181 1 2 53-5002-1003 WASHERS. THE INSERT WAS INSTALLED INTO THE AFT BULKHEAD RIN 555181 1 3 G PER MAO101-304. THE HOLES WERE LOCATED PER THE PILOT HOLES ON V070-334 555181 1 4 215-001 DRILLED TO THE DEPTH OF .414 INCHES DEEP. THE RWK WAS CORROSION 555181 1 5 PROTECTED AND FASTENERS WERE VERIFIED THAT IT WAS TORQUED TO 30 IN LBS. 555181 1 6 THE EO V070-332875 D02 WAS RELEASED ON FEB 7, 1996 AND VERIFIED BY MR. R 555181 1 7 . LANGLEY (R. ENGINEER). THIS INSTALLATION GIVES IDEAL ATTACHMENT AND ST 555181 1 8 RENGTH, THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENG OVER 555181 1 9 SIGHT. 555182 1 1 THE INSERTS WERE OBTAINED (MD115-2002-0003) WITH NAS1003-1 BOLTS AND RD1 555182 1 2 53-5002-1003 WASHERS. THE INSERT WAS INSTALLED INTO THE AFT BULKHEAD RIN 555182 1 3 G PER MAO101-304. THE HOLES WERE LOCATED PER THE PILOT HOLES ON V070-334 555182 1 4 215-001 DRILLED TO THE DEPTH OF .414 INCHES DEEP. THE RWK WAS CORROSION 555182 1 5 PROTECTED AND FASTENERS WERE VERIFIED THAT IT WAS TORQUED TO 30 IN LBS. 555182 1 6 THE EO V070-332875 D02 WAS RELEASED ON FEB 7, 1996 AND VERIFIED BY MR. R 555182 1 7 . LANGLEY (R. ENGINEER). THIS INSTALLATION GIVES IDEAL ATTACHMENT AND ST 555182 1 8 RENGTH, THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENG OVER 555182 1 9 SIGHT. 555282 1 1 INTEGRITY OF AFT COMPARTMENT WAS VIOLATED, THE INTEGRITY SEAL APPLIED 1- 555282 1 2 12-96 WAS LOST/BROKEN. R/QE PERFORMED INSPECTION OF AFT COMPARTMENT AND 555282 1 3 FOUND NO DISCREPANCIES. UPON COMPLETION OF INSPECTION R/QE REESTABLISHED 555282 1 4 CONTROL BY PLACING INTEGRITY SEALS AT ALL ACCESS OPENINGS. PROBABLE CAU 555282 1 5 SE: WORKMANSHIP. 555284 1 1 THE HINGE BEARING FREE PLAY MSMTS TAKEN IN THE FWD AND AFT DIRECTION (AX 555284 1 2 IAL OR PIN DIRECTION) ARE WITHIN THE .010 ALLOWABLE MOVEMENT. THE RADIAL 555284 1 3 MSMTS TAKEN ARE WITHIN THE .002 ALLOWABLE MOVEMENT. THE BEARINGS ARE AC 555284 1 4 CEPTABLE ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATION. REF: ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL PROCURE 555284 1 5 MENT SPECIFICATION TC130-0001, REV D, SHEET 4, 3.1.5 BEARING MOVEMENT. C 555284 1 6 OORDINATION: GAIL SALTZ (X0361) OF DOWNEY STANDARDS GROUP. PROBABLE CAUS 555284 1 7 E: NO DISCREPANCY. 555288 1 1 THE HINGE BEARING FREE PLAY MSMTS TAKEN IN THE FWD AND AFT DIRECTION (AX 555288 1 2 IAL OR PIN DIRECTION) ARE WITHIN THE .010 ALLOWABLE MOVEMENT. THE RADIAL 555288 1 3 MSMTS TAKEN ARE WITHIN THE .002 ALLOWABLE MOVEMENT. THE BEARINGS ARE AC 555288 1 4 CEPTABLE ACCORDING TO SPECIFICATION. REF: ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL PROCURE 555288 1 5 MENT SPECIFICATION TC130-0001, REV D, SHEET 4, 3.1.5 BEARING MOVEMENT. C 555288 1 6 OORDINATION: GAIL SALTZ (X0361) OF DOWNEY STANDARDS GROUP. PROBABLE CAUS 555288 1 7 E: NO DISCREPANCY. 555438 1 1 THE ROUTING FOR THE HARNESSES W922, W28 & W13 HAVE BEEN REDRESS PER V070 555438 1 2 -794317 ZONE 100E & MLO303-0014. THE ABOVE STEPS HAVE RETURNED THE HARNE 555438 1 3 SSES TO DWG CONFIGURATION. TO GET ACCESS TO THE HARNESSES, THE SHROUD, P 555438 1 4 /N V070-856179-002 WAS REMOVED & REINSTALLED. THE ABOVE STEPS RETURNED T 555438 1 5 HE SHROUD TO THE DWG CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 555449 1 1 THE DISCREPANT WIRE WAS VISUALLY INSPECTED AND IDENTIFIED. A NEW STOW CA 555449 1 2 P WAS INSTALLED PER SPEC TO RETURN THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMT. THE OTH 555449 1 3 ER ID SLEEVE WAS LEFT OVER FROM A PREVIOUS MOD. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECT 555449 1 4 ED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 555471 1 1 ITEM 1: PER PRINT MD114-5015-0303, TWO-LUG, NUT PLATE CANNOT BE INSTALLE 555471 1 2 D DUE TO SLIGHT DIP IN RING COVER FROM HEAT TREATING. MD114-5016-0303, O 555471 1 3 NE-LUG, NUT PLATE WILL BE INSTALLED BY MR ACTION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. P 555471 1 4 ROBABLE CAUSE: PROCESS TOLERANCE. ITEM 2: 1 HI-LOK AT LOCATION 38 FROM T 555471 1 5 OP ON RH DOME HEATSHIELD 2 WAS FOUND TO BE MISALIGNED DURING DRILLING OF 555471 1 6 HOLES FORM NEW RING OVER. HOLE WAS DRILLED UP TO PROVIDE FOR PROPER INS 555471 1 7 TALLATION BY MR ACTION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNAVOIDABLE 555471 1 8 DAMAGE. 555472 1 1 V070-351926-008 SPLICE PLATE FOR UPPER RH DOME HEATSHIELD 2 WAS FOUND TO 555472 1 2 HAVE CHAMFER IN SPLICE PLATE CUT ON WRONG SIDE. CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPT 555472 1 3 ED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 555483 1 1 ITEM 1: CRACKED AREA OF BLANEKT ADAPTER WAS STOP DRILLED AND MR ACCEPTED 555483 1 2 . ITEM 2: ELONGATED HOLE IN BLANKET ADAPTER WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRI 555483 1 3 CTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 555491 1 1 THE 2 DISCREPANT WIRES WERE SHORT TO BE ROUTED PER THE ROUTING EOS. PR E 555491 1 2 PD-3-J2-1471 WAS ISSUED FOR A RE-ROUTE OF HARNESS MOD. THIS PR HAD AN EO 555491 1 3 TF DISPO THAT CHANGED THE WIRE HARNESS TO LONGER LENGTHS TO ACCOMMODATE 555491 1 4 THE NEW ROUTE. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFE 555491 1 5 CTED. 555494 1 1 THE SYSTEM FOR TRACKING CONN MATES AND DEMATES (SCAN) REQUIRES MAINTAINI 555494 1 2 NG CONFIGURATION AND RETEST STATUS. THE UNAUTHORIZED DEMATE OF CONNECTOR 555494 1 3 S 50V77W49P262/55V77W1J62 INVALIDATES THE SCAN CONFIGURATION. THIS PR UP 555494 1 4 DATED THE SCAN SYSTEM TO THE PROPER CONFIGURATION FOR CONNECTORS 50V77W4 555494 1 5 9P262/55V77W1J62. FUNCTIONAL RETEST REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PERFORMED PER T 555494 1 6 HE SCAN TRACKING SYSTEM. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 555496 1 1 THE DAMAGED TERMINAL BLOCK, 50TB27 HAS BEEN REMOVED & REPLACED. TO GET A 555496 1 2 CCESS TO THE TERMINAL BLOCK, WIRES/LUGS (REF ITEMS 5-12) WAS REMOVED & R 555496 1 3 EINSTALLED. THE ABOVE STEPS RETURNED THE TERMINAL BLOCK & THE WIRES/LUGS 555496 1 4 TO DWG CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 555499 1 1 FITTING V070-338390-001 DID NOT INSTALL FLUSH WITH THE V070-338360-003 B 555499 1 2 EAM. EO B03 WAS ISSUED ON DWG V070-338390 TO CLARIFY MACHINING FOR CHAMF 555499 1 3 ER AND RUNOUT RADIUS ONTHE FITTING. PART WAS MACHINED TO THIS EO AND COR 555499 1 4 ROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301, CODE 01-CF-21-XN. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 555499 1 5 IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: DWG CLARIFICATION. 555500 1 1 FITTING V070-338390-002 DID NOT INSTALL FLUSH WITH THE V070-338360-003 B 555500 1 2 EAM. EO B03 WAS ISSUED ON DWG V070-338390 TO CLARIFY MACHINING FOR CHAMF 555500 1 3 ER AND RUNOUT RADIUS ON THE FITTING. PART WAS MACHINED TO THIS EO AND CO 555500 1 4 RROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301, CODE 01-CF-21-XN. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 555500 1 5 IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: DWG CLARIFICATION. 555501 1 1 FITTING V070-338390-003 DID NOT INSTALL FLUSH WITH THE V070-338360-003 B 555501 1 2 EAM. TWO EO'S WERE ISSUED AGAINST DWG V070-338390 TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM 555501 1 3 . EO B03 CLARIFIED THE MACHINING FOR CHAMFER AND RUNOUT RADIUS ONTHE FIT 555501 1 4 TING. EO B04 TRIMMED PART TO AVOID INTERFERENCE WITH A HI-LOK ON THE V07 555501 1 5 0-338360-003 BEAM. PART WAS MACHINED PER THESE EO'S AND CORROSION PROTEC 555501 1 6 TED PER MAO608-301, CODE 01-CF-21-XN. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED 555501 1 7 . PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 555507 1 1 FITTING V070-338390-004 DID NOT INSTALL FLUSH WITH THE V070-338360-003 B 555507 1 2 EAM. EO B03 WAS ISSUED ON DWG V070-338390 TO CLARIFY MACHINING FOR CHAMF 555507 1 3 ER AND RUNOUT RADIUS ON THE FITTING. PART WAS MACHINED TO THIS EO AND CO 555507 1 4 RROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301, CODE 01-CF-21-XN. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 555507 1 5 IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: DWG CLARIFICATION. 555508 1 1 FITTING V070-338390-005 DID NOT INSTALL FLUSH WITH THE V070-338360-003 B 555508 1 2 EAM. EO B03 WAS ISSUED ON DWG V070-338390 TO CLARIFY MACHINING FOR CHAMF 555508 1 3 ER AND RUNOUT RADIUS ON THE FITTING. PART WAS MACHINED TO THIS EO AND CO 555508 1 4 RROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301, CODE 01-CF-21-XN. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 555508 1 5 IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: DWG CLARIFICATION. 555664 1 1 DOWNEY ENGINEERING RELEASED AN EO V070-779301 EO C08, RELEASED DATE 02-0 555664 1 2 1-96, CORRECTING THE DISCREPANCIES. THE ABOVE STEP HAS RETURNED THE HARN 555664 1 3 ESS TO DWG CONFIGURATION. MOD SHEET HAS BEEN INITIATED TO INCORPORATE TH 555664 1 4 E HARNESS EO. CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 555782 1 1 V070-346235-001 WAS PREVENTED FROM BEING INSTALLED BY INTERFERENCE WITH 555782 1 2 THE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED SUPT FLANGE LOCATED ON THE AFT SIDE OF 70W2123- 555782 1 3 01 BEAM ASSY. TWO HI-LOKS REQ'D BY THE BRACKET INTERFERED WITH THE BEAM 555782 1 4 ASSY RADIUS. DRILLED PILOT HOLES WERE DRILLED INTO THE EDGES OF THE SUPT 555782 1 5 FLANGE. FASTENERS REQ'D FOR THE FASTENING OF THE BRACKET TO THE BEAM AS 555782 1 6 SY ALSO INTERFERED WITH THE SUPT FLANGE. PRIMARY BOARD ACTION WAS REQ'D 555782 1 7 TO RWK THE AREA FOR RESTRICTED USE ON OV-103. THE SUPT FLANGE WAS TRIMME 555782 1 8 D TO ALLOW THE INSTALLATION OF HI-LOKS, BEAM ASSY RADIUS WAS SPOTFACED T 555782 1 9 O PROPERLY SEAT HI-LOK. PILOT HOLES WERE PLUGGED AND THE BRACKET WAS 555782 1 10 TRIMMED TO CLEAR HI-LOK INSTALLATION. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE RWK AN 555782 1 11 EO DISPO WAS WRITTEN TO CORRECT THE DESIGN CONDITION WHICH EXISTED ON 555782 1 12 V070-346048 AND V070-346235. THE ABOVE RWK WAS ACCEPTED BY THE PRIMARY 555782 1 13 REVIEW BOARD. EO'S WERE RELEASED AND VERIFIED BY PALMDALE ENGINEERING 555782 1 14 TO MEET THE INTENT OF THE NOTED RWK. V070-346048 EO J03 RELEASED 555782 1 15 2-29-96, V070-346235 EO A02 RELEASED 2-29-96 AND V070-346048 EO J06 555782 1 16 RELEASED 3-12-96. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN ERROR. 555788 1 1 V070-346235-002 WAS PREVENTED FROM BEING INSTALLED BY INTERFERENCE WITH 555788 1 2 PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED HI-LOK AND RIVET INSTALLED ON THE 70W2123-01 BEAM A 555788 1 3 SSY. PRIMARY BOARD ACTION WAS REQ'D TO RWK THE AREA FOR RESTRICTED USE O 555788 1 4 N OV-103. TWO PILOT HOLES WERE PLUGGED AND THE BRACKET WAS TRIMMED TO CL 555788 1 5 EAR HI-LOK INSTALLATION. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE REWORK, AN EO DISPO WA 555788 1 6 S WRITTEN TO CORRECT THE DESIGN CONDITION WHICH EXISTED ON V070-346048 A 555788 1 7 ND V070-346235. THE ABOVE REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY THE PRIMARY REVIEW BOAR 555788 1 8 D. EO'S WERE RELEASED AND VERIFIED BY PALMDALE ENGINEERING TO MEET THE I 555788 1 9 NTENT OF THE NOTED REWORK. V070-346048 EO J03 RELEASED 2-29-96, 555788 1 10 V070-346235 EO A02 RELEASED 2-29-96 AND V070-346048 EO J06 RELEASED 555788 1 11 3-12-96. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN ERROR. 555805 1 1 THE LOSS OF DRY FILM LUBRICATION ON THE PLBD PINS IS A RESULT OF NORMAL 555805 1 2 WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO OPERATIONAL EXPOSURE. THE PINS WERE SENT TO VENDOR 555805 1 3 FOR STRIPPING AND REAPPLICATION OF LUBE PER DWG RQMTS. 555847 1 1 REMOVED AND REPLACED THERMAL SEAL WITH LIKE ITEM AND BONDED IN PLACE. PR 555847 1 2 OBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 555848 1 1 THE DAMAGED THERMAL SEAL WAS REMOVED. NEW THERMAL SEAL WAS OBTAINED AND 555848 1 2 TACK BONDED IN PLACE PER MAO106-322 GR B USING MBO130-119 TYPE II ADHESI 555848 1 3 VE AND MAO120-050 PRIMER. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED, INTEGRITY OF THE THERM 555848 1 4 AL BARRIER ASSY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 555849 1 1 REMOVED AND REPLACED THERMAL SEAL WITH LIKE ITEM AND BONDED IN PLACE. PR 555849 1 2 OBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 555850 1 1 REMOVEED AND REPLACED THERMAL SEAL WITH LIKE ITEM AND BONDED IN PLACE. P 555850 1 2 ROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 555851 1 1 REMOVED AND REPLACED THERMAL SEAL WITH LIKE ITEM AND BONDED IN PLACE. PR 555851 1 2 OBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 555852 1 1 THE DAMAGED AND DEBONDED THERMAL SEAL WAS REMOVED. NEW THERMAL SEAL WAS 555852 1 2 OBTAINED AND TACK BONDED IN PLACE PER MAO106-322 GR B USING MBO130-119 T 555852 1 3 YPE II ADHESIVE AND MAO120-050 PRIMER. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. INTEGRITY 555852 1 4 OF THE THERMAL BARRIER ASSY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEA 555852 1 5 R. 555859 1 1 NONCONFORMANCE NOTED ON PAGE 1 WAS ULTRASONIC INSPECTED TO DETERMINE EXT 555859 1 2 ENT OF DAMAGE. AREA WAS DEFINED AND NOTED IN ITEM 2 ON PAGE 2. DAMAGE WA 555859 1 3 S REPAIRED BY INJECTION OF MBO120-008 ADHESIVE BETWEEN DELAMINATED PLIES 555859 1 4 . SURFACE VOIDS IDENTIFIED WERE FILLED FLUSH TO SURROUNDING AREA WITH MB 555859 1 5 O120-008 ADHESIVE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 555860 1 1 NONCONFORMANCE NOTED ON PAGE 1 WAS ULTRASONIC INSPECTED TO DETERMINE EXT 555860 1 2 ENT OF DAMAGE. AREA WAS DEFINED AND NOTED IN ITEM 2 ON PAGE 2. DAMAGE WA 555860 1 3 S REPAIRED BY INJECTION OF MBO120-008 ADHESIVE BETWEEN DELAMINATED PLIES 555860 1 4 . SURFACE VOIDS ID'D WERE FILLED FLUSH TO SURROUNDING AREA WITH MBO120-0 555860 1 5 08 ADHESIVE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 555861 1 1 THE -003 SHELL WAS DAMAGED WHILE BEING REMOVED FROM THE V070-338210 FLIG 555861 1 2 HT DECK FLOOR, MR ACTION REPAIRED AND CLEANED DELAMINATED AREA. MR ID AP 555861 1 3 PLIED WITH "MR-STR-3-J2-662" PER MAO04-031 CODE WH-00-NG-13. MOD SHEET A 555861 1 4 DDED TO REINSTALL SHELL PER DWG V070-650400. THE PART IS ACCEPTABLE FOR 555861 1 5 UNRESTRICTED USE. THE AREA WILL BE COATED WITH A LAYER OF BONDING EPOXY 555861 1 6 UPON REINSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 555987 1 1 AFTER A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CONNECTOR, THE DEFECT IS LOCATED WITHIN THE 555987 1 2 WIRE SEALING CAVITY. 555993 1 1 THE GROMMETS AS CALLED OUT ON DWG ARE .140 LONG. THE KEVLAR LINER IS .07 555993 1 2 2 THICK. THEREFORE, THE GROMMETS ARE LONG ENOUGH. ENGRG REQ'D TO INSTALL 555993 1 3 TWO GROMMETS IN TWO OF THE SIX HOLES BECAUSE ALL SIX HOLES WERE ELONGAT 555993 1 4 ED. ENGRG DISPO REPAIRED ALL HOLES BY INSTALLING SIX GROMMETS. ONE HOLE 555993 1 5 WAS PLUGGED WITH ADHESIVE AND DRILLED OUT FOR THE GROMMET INSTALLATION. 555993 1 6 THE BALANCE OF HOLES WERE DRILLED TO .286 DIA TO CLEAN OUT THE ELONGATIO 555993 1 7 N AND SIX GROMMETS WERE INSTALLED IN THE HOLES TO PREVENT DETERIORATION 555993 1 8 OF THE HOLES. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED 555993 1 9 MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 556129 1 1 PRSD TANK SET 5 INSTALLATION REQUIRES NEW V544-454140-071 & -072 TUBES. 556129 1 2 RELEASED ENGINEERING ALLOWS FOR THESE TUBES TO BE "MADE FROM" V544-45414 556129 1 3 0-028 & -029 TUBES TO FACILITATE MFG OPERATIONS. THIS IS NOT A HARD RQMT 556129 1 4 ('MADE FROM') BUT IS AT THE DISCRETION OF MFG BECAUSE OF THE CONFIGURAT 556129 1 5 ION OF THE EXISTING -028 & -029 TUBES, THE NEW TANK SET 5 FILL LINE (RUN 556129 1 6 S PARALLEL TO THESE TUBES) COULD NOT BE INSTALLED. CONSEQUENTLY, THE -07 556129 1 7 1 & -072 COULD NOT BE 'MADE FROM' THESE TUBES. REQUIRED PLANNING DOCUMEN 556129 1 8 TATION WAS RELEASED (PER THIS PR) TO ALLOW FOR THE FABRICATION AND INSTA 556129 1 9 LLATION OF NEW V544-454140-071 & -072 TUBES WHICH WOULD ACCOMMODATE THE 556129 1 10 NEW TK5 FILL LINE. PROBABLE CAUSE: CONFIGURATION OF EXISTING LINES WOULD 556129 1 11 NOT ALLOW FOR INSTALLATION OF NEW TK5 FILL LINE. 556133 1 1 REF ITEM 001. THE REPAIR OF DAMAGED WIRE 3C114A24 PER ENGINEERING STANDA 556133 1 2 RD REPAIR DISPOSITION E.EL 101.1, HAS RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATI 556133 1 3 ON THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. RETEST NOT REQ'D PER MLO303-0014 PAR 556133 1 4 A 5.9.1.2.3. REF ITEM 002: THE MR REPAIR OF INSULATION DAMAGE AT THE CON 556133 1 5 N TIE TANG ON WIRE 2Y476A16 SEGMENT 1 MAINTAINS DESIGN INTENT & IS ACCEP 556133 1 6 TABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. THE CONTINUITY TEST WAS COMPLETED SATISFAC 556133 1 7 TORILY. AN MR ID PLATE MARKED "MR OEL-3-J2-0858" WAS PLACED ADJACENT TO 556133 1 8 THE NOTED DISCREPANCY FOR ID. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BAS 556133 1 9 IS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION 556133 1 10 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. CERT IS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 556133 1 11 001, WORKMANSHIP; ITEM 002, WEAR & TEAR. 556137 1 1 INSULATION WAS CRACKED (REF ITEM 001) AND TWO BROKEN STRANDS WERE FOUND 556137 1 2 (REF ITEM 002) ON WIRE P372C22. AN ME416-0031-2001 SPLICE KIT AND ID SLE 556137 1 3 EVE KSC0709, ALONG WITH A NEW WIRE ID SLEEVE, MARKED P372C22, WERE INSTA 556137 1 4 LLED PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR DISPO E.EL101.18. SCAN TRACKING SYS 556137 1 5 TEM WILL FULFILL RQMTS FOR CONN 50P744. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 556144 1 1 TWO EACH V070-340471-002 BRACKETS COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO PREVIOUS 556144 1 2 LY INSTALLED BRACKETS. THE V070-340471-002 BRACKET AND INSTALLATION HARD 556144 1 3 WARE WERE DELETED FROM INSTALLATION DWG V070-346048 PER RELEASE OF EO J0 556144 1 4 3. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING 556144 1 5 OVERSIGHT. 556358 1 1 THE THREE MILKSTOOLS WERE RELOCATED INBD ONE STRINGER TO SUPT TANK SET 5 556358 1 2 MODS. THE ENGINEERING HAS BEEN RELEASED TO CONFORM TO THIS INSTALLATION 556358 1 3 . NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 556368 1 1 THE NUT MD114-1001-0005 FOR -010 AND -011 INSTALLATION HAS BEEN REVISED 556368 1 2 BY EO V070-332887 F01 PAGE 3 OF 4. RECORDED RELEASE DATE IS FEB 6, 1996 556368 1 3 AND RI ENG VERIFIED THIS EO HAS BEEN RELEASED. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE NU 556368 1 4 T DOES NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE CREW MODULE. PROBABLE 556368 1 5 CAUSE: ENG OVERSIGHT. 556400 1 1 INCREASING GRIP LENGTH OF JO-BOLTS MAINTAINS PROPER INSTL OF SUPTS. DESI 556400 1 2 GN RQMT NOT DEGRADED, MAX GRIP OF B/P FAST OF .093 WAS NOT ADEQUATE FOR 556400 1 3 .108 TOTAL THK. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AN 556400 1 4 D DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONAL OR HA 556400 1 5 ZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOL BUILD-UP. 556477 1 1 THE REPAIR OF DAMAGED WIRE 3K571A26, PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR DIS 556477 1 2 PO E.EL101.18, HAS RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFIL 556477 1 3 L DESIGN INTENT. CONTINUITY TEST PERFORMED (REF STEP 19). THIS INSTALLAT 556477 1 4 ION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. REF ITEM 002: THE REPAIR OF DA 556477 1 5 MAGED WIRE 3L153A22 SEG 1 PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR DISPO E.EL101. 556477 1 6 1 HAS RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTE 556477 1 7 NT. CONTINUITY TEST PERFORMED (REF STEP 33). THIS INSTALLATION IS ACCEPT 556477 1 8 ABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 001, WORKMANSHIP; ITEM 556477 1 9 2, WEAR & TEAR. CERTIFICATION HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. 556482 1 1 THIS BRACKET WAS DAMAGED ON REMOVAL. IT WAS REPAIRED WITH A MR ACTION. G 556482 1 2 LASS FABRIC SATURATED WITH ADHESIVE WAS USED TO RESTORE THE RIGIDITY AND 556482 1 3 FUNCTIONALITY OF THE BRACKET IN THE DAMAGED AREA. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 556494 1 1 THE REWORK OF THE BROKEN WIRE N263B24 SEG 1 HAS BEEN COMPLETED. THE ABOV 556494 1 2 E STEPS HAVE RETURNED THE WIRE HARNESS INTO THE INSTALLATION DWG CONFIGU 556494 1 3 RATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 556645 1 1 THE DAMAGED WIRE 1C1302B24 REPAIRED PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR HAS 556645 1 2 RETURNED THE HARNESS TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. 556645 1 3 INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. THE HARNESS WILL BE 556645 1 4 RETURNED TO INSTALLATION DWG RQMTS PER TPS EPD-3-J2-392. CERT HAS NOT BE 556645 1 5 EN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 556647 1 1 THE PREVIOUS PR MR STR-3-J2-0863 WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE FLIGHT CREW DUE 556647 1 2 TO IN FLIGHT MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS. THE 2 EA COUNTER SUNK HOLES IN THE L 556647 1 3 IOH CONTAINER WERE COUNTERBORED AND SHORTER FASTENERS WERE OBTAINED FOR 556647 1 4 THE 2 LOCATIONS. THE REWORK WAS ACCEPTED MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. MR I 556647 1 5 D WAS APPLIED TO THE LIOH CONTAINER. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBAB 556647 1 6 LE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 556704 1 1 SUPT BRACKET COULD NOT BE HOT BONDED PER MAO106-301 AS DIRECTED BY ORIGI 556704 1 2 NAL ENGINEERING. EO H12 WAS RELEASED TO V070-334035 INSTALLATION DWG TO 556704 1 3 CHANGE THE REQUIREMENT TO COLD BOND PER MAO106-336. SUPT WAS BONDED IN P 556704 1 4 LACE PER RELEASED ENGINEERING. THE LAP SHEAR TEST REVEALED THAT THE ADHE 556704 1 5 SIVE WAS CURED TO THE MAO106-336 SPECIFICATION, (REPORT NUMBER 096-175) 556704 1 6 THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE BONDED ASSY IS MAINTAINED. FIT AND FUNCT 556704 1 7 ION IS NOT AFFECTED. THE MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CER 556704 1 8 T AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL), RETENTION RATIONALE 556704 1 9 OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 556705 1 1 THE BONDING PER MAO106-336 WAS COMPLETED WITH ADHESIVE BONDING GRADE "A" 556705 1 2 WHICH REQ'D A LAP SHEAR COUPON AND SHORE "D" HARDNESS. THE LAP SHEAR CO 556705 1 3 UPON TEST OF ALL THE BONDING AREAS WERE PER THE SHEAR ALLOWABLE (REF REP 556705 1 4 ORT NUMBER P96-096, P96-141, P95-152 AND P96-171) GIVEN ON BONDING SPECI 556705 1 5 FICATION MAO106-336. (COORDINATED WITH MR. CHARLES ROUSEAU M&P DOWNEY EX 556705 1 6 T 2705) EO TO FOLLOW V070-334049-E03 WAS RELEASED ON FEB 7, 1996 TO REVI 556705 1 7 SE THE BONDING NOTE TO BOND LISTED SUPPORT BRACKETS PER MAO106-336 GRADE 556705 1 8 "A", USING MBO120-179 TYPE II ADHESIVE. SUPT BRACKETS V070-336238-001 556705 1 9 (6) PLACES, V070-336238-002 (4) PLACES, V070-336238-004 (7) PLACES, 556705 1 10 V070-336238-005 (1) PLACE, V070-334049-022 (1) PLACE, V070-334049-023 556705 1 11 AND -024 (1) PLACE EACH, WERE BONDED PER EO TO FOLLOW RQMTS. DESIGN 556705 1 12 INTENT AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 556705 1 13 INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS 556705 1 14 LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: 556705 1 15 ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 556707 1 1 MANUFACTURING REQUESTED THAT THE V070-338396-001 & V070-338400-001 BRACK 556707 1 2 ETS BE INSTALLED USING A COLD BOND PROCESS. AN EO WAS RELEASED TO INSTAL 556707 1 3 L THE BRACKETS USING THE COLD BOND PROCESS, ADDITIONALLY AT AMBIENT TEMP 556707 1 4 ERATURES COLD BONDS HAVE A HIGHER SHEAR ALLOWABLE. THE BRACKETS HAVE BEE 556707 1 5 N INSTALLED AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OV 556707 1 6 ERSIGHT. 556742 1 1 THE .190 DIA HOLE DRILLED IN THE V070-338380-001 BEAM WAS PLUGGED USING 556742 1 2 A DOUBLE FLUSHED MD121-0002-06XX RIVET. THE PLUGGING OF THE HOLE WAS MR 556742 1 3 ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. THE BEAM WAS MR ID'D. THE BEAM HAS BEEN 556742 1 4 RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PR 556742 1 5 OBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 556744 1 1 THE INTERFERENCE WAS ELIMINATED BY MACHINING OUT THE CHAMFER AREA AT TWO 556744 1 2 LOCATIONS ON THE V070-338375-002 DETAIL FLOOR PANEL TO ALLOW THE V070-3 556744 1 3 38365-001 FITTINGS TO BE LOCATED CORRECTLY. AN EO TO THE V070-338375 DWG 556744 1 4 WAS RELEASED TO INCREASE THE AREA OF CHAMFER IN 2 LOCATIONS. THE REWORK 556744 1 5 ON THIS PR AND STR-3-J2-5496 HAS ROLLED THE V070-338375-002 DETAIL FLOO 556744 1 6 R PANEL TO A V070-338375-004 DETAIL FLOOR PANEL. THE PANEL WILL BE RE-ID 556744 1 7 ENTIFIED ON STR-3-J2-5496. THE FITTINGS ARE NOW LOCATED CORRECTLY AND NO 556744 1 8 FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 556745 1 1 THE PANEL (V070-338375-002) WAS TRIMMED BY CHAMFERING THE RIBS SHOWN PER 556745 1 2 ATTACHMENT "A" WITH AN EO TO FOLLOW. THE EO WAS RELEASED ON 2-5-96 AND 556745 1 3 RI ENG R. LANGLEY VERIFIED THAT IT WAS RELEASED. THE TIMMED SURFACES HAV 556745 1 4 E BEEN CORROSION PROTECTED AND REIDENTIFIED AS A -004 DETAIL. THE OCN IS 556745 1 5 RECORDED AS AA0487747. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENG OVERSIGHT. 556781 1 1 THE RWK TO CORRECT THE NOTED PR CONDITION IN ITEM 001 HAS BEEN SATISFACT 556781 1 2 ORILY PERFORMED PER DR "DV-2-904932". ENGINEERING HAD DETERMINED THAT TH 556781 1 3 IS CONDITION IS APPLICABLE TO MLO303-0014, PARA 6.3.2.8.3, "UNSIGHTLY WI 556781 1 4 RE INSTALLATION" AND DOES NOT AFFECT "SAFETY OF FLIGHT" (REF MLO303-0014 556781 1 5 , PARA 6.7.2). HOWEVER, THE WIRE SHOULD AND HAS BEEN INCLUDED INSIDE THE 556781 1 6 CLAMP WITH NO ADDITIONAL EFFORT/WORK TO "COMB OUT" OR MAKE THE INSTALLA 556781 1 7 TION HAVE A "NEW" PER DWG APPEARANCE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 556926 1 1 THERE IS NO SPEC FOR AXIAL FREEPLAY IN THIS BEARING. THE ALLOWABLE MOVEM 556926 1 2 ENT FOR THIS BEARING IS .002 INCHES IN THE RADIAL DIRECTION PER VENDOR S 556926 1 3 PEC. PER COORDINATION WITH THE VENDOR, THREE TIMES THAT RADIAL FREEPLAY 556926 1 4 OR .006 INCHES IS ACCEPTABLE IN THE AXIAL DIRECTION FOR A NEW BEARING OF 556926 1 5 THIS SIZE AND DESIGN. SINCE THE LOADS ON THIS BEARING ARE ISOLATED TO T 556926 1 6 HE RADIAL DIRECTION IN THE RADIATOR PANEL INSTALLATION, THE AXIAL FREEPL 556926 1 7 AY IN EACH BEARING MEASURED ON PAGE 1 THAT EXCEED .006 INCHES DOES NOT A 556926 1 8 FFECT THE DESIGN INTENT OF THE BEARING AND THE BEARING WILL FUNCTION PRO 556926 1 9 PERLY. THE BEARING IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. RI DOWNEY COORDIN 556926 1 10 ATION: GAIL SALTZ (X0361) OF DOWNEY STANDARDS GROUP. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEA 556926 1 11 R AND TEAR. 556932 1 1 PLBD FRAME AT XO1122, WAS TRIMMED AND THEN REFINISHED TO ALLOW FOR THE R 556932 1 2 EMOVAL OF THE #5 SHEAR PIN. CAUSE: BUILD-UP OF TOLERANCES. 556999 1 1 CONN 30V77W2P652 & 30V77W2P658 WAS OPENED, CLOSED AND TORQUED. THE ABOVE 556999 1 2 STEPS HAVE RETURNED THE CONN INSTALLATION TO DWG CONFIGURATION. THE SCA 556999 1 3 N TRACKING SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE RETEST FOR CONNECTORS 30V77W2P652 & 30V77 556999 1 4 W2P658 DEMATED/MATED THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 557013 1 1 ONE EACH 70C6400-1 BRACKET COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO PREVIOSLY INSTA 557013 1 2 LLED 70C2964-1 BRACKET. THE 70C6400-1 BRACKET AND INSTALLATION HARDWARE 557013 1 3 WERE DELETED FROM INSTALLATION DWG V070-346048 PER RELEASE OF EO J03. NO 557013 1 4 FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIG 557013 1 5 HT. 557015 1 1 MR DISPOSITION FOR ITEM 001 PLUGGED THE OPEN HOLE WITH MD121-0002-06 RIV 557015 1 2 ET FLUSH BOTH SIDES AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301. DESIGN INTEN 557015 1 3 T RESTORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS 557015 1 4 POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. DISPO FOR ITEM 002 EOTF ADDED AC 557015 1 5 CESS HOLES FOR HI-LOK INSTALLATION. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. 557015 1 6 MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT 557016 1 1 THE MISDRILLED HOLE HAS BEEN C'SUNK AND PLUGGED WITH MD121-0002-06XX RIV 557016 1 2 ET FLUSH BOTH SIDES AND RIVETS INSTALLED PER MAO101-302. THE PLUG IS COR 557016 1 3 ROSION PROTECTED AND ID'D WITH THIS MR NUMBER. THIS REWORK IS ACCEPTABLE 557016 1 4 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE 557016 1 5 CAUSE: MISINTERPRETATION OF THE DWG. 557305 1 1 PAGE 1: V070-346520-001 BRKT COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO 1.25 INCH INT 557305 1 2 ERFERENCE WITH 70C6648-1 BRKT. THIS PR WAS WRITTEN AGAINST BRKT V070-346 557305 1 3 520-001 AT XO664.5, -YO100, ZO386.78 WHICH COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO 557305 1 4 INTERFERENCE WITH BRKT (ITEM 1, PAGE 1). BRKT 70C6648-1 WAS TRIMMED PER 557305 1 5 ENGINEERING DIRECTION TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. TRIMMING WAS ACCOMPLIS 557305 1 6 HED BY EO TO FOLLOW. ORIGINAL DISPO ADDRESSED BRACKETS ON BOTH THE RIGHT 557305 1 7 AND LEFT SIDES. SINCE RH AND LH BRACKETS COULD NOT BE ADDRESSED ON THIS 557305 1 8 PR, STR-3-J2-5620 WAS WRITTEN TO ADDRESS THE RH BRACKETS. UNWORKED STEP 557305 1 9 S FOR THE RH SIDE WERE DELETED FROM THIS PR. PAGE 1C: AFTER INITIAL 557305 1 10 TRIMMING OF 70C6648 BRACKET, INTERFERENCE STILL EXISTED. BRACKET WAS 557305 1 11 REMOVED FROM FRAME AND ADDITIONAL MATERIAL WAS REMOVED. NUTPLATE FOR 557305 1 12 WIRING SUPT WAS RELOCATED. THIS RWK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AS PART OF THE 557305 1 13 EO-TO-FOLLOW ACTION. CAUSE FOR PAGES 1 AND 1C: DESIGN OVERSIGHT. PAGE 557305 1 14 1A: FOUR HOLES WERE DRILLED THROUGH THE 70C6648 BRKT AND FRAME UPON 557305 1 15 INSTALLATION. ONLY 3 HOLES WERE REQUIRED. A HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED IN THE 557305 1 16 EXTRA HOLE IN THE FRAME BY MR UNRESTRICTED DISPO. CAUSE FOR PAGE 1A: 557305 1 17 WORKMANSHIP. PAGE 1B: WORK STEPS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CODED "TQW" PER 557305 1 18 THE QPRD ARE CODED AS "TQV". WORK STEPS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CODED 557305 1 19 WITH "OK TO INSTALL" ARE CODED WITH "QW". ENGINEERING DISPO DIRECTED 557305 1 20 WORK STEPS TO BE RE-CODED TO THE CORRECT CODE PER THE QPRD. WORK STEPS 557305 1 21 WERE RE-STAMPED APPROPRIATELY. ALL WORK HAD BEEN PERFORMED PROPERLY. 557305 1 22 THIS SQUAWK RESULTED IN NO VALUE ADDED TO THE ACTUAL WORK PERFORMED. 557305 1 23 CAUSE FOR 1B: INCORRECT CODING OF WORK STEPS. 557306 1 1 REMOVING RIVET PER STR-3-J2-5503 WILL ELIMINATE THE INTERFERENCE WITH TH 557306 1 2 E INSTL OF V070-346520-002 BRKT. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGR OVERSIGHT. 557307 1 1 ITEM 001, V070-346510 COULD NOT BE INSTALLED PER DWG DUE TO INTERFERENCE 557307 1 2 WITH V070-340552-001. TRIM FLANGE OF V070-346510 SUPT AS SHOWN ON PAGE 557307 1 3 2. PART IS CORROSION PROTECTED. REMOVED TWO RIVETS ATTACHING V070-340551 557307 1 4 AND V070-340552 BRACKET TO FRAME SKETCH IS SHOWN ON PAGE 3. WHEN (ITEM 557307 1 5 04, PG 1B) POSITIONING V070-346510 SUPT IN PLACE PART COULD NOT BE INSTA 557307 1 6 LLED BECAUSE PART HAS PREDRILLED FULL SIZE HOLES AND DOES NOT MATCH EXIS 557307 1 7 TING HOLES. ADDITIONAL TRIMMING FROM THE FLANGE ON V070-346510 SUPT AND 557307 1 8 CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301. THE (ITEM 05, PG 1C) LENGTH OF THE 557307 1 9 TRIMMING WAS INCREASED A THRID TIME ON V070-346510 TO A 1.31 DIM. 557307 1 10 RIVETS WERE USED TO PLUG ALL OPEN HOLES PER MAO101-302. BRACKET WAS 557307 1 11 LOCATED PER DWG AND AS SHOWN ON PAGE 10 AND INSTALLED. AN EO ON 557307 1 12 V070-346510 B02 AND B03 WAS RELEASED ON 4-25-96; ALSO V070-346500 EO 557307 1 13 NUMBER A05 WAS RELEASED ON 4-24-96 ALL EOS WERE VERIFIED BEING RELEASED 557307 1 14 BY R. LANGLEY ON 4-24-96. PARTS WERE REIDENTIFIED. AN ENGINEERING NOTE 557307 1 15 REQUIRED THAT THE EDGE DISTANCE BE MEASURED AND RECORDED ON PAGE 12 557307 1 16 (ITEMS 2 & 3, PG 1A). MR ACTION WAS REQ'D TO TRIM FLANGE WITH A RADIUS. 557307 1 17 MR ID PER MAO104-301. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENG OVERSIGHT AND WORKMANSHIP. 557308 1 1 DURING FIT CHECK OF THE V070-346516-001 BRACKET IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT T 557308 1 2 HE V070-362543-001 LEVEL LINER BLANKET BRACKET WAS OBSTRUCTING INSTALLAT 557308 1 3 ION. THE V070-362543-001 FITTING ASSY WAS REMOVED BY REMOVING TWO MD121- 557308 1 4 0003-05XX RIVETS. THE TWO MD121-0003-05XX RIVETS WERE SCRAPPED LOCALLY. 557308 1 5 THE REMOVED V070-362543-001 FITTING ASSY WAS ROUTED TO HDA FOR DISPO. TH 557308 1 6 E OPEN HOLES WHERE THE RIVETS WERE REMOVED WERE FILLED USING MD121-0003- 557308 1 7 05XX RIVETS INSTALLED PER MAO101-302 AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO6078 557308 1 8 -301, CODE 08-AA-21-XX. THE V070-366965 DWG WAS REVISED TO DELETE THE V0 557308 1 9 70-362543-001 FITTING ASSY AND FOR PLUGGING OPEN HOLES. REF EO D03. PROB 557308 1 10 ABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 557309 1 1 THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM STATED THAT THE V070-346512-001 BRACKET COULD NOT B 557309 1 2 E INSTALLED DUE TO AN INTERFERENCE WITH THE V070-362536-003 BRACKET. FRO 557309 1 3 M THE NOTED PROBLEM, IT WAS DETERMINED BY ENGINEERING THAT THE PART TO B 557309 1 4 E REMOVED WAS ACTUALLY A V070-362536-001 FITTING ASSY AND THAT THE INTER 557309 1 5 FERING PART SHOULD BE A V070-346512-001. THE V070-362536-001 FITTING WAS 557309 1 6 REMOVED ALONG WITH IT'S ATTACHING HARDWARE AND THE OPEN HOLES WERE PLUG 557309 1 7 GED. THE DWG WAS REVISED TO REFLECT THE REMOVAL OF THE V070-362536-001 A 557309 1 8 ND FOR PLUGGING THE OPEN HOLES BY PR EO TO FOLLOW. THE EO WAS RELEASED A 557309 1 9 ND DEPARTMENT 278 ENGINEERING VERIFIED THAT THE RELEASED EO REFLECTED 557309 1 10 THE PR EO TO FOLLOW DISPOSITION. V070-366965 EO D03. PROBABLE CAUSE: 557309 1 11 ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 557310 1 1 THE V070-346515-001 BRACKET COULD NOT BE INSTALLED PER DWG DUE TO INTERF 557310 1 2 ERENCE WITH THE V070-321085-006 LEVEL LINER BRACKET. THE V070-321085-005 557310 1 3 FITTING ASSY WAS REMOVED FROM THE NOTED LOCATION BY REMOVING TWO MD121- 557310 1 4 0003-05XX RIVETS. THE V070-321083 DWG WAS REVISED BY PR EO TO FOLLOW TO 557310 1 5 ADD RQMTS FOR REMOVING THE V070-321085-006 AND FOR PLUGGING THE OPEN HOL 557310 1 6 ES AFTER THE V070-321085-006 FITTING ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED IT WAS DISCOVE 557310 1 7 RED THAT THE V070-346515-001 BRACKET FASTENER PATTERN DID NOT MATCH THAT 557310 1 8 ON THE STRUCTURE. THE LOCATION OF THE V070-346515-001 BRACKET WAS REVIS 557310 1 9 ED BY PR EO TO FOLLOW TO ALLOW FOR INSTALLATION. THE PR WAS AGAIN 557310 1 10 RESUBMITTED SINCE ONE OF THE PLUGGED HOLES WAS REQUIRED TO ALLOW FOR 557310 1 11 INSTALLATION OF THE V070-346515-001 BRACKET. IT ALSO STATED THAT THE 557310 1 12 INSTALLATION OF THE V070-346515-001 BRACKET WOULD INTERFERE WITH AN 557310 1 13 EXISTING WIRE HARNESS SUPT BRKT AT XO581, YO-100 AND ZO386.78. THE 557310 1 14 DISPOSITION WAS THEN REVISED TO PLUG JUST THE LOWER HOLE AND TO USE THE 557310 1 15 UPPER HOLE FOR THE INSTALLATION OF THE V070-346515-001 BRACKET. THE 557310 1 16 NOTED INTERFERENCE WAS DETERMINED TO NOT BE A PROBLEM IN THAT THE 557310 1 17 70C6400-1 ELECTRICAL BRACKET WAS NOT GOING TO BE USED BUT WAS ABANDONED 557310 1 18 IN PLACE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 557311 1 1 SQUAWK 001 STATED THAT THE V070-346511-001 BRACKET COULD NOT BE INSTALLE 557311 1 2 D DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH THE BLANKET SNAPS. THREE V070-362414-001 BLAN 557311 1 3 KET SNAPS WERE REMOVED BY PR EO TO FOLLOW TO REMOVE INTERFERENCE. SQUAWK 557311 1 4 002 STATED THAT THE DISPOSITION DID NOT ADDRESS THE ACTUAL PROBLEM. IT 557311 1 5 STATED THAT THERE WAS ONLY 1 V070-362414-001 TCS STUD THAT INTERFERED AN 557311 1 6 D 2 THREADED FASTENERS. ALSO THAT THE HOLES IN THE V070-346511-001 BRACK 557311 1 7 ET DID NOT ALIGN WITH THE EXISTING HOLES IN THE STRUCTURE. AN ENGINEERIN 557311 1 8 G NOTE EXPLAINED THAT THE 1 TCS STUD THAT INTERFERED WITH THE INSTALLATI 557311 1 9 ON WAS ONE OF THE 3 REMOVED. THE MD112-1002-0303 SCREW WAS REMOVED BY 557311 1 10 PR EO TO FOLLOW TO ALLOW INSTALLATION OF THE BRACKET. MR DISPOSITION 557311 1 11 WAS REQUIRED TO INSTALL THE V070-346511-001 BRACKET SINCE IT APPEARED 557311 1 12 THAT TOLERANCE BUILD UP HAD CAUSED A MISLOCATION BETWEEN THE BRACKET TO 557311 1 13 BE INSTALLED AND THE HOLES IN THE STRUCTURE. THE ONE HOLE IN THE 557311 1 14 V070-346511-001 BRACKET WAS PLUGGED AND A HOLE DRILLED IN IT TO MATCH 557311 1 15 THE HOLE AND NUTPLATE IN THE STRUCTURE. THIS HOLE WAS USED WITH A 557311 1 16 SCREW, THE SAME AS, EXCEPT A LONGER GRIP LENGTH, OF THE ONE PREVIOUSLY 557311 1 17 INSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 557323 1 1 THE ELONGATED HOLE WAS DRILLED OUT FOR NEXT DIA HI-LOK, .250 DIA HI-LOK 557323 1 2 WAS INSTALLED PER MAO101-301 AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301 CODE 557323 1 3 08-AA-28-XX. EDGE DISTANCE REMAINS ADEQUATE. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. ST 557323 1 4 RUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PRO 557323 1 5 BABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. 557539 1 1 INSTALLING A FLUSH HEAD TYPE HI-LOK IN LIEU OF A PROTRUDING HEAD ELIMINA 557539 1 2 TES FASTENER HEAD INTERFERENCE ON INSTL OF SUPT FTG. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOL 557539 1 3 ERANCE BUILD-UP. 557588 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: ITEM 001, 002 & 003; (2) V070-336368-001 BRACKETS AN 557588 001 2 D V070-336365-001 SUPPORT WERE REMOVED BY DRILLING OUT FOUR 1/8 DIA RIVE 557588 001 3 TS THAT ATTACH (2) BRACKETS TO THE FLOOR STIFFENERS. THE BRACKETS AND S 557588 001 4 UPPORT REMAINED AS AN ASSY, RIVETED TOGETHER WITH (8) RIVETS. V070-3362 557588 001 5 32-001 DOUBLER WAS BONDED TO THE FLOOR TO SUPPORT A HAND HOLD. MR ACTIO 557588 001 6 N SUBSTITUTED 5/32 DIA HI-LOKS IN LIEU OF THE 1/8 DIA RIVETS TO RE-INSTA 557588 001 7 LL. THE BRACKETS/SUPPORT ASSY. THE BRACKET/SUPPORT ASSY WAS POSITIONED 557588 001 8 SLIGHTLY LOWER TO PROVIDE CLEARANCE FOR THE BONDED DOUBLER, THE EXISTING 557588 001 9 1/8 DIA HOLES WERE PULLED DOWN AND DRILLED OUT TO .164 - .168 DIA TO PRO 557588 001 10 VIDE GOOD HOLES FOR HI-LOK INSTALLATION. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUC 557588 001 11 TURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED, MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBA 557588 001 12 BLE CAUSE: ENGR OVERSIGHT. 557724 1 1 THE BUCKLED WIRE TRAY V070-338545-001 IS BEING REPLACED BY THE V070-3385 557724 1 2 78-001 WIRE TRAY PER MCR 18099 ON TPS STR-3-J2-701 (REF DWG VK70-338303) 557724 1 3 . THE V070-338545-001 WIRE TRAY IS BEING REMOVED AND SHIPPED TO THE HDA 557724 1 4 ON STR-3-J2-701, WHICH IS CURRENTLY IN PLANNING. NOTE: RELEASED 3-26-96. 557724 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 557839 1 1 REWORK OF THE NOTED CONNECTORS THAT WERE REWORKED HAS RETURNED THEM TO T 557839 1 2 HE DWG CONFIGURATION. THE REMAINING CONNECTORS WERE REVIEWED BY AVIONICS 557839 1 3 ENGINEERING AND FOUND TO MEET ALL DWG/SPEC RQMTS. THE SCAN SYSTEM WILL 557839 1 4 PROVIDE REQ'D RETEST FOR THE CONNECTORS THAT WERE DEMATED FOR REWORK. PR 557839 1 5 OBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP/WEAR AND TEAR. 557995 1 1 DOUBLERS V070-336238-004 AND -005 COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO NO DIMEN 557995 1 2 SION CALLOUTS. EO E03 WAS ISSUED ON DWG V070-334049 TO REVISE CALLOUTS. 557995 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 557996 1 1 ITEM 1: THE THREE V070-334212-00X DOUBLERS WERE BONDED MAO106-336 (COLD 557996 1 2 BOND) PER THE EOTF DISPO. THE EO HAS BEEN RELEASED TO CHANGE FROM MAO106 557996 1 3 -301 (HOT BOND) TO MAO106-336 (COLD BOND). ITEM 2: THE V070-334419-005 S 557996 1 4 UPT WAS RELOCATED 1.75" FWD TO ELIMINATE THE INTERFERENCE WITH THE V070- 557996 1 5 334212-002 DOUBLER PER EOTF DISPO. THE EO HAS BEEN RELEASED TO RELOCATE 557996 1 6 THE V070-334419-005 SUPT. THE DOUBLERS WERE INSTALLED PER PRINT AND NO F 557996 1 7 URTHER WORK IS REQ'D ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 558001 1 1 THE REPAIR OF SHORT SHIELDS WILL NOT AFFECT THE DESIGN INTENT/FUNCTION O 558001 1 2 F CONN 55P15. THE NOTED SHORT SHIELDS WERE WRAPPED BY MYSTIK 7503 ELECTR 558001 1 3 ICAL TAPE AGAINST THE JAM NUT TO ALLOW THEM TO REACH THE NORMAL SPOT TIE 558001 1 4 D TERMINATION. THIS INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. P 558001 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 558015 1 1 ITEM 01: THE CLIP WAS REMOVED FROM THE LH & RH NO 15 FLIPPER DOOR NEW CL 558015 1 2 IP WAS ASSEMBLED WITH NEW PLATE WITHOUT PILOT HOLES, NEW CLIP WAS MOVED 558015 1 3 OUTBOARD APPROX .12 IN PICKING EXISTING HOLES IN THE FLIPPER DOORS TO EL 558015 1 4 IMINATE THE INTERFERENCE. EO E02 TO V070-198701 DWG RELEASE TO SUPT THIS 558015 1 5 WORK. EO A05 TO V070-198725 FOR NEW CLIP ASSY. ITEM 02: BOTTOM FLANGE W 558015 1 6 AS TRIMMED SIMILAR TO ALL OTHER FLIPPER DOORS TO ELIMINATE THE RIDING CO 558015 1 7 NDITION ADJACENT TO O/B HINGE POINT. EO M120882 RELEASED TO V070-147015 558015 1 8 DWG TO SUPT THIS WORK. V070-147015 B01 FOR ID TO -009 ASSY. DESIGN INTEN 558015 1 9 T RESTORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS 558015 1 10 POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 558017 1 1 ITEM 01: THE CLIP WAS REMOVED FROM THE LH & RH NO 15 FLIPPER DOOR NEW CL 558017 1 2 IP WAS ASSEMBLED WITH NEW PLATE WITHOUT PILOT HOLES, NEW CLIP WAS MOVED 558017 1 3 OUTBOARD APPROX .12 IN PICKING EXISTING HOLES IN THE FLIPPER DOORS TO EL 558017 1 4 IMINATE THE INTERFERENCE. REF EO A05 FOR NEW -012 CLIP ASSY. EO E02 TO V 558017 1 5 070-198701 FOR INSTL. ITEM 02: BOTTOM FLANGE WAS TRIMMED SIMILAR TO ALL 558017 1 6 OTHER FLIPPER DOORS TO ELIMINATE THE RIDING CONDITION ADJACENT TO O/B HI 558017 1 7 NGE POINT. REF EO M120882 FOR TRIM CHANGE. REF EO V070-147015 B01 FOR ID 558017 1 8 TO -010 ASSY. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINE 558017 1 9 D. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILDUP. 558102 1 1 AREA NOTED ON PAGE 1 AS HAVING WORKED PERFORMED IN VIOLATION OF SP-004 W 558102 1 2 AS INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE. NO DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND. INSPECTION RE-ESTA 558102 1 3 BLISHED CONTROL OF AREA. QA ATTACHED CAUSE AND CORRECTED ACTION STATEMEN 558102 1 4 T TO THIS PR. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 558107 1 1 AREA NOTED ON PAGE 1 AS HAVING WORKED PERFORMED IN VIOLATION OF SP-004 W 558107 1 2 AS INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE, NO DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND. INSPECTION RE-ESTA 558107 1 3 BLISHED CONTROL OF AREA. QA ATTACHED CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION STATEME 558107 1 4 NT TO THIS PR. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 558118 1 1 THE NOTED PR MR STR-3-16-4534 DID NOT APPLY TO THIS CONDITION. THE GOUGE 558118 1 2 IN THE STRUCTURE WAS SMOOTHED TO REMOVE ANY RAISED MATERIAL AND THE ARE 558118 1 3 A WAS CORROSION PROTECTED. THE 170D420113-13 RADIUS BLOCK WAS REWORKED T 558118 1 4 O ELIMINATE ANY FUTURE DAMAGE. THE CLEAN UP AND REWORK WAS ACCEPTED MR F 558118 1 5 OR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. MR ID WAS APPLIED. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. P 558118 1 6 ROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 558131 1 1 THE VR70-100048-001 WAS TRIMMED PER ATTACHMENT "A" FOR OV-103 ONLY WHICH 558131 1 2 WAS APPROVED BY THE PRIMARY MATERIAL AND REVIEW BOARD (PMRB). TRIMMING 558131 1 3 OF THE DOUBLER PERMITTED THE DOUBLER TO BE INSTALLED. THE PART HAS BEEN 558131 1 4 CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR IDENTIFIED WITH THIS MR NUMBER. THE STRUCTURA 558131 1 5 L INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: MR REPAIR DURING INITIAL BUIL 558131 1 6 D-UP. 558268 1 1 THE MR DH1153-000M-002 DOUBLER HAS BEEN REMOVED AND ROUTED TO HDA FOR DI 558268 1 2 SPO AND THE TWO PLUGS DH1153-000M-001 WERE NOT REMOVED. THERE WAS NO DAM 558268 1 3 AGE TO THE SURFACE AFTER THE DOUBLER WAS REMOVED. THE SURFACE OF THE PAN 558268 1 4 EL IS CLEAR TO BOND ON THE REINFORCEMENT DOUBLER V070-338387-002. THIS D 558268 1 5 OUBLER STRENGTHENS THE PANEL FOR THE 20 6 RQMTS AND ALSO REPLACES THE ST 558268 1 6 RENGTH OF THE DH1153-000M-002 DOUBLER WHICH WAS REMOVED. THE STRUCTURAL 558268 1 7 INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 558382 1 1 THE ROUTING OF THE WIRE HARNESS UNDER THE MILKSTOOL IS AN ACCEPTABLE CON 558382 1 2 DITION AND SUFFICIENT ACCESS TO THE WIRING IS STILL AVAILABLE. CAUSE: WO 558382 1 3 RKMANSHIP. 558507 1 1 THE DISPOSITION PROVIDED CORRECT RIVET CALLOUT. EO TO FOLLOW TO REVISE R 558507 1 2 EWORK INFORMATION ON V070-340008-C36. EO C47 RELEASED ON 2-14-96 CORRECT 558507 1 3 ED THE PROBLEM. .190 DIA HOLE WAS PLUGGED WITH MD121-0003-06 RIVET (2) . 558507 1 4 094 DIA HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH 2 MD121-0001-03 RIVETS. CORROSION PROTEC 558507 1 5 TION PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-CF-28-TC. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL 558507 1 6 INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CA 558507 1 7 USE: ENGRG OVERSIGHT. 558524 1 1 E-2 RH/LH DOME HEAT SHIELD YOKE FITTINGS WERE FOUND TO HAVE SEVERAL MINO 558524 1 2 R GOUGES. SHARP EDGES WERE SMOOTHED AND FITTINGS WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UN 558524 1 3 RESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 558583 1 1 DOWNEY ENGINEERING RELEASED AN EO V070-795461 EOJ09 TO ADD A NOTE TO THE 558583 1 2 DWG TO INSTALL CONN 50J1404 USING LOCKTITE TO REPLACE LOCKWIRE PROVISIO 558583 1 3 N DEFICIENCY. MOD SHEET HAS BEEN INITIATED TO INCORPORATE THE EOTF EO. P 558583 1 4 ROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. 558584 1 1 DURING INSTALLATION OF V070-334049-011 FLOOR MID DECK, A CAPTIVE NUTPLAT 558584 1 2 E IN SURROUNDING AREA PREVENTED INSTALLATION OF V070-336238-003 DOUBLER. 558584 1 3 PART ME128-0029-0803 NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED BY DRILLING OUT IT'S SECURING 558584 1 4 RIVETS. THE NUTPLATE WAS SCRAPED LOCALLY. THE INBD 0.090 RIVET HOLE WAS 558584 1 5 DOUBLE FLUSH PLUGGED USING MD121-0002-03XX RIVET PER MAO101-302 AND TOU 558584 1 6 CH COUNTERSUNK .005-.010 IN DEEP. THE RIVET WAS INSTALLED WET PER MAO608 558584 1 7 -301 CODE 08-AF-21-XX AND SHAVED FLUSH BOTH SIDES. PER PRINT V070-334012 558584 1 8 ZONE 119G & EO G08. REPLACEMENT ME128-0034-0803 NUTPLATE WAS INSTALLED 558584 1 9 PER V070-334012 ZONE 119G, WITH TWO MD121-0001-03 RIVETS PER MAO101-302 558584 1 10 USING EXISTING FASTENER HOLE AND OUTBD RIVET HOLE. NUTPLATE RIVETS WERE 558584 1 11 INSTALLED WET PER MAO608-301 CODE 08-AA-28-XX. THE AREA WAS CORROSION 558584 1 12 PROTECTED PER MAO608-301 CODE 08-AA-21-XW. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN OVER 558584 1 13 SIGHT. 558585 1 1 INTERFERING FASTENERS WERE REMOVED AND HOLES PLUGGED TO FACILITATE INST 558585 1 2 OF NEW DOUBLERS & RELOCATION OFHOLES PER DWG. REWORK INFORMATION PROVIDE 558585 1 3 D PLUGGING OPEN HOLES. PROBABLE CAUSE: PLANNING OVERSIGHT. 558586 1 1 THE V070-336238-002 DOUBLER COULD NOT BE INSTALLED BECAUSE THE SURROUNDI 558586 1 2 NG FASTENERS OBSTRUCTED THE PLACEMENT AT THE LOCATION DOCUMENTED ON THE 558586 1 3 INSTALLATION DWG. THE OBSTRUCTING FASTENERS WERE REMOVED ON V070-334049 558586 1 4 (ITEM 001) INSTALLATION DWG AND THE HOLES WERE PLUGGED BY EO V070-334049 558586 1 5 D08. THE DRILLED HOLES ON THE V070-336238-002 (ITEM 002) ARE LOCATED PE 558586 1 6 R V070-334049 DWG VIEW "AN" ZONE 109 AND EO E01. THE INSTALLATION MAINTA 558586 1 7 INS THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE. DOES NOT AFFECT THE DESIGN 558586 1 8 FIT AND FUNCTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: MISINTERPRETATION OF THE DWG. 558694 1 1 REWORK OF THE PLB HINGE SUPPORT 6.0 LOADS MOD REQUIRES REPLACEMENT OF TH 558694 1 2 E EXISTING 1/4 DIA BOLTS WITH 1/4 DIA 140 KSI BOLTS. IN ITEM 001 PREVIOU 558694 1 3 S VENDOR INSTALLED (2) 5/16 DIA BOLTS. IN ITEM 002 PREVIOUS VENDOR INSTA 558694 1 4 LLED (2) 5/16 DIA BOLTS. IN ITEM 003 PREVIOUS VENDOR INSTALLED (1) 3/8 D 558694 1 5 IA BOLT. MR ID NOT FOUND FOR ITEMS 001, 002 & 003. THE DISCREPANT BOLTS 558694 1 6 HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND APPROPRIATE DIA FOR THE DISCREPANT HOLES 6.0 LOAD 558694 1 7 BOLTS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED. INSTALLED BOLTS RESTORE DESIGN INTENT. STRUCT 558694 1 8 URAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABL 558694 1 9 E CAUSE: PREVIOUS VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. 558698 1 1 ULTRASONIC INSPECTION DID NOT REVEAL ANY DAMAGE TO CORE AND NO SKIN DELA 558698 1 2 MINATION. NONCONFORMANCE IS ESSENTIALLY COSMETIC IN NATURE. INSTALLATION 558698 1 3 OF TPS IS NOT AFFECTED AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE PLBD IS NOT DEGR 558698 1 4 ADED. THIS MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT 558698 1 5 THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. P 558698 1 6 ROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 558705 1 1 FASTENER WAS OMITTED TO ACCOMMODATE INSTRUMENTATION RQMT. A FITTING WITH 558705 1 2 A TUBE COVERS FAR SIDE OF HOLE WITH THE TUBE CONNECTING TO ADJACENT SEN 558705 1 3 SOR UNIT. HOLE PER DWG. CAUSE: NO NONCONFORMANCE. 558706 1 1 ENGINEERING EVALUATION FOUND THAT THE GOUGED AREA IS APPROX .12 WIDE. TH 558706 1 2 E OML SCREEN AND ONE PLY OF GRAPHITE EPOXY FABRIC WAS REMOVED. THE REPAI 558706 1 3 R, REMOVAL ALL SHARP EDGES AND FILLED FLUSH WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE PER 558706 1 4 MAO106-305 GRADE B. THE REPAIR RESTORES DESIGN INTENT. STRUCTURAL INTEG 558706 1 5 RITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. CAUSE: WORKMANSHI 558706 1 6 P. 558707 1 1 ULTRASONIC INSPECTION DID NOT REVEAL ANY DAMAGE TO CORE AND NO SKIN DELA 558707 1 2 MINATION. NONCONFORMANCE IS ESSENTIALLY COSMETIC IN NATURE. INSTALLATION 558707 1 3 OF TPS IS NOT AFFECTED AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE PLBD IS NOT DEGR 558707 1 4 ADED. THIS MR DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT 558707 1 5 THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. P 558707 1 6 ROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 558708 1 1 IN THE EXTRA 5/32 HOLE, ONE 5/32 HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED. THIS REWORK RESTO 558708 1 2 RES DESIGN INTENT. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY 558708 1 3 REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: TULSA WORKMANSHIP. 558711 1 1 DOWNEY ENGINEERING RELEASED AN EO V070-795461 EOJ09 TO ADD A NOTE TO THE 558711 1 2 DWG TO INSTALL CONN 50J1404 USING LOCKTITE TO REPLACE LOCKWIRE PROVISIO 558711 1 3 N DEFICIENCY. MOD SHEET HAS BEEN INITIATED TO INCORPORATE THE EOTF EO. P 558711 1 4 ROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. 558713 1 1 SQUAWK 001: THE WIRE NOTED ON SQUAWK 001 HAS BEEN RETERMINATED IN SUCH A 558713 1 2 MANNER THAT THE DAMAGED SECTION WAS REMOVED AND THE WIRE NOW IS INSTALL 558713 1 3 ED PER DWG. SQUAWK 002 IS NOT A HARDWARE NONCONFORMANCE IN AS MUCH AS TH 558713 1 4 ERE IS ONLY AN ENGINEERING RQMT TO IDENTIFY ONE CONNECTOR ON A HARNESS W 558713 1 5 HEN A DASH NUMBER IS ROLLED. RED MLO303-0014, PP 6.3.2.10.0. PROBABLE CA 558713 1 6 USE: 001 - WORKMANSHIP. 002 - MISINTERPRETATION OF ENGINEERING RQMTS. 558714 1 1 THE .257 DIA HOLE TO BE DRILLED IN THE 70A2171 CAP ASSY WAS RELOCATED ON 558714 1 2 THE CAP ASSY TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE EDGE DISTANCE FOR THE GROUNG LUG. TH 558714 1 3 E RELOCATION OF THE HOLE WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. THE CAP 558714 1 4 ASSY WAS MR ID'D. THE CAP ASSY HAS BEEN DRILLED IN AN ACCEPTABLE LOCATI 558714 1 5 ON. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR REWORK. 558757 1 1 THE 8 EA MD114-5003-0004 #10 NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND 8 EA MD114-5003- 558757 1 2 0002 #6 NUTPLATES THAT ARE NEEDED WERE INSTALLED & ON THE SURFACE OF THE 558757 1 3 V070-334902-001 SUPT THAT THE MC409-0020-0001 COUPLERS MUST BE BONDED T 558757 1 4 O. THE ANODIZE COATING WAS REMOVED AND THE SURFACE WAS REINSTALLED PER P 558757 1 5 RINT. HOWEVER, ENGINEERINGHAD MISTAKENLY REQ'D THE RIVETS THAT ATTACH TH 558757 1 6 E #6 NUTPLATES TO BE INSTALLED "DRY" WHEN THE RQMT IS TO INSTALL THEN "W 558757 1 7 ET" WITH PRIMER. THE COUPLERS WERE REMOVED FROM THE SUPPORT, THE SUPT WA 558757 1 8 S REMOVED FROM THE ORBITER AND THE #6 NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED FROM THE 558757 1 9 SUPT. THE #6 NUTPLATES WERE THEN REINSTALLED ON THE SUPT "WET" WITH 558757 1 10 PRIMER, THE SUPT WAS REINSTALLED INTO THE ORBITER AND THE COUPLERS 558757 1 11 WERE REINSTALLED ONTO THE SUPT. THE EO HAS BEEN RELEASED TO REPLACE 558757 1 12 THE 8 EA MD114-5003-0004 #10 NUTPLATES WITH 8 EA MD114-5003-0002 #6 558757 1 13 NUTPLATES AND CORROSION PROTECTION CALLOUT FOR THE SURFACE OF THE SUPT 558757 1 14 WAS REVISED. THE HARDWARE IS NOW INSTALLED PER DWGS. NO FURTHER WORK IS 558757 1 15 REQ'D ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 558758 1 1 DURING ORBITER MODIFICATIONS PER EPD-3-J2-392 IT WAS DISCOVERED CABLE E1 558758 1 2 485AB22, WHICH WAS MIS-CODED BY THE KIT DWG VK70-778101 EOA01 AS A 5 CO 558758 1 3 NDUCTOR SHIELDED CABLE, SHOULD BE A 4 CONDUCTOR SHIELDED CABLE CORRECTLY 558758 1 4 IDENTIFIED BY WIRE HARNESS DWG V070-778334-012 EO D29. THE DISCREPANT 4 558758 1 5 CONDUCTOR SHIELDED CABLE WAS ROUTED BUT NOT TERMINATED. STEPS 1 THRU 9 R 558758 1 6 EMOVED THE DISCREPANT 5 CONDUCTOR CABLE E1485AB22 AND INSTALL A NEW 4 CO 558758 1 7 NDUCTOR CABLE E1485AB22 PER WIRE HARNESS DWG RQMT. EO VK70-778101 EO A05 558758 1 8 WAS RELEASED TO REFLECT THE CORRECT CODING ON CABLE E1485AB22 AS A 4 CO 558758 1 9 NDUCTOR SHIELDED CABLE. THIS ALLOWS THE MODIFICATIONS PER EPD-3-J2-392 T 558758 1 10 O CONTINUE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY. 558943 1 1 REF DWG V070-346165 WAS CORRECTED BY EO C05 TO REMOVE 2 70A3255-1 FITTIN 558943 1 2 GS TO ACCOMMODATE INSTALLATION OF 2 V070-346166 TANK NO 5 SUPPORT. PROBA 558943 1 3 BLE CAUSE: ENGRG OVERSIGHT. 558944 1 1 MR ACTION TRIMMED PREVIOUS VENDOR MR DOUBLER TO PROVIDE CLEARANCE FOR IN 558944 1 2 STALLATION OF 70C3528-1 SUPT. CORNER OF THE SUPT WAS C'BORED TO CLEAR EX 558944 1 3 ISTING FASTENER. UPPER HOLE FOR ITEM 001 WAS PLUGGED WITH RIVET SHANK FL 558944 1 4 USH BOTH SIDES. DESIGN INTENT RETORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINE 558944 1 5 D. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS VENDOR WO 558944 1 6 RKMANSHIP. 558952 1 1 14 ME112-0014-060X HI-LOKS WERE REPLACED WITH MD128-0003-030X JO-BOLTS P 558952 1 2 ER THE EOTF DISPOSITION DUE TO INACCESSIBILITY TO INSTALL HI-LOCKS. THE 558952 1 3 EO HAS BEEN RELEASED TO REPLACE THE HI-LOCKS WITH JO-BOLTS. THE JO-BOLTS 558952 1 4 HAVE BEEN INSTALLED PER SPEC AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D ON THIS PR. P 558952 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 559007 1 1 INSTL OF ACRES SLEEVE PER TPS STR-3-J2-676 WILL NOT BE DEGRADED. ELONGAT 559007 1 2 ED PORTION OF THE HOLE WILL BE FILLED WITH ADHESIVE ON BONDING THE ACRES 559007 1 3 SLEEVE IN PLACE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MAINTAINED FOR STRENGTH AND LOAD 559007 1 4 PATH CAPABILITY. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 559075 1 1 THE DOUBLER WAS HAND WORKED TO FIT THE FITTINGS CONTOUR. USE OF LARGER D 559075 1 2 IA RIVET ENABLED THE REWORKED DOUBLER TO BE POSITIONED PROPERLY TO ELIMI 559075 1 3 NATE ANY DOUBLER/FITTING GAP. INSTALLED DOUBLER RESTORES DESIGN INTENT T 559075 1 4 O PRECLUDE HOT GAS FLOW BETWEEN THE THERMAL BARRIER AND THE ET DOOR. STR 559075 1 5 UCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROB 559075 1 6 ABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING. 559293 1 1 THE BUCKED RIVET WAS REMOVED AND A FLUSH HEAD HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED TO PE 559293 1 2 RMIT THE V070-336567-006 SUPT TO BE INSTALLED. IT WAS CORROSION PROTECTE 559293 1 3 D AND MR IDENTIFIED WITH THIS NUMBER. THE USE OF THE HI-LOK INCREASES TH 559293 1 4 E FASTENER ALLOWABLE AND DOES NOT DEGRADE THE VEHICLE STRUCTURAL INTEGRI 559293 1 5 TY. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 559352 1 1 THE ME128-0028-0707 CAPTIVE NUTPLATE WAS SUBSTITUTED BY MR ACTION FOR UN 559352 1 2 RESTRICTED USE. DUE TO THE LOCATION OF THE EXISTING HOLE, THE ATTACHING 559352 1 3 RIVET WOULD HAVE BROKEN THROUGH THE EDGE OR BE CLOSE TO THE EDGE. BY SUB 559352 1 4 STITUTING THE CAPTIVE NUTPLATES, THE ATTACHING RIVETS WERE INSTALLED IN 559352 1 5 THE IDEAL LOCATION. THE REPAIR WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR IDENTIFIED 559352 1 6 WITH THIS MR NUMBER. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 559354 1 1 REWORK BY RETERMINATION OF THE NOTED WIRE CONTACTS TO DWG RQMTS HAS ALLO 559354 1 2 WED THE HARNESS ASSY TO BE MODIFIED TO MEET DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: W 559354 1 3 ORKMANSHIP. 559398 1 1 TAPE WAS REMOVED FROM NONCONFORMANCES (01, 02) AND DOUBLERS WERE BONDED 559398 1 2 OVER THE DAMAGED FACE SHEET. NEW SILVER TAPE (207-9-428 TYPE 4) WAS INST 559398 1 3 ALLED TO COVER THE REWORKED AREA AND THE REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR U 559398 1 4 NRESTRICTED USE. CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 559512 1 1 THE ME112-0013-0084 HI-LOK WOULD NOT SEAT FLUSH WITH THE STRUCTURE BECAU 559512 1 2 SE OF THE RADIUS OF THE V070-336567-005 SUPT. THE HI-LOK WAS INCREASED I 559512 1 3 N GRIP LENGTH AND A WASHER WAS ADDED TO THE HEAD. RADIUS WAS ADDED TO TH 559512 1 4 E EDGE OF THE WASHER TO PERMIT THE HEAD TO SEAT FLUSH WITH THE SUPT. THE 559512 1 5 FASTENER WAS ID'D WITH THIS MR NUMBER. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILD- 559512 1 6 UP. 559513 1 1 THE ME112-0013-0006 HI-LOK COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO INADEQUATE SPAC 559513 1 2 E FOR THE COLLAR INSTALLATION. IN LIEU OF THE COLLAR, A MD114-1001-0004 559513 1 3 NUT AND HAS620C10 WASHER WERE INSTALLED AND TORQUED TO 20-30 IN POUNDS. 559513 1 4 THE FASTENER NUT AND WASHER WERE CORROSION PROTECTED AND MR ID'D WITH TH 559513 1 5 IS NUMBER. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS NOT DEGRADED NOR THE FIT AND FUNC 559513 1 6 TION AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 559547 1 1 IN THE MID DECK COOLING MODIFICATION, ONE OF THE DUCTS DID NOT LINE UP W 559547 1 2 ITH THE STRUCTURE THAT WAS MADE TO SUPPORT IT. THERE WAS A GAP SO A MR B 559547 1 3 RACKET WAS MADE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE BRACKET THAT WAS CLAMPED T 559547 1 4 O THE DUCT AND THE SECONDARY STRUCTURE. PROBABLE CAUSE: VEHICLE DIFFEREN 559547 1 5 CES AND STRUCTURAL TOLERANCES. 559572 1 1 THE WIRE E1444C24 - 1 "PINHOLE IN THE INSULATION" WAS COVERED BY SHRINK 559572 1 2 SLEEVING. AN MR ID PLATE MARKED "MR OEL-3-J2-0875" WAS PLACED ADJACENT T 559572 1 3 O THE NOTED DISCREPANCY FOR ID. THIS INSTALLATION MAINTAINS DESIGN INTEN 559572 1 4 T & IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. RETEST PERFORMED PER TPS EPD-3-J 559572 1 5 2-374. CERT IS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP/MATERIAL DEFICI 559572 1 6 ENCY. 559586 1 1 HOLE IN THE PLBD WAS DRILLED TO .164 - .168. DIA. A ME112-0013-0505 PIN, 559586 1 2 ME114-0022-0105 COLLAR AND NAS620C8 WASHER WERE INSTALLED IN THE OPEN H 559586 1 3 OLE NOTED ON PAGE 1. THE SEALANT DISCREPANCY ON PAGE 1A WAS ACCEPTED "AS 559586 1 4 IS". PLUGGING OF THE EXTRA HOLE MAINTAINS THE DESIGN INTENT AND THE STRU 559586 1 5 CTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE DOOR WAS NOT DEGRADED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSH 559586 1 6 IP. 559587 1 1 APPROX 2 OZ OF DI WATER WAS SPILLED DUE TO WORKMANSHIP ERROR DURING THE 559587 1 2 "J-2" MOD AT PALMDALE. THE SPILL WAS CONTAINED AND WIPED UP AND ENTERED 559587 1 3 INTO THE VEHICLE SPILL LOG. REMOVAL OF ALL WATER WAS VERIFIED, WITH NO M 559587 1 4 ATERIAL DEGRADATION TO ANY AREA OR PART IN THE VICINITY OF THE SPILL. 559589 1 1 THE INTERFERENCE ON THE -001 & -007 DOUBLERS WAS ELIMINATED BY SPOTFACIN 559589 1 2 G THE LOCATIONS AS REQUIRED TO SEAT THE FASTENER FLUGH. THE INTERFERENCE 559589 1 3 ON THE -002, 003, 004, 005 & 006 DOUBLERS WAS ELIMINATED BY ADDING A RA 559589 1 4 DIUS TO O/B SIDES OF THE DOUBLERS*. ALL WORK WAS PERFORMED EO TO FOLLOW 559589 1 5 AND INCORPORATED INTO V070-100008 BY THE RELEASE OF EOB32. NO FURTHER AC 559589 1 6 TION IS REQ'D. *DOUBLERS WERE REIDENTIFIED AS -008 THRU -012 RESPECTIVEL 559589 1 7 Y. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 559593 1 1 THE INTERFERENCE ON THE -001 & -007 DOUBLERS WAS ELIMINATED BY SPOTFACIN 559593 1 2 G THE LOCATIONS AS REQUIRED TO SEAT THE FASTENER FLUGH. THE INTERFERENCE 559593 1 3 ON THE -002, 003, 004, 005 & 006 DOUBLERS WAS ELIMINATED BY ADDING A RA 559593 1 4 DIUS TO O/B SIDES OF THE DOUBLERS*. ALL WORK WAS PERFORMED EO TO FOLLOW 559593 1 5 AND INCORPORATED INTO V070-100008 BY THE RELEASE OF EOB32. NO FURTHER AC 559593 1 6 TION IS REQ'D. *DOUBLERS WERE REIDENTIFIED AS -008 THRU -012 RESPECTIVEL 559593 1 7 Y. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 559694 1 1 R/H (L02) AND L/H (LH2) ET BLADE VALVE ASSEMBLIES WERE INSPECTED. NO ANO 559694 1 2 MALIES WERE FOUND. CAUSE: REQUESTED INSPECTION RESULTING FROM ANOMALIES 559694 1 3 FOUND PRIOR TO FLIGHT 9 ON OV-105. 559772 1 1 THE EXISTING FASTENER HOLE WAS PLUGGED PER REL ENGRG AND TPS STR-3-J2-66 559772 1 2 2. THE FITTING WILL BE INSTALLED PER DWG RQMTS. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED, 559772 1 3 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. P 559772 1 4 ROBABLE CAUSE: PLANNING OVERSIGHT. 559773 1 1 THE EXISTING FASTENER HOLE WAS PLUGGED PER REL ENGRG AND TPS STR-3-J2-66 559773 1 2 2. THE FITTING WILL BE INSTALLED PER DWG RQMTS. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED, 559773 1 3 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. P 559773 1 4 ROBABLE CAUSE: PLANNING OVERSIGHT. 559784 1 1 REPAIR (STRAIGHTENING) OF THE CONTACT PER ABOVE ENGINEERING STANDARD REP 559784 1 2 AIR DISPOSITION HAS RETURNED THE CONTACT TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FU 559784 1 3 LFILL DESIGN INTENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 559882 1 1 DOUBLER WAS TRIMMED UNDERSIZE FROM AVAILABLE MAT'L AND HAD TO BE SCRAPED 559882 1 2 . NEW MAT'L WAS OBTAINED TO MAKE A NEW VR70-334017-004 DOUBLER TO DWG RQ 559882 1 3 MTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 560056 1 1 ONE HI-LOK WAS REMOVED TO PERMIT THE INSTALLATION OF A WIRE CLAMP. THE R 560056 1 2 EMOVAL OF ONE FASTENER DOES NOT DEGRADE THE MR DOUBLER INSTALLATION OF P 560056 1 3 R MR STR-3-J2-5422. REWORK WAS ACCEPTED BY MR BOARD FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 560056 1 4 . CAUSE: MRB OVERSIGHT. 560057 1 1 REWORK PER THE ABOVE STEPS HAS REDONE THE JUMPER WIRE/SOLDER SLEEVE (SHT 560057 1 2 1). CONFORMAL COATING WAS APPLIED TO COVER THE REPAIRED AREA SINCE TAPI 560057 1 3 NG WAS DIFFICULT TO ACCOMPLISH. THE CONN/HARNESS ASSY. HAS BEEN RETURNED 560057 1 4 TO DWG CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 560063 1 1 DURING ORBITER MODIFICATIONS PER EPD-3-J2-370, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT TH 560063 1 2 E NOTED WIRES (REF ITEM 001) WERE 3 FEET TOO SHORT TO BE ROUTED PER THE 560063 1 3 RELEASED INSTALLATION DWGS. THE NOTED SHORT WIRES CUT TO KIT LENGTHS. HO 560063 1 4 WEVER, THEY WERE NOT INSTALLED IN THE VEHICLE. WIRES WITH ADEQUATE LENGT 560063 1 5 HS WERE OBTAINED TO REPLACE THE NOTED SHORT WIRES AND ALLOW THE MODIFICA 560063 1 6 TIONS PER EPD-3-J2-370 TO CONTINUE. DOWNEY ENGINEERING RELEASED AN EO V0 560063 1 7 70-773301 EO E01 TO REVISE THE NOTED WIRE SEGMENTS TO REFLECT THE ACTUAL 560063 1 8 (ON SITE) CUT LENGTHS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY. 560255 1 1 REWORK BY CLEANING THE EXCESSIVE ADHESIVE FROM THE REAR THREADED AREA OF 560255 1 2 THE CONNECTOR HAS RETURNED IT TO A CONFIGURATION THAT MEETS ALL DWG RQM 560255 1 3 TS. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR ERROR. 560272 1 1 THE APPLICATION OF EPOXY TO RETAIN THE CONTACT IN THE NOTED CONTACT LOCA 560272 1 2 TION HAS RETURNED THE CONN TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN I 560272 1 3 NTENT/RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 560276 1 1 AFTER REMOVING AND RETAINING GROUNDING HARDWARE, THE PREVIOUSLY BONDED M 560276 1 2 R DOUBLER WAS REMOVED FROM TEH 70C2919-2 STRUCTURE AND SENT TO HDA FOR D 560276 1 3 ISPO. DOUBLER MR STR-3-J2-5554-001 WAS FABRICATED FROM 2024-T81 ALUMINUM 560276 1 4 . EXISTING OPEN HOLE WAS PLUGGED WITH ADHESIVE. A NEW DOUBLER (MR STR-3- 560276 1 5 J2-5554) WAS THEN BONDED TO THE 70C-2919-2 STRUCTURE PER MAO106-336. A # 560276 1 6 10 HOLE WAS DRILLED THROUGH EXISTING 5/32 HOLE ON 70C-2919-2 STRUCTURE A 560276 1 7 ND BONDED DOUBLER. GROUNDING HARDWARE WAS THEN INSTALLED AND ELECTRICAL 560276 1 8 BONDING CHECKED PER MAO113-306. THE CONFORMAL COATING WAS THEN REMOVED F 560276 1 9 ROM THE GROUND POINT AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE, AND THEN REAPPLIED PER MAO 560276 1 10 106-330. PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR MR. 560327 1 1 NTOED INTERFERENCE BETWEEN B070-337058-005, SUPT ASSY, BEING INSTALLED W 560327 1 2 ITH AN EXISTING BLANKET SNAP WAS CAUSED BY OUT OF SEQUENCE WORK. AN EO R 560327 1 3 EMOVING THE BLANKET SNAP HAS BEEN RELEASED AND PLANNING WAS REVISED TO R 560327 1 4 EMOVE SNAP. CAUSE: PLANNING OVERSIGHT. 560332 1 1 TWO SPACERS DEBONDED FROM SUPT ASSY (REF ITEM 001). THE SUPT ASSY WAS CL 560332 1 2 EANED, AND SPACERS WERE REBONDED. FOLLOWING CURE CYCLE, THE SPACERS, AGA 560332 1 3 IN, DEBONDED (REF ITEM 002). THE SUPT ASSY WAS CLEANED AGAIN, AND SPACER 560332 1 4 S WERE REBONDED. FOLLOWING CURE CYCLE, THE UPPER OF THE TWO SPACERS DEBO 560332 1 5 NDED AGAIN (REF ITEM 003). THE SUPT ASSY WAS CLEANED, AND THE SPACER WAS 560332 1 6 SUCCESSFULLY BONDED. INSUFFICIENT CATALYST WAS USED TO BOND THE LOWER S 560332 1 7 PACER (REF ITEM 004). IT WAS REMOVED FROM THE SUPT, CLEANED, AND THEN RE 560332 1 8 BONDED PER DWG USING THE CORRECT MIXTURE RATIO. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 001 560332 1 9 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. ITEMS 002 - 004 - ENGINEERING SPEC ERROR. 560333 1 1 ITEM 001 - THE 2 EA V070-353737-001 SPACERS WERE REBONDED TO THE V070-35 560333 1 2 3867-001 ISOLATOR ASSY PER DWG. ITEM 002 - WAS VOIDED BECAUSE A STEP WAS 560333 1 3 ALREADY PROVIDED TO OBTAIN REPLACEMENT V070-353737-001 SPACERS. ITEM 00 560333 1 4 3 - THE 2 EA V070-353737-001 SPACERS WERE REMOVED FROM THE V070-353867-0 560333 1 5 01 ISOLATOR ASSY AND THEN REBONDED PER DWG USING THE CORRECT MIXTURE RAT 560333 1 6 IO. (REF SPEC MAO106-347 CHANGE D02 IN WORK). PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 001 - 560333 1 7 OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. ITEM 002 - WRITTEN IN ERROR. ITEM 003 - ENGINE 560333 1 8 ERING SPEC ERROR. 560344 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS DURING TORQUING OF STUD V070-338377-001, STUD F 560344 1 2 AILED PRIOR TO REACHING FINAL TORQUE OF 720 IN LBS. THE TORQUE CALLED OU 560344 1 3 T ON TPS STR-3-J2-670 WAS INCORRECT AND THE CORRECT TORQUE VALUE S/B 270 560344 1 4 - 300 IN LBS. THE FAILED STUD WAS ROUTED TO DOWNEY AND A NEW STUD WAS O 560344 1 5 BTAINED TO BE INSTALLED PER TPS STR-3-J2-670. DISPO WAS ADDED TO VERIFY 560344 1 6 CORRECT TORQUE CALLOUT IS MADE IN TPS STR-3-J2-670. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A WAS 560344 1 7 WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT THE OVERTORQUED CONDITION ON THE INSERT. INSPECTION 560344 1 8 FOUND NO DISCREPANCIES AND THE AREA WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE 560344 1 9 PROBABLE CAUSE: PLANNING OVERSIGHT. 560423 1 1 TWO HOLES WERE DRILLED IN THE STRUT TO ACCOMMODATE THE WIRE HARNESS ROUT 560423 1 2 ING PER THE EOTF DISPOSITION. THE EO HAS BEEN RELEASED TO DRILL THE HOLE 560423 1 3 S IN THE STRUT. THE WIRES MAY NOW BE ROUTED CORRECTLY AND NO FURTHER WOR 560423 1 4 K IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 560607 1 1 ITEM 1: O/T GAP BETWEEN NEW DOME RING COVERS ARE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICT 560607 1 2 ED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS PROCESS TOLERANCE. 560618 1 1 ITEM 010 - DURING TORQUE OF AN MD111-4020-0408 BOLT, THE BOLT SHEARED OF 560618 1 2 F INTO TWO PIECES. THE BOLT HAD BEEN OVERTORQUED TO 31 FT LBS. IT WAS RE 560618 1 3 MOVED, SCRAPPED AND A NEW BOLT WAS INSTALLED USING THE PROPER TORQUE OF 560618 1 4 85-105 INCH LBS PER MAO101-301, CLASS 2. THE V070-338204 DWG WAS REVISED 560618 1 5 BY A PR EOTF DISPO TO ADD TORQUE VALUES TO THESE FASTENERS (REF EO D03) 560618 1 6 . ITEM 002 - TORQUE RANGE OF 40-52 FT LBS FOR FOUR MD111-4020-0515, AND 560618 1 7 FOUR MD111-4020-0512 BOLTS WAS TOO HIGH FOR INSTALLATION. THE EIGHT BOLT 560618 1 8 S WERE REMOVED, SCRAPPED AND NEW BOLTS AND NUTS WERE INSTALLED USING THE 560618 1 9 PROPER TORQUE OF 190 TO 225 INCH LBS PER MAO101-301, CLASS 2. PROBABLE 560618 1 10 CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 560647 1 1 THE 2 EA V070-332923-002 GUSSETS WERE REMOVED TO ACCOMMODATE THE INSTALL 560647 1 2 ATION OF THE 2 EACH V070-334207-001 GUSSETS PER THE EOTF DISPO. THE EO H 560647 1 3 AS BEEN RELEASED TO DELETE THE 2 EA V070-332923-002 GUSSETS AND ATTACH H 560647 1 4 ARDWARE FROM THE V070-334035 DWG. THE 2 EACH V070-334207-001 GUSSETS MAY 560647 1 5 NOW BE INSTALLED PER THE V070-334012 DWG. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED O 560647 1 6 N THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 560699 1 1 WHILE REWORKING CONN 82P24, PER EPD-3-J2-391, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT SEG 560699 1 2 MENT 3 OF WIRE M2707E24 HAD BEEN MISPINNED AT THE CONN. THE TPS' BASIC P 560699 1 3 LANNING HAD INADVERTENTLY PINNED THE WIRE SEGMENT AT TERM 35, INSTEAD OF 560699 1 4 TERM 85 PER AWL EO (V070-778329-D21). THEREFORE, THE CONN WAS OPENED AN 560699 1 5 D THE CONTACT FOR WIRE M2707E24 - SEG 3, WAS EXTRACTED FROM TERM 35 AND 560699 1 6 REINSERTED INTO TERM 85 AT CONN 82P24. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY THE CLOSING 560699 1 7 OF THE CONNECTOR. THIS REWORK, PER THE ABOVE STEPS, HAS RETURNED CONN 80 560699 1 8 P24 TO DWG RQMTS. CONTINUITY TESTING FOR THE REPINNED WIRE WILL BE PERFO 560699 1 9 RMED PER EPD-3-J2-391, WHICH IS PLANNED CORRECTLY. PROBABLE CAUSE: PLANN 560699 1 10 ING ERROR. 560749 1 1 ON XO1307 BLKHD SQUARE SPOTFACE WAS ADDED PER DWG V070-856396 EOF02 TO P 560749 1 2 ROVIDE CONN PENETRATION FOR ISS/ORBITER DOCKING SYS DESIGN INTENT AND ST 560749 1 3 RUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PRO 560749 1 4 BABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING DID NOT HAVE SPECIAL TOOL AT TIME PR WAS WRIT 560749 1 5 TEN. SEE MOD SHEET 004. 560751 1 1 ON XO1307 BLKHD SQUARE SPOTFACE WAS ADDED PER DWG V070-856396 EOF02 TO P 560751 1 2 ROVIDE CONN PENETRATION FOR ISS/ORBITER DOCKING SYS DESIGN INTENT AND ST 560751 1 3 RUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PRO 560751 1 4 BABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING DID NOT HAVE SPECIAL TOOL AT TIME PR WAS WRIT 560751 1 5 TEN. SEE MOD SHEET 004. 560839 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WAS RESOLVED BY BONDING A RTV SPACER PER MR TO THE BRACKE 560839 1 2 T TO ALLOW PROPER ALIGNMENT OF THE LINE CLAMP AND THE LINE. PROBABLE CAU 560839 1 3 SE: TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 560842 1 1 SUPT ASSY V070-338415-001 COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO AN INTERFERENCE 560842 1 2 WITH EXISTING V070-331805-001 BRACKETS ITEM 1, PAGE 1. TWO EXISTING V070 560842 1 3 -338105-001 BRACKETS WERE REWORKED BY TRIMMING TO -002 & -003 CONFIGURAT 560842 1 4 IONS RESPECTIVELY TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE AND SHIMMED OUT UPON INSTALL 560842 1 5 ATION PER EOTF DISPO TO DWG V070-338805. THE V070-338415-001 SUPT ASSY W 560842 1 6 AS REWORKED TO A -003 ASSY BY PLUGGING PILOT HOLES AND MATCH DRILLING PE 560842 1 7 R EOTF DISPO TO DWG V070-338415. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A DOCUMENTS V070-338415-0 560842 1 8 01 SUPT ASSY REWORKED TO A -003 WAS REIDENTIFIED AS A 004. DISPO WAS ADD 560842 1 9 ED TO IDENTIFY THE ASSY AS A V070-338415-003. ITEM 3, PAGE 1A DOCUMENTS 560842 1 10 V070-338415-002 DETAIL SUPT WAS REWORKED TO A -004 WAS NOT IDENTIFIED. 560842 1 11 NO FURTHER MARKING WAS PERFORMED SINCE THE SUPT WAS ALREADY IDENTIFIED 560842 1 12 AS A -004 DURING STEP 5.0. NO FURTHER REWORK REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: 560842 1 13 ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 560855 1 1 MLO303-0014 PP 6.3.1.1 DICTATES THAT DISASSEMBLY/REASSEMBLY OF INSTALLAT 560855 1 2 IONS NOT AFFECTED BY THE MODIFICATION/REPAIR/INSPECTION SHALL NOT BE DON 560855 1 3 E SOLEY TO PRODUCE A LIKE NEW (PER DWG) APPEARANCE. THIS CONDITION WAS R 560855 1 4 EVIEWED BY THE UNDERSIGNED PER PP 4.7.2 WITH REGARDS TO SAFETY OF FLIGHT 560855 1 5 AND DETERMINED IT DOES NOT AFFECT SAME. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 560856 1 1 REPAIR BY REDISTRIBUTION OF THE SHIELD BRAID TO FUNCTIONAL LOCATIONS, TH 560856 1 2 OSE NOT NEXT TO THE MISSING FINGER, HAVE RETURNED THE CONN ASSY TO A CON 560856 1 3 FIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. THIS CONFIGURATION IS ACCEPT 560856 1 4 ABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 560908 1 1 5 EA SCREWS ON FWD NOSE CAP CHIN PANEL WERE FOUND TO SPIN IN PLACE. IN O 560908 1 2 RDER TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE SCREW HEADS, IT WAS NECESSARY TO REMOVE THREE 560908 1 3 TILES. THE SCREWS WERE TORQUED PER PRINT AND THEN VERIFIED NOT TO TURN 560908 1 4 AFTER TORQUE WAS APPLIED. THE TILES REMOVED ARE TRACEABLE AS FOLLOWS: V0 560908 1 5 70-399415-115 REMOVED PER THIS PR AND TO BE REINSTALLED PER FWD-3-J2-548 560908 1 6 4. V070-399415-114 AND V070-399415-118 REMOVED AND REINSTALLED PER PR FW 560908 1 7 D-3-J2-5479. NO FURTHER ACTION REQ'D ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMAN 560908 1 8 SHIP. 560993 1 1 THE 8 EA SINGLE WING NUTPLATES WERE REPLACED WITH THE PER PRINT MD114-50 560993 1 2 17-0003 NUTPLATES (REF V070-370006 EOA26). THE 8 EXTRA RIVET HOLES FROM 560993 1 3 THE SINGLE NUTPLATE REMOVALS WERE PLUGGED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE AND A 560993 1 4 CCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PLUGGING OF THE EXTRA RIVET HOLES MAINTA 560993 1 5 INS THE DESIGN INTENT AND THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE DOOR WAS NOT D 560993 1 6 EGRADED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES 560993 1 7 NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION REATIONALE OR HAZARD 560993 1 8 CONTROLS. MR ID WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS MR REWORK. 561055 1 1 DURING TESTING IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONN RECEPTACLES "J1" AND "J2" HAD 561055 1 2 BEEN SWAPPED IN POSITION AT THE STAR TRACKER DOOR AND DID NOT CONFORM T 561055 1 3 O ENGINEERING CONFIGURATION -004 ON V070-591402 EO D01 (REF ITEM -001). 561055 1 4 SUBSEQUENT DISPOSITION RELOCATED RECEPTACLES "J1" AND "J2" PER EOD01. HO 561055 1 5 WEVER, (REF ITEM -002) WHILE TRYING TO REPOSITION THE CONN RECEPTACLES I 561055 1 6 T WAS DISCOVERED CONN RECEPTACLE "J2" WOULD NOT REACH IT'S NEW LOCATION. 561055 1 7 ALSO, (REF RESUBMITTAL PAGE 4) CLARIFICATION OF MASTER KEYWAY ORIENTATI 561055 1 8 ON WAS REQUESTED. SUBSEQUENT DISPOSITION ON THE RESUBMITTAL AND ITEM 002 561055 1 9 , RELOCATED THE CONNECTOR RECEPTACLES "J1" AND "J2" TO THEIR ORIGINAL 561055 1 10 LOCATION (MASTER KEYWAY AT 12 O'CLOCK ORIENTATION) AND EOTF V070-591402 561055 1 11 D03 WAS RELEASED (5-3-96) TO REVISE THE -004 CONFIGURATION TO REFLECT 561055 1 12 THE "WAS" CONDITION OF VIEW C-C ON EO V070-591402 D01 (EFFECTIVE FOR 561055 1 13 OV-103, OV-104). PROBABLE CAUSE: VENDOR DEFICIENCY. 561056 1 1 BASED ON TEST ENGINEERING INFORMATION AND COORDINATION WITH DOWNEY MECHA 561056 1 2 NICAL SYSTEMS GROUP IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE J1 & J2 RECEPTACLES HAD B 561056 1 3 EEN INADVERTENTLY SWAPPED WITH EACH OTHER, DURING PREVIOUS MODS/REWORK. 561056 1 4 THE ORIGINAL "J1" REF DES MARKING HAD BEEN REMARKED AS "J2" ALSO THE ORI 561056 1 5 GINAL "J2" REF DES HAS BEEN REMARKED BUT IT IS NOT LEGIBLE. THE RECEPTAC 561056 1 6 LES WERE TAGGED WITH TEMPORARY 93-H TAG ID'S TO REFLECT CURRENT REF DES 561056 1 7 MARKING POSITIONS. THE RECEPTACLES WERE THEN DEMOUNTED AND THEN THE 93-H 561056 1 8 TAG IDENTIFIED "J1" RECEPTACLE WAS MOUNTED INTO THE "J2" REF DES MARKED 561056 1 9 POSITION AND 93-H TAG IDENTIFIED "J2" RECEPTACLE INTO THE "UNREADABLE" 561056 1 10 REF DES POSITION. THE REFERENCE DESIGNATORS WERE REMARKED PER 561056 1 11 MAO104-301. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 561059 1 1 REPAIR OF THE SHIELD JACKET PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR E.EL 101.7 H 561059 1 2 AS RESTORED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. 561059 1 3 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 561120 1 1 DURING ORBITER MODIFICATIONS PER EPD-3-J2-371, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WI 561120 1 2 RES 2M5106A20, 2M5107A20, 2M5109C22, 2M5108A22, 2M5101A20, 2M5102A20, 2M 561120 1 3 5104C22 AND 2M5103A22 (REF ITEM 001) WERE SHORT. MFG ESTIMATED A REQ'D L 561120 1 4 ENGTH OF APPROX FOUR FEET LONGER THAN THE AWL LENGTHS (72 & 94" FOR THE 561120 1 5 20 & 22 GA WIRES, RESPECTIVELY). THE PROPOSED REPLACEMENT LENGTHS WERE 1 561120 1 6 32 INCHES. HOWEVER, UPON COMPLETION OF STEP 7, WIRE LENGTHS OF 180 INCHE 561120 1 7 S WERE RECORDED AS BEING REQ'D. THE SHORT WIRES REMOVED AND THE LONGER W 561120 1 8 IRES (SAME AWL TYPE) WERE INSTALLED PER THE ABOVE STEPS. THIS PERMITTED 561120 1 9 THE MODIFICATIONS PER EPD-3-J2-371 TO CONTINUE. EO V070-773302-F18 WAS R 561120 1 10 ELEASED TO REVISE THE ACTUAL INSTALLED WIRE LENGTHS OF 180 INCHES. PROB 561120 1 11 ABLE CAUSE: MOCK-UP DEFICIENCY. 561146 1 1 ITEMS 001 & 004 - THE WEAR ON THE COMPOSITE MATERIAL OF THE DOGBONE WAS 561146 1 2 REPAIRED USING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. ITEMS 002 & 003 - THE 2 MINOR TEARS 561146 1 3 IN THE DOGBONE SEALS TYGON COVER WAS REPAIRED USING MBO130-085 SEALANT. 561146 1 4 MR UNRESTRICTED ACCEPTANCE WAS OBTAINED FOR ITEMS 001, 002 & 003. NO MR 561146 1 5 ID WAS REQUIRED. THE DOG BONE ASSY HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CO 561146 1 6 NDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEA 561146 1 7 R - ITEMS 1 THRU 3. ITEM 4 - WORKMANSHIP. 561148 1 1 ITEM 001 - THE WEAR ON THE COMPOSITE MATERIAL OF THE DOGBONE WAS REPAIRE 561148 1 2 D USING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE. ITEMS 002 & 003 - THE 2 MINOR TEARS IN THE 561148 1 3 DOGBONE SEALS TYGON COVER WAS REPAIRED USING MBO130-085 SEALANT. MR UNRE 561148 1 4 STRICTED ACCEPTANCE WAS OBTAINED FOR ITEMSS 001, 002 AND 003. NO MR ID W 561148 1 5 AS REQUIRED. THE DOGBONE ASSY HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITI 561148 1 6 ON AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL WEAR. 561152 1 1 KAPTON INSULATION WAS CRACKED, EXPOSING THE SHIELD BRAID OF WIRE 1ZK538A 561152 1 2 24. WIRE WAS INSPECTED AND FOUND TO HAVE NO SHIELD BRAID DAMAGE. THE WIR 561152 1 3 E CABLE WAS SUBJECT TO SNAGGING DUE TO IT'S LOCATION (REF QA NOTE ON PG 561152 1 4 3). FOLLOWING EVALUATION OF WIRE INSTALLATION, ENGINEERING ELECTED TO PR 561152 1 5 OVIDE PROTECTION TO THE WIRE HARNESS RUN (WHICH INCLUDES WIRE 1ZK538A24) 561152 1 6 USING SPLIT CONVOLUTED TUBING PER MLO303-0014 PARA 4.1.3.2.7 ANF FIG 54 561152 1 7 , 54A AND 54B. THIS GENERATED THE NEED TO INSTALL LARGER CLAMPS, ME127-0 561152 1 8 071-3006 (7) IN PLATE OF ME127-0071-3004 (6) WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE PER MLO 561152 1 9 303-0014, PARA 4.1.2.3.1. THIS REWORK RETURNS THE WIRE INSTALLATION TO 561152 1 10 DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 561154 1 1 RETORQUING OF THE "LOOSE" BACKSHELL FOR CONNECTORS 83V77W4P708 AND 83V77 561154 1 2 W4P708 AND 83V77WP707 PER STEPS 1 THRU 16 HAVE RESTORED THE INSTALLATION 561154 1 3 TO DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 561162 1 1 ITEMS 001, 002 & 003 OF THIS PR WERE REPAIRED DURING THE WORK ACCOMPLISH 561162 1 2 ED ON STR-3-J2-676, WHICH INSTALLED ACRES SLEEVES AT 272 BOLT LOCATIONS, 561162 1 3 INCLUDING THE 4 LISTED ON THIS PR. THE INSPECTION VERIFIED THAT NO FURT 561162 1 4 HER DISCREPANCIES EXIST AND NO ADDITIONAL WORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: 561162 1 5 OPERATIONAL WEAR. 561213 1 1 TROUBLESHOOTING WAS PERFORMED PER STEPS 1 THRU 15 TO ISOLATE/IDENTIFY TH 561213 1 2 E CAUSE FOR CONN 90P105 HI-POT FAILURE AT PINS 45 & 46 (REF ITEM 001). I 561213 1 3 T WAS DISCOVERED THAT SEGMENT 2 OF THE 2D1898C24 WAS NICKED UNDER THE "J 561213 1 4 R24" SOLDER SLEEVE AT THE 90P105 CONN END (REF PG 4). NOTE: WIRE 2D1898C 561213 1 5 24-2 & ITS JR24 ARE PINNED TO TERMS 45 & 46 RESPECTIVELY AT CONN 90P105) 561213 1 6 . FOLLOWING THE TROUBLESHOOTING PER THE ABOVE STEPS, CONNECTORS 90P105 & 561213 1 7 90J44 WERE REQ'D TO BE REASSEMBLED. ALSO, THE REMOVED "JR'S" WERE REQ'D 561213 1 8 TO BE RESTORED (REF STEP 16 "NOTE"). TO PERFORM THE REQ'D REPAIR, THE O 561213 1 9 RIGINAL SOLDER SLEEVE LOCATION WAS MOVED APPROX 2" AWAY FROM THE DAMAGE 561213 1 10 AREA (I.E. FURTHER AWAY FROM CONN 90P105). THIS ALLOWED THE APPLICATION 561213 1 11 OF AN INSULATOR/SEALING SLEEVE (ONLY) FROM A ME416-0031-2001 SPLICE KIT 561213 1 12 OVER THE "DAMAGED AREA" (NICK). THIS REPAIR, PER STEPS 17 THRU 31 & 55, 561213 1 13 HAS RETURNED WIRE 2D1898C24-2 AND CONN 90P105 TO AN INSTALLATION THAT 561213 1 14 WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. CONN 561213 1 15 90J744 WAS RETURNED TO DWG RQMTS. THE ORIGINAL DISPO (REF STEPS 32 THRU 561213 1 16 36), INADVERTENTLY FAILED TO RETURN THE REMOVED "JUMPER" (REF STEP 16 561213 1 17 NOTE). HOWEVER, THE ADDED STEPS (42 THRU 47) ADDRESSED THE "JUMPER" AS 561213 1 18 A PREVIOUS "MR" REPAIR ON A DAMAGED TERMINATOR SHIELD, REQUIRING TO BE 561213 1 19 RESTORED (REF PG 8). IT WAS THEN DETERMINED THAT THE "JUMPER" WAS 561213 1 20 ACTUALLY A "JR24" PINNED TO TERM (-D) AT THE "TAG-RING". THEREFORE, 561213 1 21 STEPS 48 THRU 52 WERE ADDED TO CORRECT THE PREVIOUS DISPO AND TO ADD 561213 1 22 THE CONTACT CRIMPING & PINNING RQMTS FOR JR24. THIS REWORK/REPAIR WAS 561213 1 23 FOLLWED BY SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY & HI-POT TESTS PER STEPS 37 THRU 40. 561213 1 24 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP (001). 561224 1 1 THE TWO DISCREPANT STRONGBACK ATTACH HOLES WERE REPAIRED DURING SCHEDULE 561224 1 2 D MOD TO INSTALL ACRES SLEEVES INTO EACH ATTACH HOLE ON THE PAYLOAD BAY 561224 1 3 DOORS PER TPS STR-3-J2-676. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAU 561224 1 4 SE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 561233 1 1 ONE OF THE RH CONTAINMENT SYSTEM BLADE ASSEMBLIES WAS FOUND PARTIALLY OP 561233 1 2 EN. THE BLADE ASSY IS SPRING LOADED AND BY DESIGN SHOULD REMAIN CLOSED. 561233 1 3 A CLOSER INSPECTION FOUND TWO OF THE THREE BLADE ASSEMBLIES WERE BINDING 561233 1 4 ON THE ROTATION PIN. AFTER A SIMILAR CONDITION WAS FOUND ON OV-102 AT K 561233 1 5 SC POST FLIGHT STS-76, A SUSPECT PR PAGE 1B WAS INITIATED ON THE LH CONT 561233 1 6 AINMENT SYSTEM. BOTH SYSTEMS WERE REMOVED FROM THE VEHICLE AND DISASSEMB 561233 1 7 LED FOR DETAILED INSPECTION BY DOWNEY DESIGN AND MATERIALS ENGINEERING. 561233 1 8 AS A RESULT OF THE DETAILED INSPECTIONS, DESIGN RELEASED NEW ENGINEERING 561233 1 9 WHICH PHYSICALLY CHANGED THE PIN DIAMETER AND OPENED TOLERANCES ON THE 561233 1 10 UPPER AND LOWER BLADE ASSY. THE CHANGE REQ'D DASH NUMBER ROLL OF PIN 561233 1 11 ASSY AND UPPER LEVEL INSTALLATION DWGS. BOTH CONTAINMENT SYSTEM BLADE 561233 1 12 ASSEMBLIES WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RE-INSTALLED. A FOLLOW-ON MR 561233 1 13 (UNRESTRICTED) WAS WRITTEN TO ACCEPT LOST TRACKABILITY ON TWO BLADE SET 561233 1 14 ASSEMBLIES THAT WERE REMOVED AT DOWNEY WITHOUT RECORDING THE OCN #'S. 561233 1 15 ALL ITEMS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED - NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQ'D ON THIS PR. 561233 1 16 THE RH AND LH CONTAINMENT SYSTEM BLADE ASSEMBLIES HAVE BEEN REWORKED BY 561233 1 17 MANUFACTURING TO PRINT CONFIGURATION AND THEY OPERATE AS DESIGN 561233 1 18 INTENDED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 561293 1 1 REAPPLYING THE HEAT AND VACUUM BROUGHT THE ADHESIVE TO THE ACCEPTABLE SH 561293 1 2 EAR STRENGTH FOR THE LAP SHEAR TEST, NUMBERS P96-173 AND P96-172. THIS I 561293 1 3 NDICATES THAT THE ADHESIVE ON THE VEHICLE IS PER THE SHEAR ALLOWABLE OF 561293 1 4 THE BONDING SPEC MAO106-301. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED AND 561293 1 5 THE FIT AND FUNCTION IS NOT AFFECTED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE 561293 1 6 THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RE 561293 1 7 TENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSI 561293 1 8 GHT. 561295 1 1 THE ME112-0013-0604 HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED USING A NAS620C10 WASHER AND MD 561295 1 2 114-1001-0004 NUT IN LIEU OF THE PER PRINT ME114-0022-0106 COLLAR. THE R 561295 1 3 EWORK WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE AND MR IDENTIFIED. THE HI-LOK 561295 1 4 INSTALLATION IS AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D. P 561295 1 5 ROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE BUILD-UP. 561402 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS 1 ME112-0024-0604 FASTENER HAS A ROUNDED OUT AL 561402 1 2 LEN KEY PORT USED TO FASTEN EDGE MEMBER V070-352551-003. DISPO WAS ADDED 561402 1 3 TO REMOVE TILE V070-395055-175 TO ALLOW REMOVAL OF FASTENER. A NEW FAST 561402 1 4 ENER WAS REINSTALLED PER PRINT. WHILE REMOVING TILE V070-395055-175, THE 561402 1 5 TILE WAS DAMAGED AND TILE PR AFT-3-J2-6132 WAS GENERATED. ITEM 2, PAGE 561402 1 6 1A WAS GENERATED DOCUMENTING 2 EDGE MEMBERS ARE REQUIRED TO BE REMOVED F 561402 1 7 OR REINSTALLATION OF THE TILE. ITEM 2 WAS TRANSFERRED TO TILE PR AFT-3-J 561402 1 8 2-6132 TO BE WORKED ON TILE PAPER TO SUPT TILE INSTALLATION. PROBABLE CA 561402 1 9 USE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 561407 1 1 REPAIR OF THE SPLIT IN THE SHIELD JACKET OF WIRE T1207A26 NOTED IN SQK 0 561407 1 2 01, PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR E.EL 101.7 BY APPLYING MYSTIK 7503 E 561407 1 3 LECTRICAL TAPE TO THE CABLE JACKET HAS RETURNED THE CABLE JACKET TO A CO 561407 1 4 NFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. LIKEWISE, THE REPAIR OF THE 561407 1 5 CABLE JACKET OF WIRE T765A26 NOTED IN SQUAWK 002 USING MYSTIK 7503 ELEC 561407 1 6 TRICAL TAPE TO THE CABLE JACKET HAS RETURNED THAT CABLE JACKET TO A CONF 561407 1 7 IGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. THIS IS WHY STANDARD REPAIR W 561407 1 8 ORKS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 561410 1 1 EO A06 ESTABLISHED THE V070-165000-003 INSTALLATION WITH A GENERAL NOTE 561410 1 2 TO INSTALL TAPE PER MAO105-342 THAT SPECIFIED NO OVERLAP OF ADJACENT STR 561410 1 3 IPS OF TAPE. CLARIFICATION WAS NEEDED FOR INSTALLATION IN IRREGULAR AREA 561410 1 4 S WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN WRINKLES, OVERLAPS OR EXCESSIVE GAPS BETW 561410 1 5 EEN TAPE STRIPS. THE DWG WAS REVISED BY PR EO TO FOLLOW TO PROVIDE INSTA 561410 1 6 LLATION INSTRUCTION CLARIFICATION. THE EO WAS RELEASED AND VERIFIED THAT 561410 1 7 IT REFLECTED THE PR EO TO FOLLOW DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVE 561410 1 8 RSIGHT. 561434 1 1 THREE EACH V070-340471-002 BRACKETS COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO PREVIO 561434 1 2 USLY INSTALLED BRACKETS. THE V070-340471-002 BRACKETS AND INSTALLATION H 561434 1 3 ARDWARE WERE DELETED FROM INSTALLATION DWG V070-346048 PER RELEASE OF EO 561434 1 4 J05. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING 561434 1 5 OVERSIGHT. 561435 1 1 ENGINEERING REVIEW OF EPD-3-J2-364, SEQ 40, REVEALED TPS IN ERROR. THE " 561435 1 2 2 OHMS MAX" VALUE SHOULD BE "5 OHMS MAX." THE WIRE GAUGE INVOLVED IN THE 561435 1 3 TEST RUN FROM CONN 50P613 & 50P302 IS "26 GA" (REF ATTACHED 320 RPT PG) 561435 1 4 AND THE OBTAINED READINGS ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR THIS GA SIZE (REF MLO201-0 561435 1 5 003, TABLE 1). THE TPS WAS CORRECTED PER STEP 1 TO PERMIT THE RWK TO PRO 561435 1 6 CEED PER TPS EPD-3-J2-364. PROBABLE CAUSE: PLANNING ERROR. 561436 1 1 SEGMENT 1 OF WIRE 3P749D26 WAS FOUND PULLED OUT OF SPLICE 56SP57 (ITEM 0 561436 1 2 01). INITIALLY, THE DISPOSITION REWORKED THIS DESIGN SPLICE. HOWEVER, UP 561436 1 3 ON INSPECTION OF THE REWORKED SPLICE AND ADJACENT AREA, IT WAS DISCOVERE 561436 1 4 D THAT THIS SAME WIRE SEGMENT (3P749D26-1) WAS NOW BROKEN OFF WHERE IT E 561436 1 5 XITS FROM THE SOLDER SLEEVE AT CONN 56P562 (REF ITEM 002). AS A RESULT O 561436 1 6 F ITEM 002, THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT WIRE LENGTH FOR WIRE 3P749D26 TO RE 561436 1 7 TERMINATE. THEREFORE, WIRE 3P749D26 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED. HOWEVER, W 561436 1 8 IRE 3P749D26 IS A 3-SEGMENT SHIELDED WIRE SPLICED TO THREE, 3-SEGMENT SH 561436 1 9 IELDED WIRES (1P749A26, 2P749A26 & 3P749C26) AT ONE END, AND PINNED 561436 1 10 INTO CONN 56P562 AT THE OTHER END. THEREFORE, DESIGN SPLICES 56SP57, 561436 1 11 56SP58 & 56SP59 (P/N'S ME416-0031-1004) WERE REWORKED TO SPLICE WIRE 561436 1 12 3P749D26 SEGS 1, 2 & 3 TO WIRES 1P749A26, 2P749A26 & 3P749C26 SEGS 1, 2 561436 1 13 & 3 (RESPECTIVELY). ALSO REWORKED WAS THE SHIELD FOR EACH OF THESE FOUR 561436 1 14 WIRES WHICH HAD A SOLDER SLEEVE (P/N'S ME414-0032-0006) WITH A "JUMPER" 561436 1 15 GOING TO EITHER AN "E-PT" (WIRES 3P749D26, 1P749A26, 2P749A26 & 561436 1 16 3P749C26) OR TERMINATED AT CONN 56P562 (WIRE 3P749D26). A SUCCESSFUL 561436 1 17 CONTINUITY TEST WAS PERFORMED FOLLOWING THE REWORK (REF STEPS 14 & 52). 561436 1 18 THIS REWORK, PER THE ABOVE STEPS, HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG 561436 1 19 RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP (ITEMS 001 & 002). 561502 1 1 FOLLOWING ENGINEERING REVIEW AND COORDINATION WITH DOWNEY DESIGN (CONTAC 561502 1 2 T J. JACKSON, X3395), IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE CURRENT OV-103 COM 561502 1 3 SEC CONN LOADING PANEL INSTLN INSIDE BAY 3A, IS NOT PER DWG. THE OV-103 561502 1 4 INSTALLATION IS DEPICTED BY VIEW "T" ON V070-793911 ZONE 106C. THE CURRE 561502 1 5 NT FLIGHT CAPS ARE "LANYARD" TYPE AND SHOULD BE "NON-LANYARD" CAPS. THE 561502 1 6 VEHICLE WAS RECEIVED AT PALMDALE IN THIS CONFIGURATION. THE "LANYARD" (T 561502 1 7 ETHERED) TYPE FLIGHT CAPS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE WERE REMOVED AND SCRAP 561502 1 8 ED LOCALLY. THE OBTAINED AND INSTALLED FLIGHT CAPS P/N ME193-0055-1012 ( 561502 1 9 3 EA REF J794, J796 & J800) AND P/N ME193-0056-1010 ( 1 EA REF J798), HA 561502 1 10 VE RETURNED THE INSTLN TO DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 561541 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS THAT V828-660518-001 ADAPTER PLATE WILL NOT FIT 561541 1 2 FLAT AND THAT WEB ON V828-341006 INTERFERES WITH PLATE. THIS WAS RESOLV 561541 1 3 ED BY ADDING A CUTOUT TO THE V828-660518-001 ADAPTER PLATE PER EOTF DISP 561541 1 4 O. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN OVERSIGHT. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A DOCUMENTS CUTOUT IN 561541 1 5 V828-660518 PLATE WAS MACHINED TO 11.25 IN AND S/B 12.61 IN. DISPO WAS 561541 1 6 ADDED TO MACHINE TO EO DIMENSION OF 12. 61 IN. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSH 561541 1 7 IP. 561543 1 1 THE RWK OF 2C525AC26 SOLDER SLEEVE, SHIELD JUMPER, AND GROUND LUG AT 30J 561543 1 2 691 RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. A SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY TEST 561543 1 3 WAS PERFORMED. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEA 561543 1 4 R. 561544 1 1 THE MD114-5017-0003 NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND THE V070-332823 PANEL SPOT 561544 1 2 FACED TO ALLEVIATE THE INTERFERENCE PREVENTING THE NUTPLATE INSTALLATION 561544 1 3 . PANEL WAS MR ID'D. THE NUTPLATE INSTALLATION HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN A 561544 1 4 CCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERA 561544 1 5 NCE BUILD-UP. 561601 1 1 THE REPAIR OF DAMAGED OUTER SEALING SLEEVE FOR WIRE 1E45C20, PER ENGINEE 561601 1 2 RING STANDARD REPAIR DISPO E.EL101.7 HAS RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGUR 561601 1 3 ATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. RETEST NOT REQ'D (DAMAGE NOT SIGN 561601 1 4 IFICANT). REF ITEM 002: THE REPAIR OF INSULATION DAMAGE 3" FROM CONN 83V 561601 1 5 77W4P66 ON WIRE 1E45C20 PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR DISPO E.EL101.7 561601 1 6 MAINTAINS DESIGN INTENT & IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. RETEST N 561601 1 7 OT REQ'D (DAMAGE NOT SIGNIFICANT). ITEM S 1 & 2 WERE REPAIRED BY WRAPPIN 561601 1 8 G WIRES WITH MYSTIC #7503 TAPE. AN MR ID PLATE MARKED "MR OEL-3-J2-0897" 561601 1 9 WAS PLACED ADJACENT TO THE NOTED DISCREPANCY FOR IDENTIFICATION. THIS 561601 1 10 MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT 561601 1 11 THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 561601 1 12 CERT IS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 001 AND ITEM 002: WEAR & 561601 1 13 TEAR. 561749 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS INABILITY TO INSTALL V070-338441-001 ASSY DUE T 561749 1 2 O INTERFERENCE WITH HANDHOLD. NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED, HOLES WERE PLUGGED 561749 1 3 AND CORNER NUTPLATES WERE INSTALLED PER EOTF DIPO TO RELOCATE V070-3384 561749 1 4 41-001 ASSY. ITEM 3 PAGE 1A DOCUMENTS THAT DWG V070-337606 DOES NOT LOCA 561749 1 5 TE V070-338441-001 ASSY. EO A01 DWG V070-338441 WAS RELEASED 3-15-96 AND 561749 1 6 VERIFIED 3-17-96 TO ADDRESS ITEMS 1 & 3. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN OVERSIG 561749 1 7 HT. ITEM 2, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS INABILITY TO INSTALL V070-338435-003 BRACKE 561749 1 8 T DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING V070-650422-003 HANDHOLD. MR UNRESTR 561749 1 9 ICTED DISPO WAS ADDED TO DRILL HOLES THROUGH THE BRACKET AND THE 561749 1 10 HANDHOLD TO ALLOW INSTALLATION OF HI-LOKS. AFTER HI-LOK INSTALLATION 561749 1 11 THE HOLES WERE PLUGGED IN THE HANDHOLD USING ADHESIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 561749 1 12 INSTALLATION SEQUENCE. ITEM 4, PAGE 1B DOCUMENTS INCORRECT NUTPLATE 561749 1 13 CALLOUT ON RELEASED EO A01. EOTF DISPO WAS ADDED TO CORRECT THE EO. 561749 1 14 V070-338441 EO A02 WAS RELEASED 5-9-96 AND VERIFIED ON 5-11-96. 561749 1 15 PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN OVERSIGHT. 561752 1 1 MISLOCATION OF THE PARTITION WALL ON INITIAL INSTALLATION REQ'D RELOCATI 561752 1 2 ON OF ALL 26 .228 DIA HOLES TO PERMIT INSTALLATION OF THE WIRE SUPTS AND 561752 1 3 ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE WITH MOMENT TIES OF THE MANUFACTURING ACCESS PAN 561752 1 4 EL TO AFT BULKHEAD. MR ID APPLIED TO PART. THE WIRE BUNDLES ARE FLEXIBLE 561752 1 5 AND THE HOLE RELOCATION DOES NOT AFFECT THE WIRE RUN. RELOCATION OF THE 561752 1 6 HOLES RESTORED THE DESIGN INTENT, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. M 561752 1 7 ARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS VENDOR WORKMA 561752 1 8 NSHIP. 561753 1 1 (PAGE 1) V070-337191-002 SUPT WAS DEBONDED ON XO576 BULKHEAD FOR EVA HAN 561753 1 2 D HOLD. SUPT WAS REBONDED PER ENGINEERING DISPO. (PAGE 1A) V070-337191-0 561753 1 3 02 SUPT HAS TAPERED GAP. ENGINEERING EVALUATION DETERMINED THAT THE GAP 561753 1 4 WAS CAUSED BY THE ATTACHING V070-650758-008 BRACE BEING INSTALLED INCORR 561753 1 5 ECTLY. THE BRACE WAS REMOVED AND INSTALLED PER DWG. (PAGE 1B) V070-33719 561753 1 6 1-002 SUPT NEEDS CONFORMAL COAT AND PAINT TOUCH-UP. ENGINEERING DETERMIN 561753 1 7 ED THAT CONFORMAL COAT WAS NOT REQUIRED PER DWG V070-337150. PAINT TOUCH 561753 1 8 -UP WAS ACCOMPLISHED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 561840 1 1 MANUFACTURING HAD REQUESTED A SUBSTITUTION FOR FOUR NAS6304U12D BOLTS (R 561840 1 2 EF ITEM 001). IT WAS DETERMINED THAT NO SUBSTITUTE WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE 561840 1 3 SE BOLTS (DWG BOLTS WERE ORDERED & INSTALLED). ALSO, IT WAS DISCOVERED T 561840 1 4 HAT THE STEPS TO INSTALL THE BOLTS HAD BEEN OMITTED FROM THE ORIGINAL PL 561840 1 5 ANNING (REF ITEM 002). MOD SHEET 003 WAS GENERATED AGAINST STR-3-J2-641 561840 1 6 TO INSTALL THE NAS6304U12D BOLTS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE PER MAO101-301 561840 1 7 CLASS 5. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 00 561840 1 8 1 - NOT A NONCONFORMANCE. ITEM 002 - PLANNING DEFICIENCY. 561883 1 1 THE NOTED JR24 WIRE HAD THE DAMAGED SECTION REMOVED AND THE WIRE SPLICED 561883 1 2 . THIS REPAIR HAS RETURNED THE JR24 WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FU 561883 1 3 LFILL DESIGN INTENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 561885 1 1 THE 1 EXTRA .281 DIA HOLE DRILLED IN THE V828-360224-001 RING ASSY WAS P 561885 1 2 LUGGED USING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE PER MAO106-305 GRADE "B". THE PLUGGING 561885 1 3 OF THE HOLE WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. THE RING ASSY WAS MR 561885 1 4 ID'D. THE RING ASSY HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO 561885 1 5 FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 561890 1 1 THE TORN REAR GROMMET ON CONN 83P374 WAS MR REPAIRED. SILICONE RUBBER WA 561890 1 2 S INSERTED AT THE DAMAGED LOCATION TO RESTORE THE GROMMET SEAL. AN MR ID 561890 1 3 PLATE MARKED "MR OEL-3-J2-0899" WAS SPOT TIED TO THE W/H WITHIN 12 INCH 561890 1 4 ES OF 83P374 FOR ID. THIS INSTALLATION MAINTAINS DESIGN INTENT AND IS AC 561890 1 5 CEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. CONN CONTINUITY TEST PERFORMED PER MOD 561890 1 6 TPS. CERT IS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP/MATERIAL DEFICIEN 561890 1 7 CY. 561898 1 1 THE FIT CHECK OF THE BEAM INDICATED AFTER THE 88 HOLES WERE DRILLED THAT 561898 1 2 16 RIVET HEADS WERE RIDING AND PREVENTED THE BEAM FROM BEING INSTALLED. 561898 1 3 AS A INTERIM DISPOSITION THE 16 INTERFERING RIVETS WERE REMOVED WITH HO 561898 1 4 LES MEASURED AS .1935 INCHES DIAMETER. AN EO TO FOLLOW WAS WRITTEN INSTA 561898 1 5 LLING THE HI-LOK FASTENERS FLUSH HEADS UNDER THE BEAM, CORROSION PROTECT 561898 1 6 ION AND INSTALLED PER HI-LOK INSTALLATION SPEC MAO101-301. COORDINATED W 561898 1 7 ITH MR ART HAYANO EXT 4989 DOWNEY. THE V070-332887 EO NO F02 EO HAS BEEN 561898 1 8 RELEASED AND VERIFIED BY MR R. LANGLEY. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENG OVERSIGHT. 561902 1 1 A DING WAS FOUND ON THE LH WING UPPER SURFACE. PER MR DISPOSITION, A DOU 561902 1 2 BLER WAS INSTALLED TO THE DAMAGED AREA. THE MR DOUBLER RETURNED THE DAMA 561902 1 3 GED AREA TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER ACT 561902 1 4 ION REQ'D ON THIS PR. MR ID NOT REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DAMAG 561902 1 5 E. 561903 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS A DING IN THE UPPER SKIN PANEL OF THE RH WING A 561903 1 2 T XO1000 & YO210 MEASURING 1.15 X .80 X .070 DEEP. MR UNRESTRICTED DISPO 561903 1 3 WAS ADDED TO FILL THE HONEYCOMB CORE WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE AND TO BO 561903 1 4 ND A 3 INCH DOUBLER OVER THE DISCREPANT AREA USING MBO120-048 TYPE II AD 561903 1 5 HESIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNKNOWN IMPACT ON WING. ITEMS 2 & 3 PAGE 1A DOCU 561903 1 6 MENTS THAT NASA MIPS WERE OMITTED FOR OK TO INSTALL ON CRIT 1 HARDWARE D 561903 1 7 UE TO THE PR BEING WRITTEN AGAINST THE ENTIRE WING ASSY. THE PR CONDITIO 561903 1 8 N IS AGAINST THE UPPER WING HONEYCOMB SKIN PANEL ONLY WHICH IS CRIT 3, N 561903 1 9 OT AGAINST THE TOTAL WING INSTALLATION WHICH IS CRIT 1. THE ORIGINAL 561903 1 10 PAGE 1 WRITE-UP WAS IN ERROR CALLING OUT THE TOTAL WING INSTALLATION. 561903 1 11 DISPO WAS ADDED TO CORRECT PAGE 1 AND 1A TO REFLECT THE CORRECT PART 561903 1 12 NUMBER WHICH IS DISCREPANT. ALL REWORK IS COMPLETE AND NO FURTHER RWK 561903 1 13 IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: PR NO WRITTEN AGAINST THE CORRECT PART 561903 1 14 NUMBER. 561943 1 1 NOTED FASTENERS (NAS1003-6A) INSTALLED IN LIEU OF DWG RQMT FASTENERS (NA 561943 1 2 S6303UG) NOT CONSIDERED DEGRADING TO DESIGN RQMTS. STRENGTH AND LOAD PAT 561943 1 3 H CAPABILITY MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. THIS MR ACTION DOE 561943 1 4 S NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITE 561943 1 5 MS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 561970 1 1 ITEM 001, THE INCORRECT HAND HOLD WAS DELIVERED TO PALMDALE FOR INSTALLA 561970 1 2 TION. RETURNED HAND HOLD SED33106337-353 TO LOGISTIC AND OBTAINED A NEW 561970 1 3 HAND RAIL ASSY SED33106337-349. ITEM 002, ROTATED THE HAND RAIL ASSY'S A 561970 1 4 S REQ'D TO MATCH MOUNTING HOLES IN THE STRUCTURE. LOCATION OF THE FLOATI 561970 1 5 NG END WAS OPTIONAL. ITEM 003, REVISED THE FASTENER CALLOUT TO NAS1004-9 561970 1 6 A AND NAS1004-7A. THE EO WAS RELEASED AS M072-661828-B05 ON 4-4-96 AND V 561970 1 7 IERIFIED BY R. LANGLEY ON 4-10-96. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT 561970 1 8 . 562027 1 1 WHILE DOING ELECTRICAL SPLICING IN THE AREA, THE FWD RAIN DRAIN TEFLON T 562027 1 2 UBE AT XO1285, YO-102 (REF T01R32001 DWG) WAS SLIGHTLY DISTORTED WITH A 562027 1 3 HEAT GUN. THE DAMAGE IS MINOR SURFACE DISTORTION ONLY. THE FLOW PATH THR 562027 1 4 OUGH THE TUBE WILL NOT BE AFFECTED AND THE WALL OF THE TUBE HAS NOT BEEN 562027 1 5 PENETRATED. THE TEFLON TUBE IS ACCEPTABLE "AS-IS" FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. 562027 1 6 THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPA 562027 1 7 CT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 562027 1 8 MR ID WAS APPLIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 562029 1 1 DUPLICATE OF PR STR-3-22-5164. 562031 1 1 THE V070-794200-001 ASSY, UPPER GUIDE MECHANISM BROKE. THE THREADED PORT 562031 1 2 ION OF THE BROKEN ROD AND BEARING ROD END WAS REMOVED FOR INSPECTION. HA 562031 1 3 RDWARE WAS RETAINED FOR REINSTALLATION. NO DAMAGE WAS IDENTIFIED. A FURT 562031 1 4 HER INSPECTION WAS DONE ON V070-794200-001 BY EDDY CURRENT AND ULTRASONI 562031 1 5 C INSPECTION OF THE GRAPHITE EPOXY MAT'L IN THE AREA AROUND THE FITTING 562031 1 6 T01P31365-003 OF THE TORQUE BOX. NO CRACKS WERE FOUND IN BOTH CASES SEE 562031 1 7 NDE REPORT NUMBER 103-ET-PLMS-96-29 AND -28. THE AREAS INSPECTED WAS COR 562031 1 8 ROSION PROTECTED AND REIDENTIFIED. THE ROD ENDS WERE REINSTALLED TORQUED 562031 1 9 TO 100 IN LBS, NEW ROD WAS REINSTALLED TO V070-794200-001 ASSY AND 562031 1 10 TORQUED TO 50 IN LBS. WIRE BUNDLES WERE REINSTALLED WITH CLAMPS 562031 1 11 ME127-0071-3008, MD122-1003-0410 SCREWS AND ME114-0044-0030 NUTS. THE 562031 1 12 FASTENERS WERE TORQUED. APPLIED SEALANT TO EXPOSED THREADS AND CURED TO 562031 1 13 SHORE "A" HARDNESS OF "30". THE DAMAGED ASSY HAS BEEN REPAIRED TO THE 562031 1 14 DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 562032 1 1 THE V070-794200-001 ASSY, UPPER GUIDE MECHANISM BROKE. THE THREADED PORT 562032 1 2 ION OF THE BROKEN ROD AND BEARING ROD END WAS REMOVED FOR INSPECTION. HA 562032 1 3 RDWARE WAS RETAINED FOR REINSTALLATION. NO DAMAGE WAS IDENTIFIED ON V070 562032 1 4 -794198, V070-794199-001 AND V070-794178-001. A FURTHER INSPECTION WAS D 562032 1 5 ONEON V070-794200-001 BY EDDY CURRENT AND ULTRASONIC INSPECTION OF THE G 562032 1 6 RAPHITE EPOXY MAT'L IN THE AREA AROUND THE FITTING T01P31365-003 OF THE 562032 1 7 TORQUE BOX. NO CRACKS WERE FOUND IN BOTH CASES SEE NDE REPORT NUMBER 103 562032 1 8 -ET-PLMD-96-26 AND -27. THE AREAS INSPECTED WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND 562032 1 9 REIDENTIFIED. THE ROD ENDS WERE REINSTALLED TORQUED TO 100 IN LBS, NEW 562032 1 10 ROD WAS REINSTALLED TO V070-794200-001 ASSY AND TORQUED TO 50 IN LBS. 562032 1 11 WIRE BUNDLES WERE REINSTALLED WITH CLAMPS ME127-0071-3008, 562032 1 12 MD122-1003-0410 SCREWS AND ME114-0044-0030 NUTS. THE FASTENERS WERE 562032 1 13 TORQUED. APPLIED SEALANT TO EXPOSED THREADS AND CURED TO SHORE "A" 562032 1 14 HARDNESS OF "30". THE DAMAGED ASSY HAS BEEN REPAIRED TO THE DWG RQMTS. 562032 1 15 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 562033 1 1 THE PARTIAL RIVET PLUG HAS A CHIP THAT WAS KNOCKED OUT AND THE REMAINING 562033 1 2 PORTION IS IMBEDDED INTO THE FRAME AND WILL NOT LOOSEN. THE BACK SIDE O 562033 1 3 F THIS PLUG IS WEDGED BETWEEN THE FRAME WEB AND SUPT FITTING. THE STRUCT 562033 1 4 URAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE IS NOT DEGRADED. THE FIT AND FUNCTION IS M 562033 1 5 AINTAINED. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOE 562033 1 6 S NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD 562033 1 7 CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 562036 1 1 ENGINEERING FOUND THAT THE DISCREPANCIES ITEM 001 THRU ITEM 004 THAT EAC 562036 1 2 H CONN HAD WIRE TERMINATIONS THAT WERE NOT PER SPEC AND/OR DWG. THIS PR 562036 1 3 WAS DISPOSITIONED TO RETERMINATE ALL THE WIRES PER THE SPEC AND/OR THE D 562036 1 4 WG. THE CONNECTORS WERE RETURNED TO DWG RQMTS. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTE 562036 1 5 D. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 562135 1 1 THE DISCREPANT CONN 30P453 WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A NEW CONN. THI 562135 1 2 S WAS REPLACED DUE TO THE EXCESSIVE REPAIRS ON THE GROMMET AND RTV INFIL 562135 1 3 TRATING INTO THE LOCKING DEVICE. A SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY TEST WAS PERFOR 562135 1 4 MED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 562152 1 1 THE WORN OUT MS21052-4 NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW MS21 562152 1 2 052-4 NUTPLATES AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATI 562152 1 3 ONAL WEAR. 562168 1 1 SUMMARY CONCLUSION: THE LOWER BRACKET WHICH IS BONDED PER MAO106-301 IS 562168 1 2 ACCEPTABLE AS IS. THE TOP TWO BRACKETS BONDING PROCESS WAS CHANGED TO 562168 1 3 MAO106-336 (COLD BOND) TO AVOID DAMAGING THE FEED THRU PLATE WITH ITS CO 562168 1 4 NNECTORS INSTALLED. THE LOWER BRACKET WAS INSTALLED PER THE HOT BOND SP 562168 1 5 EC AND THE SHEAR COUPON TEST IS ACCEPTABLE. SINCE THE TWO BRACKET THAT 562168 1 6 WAS CHANGED TO THE COLD BOND (MAO106-336) HELD A SMALL WIRE WITH ALMOST 562168 1 7 NEGLIGIBLE WEIGHT THE BOND WAS CHANGED TO A COLD BOND. THE OF THE TWO T 562168 1 8 OP BRACKETS WAS CURED TO A SHORE 'D' HARDNESS OF 75 WITH THE MINIMUM REQ 562168 1 9 UIRED BEING 70. THIS CHANGE WAS DONE ON A EO TO FOLLOW WHICH WAS RELEAS 562168 1 10 ED AS V070-337150 J12 ON 3/28/96. COORDINATED WITH DUNG TO EXT. 2-3524. 562168 1 11 VERIFIED BY R. LANGLEY ON 4/1/96. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE TH 562168 1 12 E BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION AND DOES NOT IMPACT CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) 562168 1 13 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING 562168 1 14 OVERSIGHT. 562269 1 1 ALL HOLES WERE REAMED TO INCREASE HOLE SIZE TO MAX DIA PER B/P. HOLES WE 562269 1 2 RE THEN CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-AA-21-XX USING A COTT 562269 1 3 ON SQAB. PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCUMULATION OF TOLERANCES. 562282 1 1 ALL HOLES WERE REAMED TO INCREASE HOLE SIZE TO MAX DIA PER B/P. HOLES WE 562282 1 2 RE THEN CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-AA-21-XX USING A COTT 562282 1 3 ON SWAB. PROBABLE CAUSE: ACCUMULATION OF TOLERANCES. 562445 1 1 THE WORN OUT MS21052-4 NUTPLATES WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW MS21 562445 1 2 052-4 NUTPLATES AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONA 562445 1 3 L WEAR. 562454 PMRB 1 MR RATIONALE: SUBSTITUTION OF NUT FOR ATTACHING GSE FIXTURE NOT DETRIMEN 562454 PMRB 2 TAL TO DESIGN. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFIC 562454 PMRB 3 ATION AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATION 562454 PMRB 4 ALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. 562454 PMRB 5 DEFERRAL RATIONALE: NUTPLATE LOCATED ON RADIATOR HINGE FITTING IS USED F 562454 PMRB 6 OR ATTACHING RADIATOR GSE LIFTING FIXTURE DURING REMOVAL AND INSTALLATIO 562454 PMRB 7 N. NUTPLATE REMAINS EMPTY WHEN GSE IS NOT INSTALLED AND DOES NOT SERVE A 562454 PMRB 8 NY FUNCTION IN FLIGHT CONFIGURATION. A NUT WILL BE USED THE NEXT TIME TH 562454 PMRB 9 E RADIATOR IS REMOVED AND WHEN THE RADIATOR IS IN THE STORAGE BOX THE 562454 PMRB 10 NUTPLATE WILL BE R&R'D. 01/21/97 PMRB APPROVED FOR DEFERRAL TO FUTURE 562454 PMRB 11 FLT (LH RADIATOR NUMBER 3 REMOVAL) OF OV-103. 562454 1 1 DURING S/N 003 RADIATOR INSTALLATION PER V5K03 (OV103-J3), THE NUT 562454 1 2 PLATE ELEMENT AT THE FWD HING GSE ATTACH PONT WAS FOUND TO BE MISSING. 562454 1 3 A MD114-1001-0005 NUT WAS USED IN PLACE OF THE NUT PLATE TO FACILITATE 562454 1 4 RADIATOR INSTALLATION. DUE TO THE LACK OF ACCESS AFTER INSTALLATION, 562454 1 5 THE REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF THE MISSING NUT PLATE ELEMENT WAS MR 562454 1 6 DEFERRED TO THE NEXT RADIATOR REMOVAL. S/N 003 RADIATOR WAS REMOVED 562454 1 7 DURING OV103-J3 OMDP AND ROUTED TO LOCKHEED MISSILES AND SPACE SYSTEMS 562454 1 8 (FORMERLY LOCKHEED VOUGHT) FOR MODIFICATION AND REFURBISHMENT. THE 562454 1 9 MISSING NUT PLATE ELEMENT WILL BE REPLACED BY THE VENDOR PER PRR 562454 1 10 90605N. FOLLOWING VENDOR MODIFICATION/REFURBISHMENT, S/N 003 RADIATOR 562454 1 11 WILL BE RETURNED TO LOGISTICS AS A FLIGHT SPARE AND NOT REINSTALLED ON 562454 1 12 OV103. LIKE END ITEMS ARE NOT AFFECTED. NO SUSPECT PR'S ARE REQUIRED. 562454 1 13 THE NUT PLATE IS USED FOR GSE INSTALLATION ONLY AND SERVES NO FUNCTION 562454 1 14 IN FLIGHT. NO RETEST IS REQUIRED. PROABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP (CODE 4). 562456 1 1 WHILE ATTEMPTING TO LATCH FWD RH (STBD) RADIATOR LATCHES (1-6) AN OUT OF 562456 1 2 RIG CONDITION WAS FOUND. THE AFT LATCHES WERE REACHING THEIR STOPS & RE 562456 1 3 STRICTING LATCH OF THE FWD 4 LATCHES ON THIS RADIATOR. THIS RESTRICTED T 562456 1 4 HE PDU LATCH SWITCH FROM CLOSING SO THAT MOTOR ONE CONTINUED TO RUN. (TR 562456 1 5 OUBLESHOOTING ON THE IPR PRIOR TO UPGRADE, ALSO FOUND THE SAME CONDITION 562456 1 6 ON THE OTHER THREE DEPLOYABLE RADIATORS). THE CAUSE WAS DETERIMINED TO 562456 1 7 BE AN ACCESS REMOVAL OF THE AFT OB LATCH ASSY & PUSH ROD. IN ORDER TO DI 562456 1 8 SCONNECT THE PUSH ROD, THE TORQUE SHAFT TO AFC ACTUATOR INTERFACE WAS DI 562456 1 9 CONNECTED BY REMOVING THE BOLT & RELATED HARDWARE TO ROTATE THE HAE ROD 562456 1 10 FOR ACCESS (ROD LENGTH WAS UNALTERED). WHEN RECONNECTED, THE TORQUE ROD 562456 1 11 & ACTUATOR WERE NO LONGER IN RIG. (REF STR-3-J2-641). AFTER REMOVING 562456 1 12 DRIVE BOLT, THE ACTUATOR WAS ROTATED TOWARD "UNLATCHED DIRECTION WITH 562456 1 13 LATCHES IN THE MIDDLE OF THEIR TRAVEL. WITH BOLT LOOSE INSTALLED, 562456 1 14 LATCHES WERE ACTUATED TO LATCHED POSITION (LATCHED LIGHT ON AT 562456 1 15 C70-0863). THEN THE AFT LATCHES WERE ROTATED/OVERCENTER WAS CERIFIED 562456 1 16 PER DWG V070-594450/SPEC MLO308-0023. THE SHAFT (TORQUE SHAFT) AND 562456 1 17 ACTUATOR WERE ASSEMBLED AT THE CLOSEST ALIGNMENT WHERE THROUGH BOLT & 562456 1 18 HARDWARE COULD BE INSTALLED. THE OVERALL RIG WAS VERIFIED BY CYCLING 562456 1 19 THE LATCHES OPEN THEN CLOSED. LATCHED/UNLATCHED LIGHTS ON THE C70-0863 562456 1 20 REMOTE LATCHING GSE & RUN TIMES WERE CONSISTENT AND NORMAL RANGE. THE 562456 1 21 RADIATOR TO PAYLOAD BAY CAVITY WAS CLOSED OUT & RADIATOR LATCHED 562456 1 22 WITHOUT ANOMALIES. TO ALLOW LIFTING RADIATORS ONE AT A TIME, ATTACHMENT 562456 1 23 1 DISCONNECTED JUMPERS BETWEEN FWD & AFT DEPLOYABLE RADIATORS. 562456 1 24 REINSTALLATION WAS PERFOMRED IN STEPS 59-68. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 562460 1 1 THE REPAIR OF DAMAGED WIRE 1D1838C24-1 PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR D 562460 1 2 ISPO E.EL 101.1, HAS RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULF 562460 1 3 ILL DESIGN INTENT. THIS INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAG 562460 1 4 E. SCAN TRACKING FOR CONN 83P55 (REF STEP 11) WILL FULFILL RETEST RQMTS. 562460 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 562519 1 1 NOTED V070-298120-001 THERMAL BARRIER WITH CRACK WAS ROUTED TO HDA FOR D 562519 1 2 ISPO AND A NEW THERMAL BARRIER WAS OBTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TE 562519 1 3 AR. 562816 1 1 MOUNTING RING WAS FOUND TO HAVE 1 EXTRA HOLE DRILLED INTO RING COVER. MR 562816 1 2 ACTION WAS TAKEN TO MATCH DRILL HOLE TO RING ANGLE AND BLANKET ADAPTER 562816 1 3 THEN INSTALL HI-LOK. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 562823 1 1 THE DAMAGED SHIELD BRAID ON WIRE T50C26 WAS REPAIRED USING ENGINEERING S 562823 1 2 TANDARD REPAIR DISPO E.EL101.15. THE SHIELD WAS TERMINATED INSIDE THE BA 562823 1 3 CKSHELL USING A 24 GA JUMPER. THIS REPAIR RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGU 562823 1 4 RATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTE 562823 1 5 D USAGE. CONN CONTINUITY TEST PERFORMED BY THE MOD TPS. FUNCTIONAL RETES 562823 1 6 T RQMTS FOR THE DEMATED CONNECTORS WILL BE PERFORMED PER THE SCAN TRACKI 562823 1 7 NG SYSTEM. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 562824 1 1 THE CONTACT WHICH WAS LEFT IN THE CONNECTOR AFTER THE WIRE WAS PULLED OU 562824 1 2 T WAS SUCCESSFULLY REMOVED. A NEW CONTACT WAS CRIMPED ONTO THE WIRE AND 562824 1 3 THE CONTACT WAS SUCCESSFULLY INSERTED AND LOCKED PER DWG. PROBABLE CAUSE 562824 1 4 : WORKMANSHIP. 562857 1 1 BRACKET 70C3521-1 WAS MISIDENTIFIED AND INSTALLED AS A 70C3512-1. BRACKE 562857 1 2 T 70C3512-1 WAS MISIDENTIFIED AND INSTALLED AS A 70C3521-1. WHEN THE ERR 562857 1 3 OR WAS DISCOVERED THE BRACKETS WERE REMOVED, PROPERLY IDENTIFIED AND REI 562857 1 4 NSTALLED IN THEIR RESPECTIVE PROPER LOCATIONS. DURING THE INSTALLATION I 562857 1 5 T WAS NOTED THAT A MISMATCH EXISTED AT ONE HOLE LOCATION ON EACH BRACKET 562857 1 6 . THE MISMATCHED HOLES WERE PLUGGED AND MR ID'D PER MR DISPOSITION. THE 562857 1 7 70C3521-1 AND 70C3512-1 BRACKETS WERE THEN INSTALLED PER PRINT. NO FURTH 562857 1 8 ER ACTION REQ'D ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: MANUFACTURING ERROR. 562880 1 1 NOT PROCESSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPI QA-001. REINITIATED AS MEQ-3-J2-09 562880 1 2 63, 0962, 0960, 0961 562912 1 1 ITEM 001, DWG V070-346048 WAS REVISED TO ADD 6 BRACKETS, EO J07 WAS RELE 562912 1 2 ASED ON 3-15-96. ITEM 002, TWO DWGS WERE REVISED TO ADD 4 SUPTS, DWG V07 562912 1 3 0-340352 EO H14 AND V070-340444 EO B08 WAS RELEASED ON 3-15-96. ITEM 003 562912 1 4 , MR ACTION PLUGGED ONE HOLE, SECOND HOLE WAS PICKED UP BY CLIP. CLIP WA 562912 1 5 S INSTALLED PER DWG RQMT. ITEM 004, MR ACTION PLUGGED 2 HOLES. CLIP WAS 562912 1 6 INSTALLED PER DWG RQMT. ITEM 005, MR ACTION REMOVED MISLOCATED SUPTS AND 562912 1 7 PLUGGED FASTENER HOLES WITH HI-LOKS. REMOVED SUPTS WERE INSTALLED ON BA 562912 1 8 CK SIDE OF WIRE TRAY LH SIDE PER DWG RQMTS. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED, STRU 562912 1 9 CTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBA 562912 1 10 BLE CAUSE: ITEMS 001 & 002, ENGRG OVERSIGHT. ITEMS 003 & 005 WORKMANSHIP 563088 1 1 THE V070-340121-007 ANGLE COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO AN INTERFERENCE 563088 1 2 WITH AN EXISTING BRACKET. EO J07 WAS RELEASED TO THE V070-346048 INSTALL 563088 1 3 ATION DWG TO RELOCATE THE ANGLE TO ACCEPTABLE LOCATION. THE ANGLE WAS IN 563088 1 4 STALLED PER TPS STR-3-J2-656 SEQUENCE 47. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED. 563088 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 563089 1 1 REMOVAL OF HEAT SINK EXPOSED BARE METAL. THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTE 563089 1 2 D PER MAO608-301 CODE 01-CF-21-XX. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL IN 563089 1 3 TEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. NEW HEAT SINK 563089 1 4 TO BE INST'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: HEATSINK REMOVAL. 563131 1 1 WHILE PERFORMING TROUBLESHOOTING OF AN OUT OF RIG CONDITION ON THE RH FW 563131 1 2 D RADIATOR LATCHES (1-6) AN OUT OF RIG CONDITION WAS FOUND TO EXIST ONTH 563131 1 3 E LH FWD RADIATOR LATCHES (1-6). WHILE PERFORMING AN ACCESS REMOVAL OF T 563131 1 4 HE AFT O/B RADIATOR LATCH & PUSHROD, THE TORQUE ROD TO ACTUATOR JOINT WA 563131 1 5 S DISASSEMBLED & REASSEMBLED OUT OF RIG (REF IPR 082V-0023). THE AFT LAT 563131 1 6 CHES WOULD REACH THEIR STOPS IN THE LATCH POSITION BEFORE THE FWD 4 LATC 563131 1 7 HES AND PDU WOULD REACH LATCHED POSITION. SINCE THE POSITION SWITCH IN T 563131 1 8 HE PDU WAS NEVER CONTACTED, MOTOR COULD NOT SHUT OFF BY RELAY. TO RE-RIG 563131 1 9 THE LATCHES WERE POSITIONED IN THE MIDDLE OF THEIR TRAVEL, THE BOLT & 563131 1 10 HARDWARE AT THE ACTUATOR TO TORQUE ROD INTERFACE WAS DISCONNECTED & THE 563131 1 11 ACTUATOR ROTATED TOWARDS UNLATCH SO THE REST OF THE LATCHES & PDU COULD 563131 1 12 REACH THEIR STOPS. THE COLLAR BOLT & NUT WERE TEMP INSTALLED FINER 563131 1 13 TIGHT & THE PDU/LATCHES DRIVEN CLOSED. THE AFT ACTUATOR WAS 563131 1 14 DISCONNECTED & MANUALLY ROTATED UNTIL BOTH AFT LATCHES WERE ON THEIR 563131 1 15 STOPS & PRELOAD VERIFIED (REF V070-594450 & MLO308-0023). THE COLLAR 563131 1 16 BOLT WAS REINSTALLED PER DWG RQMTS. THE LATCHES WERE CYCLED, WITH 563131 1 17 NORMAL CYCLE TIMES & POSITION SWITCH RESPONSES. THE AREA WAS CLOSED OUT 563131 1 18 & THE RADIATOR LATCHED. AFTER RERIG OF PORT AFT RADIATOR LATCHES (7-12) 563131 1 19 WAS COMPLETED, A "RUN 2" WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY THAT BOLT ENGAGEMENT 563131 1 20 IN THE COLLAR COULD NOT BE TIGHTENED TO NEX BOLT POSITION. (THIS WAS 563131 1 21 DONE SINCE BOLT/COLLAR ENGAGEMENT WAS DONE BY ROTATING ACTUATOR TOWARDS 563131 1 22 "UNLATCH") ROTATING ACTUATOR TOWARDS LATCH RESULTED IN EXCESSIVE FORCE 563131 1 23 BEING REQ'D TO ENGAGE BOLT, SO BOLT WAS REINSTALLED AS IN RUN 1. 563131 1 24 RETEST/CLOSEOUT/LATCHING WAS PERFORMED WITHOUT ANOMALY. ATTACHMENT 1 563131 1 25 REMOVED FREON JUMPERS TO PERMIT RADIATORS TO BE RAISED INDEPENDENTLY 563131 1 26 WITHOUT BINDING ON JUMPERS. REINSTALLATION WAS PERFOMRED IN STEPS 563131 1 27 56-71. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 563132 1 1 WHILE TROUBLESHOOTING A LATCHING PROBLEM ON THE RH FWD RADIATOR LATCHES 563132 1 2 (1-6) ON IPR 082V-0023, A SIMILAR OUT OF RIG CONDITION WAS FOUND ON THES 563132 1 3 E PORT ASSY RADIATOR LATCHES (7-12). THE AFT O/B RADIATOR LATCH WAS REMO 563132 1 4 VED & DISCONNECTED AT THE AFT ACTUATOR TO PUSHROD INTERFACE. TO ACCESS 563132 1 5 THE PUSHROD BOLT, THE THROUGH BOLT AT THE TORQUE ROD TO AFT ACTUATOR INT 563132 1 6 ERFACE. THE TORQUE ROD INTERFACE WAS INSTALLED OUT OF RIG (REF STR-3-J2- 563132 1 7 641). THE RESULTING CONDITION WAS FOR THE AFT LATCHES TO CONTACT THEIR S 563132 1 8 TOPS EARLY, PREVENTING THE OTHER 4 LATCHES & PDU SWITCH TO REACH FULL 563132 1 9 LATCHED POSITIONS. TO RE-RIG THE LATCHES, THEY WERE POWERED TO THE 563132 1 10 MIDDLE OF THEIR TRAVEL & THE THROUGH BOLT AT THE ACTUATOR/TORQUE ROD 563132 1 11 INTERFACE REMOVED. THE AFT LATCHES WERE ROTATED AWAY FROM THE LATCHED 563132 1 12 POSITION SO THE OTHER LATCHES & PDU/SWITCH WILL REACH LATCHED STOPS 563132 1 13 FIRST. THE THROUGH BOLT WAS TEMP INSTALLED & THE LATCHES/PDU WAS 563132 1 14 POWERED TO LATCHED POSITION. THE AFT LATCHES WERE ADJUSTED TO THEIR 563132 1 15 STOPS AND PRELOAD VERIFIED (REF DWG V070-394450 & MLO308-0023). THROUGH 563132 1 16 BOLT WAS REINSTALLED, LATCHES WERE CYCLED WITHOUT ANOMALY. RUN TIMES 563132 1 17 WERE NORMAL AND INDICATIONS (LIGHTS) WERE NORMAL. THE AREA WAS CLOSED 563132 1 18 OUT & THE RADIATOR LATCHED WITHOUT INCIDENT. REWORK, RETEST & CLOSEOUT 563132 1 19 COMPLETE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 563137 1 1 DURING EVALUATION OF A LATCHING ANOMALY, ON IPR 082V-0023, IT WAS DISCOV 563137 1 2 ERED THAT THE AFT PAIR OF LATCHES ON THE STBD AFT RAD LATCHES (7-12) WER 563137 1 3 E OUT OF RIG. THE AFT LATCHES WERE REACHING THEIR STOPS & KEEPING THE FW 563137 1 4 D 4 LATCHES & THE PDU FROM REACHING FULL LATCH. THE PDU SWITCH (LATCHED) 563137 1 5 WAS NOT CLOSING. FUTHER RESEARCH SHOWED THAT A REMOVAL OF THE AFT O/B L 563137 1 6 ATCH & PUSHROD WERE PERFORMED FOR ACCESS ON STR-3-J2-641. DURING DISCONN 563137 1 7 ECT OF THE PUSHROD (O/B) AT THE ACTUATOR, THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE AFT 563137 1 8 TORQUE ROD & THE ACTUATOR WAS DISCONNECTED BY REMOVING THE THROUGH BOLT 563137 1 9 FROM ITS COLLAR ON THE ACTUATOR. SUBSEQUENT REINSTALLATION WAS OUT OF 563137 1 10 RIG. DURING RERIG, BOLT REMOVAL WAS VERY DIFFICULT, SINCE MUCH PAINT 563137 1 11 HAD BEEN USED IN A "WET INSTALL" OF THE THROUGH BOLT. THE ACTUATOR TO 563137 1 12 TORQUE ROD INTERFACE DID NOT SPIN FREE. AN ATTEMPT TO USE ACTUATOR 563137 1 13 POWER TO FREE JOINT FROM ASSUMED PAINT SEIZED CONDITION, RESULTED IN A 563137 1 14 GOUGE IN THE ROD VISIBLE THROUGH BOTH BOLT HOLES IN THE ACTUATOR 563137 1 15 COLLAR, DOCUMENTED IN CONDITION 1A. MR RWK OF THE TORQUE ROD WAS 563137 1 16 ACCOMPLISHED BY REMOVING, POLISHING & CORROSION PROTECTING THE AFFECTED 563137 1 17 AREA. AFTER REINSTALLATION, THE RERIG WAS PERFORMED BY RUNNING THE AFT 563137 1 18 LATCHES AGAINST THEIR STOPS (FWD LATCHES ALREADY ON STEPS). THEN 563137 1 19 PRELOAD WAS VERIFIED AT THE LATCHES & THE ACTUATOR/TORQUE ROD 563137 1 20 INSTALLATION COMPLETED (REF V070-594450 DWG & SPEC MLO308-0023). 563137 1 21 LATCHES WERE SUCCESSFULLY CYCLED WITH LIGHT INDICATORS & OPERATING 563137 1 22 TIMES NORMAL. AFTER AREA WAS SUCCESSFULLY CLOSED OUT, RADIATOR WAS 563137 1 23 LATCHED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 563139 1 1 THE 1 EXTRA .098 DIA HOLE DRILLED IN THE V070-338424-001 SUPT ASSY WAS P 563139 1 2 LUGGED USING A MD121-0002-03 RIVET PER MAO101-302. THE PLUGGING OF THE H 563139 1 3 OLE WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. THE SUPT ASSY WAS MR ID'D. T 563139 1 4 HE SUPT ASSY HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER 563139 1 5 WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 563140 1 1 THE 1 EXTRA .098 DIA HOLE DRILLED IN THE V070-338380-001 BEAM WAS PLUGGE 563140 1 2 D USING A MD121-0002-03 RIVET PER MAO101-302. THE PLUGGING OF THE HOLE W 563140 1 3 AS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. THE BEAM WAS MR ID'D. THE BEAM HA 563140 1 4 S BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D. 563140 1 5 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 563272 1 1 OLD HARDWARE WAS REMOVED AND SCRAPED LOCALLY AND NEW HARDWARE WAS ACQUIR 563272 1 2 ED AND INSTALLED PER V5K02 AND V5K03. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED. PROBA 563272 1 3 BLE CAUSE: EXCESSIVE WEAR AND TEAR. 563274 1 1 OLD HARDWARE WAS REMOVED AND SCRAPED LOCALLY AND NEW HARDWARE WAS ACQUIR 563274 1 2 ED AND INSTALLED PER V5K03. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: EX 563274 1 3 CESSIVE WEAR AND TEAR. 563277 1 1 OLD HARDWARE WAS REMOVED AND SCRAPTED LOCALLY AND NEW HARDWARE WAS ACQUI 563277 1 2 RED AND INSTALLED PER V5K03. NO FURTHER WORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: E 563277 1 3 XCESSIVE WEAR AND TEAR. 563327 1 1 ITEM 1: (3) PER PRINT NUTPLATES COULD NOT BE REINSTALLED ON RH UPPER, 563327 1 2 RH LOWER AND LH LOWER DOME RING COVER SPLICE DUE TO RIVETS BEING TOO 563327 1 3 CLOSE TO EDGE. MR ACTION WAS TAKEN TO PLUG 1 RIVET HOLE INSTALL CORNER 563327 1 4 NUTPLATE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS PROCESS TOLERANCE. ITEM 2: THIS ITEM 563327 1 5 DOCUMENTS OPEN HOLE LEFT IN V070-852902 BLANKET ADAPTER FROM CHANGED 563327 1 6 NUTPLATES. THESE HOLES WERE MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE 563327 1 7 CAUSE IS PROCEDURAL ERROR. ITEM 3: O/T GAP BETWEEN DOME RING SEGMENTS 563327 1 8 ARE ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR 563327 1 9 WORKMANSHIP. 563357 1 1 DUE TO SCHEDULE CONSTRAINTS, THE HIGH POTENTIAL TEST WAS PERFORMED ON WH 563357 1 2 V070-778334 WITHOUT SOME CLAMPS BEING INSTALLED IN THE BAY 3A. TWO EPD- 563357 1 3 3-J2-411 PERFORMED THE HI-POT TESTS. THE CONNECTORS HI-POT TESTED ARE SC 563357 1 4 AN TRACKED, WHICH MAINTAINS CONN CONFIGURATION AND FUNCTIONAL RETEST STA 563357 1 5 TUS. FUNCTIONAL RETEST RQMTS FOR THE DEMATED CONNECTORS WILL BE PERFORME 563357 1 6 D PER THE SCAN TRACKING SYSTEM. PROBABLE CAUSE: SCHEDULE CONSTRAINTS. 563746 1 1 THE AFT BUSHING ON HINGE FITTING NUMBER 5, P/N 224-00154-105 AT XO1283, 563746 1 2 WAS FOUND TO BE EXCESSIVELY GAULED. THE FITTING AS REMOVED FROM THE RADI 563746 1 3 ATOR FOR BEST ACCESS TO BUSHING. BOTH BUSHINGS ON THE FITTING WERE REPLA 563746 1 4 CED AND LINE REAMED PER DWG RQMTS. FITTING WAS REPLACED PER PRINT. NO FU 563746 1 5 RTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 563749 1 1 THE SHIELD FINISH/CODE FOR WIRE T1714BB26 AT CONN 30P29 IS "1Z" (I.E. "P 563749 1 2 IGTAIL"). APPARENTLY, THE SHIELD TERMINATION HAD BEEN DAMAGED (I.E. SEVE 563749 1 3 RED) AND REPAIRED DURING PREVIOUS MODS. HOWEVER, THIS REPAIR DISPLAYED V 563749 1 4 ERY POOR WORKMANSHIP AS NOTED ON ITEMS 001 & 002. THEREFORE, THE DISCREP 563749 1 5 ANT SOLDER SLEEVE WAS REMOVED. A REPLACEMENT SOLDER SLEEVE, P/N MD416-00 563749 1 6 32-0007, USING A 24 GA "JUMPER" (ORIG REPAIR USED 22 GA) WAS INSTALLED P 563749 1 7 ER ESRD 101.15, METHOD "A". THIS SECOND REPAIR CORRECTED BOTH WORKMANSHI 563749 1 8 P ISSUES FOR ITEMS 001 (SPLIT AT THE SOLDER RING) & 002 (NO EVIDENCE OF 563749 1 9 "WETTING" AT SOLDER RING). IN THE INITIAL DISPOSITION, THE MR ID 563749 1 10 MARKING "OEL-3-J2-0708" (REF STEP 17) WAS IN ERROR AND WAS MARKED 563749 1 11 ACCORDINGLY (REF ITEM 003). THIS INCORRECT MARKING WAS REMOVED AND THE 563749 1 12 CORRECT ONE WAS MARKED TO REFLECT THE ACTUAL MR ID MARKING OF 563749 1 13 "OEL-3-J2-0907" PER STEP 24. THIS REPAIR HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION 563749 1 14 TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE 563749 1 15 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED PER ECL-3-J2-415, SEQ 563749 1 16 6.14 (REF STEP 19). PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP (ITEMS 001 & 002). WORK 563749 1 17 AUTHORIZATION ERROR (003). 563750 1 1 ELECTRICAL CONN 81V77W8P29 CAVITY (25) HAS FAILED DURING THE HIPOT TEST. 563750 1 2 UPON TROUBLESHOOTING, AN INSPECTION OF WIRE NO E1272C26 WAS DISCOVERED 563750 1 3 A NICK IN THE INSULATION OF WIRE E1272C26 SEGMENT 2, WIRE BROKE OUT OF T 563750 1 4 HE SHIELD AND THE CONDUCTOR WAS VISIBLE. SEGMENT 2 WAS THEN ISOLATED FRO 563750 1 5 M SHIELD & BACKSHELL & A SUCCESSFUL HIPOT TEST WAS PERFORMED. IT WAS THE 563750 1 6 REFORE CONCLUDED THAT THE WIRE E127272C26 SEGMENT 2 CAUSED THE HIPOT FAI 563750 1 7 LURE. ITEM 001: A REPAIR WAS DONE ON THE DISCREPANT WIRE E1272C26 SEGMEN 563750 1 8 T 2 USING AN INSULATOR/SEALING SLEEVE ONLY FROM SPLICE KIT ME416-0031-20 563750 1 9 01. A CONTIUITY & HIPOT TEST PER MLO202-0003 WAS DONE. THEN AN ID PLATE 563750 1 10 "MR OEL-3-J2-0910" WAS MARKED ONTHE DISCREPANT WIRE. CONTINUITY & HIPOT 563750 1 11 TESTS ACCEPTABLE. ITEM 002: THIS REPAIR INVOLVES THE INSTALLATION OF A 563750 1 12 SPLICE INSULATOR SLEEVE OVER THE DAMAGED AREA OF THE WIRE INSULATION TO 563750 1 13 RETURN TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. PROBABLE 563750 1 14 CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 563753 1 1 THE HI-LOK COLLAR (ME114-0022-0105) COULD NOT BE INSTALLED WITHOUT INTER 563753 1 2 FERING WITH THE MILK STOOL. A NUT (MD114-1001-0004) AND WASHER (NAS620C1 563753 1 3 0) WAS INSTALLED IN IT'S PLACE WITH A TORQUE RQMT OF 20 TO 20 INCH POUND 563753 1 4 S. IT WAS CORROSION PROTECTED AND ID'D AS A MR. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE C 563753 1 5 OLLAR TO A NUT DOES NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY OF THE VEHICLE 563753 1 6 . THE FIT AND FUNCTION IS PER DESIGN INTENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE B 563753 1 7 UILDUP. 563754 1 1 THE 1 EXTRA .098 DIA HOLE DRILLED IN THE 70A24804-15E SUPT WAS PLUGGED U 563754 1 2 SING MBO120-008 ADHESIVE PER MAO106-305 GRADE "B". THE PLUGGING OF THE H 563754 1 3 OLE WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. THE RING ASSY WAS MR ID'D. T 563754 1 4 HE SUPT HAS BEEN RETURNED TO AN ACCEPTABLE CONDITION AND NO FURTHER WORK 563754 1 5 IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 563755 1 1 THE BACKSHELL OF CONN 30V77W2P9565 WAS REPAIRED TO RESTORE THE ORIGINAL 563755 1 2 REPAIR PER MR OEL-3-13-0098. MBO120-037 ADHESIVE WAS USED (2 BEADS, 180 563755 1 3 DEGREES APART) TO SECURE THE BACKSHELL TANG TO THE BACKSHELL TERMINATOR 563755 1 4 SHELL ON CONN 30P9565. THIS WAS DONE TO PREVENT TANG ROTATION DUE TO AN 563755 1 5 UNREMOVEABLE STRIPPED SET SCREW. THE EXISTING MR ID PLATE (REF OEL-3-13- 563755 1 6 0098) WAS REPLACED AT THE SAME LOCATION WITH AN MR ID PLATE MARKED "MR O 563755 1 7 EL-3-J2-0908". THIS REPAIR IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABL 563755 1 8 E CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 563832 1 1 REMOVED P/N V070-335084-001 OCN F69985 (ME128-0026-4006 AND ME128-0037-0 563832 1 2 004 HARDWARE IS ATTACHED TO PART). FOR DEBONDED AREA, THE DISCREPANCY WA 563832 1 3 S BONDED PER MAO106-336 USING MBO120-079 ADHESIVE GRADE B. CRACKED AREAS 563832 1 4 , IT WAS STOPPED DRILLED/OR REINFORCED WITH FIBERGLASS LAMINATED AND LAI 563832 1 5 D OVER THE AREA, THEN BONDED WITH THE ABOVE MENTIONED ADHESIVE AND PROCE 563832 1 6 SS. THE SHORE "D" HARDNESS IS 78 FOR ALL MSMTS. THIS IS ACCEPTABLE. CORR 563832 1 7 OSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-CF-20-XW AND HARDWARE WAS REINSTA 563832 1 8 LLED. REINSTALLED COVER OCN 03953-F69985 WITH 20-30 INCH LB TORQUE. APPL 563832 1 9 IED TORQUE IS 30 IN LBS. MR WAS IDENTIFIED WITH THIS MR NUMBER. ALL 563832 1 10 REPAIR WAS STRUCTURALLY ADEQUATE AND THIS PANEL IS CONSIDERED A 563832 1 11 SECONDARY STRUCTURE WITH NO APPLIED FLIGHT LOADS. PROBABLE CAUSE: 563832 1 12 EXCESSIVE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL. 563834 1 1 MR ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO REWORK THE V070-298120-001 THERMAL BARRIER FOR 563834 1 2 UNRESTRICTED USE. THE MISALIGNED HOLE ONTHE V070-298120-001 THERMAL BAR 563834 1 3 RIER ON THE LH UPPER RSB WAS SLOTTED IN THE DIRECTION OF THE MISLOCATED 563834 1 4 HOLE IN THE STRUCTURE. THERMAL BARRIER IS MR ID'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKM 563834 1 5 ANSHIP. 563838 1 1 THE MD131-6002-0006 SPHERICAL BEARING WAS DAMAGED, CAUSING INTERFERENCE 563838 1 2 OF THE BOLT INSTALLATION. THE T01P31169-031 FITTING AND DETAIL HARDWARE 563838 1 3 WERE REMOVED IN ORDER TO R&R THE DAMAGED BEARING. FOLLOWING REMOVAL AND 563838 1 4 REPLACEMENT OF THE BEARING, THE NAS6306UXX BOLT WAS FIT CHECKED, WITH NO 563838 1 5 INTERFERENCE NOTED. THE T01P31169-031 AND DETAIL HARDWARE WERE REINSTAL 563838 1 6 LED, AND THE CONFORMAL COATING WAS REMOVED & REPLACED PER MAO106-330. AN 563838 1 7 ELECTRICAL BOND RESISTANCE CHECK WAS PERFORMED, AND RTV WAS APPLIED. TH 563838 1 8 IS REWORK HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WE 563838 1 9 AR AND TEAR. 563991 1 1 ITEM 001 (B) & 002 (B) "WORN DOWN LOCKING TEETH": ENGINEERING REVIEW REV 563991 1 2 EALED THAT THE "WORN TEETH" ON BOTH THE CONN PLUG AND BACKSHELL FOR CONN 563991 1 3 S 30P758 (001 B) & 30P732 (002 B) ARE A RESULT OF NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. 563991 1 4 HOWEVER, THERE REMAINS SUFFICIENT "TEETH" AREA TO PROPERLY ENGAGE AND TO 563991 1 5 RQUE THE BACKSHELL INTO THE CONNS PLUG TO MEET DWG RQMTS. THEREFORE, THE 563991 1 6 SE CONDITIONS ARE NOT A PR CONDITION AND REQUIRE NO REWORK/REPAIRS. ITEM 563991 1 7 001 (A): ITEM 001 (A) WAS UPGRADED TO AN MR. ONE OF THE ALIGNMENT KEYS 563991 1 8 ON 30P758 WAS COMPLETELY SHEARED OFF, SO ALL SHARP EDGES WERE REMOVED AT 563991 1 9 DAMAGED KEYWAY. THE 30V77W2P758 CONN BARREL WAS ID'D WITH MR 563991 1 10 OEL-3-J2-0911. THE DAMAGES LISTED (001 A) ARE COSMETIC AND WILL NOT 563991 1 11 AFFECT DESIGN INTENT/FUNCTION OF THE CONNECTOR. POLARIZATION OF THE 563991 1 12 CONN SHELLS IS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE FIVE KEYS. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY WILL 563991 1 13 BE MAINTAINED WITH THE ONE DAMAGED KEYWAY. ITEM 002 (A): THE DAMAGED 563991 1 14 SHIELD BRAID ON WIRE YC277A24 WAS REPAIRED USING ENGINEERING STANDARD 563991 1 15 REPAIR DISPOSITION E.EL101.15. THE SHIELD WAS TERMINATED INSIDE THE 563991 1 16 BACKSHELL USING A 24 GA JUMPER. A SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY AND HYPOT TEST 563991 1 17 WERE PERFORMED. THIS REPAIR RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT 563991 1 18 WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. 563991 1 19 PROBABLE CAUSE: (001 B) (002 B): FAIR WEAR AND TEAR. PROBABLE CAUSE: 563991 1 20 (001 A) (002 A): WORKMANSHIP. 563996 1 1 THE NOTED DISCREPANCY FOR THE CONN LISTED ON PG 1 REF ITEM 001, OCCURRED 563996 1 2 DURING "INITIAL" BUILD OF THE ORBITER (REF "MRBD9367000M") AND IS THERE 563996 1 3 FORE APPLICABLE TO MLO303-0014, SECTION 6, "MODIFICATION/REPAIR OF DELIV 563996 1 4 ERED/FLOWN HARDWARE". ENGINEERING REVIEWED THE NOTED DISCREPANCY AND EVA 563996 1 5 LUATED THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS TO THE "SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSU 563996 1 6 E" IN PARA 6.7.2 OF THE NOTED SECTION: THE NOTED "BOW STRING" CONDITION 563996 1 7 WAS ONLY OBSERVED WHEN THE CONN WAS PULLED AWAY FROM THE FIREST CLAMP (I 563996 1 8 E HARNESS STRETCHED & WIRE 2P206A26 IS SHORTEST WIRE IN THE RUN). FOLLOW 563996 1 9 ING THE FINAL MATE OF THE CONN AND INSTALLATION OF SPOT TIES PER DWG 563996 1 10 RQMTS (REF STEP 24), THE "BOWED STRING" CONDITION WAS NOT OBSERVED BY 563996 1 11 ENGINEERING. ENGINEERING AS DETERMINED THAT THIS CONDITION DOES NOT 563996 1 12 AFFECT "SAFETY OF FLIGHT" AND ALSO MEETS DWG RQMTS. THEREFORE, THIS 563996 1 13 CONDITION REQUIRES NO REWORK/REPAIR. PROBABLE CAUSE: HARNESS 563996 1 14 MODIFICATIONS. 564270 1 1 TROUBLESHOOTING STEPS 1 THRU 4 ISOLATED THE CAUSE OF THE ISOLATION TEST 564270 1 2 FAILURE AT 83P12 PIN 92. INSPECTION OF WIRE NO E1485AB22-3 FOUND A NICK 564270 1 3 IN THE INSULATION OF WIRE E1485AB22-3 THE CONDUCTOR IS VISIBLE AND A BRO 564270 1 4 KEN STRAND WAS FOUND USING A 10X MAGNIFIER. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT LENGTH 564270 1 5 TO RETERMINATE PER DWG RQMTS. WIRE E1485AB22 WAS EXTRACTED FROM CONN 83P 564270 1 6 12 AND RETERMINATED PER MLO303-0032. THIS RWK RETURNED THE INSTALLATION 564270 1 7 TO DWG RQMTS. A SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY AND HYPOT WERE PERFORMED. PROBABLE 564270 1 8 CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 564276 1 1 FIFTEEN HI-LOKS WERE WRITTEN UP AS BEING NOT FLUSH. DISPO WAS ADDED TO R 564276 1 2 EMOVE HI-LOKS, DEBURR HOLES AND INSTALL HI-LOKS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKM 564276 1 3 ANSHIP. 564463 1 1 DAMAGED STRUT WAS REMOVED. PRR WAS GENERATED. REMOVED STRUT WAS ROUTED T 564463 1 2 HRU HDA TO ROCKWELL SERVICE CENTER (NSLD). NSLD FABRICATED REPLACEMENT A 564463 1 3 LUMINUM STRUT USING END FITTINGS FROM THE DAMAGED STRUT. NEW STRUT WAS I 564463 1 4 NSTALLED USING RETAINED HARDWARE. SAFETY WIRE NUT TO BOLT PER MAO113-302 564463 1 5 . PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 564465 1 1 ITEM 001: A FLIGHT CAP ME193-0056-1010 (1) WAS OBTAINED AND INSTALLED ON 564465 1 2 CONN 82J800, A STOWED CONN WITH NO PROVISIONS FOR A FLIGHT CAP. EO TO F 564465 1 3 OLLOW V070-793871 E20 WAS VERIFIED AND RELEASED ON 3-28-96. PROBABLE CAU 564465 1 4 SE: ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY. 564466 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: THE REMOVAL & REPLACEMENT OF THE DAMAGED BACKSHELL, 564466 001 2 P/N NLS-SCT-8, FOR CONNECTOR 40V77W28P39 PER THE ABOVE STEPS HAS RETURN 564466 001 3 ED THE INSTALLATION TO DRAWING CONFIGURATION. FUNCTIONAL TEST WILL BE P 564466 001 4 ERFORMED BY ECL-3-J2-415 SEQ. 04. CERTIFICATION IS NOT AFFECTED. PROBA 564466 001 5 BLE CAUSE: WEAR & TEAR. 564467 1 1 SILICONE GASKET WAS REBONDED USING MBO130-085 ADHESIVE PER MAO106-330 GR 564467 1 2 B. THE FILTER WAS INSTALLED TO SUPPLY POSITIVE PRESSURE FOR BONDING. RE 564467 1 3 PAIR DID NOT ADHERE AT CENTER CAVITY LOCATION. THE AREA WAS CLEANED AND 564467 1 4 THE SEAL WAS REBONDED USING POSITIVE PRESSURE. BOND WAS CURED AND THE AD 564467 1 5 HESIVE REACHED A SHORE "A" OF 60. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 564472 1 1 PR WAS WRITTEN IN ERROR. EO C05 V070-346165 REVISED THE CALLOUT FOR 2 EA 564472 1 2 70A3255-1 SUPTS TO BE REMOVED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: 564472 1 3 NO PR CONDITION. 564502 1 1 PLBD HINGE PIN BOLT WOULD NOT PASS THROUGH BEARING DUE TO EXCESSIVE BUIL 564502 1 2 D-UP OF FOREIGN MATERIAL. .400 GRIT (OR FINER) ABRASIVE PAPER WAS USED O 564502 1 3 N INTERIOR OF BEARING. IT WAS THEN WIPED CLEAN WITH ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL AN 564502 1 4 D DRIED WITH A CLEAN, LINT-FREE WIPE. DISCOLORATION WAS REMOVED BY SANDI 564502 1 5 NG AND CLEANING OF THE BEARING INTERIOR. BOLT WAS FIT-CHECKED AND INSTAL 564502 1 6 LATION WILL CONTINUE PER V5K03. PROBABLE CAUSE: BUILD-UP DUE TO NORMAL W 564502 1 7 EAR AND TEAR. 564535 1 1 WIRE SEGMENT 2D1841D24-3 WAS FOUND TO HAVE DAMAGED INSULATION NEAR THE C 564535 1 2 ONN (83P49) BACKSHELL AFTER HI-POT FAILURE AT PIN 91 OF 83P49. WIRE CABL 564535 1 3 E 2D1841D24 WAS EXTRACTED FROM 83P49 AND SEGMENT 3 WAS REPAIRED USING AN 564535 1 4 INSULATOR/SEALING SLEEVE FROM A ME416-0031-1001 SPLICE KIT. ADJACENT WI 564535 1 5 RE SEGMENTS OF 2D1841D24 WERE INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE ALSO BUT NONE WAS FOU 564535 1 6 ND. WIRE CABLE 2D1841D24 CONTACTS WERE THEN INSERTED BACK INTO THE CONN 564535 1 7 AND THE BACKSHELL CLOSED. AN MR ID PLATE "MR OEL-3-J2-0916" WAS INSTALLE 564535 1 8 D NEAR 83P49 PER MLO303-0013. CONTINUITY AND HI-POT TESTING WAS THEN SUC 564535 1 9 CESSFULLY PERFORMED ON WIRE CABLE 2D1841D24. THIS REPAIR IS ACCEPTABLE 564535 1 10 FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 564562 1 1 WHILE REWORKING CONN 40P311, PER EPD-3-J2-378, TERM 83 AND 84, IT WAS DI 564562 1 2 SCOVERED THAT THERE WERE NO PINS IN CONN 40P311 TERM 83 AND 84. WIRE 1M2 564562 1 3 516B22 IN TERM 78 S/B IN TERM 83, WIRE 1M2517B22 IN TERM 77 S/B IN TERM 564562 1 4 88, WIRE 1M2518B22 IN TERM 128 S/B IN TERM 127 AND WIRE 1M251B22 IN TERM 564562 1 5 127 S/B IN TERM 128. THEREFORE, THE CONTACT FOR WIRE 1M2516B22 WAS EXTR 564562 1 6 ACTED FROM TERM 78 AND REINSERTED INTO 83, 1M2517B22 WAS EXTRACED FROM T 564562 1 7 ERM 77 AND REINSERTED INTO 84, 1M251B22 WAS EXTRACTED FROM TERM 128 AND 564562 1 8 REINSERTED INTO 127, 1M2519B22 WAS EXTRACTED FROM TERM 127 AND REINSERTE 564562 1 9 D INTO 128. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY THE CLOSING OF THE CONN. THE RWK PER 564562 1 10 THE ABOVE STEPS HAS RETURNED CONN 40P311 TO DWG RQMTS. A SUCCESSFUL 564562 1 11 CONTINUITY TEST WAS PERFORMED. PROBABLE CAUSE: PLANNING ERROR. 564643 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, DENTS IN HATCH OUTER DIA HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED F 564643 1 2 OR UNRESTRICTED USE PER MR MRD219242. THE ORIGINAL MR DISPOSITION HAD MR 564643 1 3 IDENTIFIED THE ASSY. PROBABLE CAUSE: APPARENTLY THE MR ID HAS BEEN COVE 564643 1 4 RED WITH PAINT DURING A SUBSEQUENT REPAIR. STEP 8.1 REAPPLIED MR ID. ITE 564643 1 5 M 2, PAGE 1A, THE HATCH ASSY WAS MODIFIED TO THE M072-593301-036 CONFIGU 564643 1 6 RATION ON TPS MEQ-3-07-040 PER EO C06. THE M072-593301-036 IS AN INSTALL 564643 1 7 ATION CONFIGURATION AND NO RQMT EXISTS TO ID HATCH WITH THIS NUMBER. PRO 564643 1 8 BABLE CAUSE: NO PR CONDITION. ITEM 3, PAGE 1B, WHICH DOCUMENTS CHIPPED A 564643 1 9 ND PEELING PAINT WAS RESOLVED BY REAPPLYING CORROSION PROTECTION PER 564643 1 10 PRINT RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. ITEM 4, PAGE 1C, THE 564643 1 11 BLUE VELCRO IS INSTALLED ONTO "A" HATCH PER NASA-JSC DWG SAD32102603, 564643 1 12 CREW MODULE OPERATIONAL HOOK AND LOOP FASTENER CONFIGURATION. NO 564643 1 13 ENGINEERING EXISTS AT THIS TIME TO REMOVE THE VELCRO. PROBABLE CAUSE: 564643 1 14 NO PR CONDITION. ITEM 5, PAGE 1D, VIEW H-H ON TECH ORDER INSTL 564643 1 15 M072-593830 INSTALLS VELCRO STRIPS, AND THE DIMENSIONAL CALLOUTS ARE IN 564643 1 16 REFERENCE TO THE PERIMETER AND CENTERLINE OF THE HATCH ONLY. THE 564643 1 17 CONFIGURATION OF THE INTERIOR OF THE HATCH IS FOR REFERENCE ONLY. HATCH 564643 1 18 WEB CONFIGURATION CONTROLLED BY DWG V070-332604. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO PR 564643 1 19 CONDITION. ALL DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED AND RESOLVED. NO 564643 1 20 FURTHER REWORK REQ'D. 564648 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS INABILITY TO DRILL DUE TO HI-LOK INTERFERENCE. 564648 1 2 EOTF DISPOSITION WAS ADDED TO REPLACE HI-LOKS WITH RIVETS TO FACILITATE 564648 1 3 SUPT ASSY INSTALLATION. V070-337606 EO A04 WAS RELEASED 4/3/96 AND VERIF 564648 1 4 IED ON 4-19-96 TO INSTALL FOUR MD121-0003-05XX RIVETS IN PLACE OF ME112- 564648 1 5 0013-05 PINS AND ME114-0022-0105 COLLARS. NO FURTHER REWORK REQ'D. PROBA 564648 1 6 BLE CAUSE: INSTALLATION SEQUENCE. 564652 1 1 BENT TABS WERE STRAIGHTENED TO DWG RQMTS. TABS WERE THEN EXAMINED AND NO 564652 1 2 CRACKS WERE FOUND. NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANS 564652 1 3 HIP. 564655 1 1 THE A1U (A1A1) PANEL WAS REMOVED FROM THE STRUCTURE AT THE PANEL HINGE A 564655 1 2 ND FORWARDED TO THE ELECTRICAL/AVIONICS SHIP AT PLMD FOR REWORK (REF ITE 564655 1 3 M 001). A BROKEN "F1" FUSEHOLDER (P/N 415-0026-0001) WAS R&R'ED AND FUSE 564655 1 4 AT THIS LOCATION (P/N ME451-0018-0500) WAS REPLACED AS STANDARD SHOP PR 564655 1 5 ACTICE. DAMAGED INSULATION OF FUSE 2 WIRE Z130B20 WAS DETECTED (REF ITEM 564655 1 6 002) AND A SPLICE INSULATOR SLEEVE (FROM A P/N ME416-0031-1001) WAS INS 564655 1 7 TALLED OVER THE DAMAGED AREA OF INSULATION. A FUNCTIONAL RETEST WAS PERF 564655 1 8 ORMED AND THE FUSEHOLDER CAP WAS SAFETY WIRED PER MLO303-0018. ALL AREAS 564655 1 9 INVOLVING THE FUSEHOLDER REWORK WAS CONFORMAL COATED (I.E. WIRES, 564655 1 10 SLEEVES, TERMINAL AND MOUNTING NUT). THE A1U PANEL WAS THEN CLOSED OUT 564655 1 11 WITH PHOTO A960324L-1C. ID SLEEVE ATTACHED WITH THIS PR PER EL1.1 AFTER 564655 1 12 OBTAINING THE A1U PANEL FROM THE ELECTRICAL SHOP, IT WAS REINSTALLED AT 564655 1 13 THE HINGE ONLY. FINAL CLOSEOUT INCLUDING ELECTRICAL BOND TEST PERFORMED 564655 1 14 PER WAD V30-13333 AS REQUESTED BY MFG. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP 564655 1 15 (ITEMS 001 & 002). 564679 1 1 CONN 83V77W4P374 BACKSHELL WAS OPENED. RECESSED PIN "K" (WIRE 1ZC3026A24 564679 1 2 ) IN CONN 83P374 WAS REPAIRED BY EXTRACTING THE CONTACT AND REINSERTING 564679 1 3 UNTIL CONTACT WAS LOCKED. INSPECTION OF CONTACT LOCKING DEVICE AFTER EXT 564679 1 4 RACTION SHOWED NO DAMAGE OR EXCESSIVE WEAR. CONN 83P374 BACKSHELL WAS TH 564679 1 5 EN CLOSED PER MLO303-0040. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 564967 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: ITEM 001 EO TO FOLLOW, 70C6648-1 BRACKET HAS BEEN RE 564967 001 2 VISED ON V070-340008 EOC51 TO PERMIT INSTALLATION OF V070-346520-001 BR 564967 001 3 ACKET. V070-340008 IS A MAKE WORK DWG FOR OV-103 ONLY EO C51 IDENTIFIED 564967 001 4 THE REWORKED BRACKET AS 70C6648-007 A ROCKWELL DWG SYSTEM RATHER THAN T 564967 001 5 HE GD DWG SYS 70C6648-7, THE DASH NUMBER SYSTEMS ARE SYNONYMOUS, THE TWO 564967 001 6 DASH NUMBERING SYSTEMS ARE ALIKE IN MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE. EO C53 C 564967 001 7 ORRECTED ADHESIVE SPEC IN THE BOND NOTE ON EO C51. 40TB26 WAS REMOVED F 564967 001 8 ROM RETAINING CLIP AND STOWED OUT OF WAY. THE BRACKET WAS REMOVED AND 564967 001 9 TRIMMED PER DISPO PLATE NUTS WERE RELOCATED. THE BRACKET WAS BONDED ON 564967 001 10 AFTER REWORK. INTERFERENCE WITH RIVET BUCKTAIL, THE RIVET WAS REMOVED 564967 001 11 AND NEW RIVET WAS INSTALLED FLUSH BOTH SIDES. 40TB26 RETAINING CLIP, 564967 001 12 SPACER AND CLAMP WAS RE-INSTALLED USING RETAINED HARDWARE. ITEM 002, 564967 001 13 THE DISCREPANT HOLE MR ACTION, DRILLED OUT THE HOLE TO .250 DIA AND 1/4 564967 001 14 DIA HI-LOK WAS INSTALLED. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL 564967 001 15 INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE 564967 001 16 CAUSE: ITEM 001, ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. ITEM 002, PREVIOUS VENDOR 564967 001 17 WORKMANSHIP. 564980 1 1 INSULATION SUPT HOOK WAS REMOVED PER ENGINEERING DWG RQMT TO ACCOMMODATE 564980 1 2 TCS LINER SUPT BRACKET INSTALLATION. DESIGN INTENT AND STRUCTURAL INTEG 564980 1 3 RITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY IS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: PLANNI 564980 1 4 NG OVERSIGHT. 564982 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS INABILITY TO INSTALL V070-346510-003 AND -004 S 564982 1 2 UPPORTS DUE TO INTERFERENCES WITH EXISTING FITTINGS. EOTF DISPO WAS ADDE 564982 1 3 D TO TRIM THE V070-346510-003 & -004 SUPPORTS TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. 564982 1 4 EO'S B02 RELEASED 4-4-96 AND B03 RELEASED 4-25-96 WERE VERIFIED 4-25-96 564982 1 5 . PARTS WERE REIDENTIFIED. NO FURTHER REWORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: D 564982 1 6 ESIGN OVERSIGHT. 564983 1 1 IN ITEM 001, PROTRUDING HEAD FASTENERS ATTACHING 70C296401 BRACKET WERE 564983 1 2 REMOVED AND THE BRACKET WAS REINSTALLED WITH CSK HI-LOKS. DWG V070-34000 564983 1 3 8C52 REVISED FASTENER CALLOUT. IN ITEM 002, DWG V070-346500A05 REVISED F 564983 1 4 ASTENER CALLOUT TO INSTALL V070-346516-002 BRACKET WITH CSK HI-LOKS ELIM 564983 1 5 INATING THE INTERFERENCE. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY I 564983 1 6 S MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGRG O 564983 1 7 VERSIGHT. 564985 1 1 ITEM 001, REMOVAL OF THE CARRIER PANELS ON THE PLBD HINGES LEFT SIDE 7, 564985 1 2 8, 9 & 10 EXPOSED SOME FASTENER HOLES WHICH WERE REWORKED PER REWORK EO. 564985 1 3 THE TOTAL COUNT OF THE 1/4 AND 3/16 WERE 8 (1/4) SHOULD BE 12 AND 32 (3 564985 1 4 /16) SHOULD BE 28. AN EO TO FOLLOW FOR V070-394743 WAS WRITTEN TO REVISE 564985 1 5 THE COUNT TO 12 (.250) DIA, NAS1581C4T4 (8 BOLTS) AND (4 NAS1581C4T5 BO 564985 1 6 LTS). THE .190 DIA HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH NAS1581C3T2 (28 REQ'D). THE 1 564985 1 7 /4 DIA BOLTS WERE TORQUED TO 47 IN-#, AND THE 3/16 DIA BOLTS WERE TORQUE 564985 1 8 D TO 25 IN-#. THE EO V070-394743 A04 WAS RELEASED ON 3-28-96 AND VERIFIE 564985 1 9 D BY RI ENG R. LANGLEY. ITEM 002, AFTER THE ABOVE REWORK THERE WERE 8 564985 1 10 HOLES IN WHICH THE COUNTER SUNK HEADS WERE NOT FLUSH TO THE SKIN BUT 564985 1 11 FROM .032 - .038 INCHES BELOW THE SURFACE. MR ACTION WAS REQ'D TO 564985 1 12 ACCEPT THE HEADS BEING INSTALLED BELOW THE SURFACE WITH NO ID REQ'D 564985 1 13 BECAUSE THE BLANKETS WERE TO BE BONDED ON TO THIS AREA. THE STRUCTURAL 564985 1 14 INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED, FIT AND FUNCTION IS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE 564985 1 15 CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 564988 1 1 THE DEEP C'SUNK HOLES THAT PREVENTS THE FASTENER FROM BEING FLUSH TO THE 564988 1 2 SKIN SURFACE DOES NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE. 564988 1 3 THE FIT AND FUNCTION IS PER DESIGN INTENT. THE PLUGGING OF THE CARRIER P 564988 1 4 LATE HOLES ON THE RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE VEHICLE DID NOT MATCH THE EXIST 564988 1 5 ING STRUCTURES' OPEN HOLES TO THE REWORK EO, V070-394743. AN EO TO FOLLO 564988 1 6 W FOR THIS PART WAS DISPOSITIONED ON THIS PR AND 12 .25 DIA HOLES WERE P 564988 1 7 LUGGED WITH NAS1581C4T4 (8) AND NAS1581C4T5 (4) BOLTS, AND NAS1581C3T2 ( 564988 1 8 28) BOLTS. HOLES WERE C'SUNK .399 X 100 DEGREE AND .305 X 100 DEGREE RES 564988 1 9 PECTIVELY. INSTALLED PER MAO101-301. CORROSION PROTECTION AND TORQUED 564988 1 10 TO 50 IN LBS FOR THE NAS1581C4 AND 30 IN-LBS FOR NAS1582C3 BOLTS. THE 564988 1 11 EO WAS RELEASED ON 3-28-96 AS A V070-394743 A04 AND VERIFIED BY K. 564988 1 12 HAYASHIDA ON 3-31-96. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR 564988 1 13 CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION 564988 1 14 RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 565016 1 1 ITEM 001: CONN 40V77W985 FAILED HI-POT TEST FROM WIRE NO M27713C24-2 PIN 565016 1 2 73 TO JUMPER PIN 63. TROUBLESHOOTING OF WIRE HARNESS HI-POT FAILURE AT 565016 1 3 40J602 ISOLATED THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM TO A NICK IN THE INSULATION OF 565016 1 4 WIRE M2713C24-2. THE CONN BACKSHELL WAS OPENED AND THE SOLDER SLEEVE WAS 565016 1 5 REMOVED. THE REPAIR INVOLVED THE INSTALLATION OF SPLICE INSULATOR SLEEV 565016 1 6 E OVER THE DAMAGED AREA OF THE WIRE INSULATION AND THE SOLDER SLEEVE WAS 565016 1 7 REWORKED TO ADD A NEW JUMPER/CONTACT THAT WAS INSTALLED ON 40J602 (63). 565016 1 8 A SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY AND HI-POT WERE PERFORMED. ITEM 002 & 003: THE 565016 1 9 DAMAGED GROMMET ON 40P602 AT CONTACT 73 WAS REPAIRED PER STANDARD 565016 1 10 REPAIR EL 1.7. THE REPAIR IS MADE WITH RTV, A SILICONE RUBBER THAT 565016 1 11 REQUIRES 48 HOURS TO SET UP. THE 40J602 CONTACTS (#72 & #73) ENDED UP 565016 1 12 WITH WHITE RTV IN THE CAVITY. STEPS WERE ADDED TO THE DISPOSITION TO 565016 1 13 CLEAN THE CONTACT/CAVITIES. THE CONNECTOR 40J602 WAS REMOUNTED WITH THE 565016 1 14 RETAINED HARDWARE AND A SUCCESSFUL ELECTRICAL BOND WAS PERFORMED. 565016 1 15 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP (ITEMS 001, 002 & 003. 565139 1 1 SUPT ASSY 1 V070-338404-002 WAS RECONFIGURED TO A -005 ASSY BY AN EO ADD 565139 1 2 ING A CUTOUT TO FLANGE PROVIDING CLEARANCE WITH ADJACENT PANEL. PROBABLE 565139 1 3 CAUSE: ENGR OVERSIGHT. 565276 1 1 V070-340121-007 ANGLE WAS LOCATED ON RH SIDE AT XO636, ZO325.95 PER DWG. 565276 1 2 THE ANGLE SHOULD HAVE BEEN LOCATED ON THE LH SIDE. THE ANGLE WAS REMOVE 565276 1 3 D FROM THE RH AND HOLES WERE PLUGGED. ANGLE V070-340121-007 WAS REPOSITI 565276 1 4 ONED CORRECTLY TO THE LH SIDE OF THE VEHICLE. DWGS WERE CORRECTED. WORK 565276 1 5 WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY EO TO FOLLOW DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENC 565276 1 6 Y. 565281 1 1 SUPT 70A2806-13 COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING 565281 1 2 RIVET FROM ADJACENT SUPT AND TORSION STRAP INSTALLATION (ITEM 1, PAGE 1 565281 1 3 ). SUPT WAS RELOCATED FWD PER MR UNRESTRICTED DISPO TO PICK UP THE 2 EXI 565281 1 4 STING FASTENER LOCATIONS FROM THE ADJACENT SUPT WHICH ELIMINATED THE INT 565281 1 5 ERFERENCE WITH THE RIVET AND THE TORSION STRAP. NO FURTHER REWORK REQ'D. 565281 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE: TORSION STRAP MISLOCATED. 565285 1 1 THE CONFORMAL COATING AT GROUND POINT 30E55 (REF ITEM 001) WAS INITIALLY 565285 1 2 REWORKED TO CORRECT THE EXPOSED BARE METAL, ON A DR LEVEL (I.E. RETURNE 565285 1 3 D TO DWG). DURING PAPER REVIEW IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE RECORDED CURE 565285 1 4 START TIME OF THE RTV HAD EXCEEDED ITS POT LIFE TIME (REF ITEM 002). THE 565285 1 5 DR WAS REOPENED AND UPGRADED TO A PR DUE TO THE AREA REQUIRED TO BE ACC 565285 1 6 ESSED FOR THE REWORK WAS BEHIND A CLOSED-OUT PANEL (L1A2). STEPS WERE PR 565285 1 7 OVIDED TO OPEN TH EL1A2 PANEL, REMOVE THE DISCREPANT RTV, RECONFORMAL CO 565285 1 8 AT THE E-POINT (30E55) TO DWG RQMTS, TEMPORARILY CLOSE THE PANEL TO SUPT 565285 1 9 POWER UP ACTIVITY, AND THEN PERFORM A FINAL CLOSE OF THE PANEL. THE 565285 1 10 PROPER CLEANING AND PRIMING WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED PER DWG, (REF ITEM 565285 1 11 003) AND STEPS WERE AGAIN ADDED TO AGAIN REMOVE THE DISCREPANT RTV FROM 565285 1 12 30E55 AND AGAIN A CLEAN AND PRIME, AS REQUIRED PER DWG, WAS 565285 1 13 ACCOMPLISHED. THE NOTED E POINT HAS BEEN CORRECTLY CLEANED, AN 565285 1 14 ELECTRICAL BOND CHECK MADE AND VERIFIED AND THE CONFORMAL COATING 565285 1 15 REAPPLIED PER DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 565323 1 1 DURING TESTING (EPD-3-J2-389) IT WAS VERIFIED BY TEST AND BY ENGINEERING 565323 1 2 ORDER V070-778302 C11 THAT TPS EPD-3-J2-389 WAS INCORRECT. THIS RESULTE 565323 1 3 D IN AN INCORRECT CONFIGURATION AT CONN 80P9727. WIRE E1554A24-2 IS IN C 565323 1 4 AVITY "J", S/B IN CAVITY "X". WIRE E1554A24-3 IS IN CAVITY "X", S/B IN C 565323 1 5 AVITY "J". CONN 80P9727 WAS RE-PINNED AS SPECIFIED ABOVE TO RETURN IT TO 565323 1 6 THE CORRECT CONFIGURATION AND THE AFFECTED WIRES WERE SUCCESSFULLY TEST 565323 1 7 ED FOR CONTINUITY. THE TPS WAS CORRECTED PER EO V070-778302-C11. PROBABL 565323 1 8 E CAUSE: INCORRECT PLANNING PAPER (EPD-3-J2-389). 565359 1 1 MR ACTION PLUGGED TWO HOLES IN BEAM AND TWO HOLES IN THE BRACKET FLUSH B 565359 1 2 OTH SIDES. RIVET INSTL WAS CORROSION PER MAO608-301 CODE 08-AA-21-XN. TW 565359 1 3 O NEW HOLES WERE LOCATED .18 UPWARD FROM THE PLUGGED HOLES ON THE BRACKE 565359 1 4 T AND DRILLED THRU THE BEAM. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRIT 565359 1 5 Y IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORK 565359 1 6 MANSHIP. 565525 1 1 ITEM 001: THE BROKEN GND LUG ON SHIELD JUMPER WIRE T1949C26SH JR24 (WHIC 565525 1 2 H WAS ATTACHED TO THE CONN 30P30 TANG) WAS REPLACED (LUG P/N ME416-0028- 565525 1 3 2406). EXTRA LENGTH OF WIRE (P/N MP571-0086-0002) HAD TO BE SPLICED (SPL 565525 1 4 ICE KIT P/N ME416-0031-1001) TO ALLOW LUG TO REACH TANG AND BE REINSTALL 565525 1 5 ED. THE WIRE WAS ID'D WITH SPLICE ID KSC0739. ITEM 002: THE BROKEN GND L 565525 1 6 UG ON SHIELD JUMPER WIRE T1948C26SH JR24 (WHICH WAS ATTACHED TO THE CONN 565525 1 7 30P30 TANG) WAS REPLACED (LUG P/N ME416-0028-2406). EXTRA LENGTH OF WIR 565525 1 8 E (P/N MP571-0086-0002) HAD TO BE SPLICED (SPLICE KIT P/N ME416-0031-100 565525 1 9 1) TO ALLOW LUG TO REACH TANG AND BE REINSTALLED. THE WIRE WAS ID'D 565525 1 10 WITH SPLICE ID KSC0740. THIS REPAIR IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED 565525 1 11 USAGE. REF RATIONALE ON PAGE 6. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP (ITEMS 001 565525 1 12 & 002). 565528 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS LT-80 TAPE BEING DAMAGED AROUND SCREEN #2 565528 1 2 4 ON THE RUDDER SPEED BRAKE WAS RESOLVED BY REMOVING DISCREPANT TAPE AND 565528 1 3 REINSTALLING NEW TAPE PER PRINT. NO FURTHER REWORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE C 565528 1 4 AUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 565607 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS A GAP EXISTS BETWEEN THE V070-334926-029 DOOR A 565607 1 2 ND V070-334655-001 BRACKET AFTER NAS1834A3 SPACERS WERE INSTALLED. MR UN 565607 1 3 RESTRICTED DISPO WAS ADDED TO BOND IN MD153-0018-0001 WASHER WITH THE IN 565607 1 4 SIDE DIA INCREASED TO 0.22 ONTO THE SPACER AT 10 LOCATIONS TO ELIMINATE 565607 1 5 THE GAP. PART WAS MR ID'D. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A DOCUMENTS MD112-1002-0317 AND 565607 1 6 -0318 SCREWS WERE TOO SHORT. EOTF DISPO WAS ADDED TO INCREASE THE LENGT 565607 1 7 H TO MD112-1002-0319 & -0320. V070-334901 EO J06 WAS VERIFIED ON 4-9-96. 565607 1 8 NO FURTHER REWORK REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: ITEM 1: PART MADE TOO THICK. I 565607 1 9 TEM 2: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 565609 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: THE MR REPAIR, OF BROKEN/SHORT WIRE 1M1135B20 BY SP 565609 001 2 LICING ADDITIONAL WIRE LENGTH AND RETERMINATING THE GND LUG AT 40P9107 H 565609 001 3 AS RETURNED THE WIRE LENGTH TO A CONFIGURATION THAT MAINTAINS DESIGN INT 565609 001 4 ENT & IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. FUNCTIONAL TEST WILL BE PER 565609 001 5 FORMED BY MEQ-3-J2-237. MR IDENTIFICATION WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH I.D. SL 565609 001 6 EEVE KSC0738. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFIC 565609 001 7 ATION AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTION RATION 565609 001 8 ALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. CERTIFICATION IS NOT AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 565609 001 9 WEAR AND TEAR. 565706 1 1 PLANNING INCORRECTLY CALLED OUT TO INSTALL (6) V070-346148-001 CLIPS, SH 565706 1 2 OULD HAVE BEEN (4). ENGINEERING FAILED TO DETECT THIS ERROR. THE PMRB AC 565706 1 3 CEPTED V070-346148-001 CLIPS INSTALLED IN LIEU OF THE V070-346101-001 CL 565706 1 4 IPS REQUIRED. THE V070-346148-001 CLIPS MEET DESIGN INTENT. CLIPS ARE SE 565706 1 5 CONDARY STRUCTURE. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY 565706 1 6 REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: PLANNING AND ENGRG OVERSIGHT. 565711 1 1 REPOSTITIONING THE WIRE TRAY ASSY IN THE FWD DIRECTION ALLOWS THE O/B LE 565711 1 2 G OF THE FWD SUPT 70A2806-13 TO PICK UP (2) EXISTING HOLES IN STGR. PILO 565711 1 3 T HOLE (1) IN SUPT WAS PLUGGED WITH ADHESIVE DUE TO MISMATCH WITH EXISTI 565711 1 4 NG HOLE IN STGR. PROPER EDGE DISTANCE IN LEG OF SUPT FOR THE (2) FASTENE 565711 1 5 RS MAINTAINED. LOCATING THE WIRE TRAY ASSY APPROX .40 FWD WILL NOT AFFEC 565711 1 6 T SUPT OF WIRE HARNESS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 565854 1 1 DWG V070-346048 DID NOT SHOW THE ORIENTATION OF THE V070-340312-002 WIRE 565854 1 2 TRAY. THE DWG WAS REVISED BY PR EO TO FOLLOW TO CLARIFY THE INSTALLATIO 565854 1 3 N. THE EO WAS RELEASED, AND VERIFIED BY ENGINEERING THAT IT REFLECTED TH 565854 1 4 E PR EO TO FOLLOW DISPOSITION. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 565856 1 1 TWO NEW RECEPTACLES WERE ADDED ON PANEL MO13Q 80J7 & 80J8. DURING EPD-3- 565856 1 2 J2-418, SEQ 69, IT WAS FOUND OUT THAT CONN 80P9757 (MATES WITH 80J7) & 8 565856 1 3 0P9758 (MATES WITH 80J8) DOES NOT REACH TO THERE RESPECTIVE "J" NOS. AN 565856 1 4 ENGINEERING ACTION WAS PLANNED TO SPLICE 2-4 CONDUCTOR WIRES PER CONN, F 565856 1 5 OR A TOTAL OF 16 KSC SPLICES. FURTHER ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING RE-EVA 565856 1 6 LUATION WAS DONE. IT WAS FOUND OUT THAT BY WORKING THE SPOT TIES, SUFFIC 565856 1 7 IENT SLACKS WERE OBTAINED. ONLY 1-4 CONDUCTOR PER CONN NEEDED TO BE SPLI 565856 1 8 CED FOR A TOTAL OF 8 KSC SPLICES. FUNCTIONAL TEST WAS DISALLOWED AT PALM 565856 1 9 DALE; INSTEAD A SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY TEST WAS PERFORMED. PROBABLE CAUSE 565856 1 10 ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY. 565860 1 1 THE DAMAGED CABLE TIE STRAIN RELIEF BACKSHELL ON CONN 40V77W46P9846 HAS 565860 1 2 BEEN SEVERED AND DELIVERED TO HDA FOR SCRAP PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REP 565860 1 3 AIR EL 101.17. A NEW REPLACEMENT SPLIT BACKSHELL (P/N ME127-0106-0110) H 565860 1 4 AS BEEN INSTALLED. THE GND LUG AND RETAINED HARDWARE WERE INSTALLED ONTH 565860 1 5 E NEW SPLIT BACKSHELL AND TORQUED 16-20 INCH OUNCES, THE BACKSHELL WAS T 565860 1 6 ORQUED 30-35 INCH POUNDS. CONNS 40P9846/40J1 WERE MATED (SCAN 3-J2-2140) 565860 1 7 . THE REPAIR WAS VERIFIED COMPLETE PER PR OEL-3-J2-0928. MR ID WAS NOT R 565860 1 8 EQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 565861 1 1 DURING COM-3-J2-274, IT WAS DISCOVERED THERE WAS NO CLAMPING PROVISION F 565861 1 2 OR HARNESSES 40W34 (CONN 40J620) AND 40W224 (CONN 40J204) AT THE STBD DO 565861 1 3 CKING LINER PENETRATION PANEL. A HOLE WAS PROVIDED IN P/N V070-346232 PE 565861 1 4 R EO V070-346048 (J06) AND ATTACH HDW (P/NS" MD152-0018-0016 (1 EA), MD1 565861 1 5 12-1003-0424 (1 EA) AND ME114-0044-0030 (1 EA) WAS PROVIDED PER EO V070- 565861 1 6 794341 (E06) TO SUPT THESE HARNESSES (EXISTING CLAMPS WERE USED). ITEMS 565861 1 7 001 AND 002: HOWEVER, HARNESSES 40W34 AND 40W224 HAD BEEN MISTAKENLY ROU 565861 1 8 TED WITH HARNESS 40V77W98 (CONNECTORS 40J4602 AND 40J610) IN THE INTERIM 565861 1 9 . CLAMPS AND ATTACH HDW WERE REMOVED AND REINSTALLED IN CONJUNCTION 565861 1 10 WITH PR COM-3-J2-0238 TO CORRECT THE ROUTING OF THESE HARNESSES AND 565861 1 11 RETURN THE CONFIGURATION TO INSTALLATION DWG V070-794341 (E06) RQMTS. 565861 1 12 PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY (ITEMS 001 & 002). 565918 1 1 TRIMMING THE END OF THE 2 FLANGES FROM BRKT V070-338419-001 ELIMINATED T 565918 1 2 HE INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2 HI-LOKS, FACILITATING THE INSTL OF BRKT. THIS 565918 1 3 REQ'D AN EO CHANGE TO THE DETAIL ADDING CUT-OUT TO THE FLANGES. A NEW D 565918 1 4 ASH NO WAS ESTABLISHED AND THE BRKT REIDENTIFIED V070-338419-003 WAS -00 565918 1 5 1. THE NEXT ASSY DWG WAS REVISED BY AN EO CHANGING THE P/L & F/D ADDING 565918 1 6 THE NEW DASH NO OF BRKT. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGR OVERSIGHT. 565920 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 WHICH DOCUMENTS CRACKED TUBING SUPT WAS RESOLVED BY APPLY 565920 1 2 ING GLASS FABRIC AND ADHESIVE DOUBLER TO DISCREPANT AREA PER UNRESTRICTE 565920 1 3 D MR DISPOSITION. NO FURTHER REWORK REQUIRED. MR ID ADDED TO SUPT. PROBA 565920 1 4 BLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 565921 1 1 AN ELECTRICAL TECHNICIAN ENTERED THE RIGHT WING FWD GLOVE AREA AFTER IT 565921 1 2 HAD BEEN CLOSED OUT. HE ENTERED ON 3-29-96 TO DE-MATE A CONN. ENTRY WAS 565921 1 3 MADE THRU THE RIGHT WING ACCESS AND FWD OF ACCESS DOOR. THIS WAS A VIOLA 565921 1 4 TION OF SPI 507, PAGE 4, ITEM 17. NO CLOSED OUT PLACARD WAS IN THE AREA. 565921 1 5 ENGINEERING REQUESTED THE DEMATED CONN NUMBER (64P102) AND THAT QA MGMT 565921 1 6 ATTACH A CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION STATEMENT TO THE PR. THE CAUSE WAS 565921 1 7 STATED AS FOLLOWS: THE TECHNICIAN WAS UNAWARE THAT THE RIGHT WING GLOVE 565921 1 8 WAS CLOSED FOR FLIGHT. THE HATCH GUARD ALLOWED THE TECHNICIAN TO ENTER 565921 1 9 THE RIGHT WING FOR TROUBLESHOOTING OF MSMT V12G9452 PER INS-3-J2-0724. 565921 1 10 MSMT RAN FROM WING TO WING GLOVE. THE TECHNICIAN THEN REQUESTED ACCESS 565921 1 11 TO WING GLOVE AREA FROM THE HATCH GUARD AND ENTERED THRU THE SMALL 565921 1 12 OPENING BETWEEN THE WING AND THE WING GLOVE. THE HATCH GUARD HAD 565921 1 13 GRANTED HIS REQUEST. CLOSEOUT PLACARDS WERE NOT PLACED AT THE INTERNAL 565921 1 14 OPENING TO THE WING GLOVE FROM THE WING SIDE. FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION: 565921 1 15 A PR (THIS ONE) WAS GENERATED FOR VIOLATION OF SPI 507 CLOSEOUT RQMTS. 565921 1 16 A CLOSEOUT INSPECTION WILL BE PERFORMED IN THE RIGHT WING GLOVE AFTER 565921 1 17 THE REWORK IS COMPLETE PER INS-3-J2-0724. CLOSEOUT PLACARDS ARE TO BE 565921 1 18 PLACED AT ALL ENTRANCE POINTS TO THE LEFT AND RIGHT WING GLOVE AREAS 565921 1 19 PER SPI 507 RQMTS. BOTH THE TECHNICIAN AND THE HATCH GUARD UNDERSTAND 565921 1 20 THE RQMTS OF THE SPI 507. THE SPI 507 RQMTS WERE ADDRESSED AT THE TEAM 565921 1 21 WORKMANSHIP MEETINGS FOR BOTH MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL GROUPS. WAD 565921 1 22 V70-06302 WAS ISSUED TO REOPEN THE CLOSED OUT AREA AND WAD V80-96302 565921 1 23 WAS ISSUED TO CLOSE THE AREA AFTER THE REWORK IS COMPLETE. PROBABLE 565921 1 24 CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 565948 1 1 REF DWG V070-338394 EO A01 REVISED DIM LOCATING THE FASTENER HOLES. EXIS 565948 1 2 TING HOLES IN -002 WERE PLUGGED WITH MD121-0002-03XX RIVETS FLUSH BOTH S 565948 1 3 IDES. NEW HOLES WERE DRILLED PER ENGRG DISPO. AFTER RWK V070-338394-002 565948 1 4 WAS REIDENTIFIED AS V070-338394-006. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL 565948 1 5 INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAU 565948 1 6 SE: ENGRG OVERSIGHT. 565952 1 1 THE BRACKET INSTALLATION OF THE V070-338394 BRACKET BOTTOM HOLES DID NOT 565952 1 2 CLEAR THE LIP OF THE V070-338360 BEAM. THE BEAM HAS A THICKER FLANGE. F 565952 1 3 OUR HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH MD121-0002-03XX C'SUNK .010-.015 DEEP FLUSH 565952 1 4 BOTH SIDES. HOLES WERE DRILED AS SHOWN ON PAGE 2 THEN CORROSION PROTECTE 565952 1 5 D PER MAO608-301. REIDENTIFIED WITH THE NEW DASH NUMBER V070-338394-005 565952 1 6 PER MAO104-301. THE FOLLOWING EOS WERE RELEASED V070-338394-A01 (4-15-96 565952 1 7 ), V070-337601 H04 (5-6-96). PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 565955 1 1 THE MISLOCATED MILK STOOL SUPPORTS THE SIMULATOR. THE SIMULATOR IS INSTA 565955 1 2 LLED AND HARD LINES TO THE SIMULATOR ARE INSTALLED, THE INSTALLATION DOE 565955 1 3 S NOT INTERFERE WITH TANKS. DESIGN INTENT AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MA 565955 1 4 INTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 566084 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS 2 V070-340184-001 SUPT ASSEMBLIES COULD NOT BE 566084 1 2 INSTALLED WITHOUT EXCESSIVE FORCE. THE ASSEMBLIES WERE REWORKED PER MR U 566084 1 3 NRESTRICTED DISPOSITION TO ADD A NOTCH TO ALLOW FLEXIBILITY FOR INSTALLA 566084 1 4 TION AND THE INSTALLATION OF DOUBLERS TO RETURN STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TO 566084 1 5 THE PARTS AFTER INSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: ADVERSE TOLERANCE BUILDUP. 566091 1 1 THE DAMAGED SHIELD JACKET FOR CABLE DF429A24 (REF ITEM 2 & STEP 6A) WAS 566091 1 2 REPAIRED PER STANDARD REPAIR PROCEDURE EL 1.4. THIS REPAIR HAS RETURNED 566091 1 3 THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCE 566091 1 4 PTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. NO RETEST REQUIRED. DAMAGE NOT SIGNIFIC 566091 1 5 ANT. THE WIRE WAS INADVERTENTLY DAMAGED WHILE DRILLING OUT RIVETS OUTSI 566091 1 6 DE THE L/H WING GLOVE AREA (REF. ITEM 1). THE AREA WHICH CONTAINED THE 566091 1 7 "DAMAGED" WIRE WAS A CLOSED OUT AREA AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. THE P 566091 1 8 R PROVIDE STEPS/AUTHORITY TO: 1.) OPEN THE CLOSED OUT AREA TO ASSESS TH 566091 1 9 E DAMAGE (REF. STEP 8) 2.) CLOSE THE AREA FOLLOWING THE REAPIRS (REF. S 566091 1 10 TEP 9). PROBABLE CAUSE WORKMANSHIP. 566094 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: EOTF V070-337193 A04 AND V070-337150 J13 HAVE BEEN 566094 001 2 RELEASED ON APRIL 29, 1996 TO ACCEPT V070-337193-001 AS INSTALLED. DESI 566094 001 3 GN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFE 566094 001 4 TY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 566095 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: THE V070-337058-005 BRACKET WAS FOUND TO BE INSTALL 566095 001 2 ED 180 DEGREES OUT OF PRINT CONFIGURATION WITH THE NUTPLATE FLANGE FACIN 566095 001 3 G OUTBOARD. ENGINEERING EVALUATION REVEALED THAT AN INTERFERENCE WOULD 566095 001 4 EXIST IF THE PART WAS REMOVED AND INSTALLED PER THE PRINT. THEREFORE A 566095 001 5 FIELD E.O.-TO-FOLLOW WAS GENERATED TO DOCUMENT/AUTHORIZE THE 'AS-IS' INS 566095 001 6 TALLATION OF THE BRACKET. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAU 566095 001 7 SE: DESIGN ERROR. 566318 1 1 (PAGE 1) REFERENCE DWG V070-334049. THREE (.228 DIA) HOLES COULD NOT BE 566318 1 2 DRILLED PER DESIGN IN MID DECK FLOOR DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING R 566318 1 3 IVET HEADS AND RADII OF FLOOR STRUCTURE. HOLES AND NUTPLATES WERE RELOCA 566318 1 4 TED TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. INTERFERING RIVETS WERE COUNTERSINKED. RW 566318 1 5 K WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER EO TO FOLLOW. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 566318 1 6 (PAGE 1A) NEW HOLE DRILLED PER EO TO FOLLOW DISPO WAS MISLOCATED. MISLOC REF_RPT_NO TEXT_ SEQ_NO DISPOSITION ---------- ----- ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 566318 1 7 ATED HOLE WAS ACCEPTED BY MR FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE ON OV-103. PROBABLE 566318 1 8 CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 566346 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1, WHICH DOCUMENTS 3 PILOT HOLES WERE MISDRILLED (2 IN V070 566346 1 2 -338441-003 PANEL ASSY & 1 IN V070-338375 FLOOR PANEL) WERE REWORKED PER 566346 1 3 MR UNRESTRICTED DISPO TO PLUG THE HOLES WITH RIVETS DOUBLE FLUSH AND CO 566346 1 4 RROSION PROTECT. NO FURTHER REWORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP 566346 1 5 . 566382 1 1 SIX HOLES ON THE V070-730373-010 (A15) PANEL WERE FOUND TO BE SLIGHTLY M 566382 1 2 ISALIGNED WITH THE MATING HOLES IN THE SUBSTRUCTURE. THE HOLES IN THE PA 566382 1 3 NEL WERE SLOTTED UP TO .020 MAX TO ALLOW FOR CAPTIVE FASTENER INSTALLATI 566382 1 4 ON PER MR UNRESTRICTED USE. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. PROBABLE CAU 566382 1 5 SE: TOLERANCE BUILD-UPS. 566458 1 1 REF DWG V070-346165 EO C06 REL MAY 10, 1996 CORRECTED CALLOUT ON F/D ZN3 566458 1 2 8D: V070-346165-003 1 REQ'D 4 PL (WAS) 2 REQ'D AND CORRECTED EO C04: V07 566458 1 3 0-346165-003 (WAS) V070-340165-003. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL I 566458 1 4 NTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: 566458 1 5 ENGRG OVERSIGHT. 566466 1 1 REF DWG V070-346165 EO C06 REL MAY 10, 1996 CORRECTED CALLOUT ON F/D: 2 566466 1 2 EQ SP (WAS 1.25 2 EQ SP. HOLE SPACING PICKUP FROM 70C2832 DWG. DESIGN IN 566466 1 3 TENT RESTORED, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY IS M 566466 1 4 AINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGRG OVERSIGHT. 566506 1 1 ITEM 1: THE V070-338422-003 CLIP COULD NOT BE INSTALLED BECAUSE THE FAS 566506 1 2 TENERS WERE FALLING NEAR THE RADIUS OF THE STRUCTURAL BEAM V070-338360. 566506 1 3 THE PILOT HOLES WERE PLUGGED USING MD121-0002-03 RIVETS FLUSH BOTH SIDE 566506 1 4 S. THE NEW HOLES DRILLED WITH THE EDGE DISTANCES OF .24 INCHES. ITEM 2 566506 1 5 : THE V070-338422-003 CLIP IS INACCESSIBLE DUE TO THE FABRICATION SEQUE 566506 1 6 NCE. THE FASTENERS WERE CHANGED TO JOBOLTS IN LIEU OF HI-LOKS. ITEM 3 566506 1 7 AND 4: NO LOCATION FOR V070-338422-003 AND V070-338402-001 BRACKETS. A 566506 1 8 N EO FOR V070-338422 RELEASED ON 4-15-96 AND V070-337606 RELEASED 4-24-9 566506 1 9 6 WERE WRITTEN AND VERIFIED BY R. LANGLEY. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING 566506 1 10 OVERSIGHT. 566668 1 1 THE V494-742618-005 BRACKET CUTOUT FOR MOUNTING COAX V070-744605-001, AN 566668 1 2 D CONN 40V74W630J2 WERE INSTALLED BY USING THE EO TO FOLLOW METHOD TO DE 566668 1 3 LETE THE O-RING. THE O-RING "SEAL" IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THIS INSTALLATION 566668 1 4 . V070-744010 EO B02 WAS RELEASED TO CORRECT THE ENGINEERING ERROR. CERT 566668 1 5 HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING. 566673 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: EO V070-346165 C06 REVISED QTY REQUIRED OF H-LOK PI 566673 001 2 NS AND HI-LOK NUTS TO 20 EA REQD IN ZONE 72B AND 4 EA REQD IN ZONE 70B. 566673 001 3 DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF 566673 001 4 SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGR OVERSIGHT. 566701 1 1 THE NOTED WIRE ROUTING DISCREPANCY FOR WIRE N271B22 HAS RESULTED DURING 566701 1 2 A "PREVIOUS" MOD OF THE ORBITER (J1, REF EO V070-793870-E05) AND IS THER 566701 1 3 EFORE APPLICABLE TO MLO303-0014, SECTION 6, "MODIFICATION/REPAIR OF DELI 566701 1 4 VERED/FLOWN HARDWARE". ENGINEERING REVIEWED THE WIRE ROUTING FOR WIRE N2 566701 1 5 71B22 AND EVALUATED THE INSTALLATION TO THE "SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE" IN 566701 1 6 PARA 6.7.2 OF THE NOTED SECTION. IT HAS DETERMINED THE THIS CONDITION DO 566701 1 7 ES NOT AFFECT "SAFETY OF FLIGHT" AND REQUIRES NO REWORK/REPAIR. PROBABLE 566701 1 8 CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 566767 1 1 WIRE 2C1892B14 SEGMENT 2 WAS EXTRACTED FROM CONNECTOR 83P375 TO ALLOW TH 566767 1 2 E REPAIR OF DAMAGED INSULATION USING A HEAT SHRINK SEALING SLEEVE. THE 566767 1 3 WIRE WAS INSERTED AND CONNECTOR CLOSED. AN I.D. PLATE MARKED "MR OEL-3- 566767 1 4 J2-0933" WAS PLACED ADJACENT TO THE NOTED DISCREPANCY FOR IDENTIFICATION 566767 1 5 . FUNCTIONAL TEST TO BE PERFORMED PER THE SCAN TRACKING SYSTEM. THIS I 566767 1 6 NSULATION MAINTAINS DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USA 566767 1 7 GE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERTIFICATION AND 566767 1 8 DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENSION RATIONALE OR HAZ 566767 1 9 ARD CONTROLES. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 566775 1 1 THE RETAINERS WERE BONDED TO THE BEAM PER TPS. RIVETS WERE INSTALLED IN 566775 1 2 THE DISCREPANT HOLES RIVETING THE RETAINERS TO THE BEAM, WITH FLUSH RIVE 566775 1 3 TS TO PROVIDE FLUSH SURFACE ON THE BEAM FOR BONDING OF THE V070-362539-0 566775 1 4 01 FITTINGS. THE FITTINGS WERE BONDED TO THE BEAM PER TPS. DESIGN INTENT 566775 1 5 RESTORED, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS 566775 1 6 POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 566777 1 1 THE RETAINERS WERE BONDED TO THE BEAM PER TPS. RIVETS WERE INSTALLED IN 566777 1 2 THE DISCREPANT HOLES RIVETING THE RETAINERS TO THE BEAM, WITH FLUSH RIVE 566777 1 3 TS TO PROVIDE FLUSH SURFACE ON THE BEAM FOR BONDING OF THE V070-362539-0 566777 1 4 01 FITTINGS. THE FITTINGS WERE BONDED TO THE BEAM PER TPS. DESIGN INTENT 566777 1 5 RESTORED, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS 566777 1 6 POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 566778 1 1 THE RETAINERS WERE BONDED TO THE BEAM PER TPS. RIVETS WERE INSTALLED IN 566778 1 2 THE DISCREPANT HOLES RIVETING THE RETAINERS TO THE BEAM, WITH FLUSH RIVE 566778 1 3 TS TO PROVIDE FLUSH SURFACE ON THE BEAM FOR BONDING OF THE V070-362539-0 566778 1 4 01 FITTINGS. THE FITTINGS WERE BONDED TO THE BEAM PER TPS. DESIGN INTENT 566778 1 5 RESTORED, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS 566778 1 6 POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 566780 1 1 THE RETAINERS WERE BONDED TO THE BEAM PER TPS. RIVETS WERE INSTALLED IN 566780 1 2 THE DISCREPANT HOLES RIVETING THE RETAINERS TO THE BEAM, WITH FLUSH RIVE 566780 1 3 TS TO PROVIDE FLUSH SURFACE ON THE BEAM FOR BONDING OF THE V070-362539-0 566780 1 4 01 FITTINGS. THE FITTINGS WERE BONDED TO THE BEAM PER TPS. DESIGN INTENT 566780 1 5 RESTORED, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS 566780 1 6 POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 566820 1 1 THIS PR WAS WORKED CONCURRENTLY WITH TPS EPD-3-J2-419 ON THE V070-793991 566820 1 2 INSTALLATION. REF ITEM 001, THE INSTALLATION HARDWARE WAS CHANGED TO AL 566820 1 3 LOW THE CAP & LANYARD TO BE INSTALLED AND TORQUED. REF ITEM 002, THE OVE 566820 1 4 RSIZED PLUGS P/N SS051026K1110 WERE RETURNED TO STOCK AND THE CORRECT SI 566820 1 5 ZE SS-50727K1110 OBTAINED. THE EO TO FOLLOW METHOD WAS UTILIZED FOR THE 566820 1 6 CHANGES. EO V070-793991 D34 WAS RELEASED TO CHANGE THE F/D AND P/L OF TH 566820 1 7 E INSTALLATION DWG. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY. 567027 1 1 ITEMS 01 & 02, FOUR HILOKS WERE REMOVED TO INSTALL THE BRACKET. ONE 5/32 567027 1 2 DIA HOLE AND 2 PILOT HOLES WERE PLUGGED. TWO EXISTING HOLES WERE PICKED 567027 1 3 UP IN V070-338208 AND V070-337657 FOR ATTACHING V070-338438-007 & -009. 567027 1 4 AFTER RWK V070-338438-001 & -003 WERE REIDENTIFIED AS -007 & -009 RESPE 567027 1 5 CTIVELY. ITEM 03, ONE PILOT HOLE WAS PLUGGED IN V070-338435-001 BRACKET, 567027 1 6 AND THE BRACKET WAS REIDENTIFIED AS V070-338435-005. ITEM 01, ONE HILOK 567027 1 7 WAS REMOVED AND THE HOLE WAS PLUGGED FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. THE HILOK IS 567027 1 8 NOT REQ'D IN THIS AREA PER ENGRG DWG. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED, STRUCTURA 567027 1 9 L INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE 567027 1 10 CAUSE: ENGRG OVERSIGHT. 567029 1 1 THE OUTBOARD UPPER EDGE OF THE V070-338442 BRACKET WAS TRIMMED .06 TO CL 567029 1 2 EAR THE SEAT MOUNT REINFORCEMENT. CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301 WIT 567029 1 3 H AN EO TO FOLLOW. REIDENTIFIED PART AS V070-338442-007. V070-338442 EO 567029 1 4 NUMBER A03 WAS RELEASED ON 4-16-96 AND VERIFIED BY R. LANGLEY ON 4-12-96 567029 1 5 . REVISED THE NEXT ASSY DWG NUMBER V070-337601 EO NUMBER H04 RELEASED ON 567029 1 6 5-6-96 VERIFIED BY R. LANGLEY ON 5-6-96. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OV 567029 1 7 ERSIGHT. 567031 1 1 TRIMMING FLANGE OF BRKT V070-338442 ELIMINATED INTERFERENCE WITH SEAT MO 567031 1 2 UNT PLATE. EO CHANGE WAS REQ'D AGAINST THE DETAIL DWG. THAT ESTABLISHED 567031 1 3 A NEW DASH NO FOR BRKT ASSY. PART WAS REIDENTIFIED WITH -009 ASSY, WAS - 567031 1 4 003 ASSY. NEXT ASSY DWG WAS REVISED REFLECTING THE NEW DASH NO CALLOUT I 567031 1 5 N THE P/L AND F/D. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGR OVERSIGHT. 567033 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS GOUGES ON V070-358847-002 ANGLE BRACKET. RAISED 567033 1 2 EDGES WERE REMOVED USING ABRASIVE PAPER AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER MR 567033 1 3 UNRESTRICTED DISPO. NO FURTHER REWORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIO 567033 1 4 NAL DEGRADATION. 567073 1 1 THE SYSTEM FOR TRACKING CONN MATES AND DEMATES (SCAN) REQUIRES MAINTAINI 567073 1 2 NG CONFIGURATION AND RETEST STATUS. THE UNAUTHORIZED MATE OF CONNECTORS 567073 1 3 30V77W2P364/30V70A6J7 INVALIDATES THE SCAN CONFIGURATION. THIS PR DEMATE 567073 1 4 D, INSPECTED CONNECTORS 30V77W2P364/30V70A6J7 AND UPDATED THE SCAN SYSTE 567073 1 5 M TO THE PROPER CONFIGURATION. FUNCTIONAL RETEST RQMTS WILL BE PERFORMED 567073 1 6 PER THE SCAN TRACKING SYSTEM. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUS 567073 1 7 E: WORKMANSHIP. 567134 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS THAT PRE-AMP V494-742622-005 MOUNTING HOLES DO 567134 1 2 NOT LINE UP WITH MOUNTING BRACKET. UPON FURTHER INSPECTION, IT WAS DISCO 567134 1 3 VERED THAT THE SUPT V070-337193-001 WAS BONDED ONTO THE BULKHEAD UPSIDE 567134 1 4 DOWN. MR UNRESTRICTED DISPO WAS ADDED TO MATCH DRILL THE TWO CENTER FAST 567134 1 5 ENER HOLES ON THE SUPT FROM THE PRE-AMP. THE EXISTING CENTER NUTPLATES W 567134 1 6 ERE REMOVED AND SINGLE LUG NUTPLATES WERE INSTALLED AT THE CENTER LOCATI 567134 1 7 ONS PER MR. AREA WAS MR IDENTIFIED WITH THIS PR NUMBER. PRE-AMP WAS INST 567134 1 8 ALLED PER INS-3-J2-210. NO FURTHER REWORK REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMAN 567134 1 9 SHIP. 567141 1 1 THE SEVERED WIRE 2E431A22 AT THE CONNECTOR 90P412 TIE TANG, WAS REPAIRED 567141 1 2 PER ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR DISPO E.EL 101.18. A SUCCESSFUL CONTINU 567141 1 3 ITY TEST FOLLOWED THE REPAIR. THIS HAS RETURNED THE WIRE TO A CONFIGURAT 567141 1 4 ION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED U 567141 1 5 SAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 567145 1 1 THE REMOVAL & REPLACEMENT OF THE DAMAGED BACKSHELL ON CONN 90V77W5P417 P 567145 1 2 ER THE ABOVE STEPS (ENGINEERING STANDARD REPAIR DISPO E.EL 101.17) HAS R 567145 1 3 ETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG CONFIGURATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSH 567145 1 4 IP. 567146 1 1 THREE V070-346510-004 BRACKETS HAVE BEEN INADVERTENTLY ALTERED TO A -007 567146 1 2 (2) AND -010 (1) CONFIGURATION. OBTAINED THREE NEW V070-346510-004 BRAC 567146 1 3 KETS. ROUTED TRIMMED BRACKETS TO HDA FOR DISPO AND RECORDED DDC LRU STR- 567146 1 4 3-J2-5662. THREE NEW PARTS WITH OCN 6Z760 FM0007945 WERE INSTALLED. THE 567146 1 5 INSTALLATION OF THESE PARTS IS PER DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHI 567146 1 6 P. 567149 1 1 THREE V070-346510-003 BRACKETS HAVE BEEN INADVERTENTLY ALTERED TO A -008 567149 1 2 CONFIGURATION. OBTAINED THREE NEW V070-346510-003 BRACKETS. ROUTED TRIM 567149 1 3 MED BRACKETS TO HDA FOR DISPO AND RECORDED DDC LRU STR-3-J2-5663. THREE 567149 1 4 NEW PARTS WITH OCN 6Z760 FM0007944 WERE INSTALLED. THE INSTALLATION OF T 567149 1 5 HESE PARTS IS PER DWG RQMTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 567152 1 1 THE GPS PREAMP MOD RELOCATED CONN 40V77W88J9798, WITH THE WIRE HARNESS B 567152 1 2 EING APPROX SIX INCHES TOO SHORT. TWO SPLICES AND WIRES WERE ADDED USING 567152 1 3 THE EOTF METHOD. THE CONTINUITY TEST WAS PERFORMED. V070-774388 EO C05 567152 1 4 WAS RELEASED TO CORRECT THE ENGINEERING ERROR. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTE 567152 1 5 D. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING. 567209 1 1 WIRE TRAY V070-338578-001 WAS MACHINED PER DRAWING WITH CSK OF 2 HOLES O 567209 1 2 N WRONG SIDE. THIS IS OV-103 MOD ONLY. USE OF CSK WASHER PERMITTED INS 567209 1 3 TALLATION OF THE WIRE SUPPORT BRACKET. THE WASHER IS .072 THICK WITH A 567209 1 4 RADIUS ON OUTER DIAMETER, WIRE BUNDLES DO NOT RUN OVER THE WASHER SCREW 567209 1 5 INSTALLATION. EOTF V070-793911 E25 WAS RELEASED ON 24 APR 1996, TO ADD 567209 1 6 2 WASHERS AND LONGER SCREWS. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGR 567209 1 7 ITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 567209 1 8 ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 567210 1 1 THE DISCREPANT CONDITION WILL NOT DEGRADE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF TH 567210 1 2 E VEHICLE. FIT & FUNCTION WILL NOT BE AFFECTED. COORDINATED WITH NESTER 567210 1 3 CABALLERO DOWNEY DESIGN (X 2-2869). THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE T 567210 1 4 HE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETE 567210 1 5 NTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 567211 1 1 THE MD411-4005-1132 CONDUCTOR TO THE V070-338544-003 WIRE TRAY IS BROKEN 567211 1 2 . OBTAINED NEW HARDWARE MD114-4006-1132 CONDUCTOR S/N 6Z760FM0000797 AND 567211 1 3 INSTALLED. (REF TPS STR-3-J2-701, SEQ 26). THE FUNCTION IS PER DWG RQMT 567211 1 4 S. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 567212 1 1 FOLLOWING BRACKETS WERE REMOVED: 1 70C2901-1, 4 70C2903-1, 1 70C2064-1, 567212 1 2 2 70C2921-1 AND OPEN HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH RIVETS PER EOTF TO DWG V070 567212 1 3 -340008. TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE AND TO PERMIT INSTALLATION OF MC282-0 567212 1 4 082-0040 TANK ASSY. FOLLOWING BRACKETS WERE INSTALLED: 1 70C2901-1 AT XO 567212 1 5 1128.08, 1 70C2903-1 AT XO1115.50, 2 70C2903-1 AT XO1140.67 AND 1 70C206 567212 1 6 4-1 AT XO1140.67. FOLLOWING BRACKETS WERE RETURNED TO STOCK: 1 70C2903-1 567212 1 7 , 2 70C2921-1, 1 70C2903-1. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 567212 1 8 IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGRG 567212 1 9 OVERSIGHT. 567213 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS INABILITY TO INSTALL 1 V070-346510-003 & 1 V070 567213 1 2 -346510-004 SUPPORTS DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH 1 70C2892-1 CLIP AND RIVET 567213 1 3 PLUG. SUPTS V070-346510-003 & -004 WERE TRIMMED PER PMRB APPROVAL TO CL 567213 1 4 EAR RIVET. THE 70C2892-1 CLIP WAS REMOVED PER EOTF DISPO. V070-340008 EO 567213 1 5 C52 WAS RELEASED 4-25-96 VERIFIED 4-27-96. SUPRTS V070-346510-003 & -00 567213 1 6 4 WERE INSTALLED PICKING UP EXISTING HOLES. A .190 DIA HOLE WAS ADDED TO 567213 1 7 THE V070-346510-003 SUPT FOR WIRE CLAMP INSTALLATION PER EOTF DISPO. V0 567213 1 8 70-346510 EO B03 WAS RELEASED 4-25-96 AND VERIFIED 4-27-96. V070-346510- 567213 1 9 -003 WAS REIDENTIFIED AS A V070-346510-011. DISCREPANCY WAS RESOLVED AND 567213 1 10 NO FURTHER REWORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 567214 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS INABILITY TO INSTALL 1 V070-346510-003 & 1 V070 567214 1 2 -346510-004 SUPTS DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH 1 70C2892-1 CLIP. THE 70C2892 567214 1 3 -1 CLIP WAS REMOVED AND THE LOWER HOLE WAS PLUGGED PER EOTF DISPO. V070- 567214 1 4 340008 EO C52 WAS RELEASED 4-25-96 VERIFIED 4-27-96. SUPTS V070-346510-0 567214 1 5 03 & -004 WERE INSTALLED PICKING UP EXISTING HOLES. A .190 DIA HOLE WAS 567214 1 6 ADDED TO THE V070-346510-004 SUPT FOR WIRE CLAMP INSTALLATION PER EOTF D 567214 1 7 IPSO. V070-346510 EO B03 WAS RELEASED 4-25-96 AND VERIFIED 4-27-96. V070 567214 1 8 -346510-004 WAS REIDENTIFIED AS A V070-346510-012. DISCREPANCY WAS RESOL 567214 1 9 VED AND NO FURTHER REWORK IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN OVERSIGHT. 567215 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS THAT TANK MC282-0082-0140 COULD NOT BE INSTALLE 567215 1 2 D DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH WIRE SUPT. THE WIRE SUPTS FOR THE TANK WIRING 567215 1 3 WERE RELOCATED PER EOTF DISPO. V070-340008 EO C52 WAS RELEASED 4-25-96 567215 1 4 AND VERIFIED 5-3-96. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN OVERSIGHT. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A D 567215 1 5 OCUMENTS THAT SUPTS 70C2064-1 AND 70C2903-1 WERE MISLOCATED DURING INSTA 567215 1 6 LLATION PER THE EOTF DISPO. MR UNRESTRICTED DISPO WAS ADDED TO ACCEPT TH 567215 1 7 E MISLOCATED SUPPORTS AS IS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 567265 1 1 ITEM 1: HOLES WITH BELOW MINIMUM EDGE DISTANCE ON LH DHS 3 WERE ACCEPTED 567265 1 2 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS PROCESS TOLERANCE. 567268 1 1 ITEM 1: HOLES WITH BELOW MINIMUM EDGE DISTANCE ON RH DHS 3 WERE ACCEPTED 567268 1 2 FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS PROCESS TOLERANCE. 567319 1 1 THE FLANGE WAS TRIMMED TO MAINTAIN EDGE DISTANCE ON THE FASTENER. EDGE D 567319 1 2 ISTANCE ON THE FASTENER RESTORES DESIGN INTENT. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS 567319 1 3 MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: PREVIOUS 567319 1 4 VENDOR WORKMANSHIP. 567323 1 1 SPLICE 50SP399 AND WIRE 2H61J22 FROM CONN 50P2 CAVITY 10, WERE REMOVED A 567323 1 2 ND SCRAPPED. A NEW WIRE, NEW DESIGN SPLICE (50SP399) AND CONTACT WERE IN 567323 1 3 STALLED. THE HARNESS WAS RETURNED TO DWG RQMTS. A SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY 567323 1 4 TEST WAS PERFORMED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 567330 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS THAT PANEL V070-338432-001 WILL NOT FIT ON TOP 567330 1 2 OF THE V070-338326 SPACER, EOTF DISPO WAS ADDED TO TRIM THE PANEL TO ACH 567330 1 3 IEVE A GOOD FIT. EO A02 TO DWG V070-338432 AND EO A01 TO DWG V070-337808 567330 1 4 WERE RELEASED 5-10-96 AND VERIFIED ON 5-22-96. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN O 567330 1 5 VERSIGHT. ITEM 2, PAGE 1A DOCUMENTS THAT THE CUTOUT WAS MADE TO 1.12 IN 567330 1 6 AND S/B 1.04 IN. MR UNRESTRICTED DISPO WAS ADDED TO FABRICATE A MR FIBER 567330 1 7 GLASS BLOCK WHICH WAS BONDED ONTO THE PANEL TO CLOSEOUT THE GAP AND ACH 567330 1 8 IEVE THE PRINT CUTOUT DIMENSION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. NO FURTHER 567330 1 9 RWK REQ'D. 567335 1 1 ADDED CUTOUT TO CLOSE OUT PANEL V070-338431-001 TO PROVIDE CLEARANCE FOR 567335 1 2 SPACER V070-338326 ATTACHED TO CEILING BEAM. PANEL WAS REIDENTIFIED WIT 567335 1 3 H NEW DASH NO -002 WAS -001 ESTABLISHED BY EO A01. INSTL DWG REVISED ADD 567335 1 4 ING NEW PANEL CALLOUT. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGR OVERSIGHT. 567401 1 1 DURING REMOVAL OF TANK 1 FROM BAY 2, HARDWARE AT UPPER END OF TANK CONSI 567401 1 2 STING OF A PLATE & BAR ASSY HAD BEEN INSTALLED INCORRECTLY CAUSING THE D 567401 1 3 AMAGE TO PARTS. DAMAGED HARDWARE SENT TO HDA FOR DISPO. AN LRU PR WAS GE 567401 1 4 NERATED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 567422 1 1 MDM PF2 SECONDARY PORT BSR READ TEST FAILURE TROUBLE SHOOTING LOCATED DI 567422 1 2 SCREPANT SPLICE 82SP26. SPLICE 82SP26 WAS REMOVED, SCRAPPED, A NEW SPLIC 567422 1 3 E AND ID INSTALLED TO RETURN THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. FUNCTIONAL R 567422 1 4 ETEST WAS PERFORMED BY EPD-3-J2-412, WITH COPIES ATTACHED. PROBABLE CAUS 567422 1 5 E: WEAR AND TEAR. 567429 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS THAT DWG V070-334035 EO H08 CALLS OUT TO DRILL 567429 1 2 HOLE THRU V637-334028-001 PALLET AND SHOULD BE THRU V070-336701-012 CONT 567429 1 3 AINER. EOTF DISPOSITION WAS ADDED TO CORRECT THE DWG TO CALL OUT DRILLIN 567429 1 4 G THRU V070-336701. V070-334035 EO H13 RELEASED 4-30-96 AND VERIFIED 5-9 567429 1 5 -96. NO FURTHER WORK REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN OVERSIGHT. 567432 1 1 THE .203 DIA HOLE THRU V619-332099-001 AND V070-332113 ONLY HAS BEEN DRI 567432 1 2 LLED. THE EO V070-334035 H13 HAS BEEN RELEASED ON 4-30-96. MR R. LANGLEY 567432 1 3 VERIFIED THE EO RELEASED. THERE WAS NO MOD SHEET PLANNING REQ'D. PROBAB 567432 1 4 LE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 567602 1 1 DISCREPANT SPLICE 83SP380 WAS REMOVED, SCRAPED, A NEW SPLICE AND ID INST 567602 1 2 ALLED TO RETURN THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. FUNCTIONAL RETEST WILL BE 567602 1 3 PERFORMED BY KSC OMS SCAN RETEST. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 567614 1 1 INSTALLATION TECH ORDER M072-362030 HAD NO PROVISION TO DRILL UP THE PIL 567614 1 2 OT HOLES IN THE V566-360002 CLIPS TO SIZE #10 (.1935) DURING INSTALLATIO 567614 1 3 N. THIS RQMT WAS ADDED TO DWG M072-362030 BY EO TO FOLLOW. PROBABLE CAUS 567614 1 4 E: DESIGN. 567638 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: ITEM 001: CREW MODULE SIDE HATCH HOLDING FIXTURE WA 567638 001 2 S ROTATED TILE SIDE UP TO CAREFULLY MOVE HATCH INTO POSITION TO PROPERLY 567638 001 3 ATTACH LOCATORS AND SECURE EACH LOCATOR. THEN THE HOLDING FIXTURE WAS 567638 001 4 ROTATED TILE SIDE DOWN TO REMOVE AND REPLACE LOCATORS ONE AT A TIME TO I 567638 001 5 NSPECT FOR DAMAGE. 567638 001 6 ITEM 002: THE DAMAGED SEAL WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW SEAL. ITEM 567638 001 7 003: THE SCRATCH ON AFT SIDE HATCH SEALING SURFACE RAISED EDGES WERE BL 567638 001 8 ENDED SMOOTH USING 600 GRIT ABRASIVE PAPER AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER D 567638 001 9 WG REQUIREMENTS. ITEM 004: WITH THE SEAL REMOVED, THE WRINKLES IN THE 567638 001 10 LT-80 TAPE WERE SMOOTHED OUT BY INSTALLING NEW TAPE WHERE REQUIRED. 567638 001 11 THE SEAL, SEAL GROOVE AND SEALING SURFACE WERE CLEANED WITH LINT-FREE 567638 001 12 CLOTH DAMPEDED WITH IPA AND VERIFIED THAT THE GROOVE AND SEALING 567638 001 13 SURFACE AND THE SEAL ARE CLEAN. NEW SEAL WAS INSTALLED INTO THE GROOVE 567638 001 14 EVENLY FLAT AND NOT WAVY. THE SEAL WAS COVERED WITH MYSTIC 7361/2 567638 001 15 TAPE. PLACING 1 IN WIDE TAPE DOWN CENTER OF STRIPS OF 2 IN WIDE TAPE 567638 001 16 WITH ADHESIVE FACING EACH OTHER THEN THE TAPE WAS PLACED OVER THE SEAL 567638 001 17 PREVENTING ADHESIVE SIDE OF TAPE TO CONTACTING THE SEAL. SEAL RESTORED 567638 001 18 TO THE DESIGN INTENT. A HATCH SEAL LEAK CHECK WILL BE PERFORMED WHEN 567638 001 19 IS REINSTALLED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 567733 1 1 SUPT ASSY INSTALLED ON TRAY ASSY AT THE REVISED DIM EO V070-334802 F03 T 567733 1 2 O CHANGE THE DIM WAS RELEASED 4-19-96. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURA 567733 1 3 L INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE C 567733 1 4 AUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 567736 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: NUTPLATE WAS CHANGED TO MD114-5004-0004 AND INSTALL 567736 001 2 ED ON V070-336501 ORIENTED OFF CENTER. ENG. INFORMED PALMDALE THAT THE 567736 001 3 REWORK WILL NOT WORK THEREFORE PAGES 2 AND 3 WERE VOIDED ENTIRELY. THE 567736 001 4 SAME NUTPLATE WAS RELOCATED FWD AND ROTATED 90 DEGREES PER SKETCH 'A', C 567736 001 5 ORROSION PROTECTED AND THE CHANGE EO FOR V070-334049 EO E05 WAS RELEASED 567736 001 6 5-3-96. RI ENG. R. LANGLEY VERIFIED RELEASE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENG. OV 567736 001 7 ERSIGHT. 567908 1 1 THE SPLICE PLATE WAS MADE SHORTER AND COULD NOT PICK UP THE EXISTING RIV 567908 1 2 ET AS SHOWN ON PAGE 2. THE PRE DRILLED HOLES ON THE SPLICE WAS PLUGGED A 567908 1 3 ND NEW HOLES WERE RELOCATED WITH AN EO TO FOLLOW. INSTALLED 070-337601 S 567908 1 4 PLICE PER SKETCH ON PAGE 2. THE HI-LOKS WERE RELOCATED. THE V070-337601 567908 1 5 EO NUMBER H-04 WAS RELEASED ON 5-6-96 VERIFIED BY R. LANGLEY ON 5-7-96. 567908 1 6 PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 567934 1 1 ITEM 1: HOLE NUMBER 51 WAS FOUND TO BE ELONGATED. MR ACTION WAS TAKEN TO 567934 1 2 ENLARGE HOLE NUMBER 51 AND INSTALL DOUBLE OVERSIZED HI-LOK. ITEM 2: HOL 567934 1 3 E NUMBER 50 WAS FOUND TO BE ELONGATED, MR ACTION WAS TAKEN TO INSTALL DO 567934 1 4 UBLER BECAUSE HOLE COULD NOT BE ENLARGED DUE TO EDGE DISTANCE. ITEM 3: H 567934 1 5 V410V-6-3 DOUBLE OVERSIZED HI-LOK PIN TO BE INSTALLED PER STEP 1-7 WAS F 567934 1 6 OUND TO BE TOO SHORT. THE PIN WAS REMOVED AND PROPER LENGTH WAS INSTALLE 567934 1 7 D PER MA0101-301. PROBABLE CAUSE IS WORKMANSHIP. 568000 001 1 SUMMARY CONCLUSION: DURING INSTALLATION OF THE 83V77W4J1 RECEPTACLE ON 568000 001 2 THE TACAN MOUNTING PLATE, PER TPS EPD-3-J2-392 (MOD SHT. #10), IT WAS DI 568000 001 3 SCOVERED THAT EO V070-793911 E07, HAD CALLED OUT THE SECURING SCREWS P/N 568000 001 4 AS MD112-3003-3006 (S/B MD112-3003-0206), AND INADVERTENTLY OMITTED THE 568000 001 5 G/N <10>, CALLING OUT THE LOCTITE, PER MAO106-333. EO V070-793911-E26 568000 001 6 WAS RELEASED TO CORRECT THE SCREW P/N TO MD112-3003-0206, AND TO INCLUDE 568000 001 7 THE G/N <10> CALL-OUT FOR THESE SAME SCREWS. THIS PERMITTED THE INSTAL 568000 001 8 LATION TO PROCEED PER EPD-3-J2-392, MOD SHT. #10. PROBABLE CAUSE: 568000 001 9 ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY. 568147 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS THAT TANK ASSY MC282-0082-0040 COULD NOT BE INS 568147 1 2 TALLED DUE TO INTERFERENCE WITH TWO CLIPS MOUNTED ON THE UNDERSIDE OF TH 568147 1 3 E WIRE TRAY. THE CLIPS WERE REMOVED PER EOTF DISP. EO C05 TO DWG V070-34 568147 1 4 0382 AND EO A03 TO DWG V070-340106 WERE RELEASED 5-10-96 AND VERIFIED 5- 568147 1 5 17-96. NO FURTHER REWORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN OVERSIGHT. 568148 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: THE SEVERED GROUND SEGMENT WAS OF SUFFICIENT LENGTH 568148 001 2 TO BE RETERMINATED TO THE SHIELD BRAID, SHIELD BRAID WAS EXPOSED BY REM 568148 001 3 OVING ENOUGH CONFORMAL COATING TO ALLOW REATTACHMENT. GROUND WIRE 1Y3AC 568148 001 4 X30 WAS PREPPED AND ATTEMPTED TO BE SOLDERED TO THE SHIELD BRAID. IT WA 568148 001 5 S THEN NOTED THAT THERE WAS DAMAGE TO THE SHIELD BRAID. DAMAGE TO THE O 568148 001 6 UTER SHIELD BRAID WAS TRIMMED SUFFICIENTLY TO ALLOW SUCCESSFUL SOLDERING 568148 001 7 OF THE GROUND SEGMENT. CONFORMAL COAT WAS REAPPLIED TO THE AREA TO RETU 568148 001 8 RN THE INSTALLATION TO DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. REPAIR PROCEDURE WAS PERFO 568148 001 9 RMED WITHOUT OPENING THE NEARBY CONNECTOR, 30P235, DUE TO IT BEING 568148 001 10 POTTED. FUNCTIONAL TEST WILL BE PERFORMED TO VERIFY INTEGRITY OF THE 568148 001 11 INSTALLATION. AN IDENTIFICATION PLATE "MR OEL-3-J2-0944" WAS ATTACHED 568148 001 12 TO THE HARNESS WITHIN 18" OF CONNECTOR 30P235. REPAIR IS ACCEPTABLE 568148 001 13 FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE BASIS 568148 001 14 FOR CERTIFICATION AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) 568148 001 15 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 568189 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS ONE #40 HOLE WAS MISLOCATED. MR UNRESTRICTED DI 568189 1 2 SPO WAS ADDED TO PLUG THE HOLE DOUBLE FLUSH USING ONE MD121-0002-03XX RI 568189 1 3 VET AND CORROSION PROTECT. MR ID WAS APPLIED. NO FURTHER RWK REQ'D. PROB 568189 1 4 ABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 568352 1 1 REF ITEM 001 & 002: THE DISCREPANT CONDITIONS FOR ITEMS 001 & 002 WERE O 568352 1 2 RIGINALLY DISPOSITIONED AND REWORKED ON A "DR" LEVEL OF EFFORT, PER MLO3 568352 1 3 03-0014, PARA 6.3.2.8.1 & SUBS. HOWEVER, THE REQUIRED INSPECTION PER PAR 568352 1 4 6.3.2.8.1.1 WAS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED. THEREFORE, ITEMS 001 & 002 WERE 568352 1 5 RE-DISPOSITIONED TO INCLUDE THE INSPECTION POINT. CABLE YC907B24 (REF IT 568352 1 6 EM 002) WAS REWORKED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MLO303-0014 ("D" LEVEL), FOUND S 568352 1 7 HIELD BRAID DAMAGE (REF STEP 15). THEREFORE, THE "DR" WAS UPGRADED TO A 568352 1 8 "PR" (REF STEP 28) AND PG 1A WAS INITIATED (REF ITEM 003). REF ITEMS 001 568352 1 9 & 003: THE BROKEN SHIELD BRAID STRANDS ON CABLE YC277B24 AT 1-1/2 & 5 568352 1 10 INCHES BEHIND THE TANG (REF CONN 83P76) WERE TRIMMED DOWN TO THE PARENT 568352 1 11 MATERIAL. BOTH WIRE SEGMENTS WERE INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE AND NO DAMAGE 568352 1 12 WAS FOUND. ALSO, ALL RADIAL CRACKS BETWEEN THE CONN AND AT LEAST 1 INCH 568352 1 13 PAST THE FIRST CLAMP WERE INSPECTED PER MLO303-0014 PARA 6.3.2.8.1.1. 568352 1 14 AND NO DAMAGE FOUND. FOLLOWING THE ABOVE REPAIRS AND INSPECTIONS, A 568352 1 15 CONTINUOUS SLEEVE OF RT1146 SHRINK SLEEVING WAS INSTALLED OVER THIS 568352 1 16 AREA OF THE CABLE (OVER EXISTING CABLE ID'S.). THE CABLE ID AND MATING 568352 1 17 REF DES ID WERE REAPPLIED OVER THE SHRINK SLEEVING. AN EXISTING "MR" ID 568352 1 18 PLATE (MR OEL-3-16-0393) FOR PREVIOUS REPAIRS ON CABLES YC277B24 & 568352 1 19 YC907B24 WAS FOUND ATTACHED TO CABLE YC277B24. SINCE THE PREVIOUS 568352 1 20 REPAIR HAS NOW BEEN REWORKED, THE ID PLATE WAS ATTACHED TO CABLE 568352 1 21 YC907B24, 6" TO 12" FROM CONN 83P78 (NONE PRESENT, REF STEP 54) AND AN 568352 1 22 MR ID PLATE MARKED "MR OEL-3-J2-0948" WAS ATTACHED 6" TO 12" FROM CONN 568352 1 23 83076. THIS REPAIR WAS FOLLOWED BY SUCCESSFUL CONTINUITY, ISOLATION & 568352 1 24 HY-POT TESTS. THIS REPAIR HAS ALSO RETURNED THE CABLE TO AN 568352 1 25 INSTALLATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR 568352 1 26 UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR & TEAR (ITEMS 001, 002 & 003). 568353 1 1 REMOVAL AND RETERMINATION OF CONN 83P2 ON COAXIAL CABLE 83W564 PER THE A 568353 1 2 BOVE STEPS HAS RETURNED THE ASSY TO DWG RQMTS. TESTING PERMLO305-0006 (S 568353 1 3 TEPS 22.1, 22.2, 22.3) HAS VERIFIED THE INSTALLATION SATISFIES DESIGN RQ 568353 1 4 MTS. INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: 568353 1 5 WORKMANSHIP. 568358 1 1 REWORK OF THE DAMAGED WIRE 1C8D20 SEG 2 AT SPLICE 83SP46 REQUIRED THE RE 568358 1 2 MOVAL AND RETERMINATION OF SPLICES 83SP46 AND 83SP45. THIS RETURNED THE 568358 1 3 INSTALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. FUNCTIONAL TEST WILL BE PERFORMED BY TPS COM- 568358 1 4 3-J2-298. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 568412 1 1 THE INSTALLATION OF WIRE PROTECTION ON THE HARNESS AREAS MAKING CONTACT 568412 1 2 WITH THE NOTED COOLANT LINES AND SHELF, PER MLO303-0014, PARA 4.1.3.2.4 568412 1 3 HAS RETURNED THE INSTALLATION TO DWG RQTMS. UNLESS ACTUAL WIRE HARNESS D 568412 1 4 AMAGED IS DISCOVERED, THE INSTALLATION OF WIRE PROTECTION PER MLO303-001 568412 1 5 4, IS CONSIDERED SHOP PRACTICE DURING HARNESS INSTALLATION/REWORK. NO DA 568412 1 6 MAGE WAS NOTED, THEREFORE, NO ALERT TO THE FLEET IS REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUS 568412 1 7 E: WORKMANSHIP. 568424 1 1 ENGINEERING REVIEWED/INSPECTED THE CONN AND FOUND THE NOTED GOUGES, NICK 568424 1 2 S AND HOLE DO NOT AFFECT THE CONNS FUNCTION. ALSO, THE DEFECTS ARE ON TH 568424 1 3 E PLUG AND NOT ON THE BACKSHELL AND THE CONN IS A POTTED CONN. THE PRESE 568424 1 4 NT DEFECT AND POSSIBLE DAMAGE FROM REMOVAL/REPLACEMENT DO NOT JUSTIFY RE 568424 1 5 PLACEMENT OF THE CONN. THE INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED U 568424 1 6 SE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 568545 1 1 CUTOUTS WERE ADDED IN THE WIRE TRAY COVER. EOTF V070-340359 C12 WAS REL 568545 1 2 ON MAY 1, 1996. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAIN 568545 1 3 ED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGRG OVERSIGHT. 568546 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: CUTOUTS WERE ADDED IN THE WIRE TRAY COVER. EOTF V0 568546 001 2 70-340359 C12 RELEASED ON MAY 1, 1996. DESIGN INTENT RESTORED. STRUCT 568546 001 3 INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS POSITIVE. PROBABLE C 568546 001 4 AUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 568548 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: THE FITTING ASSY V070-362536 WAS INSTALLED BY XO-05 568548 001 2 RIVETS ON THE EO BUT THE EXISTING RIVETS WERE XO-06 PER DRAWING V070-34 568548 001 3 6219. EO TO FOLLOW CHANGED VIEW BR-BR ZONE 77 OF V070-366965 FOR XO-06 568548 001 4 RIVETS WAS XO-05. EO V070-366965 NUMBER D05 RELEASED ON 5-9-96 AND VERI 568548 001 5 FIED BY R. LANGLEY ON 5-11-96. PLANNING AT THE DETAIL LEVEL WAS NOT REQ 568548 001 6 UIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 568595 1 1 DURING REMOVAL OF TANK 2 FROM BAY 2, HARDWARE AT UPPER END OF TANK (CONS 568595 1 2 ISTING OF A PLATE AND BAR ASSY) HAD BEEN INSTALLED INCORRECTLY, CAUSING 568595 1 3 DAMAGE TO THE ANTI-ROTATION PLATE. AN LRU PR WAS INITIATED TO ROUTE THE 568595 1 4 DAMAGED PLATE TO LOGISTICS, AND THE BAR AND ATTACHING HARDWARE WERE RETA 568595 1 5 INED AND KITTED (REF V465-000002). SURROUNDING HARDWARE WAS INSPECTED AT 568595 1 6 THE REQUEST OF ENGINEERING, WITH NO DAMAGE NOTED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKM 568595 1 7 ANSHIP. 568651 1 1 SPLICE 83SP24 WAS REMOVED, SCRAPED, A NEW SPLICE, AND ID'D. INSTALLED TO 568651 1 2 REWORK THE INSULATION DAMAGE ON WIRE 1W28H22 AT 83SP24 TO RETURN THE IN 568651 1 3 STALLATION TO DWG RQMTS. FUNCTIONAL RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED BY EPD-3-J2 568651 1 4 -412, SEQ 6. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 568686 1 1 THE THREE HOLES ON SED33106337 DID NOT FIT ONTO THE PLATE V828-660518-00 568686 1 2 4. THE PART WAS RETURNED TO SUPPLIER AND RECORDED ON DD1149 ROUTED TO HD 568686 1 3 A FOR DISPO. STEP 2.0 WAS DELETED. THE HANDRAIL WAS SENT TO PALMDALE AS 568686 1 4 A REPLACEMENT PART (SED33106337-601 OCN E7.) THE NEW HANDRAIL WAS INSTAL 568686 1 5 LED PER TPS MX-3-J2-045. DETAIL PLANNING WAS REQUIRED TO TPS MX-3-J2-045 568686 1 6 REF M072-661828 B02. THE PART IS COMPLETELY INSTALLED, AND SATISFIES TH 568686 1 7 E M072-661828-B07. PROBABLE CAUSE: CUSTOMER OVERSIGHT. 568753 1 1 THE DASH 003 BRACKET WAS FABRICATED INCORRECTLY. IT SHOULD HAVE HAD A .1 568753 1 2 90 HOLE AND NOT SLOTTED. A MR BRACKET WAS FABRICATED FROM 2024-T81, QQ-A 568753 1 3 -250/4 (.050 X 1 5/8 X 1 5/8) WITH A BAG AND TAG FOR ID. INSTALLED THE D 568753 1 4 OUBLER TO THE BRACKET WITH RIVETS PER MAO101-302. CORROSION PROTECTED PE 568753 1 5 R MAO608-301. HOLES WERE DRILLED TO .190 - .194 DIA TO MATCH HOLE IN THE 568753 1 6 SUPT FAR SIDE. PART WAS ID'D PER MAO104-301. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MA 568753 1 7 INTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 568754 1 1 THE DASH 004 BRACKET WAS FABRICATED INCORRECTLY. IT SHOULD HAVE HAD A .1 568754 1 2 90 HOLE AND NOT SLOTTED. A MR BRACKET WAS FABRICATED FROM 2024-T81, QQ-A 568754 1 3 -250/4 (.050 X 1 5/8 X 1 5/8) WITH A BAG AND TAG FOR ID. INSTALLED THE D 568754 1 4 OUBLER TO THE BRACKET WITH RIVETS PER MAO101-302. CORROSION PROTECTED PE 568754 1 5 R MAO608-301. HOLES WERE DRILLED TO .190 - .194 DIA TO MATCH HOLE IN THE 568754 1 6 SUPT FAR SIDE. PART WAS ID'D PER MAO104-301. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MA 568754 1 7 INTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 568809 1 1 REMOVING V070-338390-001 FTG FACILITATES INSTL OF HI-LOK FASTENER. REINS 568809 1 2 TL FTG TO DWG RQMT. PROBABLE CAUSE: OUT OF SEQUENCE INSTL. 568847 1 1 REMOVAL OF V070-338390-001 FTG NOT REQ'D, AREA ACCESSIBLE FOR INSTL OF H 568847 1 2 I-LOK PER TPS STR-3-J2-662. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 568850 1 1 THE V070-366965-029 SPACERS WERE CALLED OUT FOR -027 AND -028 ASSEMBLIES 568850 1 2 ONLY. ONLY 4 SPACERS WERE MADE AND 8 ARE REQ'D. EOTF DISPO WAS ADDED TO 568850 1 3 SUBSTITUTE V070-366965-003 AND -005 SPACERS TO SUPT -028 ASSY. V070-366 568850 1 4 965-003 & -005 SPACERS WERE INSTALLED USING EXISTING HOLES AS SHOWN ON P 568850 1 5 AGE 2. EO D05 TO DWG V070-366965 WAS RELEASED ON 5-9-96 AND VERIFIED BY 568850 1 6 ENGINEERING ON 5-11-96. NO FURTHER REWORK REQ'D. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN 568850 1 7 OVERSIGHT. 568857 1 1 THE DISCREPANT BRACKET WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PRINT. THE DISCREPAN 568857 1 2 T BRACKET WAS ROUTED TO HDA FOR DISPO. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. P 568857 1 3 ROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 568950 1 1 WIRE PROTECTION MATERIAL WAS INSTALLED ON V070-778334 WIRE HARNESS WHERE 568950 1 2 IT CONTACTS THE COOLANT LINE, V070-613340. THE PERMANENT WIRE PROTECTI 568950 1 3 ON WAS INSTALLED PER THE ELECTRICAL WIRE HARNESS INSTALLATION SPECIFICAT 568950 1 4 IONM, ML0303-0014. CERTIFICATION HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBABLE CAUSE 568950 1 5 : WORKMANSHIP. 568951 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: REMOVED INTERFERING RIVET AND INSTALLED A FLUSH HEA 568951 001 2 D TYPE TO PROVIDE A FLUSH SURFACE FOR INSTL OF V070-338445-001 BRACKET I 568951 001 3 NSTALLATION DWG CHANGED BY AN E.O. REFLECTING FASTENER CHANGE. PROBABLE 568951 001 4 CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 568952 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: REMOVED INTERFERING RIVET AND INSTALLED A FLUSH HEA 568952 001 2 D TYPE RIVET TO PROVIDE A FLUSH SURFACE FOR INSTL OF V070-338445-001 BRK 568952 001 3 T. INSTL DWG WAS CHANGED BY AN E.O. REFLECTING FASTENER CHANGE. PROBAB 568952 001 4 LE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 569005 1 1 ONE FASTENER COULD NOT BE INSTALLED ON V070-394708 CARRIER PANEL BECAUSE 569005 1 2 OF DAMAGED NUTPLATE. THE NUT ELEMENT WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER PR DI 569005 1 3 SPO. PRINT CONFIGURATION WAS MAINTAINED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PRO 569005 1 4 BABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 569031 1 1 TWO .190 DIA HOLES ON THE V828-337906-001 WERE MISLOCATED BY .250 FROM T 569031 1 2 HE NUTPLATE HOLES. THE TWO MISLOCATED HOLES. THE TWO MISLOCATED HOLES WE 569031 1 3 RE FILLED WITH ADHESIVE AND NEW HOLES WERE DRILLED BY MR ACTION. PROBABL 569031 1 4 E CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 569086 1 1 V070-351926-009 SPLICE PLATE FOR UPPER DHS 3 WAS FOUND TO HAVE CHAMFER I 569086 1 2 N SPLICE PLATE CUT ON WRONG SIDE. CONDITION WAS MR ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRI 569086 1 3 CTED USE. PROBABLE CAUSE IS VENDOR. 569088 1 1 ITEM 001, FOUR DOUBLERS V070-336232 AT THE MID DECK FLOOR ARE BONDED PER 569088 1 2 MAO106-301 (HOT BOND) SINCE THE SUB SYSTEMS ARE INSTALLED THE BONDING H 569088 1 3 AS TO BE CHANGED TO COLD BOND IN ORDER TO NOT DAMAGE THE SUB SYSTEM. WIT 569088 1 4 H AN EO TO FOLLOW THE V070-336232 DOUBLERS ARE BEING BONDED PER MAO1-6-3 569088 1 5 36 GRADE "A" WITH MBO120-079 ADHESIVE. THE SHORE "D" HARDNESS IS RECORDE 569088 1 6 D AS 82 WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE SINCE THE ACCEPTABLE MINIMUM IS 70. RECORDED 569088 1 7 LAB REPORT P96-363 AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301. THE V070-334 569088 1 8 049 EO NUMBER E05 WAS RELEASED ON 5-3-96. RI ENG. R. LANGLEY VERIFIED TH 569088 1 9 E RELEASE ON 5-12-96. ITEM 002, DURING INSPECTION OF THE V070-336232 569088 1 10 DOUBLERS, TWO OF THE BONDED DOUBLERS HAD A GAP RUNNING .03 X .50 LONG 569088 1 11 AND .02 X .43 LONG. THE DOUBLERS WERE REMOVED AND REBONDED AFTER 569088 1 12 CLEANING THE AREA. THE SHORE "D" HARDNESS IS 80 WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE 569088 1 13 SINCE THE MINIMUM IS 70. THE RECORDED LAB REPORT IS P96-364. PROBABLE 569088 1 14 CAUSE: INSTALLATION SEQUENCE AND WORKMANSHIP. 569267 1 1 THE V070-763430-004 RESISTOR WAS INSTALLED IN THE WRONG LOCATION. THE R 569267 1 2 ESISTOR WAS REMOVED, TWO DISCREPANT HAOLES WERE PLUGGED BY MR, AND THEN 569267 1 3 REINSTALLED AT THE PER PRINT LOCATION. NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. 569267 1 4 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 569270 1 1 BENT PIN #15 IN CONN 40P9162 WAS STRAIGHTENED BUT INITIAL, CURSORY INSPE 569270 1 2 CTION INACCURATELY REVEALED SUSPECTED PLATING DAMAGE. INITIAL DISPOSITIO 569270 1 3 NS TO REMOVE AND REPLACE THE DISCREPANT PIN WERE NULLIFIED AFTER DETAILE 569270 1 4 D ENGINEERING EVALUATION AND QUALITY RE-EVALUATION REVEALED PIN #15 DID 569270 1 5 NOT HAVE PLATING DAMAGE OTHER THAN NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR. HOWEVER, IN THE 569270 1 6 PROCESS OF EVALUATING SUSPECTED PLATING DAMAGE TO DISCREPANT PIN #15 OF 569270 1 7 CONN 40P9162, VERY MINOR DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED IN 2 PLACES ON THE GROUN 569270 1 8 D WIRE TERMINATED AT THE CONN TANG. AFTER REMOVING THE LUG, RTV WAS APPL 569270 1 9 IED TO THE MINOR DAMAGE IN THE INSULATION (2 PLACES) TO PROVIDE AMPLE 569270 1 10 SEALING AND PROTECTION. THE LUG WAS RE-ATTACHED AFTER THE REPAIR. THE 569270 1 11 REPAIR ON THE GROUND WIRE INSULATION RESTORED THE GROUND WIRE TO A 569270 1 12 CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT 569270 1 13 INVALIDATE THE CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) 569270 1 14 RETENTION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 569276 1 1 SEMI-RIGID COAXIAL CABLE (P/N V070-743500-008) WAS REMOVED FROM AVIONICS 569276 1 2 BAY 3A SHELF 2 AND REFORMED TO ELIMINATE A "RIDING" CONDITION WITH ADJA 569276 1 3 ENT SEMI-RIGID COAXIAL CABLE V070-743500-007. A BASELINE INSERTION AND R 569276 1 4 ETURN LOSS TEST WAS PERFORMED AFTER REMOVAL OF THE COAXIAL CABLE (P/N V0 569276 1 5 70-743500-008). THE COAX CABLE WAS REFORMED TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST .25 INCH 569276 1 6 CLEARANCE TO THE ADJACENT COAX CABLE AND A FINAL INSERTION AND RETURN L 569276 1 7 OSS TEST WAS PERFORMED PRIOR TO REINSTALLATION. EACH TEST MET ACCEPTANCE 569276 1 8 CRITERIA. AN MR ID "MR OEL-3-J2-0956" WAS STAMPED ON COAXIAL CABLE V070 569276 1 9 -743500-008. THIS REPAIR IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE 569276 1 10 CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 569378 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: THE MD114-5017-0003 NUT PLATE COULD NOT BE INSTALLE 569378 001 2 D AS SHOWN ON THE INSTALLATION DRAWING. A REPLACEMENT NUT PLATE MD114-5 569378 001 3 004-0004 IS USED WITH MD121-0001-03 RIVETS AND INSTALLED PER MAO101-302 569378 001 4 WITH CORROSION PROTECTION. THE EO V070-334048 NO. E05 WAS RELEASED ON 5 569378 001 5 -3-96. RI ENG. R. LANGLEY VERIFIED THAT THE EO WAS RELEASED. PROBABLE 569378 001 6 CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 569380 1 1 EO TO FOLLOW WAS OBTAINED TO ALLOW COLD BOND INSTEAD OF HOT BOND FOR THE 569380 1 2 V070-334261-003 DOUBLER (REF H13). NO FURTHER DISCREPANCIES EXIST. CLOS 569380 1 3 E THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSTALLATION SEQUENCING/MFG REQUEST. 569404 1 1 THREE BRACKETS: V070-346510-001, 002 AND 003 WERE MISSING CALLOUTS FOR T 569404 1 2 HE INSTALLATION OF 12 V070-362414-001 SNAPS. THE -032 AND -033 INSTALLAT 569404 1 3 IONS WERE REWORKED BY PR EO TO FOLLOW TO ADD 6 EACH V070-362414-001 STUD 569404 1 4 S. THE EO WAS RELEASED AND VERIFIED THAT IT REFLECTED THE PR EO TO FOLLO 569404 1 5 W DISPO. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 569475 1 1 DURING REMOVAL OF A DIVING BOARD IN BAY 1, RH SIDE, SUSPECTED DAMAGE OCC 569475 1 2 URRED TO THE V070-454110-154 WATER LINE AND THE V070-634452-038 AND V070 569475 1 3 -634451-036 FREON LINES. THE FIBROUS INSULATION WAS REMOVED FROM THESE L 569475 1 4 INES TO INSPECT FOR DAMAGE. ALSO, THE L-T-80 TAPE WAS REMOVED FROM THE M 569475 1 5 C363-0038-0032 40V45HR273 TO EXPOSE THE HEATER AND THE -154 TUBE FOR INS 569475 1 6 EPCTION. VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE -0032 HEATER AND THE -154, -038 AND -0 569475 1 7 36 TUBES FOUND NO DAMAGE, NOR WAS THERE ANY DAMAGE TO THE SURROUNDING ST 569475 1 8 RUCTURE. THE FIBROUS INSULATION WAS INSTALLED ON THE -038 AND -036 TUBES 569475 1 9 PER MAO105-317 TYPE IV CLB. THEN THE -0032 HEATER WAS SECURED TO THE 569475 1 10 -154 TUBE USING L-T-80 TAPE PER MLO310-0064. PER TEST TPS 569475 1 11 FCP-3-J2-0347, PRSD TEST ENGINEERING PERFORMED A RETEST OF THE -0032 569475 1 12 HEATER, WHICH VERIFIED NOMINAL HEATER OPERATION. THE FIBROUS INSULATION 569475 1 13 WAS THEN INSTALLED ON THE -154 TUBE PER MAO105-317 TYPE IV CLB. 569475 1 14 PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 569842 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: CONNECTOR 30V77W4P608 HAD A SPLIT BACKSHELL WHICH R 569842 001 2 OTATED FREELY (REF ITEM -001). THE SPLIT BACKSHELL WAS REMOVED, ITS THR 569842 001 3 EADS CLEANED AND THEN RE-INSTALLED WITH ONE DROP OF LOCTITE ON EACH SECU 569842 001 4 RING SCREW AND THE CORRECT TORQUE. IN THE PROCESS OF REPAIRING THE BACK 569842 001 5 SHELLIT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A 22 GA WIRE AT A LUG AT CONNECTOR 30V77W4P6 569842 001 6 08 HAD THREE BROKEN STRANDS (REF ITEM -002). SINCE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT 569842 001 7 LENGTH OF WIRE TO RE-TERMINATE, THE DAMAGED PORTION OF THE WIRE WAS CUT 569842 001 8 AWAY AND SCRAPPED AND A NEW LUG (P/N ME416-0028-2206) WAS OBTAINED AND 569844 1 1 CLOSEOUT PANEL V070-338431-001 IN THE FWD COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO 569844 1 2 INTERFERENCE WITH NUTPLATE ON V070-338422-003 CLIP. THE FIBERGLASS PANEL 569844 1 3 WAS TRIMMED TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. TRIMMING WAS APPROVED BY STRESS 569844 1 4 ENGINEERING. THE CLOSEOUT PANEL WILL CONTINUE TO PERFORM PER DESIGN INTE 569844 1 5 NT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS PANEL IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 569844 1 6 INTERFERENCE WAS CAUSED BY STACK-UP TOLERANCES BASED ON THE INSTALLATION 569844 1 7 POSITIONING OF CLIP AND PANEL. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE B 569844 1 8 ASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS (CIL) RETENTION RAT 569844 1 9 IONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. CAUSE: STACK UP TOLERANCES. 569846 1 1 CLOSE OUT PANEL V070-338432-001 IN THE FWD COULD NOT BE INSTALLED DUE TO 569846 1 2 INTERFERENCE WITH NUTPLATE ON V070-338422-003 CLIP. THE FIBERGLASS PANE 569846 1 3 L WAS TRIMMED TO ELIMINATE INTERFERENCE. TRIMMING WAS APPROVED BY STRESS 569846 1 4 ENGINEERING. THE CLOSEOUT PANEL WILL CONTINUE TO PERFORM PER DESIGN INT 569846 1 5 ENT WITH A POSITIVE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THIS PANEL IS SECONDARY STRUCTURE. 569846 1 6 INTERFERENCE WAS CAUSED BY STACK UP TOLERANCES BASED ON THE INSTALLATIO 569846 1 7 N POSITIONING OF CLIP AND PANEL. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE 569846 1 8 BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) RETENTI 569846 1 9 ON OR HAZARD CONTROLS. CAUSE: STACK UP TOLERANCES. 569953 1 1 ORIGINAL DR DISCREPANCY (REF ITEM 001) REPORTED WIRE 1Y454B22 HAD A PIEC 569953 1 2 E OF KAPTON MISSING WHICH RESULTED IN EXPOSED SHIELD WITH NO BROKEN STRA 569953 1 3 NDS. AFTER THE DR DISPOSITION WAS PARTIALLY WORKED, CLOSER INSPECTION OF 569953 1 4 THE DISCREPANT AREA (STEP 4) REVEALED THAT THE SHIELD WAS INDEED DAMAGE 569953 1 5 D (REF ITEM 002). ENGINEERING STD REPAIR E.EL 101.7 WAS INVOKED TO REPAI 569953 1 6 R THE DAMAGED SHIELD JACKET AND AN MR ID "OEL-3-J2-0959" PLATE WAS ATTAC 569953 1 7 HED. THIS REPAIR IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: W 569953 1 8 ORKMANSHIP (ITEMS 001 AND 002). 569954 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: SHIELDED WIRE SEGMENT E317A26 HAD SHIELD DAMAGE, NO 569954 001 2 PRIMARY INSULATION/CONDUCTOR DAMAGE WAS FOUND AFTER CLOSE INSPECTION. 569954 001 3 ENGINEERING STD REPAIR E.EL 101.7 WAS INVOKED TO REPAIR THE DAMAGED SHIE 569954 001 4 LD. AN MR ID PLATE MARKED 'MR OEL-3-J2-0960' WAS ATTACHED ADJACENT TO T 569954 001 5 HE REPAIRED AREA. FUNCTIONAL TEST WILL BE PERFORMED PER TPS ECL-3-J2-41 569954 001 6 5 SEQ 3.68. COMPLETION OF FUNCTIONAL TEST IS NOT REQUIRED FOR CLOSE-OUT 569954 001 7 OF THIS PR. THIS REPAIR IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABL 569954 001 8 E CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 569955 1 1 THIS PR WAS GENERATED AFTER DIFFICULTY WAS ENCOUNTERED WHILE TRYING TO I 569955 1 2 NSTALL THE V073-340292-003 PINS (L/H & R/H) ON TECH ORDER M072-002002. T 569955 1 3 HE PINS WERE CHAMFERED AT THE END TO FACILITATE THE INSTALLATION BY MR U 569955 1 4 NRESTRICTED USE DISPOSITION. THE PINS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED PER PRINT. NO 569955 1 5 FURTHER DISCREPANCY EXISTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 569957 1 1 ITEM 001, TCS LINER WAS REMOVED TO GAIN ACCESS FOR REMOVAL OF THE DISCRE 569957 1 2 PANT CLIP FROM FRAME XO636 LH SIDE. THE CLIP WAS SHIPPED TO DOWNEY FOR F 569957 1 3 AILURE ANALYSIS. CLIP REMOVED FROM FRAME XO1040 WAS INSTALLED ON FRAME X 569957 1 4 O636. CLOSE OUT INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED, CLOSEOUT PHOTOS WERE TAKEN, TC 569957 1 5 S LINER WAS REPLACED. NEW CLIP WAS INSTALLED ON FRAME XO1040 RH SIDE. IT 569957 1 6 EM 002, MR ACTION EXCEPTED ELONGATED HOLES AS IS FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. T 569957 1 7 HE FUNCTION OF THE CLIPS IS TO ATTACH A PLATE NUT TO THE FRAME FOR CARGO 569957 1 8 BOLT INSTALLATION. THE ELONGATED HOLES WILL NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF 569957 1 9 THE CLIP. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINS 569957 1 10 POSITIVE. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGRG OVERSIGHT & WORKMANSHIP. 570003 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: CLARIFICATION WAS PROVIDED ON MATING CONNECTORS TO 570003 001 2 COLLINS TACAN #3. IT WAS DISCOVERED INSTALLATION OMI (#V5A03) HAD A WRO 570003 001 3 NG VENDOR CONNECTOR ID LISTED FOR TACAN #3. THE OMI WAS DEVIATED (TEMPO 570003 001 4 RARILY) TO MATE CONNECTORS FOR COLLINS TACAN #3 IN ACCORDANCE WITH G/N " 570003 001 5 LS". GENERAL NOTE "LS" STATES THE INTERCHANGEABILITY REQUIREMENTS OF TH 570003 001 6 E COLLINS & GOULD TACAN LRU'S FOR OV-103 AVIONICS BAY 3A. EOTF WAS RELE 570003 001 7 ASED (V070-778334 E01 REL 5/8/96) TO ADD G/N 'LS' FOR CONNECTOR 83P320 ( 570003 001 8 BAY 3A). PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY. 570014 1 1 THE WIRING DISCREPANCY FOR MID DECK BULKHEAD FLOODLIGHT #9 WAS CORRECTED 570014 1 2 BY REPINNING THE INVOLVED CABLE AT CONN 84P80 WITH AN EO TO FOLLOW RQMT 570014 1 3 . EO V828-778003-A06 WAS RELEASED DOCUMENTING THE REQ'D AWL CHANGES. INS 570014 1 4 TALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN D 570014 1 5 EFICIENCY. 570016 1 1 THE WIRING DISCREPANCY FOR MIDDECK BULKHEAD FLOODLIGHT #10 WAS CORRECTED 570016 1 2 BY REPINNING THE INVOLVED CABLE AT CONN 84P681 WITH AN EO TO FOLLOW RQM 570016 1 3 T. EO V828-778004-A07 WAS RELEASED DOCUMENTING THE REQUIRED AWL CHANGES. 570016 1 4 INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESI 570016 1 5 GN DEFICIENCY. 570440 1 1 LINE BLOCKS WERE FOUND TO BE PRIMED ONLY SHOULD HAVE TOP COAT. TOP COAT 570440 1 2 WAS APPLIED TO LINE BLOCKS PER EOTF DISPO. V828-643204 EO A01 AND V828-6 570440 1 3 43203 EO A02 WERE RELEASED AND REFLECT ACCOMPLISHED WORK. LINE BLOCKS WE 570440 1 4 RE IDENTIFIED WITH LATEST CONFIGURATION DASH NUMBER. M072-643401 EO C01 570440 1 5 WAS RELEASED TO UPDATE CONFIGURATIONS ON INSTALLATION TECH ORDER. NO FUR 570440 1 6 THER ACTION REQ'D ON THIS PR. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN OVERSIGHT. 570453 1 1 BRACKETS V070-368050-001 AND -002 COULD NOT BE INSTALLED PER INSTALLATIO 570453 1 2 N DWG V070-366997 DUE TO ACCESS. NO ACCESS WAS AVAILABLE TO INSTALL THE 570453 1 3 4 REQ'D MD121-0003-05 RIVETS (2 RIVETS PER BRACKET) DUE TO INSTALLATION 570453 1 4 OF EXISTING STRUCTURE. THE 4 EACH MD121-0003-05 RIVETS WERE REPLACED WIT 570453 1 5 H 4 EAC HME112-0013-05 HI-LOKS FOR BRACKET INSTALLATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: 570453 1 6 INSTALLATION SEQUENCING. 570454 1 1 DURING PANEL INSTALLATION IT WAS NOTED THAT GAPS EXISTED BETWEEN THE V82 570454 1 2 8-337902 CLOSEOUT PANEL AND SURROUNDING STRUCTURE AT TWO LOCATIONS. ADDI 570454 1 3 TIONAL MATERIAL WAS ADDED BY MR DISPO TO AUGMENT THE PANEL TO FILL THE E 570454 1 4 XISTING GAPS. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. ALL REWORK WAS ACCEPTED FOR UN 570454 1 5 RESTRICTED USE AND MR MARKING WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER MR DISPO. PROBABLE CA 570454 1 6 USE: TOLERANCE BUILD UP. 570456 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: NO PLANNING AND REWORK INFORMATION ON MOVING OR PLU 570456 001 2 GGING THE BRACKET AND ITS ATTACHING HOLES. THE V070-337827-002 BRACKET 570456 001 3 WAS RELOCATED 16.75 INCHES. PLUGGED (2) OUTBD HOLES USING MD121-0002-05 570456 001 4 XX RIVETS, AND (2 INBD HOLES WITH MD121-0003-05XX RIVETS FLUSH HEAD ON A 570456 001 5 FT SIDE. RIVETS INSTALLED PER MAO101-302 AND CORROSION PROTECTION PER M 570456 001 6 AO608-301 CODE 08-AA-21-XN. THE V070-337827-001 & -002 BRACKETS WERE IN 570456 001 7 STALLED USING HI-LIKS ME112-0013-0503 PINS AND ME114-0022-0105 COLLAR IN 570456 001 8 STALLED PER MAO101-301, CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301. THE V070-33 570456 001 9 7601 EO NO. H04 WAS RELEASED ON 5/6/96, VERIFIED BY R. LANGLEY (5/7/96). 570456 001 10 PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 570459 1 1 A .125 INCH DIA HOLE WAS DRILLED BY MR ACTION TO INSTALL A NAS1200-4-3 P 570459 1 2 ER MAO101-302. NO CORROSION PROTECTION WAS APPLIED TO THIS FASTENER BECA 570459 1 3 USE THE RIVET MATERIAL IS CRES. INCREASING THE SIZE OF THE RIVET DOES NO 570459 1 4 T DEGRADE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKM 570459 1 5 ANSHIP. 570460 1 1 SIX EACH HOLES COULD NOT BE DRILLED PER DWG LOCATIONS DUE TO INTERFERENC 570460 1 2 E WITH WEB RADIUS. TWO OF THE SIX HOLES WERE DRILLED WITH PILOT HOLES. A 570460 1 3 N EO WAS WRITTEN TO V070-334049 TO RELOCATE THE SIX HOLES AND TO PLUG TH 570460 1 4 E TWO OPEN HOLES. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: ENGINEERIN 570460 1 5 G OVERSIGHT. 570480 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS THAT WASHER WILL NOT INSTALL PROPERLY FOR CLOSE 570480 1 2 OUT PANEL V070-338431-001 INSTALLATION. EOTF DISPO WAS ADDED TO SPOT FAC 570480 1 3 E THE AREA TO .625 DIA AND CORROSION PROTECT. EO A01 TO DWG V070-337808 570480 1 4 WAS RELEASED 5-10-96 AND VERIFIED 5-13-96. NO FURTHER REWORK REQ'D. PROB 570480 1 5 ABLE CAUSE: DESIGN OVERSIGHT. 570481 1 1 THE SEAL IN THE GROVE IS COMPRESSED BELOW THE SURFACE. THE SEAL V070-331 570481 1 2 049-004 WAS REMOVED AND NEW SEAL OBTAINED. THE OCN NUMBER WAS RECORDED D 570481 1 3 URING REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION. THE NEW SEAL WAS CUT TO THE PROPER LENGT 570481 1 4 H AND THE ENDS BONDED TOGETHER PER MAO106-330 USING MBO120-085 ADH GRADE 570481 1 5 "B". THE SHORE "A" HARDNESS OF 55 MINIMUM WAS REQ'D AND THE APPLIED ADH 570481 1 6 ESIVE IS RECORDED AS 62. THE GROVE WAS INSPECTED WITH NO DAMAGE RECORDED 570481 1 7 . THE AREA WAS CLEANED WITH IPA AND WIPED DRY. PROBABLE CAUSE: HEAVY USA 570481 1 8 GE. SEAL INSTALLED. 570482 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS THAT WASHER WILL NOT INSTALL PROPERLY FOR CLOSE 570482 1 2 OUT PANEL V070-338432-001 INSTALLATION. EOTF DISPO WAS ADDED TO SPOT FAC 570482 1 3 E THE AREA TO .625 DIA AND CORROSION PROTECT. EO A01 TO DWG V070-337808 570482 1 4 WAS RELEASED 5-10-96 AND VERIFIED 5-13-96. NO FURTHER REWORK REQ'D. PROB 570482 1 5 ABLE CAUSE: DESIGN OVERSIGHT. 570681 1 1 ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS A DING 1.5 X 1.5 X 0.060 DEEP IN THE UPPER SKIN 570681 1 2 OF THE RH WING AT XO1120 X YO200. ULTRASONIC INSPECTION FOUND THE AREA 570681 1 3 DELAMINATED SO THE CORE WAS FILLED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE AND A 3" DOU 570681 1 4 BLER WAS BONDED USING MBO120-048 TYPE II ADHESIVE PER MR UNRESTRICTED DI 570681 1 5 SPOSITION. NO FURTHER REWORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: UNKNOWN CONTACT W 570681 1 6 ITH THE WING. 570705 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: DURING INSTALLATION OF V070-613225-003 ORIFICE, THE 570705 001 2 SINGLE MOUNTING RIVET FOR MD114-5004-0004 NUTPLATE CAME LOOSE THUS ALLO 570705 001 3 WING THE NUTPLATE TO DETACH FROM THE V070-613119 DIFFUSER ASSEMBLY. THE 570705 001 4 NUTPLATE MOUNTING LOCATION WAS INSTALLED ON THE V070-613119 DIFFUSER AS 570705 001 5 SEMBLY. INSTALLATION REQMTS ARE SATISFIED. PROBABLE CAUSE: INSUFFICIE 570705 001 6 NT INITIAL RIVET INSTALLATION. 570824 1 1 THE CONFORMAL COATING (MBO13-085 SILICONE RUBBER) ON GROUND POINTS 20E7, 570824 1 2 20E8, 20E9, 20E10, 20E11, 20E12, 20E13, 20E15, 20E16, 20E3, 20E5, 20E6, 570824 1 3 2020E17, WAS REPAIRED/REAPPLIED TO RETURN CONFIGURATION TO DWG RQMTS. R 570824 1 4 ESUBMITTAL VOIDED STEPS 19 THROUGH 22 WHICH WERE NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE TH 570824 1 5 E SAME SILICONE RUBBER MIX WAS USED ON 20E10, 20E11, 20E15, 20E16, 20E7, 570824 1 6 20E8, 20E9, 20E12, 20E13. RETEST WAS NOT REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORK 570824 1 7 MANSHIP. 570835 1 1 THE REPAIR OF CABLE 2J112B16 SEGMENT 2 USING SPLICE INSULATOR SLEEVE HAS 570835 1 2 RETURNED THE CABLE (DISCREPANT AREA) TO A CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULFI 570835 1 3 LL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. MR ID "MR OEL 570835 1 4 -3-J2-0967" WAS PLACED 6" TO 12" FROM THE NOTED DISCREPANCY FOR ID. REF 570835 1 5 PAGE 10 RESUBMITTAL: CONN 50J829 WAS INACCESSIBLE FOR STEP 31, DEMATE; S 570835 1 6 TEP 32, CONTINUITY, STEP 38, MATE. STEPS 41 THRU 47 WERE ADDED TO CHANGE 570835 1 7 TO ACCESSIBLE CONN 50P813 IN THE CIRCUIT. CONTINUITY, ISOLATION & HIGH 570835 1 8 POTENTIAL TEST WERE COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY. THIS MR ACTION DOES NOT INVA 570835 1 9 LIDATE THE BASIS FOR CERT AND DOES NOT IMPACT THE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (C 570835 1 10 IL) RETENSION RATIONALE OR HAZARD CONTROLS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 570843 1 1 PANEL WAS REIDENTIFIED TO A NEW NO DUE TO AN EO REWORKING PANEL INTO A N 570843 1 2 EW CONFIGURATION CHANGING THE BASIC -003 PANEL TO -005 PANEL. PROBABLE C 570843 1 3 AUSE: ENGR/PLANNING OVERSIGHT. 570986 1 1 SIX DENTS WERE FOUND IN THE DOOR FACESHEET. EACH DENT WAS MEASURED AND I 570986 1 2 NSPECTED FOR VOIDS AND FACESHEET CRACKS. BASED ON INSPECTION RESULTS THR 570986 1 3 EE OF THE DENTS WERE ACCEPTED AS IS PER MR. THE THREE REMAINING DENTS WE 570986 1 4 RE FOUND TO HAVE VOIDS BETWEEN FACESHEET AND CORE. THE VOIDS WERE INJECT 570986 1 5 ED WITH MBO120-008 ADHESIVE PER MAO106-305 AND DOUBLERS BONDED OVER THE 570986 1 6 DAMAGED AREA PER MAO106-301. ALL REWORK WAS ACCEPTED FOR UNRESTRICTED US 570986 1 7 E AND MR MARKING WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER MR DISPO. NO FURTHER ACTION REQ'D. 570986 1 8 PROBABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 571029 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: USING A 400 GRIT ABRASIVE MATERIAL THE AREA WAS CLE 571029 001 2 ANED THEN WIPED WITH IPA AND DRIED WITH LINT FREE MATERIAL. FINISHED WI 571029 001 3 TH TOP COAT PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-AA-20-XG NEAR SIDE. MARK REFERENCE D 571029 001 4 ESIGNATORS PER MAO104-301, CODE BL-08-NG-13 LOCATED IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT 571029 001 5 TO PART IN SUCH A POSITION AS TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM LEGIBILITY AND OVER COA 571029 001 6 TED WITH MBO125-057. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 571030 1 1 PANEL V070-332734-001 WAS REMOVED TO GAIN ACCESS TO 83P678 DURING TESTIN 571030 1 2 G. TESTING INDICATED HI-POT FAILURE ON WIRE CABLE 3E45A16 (PIN -1 TO GRO 571030 1 3 UND) WIRE HARNESS V070-778334-013 (WHICH IS PART OF THE CIRCUIT BETWEEN 571030 1 4 AVIONICS BAY 3A AND THE ECLSS INTERFACE). INSPECTION REVEALED DAMAGE TO 571030 1 5 WIRES 3E45A16-1 AND 3E45A16-2 IN 3 PLACES. DAMAGED WIRE CABLE 3E45A16 WA 571030 1 6 S REMOVED FROM CONNS 83P317 AND 83P678 AND REPLACED WITH A NEW CABLE - S 571030 1 7 AME ID. CONTINUITY AND HI-POT TESTING WAS PERFORMED ON THE REPLACEMENT W 571030 1 8 IRE CABLE AND MET ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA. CLOSEOUT PHOTO A96524J-8C WAS ROU 571030 1 9 TED TO ENGINEERING (BILL DEAN) FOR EVALUATION. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR & TE 571030 1 10 AR. 571145 1 1 LOOSE ITEMS INSIDE LRU WERE DISCOVERED TO BE DISLODGED CONN GROMMET SEAL 571145 1 2 PLUGS (REF ITEMS 001, 002, 003). REINSTALLATION OF THE PLUGS PER THE AB 571145 1 3 OVE DISPOSITION HAS RETURNED THE LRU TO DESIGN RQMTS. REPAIR IS ACCEPTAB 571145 1 4 LE FOR UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR AND TEAR. 571154 1 1 THE NOTED CONDITION EXISTED SINCE INITIAL BUILD. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO 571154 1 2 APPLY THE CONFORMAL COATING. WHAT COULD BE APPLIED WAS APPLIED. FURTHER 571154 1 3 ATTEMPTS WILL NOT ACCOMPLISH ANY USEFUL PURPOSE. THE INSTALLATION, EXIST 571154 1 4 ING TODAY, WILL CONTINUE TO FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: PLANN 571154 1 5 ING ERROR. 571155 1 1 THE NOTED CONDITION EXISTED SINCE INITIAL BUILD. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO 571155 1 2 APPLY THE CONFORMAL COATING. WHAT COULD BE APPLIED WAS APPLIED. FURTHER 571155 1 3 ATTEMPTS WILL NOT ACCOMPLISH ANY USEFUL PURPOSE. THE INSTALLATION, EXIST 571155 1 4 ING TODAY, WILL CONTINUE TO FULFILL DESIGN INTENT. PROBABLE CAUSE: PLANN 571155 1 5 ING ERROR. 571163 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS NUTPLATES CANNOT BE INSTAL 571163 001 2 LED DUE TO BRACKETS BEING MISLOCATED DURING INITIAL BUILD. THE NUTPLATE 571163 001 3 S WERE RELOCATED PER MR UNRESTRICTED DISPO AND DO NOT AFFECT THE WIRE CL 571163 001 4 AMP INSTALLATION. NO FURTHER REWORK REQUIRED. PROBABLE CAUSE: BRACKET 571163 001 5 S MISLOCATED AT INITIAL BUILD. 571213 1 1 THE SYSTEM FOR TRACKING CONN MATES AND DEMATES (SCAN) REQUIRES MAINTAINI 571213 1 2 NG CONFIGURATION AND RETEST STATUS. THE UNAUTHORIZED DEMATE OF CONNECTOR 571213 1 3 S 50V77W119P650/50V41MT25J1 INVALIDATES THE SCAN CONFIGURATION. THIS PR 571213 1 4 VERIFIED DEMATE, INSPECTED CONNECTORS 50V77W119P650 & 50V41MT25J1 AND UP 571213 1 5 DATED THE SCAN SYSTEM TO THE PROPER CONFIGURATION. FUNCTIONAL RETEST RQM 571213 1 6 TS WILL BE PERFORMED PER MPS-3-J2-293. CERT HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED. PROBA 571213 1 7 BLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP. 571305 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: THE DISCREPANT CONDITIONS FOR ITEMS 001 & 002 WERE 571305 001 2 ORIGINALLY DISPOSITIONED ON A 'DR' LEVEL OF EFFORT. HOWEVER, DURING THE 571305 001 3 REWORK, ITEMS 003, 004, 005 & 006 WERE INITIATED TO DOCUMENT THE FINDIN 571305 001 4 GS. THUS, THE 'DR' WAS UPGRADED TO A 'PR'. DURING THE REPAIR FOR ITEM 571305 001 5 004, THE WIRE (#T2161D24) WAS MISTANKENLY SEVERED. THEREFORE, ITEM 007 571305 001 6 WAS INITIATED, WHICH ALSO SUPERCEDED THE INITIAL ITEM004 SQUAWK AND ITS 571305 001 7 DISPOSITION (REF. STEP 53). REF. ITEMS 005 & 006: THE NOTED RADIAL CRAC 571305 001 8 KS ON WIRES E388A26 & E390A26 WERE FOUND TO BE WITHIN THE SPECIFICATIONS 571305 001 9 OF MLO303-0014, PARA. 6.3.2.8.1. THEREFORE, NO ADDITIONAL 571305 001 10 REWORK/REPAIR WAS REQUIRED. REF. ITEMS 003, 004 & 007: TO REPAIR THE 571305 001 11 NOTED WIRE DAMAGES FOR WIRE T844A26 (REF. ITEM 003) ESRD E. EL101.4 WAS 571305 001 12 INVOKED. UPON COMPLETION OF THIS REPAIR, THE DAMAGED SHIELD BRAIDS AND 571305 001 13 DAMAGED SECTION OF WIRE EXPOSING THE CONDUCTOR WERE REMOVED. 'MR' 571305 001 14 SPLICES KSC0747, KSC0748, KSC0749 & KSC0750, WERE UTILIZED TO RETURN 571305 001 15 THE CABLE TO A CONFIGURATION THAT FULFILLS DESIGN INTENT AND IS 571305 001 16 ACCEPTABLE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE. FUNCTIONAL TESTING PER ECL-3-J2-413, 571305 001 17 ATT #2, STEP 6, WILL SATISFY RETEST REQUIREMENTS. WHILE PERFORMING THE 571305 001 18 REPAIRS FOR ITEM 003, CABLE T2161D24 (REF. ITEM 004) WAS MISTAKENLY 571305 001 19 SEVERED FOR CABLE T844A26 AT THE NOTED DAMAGE AREA FOR T2161D24. ITEM 571305 001 20 007 WAS WRITTEN AND HENCEFORTH SUPERCEDED THE PREVIOUS ITEM 004 AND ITS 571305 001 21 DISPOSITION. TO REPAIR CABLE T2161D24, ESRD E. EL101.4 WAS INVOKED. 571305 001 22 "MR" SPLICES KSC0743 & KSC0744, WERE UTILIZED TO RETURN THE CABLE TO A 571305 001 23 CONFIGURATION THAT WILL FULLFILL DESIGN INTENT AND IS ACCEPTABLE FOR 571305 001 24 UNRESTRICTED USE. FUNCTIONAL TESTING PER ECL-3-J2-413, ATT #2, STEPS 5 571305 001 25 & 6, WILL SATISFY RETEST REQUIREMENTS. REF. ITEMS 001 & 002: UPON 571305 001 26 COMPLETION OF REPAIRS FOR ITEMS 003 & 007, THE UNDERSIZED CONVOLUTED 571305 001 27 TUBING (ITEM 001) WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH AN APPROPRIATE SIZE IN 571305 001 28 ACCORDANCE WITH MLO303-0014, PP 4.1.3.2.7. ALSO, THE CONVOLUTED TUBING 571305 001 29 WAS SPLICED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MLO303-0014, PP 4.1.3.2.7 & FIGURE 54A 571305 001 30 (ITEM 002). THIS RETURNED THE CONVOLUTED TUBING INSTALLATION TO 571305 001 31 DRAWING REQUIREMENTS. PROBABLE CAUSE: WORKMANSHIP (ITEMS 001, 002, 571305 001 32 003, 004 & 007) WEAR AND TEAR (ITEMS 005 & 006). 571345 1 1 THE SCRATCH ON THE KEEL LATCH ASSY HAS BEEN TOUCHED UP. TOP COAT OF PAIN 571345 1 2 T HAS BEEN APPLIED OVER THE SCRATCH PER MAO608-301. DESIGN INTENT RESTOR 571345 1 3 ED. CORROSION PROTECTION INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. PROBABLE CAUSE: WEAR A 571345 1 4 ND TEAR. 571488 1 1 ITEM 1.0 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION REFLECTS AN INSTALLATION MADE TO THE V070-7 571488 1 2 03125 EO A03. THIS EO IS EFFECTIVE AGAINST OV105 & SUBS. THE BASIC OV-10 571488 1 3 3 CONFIGURATION IS WITH AN MC409-0014-0004 MOUNT PER V070-703125 EO A02. 571488 1 4 REF PAGE 1A, ENGINEERING CONCURS THAT THE V070-703125 EO A07 DOES, IN F 571488 1 5 ACT, PROVIDE ALL REQ'D INFORMATION FOR THE INTERCHANGEABILITY OF THE COL 571488 1 6 LINS TACAN WITH THE GOULD TACAN. ENGINEERING COULD/SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE 571488 1 7 INFORMATIVE IN THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION FURNISHED. PROBABLE CAUSE: NO N 571488 1 8 ONCONFORMANCE. 571489 1 1 NOTED HARNESS IS SUPPLIED BY AN OUTSIDE CONTRACTOR, COLLINS RADIO, AND A 571489 1 2 S SUCH THE NOTED MLO303-0015 DOCUMENT IS NOT APPLICABLE. (THIS SPECIFICA 571489 1 3 TION APPLIES ONLY TO IN HOUSE ROCKWELL BUILT HARDWARE). THE RQMT INVOKED 571489 1 4 ON MOST OF THESE SUPPLIERS IS THAT THEY PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL I 571489 1 5 N THE CONN ASSY. THE ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE APPLI 571489 1 6 CATION OF SEALING PLUGS (DOG BONES) INTO THE REAR OF THE CONN OR THE INS 571489 1 7 ERTION OF PINS INTO THE UNUSED CONTACT LOCATION. EITHER WAY WILL PROVIDE 571489 1 8 THE REQ'D SEALING. AS AN ADDED NOTE, A SEALING PLUG CANNOT BE INSTALLED 571489 1 9 INTO A CONN THAT HAS UNWIRED CONTACTS IN IT, THEY PHYSICALLY WILL NOT IN 571489 1 10 STALL AND IN FACT CAN CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE CONN GROMMET. CAUSE: NO NONCON 571489 1 11 FORMANCE. 571490 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: THE UPPER FORWARD ECLSS BAY CONTAINED FLUID LINES I 571490 001 2 N THE AREA PREVIOUSLY DEDICATED TO A WIRE HARNESS INSTALLATION. THE CLA 571490 001 3 MPING/ROUTING SCHEME IN THE AREA WAS REVISED, WITH AN EO-TO-FOLLOW REQUI 571490 001 4 REMENT, TO ALLOW THE INVOLVED HARNESSES TO BE PROPERLY RESTRAINED WITHOU 571490 001 5 T INTERFERENCE FROM NEARBY HARDWARE (REF ITEM 001). THIS INSTALLATION A 571490 001 6 LSO ALLOWS ALL CONNECTORS TO REACH THEIR MATING COMPONENTS (REF ITEM 002 571490 001 7 ). EO M072-783601-B05 WAS ISSUED REVISING THE F/D TO REFLECT THE NEW CL 571490 001 8 AMPING/ROUTING CONFIGURATION AND REVISING THE P/L TO REFLECT THE CORRECT 571490 001 9 HARDWARE COMPONENTS INSTALLED. INSTALLATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR 571490 001 10 UNRESTRICTED USAGE. PROBABLE CAUSE: DESIGN DEFICIENCY. 571491 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS THAT HOLES ON V828-338433- 571491 001 2 001 DRILLED AT DETAIL LEVEL DO NOT ALIGN WITH HOLES IN STRUCTURE. MR UN 571491 001 3 RESTRICTED DISPOSITION WAS ADDED TO PLUG THE HOLES WITH ADHESIVE AND MAT 571491 001 4 CH DRILL. PANEL WAS MR IDENTIFIED. NO FURTHER REWORK IS REQUIRED. PRO 571491 001 5 BABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE STACK-UP. 571492 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: ITEM 1, PAGE 1 DOCUMENTS THAT HOLES ON V828-338433- 571492 001 2 002 PANEL DRILLED AT DETAIL LEVEL DO NOT ALIGN WITH HOLES IN STRUCTURE. 571492 001 3 MR UNRESTRICTED DISPOSITION WAS ADDED TO PLUG THE HOLES WITH ADHESIVE A 571492 001 4 ND MATCH DRILL. AFTER MATCH DRILLING A GAP OF .200 EXISTED AND S/B .100 571492 001 5 +/- 0.30 PER PRINT (ITEM 2, PAGE 1A). MR UNRESTRICTED DISPOSITION WAS 571492 001 6 ADDED TO PERFORM A FIBERGLASS REPAIR AND MATCH DRILL PANEL TO MEET DWG R 571492 001 7 EQUIREMENTS. PANEL WAS MR IDENTIFIED. NO FURTHER REQORK IS REQUIRED. 571492 001 8 PROBABLE CAUSE: TOLERANCE STACK-UP. 571494 1 1 ITEM 001, RIBS ON LOWER EDGE OF PANEL ARE RIDING ON THE WIRE TRAY. THE R 571494 1 2 IBS WERE ORIGINALLY DISPOSITIONED TO BE TRIMMED BY EO WITH CORROSION PRO 571494 1 3 TECTION BUT LATER IT WAS DONE BY MR ACTION TO BE AN OVERSIGHT. THIS TRIM 571494 1 4 AND FIT WAS DONE BY MR ACTION TO REPAIR THE AREA WITH AN MR-003 AND MR- 571494 1 5 004 DOUBLER AFTER IT WAS TRIMMED IN EXCESS. THE EDGE OF THE RIBS WERE TR 571494 1 6 IMMED .25 X .25 INCHES, CORROSION PROTECTION PER MAO608-301. THE DOUBLER 571494 1 7 S WERE BONDED PER MAO106-301 USING MBO120-053 TYPE III ADHESIVE AND MBO1 571494 1 8 20-078 PRIMER. THE LAP SHEAR IS RECORDED ON TEST REPORT NO P96-411. ITEM 571494 1 9 002, THERE ARE 7 1/4 DIA AND 10 3/16 DIA OPEN HOLES. THESE OPEN HOLES 571494 1 10 WERE PLUGGED AS FOLLOWS, 7 3/16 DIA HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH 571494 1 11 MD121-0001-06XX AND FLUSHED PER MAO101-302. CORROSION PROTECTED PER 571494 1 12 MAO608-301. THE 7 OPEN 1/4 HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH AN ALUMINUM DOUBLERS 571494 1 13 AND BONDED IN PLACE WITH MBO120-079 ADHESIVE PER MAO106-336. THE SHORE 571494 1 14 "D" HARDNESS RECORDED 74 MIN IS 70. ONE HOLE WHICH WAS BREAKING OUT AT 571494 1 15 THE EDGE WAS ROUNDED OFF AND THE TWO OTHERS WERE FILLED WITH ADHESIVES. 571494 1 16 THE EO TO FOLLOW WAS RELEASED ON V070-338551 EO A02 (6-7-96) AND 571494 1 17 VR70-338551 A02 (6-10-96) EO WAS VERIFIED THAT IT WAS RELEASED BY R. 571494 1 18 HOLUB ON 6-11-96. ITEM 003 AND 004, A GAP EXISTED BETWEEN THE COVER AND 571494 1 19 STRUCTURE BECAUSE THE WIRE TRAY 1A IS AFT .14 INCHES AND WIRE TRAY 1 IS 571494 1 20 .08 INCHES FWD. FABRICATED MR -001 AND -002 (BAG AND TAG) WHICH IS 571494 1 21 BONDED TO THE AFT SIDE OF THE COVER PER MAO106-336. THE CURED RECORDED 571494 1 22 HARDNESS IS 74 AND MIN WAS 70. THE AREA WAS CORROSION PROTECTED PER 571494 1 23 MAO608-301. THEN THE HOLES ON THE PANELS WERE DRILLED TO MATCH COVER. 571494 1 24 INSALLED ME128-0037-0004 RETAINING RING PER MAO101-308. AREA WAS 571494 1 25 IDENTIFIED WITH THIS MR NUMBER. PROBABLE CAUSE: MISLOCATED WIRE TRAY 571494 1 26 AND ENGINEERING OVERSIGHT. 571495 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: THE INTERFERRING 'TAPE RESTRAINTED' WIRE BUNDLES (R 571495 001 2 EF. W217 & W429 HARNESSES) WERE 'SLIGHTLY' REPOSITIONED AS DEPICTED ON A 571495 001 3 TTACHMENTS 'A', 'B' & 'C' AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH M072-784633 INSTALLATIO 571495 001 4 N G/NS. THIS PERMITTED THE INSTALLATION OF THE REQUIRED BLANKETS TIE DO 571495 001 5 WNS & STUDS TO PROCEED PER TPS 'TCS-3-J2-207'. THERE IS NO IMPACT TO TH 571495 001 6 E TECH ORDER INSTALLATION DRAWING, M072-784633. PROBABLE CAUSE: TAPE R 571495 001 7 ESTRAINTED WIRE RUNS ARE APPROXIMATE. 571619 1 1 ONE FASTENER COULD NOT BE INSTALLED ON V070-397028 CARRIER PANEL BECAUSE 571619 1 2 OF DAMAGED NUTPLATE. THE DAMAGED NUTPLATE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED PER 571619 1 3 PR DISPO. RETURN TO PRINT CONFIGURATION. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. PRO 571619 1 4 BABLE CAUSE: OPERATIONAL DEGRADATION. 571621 1 1 AN MD128-0009-0001 WAS STATED AS INTERFERING WITH A 14170-70C3512-1 BRAC 571621 1 2 KET BEING INSTALLED FOR TANKSET 5. THE MD128-0009-0001 IS TO BE INSTALLE 571621 1 3 D ON -001, NOT ON -008 USED FOR OV-103. PROBABLE CAUSE: SHOP OVERSIGHT. 571628 001 1 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: THE CLOSEOUT PANEL CRACKED AND DEBONDED. THE CRACK 571628 001 2 WAS STOPPED DRILLED USING A #40 BIT. PAINT IN THE AREA OF THE DISCREPA 571628 001 3 NCE WAS REMOVED AND BONDED PER MAO106-336 USING MBO120-079 ADHESIVE TYPE 571628 001 4 II GRADE B. TWO PIECES OF FABRIC GLASS WAS IMPREGNATED TO COVER THE DI 571628 001 5 SCREPANCY. THE BONDED REPAIR WAS CURED TO A SHORE 'D' HARDNESS OF 75 MI 571628 001 6 NIMUM REQUIRED IS 70. THE HOLES WERE REDRILLED TO .257 DIAMETER THEN SU 571628 001 7 RFACE FINISH PER MAO608-301 CODE 00-AA-21-XW. MR IDENTIFICATION WAS DON 571628 001 8 E OUT OF SIGHT OF CREW PER THIS MR NUMBER. PROBABLE CAUSE: EXCESSIVE 571628 001 9 WEAR AND TEAR. 571639 1 1 THE MISSING ENGINEERING REQUIRED TO INSTALL THE REQUIRED WIRE RUN(S) AND 571639 1 2 TRANSFORMERS TO AGREE WITH THE REVISED STRUCTURE WAS RELEASED AND TE WI 571639 1 3 RING/TRANSFORMERS WAS INSTALLED PER DWG. PROBABLE CAUSE: MISSING ENGINEE 571639 1 4 RING. 571689 1 1 ITEM 001: V070-793940-002 PANEL ASSY WAS REMOVED TO ALLOW ACCESS FOR REW 571689 1 2 ORK. ONE 1/4 DIA HOLE AT ZO404.65 & ZO385 WAS PLUGGED WITH MD121-0001-06 571689 1 3 XX RIVET FLUSH BOTH SIDES AND CORROSION PROTECTED PER MAO608-301 CODE 08 571689 1 4 -AA-21-XN PER REWORK EO. TWO .098 DIA HOLES AT ZO404.65 & ZO385 WERE PLU 571689 1 5 GGED WITH MD121-0001-03XX RIVETS FLUSH BOTH SIDES AND CORROSION PROTECTE 571689 1 6 D PER MAO608-301 CODE 08-AA-21-XN PER RWK EO. ITEM 002: EOTF ONE 1/4 DIA 571689 1 7 HOLE AT ZO3994 WAS PLUGGED WITH MD121-0001-06XX RIVET AND (2) .098 DIA 571689 1 8 HOLES WERE PLUGGED WITH MD121-0001-03XX RIVETS FLUSH BOTH SIDES AND CORR 571689 1 9 OSION PROTECTS PER MAO608-301 CODE 08-AA-21-XN. VR70-334802-003 DOUBLER 571689 1 10 WAS COLD BONDED AT ZO385 PER MAO106-905 GRADE A USING MBO120-008 571689 1 11 ADHESIVE. REWORK EO WA